



Monday, 3 April 1961,
at 11.5 a.m.

New York

C O N T E N T S

	Page
Agenda item 45:	
Question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi (<i>continued</i>)	
Hearing of petitioners (<i>continued</i>).....	185

Chairman: Mr. Adnan M. PACHACHI (Iraq).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Ortiz de Rozas (Argentina), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 45

Question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi (A/4689-A/4692, A/4694, A/4706 and Add.1, A/C.4/471, A/C.4/476) (*continued*)

HEARING OF PETITIONERS (*continued*)

At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Germain Gasingwa and Mr. Aloys Munyangaju, representatives of the Association pour la promotion sociale de la masse (APROSOMA), Mr. Nelson Rwagasore, representative of the Mouvement pour la réconciliation nationale au Rwanda, Mr. Fidèle Nkundabagenzi, representative of the Parti du mouvement de l'émancipation hutu (PARMEHUTU), Mr. Prosper Bwanakweri, representative of the Rassemblement démocratique ruandais (RADER), Mr. Côme Rebero, Mr. Joseph Rutsindintwarane and Mr. Michel Rwagasana, representatives of the Union nationale ruandaise (UNAR), and Mr. Alexandre Rutera, representing the Mwami Kigeli V, took places at the Committee table.

1. Mr. BOEG (Denmark) said that he wished first of all to raise the problem of national reconciliation. Since the solution of that problem in Ruanda-Urundi might perhaps lead to a solution of all the other questions he had been particularly interested in Mr. Rwagasore's statement (1124th meeting). That was especially true because that petitioner represented a party which had been founded quite recently with national reconciliation as its main objective. He asked Mr. Rwagasore when the party had been established, how many persons belonged to it and how the members were recruited. As Mr. Rwagasore had stated that he had previously been Chairman of UNAR, he might be able to explain whether the new party included other Ruandese political leaders among its members.

2. Mr. RWAGASORE (Mouvement pour la réconciliation nationale au Rwanda) recalled that after the adoption of resolutions 1579 (XV) and 1580 (XV) by the General Assembly and after the Kisenyi and Ostend talks, tension had arisen in Ruanda between the supporters of the General Assembly's resolutions and those who considered that those resolutions involved an infringement of their rights. He had then thought it advisable to form a reconciliation party uniting the Hutu and the Tutsi, and perhaps also the

followers of two basic trends represented by the APROSOMA and PARMEHUTU parties, on the one hand, and by the UNAR and RADER parties, on the other. The new party included, particularly in its executive committee, some former members of UNAR and RADER, and also of the Union des masses ruandaises (UMAR), a smaller party. The Vice-Chairman of the new party was a Hutu.

3. Mr. BOEG (Denmark) pointed out that Mr. Rwagasana had stated at the 1117th meeting that he was the spokesman for the nationalist movement in the Territory of Ruanda-Urundi. As that might give the impression that the Hutu parties were not nationalist parties, he asked the representative of UNAR to define his party's conception of nationalism.

4. Mr. RWAGASANA (Union nationale ruandaise) recalled that he had stated on several occasions at meetings of the Fourth Committee and the Trusteeship Council that UNAR was not a tribal party, but included a Hutu majority and a Tutsi minority. The executive committee had a Hutu majority. It could therefore not be said that UNAR was either a Hutu or a Tutsi party. In that sense, the Hutu members were just as nationalist as the Tutsi members, the nationalist parties of the Territory being UNAR and UPRONA.

5. Mr. BOEG (Denmark) asked the UNAR representatives whether they were in principle favourable to a national reconciliation, irrespective of the means by which it might be achieved or the practical difficulties that might be encountered.

6. Mr. RWAGASANA (Union nationale ruandaise) said that the executive committee of UNAR had already raised that question with the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1960, when they had requested the Mission to arrange a conference of all the political leaders. Unfortunately, although UNAR had not ceased to advocate understanding among the parties since that time, attempts at reconciliation had always been sabotaged by the Administering Authority.

