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*Chairman: Mr. Majid RAHNEMA (Iran).*

*In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Bruce (Togo), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

## AGENDA ITEMS 23 AND 71

Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: Territories under Portuguese administration (continued)\* (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V; A/5946; A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V)

Special training programme for Territories under Portuguese administration: reports of the Secretary-General (continued)\* (A/5783 and Add.1, A/6076 and Add.1 and 2)

### GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. SHRESTHA (Nepal) said that his delegation had read with great interest the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples on the activities of foreign economic and other interests which were impeding the implementation of the Declaration in the Territories under Portuguese administration (see A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V).

\*Resumed from the 1585th meeting.

2. The petitioners heard by the Fourth Committee (1574th and 1584th meetings) had exposed the brutality of the Portuguese administration and the fact that during five centuries of colonial rule the peoples of Mozambique, Angola, so-called Portuguese Guinea and the other Territories had known only discrimination, mistreatment and exploitation. His delegation had always maintained that any form of segregation and discrimination based on race, colour and ethnic origin was contrary to human dignity and incompatible with the principles proclaimed in the United Nations Charter. Colonialism was in its very essence reactionary and ruthless and had become an anachronism.

3. His delegation condemned the Portuguese authorities for their reactionary administration, recognized the legitimacy of the demands made by the peoples of the Portuguese Territories and wished the brave freedom fighters success in their efforts. In his opinion, Portugal would do well to ponder the fact that other colonial Powers, more powerful and wealthy than Portugal, had had to bow to reality and give up their empires. If Portugal's allies had heeded the many appeals made to them and had halted all financial and military assistance to Portugal, the latter, which was one of the poorest countries in Europe, would never have been able to wage war on three fronts. The great Powers should realize that the lasting goodwill of nations was well worth a small financial sacrifice.

4. It was time for the United Nations to take resolute action and declare itself on the side of the national liberation movement by stating that it would not hesitate to take the measures provided for in the Charter to ensure enforcement of its decisions. His delegation would support any resolution calling upon Member States to break off diplomatic, economic and financial relations with Portugal and imposing an embargo on all arms deliveries to that country.

5. Mr. SZILAGYI (Hungary) said that the time had come to put an end to Portuguese rule in Africa. The "civilizing mission" which Portugal contended it had been carrying out for five hundred years had been clearly exposed as a myth. In 1959, the National Statistical Institute at Lisbon had indicated that over the period of five centuries Portugal had succeeded in "civilizing" only 0.39 per cent of the population of Portuguese Guinea, 0.44 per cent of the population of Mozambique and 0.74 per cent of that of Angola. Moreover, 99 per cent of the inhabitants of Angola and Mozambique were illiterate and the vast majority did not speak Portuguese. In view of those deplorable results, there could be no justification for prolonging Portuguese colonial rule. The African majority was being subjected to merciless exploitation by the colonizing Power and by international monopolies

whose activities were impeding the Territories' attainment of freedom and independence.

6. Although its position had been condemned by almost all States Members of the United Nations, Portugal was refusing to comply with the provisions of the Charter and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and was continuing to disregard the appeals, recommendations and decisions of various United Nations bodies. What was more, now that the myth of its so-called civilizing mission had been exploded, Portugal was increasingly resorting to force and, in particular, engaging in brutal military operations against the population in order to maintain itself in the Territories.

7. Portugal's allies contended that they had no responsibility for the situation, that they were not helping to exploit the human and material resources of the Territories, and that they were not providing Portugal with military or other assistance which was helping it to prolong its colonial rule. According to a statement made by the United States delegation in the Security Council on 11 November 1965 (1256th meeting), the United States had for years prohibited the shipment of arms and military equipment to Portugal except when guarantees were provided that they would not be used in the Portuguese Territories, and had also prohibited the direct export of arms and military equipment to those Territories. However, a number of recent statements in the plenary Assembly and in the Security Council revealed that Portugal was receiving substantial military and other assistance from its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In that connexion, he drew attention to a recent article in the London *Daily Sketch* indicating that seven B-26 bombers had been secretly delivered to Portugal on instructions from the competent United States authorities.

