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*Chairman: Mr. ACHKAR Marof (Guinea).*

Statement by the representative of Haiti in connexion with the recent catastrophes in Haiti and Italy

1. Mr. JEAN-LOUIS (Haiti) thanked the members of the Committee for the kind words of sympathy which they had addressed to his country at the 1444th meeting in connexion with the recent hurricane.
2. He expressed sympathy to the Italian delegation, whose country had also been struck by a disaster.

AGENDA ITEM 75

Question of Southern Rhodesia: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (A/5446/Rev.1, chap. III; A/5448 and Add.1-5; A/C.4/603; A/C.4/606) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

3. Mr. RANA (Nepal) said that, since the time of the first raising of the Southern Rhodesian question in the United Nations, the basic character of the problem in that Territory had not changed: it remained that of ensuring that every adult in the Territory had the right to vote and to exercise basic human rights, regardless of colour or race. The problem was, however, one of increasing gravity and there was every day a growing risk of its degenerating into an open crisis jeopardizing international peace. Conscious of the need to find an urgent and just solution to that question, his delegation was grateful to all the delegations that had dealt with it in a rational and exhaustive manner, and particularly to the delegation of Ghana, which had set it forth with admirable logic and lucidity.
4. The Nepalese Constitution of 1962, which enunciated the principles of panchayat democracy, guar-

anteed to every citizen equal rights, including the right to vote, without distinction as to race, colour, religion or sex. The people of Nepal believed that an individual must be judged, not from the standpoint of his race or the colour of his skin, but by his qualities and capabilities. They felt, therefore, that all the inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia should enjoy equal rights and privileges, in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter and the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.

5. His delegation reiterated its past appeals to the United Kingdom Government to continue to be worthy of its illustrious tradition. The United Kingdom had been the first to discern the "wind of change" in Africa; its sense of justice and its spirit of compromise and adaptation should inspire it to comply with the resolutions of the General Assembly and of the recent Summit Conference of Independent African States held at Addis Ababa. If the United Kingdom persisted in ignoring world opinion, as expressed in the United Nations and elsewhere, it would have to face the disastrous political consequences which would inevitably follow. The Nepalese Government fully supported the brave people of Southern Rhodesia who had suffered so much and gained so little. The 1961 Constitution had aggravated the already tense situation in Southern Rhodesia, and the present policy of the Field Government was in danger of creating in that Territory a system of apartheid similar to that in South Africa. His delegation could not understand how the United Kingdom was able to support such a Constitution, when that country had been one of the authors of the United Nations Charter and, in the case of Malta for example, had adopted an entirely different attitude. Would it now try to prevent the inevitable dawning of the era of the peoples' liberation? The Nepalese Government, which had close ties of friendship with the United Kingdom, would be very sorry if that were to happen. It hoped that the United Kingdom would recall, in the case of Southern Rhodesia, the role it had played in history and would remain faithful to the principles which had won for it the respect of many peoples.

6. Nor could his delegation understand the attitude of the white settlers in Africa, and particularly those of Southern Rhodesia. If it was because of their determination to halt the rising tide of nationalism that they wished the armed forces to be transferred to them, they should ponder the history of mankind, which had often shown that force could not be used successfully against nationalism. But if on the other hand they were afraid, as a minority group, of being exploited by the majority of the population, their misgivings should be dispelled by the example of Kenya and by the declarations of all responsible leaders of the African continent, who had always advocated just and equal treatment for all inhabitants of Africa without distinction as to colour.

7. His delegation felt that the question before the Committee went beyond the context of Southern Rhodesia. There was the wider question whether human beings of different colour and origin could live in peace with each other or must exist in an atmosphere of perpetual hatred and strife, constituting a constant threat to world peace. At a time when nations of different ideologies and social and economic systems were learning how to coexist, it did not seem too much to expect that citizens of the same nation could live together in peace and full equality of rights, regardless of their race and colour.