7. Mr. BOEG (Denmark) said that he now considered it an established fact that UNAR was in favour of national reconciliation but wanted to know whether that party was also willing to make certain concessions. Although, as the representative of India had pointed out, a minority party generally was not in a position to make concessions, those could apply to what a minority party demanded from the majority parties. He did not want to suggest that UNAR and RADER were making excessive demands, but, quoting paragraph 38 of the interim report of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi (A/4706 and Add.1), he asked the representatives of those parties what representation would have been numerically sufficient for them at the Kisenyi talks and what objective data constituted the basis for their claims.

8. Mr. RWAGASANA (Union nationale ruandaise) stated that he had already protested to the Commission against the insufficiency of his party's representation at the Kisenyi talks. Even if it were accepted that UNAR should be represented by its leaders at meetings of that kind, there would be no basis for deciding in advance which of the existing parties had the majority so long as free, democratic elections had not been held, because no faith could be placed in the results of the communal elections. At a conference for national reconciliation the four main parties ought to be represented on an equal footing by persons appointed by the parties themselves. Since that had never been the case and since efforts had been made to have UNAR represented by persons appointed in advance, all attempts at conciliation had hitherto failed.

9. Mr. RWAGASORE (Mouvement pour la reconciliation nationale au Rwanda) pointed out that the Kisenyi talks, at which he had represented UNAR, had been intended to have a regional and advisory character because of the fact that the parties were to study draft orders relating to the legislative elections and the institutions necessary for self-government, as well as the possibility of national reconciliation. UNAR and RADER had requested that the four large parties and all the other smaller parties attending that conference should have equal representation, which would be determined on an ethnic basis and hence obviously have led to a Hutu majority.

10. Mr. BOEG (Denmark) observed that UNAR had not taken part in the communal elections nor in the Conference that had been held at Brussels in the summer of 1960, and that it had also withdrawn from the Provisional Special Council. He was anxious to know whether that attitude did not involve a risk of making national reconciliation more difficult.

11. Mr. RWAGASANA (Union nationale ruandaise) replied that his party had only acted in self-defence. At the time of the communal elections, which had followed the disturbances of November 1959, more than 4,000 members of UNAR, including its Chairman, had been imprisoned, and the executive committee had been in exile. The United Nations Visiting Mission had recommended the holding of a round-table conference at Brussels before the date of the communal elections. At its twenty-sixth session, the Trusteeship Council had made that recommendation its own after he himself had appeared before it as a petitioner, but Belgium had ignored its conclusions.

12. At the Brussels talks, held in pursuance of the Trusteeship Council's recommendations, UNAR would have been glad to take part if it had been invited, but only those members of the Provisional Special Council who had also belonged to PARMEHUTU had been invited to attend.

13. For the Ostend Conference, which had been organized in response to the General Assembly's recommendations, UNAR would have liked to send representatives who, incidentally, had already been at Lille, but the Chairman of the Conference had not even replied to them. It had been evident that neither the Administering Authority nor the parties favoured by the Administering Authority had wanted UNAR to participate in the political life of the country, from which it had been excluded in advance.

14. Mr. BOEG (Denmark) observed that the representatives of the Hutu parties had expressed their

desire for a national reconciliation and had accepted the principle that the participation of the United Nations as a third party might exert a favourable influence. They had, however, considered that such participation was not necessary for the time being and that it should not be difficult to organize a meeting between the parties. Nevertheless, it seemed that, so far, nothing had been done along those lines. He wondered whether the Hutu parties thought that, without the intervention of the Visiting Mission, it would have been possible, for instance, to publish the joint *communiqué* of the Ruandese political parties on 14 March 1960 (T/1538, annex IV).

15. Mr. MUNYANGAJU (Association pour la promotion sociale de la masse) said that he had in fact stated that direct intervention by the United Nations was not necessary until the political parties had met. He had not, however, suggested the exclusion of all United Nations action, since he was anxious that the Commission for Ruanda-Urundi should participate in a conference called to put an end to fratricidal strife and should closely follow the progress of that conference. He was pleased to note that the representative of UNAR accepted the principle of national reconciliation, particularly as certain earlier statements had caused him to fear a civil war. He nevertheless thought it essential to know exactly what UNAR meant by equality between the parties, because the existence of a majority and a minority was a fact that could not be denied. For instance, APROSOMA had not as many affiliated members as PARMEHUTU and would agree that the latter party should have more representatives than itself at a conference. Nor was there any justification for asking that all small parties, whether or not already in existence, should be represented. While the popular parties were pleased that the process of reconciliation might at last be initiated, they were anxious that the problems should be stated clearly. The reasons given by UNAR for its abstention did not seem to be valid. By insisting on being represented by its delegates who were outside the country, that party had automatically excluded all its members who had remained in the Territory and who would have liked to work towards an understanding with the other parties. If UNAR had now modified its attitude, there might be some possibility of making progress.