8. The question of the Portuguese Territories could not be dissociated from those of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. The situation in those Territories would be very different if Portugal and its allies had complied with United Nations resolutions. His delegation shared the disappointment expressed by the petitioner Mr. Mondlane concerning United Nations inaction. If it did not wish to lose the confidence of the colonial peoples, the Organization must ensure compliance with its decisions by requesting the Security Council to take the measures provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter. The situation in the Portuguese Territories called for action over a very long period. The United Nations should reaffirm its view that the situation resulting from the policy pursued by Portugal with regard to the African population of its colonies and the neighbouring States constituted a serious threat to international peace and security. It should recognize the legitimacy of the struggle in which the peoples of the Territories were engaged and pledge its support for them. It should condemn Portugal for having refused to recognize the inalienable right of the peoples under its administration to self-determination and independence. It should proclaim that Portugal's colonial policy was a crime against humanity and civilization and that, in order to put an end to it, it was prepared to apply all the sanctions

provided for in the Charter. His delegation would support any proposal along those lines.

## AGENDA ITEM 73

Question of Oman: report of the *Ad Hoc Committee on Oman (continued)* (A/5846, A/C.4/L.821)

### REQUESTS FOR SUPPLEMENTARY HEARINGS

9. The CHAIRMAN said that he had received letters from Mr. Faris Glubb and Sheikh Talib bin Ali Al-Hani requesting that the petitioners should be allowed to speak in the Committee in reply to certain observations made at the previous meeting by the United Kingdom representative. Since there was no objection, he would take it that the Committee wished to grant the requests.

*It was so decided.*

### HEARING OF PETITIONERS (concluded)

*At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Faris Glubb, representative of the Committee for the Rights of Oman, and Sheikh Suleiman bin Himyar, Sheikh Talib bin Ali Al-Hani and Mr. Faissal Ali Faissal took places at the Committee table.*

10. Sheikh TALIB BIN ALI AL-HANI recalled that at the previous meeting the United Kingdom representative had referred to the failure of the Oman revolution without saying anything about its causes. Perhaps he agreed with those who believed that the United Kingdom had been forced to invade Oman and put down the Oman revolution in order to protect its reputation in the area of the Persian Gulf.

11. As for the personal attacks made on him by the United Kingdom representative and the assertion that he did not have the capacity to introduce social reforms in his country, he would of course refuse to take part in the United Kingdom's work of destruction and become an agent for its interests in Oman; with regard to his ability to institute genuine reforms, the United Kingdom representative had merely used the familiar arguments of the colonial Powers, which had been refuted innumerable times. Some years previously, the United Kingdom had contended that Egypt would be unable to ensure the proper operation of the Suez Canal, but the United Arab Republic had made more improvements in the Canal since nationalizing it than the international Suez Canal Company had done since its construction. Similarly, the United Kingdom had in the past described Mr. Kenyatta and Archbishop Makarios as incompetents, and they were now directing the destinies of their respective countries. The United Kingdom representative should wake up to realities and show some respect for persons who represented an entire people.

12. Mr. GLUBB (Committee for the Rights of Oman) read out a letter to the Chairman of the Fourth Committee from Sheikh Suleiman bin Himyar, Sheikh Talib bin Ali Al-Hani and Mr. Faissal Ali Faissal stating that Sheikh Talib bin Ali Al-Hani had spoken before the Committee on behalf of the entire delegation of the Omani people, which had included Mr. Faris Glubb in addition to the three authors of the letter. The United Kingdom representative's allegations concern-

ing agreement among the petitioners were therefore completely unfounded.

13. He would point out to the United Kingdom representative that he had never contended that Socotra was part of Muscat and Oman; he had stated that Socotra was an island off the South Arabian coast and that the Masirah and Socotra bases were meant to be the lower jaw of a pincer which was to crush the people of Oman. With regard to the United Kingdom's denial that it even had a base on Socotra, many examples could be cited to show that statements made by the United Kingdom Government in Parliament should not be taken at face value.

14. He was surprised that the United Kingdom representative had repeatedly referred to his youth but had said nothing about the wide experience with the question of Oman which he had acquired over a period of years. Contrary to what the United Kingdom representative seemed to think, he had made no comments on domestic events in the United Kingdom, but he would now take the opportunity to point out that the United Kingdom authorities intercepted the mail and listened to the telephone conversations of the Omani people's delegation in London. With regard to the accusation that he had never been to Muscat and Oman, he had visited Sharjah, Dubai and Ras Al Khaimah, which were part of Oman, and he would have visited the interior of the territory if the occupation authorities had not refused to admit him. The United Kingdom authorities were clearly terrified that the truth about conditions in the territory might become known, and that was why they had refused the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. de Ribbing, permission to visit the prison at Fort Jalali.

15. Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations was not *per se* a derogation from national sovereignty. He had referred to the fact that the only consul in Oman was a United Kingdom national because that was further evidence of the role played by United Kingdom personnel in the territory. With regard to the three United Kingdom nationals who, according to the United Kingdom representative, were employees "on contract" with the Sultan, it should be pointed out that they occupied very important positions, namely those of Chief of Intelligence, Secretary for Defence and Sultan's Adviser—an adviser on whom the Sultan relied for all important decisions.

16. Sheikh Talib bin Ali had not suggested that 40,000 men were permanently stationed at Masirah but that, according to information from Omani sources, the weapons and equipment stored at Masirah were sufficient for 30,000 to 40,000 men. It therefore appeared that at Masirah the United Kingdom Government was employing the technique of stockpiling heavy equipment at strategic points, ready to be used when needed by troops airlifted to the spot.

17. With reference to the allegation that Sheikh Talib bin Ali had organized a rebellion from outside, he would point out that everyone who had fought with the Sheikh was an Omani, whereas the Sultan had had to call for help from a great foreign Power and the United Kingdom had had to intervene militarily in order to crush the Omani people's liberation move-

ment. Sheikh Talib bin Ali's tireless struggle to defend the rights of his people had not yet achieved success, but his victory, and the defeat of the United Kingdom, would one day come.

*The petitioners withdrew.*

#### CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTION A/C.4/ L.821 (concluded)

18. Mr. KISAKA (Kenya), a co-sponsor of draft resolution A/C.4/L.821, said that the facts stated by the petitioners concerning the situation in Oman had amply demonstrated that the Sultan of Muscat and Oman was a vassal of the United Kingdom and that his rule rested only on the presence of United Kingdom forces in the country. Whether the Sultan remained on his shaky throne or was replaced by his son, Oman was still a Non-Self-Governing Territory and the people of Oman were being denied their right to self-determination and independence by the United Kingdom's military intervention and imperialist policies.

19. In no sovereign, independent nation was the civil service entirely maintained by foreign nationals, as had been the case in Oman ever since 1955, when the United Kingdom had taken over the administration of the territory by force. The British had thus been entrenched in the Omani civil service for the past ten years, and there was no indication that they intended to give up their lucrative jobs to make way for Omanis.

20. It was therefore clear that the United Kingdom's argument that the Sultanate was an independent State in regard to its internal affairs, which the United Nations had no reason to discuss, had now collapsed completely. The only case which the United Kingdom could make was that based on armed force, and the United Nations must assert itself and assist the people of Oman and Muscat along the road to self-government.

21. As for the Sultan or his successor, history had shown that when a ruler had the interests of his people and country at heart, not even a powerful imperialist nation could overcome him. He recalled the United Kingdom's defeat in Bechuanaland and Uganda, where the people had remained faithful to their exiled rulers, thus thwarting the United Kingdom's manoeuvres. The fate of King Farouk in Egypt and of King Louis XVI in France showed what was in store for the Sultan of Muscat and Oman if he continued to ride roughshod over the interests and aspirations of the Omani people, to be a puppet of United Kingdom imperialism and a stumbling block to the establishment of an independent democratic State in Muscat and Oman.

22. If it wished to maintain its economic interests in Oman and in the Middle East, the United Kingdom would be well advised to seek the friendship and co-operation of the peoples of the area instead of dealing with unpopular sheikhs and sultans.

23. Draft resolution A/C.4/L.821 called upon the United Kingdom Government to effect immediately the implementation of the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in Muscat and Oman. Particular attention should be given to operative paragraph 5, whose implementation would be a first step towards a peaceful solution of the question of Oman. His delegation hoped that all members of the

Committee would support the draft resolution in view of the conclusions contained in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Oman (A/5846), and particularly in paragraphs 693, 694, the first sentence of paragraph 695 and the last sentence of paragraph 696.

24. His delegation wished to reaffirm its Government's total opposition to all forms of colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism, whether in Africa or elsewhere. It urged all delegations not to lose sight of the fact that the question of Oman had to do with a disguised form of colonialism. The problem must be dealt with by applying General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

*Mr. Rahnama (Iran) took the Chair.*

25. Sir Senerat GUNewardene (Ceylon) said that he had not taken part in the general debate but felt obliged to make a statement now in view of the turn taken by the discussion.

26. Ceylon had many reasons for being concerned with the aspirations of the Arab peoples, with whom it had maintained extremely friendly relations in all fields for centuries. The Arabs had been made very welcome in Ceylon, so that there was now a strong Moslem community, many of whose members held high posts in the Government and other spheres. Since joining the United Nations, Ceylon had always upheld the interests of the Arabs, and he himself had taken their defence not only in his own country but also in the United Nations, where he had played an active part at the time of the Suez crisis and during the Algerian war of independence.

