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AGENDA ITEM 23

Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: A/5800/Rev.1, chapters VII, IX, X and XIII-XXVI; A/6000/Rev.1, chapters IX-XXV (continued) (A/5959 and Corr.1; A/6084, A/6094; A/C.4/L.809/Rev.1 and Add.1, L.810 and Add.1, L.814/Rev.1)

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (continued) (A/C.4/L.809/REV.1 AND ADD.1, L.810 AND ADD.1, L.814/REV.1)

1. Mr. DIAZ GONZALEZ (Venezuela) said that he would not have spoken on the draft resolution (A/C.4/L.809/Rev.1 and Add.1) if the sponsors of that text had taken into consideration the legitimate claims of the Venezuelan people and Government concerning part of the territory of Venezuela occupied by the administering Power and annexed to the colonial territory designated as British Guiana. Venezuela, having justice and right on its side, had expected that without prejudging the merits of the question, the Afro-Asian group would at least have helped it to continue the search through negotiation of a solution to its dispute with the United Kingdom. It had not, however, obtained the desired support, although it had itself in the past always supported the cause of the colonial peoples, even at the time when there was only a minority in the United Nations to do so. Venezuela itself had always acted on the principle that colonial problems, whatever their individual characteristics, all had essentially the same importance and deserved the same attention.

2. The fourth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.4/809/Rev.1 and Add.1 anticipated that British Guiana would accede to independence in the most favourable conditions. For that to come about, the racial problem which the new independent State had to face must not be complicated by a territorial dispute with a neighbouring State. Many Members of the Organization had inherited disputes that went back to the colonial period, and some of them, disregarding the principles of the Charter to which they had subscribed, had even resorted to force to recover the territories that they had considered theirs. Venezuela, however, refused to entertain such a solution, at least until all peaceful means of settlement had been employed. After long years of waiting and after Venezuela had submitted its case to the United Nations, the United Kingdom had finally decided in 1962 to implement the statement formulated in agreement with Venezuela at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly that it would seek a solution to the territorial issue between them (see A/5313, ^{1/} para. 4).

3. He accordingly asked the sponsors, and more particularly the members of the Afro-Asian group, to insert in their draft resolution a paragraph calling on the United Kingdom and Venezuela to intensify their efforts in order to solve the territorial issue between Venezuela and British Guiana before the date set for that colony's accession to independence. The inclusion of such a paragraph would be consistent with the fourth preambular paragraph to which he had already referred. If the problem remained unsolved, the peace and good relationships which should exist between neighbouring and fraternal countries would be prejudiced for the future. In support of his argument, he recalled the statement made by the representative of Afghanistan at the 349th meeting of the Special Political Committee, during the seventeenth session of the General Assembly.

4. His country had always made a close study of the colonial problems concerning other regions of the world when they had been submitted to the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples or to the General Assembly, so as to be able to vote with a full knowledge of the facts; it had been entitled to think that the friendly countries in the other continents would act in the same way on colonial problems that concerned America. It had been said that Venezuela had not presented its case in the United Nations and that was why the Venezuelan request had not been taken into account in the draft resolution submitted. In actual fact, the question of British Guiana had first

^{1/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 88.

been considered by the United Nations at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly, in connexion with the agenda item on information from Non-Self-Governing Territories; on that occasion, the Permanent Representative of Venezuela had sent the Secretary-General a memorandum dated 14 February 1962 setting out the Venezuelan Government's views and its reservations with regard to the territorial problem of Guiana (A/C.4/536).^{2/}

5. When the question of British Guiana had been taken up at the 1302nd meeting of the Fourth Committee, the Venezuelan delegation had spoken in support of the British colony's independence, though entering very categorical reservations with regard to Venezuela's rights to the part of that country's territory annexed by the administering Power (Guayana Esequiba). The statement which the Venezuelan representative had made on that occasion had been circulated as document A/C.4/540. Furthermore, the question of the frontiers between Venezuela and the territory of British Guiana had been referred to the General Assembly at its seventeenth session as agenda item 88. His delegation had requested the inclusion of that item in the agenda in a letter dated 18 August 1962 which had been accompanied by a memorandum (A/5168 and Add.1).^{3/} That memorandum had been supplemented by the detailed statement which the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Venezuela had made at the 348th meeting of the Special Political Committee, the text of which appeared in document A/SPC/71.^{3/} Following the discussion concerning the frontier between Venezuela and the territory of British Guiana and having regard to the fact that the representatives of the United Kingdom and Venezuela had announced that direct discussions were about to open between the parties concerned, namely the Governments of the United Kingdom and Venezuela and that of British Guiana, the Special Political Committee, on a motion by the Chilean representative, had decided (350th meeting) to adjourn consideration of the question, and it had been understood that the parties concerned would inform the United Nations of the results of the conversations they were about to hold. At its 1191st plenary meeting, the General Assembly had noted the Special Political Committee's report on that subject (A/5313).

