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Chairman: Mr. FAKHREDDINE Mohamed (Sudan).

AGENDA ITEM 23

Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: Aden (continued) (A/6274, A/6276, A/6300/Rev.1, chap. VI; A/6317, A/6374, A/6478, A/6514, A/C.4/678, A/C.4/L.840, A/C.4/L.841, and Add.1, A/C.4/L.843)

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (continued) (A/C.4/L.840, A/C.4/L.841 AND ADD.1)

1. Mr. ISMAIL (Malaysia) said that the situation in Aden was very different from that in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa or the Territories under Portuguese administration since the administering Power had formally announced that it would grant independence before 1968 and would evacuate its military bases. It should therefore only be a matter of discussing certain arrangements. Nevertheless, the situation was highly complex and it was the Committee's task to protect the interests of the Arabs of the South and ensure the independence of their country by eliminating all remaining obstacles to it. That was the purpose of draft resolution A/C.4/L.841 and Add.1.

2. In his delegation's view, the Committee could not exert any greater pressure and all remedies had been

exhausted; a mission must be sent to the Territory and even the extension of the state of emergency ought not to prevent it from accomplishing its task. Without United Nations assistance, it was to be feared that accession to independence would lead to anarchy. The United Nations would then have to bear a heavy burden of responsibility and might be compelled to undertake a peace-keeping operation.

3. Conscious of the interests of the people of South Arabia and of United Nations interests, Malaysia would vote for draft resolution A/C.4/L.841 and Add.1 and, if necessary, for the Saudi Arabian amendment (A/C.4/L.843).

4. Mr. CARRASQUERO (Venezuela) deplored the fact that some differences of view were preventing the Committee from reaching agreement on the question of Aden. It was inadmissible that minor obstacles should still be delaying the dispatch of a mission to the Territory when its people had confidence in the United Nations and awaited its assistance. The two draft resolutions before the Committee (A/C.4/L.840 and A/C.4/L.841 and Add.1) had the same purpose and were drafted in the same spirit, while the Saudi Arabian amendment confirmed the interpretation which the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/L.841 and Add.1 gave to paragraph 7 of their text.

5. He appealed to the sponsors of the draft resolutions and to the administering Power to remove the remaining difficulties. His delegation would vote for draft resolution A/C.4/L.841 and Add.1 and the Saudi Arabian amendment and would spare no effort to enable the mission to proceed to the Territory as soon as possible.

6. Mr. MAKKAWI (Lebanon) said that his delegation, which was a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.4/L.841 and Add.1, did not regard paragraph 7 of that text as a pre-condition for the sending of a United Nations mission to Aden. The members of that mission should be appointed and sent to the Territory as quickly as possible.

7. The Saudi Arabian amendment added nothing to the draft resolution, since paragraph 5 of the latter was applicable in all cases.

8. Mr. GHAREKHAN (India) said that the sponsors of both draft resolutions considered the sending of a mission to Aden to be indispensable; that had also seemed to be the view of the United Kingdom, which had stated its readiness to co-operate with the United Nations. However, the statements of its representative at the previous meeting had raised some doubts in that connexion. The United Kingdom had asked the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/L.841 and Add.1 to interpret paragraph 7 in such a way as to leave no ambiguity remaining. That request was somewhat

surprising in view of the numerous consultations that had been held between the sponsors and the United Kingdom; moreover, that paragraph, which was addressed to the administering Power, referred to the provisions of paragraph 3 which, for their part, had met with no objection by the United Kingdom. Any doubts that the United Kingdom might have had should have been removed, since the Iraqi representative had indicated that nothing in paragraph 7 could constitute a pre-condition for the dispatch of the mission to Aden. By requesting an interpretation of that paragraph, therefore, the United Kingdom delegation seemed to want to introduce an element of ambiguity.

9. When the United Kingdom representative had said that all members of the Committee were endeavouring to work out a solution which could avoid causing frustration in certain quarters, whom specifically did he have in mind? Was it not, on the contrary, his own attitude which was liable to cause frustration?

10. When exercising his right of reply at the previous meeting, the United Kingdom representative had seen fit to recite a long list of acts of terrorism committed by the nationalists; that had been uncalled for, since no paragraph in the draft resolution listed the tortures and ill-treatment inflicted on the nationalists.

11. His delegation considered that the Saudi Arabian amendment was open to several interpretations and was unjustified. It hoped that draft resolution A/C.4/L.841 and Add.1 would be adopted.