16. Mr. BOEG (Denmark) recalled that at the 1121st meeting the representative of India had spoken of the different attitudes of delegations with regard to General Assembly resolution 1579 (XV), naming those which had voted in favour of the resolution and, in response to a request from the representative of Ireland, those who had abstained. The picture was, however, incomplete, since six countries including Denmark had submitted amendments (A/C.4/L.670) which had been rejected. He would like to know the opinion of the Hutu parties on those amendments and particularly the amendment suggesting that the words "full and unconditional" should be replaced by the words "wide and effective".

17. Mr. NKUNDABAGENZI (Parti du mouvement de l'émancipation hutu) said that he would willingly state how his party would have liked the resolution to be worded, for it had taken the view that in the light of the special circumstances prevailing in Ruanda when the resolution had been adopted, the measures of full and unconditional amnesty that had been recommended had been scarcely practicable. The popular parties did not object to an amnesty on condition that the methods

for applying it had been worked out beforehand so as to ensure that the return of political offenders did not serve to aggravate the internal political situation. That was why PARMEHUTU would have liked a resolution couched in more general and flexible terms. The question was still relevant. If practical amnesty measures could be decided upon at a conference in which the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi would take part, it might be possible to reach a solution meeting the wishes of all parties.

18. Mr. BOEG (Denmark) was under the impression that the political offenders included persons who were guilty of serious crimes such as arson or murder. UNAR, however, was calling for a full and unconditional amnesty. He asked whether in the opinion of that party the term "political prisoners" applied not only to persons imprisoned for their political ideas but also to those who had committed crimes for political motives, and whether that party believed that the immediate and unconditional release of such prisoners would not increase tension in the Territory.

19. Mr. RWAGASANA (Union nationale ruandaise) stated that his party was grateful to the Fourth Committee for having realized the importance of that point and for having urged a full and unconditional amnesty, because the Administering Authority would have paid no attention to a less categorical recommendation. Since in any event it had not yet granted even a partial amnesty, it was clearly making no effort to release prisoners such as the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of UNAR. He continued to be astonished that in the wake of the disturbances of November 1959, during which there had been aggressors and victims on both sides, those who had not started the disturbances had been arrested for defending themselves. The proper course would have been either to imprison the leaders of both parties or else to release them all. UNAR attached great importance to the question and hoped that the Administering Authority would adopt adequate measures to solve it.

20. Mr. BOEG (Denmark) asked Mr. Rwagasore what he had meant by "negotiated" amnesty in his statement at the 1124th meeting.

21. Mr. RWAGASORE (Mouvement pour la réconciliation nationale au Rwanda) said that he would like an amnesty to be granted because he had brothers and friends who had been arrested, but he certainly would not want them to be massacred a few days after their release. It was essential therefore that parties should negotiate. Since they were all in agreement in principle, the question of methods would present no difficulty if it was generally understood that the amnesty was necessary and would be for the benefit of the whole population. Some wished the amnesty to be unconditional, and others not. What was really at issue was two parties that were dissatisfied either because they had lost power or because, having just acquired power, they intended to retain it. In order to reconcile them, a compromise must be sought which would take into account the claims of both.

22. Mr. BOEG (Denmark):¹ I come now to my last question. Among the several amendments to which I referred a while ago was an amendment on the very crucial question of elections and the timing of the elec-

tions mentioned in paragraph 7 of resolution 1579 (XV). We all know what that paragraph recommended. If the amendment had been accepted, the paragraph would have recommended that the elections be postponed until a date to be decided by a round-table conference in consultation with the United Nations Commission, and at the round-table conference would be representatives of all the political parties in the Territory. The Hutu parties have not left us in any doubt that they were not satisfied with that recommendation as it now stands, and they have even made it clear to us that the later and dramatic events in the Territory were a consequence of this particular resolution. Against that background, it is of great importance to my delegation to have the views of the Hutu representatives in this respect, and to learn from them whether it would satisfy their side if the timing of the elections were to be decided in the manner I have just mentioned, that is to say, by a round-table conference in consultation with the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi. That is my last question.