6. He then described in detail the successive measures taken by the United Kingdom and Venezuelan Governments to give effect to the statement approved by the General Assembly, measures which had culminated in the communiqué sent jointly by the Governments concerned to the Secretary-General of the United Nations; that communiqué was the subject of circular note No. PO 220 VENE (2). The expert reports referred to in that communiqué had long since been submitted to the Governments concerned and had been thoroughly studied, and the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom and Venezuela had agreed to hold a meeting in London on 9 and 10 December 1965, at which the Government of British Guiana would be represented.

7. As the statement approved by the General Assembly had been implemented and progress made,

^{2/} *Ibid.*, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda items 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 44.

^{3/} *Ibid.*, Seventeenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 88.

his delegation had refrained from bringing the matter up again in the General Assembly or in the Special Committee, but it had always expressly reserved its rights whenever the problem had been touched upon in any United Nations body. In that connexion, he reminded the members of the Committee of the various occasions on which his delegation had reaffirmed in the Special Committee, the General Assembly or the Special Political Committee his country's rights to the disputed part of the territory of British Guiana. The last major statement on the subject had been made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Venezuela at the 1350th meeting of the General Assembly, at the current session.

8. It was altogether wrong, therefore, to say that the Committee had not been advised of the existence of the Venezuelan claim. The matter had been referred to the United Nations and it had been precisely because the General Assembly had taken a decision which the parties concerned were at the present time engaged in carrying out that Venezuela had confined itself to entering reservations. But now that the United Kingdom Government had just announced the date on which British Guiana was to become independent, Venezuela found it inadmissible that the draft resolution before the Committee should take that new factor into account but should make no mention whatever of the Venezuelan people's interests and rights.

9. His country had never opposed and did not now oppose independence for British Guiana; quite the contrary. But the United Kingdom could dispose only of the territory that belonged to it; pursuant to the principle *uti possidetis*, that part of Guiana west of the Essequibo river was Venezuelan territory, since that river had marked the frontier of the Captaincy-General of Venezuela when the latter had acquired the status of a sovereign nation in 1810. When Venezuela, the heir of the Spanish Crown, had proclaimed its independence on that date, the British colony had not existed and the territories which had later been ceded by the Netherlands to the United Kingdom under the Convention signed in London on 13 August 1814 had ended at the right bank of the Essequibo river.

10. In a brief historical survey of the problem, he recalled that, under the Treaty of Münster signed in 1648, Spain had recognized the independence of the Netherlands and Dutch sovereignty over Dutch possessions in America. However, the charter creating the New Dutch West India Company, registered in 1674, designated as Dutch possessions in Latin America only the establishments on the Essequibo and the Pomeroon, and the maps of the period showed that Dutch establishments had not extended further. Further inland and to the south, Dutch penetration had been halted by the Cuyuni and Mazaruni rapids, and the Spaniards had refused to allow the Dutch beyond the boundaries of the territories which they had occupied at the time of the signing of the Treaty of Münster. He cited as proof the many incidents which had occurred in the eighteenth century between the Spaniards and the Dutch, mentioning in particular the construction of a fort armed with guns in the Moruca cove in 1779 to drive out the Dutch, who had

established an outpost there. He then cited evidence dating back to 1770, 1787, and 1794 showing that the Dutch had never occupied the coast beyond the Moruca river, and that the frontier between the Spanish and Dutch colonies had been very well defined.

11. In 1796, because of the situation which had arisen in Europe, Great Britain had occupied the Dutch establishments by military force; but, by the London Convention of 13 August 1814, the Netherlands had ceded to Great Britain sovereignty only over the Demerara, Essequibo and Berbice establishments. Those establishments, situated on the right bank of the Essequibo or on that river, had never been challenged by Venezuela, and included the zones actually occupied by the Dutch and recognized by the Treaty of Münster of 1648. The territory ceded by the Netherlands in 1814 had covered some 20,000 square miles.

