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*Chairman:* Miss Angie BROOKS (Liberia).

AGENDA ITEM 49

**Question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi: report of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi (A/4856, A/4865 and Corr.1, A/4970, A/4994 and Add.1 and Corr.1, A/5086; A/C.4/516 and Add.1 and 2, 517 and Corr.1, 522 and Add.1-4, 532 and Corr.1, 533-535, 537; A/C.4/L.730 and Add.1) (continued)**

**CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (A/C.4/L.730 AND ADD.1) (continued)**

1. The CHAIRMAN drew the attention of the Committee to the note by the Secretary-General (A/C.4/537) regarding the financial implications of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.4/L.730.

2. Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea) said that, as a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.4/L.730 and Add.1, he wished to reply to certain suggestions and questions concerning the draft resolution. It was clear that the draft resolution could not be perfect inasmuch as the sponsors had sought to take into account the various views expressed during the general debate, so that the final result represented something of a compromise. It might be well to preserve that compromise in view of the little time remaining, and he hoped that no amendments would be submitted which would substantially alter a text every word of which had been carefully weighed by the sponsors. At the present stage the sponsors, of whom there were a large number, could no longer automatically accept such amendments without the danger of creating a split among their own group and they would have to leave it to the Committee to decide should any amendments nevertheless be submitted.

3. At the 1293rd meeting the representative of France had pointed out that some mention should be made of the work of the special Commission for the Amnesty. The sponsors were anxious to correct what had merely been an omission on their part. Accordingly, in operative paragraph 1, the words "and the Special Commission for the Amnesty" should be inserted after the words "United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi", the words "entrusted to it" should be replaced by "entrusted to them" and the word "Commission" should read "Commissions".

4. The representative of France had further suggested that the resumed session planned for June 1962 should

be limited both in objective and in time. The sponsors did not wish to add anything to their draft resolution but they confirmed that it was quite understood that the resumed session would deal only with the question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi. It would accordingly last only as long as was absolutely necessary for the discussion of that one question.

5. Replying to the questions the USSR representative had asked at the 1294th meeting, he pointed out that the words "with a view to ensuring" in operative paragraph 3 clearly showed that the proposed commission would not be expected to carry out the tasks enumerated in the draft resolution but would work in close co-operation with the Administering Authority and national authorities for the achievement of the objectives sought. For example, the commission would not be expected to guarantee, of its own accord, the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms or to ensure the maintenance of law and order.

6. The USSR representative had asked, with reference to operative paragraph 3 (b), who would cover the expenses entailed in the return and resettlement of the refugees. Until such time as the trusteeship was terminated, the Administering Authority remained responsible for the Territory, together with the national authorities. The refugee question, therefore, was primarily the responsibility of the Administering Authority and the Government of Rwanda. Like any other Member State, Belgium could, if it wished, request the assistance of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. He himself thought that it would be wise to do so, but it lay with Belgium to take that initiative.

7. With regard to the responsibility of the United Nations commission for the maintenance of law and order, to which reference was made in operative paragraph 3 (d), he observed that, there again, the Administering Authority, which was responsible for the Territory until the termination of the trusteeship, would necessarily continue to be responsible for the maintenance of law and order. If, however, as provided in operative paragraph 5, responsibility for the maintenance of law and order had been transferred to the local Government by 30 April 1962, it would thenceforth be their responsibility to ensure it. The maintenance of law and order did not mean the defence of the Territory, for which the Administering Authority would continue to be responsible until the termination of the trusteeship. In operative paragraph 11, the United Nations was requested to assist the commission in its work by providing military observers, whose task it would be to see that no discriminatory repressive measures were taken against any of the parties concerned. Those observers would also help to train police cadres at the request of the Government concerned. Those matters were left to the discretion of the proposed commission, which should have the broadest possible terms of reference.

8. In reply to the USSR delegation's question concerning the meaning of "training missions" in operative paragraph 3 (e) and what organ would appoint those missions, he said that the reference was to military experts whom the United Nations would place at the disposal of the country for the purpose of supervising the progressive withdrawal of Belgian troops and the training of an indigenous police force. The training missions would consist of the military experts mentioned in operative paragraph 11, to be appointed by the United Nations as part of the technical assistance it would provide. The USSR representative had further inquired whether, in operative paragraph 6 (b), the sponsors of the draft resolution were referring to assistance to be provided under existing technical assistance programmes or whether they had a separate programme in mind. The answer was that the sponsors were referring to the existing programmes and were not thinking of any special programme. It was their hope, however, that the assistance already granted to Ruanda-Urundi under the existing programmes would be increased to meet the needs of the Territory; it was for that reason that they spoke of the assistance which the United Nations "could" provide for the Territory.