8. His delegation had been one of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/L.774 and Add.1 and 2, and sincerely hoped that the United Kingdom Government would act upon that resolution once it had been adopted by the General Assembly. The strength of the United Nations lay in the faith of the people of the world, who saw in it an instrument of international peace and justice. The question of Southern Rhodesia was a direct challenge to the basic principles laid down in the Charter. Member States were therefore bound to ensure that world confidence remained unshaken. For that it was necessary to act, and to act immediately. His delegation felt that the question of Southern Rhodesia should be settled immediately, and would be happy to welcome to the United Nations, in the very near future, a truly self-governing and democratic State of Southern Rhodesia.

9. Mr. CHERNUSHCHENKO (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the fact that the question of Southern Rhodesia was the first item of the Committee's agenda proved that the great majority of the Committee's members attached particular importance to the situation in the Territory. Many representatives had said, in their speeches, that it was indispensable and urgent to take positive measures to normalize social and political life in Southern Rhodesia and to eliminate the colonial domination which, in a most harsh and cruel form, was stifling the life of the country and obstructing the normal development of the African population. Although the question of Southern Rhodesia was a separate agenda item, it was an integral part of the burning problem of the day: the rapid and complete implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. By that Declaration, the General Assembly, "aware of the increasing conflicts resulting from the denial of or impediments in the way of the freedom of such peoples, which constitute a serious threat to world peace", had affirmed "that, in order to avoid serious crises, an end must be put to colonialism and all practices of segregation and discrimination associated therewith". Events corroborated those words in the case of Southern Rhodesia, where the colonial régime, and measures recently adopted, constituted a threat to peace and security in Southern Africa.

10. A glance at the political map of Africa showed the existence in that continent today of over thirty independent States. Only the southern part of the map had remained unchanged. That part included the Republic of South Africa, dominated by a fascist régime, and the colonial territories of Southern Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, South West Africa and Bechuanaland, where unbridled racialism was rampant and the African population was subjected to brutal repression. However, the national liberation movement was now spreading to those territories. That accounted for the attempts to create a league which would halt that

powerful wave, and for the cruel racist laws passed in order to maintain the domination of a white minority and to perpetuate the ascendancy of the monopolies. Statements by white settlers clearly indicated their attitude. On 6 October 1963, Sir Roy Welensky, the Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, had declared his firm resolve to stop the wave of African nationalism if he could. The Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Mr. Winston Field, for his part, had many times stated that it was indispensable to unite the forces of Southern Rhodesia with those of the Republic of South Africa and Portugal, in order to combat nationalism. In May 1962, even before his party's advent to power, the same Mr. W. Field had said that, if the Federation were dissolved, a defence pact and a common market linking the States of Southern Africa would become necessary. Finally, Sir Roy Welensky had stated at a press conference in New York that Southern Rhodesia might contemplate economic union with South Africa. Obviously, the white minorities in both countries were trying to maintain their supremacy and, in order to do so, were resorting to a political system based on apartheid.

11. Much had already been said about the terrible consequences which would ensue if so-called independence were granted to Southern Rhodesia as it was now governed. In April 1963, The Observer had stressed that if the United Kingdom Government yielded to the demands of Sir Roy Welensky and Mr. Field, it would be the first time since 1910—when independence was granted to South Africa—that power would be transferred to a white minority Government; the newspaper had added that such an act, unwise in 1910, would be unthinkable and insane today. The United Kingdom Government, however, seemed determined to embark on the same course as that which it had followed in 1910, and the white minority already enjoyed unlimited powers.