12. Both private and official British sources of the period of the military occupation of the Dutch territories in Guiana and those of the period following the Convention of 1814 confirmed the frontiers of the territory which had passed under British control. In 1797, for example, one year after the *de facto* occupation by Great Britain, the medical inspector of British military hospitals had written that the outpost on the Moruca river was the most distant point of the Essequibo colony. In 1838, the Governor of British Guiana had written that the Pomeroon, at the western end of the Essequibo, might be considered as the frontier of the country. Lastly, a decision by the Demerara court in 1840 showed that the Moruca outpost had been regarded by the British as foreign territory.

13. The British themselves had recognized, therefore, that the Moruca river constituted the western frontier of the colony. That view had coincided with that of the Venezuelan authorities of the time. Thus, in 1817, Simón Bolívar, the Liberator, had declared that the Venezuelan territories in Guiana extended from the Río Grande up to, but not including, the Moruca fort.

14. The situation had changed with the seizure by the United Kingdom of a part of Venezuelan territory by force during the Victorian era. Venezuela, then in a weakened state, had had to confine itself to diplomatic protests; in 1887, it had broken off relations with Great Britain in order to protest, before the whole world, against British violations of the rights which Venezuela had expressly inherited from Spain under the Treaty of Madrid of 1845. Like Spain, Venezuela had never accepted any challenge to its rights to the province of Guiana, which had formed part of the Captaincy-General of Venezuela. According to a Soviet historian, Vladimirov, the struggle between the great Powers for hegemony over the western hemisphere had been given greater prominence by the United States intervention in the Anglo-Venezuelan territorial dispute, a dispute brought about by the designs of British capital on certain important regions of Venezuela. Those designs had resulted in the occupation of Venezuelan territory, confirmed by an arbitral—or, rather, an arbitrary—award handed down on 30 October 1899 by a panel of British and American arbitrators under the chairmanship of an Anglophile Russian. The Venezuelan representative had stated on 6 October last, at the 1350th plenary meeting of

the General Assembly, that his country regarded the arbitral award of 1899 as having no validity whatever, and the President of the Venezuelan Republic had also stated recently that his Government would pursue its struggle for the restoration of the rights of which Venezuela had been unlawfully deprived.

15. It was natural, in those circumstances, for the Venezuelan delegation to oppose the adoption of a draft resolution which did not contain any formulation at all which could be regarded, not as endorsing, but as merely reserving Venezuela's rights. His delegation had always voted in favour of resolutions calling for independence for British Guiana, and its position in that regard had not changed, but British Guiana's accession to independence did not imply that sovereign rights belonging to Venezuela by virtue of the *uti possidetis juris* of 1810 had lapsed. The administering Power could not dispose of Venezuelan territory as though it belonged to it. While it was true that colonies should become independent in accordance with the principle of self-determination, colonial territories which had been seized by force from a sovereign State could only be decolonized by being reunited with the State from which they had been wrested. That was the only procedure consistent with the principle of the territorial integrity of sovereign States as stated in the United Nations Charter and in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), paragraph 6. He then cited a motion adopted at the First Special Inter-American Conference held at Washington in December 1964, to the effect that the Council of the Organization of American States would take no decision on an application for membership submitted by a political entity whose territory was the subject of a dispute between a member of the Organization of American States and a State situated outside the American continent, until that dispute had been settled by peaceful means.

16. While his Government favoured the accession of British Guiana to independence, it could not support a draft resolution which, by deliberately omitting any reference to the claims of Venezuela, was prejudicial to the latter's interest.

17. Mr. DE PINIES (Spain), supported by Mr. GEIGER (Chile), Mr. MOUSHOUTAS (Cyprus) and Mr. URRUTIA (Argentina), proposed that in view of its importance the Venezuelan representative's statement should be reproduced in full as a Committee document.