9. Some members of the Committee were wondering whether it was through an oversight that the sponsors failed to mention the Administering Authority in operative paragraph 4. The sponsors had not thought it necessary in that paragraph to request the Administering Authority to co-operate fully with the United Nations commission, since that request was made in operative paragraph 9. Moreover, at the conference called for in operative paragraph 6, the two local Governments and the United Nations would endeavour to work out practicable formulae for associating the two countries, particularly after independence, i.e. after the withdrawal of the Administering Authority, which would therefore have no immediate role to play in the matter. If, however, the co-operation of the Administering Authority proved essential when the time came, the United Nations commission would be justified in requesting it, in accordance with operative paragraph 9.

10. In conclusion, he pointed out that the sponsors had sought basically, in their draft resolution, to take advantage of the agreement which was apparent in the Fourth Committee on the need to restore harmony and peace in the Territory, to promote independence at an early date and to protect the unity of the Territory. He hoped that he had dispelled the misgivings of some members. The sponsors would be glad to answer any other questions in the hope that they might avoid the submission of formal amendments.

11. Mrs. SKOTTSBERG-AHMAN (Sweden) said that she would explain the position of her delegation on the question as a whole and on draft resolution A/C.4/L.730 and Add.1. The problem was serious because it was a human problem. Nevertheless, despite the many dangers and difficulties that still remained, there was reason for cautious optimism because the outlook was certainly brighter than it had been at the fifteenth session.

12. The three principal characters in the drama—namely, the United Nations, the Administering Authority and the people of the Territory—could do nothing independently of each other. Consequently, the first reason for optimism was the change in attitude of the Administering Authority and the willingness with which it had co-operated with the United Nations

Commission. She thanked the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs for the contribution he had made to the Committee's work. The second encouraging factor was that it had been possible to bring together the representatives of the Government of Rwanda and of the Opposition, thanks to the Agreement reached under the auspices of the Conciliation Group (A/C.4/532 and Corr.1). She stressed the responsibility which rested upon the people of Ruanda-Urundi, and particularly on their elected representatives, for the destiny of their country and possibly of the United Nations itself. She hoped that the political leaders of Rwanda would not take lightly the moral obligation which they had assumed in signing the conciliation Agreement.

13. A third encouraging factor was the draft resolution (A/C.4/L.730 and Add.1) now before the Committee. Its sponsors had worked hard to produce a well balanced and constructive text and the Swedish delegation found it generally acceptable. Despite the explanations given by the representative of Guinea and the appeal he had just made, she felt obliged to comment briefly on it.

14. To begin with, she felt that the wording of the first few lines of paragraph 3, contrary to the sponsors' intentions, gave the impression that the United Nations commission which was to be set up would take over the functions of the Administering Authority, whose role would be limited to co-operating with the commission. Until the trusteeship was terminated, the Belgian Government was responsible for the administration of the Territory and accountable to the Territory and accountable to the United Nations, and it was also that Government's responsibility to create conditions conducive to the peaceful accession of the Territory to independence. That fact was rightly stressed in General Assembly resolution 1605 (XV); the Administering Authority could not shirk these responsibilities, nor could the United Nations relieve it of them. She would therefore prefer the wording of operative paragraph 3 to be closer to that of resolution 1605 (XV), which requested the United Nations Commission to assist and advise the Administering Authority, the more so as that wording would correspond to the intentions of the sponsors of the draft resolution. It would be preferable also for the terms of reference of the new commission to be defined along those lines.