27. His delegation was therefore very sorry that it could not support draft resolution A/C.4/L.821 as it now stood. The Sultanate of Muscat and Oman did not fit the definition of a colony in the strict sense or of a protectorate, so that the question of Oman could not be placed in the category of colonial problems. His delegation therefore did not see how the problem could be referred to the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which dealt only with questions of decolonization.

28. Relations between the Sultanate and the United Kingdom Government were such that the latter undeniably wielded influence. However, the United Kingdom was not responsible for the administration of the territory, and the United Nations could therefore not ask it to take measures relating to the future of Muscat and Oman. Moreover, both the United Kingdom and the Sultan had asserted that the State of Muscat and Oman was free and independent. The administration of the country was not, as had been claimed, under the control of the United Kingdom. The fact that a British officer had been put at the head of the army did not make him its absolute chief. He recalled that when Ceylon had acceded to independence its Governor had been a United Kingdom national, but that had not prevented the delegation of Ceylon from opposing the United Kingdom in the United Nations. More recently, the Ceylonese air force had been placed under British command by arrangement with the United Kingdom, and similar arrangements existed in other Commonwealth coun-

tries. India and Pakistan, as well as Ceylon, sent officer cadets to Sandhurst, but that did not mean that those cadets were in the service of the United Kingdom.

29. He also deplored the cavalier fashion in which some representatives had treated Mr. de Ribbing's report (A/5562), going so far as to quote some passages out of context in an attempt to prove that the author was not really familiar with the question and had not had time to study the problem. What had been expected from Mr. de Ribbing was not a study on the civilization, politics and culture of the country in question, but accurate information on the present situation. That was exactly what Mr. de Ribbing had provided, and the delegation of Ceylon, for its part, accepted his conclusions.

30. The conclusions of Mr. de Ribbing's report (A/5562, paras. 171 and 172), which the Ad Hoc Committee on Oman itself had not rejected, showed that during long periods in Oman's history, for instance from 1821 to 1868 and from 1871 to 1913, no Imam had been in office. From 1913 to 1920, the dispute between the Sultan of Muscat and the Imam had caused occasional disturbances, which had ended with an agreement between the people of Oman, who had sought to obtain self-government in return for peace, and the Sultan. There had been no harm in that, and it could be readily conceived that a sovereign State might grant internal self-government to part of its population, as it had been suggested that Iraq might do for the Kurds.

31. Mr. AL-DAOUD (Iraq), speaking on a point of order, remarked that the problem of the Kurds had nothing to do with the question before the Committee. If the representative of Ceylon wished to make a long statement, he should not have waited until just before the vote to do so. The delegation of Iraq reserved the right to speak again if necessary.

32. Sir Senerat GUNewardene (Ceylon) reaffirmed that it was possible for a Government to grant local self-government to part of the population of its country.

33. It was true that it was United Kingdom intervention which had saved the Sultan of Muscat and Oman in 1955, but the Sultan, who was a sovereign head of State, was perfectly free to conclude treaties or negotiate with other countries and to call on them for assistance. Ceylon was opposed to foreign military bases, but there could be no question of contesting a country's right to take all the steps it considered necessary for its security. The fact remained that the Sultan had had the right to ask the United Kingdom for assistance and that the United Kingdom had had the right to provide it under the terms of a treaty with another sovereign country. The delegation of Ceylon wished to congratulate the Ad Hoc Committee on Oman on the study it had made (A/5846), but its Government was entitled to accept only the facts set out in that report and to reject the evaluation if it was at variance with its own views.

34. Many delegations had tried to interpret what the Ad Hoc Committee on Oman had written, but it had certainly not said that Oman was a colony. In any case, it would rather be for a body such as the Inter-

national Court of Justice to give an opinion on that subject. Such a body had already taken all the relevant facts into account and had delivered a judgement at The Hague in 1905 asserting that Oman was a sovereign, independent State. The facts cited in paragraphs 615 to 618 of the Ad Hoc Committee's report failed to prove that Oman was not independent. The situation regarding the armed forces was similar to that which had existed in Ceylon at the time of its accession to independence. Where currency was concerned, the territory used Indian rupees, not pounds sterling, while the postal agreement with the United Kingdom resulted from the desire, normal for any under-developed country, to find an economical way of administering one of its public services. As regards consular services, it would be absurd to demand that Oman should be represented abroad solely by Omanis, when so many States Members of the United Nations relied on foreigners. He had set out the legal position as he knew it. The Government of Ceylon had, however, decided to abstain on the draft resolution out of respect for Arab sentiment.