It was so decided.^{4/}

18. Mr. GBEHO (Ghana) explained that when they had been preparing the draft resolution the sponsors had decided, after a conversation with the Venezuelan representative, to do some research themselves. They had found that under the arbitral award handed down at the end of the nineteenth century one part of the disputed territory had been awarded to Venezuela and the other to British Guiana. Venezuela, dissatisfied with that decision, had brought the matter before the General Assembly at the sixteenth session, claiming that, according to a letter opened after his death, one of the members of the Tribunal of Arbitration had admitted that he had made his decision against his

^{4/} The complete text of the statement was subsequently circulated as document A/C.4/661.

will, under outside pressure. The sponsors of the draft resolution had felt, however, that they were in no way competent to decide on the justice of the Venezuelan claim, and they categorically rejected any suggestion that the settlement of the dispute in question should be regarded as a prerequisite for Guiana's accession to independence. He was glad to note that Venezuela was not opposed to British Guiana's accession to independence and wished to see the problem settled by peaceful means, and at the same time, that the United Kingdom Government had never refused to discuss the question, which was in fact to be taken up at tripartite talks shortly to be held in London. The Committee, for its part, must keep to its terms of reference, which covered decolonization, and not become involved in the settlement of territorial disputes. The sponsors of the draft resolution had no wish to challenge Venezuela's territorial claims; on the contrary, they hoped that a solution might be found at the London talks, preferably before 26 May 1966, but they could not accept the idea that the settlement of the dispute should be a prerequisite for independence.

19. Mr. DIAZ GONZALEZ (Venezuela) said that he had never had it in mind to ask the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/L.809/Rev.1 and Add.1 to take a stand on the substance of the matter; on the other hand, he could not acquiesce in Venezuela's rights being prejudiced by omission. Venezuela had never recognized the 1899 arbitral award, the arbitrary character of which had been denounced throughout the world, even in the United Kingdom itself. He cited a statement which Lord Salisbury had made at the time in the British Parliament, impudently jubilant over Britain's success; the award, he had said, had given Great Britain the greater part of the disputed territory, whereas the part awarded to Venezuela was not worth so much as a pound. His delegation was not attempting to make British Guiana's independence contingent upon the settlement of the territorial question. It was not asking the Committee to decide on the merits of the case, nor was it insisting that the issue should be settled before British Guiana became independent. It realized that the two questions were entirely separate. All it wanted was that at the time of British Guiana's attainment of independence, the Committee should not prejudice Venezuela's interests by silence but should request the parties concerned to settle the existing dispute.

20. Miss BROOKS (Liberia) regretted that the Venezuelan delegation should have seen fit to plead its case before the Fourth Committee, which was concerned only with problems of decolonization, when Venezuela had never before made its approval of British Guiana's accession to independence contingent upon the settlement of the territorial question. She pointed out that General Assembly resolution 1418 (XIV) concerning the date of independence of Somaliland under Italian administration had contained no reference to the territorial dispute existing at the time between Somaliland and Ethiopia—a dispute which had subsequently been settled by the parties concerned.

21. Mr. ALJUBOURI (Iraq) said that it would of course have been best if the territorial dispute could

have been settled peacefully before British Guiana became independent so that the new State, relieved of that problem, could devote its full energy to consolidating its authority and developing the country. Nevertheless, it was to be hoped that a peaceful solution based on the feelings of friendship between the Venezuelan and Guianese peoples could be found without undue delay.

22. Mr. O'HARA (United States of America), referring to operative paragraphs 3 and 4 of draft resolution A/C.4/L.810 and Add.1, said that several members of the Committee, particularly those representing communist countries, had referred unfavourably to the military base in the United States Territory of Guam, one of the Territories listed in the first preambular paragraph of the draft resolution. Operative paragraphs 3 and 4 were out of place and should be deleted. Nothing in the United Nations Charter prohibited the establishment or maintenance of military bases in the Non-Self-Governing Territories. The maintenance of such bases was a sovereign right of nations deriving from their duty and obligation to assume their own defence and the security of their peoples. Contrary to the claim in operative paragraph 3, the bases safeguarded the freedom and independence of the Territories in question. He was sure that all members of the Committee knew why, since 1945, the United States had found it necessary to devote a large part of its resources to military preparedness; when the need for such measures of defence of his nation and of the free world ceased to exist, the United States would move with alacrity to devote those resources more directly to making a better life for its people and for all mankind. Until then, the United States Government would continue to maintain its defence preparedness in all ways it considered necessary, including the location of facilities in Territories under its administration. He hoped that the great majority of the Members of the United Nations would not be taken in by the tactics of those who sought to capitalize on their genuine anti-colonial feelings in order to undermine the strength of the nations which defended freedom in the world. His delegation would vote against operative paragraphs 3 and 4 and, if they were adopted, against the draft resolution as a whole. If those paragraphs were rejected, it would gladly vote in favour of the draft resolution as a whole.