12. Mr. KANAKARATNE (Ceylon) said that his delegation had remained silent up to that point not out of indifference but, on the contrary, out of its awareness of the difficulties created by the interests involved in the matter.

13. Moreover, his delegation could probably do most to facilitate the Committee's task by demonstrating a degree of detachment on a matter of such great importance. Not being directly concerned, it could perhaps be more objective than some delegations. The Committee's main concern was to safeguard the freedom and interests of the people of Aden and of South Arabia. The petitioners had furnished extremely valuable information and his delegation thanked them for doing so.

14. Paragraph 2 of draft resolution A/C.4/L.841 and Add.1 rightly reaffirmed the inalienable right of the people of Aden and South Arabia to self-determination and independence; paragraph 5 was approved by all members of the Committee, including his own delegation. Other provisions of the draft resolution, however, gave rise to difficulties.

15. He appealed to the administering Power to try to remove the remaining obstacles. It undoubtedly had great responsibilities and no one sought to minimize them; yet, as the USSR representative had said, in connexion with the state of emergency in Aden, a number of factors must be taken into consideration. The proclamation of a state of emergency was justified in very special circumstances, but not when mere acts of violence were committed. The United Kingdom representative had explained that the state of emergency had been proclaimed in Aden following acts of terrorism. In the view of his delegation a distinction

should be made between violence due to vicious terrorism and the violence to which nationalist movements were compelled to resort in order to obtain justice and regain freedom; that was obviously the case in Aden where, accordingly, a state of emergency did not appear to be any longer justified.

16. With regard to the draft resolution and the Saudi Arabian amendment, the differences between the two interpretations of paragraph 7—both given in good faith, moreover—were very small and the assurances given by the Iraqi representative on behalf of the co-sponsors should be sufficient to remove all doubts and to persuade the United Kingdom representative to agree to the Secretary-General's acting on the recommendation made in paragraph 5. On the other hand as the United Kingdom representative himself had observed, the Secretary-General would undoubtedly appoint as members of the proposed mission persons whose experience and integrity were recognized by all, including the administering Power. The mission could and no doubt would obtain on the spot an idea of the conditions in which it would have to perform its task and, if necessary, would report to the Secretary-General accordingly. If the mission took the view that the state of emergency prevented its proper and efficient functioning, it would no doubt request the administering Power to lift it. The mission's judgement should be relied on.

17. He suggested that the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia should withdraw their reservations and accept draft resolution A/C.4/L.841 and Add.1 as it stood on that understanding. In view of the explosive nature of the situation in Aden, it was essential that a United Nations mission should proceed there and start work as soon as possible. Otherwise the United Nations might be compelled in the near future to send another type of mission—a peace-keeping force—in its place. And that, he believed, no member of the Committee would desire.

18. Mr. APPIAH (Ghana) said that he had no doubt that, whatever the reasons for its decision, the United Kingdom would leave Aden in 1968 and at the same time evacuate its military base. The United Kingdom always kept its promises. But would it not leave behind political chaos, leading to discord, violence and bloodshed? The Committee was determined to avoid that at any cost, and the debate on Aden showed that all members were convinced that a United Nations presence in the Territory was imperative as of now. A mission should be appointed and dispatched to help the people of Aden to accede to independence in the most peaceful and harmonious manner possible.

19. In one of his statements on the question of Aden he had appealed to the United Kingdom Government to end at once the state of emergency in the Territory and to authorize all exiles to return and to express their views freely; he repeated that appeal. The United Kingdom was asking for United Nations assistance in helping Aden to advance towards independence and, as a proof of its goodwill and in deference to the United Nations, it ought to respond to that appeal.

20. He also appealed to the people of Aden to observe a truce during the mission's stay in the Territory. Better still, let them make it publicly known that they

accepted the challenge and call on the combatants to lay down their arms. That would be greatly to their credit.

21. The Saudi Arabian amendment (A/C.4/L.843) to draft resolution A/C.4/L.841 and Add.1, of which his delegation was a sponsor, was superfluous and he would abstain if it was put to the vote. Nevertheless, he still hoped that the Committee would be able to agree on paragraph 7 and adopt unanimously a draft resolution which would enable the United Nations to discharge its responsibilities to the Territory and lead it to independence in peace and harmony. Too much blood had already been shed; passions and selfish interests must give way to reason and humanity.

22. Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Ireland) thought the debate on the question of Aden was most interesting and important. It was extremely pertinent to the situation in the Territory, and his delegation had therefore studied very closely draft resolution A/C.4/L.841 and Add.1 and the Saudi Arabian amendment (A/C.4/L.843), and also the declaration made by Iraq, on behalf of the sponsors, with reference to paragraph 7 (1649th meeting, para. 39). The draft resolution made full provision for the appointment, dispatch and functioning of a United Nations mission to Aden and he was therefore naturally prepared to endorse it. However, the Saudi Arabian amendment and the United Kingdom representative's statement had given him food for thought. It was with disappointment and dismay that he had heard the United Kingdom representative declare that if the Saudi Arabian amendment were not adopted serious consequences would ensue. Did that mean that the United Kingdom Government would refuse the mission entry into the Territory? The Irish delegation was particularly concerned as the Saudi Arabian representative had stated that his country, which occupied the major part of the Arabian peninsula and bordered on South Arabia, would not remain indifferent to events in the Territory. The situation in the region was explosive not only because of the presence of a colonial Power, but also because of competing interests and rival States. It could therefore hardly be claimed that the Saudi Arabian amendment was superfluous. Not only was it necessary, but its adoption might mean the difference between peace and war in the peninsula. Like the representative of India, he felt that the amendment could be made more explicit, but it was certainly not useless. Operative paragraphs 5 and 7 of the draft resolution were closely connected. Paragraph 5 not only requested the Secretary-General to appoint a special mission, but defined that mission's mandate. His delegation would consequently support the Saudi Arabian amendment.

23. The Committee's debates had centred on the state of emergency in the Territory. He supported the Ghanaian representative's appeal in that connexion. However, the attitude of the administering Power had changed greatly in the past three years; the United Kingdom had repeatedly promised to lift the state of emergency and release the political prisoners as soon as acts of violence and terrorism ceased. The Irish delegation was certainly not asking freedom fighters to lay down their arms, but it urged both the people of Aden and the administering Power to observe a truce as soon as the Committee had adopted

a resolution on the dispatch of a mission to the Territory, in order to enable that mission to carry out its instructions in an atmosphere of peace and tranquillity.

24. He expressed the hope that members would be able to agree on the meaning of paragraph 7 and that the draft resolution could soon be put to the vote. That text would help to settle the question of Aden by peaceful means and thereby to improve what was now an explosive situation in the Territory.

25. Mr. RAKOTONIAINA (Madagascar) remarked that draft resolution A/C.4/L.841 and Add.1 pursued two basic aims: to ensure a United Nations presence in the Territory by dispatching a mission, and to cope with the situation in the Territory. As had often been stated, the mission's success would to a large extent depend on how it was received in Aden. For that reason, the sponsors of the draft resolution had made definite recommendations to the administering Power, for it was important that the United Kingdom should try to eliminate the various causes of tension and misunderstanding. His delegation consequently supported the draft resolution, in particular the ninth preambular paragraph and operative paragraphs 3 and 7. With regard to the dispatch of United Nations missions to colonial territories, Madagascar had consistently taken the position that those missions alone were able to shed light on situations which an attempt was being made to conceal. His delegation would vote for the Saudi Arabian amendment, not because it thought that amendment essential to the solution of the problem or because it capitulated before the United Kingdom ultimatum, but simply because it wanted the mission to be able to operate under optimum conditions and the United Kingdom to regard itself as bound to facilitate the mission's work in the interests of the population.

26. Mr. McCARTHY (Australia), recalling his statement of 22 November 1966 (1640th meeting), stressed once again that what mattered now was to have a mission go to Aden and discharge its duties there. Given that imperative need and the difficult circumstances in which the debate had taken place, his delegation had refrained from any statement that might have been interpreted as either praise or censure of the United Kingdom and the other parties concerned, although the draft resolution contained many provisions which in other circumstances it would have been unable to support.

27. It was a matter of surprise that after the Iraqi representative's statements recognizing the overriding importance of paragraph 5 of the draft resolution, the debate had centred mainly on paragraph 7. Like the Irish representative, he failed to see why the Saudi Arabian amendment had aroused such opposition. It might not add much to the draft resolution, but it in no way interfered with the application of paragraph 5, and would even facilitate it. To adopt it would be quite reasonable, particularly as it had been submitted by a country which was directly concerned in the Aden situation, and which would have every reason to fear an outbreak of violence. For its part, the Australian delegation would vote for the amendment and would also support any other proposal that might facilitate the dispatch of the mission and its work.

28. The Iraqi declaration with reference to paragraph 7 was somewhat surprising, for it applied only to the appointment and/or dispatch of the mission; should it not also apply to the mission's activities in the Territory?