15. Turning to operative paragraph 3 (e), she observed that the purpose of the sub-paragraph probably met with the agreement of all—the Administering Authority, the Governments concerned and the United Nations. It was clearly necessary to ensure that an independent Ruanda-Urundi would have adequate forces of its own for the maintenance of law and order. What worried the Swedish delegation was the short time allowed to the United Nations for its training mission. Experience in the Congo had shown that such a mission could not be accomplished at a moment's notice. It was natural and desirable that Ruanda-Urundi should possess adequate forces of its own before it became independent, but the question arose whether it was reasonable, or indeed possible, to ask the United Nations to assume another such task when the efforts which had been made in the Congo had not yet proved adequate, in spite of the sacrifices made by Member States. It might be asked what would happen if on 1 July 1962, when under the terms of the draft resolution the Belgian forces would have to leave Ruanda-Urundi, the national forces were not yet in a position to ensure the maintenance of law and order. Would the United

Nations have to fill the gap, and were Member States to be asked to provide yet more troops? It was of course to be hoped that the situation in the Territory would not necessitate military intervention by the United Nations at that time, but it would be advisable not to lay down a formula so rigid as to constitute a commitment which the United Nations might be unable to honour. The Swedish delegation had given thought to the question how the sub-paragraph might best be drafted. It might begin by stating that indigenous forces should be trained with United Nations assistance, thus making possible the progressive withdrawal of Belgian military forces as rapidly as the progress of the training programme allowed. Even if it was self-evident that the process of replacing Belgian troops by indigenous troops must be progressive, it might be as well to state the fact. The whole training plan should be completed before independence and the commission would report to the General Assembly in June on its implementation.

16. Concerning operative paragraph 4, her delegation questioned whether it was appropriate for the United Nations to tell the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi what was to be the composition of their delegations to the proposed conference. It was naturally desirable that the negotiations in question should be held at as high a level as possible, but a certain latitude should be left to the Governments. The United Nations should do no more than express its wishes in that connexion. From what had been said by the representative of Guinea at the 1293rd meeting, it seemed that that was the intention of the sponsors of the draft resolution, but it would perhaps be well to make the fact somewhat clearer in the wording of the paragraph. She wondered, too, whether it would not be appropriate to provide, in that paragraph, for the participation of representatives of the Administering Authority in the conference.

17. In the last sentence of operative paragraph 4 as now drafted, the expression "in this task" referred simply to the holding of the conference, which was the only question dealt with in the paragraph. Although operative paragraph 11 rectified that point, it would perhaps be preferable, in the interest of clarity, to remove the provisions for various kinds of technical assistance from paragraph 4 and to place them in a separate paragraph referring to all the various tasks with which the commission would be entrusted.

18. With regard to operative paragraph 7, which was one of the key paragraphs of the draft resolution, her delegation did not wish to upset the compromise reached by the sponsors but she would like to point out that the wording was rather vague and that the choice of the term "envisages" did not seem very fortunate. As her delegation understood it, the intention was to say that a United Nations organ entrusted with such important tasks as the proposed commission would naturally have to report to the General Assembly. It was reasonable that its report should be submitted to the Fourth Committee before the Territory attained independence and the United Nations needed to satisfy itself that everything possible had been done to permit Ruanda-Urundi to accede to independence in the most favourable conditions possible. The question was to what extent the accession of the Territory to independence should be conditional on the commission's report; in other words, whether the date of independence should be left more or less in abeyance pending the report of the commission.

19. The present text of the draft resolution seemed to leave some doubt on that point and it was to be feared that the existence of such doubts in the minds of the peoples concerned would hardly promote stability in the Territory. Whether for individuals or for peoples, uncertainty was unsettling, and that was especially so when the peoples concerned were passing through a crucial stage in their history.

20. It might be argued that by stating that it "envisaged" setting 1 July 1962 as the date for Ruanda-Urundi's accession to independence, the General Assembly was making a solemn declaration of intent and that only the most serious reasons could make it go back on that commitment. That was certainly the way in which her delegation would understand the paragraph, but what was more important was how it would be understood by the peoples and Governments of the Territory. It must be asked whether it would give them the confidence which they needed and the incentive to rally their forces in order to prepare for independence. In her delegation's view, it was important psychologically to give both the Governments and the Opposition parties the definite impression that the United Nations was firmly resolved to terminate the trusteeship on 1 July 1962, barring, of course, some very serious turn of events. The word "envisage" did not really convey that impression.