23. Mr. NKUNDABAGENZI (Parti du mouvement de l'émancipation hutu) (*translated from French*): The question is of capital importance, because the consent of our two parties—PARMEHUTU and APROSOMA—to the elections was one of the concessions which we made immediately and without any acrimony. We could perhaps have clung to the present situation and said that there was already a Government in being as the result of second-stage elections. To have done so would have been satisfactory for us and it was, in fact, our position at the beginning. But we considered that it was in the interest of reconciliation to agree to the holding of other elections. What we said nothing about was the actual date of such elections. The representative of India, quoting the words used in the Commission's report, said that the elections should be held within a reasonable period. That was our attitude, and it remains our attitude today. But we are also of the opinion that the date on which the elections shall take place, within that reasonable period, should be decided at a conference which would prepare the implementation of any recommendations which this Assembly may make.

24. The important thing, to our minds, is first of all to clear up the situation, to get the parties to agree to carry out any recommendations made. Recommendations can be adopted, but we feel that they can be of no use until the different political parties undertake, in full knowledge of the facts and by common agreement, to carry them out. That is why we have considered from the beginning that an extraordinary conference would be essential. At such a conference, every political party would be heard and would indicate how it considered that any particular recommendation in the various resolutions should be given effect. Agreement would be reached on ways and means for both the elections and the amnesty; and means would be sought for safeguarding the internal security of the country on the release of a good number of political prisoners. Agreement would even be reached on the establishment of priorities, since the penal situation is not the same for all political prisoners. Even the problem of the Mwami would be discussed—and this, too, is a concession which we have agreed to. Thus, all these problems should be thrashed out at an extraordinary conference, which should lead to a national pact, the terms of which would then be respected by all the participants signing it. That was and still is our point of view.

¹ The Committee decided, on the proposal of the representative of India, and in accordance with its decision at the 1117th meeting, that the text of the statements in paragraphs 22 to 31 below should be reproduced in full.

25. Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea) (*translated from French*): My delegation has asked to speak in order to request some explanation. We put our name down with a view to asking a number of questions, but we are foregoing that as we consider that it has now become somewhat unnecessary. We can see certain manoeuvres beginning to take shape; and that is why we should like to ask the representative of Denmark to clarify one point.

26. The question which the representative of Denmark put to PARMEHUTU a moment ago seemed to imply that it is in fact PARMEHUTU which must decide on the amnesty—which incidentally implies that it may be that party which is responsible for the imprisonment of the detainees. Following that question—which in our opinion is one solely for the Administering Authority—the representative of Denmark made some comments and referred to certain amendments which, he said, had been rejected by the General Assembly. We have the impression that an attempt is now being made to call into question a resolution which was adopted by the General Assembly. The attempt to call into question that resolution is being made by implying that the General Assembly was in fact wrong to adopt it and that those who are defying it—PARMEHUTU, those who carried out the *coup d'état* in Ruanda and the Administering Authority—are right. They are right because Denmark and other countries—including all the colonialist Powers—were themselves right to submit amendments which would have made it possible to resolve the problem in wiser fashion. We reject that interpretation. We should therefore like to ask the representative of Denmark if he considers that the resolution adopted by the General Assembly during the first part of the session is still valid, or if he wants to declare it null and void. That is the first explanation we are asking for.

27. I repeat that so far as we are concerned, there can be no question of calling into question and criticizing once again a resolution which was adopted by the General Assembly by a very respectable majority and with the support of all the countries which have always fought against the colonial system here. If an attempt is being made to reopen the question of this resolution, we should like to hear some explanation of the reasons.

28. As regards the amnesty to be granted to the political detainees, it seems clear to us that not all the criminals are in prison. If all the criminals were to be put in prison, we are convinced that several officials of the Administering Authority would find themselves incarcerated.