23. Mr. Chiping H. C. KIANG (China) said that draft resolution A/C.4/L.809/Rev.1 and Add.1 reflected the desire for balance mentioned by the Ghanaian representative in his statement at the previous meeting. All members of the Committee hoped that the leaders of British Guiana would bury their differences and that the Territory would attain independence in an atmosphere of mutual trust. He was glad that an understanding concerning the date of independence and the protection of minorities had finally been achieved, thanks to the wisdom of the United Kingdom Government and of Mr. Burnham, the Premier of British Guiana. There was now every reason to hope that independent Guyana would give an example of a harmonious and prosperous multiracial society. His delegation would vote for the draft resolution, but its vote should not be construed as prejudging any other issues raised in the course of the debate.

24. Mr. SIDI BABA (Morocco) said that while listening to the statement of the United States representative on draft resolution A/C.4/L.810 and Add.1, he had realized that the sponsors had perhaps failed to give sufficient thought to all the implications of their text. His delegation, for one, would like to discuss the matter further with other sponsors before the draft resolution was put to the vote. It believed that it was in the interests of decolonization that the draft resolutions should be adopted by as large a majority as possible.

25. Mr. DE PINIES (Spain) said that his delegation would vote for draft resolution A/C.4/L.809/Rev.1 and Add.1, but its vote should not be interpreted as a move to deprive Venezuela of its rights.

26. With regard to draft resolution A/C.4/L.810 and Add.1, his delegation feared that pending general and complete disarmament it would be impossible for all military bases to be dismantled without creating an imbalance that would threaten world peace; nevertheless, he wished to make it clear that his country was opposed to the establishment of military bases in a Territory against the wishes of the population. His delegation would vote against paragraphs 3 and 4 if they were put to the vote separately, but it would vote in favour of the draft resolutions as a whole.

27. With respect to draft resolution A/C.4/L.814/Rev.1, concerning Gibraltar, he wished to thank those delegations which had urged the negotiated settlement of the issue; he requested a roll-call vote on that draft resolution.

28. Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Ireland) said that he would vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/L.809/Rev.1 and Add.1, without thereby wishing to prejudge the outcome of the territorial dispute between British Guiana and Venezuela.

29. He would also vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/L.814/Rev.1.

30. With regard to draft resolution A/C.4/L.810 and Add.1, his delegation could vote in favour of it only if operative paragraphs 3 and 4 were deleted; otherwise it would have to abstain. Although his delegation believed that the Committee's main task was to ensure the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, it felt bound to point out that nothing in that Declaration or in the Charter condemned the establishment of military bases as an obstacle to the freedom and independence of Non-Self-Governing Territories. Military bases found their justification in the ideological differences that gave rise to rival and opposing blocs. Ireland was not a member of any bloc or military alliance and had always striven to maintain independence of judgement on all questions brought before the United Nations. To vote in favour of operative paragraphs 3 and 4 of draft resolution A/C.4/L.810 and Add.1 would in its view amount to taking sides in the ideological dispute. It held that by adopting operative paragraphs 3 and 4 the Committee would do a disservice to the cause of the freedom and independence of colonial peoples.

31. Mr. IZADI (Iran) said that like the Iraqi representative he would vote for draft resolution A/C.4/

L.809/Rev.1 and Add.1, without thereby taking sides in the territorial dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana. He sincerely hoped that that dispute would be settled before independence was attained, but the Territory's development towards the final goal of independence should not be hampered by any international dispute, whatever its nature.

32. Mr. BROWN (United Kingdom) said that his delegation found much in draft resolution A/C.4/L.809/Rev.1 and Add.1 with which it agreed and it welcomed the recognition of the decision of the recent London conference that British Guiana was soon to become independent, but it would be obliged to abstain in the vote. Operative paragraph 1 approved recommendations by the Special Committee which had been overtaken by the results of the recent constitutional conference, and operative paragraph 3 referred to internal security matters which were constitutionally the responsibility of the elected Ministers of the British Guiana Government.

33. Referring to the statement made earlier in the meeting by the Venezuelan representative, he recalled that it had been agreed in the United Nations in 1962, at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, that the three Governments concerned would examine and discuss the documentary material and inform the United Nations of the results of their conversations (see A/5313, para. 4). The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Venezuela would be meeting with the British and British Guianese Ministers that week; it was unfortunate that the Venezuelan representative should have raised the issue at a time so close to that meeting.