35. Mr. AZIMOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), speaking on a point of order, asked whether the Committee was going to continue an abstract debate or whether it intended to vote on draft resolution A/C.4/L.821.

36. Mr. AL-DAOUD (Iraq), supported by Mr. KHANACHET (Iran), asked that the draft resolution should be put to the vote immediately. Representatives could give explanations, if they so wished, after the vote.

37. The CHAIRMAN invited the representative of Ceylon to be as brief as possible in explaining his vote.

38. Sir Senerat GUNewardene (Ceylon), continuing his statement, said that the problem in Oman was not a colonial problem but a conflict between two personalities, the Sultan and the Imam. The Ad Hoc Committee on Oman itself had not made any reference to a colonial problem. In its conclusions (A/5846, paras. 693-699), it had recommended that the United Nations should take an active part in facilitating the negotiations between all the parties concerned and that it should call upon the Imam and the Sultan to make every effort to settle the question. It had not spoken of the United Kingdom as an administering Power, but had suggested that the General Assembly should call upon the Government of the United Kingdom to use its close and friendly relationship with the Sultan to facilitate a negotiated settlement. The delegation of Ceylon fully endorsed the Ad Hoc Committee's conclusions and deplored the fact that draft resolution A/C.4/L.821 either took no account of them or departed from them. He did not see how there could be any legal grounds for considering the question of Oman as a colonial question or how it could be referred to the Special Committee. He would therefore be unable to support draft resolution A/C.4/L.821.

39. Mr. BOULHOUD (Congo, Brazzaville) considered that the statement just made by the representative of Ceylon was reminiscent of those made by colonial Powers desperately clinging on to the last vestiges

of their empires. The representative of Ceylon might have been speaking for the United Kingdom.

40. The CHAIRMAN asked the representative of Congo (Brazzaville) to refrain from saying anything which might give rise to exchanges having nothing to do with the vote on the draft resolution.

41. Mr. BOULHOUD (Congo, Brazzaville) said that he simply wished to add that the Committee should proceed to vote on the draft resolution.

42. Mr. ADAN (Somalia) stressed that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples condemned colonialism in all its forms and manifestations and was therefore applicable to Muscat and Oman, where certain forms of colonialism existed.

43. Mr. MARRACHE (Syria) asked to exercise his right of reply to the statement of the representative of Ceylon.

44. Miss IMRU (Ethiopia), supported by Mr. JANEVSKI (Yugoslavia), appealed to the Syrian representative to wait until after the Committee had voted on the draft resolution before exercising his right of reply.

45. Mr. MARRACHE (Syria) said that he had no objection to an immediate vote on the draft resolution.

46. The CHAIRMAN put draft resolution A/C.4/L.821 to the vote.

*At the request of the representative of Kuwait, the vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Kuwait, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Panama, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan.

*Against:* South Africa, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway.

*Abstaining:* Peru, Portugal, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Spain, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela, Brazil, Burma, Central African Republic, Ceylon, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, India, Iran, Ireland, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico.

*Draft resolution A/C.4/L.821 was adopted by 55 votes to 15, with 26 abstentions.*

47. Mrs. BARISH (Costa Rica) said that her country, which had participated as a member in the work of the

Ad Hoc Committee on Oman, took a great interest in the question of Oman. Her delegation regretted that it had been unable to vote for draft resolution A/C.4/L.821. Generally speaking, that draft reflected the views of its Government on the right of peoples to independence and sovereignty, but there was nothing in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee to support the conclusion that Oman was under a colonial régime. Oman was a sovereign State whose problem was rather that a foreign Power was interfering in its internal affairs. It was for those reasons that the Costa Rican delegation had abstained in the vote, although it hoped that a settlement could be reached which would guarantee to the people of Oman the free and unrestricted enjoyment of their rights.

48. Mr. ESFANDIARY (Iran) explained why his delegation had abstained. Iran had been unwavering in its support for dependent countries and peoples struggling for independence. The Iranian delegation had carefully studied the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Oman and fully endorsed its conclusions. It agreed with the Ad Hoc Committee that the problem derived from imperialist policies and foreign intervention in Muscat and Oman; that all parties concerned should enter into negotiations to settle the question; that the United Nations should assist in bringing about a solution to the problem by taking an active part in facilitating negotiations between all the parties concerned through the establishment of a good offices committee; and that the General Assembly should call upon the Imam and the Sultan and also upon the Government of the United Kingdom to make every effort to encourage a negotiated settlement.