29. We know that if reconciliation is to be brought about in a colony, it can only be based on one valid criterion: unconditional amnesty. For as soon as specific conditions are laid down, there is a danger of discrimination. It is clear that those whom the Administering Authority does not want to see exercising political power will for certain dark reasons never be amnestied.

30. I should therefore be grateful if the representative of Denmark would tell us if he intends to say here that the General Assembly's resolution is null and void and if he will justify the attitude of those who have opposed implementing the resolutions.

31. Mr. BOEG (Denmark): I am not too sure whether, under our rules of procedure, this is the time for delegations to engage in question and answer, but if it is acceptable to the Chairman, I am quite prepared

to give immediately a brief reply to the representative of Guinea, since I understood him to be much interested in a clarification from my delegation at this intermediate stage. If I can understand him correctly, his question was whether my delegation considered General Assembly resolution 1579 (XV) as null and void. I would hope that it would go without saying that that is not the case. The resolution was adopted by a majority which has been mentioned before and which we all know about but, if I may make one additional point by way of clarification, the situation as my delegation sees it is the following. The General Assembly has adopted a resolution which has met with some criticism from some of the petitioners, and in that connexion several delegations have put a great many lengthy questions—questions which in some cases have been repeated by more than one delegation—to the petitioners with a view to getting information from them relating to their views on the resolution. For that reason, my delegation felt that it would be of some interest and relevance—at least it seemed relevant to my delegation, in view of the fact, which we cannot dispute, whether we agree with it or not, that the Hutu parties have put a certain evaluation on the resolution—also to obtain their views on other proposals which were made at the same time. That, of course, has nothing to do with the resolution as a whole. It was for that reason that my delegation felt free to pick out one or two of the proposed amendments and ask the Hutu parties for their views upon them. I hope very much that this explanation will satisfy the representative of Guinea and that he now fully understands our position.

32. Mr. RASGOTRA (India) pointed out that the views expressed by Mr. Nkundabagenzi were exactly the same as those of the sponsors of resolution 1579 (XV), namely, that there were no essential differences between the Ruandese parties.

33. Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea) thanked the representative of Denmark for his reply, which he duly noted. He pointed out, however, that the second aspect of his question had been skilfully evaded by Mr. Boeg. There was more at issue than the criticisms which the petitioners had levelled at resolution 1579 (XV); there had also been certain irrevocable happenings and in particular a *coup d'état* at Gitarama. He wondered whether the representative of Denmark was seeking to justify those who, having decided that the General Assembly resolution did not suit them, had tried to defy the United Nations and had created obstacles to the implementation of General Assembly resolutions.

34. Mr. NEKLESSA (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) informed the Committee that in view of the nearness of the closing date of the General Assembly and in order to accelerate the work of the Committee, his delegation would not question the petitioners.

35. The CHAIRMAN took note of that statement.

36. Mr. CARPIO (Philippines) asked Mr. Rebero to give examples of what he meant by his statement at the previous meeting to the effect that Belgium was trying to create the same situation in Ruanda-Urundi as in the Congo.

37. Mr. REBERO (Union nationale ruandaise) said that a few days after Belgium had granted full independence to the Congo, there had been an outburst of hatred there and rifts had appeared that had not been closed. In Ruanda, after November 1959 there had suddenly been bloodshed among the three tribes that had lived in peace for centuries. UNAR had produced

abundant evidence to prove that the Belgian Government was instigating the disturbances and fomenting hatred, that it was responsible for the massacres and was pursuing a policy of driving a wedge between Ruanda and Urundi.

38. Mr. CARPIO (Philippines) felt that the difficulties which the United Nations had encountered in the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, and also in other territories, stemmed from the fact that the national emancipation movements had brought forth new leaders, many of them tribal chiefs, who were struggling for power and trying to dominate their country. Many delegations had expressed their concern at the thought that, whatever decision was taken, the situation now existing in the Congo might be repeated in Ruanda-Urundi. The Territory, consisting of three tribes, made up two separate realms; furthermore, the Mwami of Ruanda was living in exile and public opinion in Ruanda was sharply divided on the question of his return. That being so the Philippine delegation would like to know how the representatives of the opposing factions, assuming that they had sufficient authority to solve the question of Ruanda-Urundi, would go about settling the different problems now pending so that Ruanda-Urundi could achieve independence smoothly.