34. With regard to Venezuela's claims concerning the boundary with British Guiana, the present boundary had been determined under the arbitral award of 3 October 1899 and both Venezuela and the United Kingdom had been and still were under a treaty obligation to accept that award. Both sides had signed an agreement in 1905 recording the results of the boundary commission's work; the Treaty of Arbitration had been signed in 1897 and later ratified. Venezuela had not begun to criticize the award until 1944, and had denounced it only in 1962. Moreover, Venezuelan representatives in the Special Committee, the General Assembly and other United Nations bodies had always stated categorically that Venezuela did not oppose early independence for British Guiana and that Venezuela regarded the question of independence and the question of the boundary as entirely separate issues. In that connexion he referred the Committee to the statement made by the representative of Venezuela at the 270th meeting of the Special Committee (see A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VII, para. 176) and the statement made on 6 October 1965 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Venezuela in the General Assembly (1350th plenary meeting), to the effect that Venezuela had never taken the position that the independence of British Guiana was conditional upon prior settlement of the frontier problem. He hoped that the Venezuelan statement did not represent a reversal of that position, with which his delegation agreed. Lastly, he was surprised that the Venezuelan representative had cited in support of his argument paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1514

(XV), which provided that any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country was incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. As the United Kingdom delegation had previously demonstrated, that paragraph referred to efforts that might be made to disrupt the territorial integrity of colonial territories, but clearly it was Venezuela which was now intent on dismembering its weak neighbour on the very eve of independence, on the basis of unfounded claims. The United Kingdom Government reaffirmed once again its sovereignty over the whole of the territory of British Guiana. It hoped that the forthcoming talks between the three Governments concerned would prove successful; meanwhile, he hoped that nothing would be said or done which might prejudice those talks.

35. In draft resolution A/C.4/L.810 and Add.1, concerning twenty-six Territories, his delegation could not accept operative paragraphs 3 and 4, which referred to military bases in the Territories concerned. There was no justification for the assertion that the establishment of military bases constituted an obstacle to the constitutional development or independence of those Territories, or that the bases were unwelcome to the people. As Lord Caradon had stated in the General Assembly on 1 December (1386th plenary meeting), it was the United Kingdom Government's expressed view that no base was morally or militarily defensible unless it had the support of the people of the Territory in which it was situated. To the extent that bases existed in the Territories listed in draft resolution A/C.4/L.810 and Add.1, the people concerned were proud to play their part in the defence of freedom. In his opinion, those were questions for them, and not for the Committee. His delegation would therefore vote against paragraphs 3 and 4. It also wished to reserve its position regarding paragraphs 1 and 5: its reservations on the recommendations of the Special Committee on the twenty-six Territories concerned were already on record. Consequently it would not support draft resolution A/C.4/L.810 and Add.1, and its vote would be determined in the light of the outcome of the voting on paragraphs 3 and 4, if a separate vote was requested on those paragraphs.

36. Turning to draft resolution A/C.4/L.814/Rev.1, concerning Gibraltar, he said that the United Kingdom Government's position with regard to talks on that question with the Spanish Government had already been made known. His Government had no doubt as to its sovereignty over Gibraltar, and would take all necessary measures to defend the interests of the inhabitants of Gibraltar. However, having regard to the consensus adopted by the Special Committee (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. X, para. 209) and the communications which the United Kingdom Government had addressed to the Spanish Government, his Government was willing to entertain proposals for conversations with the Spanish Government but could not do so while an abnormal situation existed on the frontier between Gibraltar and Spain. He reaffirmed the reservations made by the United Kingdom delegation immediately after the adoption of the consensus in question (*ibid.*, paras. 206-208).

37. With regard to the "Red Book" to which the representative of Spain had referred in the General As-

sembly the previous day (1389th plenary meeting), the United Kingdom Government had not had time to study it but feared that the language used in it would not help to create the right atmosphere for talks, and the courses of action which Spain regarded as open to it under the Treaty of Utrecht could be interpreted as a form of duress under which no Government could be expected to agree to negotiate. His delegation had already made it clear that it regarded the restrictions on the border as a deliberate attempt by Spain to influence the situation at the expense of the interests of the inhabitants of Gibraltar and as an obstacle to the talks envisaged by the Special Committee and by the draft resolution under consideration. He hoped that Spain would promptly remove the causes of delay in opening the conversations.