29. No one could accuse Australia of trying to defend the United Kingdom's alleged colonialist plans. In point of fact, there was no colonialist cause to defend in Aden, for in 1968 the British were to quit the Territory and the base. The Australian delegation understood the motives of those who were fighting for independence, and it was for that reason that it had refrained from asking the petitioners any questions which they might find too embarrassing. In the present situation, however, any continuance of the acts of violence which had been reported by the United Kingdom representative would be pointless.

30. The distance the United Kingdom had covered since the abortive attempt to send a first visiting mission to the Territory was truly astonishing. It was interesting in that connexion to note that paragraph 4 recognized that the only authority responsible for the full implementation of the United Nations resolutions with regard to the Territory was the United Kingdom. That being so, how could the United Kingdom be denied the right to have its own point of view on the matter?

31. The Committee should as soon as possible take the necessary steps to send the mission to the Territory, recognizing the sincerity of the United Kingdom's appeal and bearing in mind also the appeal of the representative of Ceylon, which the Australian delegation, while not approving all its terms, recognized to be well founded.

32. Mr. APPIAH (Ghana) said that as a former political prisoner he well knew how tragic it was for a people to live in a state of emergency and at the mercy of arbitrary action, and he wished to stress how important it was that action should be taken without delay to protect the interests of the Territory's inhabitants, whose critical situation the petitioners had described, against the interests of the Sultans and those who were only waiting for the right moment to intervene. Whether or not the state of emergency was lifted, the mission should be organized so that bloodshed, torture and the massacre of women and children could be ended. What was now needed was not discussion but action. Accordingly, Ghana would support any measure aimed at facilitating a solution of the problem, and would if necessary vote even for the Saudi Arabian amendment, in order to bring the discussion to a close as quickly as possible and open the door for the adoption of practical measures.

33. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom) said it was regrettable that it had not proved possible to reach agreement in the Committee, and that, although the need for urgent action to solve the difficult problem of South Arabia was universally recognized, no decision had been taken to respond to the United Kingdom's

appeal. The United Nations was the embodiment of the hopes of the people of Aden for a better future under a truly representative Government, and it would be tragic if the United Nations failed to respond to those hopes.

34. The question of public security and the emergency measures had been debated with particular bitterness. All delegations wished the bloodshed to cease immediately so that the mission could carry out its task in the best possible conditions. He had made contact with his Government and with the High Commissioner in Aden, and had received the assurance that the High Commissioner would give the greatest possible consideration to the observations made by members of the Committee. Once again, the United Kingdom delegation declared that the state of emergency would be lifted as soon as violence had ceased. It was naturally not easy to judge at a distance the action taken by the security authorities in Aden, who were responsible for protecting the lives of the public. The truce advocated by the Irish representative would be made effective and would be respected by the United Kingdom as soon as acts of violence had ceased and the invitation to co-operate extended to all parties had been accepted.

35. The United Kingdom delegation had listened with the greatest interest to the statements made at the current meeting. In reality the differences between the various parties concerned were not great; but the essential thing was that agreement should be reached. Thus there were various possible solutions. The adoption of the Saudi Arabian amendment would of course remove all difficulties, but, failing that, the United Kingdom delegation would be inclined to accept the proposal of the representative of Ceylon and rely on the mission's own decision whether it was in a position to carry out its task and whether the British authorities were in fact prepared to co-operate with it. If therefore the Saudi Arabian amendment were not accepted, the United Kingdom Government would support that solution, and he hoped that the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/L.841 and Add.1 would give equal evidence of a spirit of conciliation by agreeing also to rely on the mission's judgement.

36. The United Kingdom Government had pledged itself to give the Territory independence on a specified date, to evacuate the base and to encourage the establishment of a fully representative Government, in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations. Members of the Committee could be assured that it would warmly welcome the mission and would not hinder its work. The future of a million inhabitants of South Arabia depended on the Committee's decision; the United Kingdom was convinced that the Committee would find a solution which would best answer their interests.

37. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the vote on the draft resolutions should be postponed until the following day.

It was so decided.

AGENDA ITEM 67

Question of Territories under Portuguese administration: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (continued) (A/6292, A/6294, A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V; A/6335/Rev.1, A/6337, A/6340, A/C.4/L.842 and Add.1)

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTION A/C.4/L.842 AND ADD.1 (continued)

38. The CHAIRMAN announced that Cameroon, Iraq and Madagascar associated themselves with the sponsors of the draft resolution on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration (A/C.4/L.842/Add.1).

The meeting rose on Friday, 2 December, at 12.5 a.m.