12. In 1955, the American writer John Gunther had stated that racial discriminations in Southern Rhodesia were among the most barbarous and shameful in the world. Since then, the situation had in no way improved; it had been only aggravated by new legislation. The white colonialist Government had instituted a thoroughgoing policy of apartheid, despite repeated condemnation by the United Nations. In Southern Rhodesia, as in the Republic of South Africa, African political organizations were banned, and in both countries petitioners who appeared at the United Nations were liable to imprisonment ranging from ten to twenty years. The New York Times had written, on 4 October 1963, that Southern Rhodesia was applying in the most arbitrary way a section of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act which provided for hanging; and The Times of London had stated on 26 June 1963 that Southern Rhodesia was embarking on the road followed by South Africa, where 129 people had been condemned to death in 1962. The Land Apportionment Act dispossessed the Africans of the best land in the country and compelled them to live in reserves. The Native Affairs Act limited the movements of Africans and obliged them to carry passes. Thus the policy of apartheid was already deeply rooted in the country, and the transfer of powers and armed forces now being contemplated would only strengthen the position of the racists in Southern Africa; in that connexion it was a known fact that many of the officers in the Federal army were citizens of the Republic of South Africa. Although the United Nations had been protesting against the system for a number of years, it was

maintained thanks to the support which it received from the Western Powers, whose policies were aimed at strengthening the racist States and obstructing national liberation movements.

13. On 27 August 1963, The Times of London had stated that the Southern Rhodesian Government had established five new police posts on Southern Rhodesia's border with South Africa; the measure had been taken in order to close the frontiers and prevent political refugees from crossing into Southern Rhodesia. Those who did succeed in entering the Territory were arrested by the authorities and sent back to South Africa; Africans trying to flee from the Portuguese colonies were similarly arrested and returned. In addition, as the petitioner Mr. Mugabe had said at the 1442nd meeting, South Africa had sent troops to Southern Rhodesia which had been used in the repression of peaceful demonstrations. All those measures were evidence of the existing collaboration between the two Governments, and showed how explosive and menacing to peace the situation in that region of Africa was.

14. It was clear that the situation would not have taken so critical a turn if the United Kingdom, ignoring the resolutions of the United Nations and in order to protect the white minority, had not enforced the 1961 Constitution and opened the way to Mr. Field's party. As the administering Power, the United Kingdom had been well aware that the Constitution in question would give rise to African protests. According to paragraph 21 of the report of the Sub-Committee on Southern Rhodesia (A/5446/Rev.1, chap. III, appendix) the United Kingdom Government had pointed out that the 1961 Constitution would lead to an African majority in the legislature in eight to twelve years, and further that the constitutional safeguards entrenched in the new Constitution were adequate and practically more effective and valid for the African people than the reserve powers. How could that comment be reconciled with the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary's statement at the General Assembly's 1222nd plenary meeting that the United Kingdom intended to transfer powers speedily and in an orderly way, recognizing everywhere and without exception the rights of majorities? The only purpose of such statements was to camouflage a colonialist policy aimed at protecting the monopolies which, like gigantic leeches, fed upon the natural riches of Southern Rhodesia. It would be possible to give many details regarding those monopolies. He would confine himself to pointing out that in 1962 the profits of the main monopolies had increased by 10 per cent over the previous year. As Mr. Mugabe had observed, certain members of the governing circles in the United Kingdom had a direct interest in the preservation of those monopolies. There were close links between the economic interests of the monopolies and the United Kingdom's colonial policy in the Territory. Thus Lord Salisbury, a former United Kingdom Minister, was a director of the British South Africa Company. It was therefore understandable that the United Kingdom should oppose Southern Rhodesia's accession to genuine independence.

15. His delegation considered that the United Nations should show more determination than hitherto in defending the indigenous population. It must not allow the United Kingdom and the white racists to carry out their plans. Nor must it allow Southern Rhodesia to swell the ranks of those States which practised apartheid, flouted African rights and participated in a

system in which the great majority of the indigenous population were exploited by a small minority. His delegation supported the claims of the African people, who were asking for the abolition of the 1961 Constitution and the holding of elections under universal suffrage. The Byelorussian delegation considered that truly representative organs with full powers must be set up in Southern Rhodesia and that the indigenous population must be granted immediate independence without reservation. To that end, the United Nations must show more firmness in order to obtain the implementation of the Declaration of the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples and of the resolutions which it had adopted regarding Southern Rhodesia, and it must take into account the powerful voice of the African States, as heard at the recent Addis Ababa Conference.