21. In operative paragraph the formula "subject to General Assembly approval" tended to make the text still more vague and to increase the sense of uncertainty. The expression had a negative ring; the United Nations seemed to be taking back with one hand what it was offering with the other. She understood that the aim of the sponsors was to set a date forthwith, while at the same time leaving it still open to the General Assembly to re-examine the situation when it had the report of the commission before it. If that was so, it would be preferable to state the fact in a way less likely to cause anxiety and doubt in the minds of the people, who were now on the threshold of independence and were impatient to cross that threshold. The Assembly could surely set a date now, while reserving its freedom of action should circumstances make a change necessary. The mere fact that at its resumed session the Assembly would have before it the commission's report meant that it would have to take a position on the whole problem at that time. That also implied the possibility of a change of date and it should be possible to express that fact in a less negative way than in the present draft resolution.

22. The Swedish delegation regarded draft resolution A/C.4/L.730 and Add.1 as a constructive proposal which would make it possible to find a satisfactory solution to the problem before the Committee. The observations which she had made related primarily to questions of drafting and she would be very glad if the sponsors of the draft resolution felt able to take them into account.

23. U TIN MAUNG (Burma) said that the draft resolution represented a synthesis of the divergent views of the great majority of delegations and set forth the objectives of the Fourth Committee and the General Assembly. The sponsors were to be commended for the spirit of compromise and co-operation which they had shown; the only differences of opinion remaining concerned the means to be used to attain, in the very short time available, the objectives defined in the draft resolution. The best future for Ruanda-Urundi lay in the accession of that Territory to independence as a

single, united and composite State in which Rwanda and Burundi would enjoy internal autonomy. The political union of the two countries should be the objective of the people of Rwanda and Burundi and his delegation was convinced that the political leaders of the Territory now in New York had not closed their ears to pleas that they should strive to find a constitutional formula whereby the particular characteristics they so highly prized might be preserved.

24. His delegation had always been strongly in favour of the political union of Ruanda-Urundi and saw no reason to change its opinion now. As early as 1959 the Administering Authority had provided in their plans for the merger of the two parts of the Territory, but that solution had been abandoned and the Belgian colonial administration in the Territory had created conditions which had led to the disturbances and disorders of November 1959 and which were still poisoning the political atmosphere today. His delegation deeply regretted that the political leaders of Rwanda and Burundi still thought that at present the political unity of Rwanda and Burundi was undesirable and impossible to effect except by force. That was a misconception on their part, and the United Nations was not seeking to impose any preconceived constitutional or political solution upon them. As a party to the Trusteeship Agreement, the United Nations had a duty to ensure the Territory's accession to full independence in peace and harmony, and was convinced that the best solution lay in the political union of Rwanda and Burundi. Economic union would not be really effective and could not easily be extended over all fields of industry and agriculture if it were not strongly supported and organized by a centralized authority. Conditions were not the same in Europe and Africa. In the highly industrialized European countries, economic unions and alliances between small States with long-established democratic traditions and institutions gave those States distinct advantages in enabling them to withstand competition from States which were economically and militarily more powerful. But, in Ruanda-Urundi, if the two parts of the Territory were not politically united, economic union would be ineffectual in the face of Belgian economic and commercial interests which were still firmly entrenched in the Territory. The two Protocols signed at Brussels on 21 December 1961 (A/C.4/517 and Corr.1), which the Administering Authority had presented to the Committee without giving it the final say in the matter, had as it were dismantled the economic and administrative infrastructure of Ruanda-Urundi.

25. As his delegation had already stated in the general debate (1278th meeting), it had no objection to the dispatch of a commission to Ruanda-Urundi. In its view the enlarged commission envisaged in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution was not a simple observation commission. Its terms of reference were wide and its mission precise, and it had a tremendous task to perform in an extremely short period of time. In view of the many-sidedness and difficulty of that task, the commission might have to invite the representatives of the administering authority and of the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi to attend its meetings, but it would be for the commission itself to reach the final decisions and conclusions.

26. The objectives enumerated in operative paragraph 3 were extremely important and closely interrelated, so that they could only be achieved if the commission's activities were closely co-ordinated and its responsibilities divided amongst its members.

27. In view of the terms of the fifth preambular paragraph, his delegation was confident the United Nations commission would see to it that the Agreement contained in document A/C.4/532 and Corr.1 would be implemented in Rwanda in the spirit in which the Conciliation Group and the Fourth Committee had addressed themselves to the problem of reconciliation. As he understood it, operative paragraph 3 (a) applied not only to Rwanda but also to Burundi, although no serious problem existed in the latter country—unless the local Belgian administration there was considered as a political faction. The Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs had in fact seemed worried about a rupture of relations between Belgium and Burundi.