49. However, his delegation had found nothing in the Ad Hoc Committee's report to convince it that the Territory was a colony in the legal and traditional sense of the term. It had therefore preferred to take a more prudent course and abstain in the vote, out of respect for the provision in the Charter prescribing non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries. In its opinion, that rule could be departed from only in the case of Non-Self-Governing Territories administered by a foreign Power. It recognized that there were countries whose degree of genuine independence was subject to controversy, but, whatever the difficulties that the inhabitants might suffer and whatever the solutions that the world community might eventually find for neo-colonialism, the Iranian delegation believed that the Committee should think twice before deciding to extend the application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) to cases regarding which there were legal or constitutional doubts. However noble it might be to wish to help oppressed peoples in their struggle for freedom, it was important to avoid setting a precedent that might serve less laudable aims.

50. Mr. GRINBERG (Bulgaria) said that his delegation had carefully studied the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Oman and had closely followed the statements of the petitioners and the discussion in the Fourth Committee. It entirely agreed with the Ad Hoc Committee's conclusion that the problem derived from imperialistic policies and foreign intervention in Muscat and Oman. It also believed that any initiative that the General Assembly might take in the matter

should be designed to achieve the fulfilment of the legitimate aspirations of the people of Muscat and Oman. It was regrettable that the United Kingdom and the Sultan, in their anxiety to conceal the measures they had taken to suppress the movement of national liberation in the Territory, should have prevented the Ad Hoc Committee from visiting the country, but from the available information it could be concluded that the relations between the United Kingdom and the Sultan were not on a footing of equality. The Sultan's sovereignty was a legal fiction, since he was kept in power by British armed forces.

51. The United Nations should do its utmost to help the people of Oman to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination and independence, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). In order to achieve that aim through peaceful means, the United Nations should ask the United Kingdom to end all repressive measures against the people of Oman and to make it possible for them to express their wishes freely. As the question of Oman came within the terms of reference of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, it was only right that the question should be placed on that Committee's agenda.

52. Those were the considerations that had led the Bulgarian delegation to vote for draft resolution A/C.4/L.821.

53. Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Ireland) recalled that his delegation had voted for General Assembly resolution 1948 (XVIII), on the question of Oman, the draft text of which had been submitted by the Latin American delegations. However, while recognizing the problem as one of concern to international public opinion, his delegation had maintained that it was not a colonial problem and that there was no justification for referring it to the Special Committee. The report of the Ad Hoc Committee confirmed that view.

54. Oman was situated in a region that had from time immemorial been subject to rival influences; in the past because of what was known as the route to India; and now because of oil. However, it was an independent and sovereign State. The United Kingdom kept no troops in the territory, and its installations there were limited to two Royal Air Force staging posts. It was true that there were British officers there, but they were serving under contract in the Sultan's armed forces. It was also true that the United Kingdom had intervened in 1957 at the Sultan's request, and that it might be obliged to do so again, but only on the basis of a treaty concluded between two sovereign States. The fact was that there existed a long-standing dispute between the Sultan and the Imam and also a certain hostility to the Sultan on the part of some of his subjects and some of the States in the area; but that did not justify the conclusion that the Territory was under a colonial régime, as the petitioners and some members of the Committee had maintained. The Ad Hoc Committee had itself refrained from drawing that conclusion in its report.

55. He agreed with the Iranian representative that the case was one in which the provision in the Charter concerning non-intervention in the domestic affairs

of a country must be respected. He acknowledged that the question of Oman was a serious international problem requiring the special attention of the General Assembly, as was stated in the Ad Hoc Committee's report; but, in view of the considerations he had mentioned, he had not wished to commit himself one way or the other and accordingly had abstained in the vote.

56. Mr. ZAHRE LIAN (Burma) stated that his delegation's abstention did not mean that Burma was not friendly to the Arab peoples or was indifferent to colonial problems. Burma was determined to eliminate

colonialism in all its forms and manifestations, as its voting record showed. The present case related to a conflict between the Imam and the Sultan which involved the entire territory of Oman, including the Trucial States, and the Burmese Government wished to study the question more thoroughly. His delegation had not yet received instructions from its Government and had accordingly preferred to abstain in the vote. It reserved the right to speak on the subject when a suitable opportunity arose.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.