16. Mr. TALLARIGO (Italy) said that his delegation, like most members of the Committee, considered the existing situation in Southern Rhodesia to be far from satisfactory. The Italian delegation and the Italian people considered that self-government and independence should be granted to all countries and peoples which had not yet obtained them. However, he had doubts as to the usefulness of resolutions which embodied noble declarations of principle rather than specific and concrete recommendations regarding measures for securing positive results. In his delegation's view, the United Kingdom Government should apply in Southern Rhodesia the policies which it had successfully carried out in so many of its former colonies, and should do so before it was too late and a wedge had been driven between the European and the African population of the Territory.

17. On the basis of those considerations, the Italian delegation had reached certain conclusions concerning the approach to be followed in order to solve the problem before the Committee.

18. Firstly, the various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly concerning Southern Rhodesia should be solemnly reaffirmed and should be regarded, as it were, as a declaration of the aims of the United Nations in Southern Rhodesia. He was referring to resolutions containing general statements of principle and not, of course, to those dealing with particular problems such as the introduction of a new constitution or the holding of new elections.

19. The Italian delegation felt that the United Nations was, at the present moment, in a position to create in Southern Rhodesia a truly democratic society, based on the rule of the majority and respect and protection for the rights of the minority. The Organization could contribute very effectively towards that end by acting in the field of education in Southern Rhodesia.

20. What Italy had in mind was a massive "crash" programme sponsored by the United Nations and aimed at giving the African population of Southern Rhodesia adequate facilities for secondary and higher education. Such a programme, which would also bring enormous economic and social benefits, would be designed to provide the Africans with educational qualifications sufficient to enable them to take a full part in the political life of their country, the aim being to reach that goal in a reasonably short period of time. The United Nations should make a major contribution towards the implementation of the programme, a contribution probably amounting to several million dollars. For that purpose, the establishment either of a new United Nations agency or of a new branch of an exist-

ing United Nations body which would be called upon to administer the programme might be envisaged. The enterprise would be financed through the regular budget of the Organization as well as by voluntary contributions from Member States, finance corporations and cultural and philanthropic foundations throughout the world. His delegation considered that the United Kingdom Government should provide a substantial portion of the necessary funds in view of its special responsibilities for the existing situation in Southern Rhodesia.

21. The Government of Southern Rhodesia would of course have a part to play in carrying out the programme. First of all, loyal acceptance of, and co-operation in implementing the programme would be expected of it. The details of such co-operation would be worked out by the United Nations and the Government of Southern Rhodesia, it being understood that on the level of technical assistance, a United Nations presence in the Territory should be effectively assured. As evidence of goodwill, the Southern Rhodesian authorities should be asked to open schools at present reserved for pupils of European origin to all the ethnic groups living in the Territory. Secondly, the Southern Rhodesian Government should be asked to share in the financing of the emergency programme to an extent proportional to the sums provided by the United Nations, it being stipulated that the Southern Rhodesian contribution should consist of fresh resources assigned for that purpose and not of moneys already earmarked for education.

22. Last but by no means least, the United Nations should once again ask the United Kingdom Government to approach the Southern Rhodesian authorities and persuade them to adopt the necessary constitutional amendments aimed at lowering the economic and educational voting qualifications to be met by Africans. That was a reasonable minimum demand; the United Kingdom Government itself had recently indicated its willingness to approach the Southern Rhodesian Government for that purpose and felt that it would be successful. Such a lowering of the voting qualifications, accompanied by an accelerated educational programme, would enable the problem of political representation in Southern Rhodesia to be tackled simultaneously on two fronts.

23. While recognizing the need to analyse the implications of the proposed programme more carefully and to estimate broadly the financial burden involved, his delegation hoped that the Committee would agree that the political situation and the whole atmosphere in Southern Rhodesia would change rapidly and radically if the suggestions which had just been made were accepted by all the parties concerned. Not only would such an emergency programme give the population of Southern Rhodesia an opportunity of receiving a better education and of subsequently obtaining more highly paid employment, but it would also afford hopes for a brighter and more peaceful future.