28. With regard to the problem of the refugees, a solution must be found not only for humanitarian reasons but also to ensure harmony in the political relations between the two parts of the Territory as well as between the Territory and the neighbouring countries. The question of the refugees must be settled with the utmost dispatch, and the full co-operation of all political parties and of the Administering Authority must be obtained to that end.

29. He was hopeful, with regard to operative paragraph 3 (c), that the parties concerned would see to it that the Territory's evolution towards independence would not be interrupted by fresh outbreaks of violence like those which had already marred the history of a traditionally peaceful people.

30. With regard to operative paragraph 3 (d), it was clear that the Administering Authority would remain responsible for the maintenance of law and order in the Territory until independence. It was nevertheless important that the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi should be prepared to assume the powers which would devolve upon them when the trusteeship was terminated. The objectives envisaged in operative paragraph 3 (e) must therefore be achieved as soon as possible, and the Belgian military and paramilitary forces rapidly replaced by indigenous forces. The Belgian Government must forthwith give a categorical assurance that all Belgian military and paramilitary forces would be withdrawn from the Territory by independence day. If a single Belgian soldier, whether in uniform or not, remained in an independent Ruanda-Urundi for any reason whatever, the international community would have no alternative but to regard Belgium as an aggressor under the provisions of the Charter. The words "to be completed before independence" had been inserted in operative paragraph 3 (e) by the sponsors to emphasize the urgency of that problem.

31. His delegation interpreted operative paragraph 4 as meaning that the United Nations commission would without delay convene a high-level conference at Addis Ababa; in its view, only the chairman of the commission and perhaps one other United Nations commissioner should take part in it. The second sentence of that paragraph defined the role which the United Nations commission would be called upon to play in reconciling the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi. It would be for the commission to supply the initiative and the persuasion. In view of the difficulty and delicacy of the chairman's task, the Burmese delegation hoped that the General Assembly would appoint someone with the necessary diplomatic and political experience and the firm conviction that the future of Ruanda-Urundi "lies in the emergence of a single State with economic unity, common defence and external relations, without prejudice to the internal autonomy of Rwanda and Burundi".

32. So far as operative paragraph 5 was concerned, his delegation hoped the Administering Authority would carry out its provisions within the time-limit prescribed.

33. With regard to operative paragraph 6, he thought that it would be difficult for the commission, no matter how competent it was, to report to the General Assembly on the progress made towards the achievement of its objectives before 1 June. The date envisaged in operative paragraph 7 for the termination of the trusteeship was unrealistic, for even if the Fourth Committee received the report in the first week of June, it would have to discuss extremely important questions such as the transfer of powers and the replacement of Belgian troops. His delegation would prefer to see the words "31 December 1962 at the latest" substituted for the words "1 July 1962". If everything went well, it would be possible to bring forward the date for independence, as had been done in the case of other Trust Territories. The United Nations was very anxious to give Ruanda-Urundi its independence, but a miracle would be needed for that independence to be declared on 1 July 1962. He would be glad to believe in Belgium's good faith and willingness to co-operate, and he hoped that a miracle would take place.

34. Mr. HOOD (Australia) said he was sure that all the delegation statements would help to clarify the real intentions and the hopes of the United Nations with respect to the future of Ruanda-Urundi. It was most important that the Committee should formulate a draft resolution capable of producing the anticipated results, since its implementation would involve the United Nations in considerable expenditure and it would be unfortunate if any ambiguity in the text were to cause additional expense.

35. The draft resolution covered all aspects of the problem, and was at the same time a compromise. In so far as it contained a great many points on which a majority of delegations, the Administering Authority and the representatives of the Territory were in agreement, his delegation would welcome it in the hope that it would prove workable. In that connexion he associated himself with the observations made by the Swedish representative. While all the Trusteeship Agreements were on the whole similar, the procedure followed in terminating them varied with the particular conditions in each Territory; the situation in Ruanda-Urundi was unique, and any proposal for the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement must take that fact into account. Furthermore, the termination of the trusteeship was the exclusive concern of the two parties to the Agreement—the United Nations and the Administering Authority. The United Nations must therefore not take any action towards exercising the functions which had been conferred on the Administering Authority under the Agreement; specifically, the resolutions it adopted must take into account the fact that the final decision concerning the date of the proclamation of independence rested with the Administering Authority. With some reservations, it might be said that the draft resolution before the Committee was drafted on those lines.