39. Mr. MUNYANGAJU (Association pour la promotion sociale de la masse) said that, in the view of his party, Ruanda-Urundi should be a united, even though composite, State. That meant that the problem of the Bami must be solved. But each Mwami wanted to be paramount in his State and neither was willing to be subject to the other. It was not for reasons of sentiment alone that APROSOMA could not accept a monarchy, but because only an absolutist monarchy could survive. To which constitution would a constitutional Mwami owe allegiance—to that of Ruanda or that of Urundi? And if the two territories were federated, which Mwami would agree to be subordinate to the other? Thus it was obvious that the monarchy was bound to disappear. No one could accuse him of being biased, for his one concern was to ensure the progress of the masses and the viability of the State of Ruanda-Urundi. However, if the opposition parties could explain satisfactorily their conception of a viable federated State of Ruanda-Urundi, the majority parties were willing to accept their reasoning.

40. Mr. NKUNDABAGENZI (Parti du mouvement de l'émancipation hutu) agreed with Mr. Mulyangaju that the institution of the Mwami was a major obstacle to the effective union of Ruanda and Urundi. That was why PARMEHUTU, although it respected other points of view, favoured an ideology which seemed better adapted to the situation and could solve the problem, namely the republican system. He reiterated his hope that the principal questions connected with the future of the Territory would be discussed at a round-table conference.

41. However, the existence and the influence of the new political parties in Ruanda must be borne in mind. The traditional Tutsi chiefs, who had represented only the noble caste, had claimed to represent the nation as a whole because they were the highest in the social scale. But the disintegration of the traditional *élite* as a result of certain events had led to the political awakening of other castes which were also imbued with a sincere desire to develop and to participate in the

Government of the country. There was nothing in that which conflicted with a normal political life; what was not normal was that one caste should dominate the others.

42. Rifts in Ruanda had been mentioned by UNAR, but in reality what was taking place was a reshuffle, for leaders were emerging from all the castes and what under the old system had been a monologue had now become a dialogue. New symbols were required, for people were no longer content to pay homage to the myths of the past but wished to revitalize their institutions and stride out along the path of progress.

43. Mr. BWANAKWERI (Rassemblement démocratique ruandais) said he was convinced that Ruanda could live under a republican régime or under a monarchy, provided that its institutions were democratic. The reason that RADER was pressing for the return of the Mwami to Ruanda was that he had been exiled by the Belgian Government and not by the people of Ruanda. In any event, RADER was in favour of a referendum on the question of the Mwami.

44. As for an association of Ruanda and Urundi that was a matter for joint consideration by the representatives of both territories. It should be noted, however, that all the parties in Urundi were monarchist, a fact which should be borne in mind when a formula for unification was being sought. Any such formula should respect the monarchy of both Urundi and Ruanda and safeguard the Territory's economic future.

45. Mr. RWAGASANA (Union nationale ruandaise) said that his party would accept whatever régime was chosen by the people, but it could not agree to the arbitrary removal of the Mwami by an external authority, the Belgian Government.

46. Regarding the future of the Territory, the Mwami had already stated officially that he favoured the establishment of a united though composite State. Nevertheless, the Administering Authority was determined to divide Ruanda from Urundi and thus destroy a community which had actually existed for over forty years.

47. Regarding the question of how the leaders of the different political parties could settle their differences among themselves, there was still one difficulty—the presence of Belgian political and military authorities, who supported the dictatorship of the government parties. Once that foreign element had been removed, the leaders of all the national parties would undoubtedly be ready to settle their problems among themselves.

48. Mr. RWAGASORE (Mouvement pour la réconciliation nationale au Rwanda) stressed that tribes and ethnic groups should not be confused; unlike the Congolese tribes, the three ethnic groups in Ruanda-Urundi had the same customs and spoke the same language, although their levels of living were different. He supposed that what was meant by a united but composite State was a single State comprising both Ruanda and Urundi; but he wondered whether there were any other States of that type in Africa and he was afraid that such a State would split apart after the achievement of independence. In any event, it would be advisable to ask the opinion of the representatives of Urundi whenever the question was discussed.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.