38. On those understandings and with those reservations his delegation would vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/L.814/Rev.1.

39. Mr. BHABHA (Pakistan) said that he would vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/L.809/Rev.1 and Add.1, concerning British Guiana. In common with the representatives of Iraq and Iran, he wished to assure the representative of Venezuela that he had no intention of influencing the territorial dispute between that country and British Guiana in any way. He hoped that the dispute would be settled to the satisfaction of all parties.

40. Since Pakistan was opposed to the establishment of military bases by any nation in territories other than that nation's own, it would vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/L.810 and Add.1.

41. It would also vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/L.814/Rev.1, concerning Gibraltar.

42. Mr. DIAZ GONZALEZ (Venezuela), exercising his right of reply, said that the Liberian and United Kingdom representatives had quoted the same sources as he concerning his country's position with regard to the attainment of independence by British Guiana. He wished to state once again that Venezuela was not setting any prior condition for the independence of that Territory. On the contrary, as one of the first countries to advocate the decolonization of independent countries and peoples, it was happy to see the movement spread to Latin American countries. Its only objection to draft resolution A/C.4/L.809/Rev.1 and Add.1 was that the sponsors had deliberately omitted to mention Venezuela's territorial claims, thus prejudicing its rights. Contrary to what had been suggested by the representative of Liberia, Venezuela had brought its territorial claims in British Guiana before the United Nations since General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) applied equally well to usurped territories and meant that such territories should be restored to the countries from which they had been taken. Perhaps, however, the representative of Liberia did not regard those territories as colonial territories. Naturally his delegation had no intention of asking the Fourth Committee to rule on Venezuela's dispute with the United Kingdom; all it asked was that Venezuela's rights should not be impaired by an omission which had not been made good in one way or another in the draft resolution under consideration. What his delegation was asking was in no way

prejudicial to the independence of the future Guyana. Indeed, Guyana could count on the friendship of Venezuela, which was willing to give it both material and moral assistance.

43. Mr. ADAN (Somalia), referring to the statement made by the representative of Liberia, pointed out that the Fourth Committee had recognized the existence of a territorial dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia. Similarly, he recognized that there was such a dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana, and he hoped that a satisfactory solution to that problem would be found during the forthcoming talks in London before the attainment of British Guiana's independence. However, he did not think the Committee should deal with questions other than decolonization, and he would therefore vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/L.809/Rev.1 and Add.1 as it stood, without prejudice to the results of the meeting which was to take place that week between the United Kingdom and Venezuelan Ministers.

44. Mr. KANO (Nigeria) deplored the United States representative's attempt to inject the cold war into draft resolution A/C.4/L.810 and Add.1, concerning twenty-six Territories. As to paragraphs 3 and 4 of that draft resolution, members were entitled to ask for the removal of military bases, which they regarded as a serious threat to the independence of nations and as a vestige of colonialism. The United States itself had sounded the alarm in 1962 when it had felt threatened by the presence of missiles in Cuba. Lastly, he found it hard to credit the United States representative's assertions that the people of Non-Self-Governing Territories welcomed the establishment of bases in their countries. Everyone knew

that there was no equality in their relationship with the administering Powers, and that their consent was often wrung from them under duress.

45. Miss BROOKS (Liberia) wished to make it clear that her delegation had not taken sides in the territorial dispute to which Venezuela was a party. She had merely wished to point out that disputes of that kind had never been referred to in draft resolutions adopted by the Fourth Committee on questions of decolonization. She hoped that the dispute in question would be settled amicably between the parties concerned.

46. Mr. SIDI BABA (Morocco) said that he would vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/L.809/Rev.1 and Add.1, concerning British Guiana, and hoped that the Territory would soon take its rightful place in the United Nations. However, he joined the representatives of Iran, Iraq and Pakistan in specifying that his vote should not be construed as disregard or non-recognition of Venezuela's rights.

47. He would also vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/L.814/Rev.1, concerning Gibraltar. That problem deserved the attention of the General Assembly, and Morocco attached particular importance to its peaceful and amicable solution within the frame of reference of decolonization and in accordance with the legitimate rights of the Spanish Government. Needless to say, its friendly attitude towards Spain should not be regarded as a hostile attitude towards the United Kingdom, to which his country was bound by age-old friendship.

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.