36. His delegation had certain criticisms to make. Operative paragraph 3, in particular, raised some problems of interpretation. Undoubtedly the sponsors of the draft resolution did not intend to contravene the provisions of the Trusteeship Agreement. However, in any decision to establish a commission with a view "to ensuring the achievement" of the enumerated objectives, it must be borne in mind that the local Adminis-

tration alone was entitled to achieve those objectives and that the commission in question could only assist it in that task. The sponsors requested the commission to ensure, *inter alia*, the return and resettlement of all refugees: but surely the only refugees concerned were those who wished to return to their country, and in that matter the measures already taken or contemplated by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees must not be overlooked. It could thus be quite proper for the draft resolution to take note of the work of that Office, since the very complex problem of the return of the refugees could not be solved by a single sentence on a sheet of paper. The commission would likewise be entrusted with the important task of ensuring the "guaranteeing of human rights and fundamental freedoms". He pointed out in that connexion that Belgium, as a signatory of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, had undertaken to carry out all its provisions. As for the maintenance of law and order and the rapid replacement of Belgian military forces by indigenous forces, he would like to see operative paragraph 3 worded more explicitly; the vagueness of its terms might expose the United Nations to unforeseen risks, and the text of the paragraph must be in accord with the fact, which was that the Administering Authority was making every effort to organize a national force. Operative paragraph 5, too, was loosely drafted: in that paragraph the new commission was requested to see that all powers of internal autonomy were transferred to the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi, although the representative of the Administering Authority had already given assurances that those powers had in fact been transferred. If the wording of that paragraph was changed to meet the point he had made, his delegation would be able to vote for it.

37. The main purpose of the draft resolution was to find a compromise between the positions of those who, like the Administering Authority, thought that it would be dangerous not to set the date for the proclamation of independence and of those who thought that it would be still more dangerous to set a date before all outstanding problems had been settled. That being the case, operative paragraph 7 was illogical for it only "envisaged" the setting of a date. He saw no reason why a specific date should not be indicated, subject, of course, to approval by the General Assembly. The manner in which the paragraph was worded added to the uncertainty—which the Administering Authority wished most of all to avoid.

38. His delegation would support any amendment that would clarify the course of proceedings at the resumed session of the Assembly in June. There seemed, for instance, to be a contradiction between operative paragraph 6, which requested the commission to submit a report before the resumed session in respect of "the progress made towards the achievement" of its objectives, and operative paragraph 8, stating that the Assembly considered "that the implementation of the provisions of this resolution" would "ensure the emergence of Ruanda-Urundi to independence... and the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement at the session envisaged". Did that mean that the Assembly would have to take its decision concerning the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement in the light of the information contained in the commission's interim report? There seemed also to be a contradiction between the terms of operative paragraph 7, whereby the Assembly would envisage resuming its session "in the first week of June, 1962", and those of operative paragraph 10,

whereby the Assembly would authorize the commission, were circumstances so to require, "to return to United Nations Headquarters and request the President of the General Assembly to reconvene the General Assembly immediately". In view of the short time remaining before 1 June 1962, the second provision seemed pointless, or in any event a mere duplication of the first. Admittedly, the commission for Ruanda-Urundi could accomplish a great deal, but at any moment new factors might come into play and prevent the commission from dealing with all aspects of its mission in the seven or eight weeks that the mission would actually last. Nor should it be forgotten that the commission had to convene a conference at Addis Ababa, and that, according to the information furnished by the representative of the Administering Authority, that conference would have no easy task. With respect

to that conference, he pointed out that according to operative paragraph 4, the role of the commission would be "to endeavour to reconcile the points of view of the two Governments" that seemed somewhat odd, since in that matter their points of view were absolutely identical.

39. It was essential not to lose sight of reality and not to assign to the United Nations commission which would go to the Territory a mission that it manifestly would be unable to accomplish within the short time at its disposal. Under the circumstances, the Fourth Committee should take steps to terminate the trusteeship under the most favourable conditions and in the best interests of all the parties concerned.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.