24. The programme outlined would, moreover, serve as a means of testing the good faith of the Southern Rhodesian Government with respect to the two "priorities of policy" defined at the end of the penultimate paragraph of the section of its memorandum (A/C.4/606) entitled "Amendment of the Constitution". If the Southern Rhodesian Government really meant what it said, it would not refuse the proffered assistance.

25. His delegation was fully aware that those suggestions would probably be looked upon as limited in scope and therefore falling short of the maximum

programme advocated by the African countries and set forth in a number of General Assembly resolutions. They should, however, be viewed only as a means of achieving the goals laid down in the resolutions already adopted by the General Assembly with respect to Southern Rhodesia. His delegation was convinced that the Organization should now seek alternative solutions to the problem if it did not wish to remain powerless while Southern Rhodesia found itself increasingly in a situation similar to that which had obtained in Algeria before that country's independence. If the United Nations was convinced that the present situation in Southern Rhodesia was steadily deteriorating and contained the makings of a threat to international peace and security, it would be much better and wiser for the Organization to act immediately by furnishing financial assistance than to await the outbreak of a civil war which would compel it to undertake a peace-keeping operation. The first alternative would be far less expensive and would spare the people widespread suffering.

26. His delegation hoped that the suggestions which it had just made would enable the United Nations to find a new approach that might open the way towards a solution of the problem of Southern Rhodesia.

27. Mr. DELPRAT (Netherlands) said that in the opinion of his delegation the question of the precise legal status of Southern Rhodesia, which the General Assembly and the Security Council had dealt with at such length, was not the most relevant aspect of the question before the Committee. In his delegation's view, three closely interrelated aspects of the problem demanded to be taken into account.

28. The first aspect to be considered was the present situation in the Territory, where a small minority ruled over a vast majority, a fact which was inconsistent with the principles enshrined in the Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The right of the people of Southern Rhodesia to self-determination was paramount and should be recognized as soon as possible.

29. The second aspect to be considered was the body of decisions jointly agreed on by all four Governments concerned at the Central African Conference held at Victoria Falls. For Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to gain independence, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland had necessarily to be dissolved, but that could be done only if certain powers currently held by the Federation reverted or were transferred to the three component Territories. The armed forces of the Federation had also to be shared out between the three countries concerned. His delegation felt that the Victoria Falls agreements were an indispensable prelude to the dissolution of the Federation and, what was even more important, to the granting of independence to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

30. The third important aspect to be considered was the international responsibility of the United Kingdom for the future status of the Territory. Whatever its present status and its position in relation to the United Kingdom Government, the Territory could not become independent without the consent of the United Kingdom Government and Parliament. The United Kingdom Minister responsible for Central African Affairs had stated that the question of Southern Rhodesia's independence could be considered only after the Southern Rhodesian Government had first satisfied the United Kingdom Government by amending the Territory's

Constitution so as to broaden the basis of representation of the legislature, a step which should be taken as soon as possible.

31. It could be concluded from what he had just said that the situation in Southern Rhodesia was unsatisfactory and was a cause for concern for all Member States, including the United Kingdom, as was indicated in paragraph 42 of the report of the Sub-Committee on Southern Rhodesia. His delegation, for one, could not accept a situation in which the large indigenous majority of the Territory was deprived of a number of its fundamental human rights.

32. Furthermore, the reversion of strong armed forces to the control of the Southern Rhodesian Government would further strengthen its position with respect to the African population, and that could not help but be another cause for concern. As to the deployment of those forces outside the borders of the Territory, his delegation was certain that the United Kingdom would never forgo its responsibility in that respect. The Victoria Falls agreements had wider implications, however, one of the most important being that they opened the road to independence for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. He consequently felt that the General Assembly should not try to reverse those agreements. That had been in fact the intention of draft resolution A/C.4/L.774 and Add.1 and 2, adopted by the Committee at its 1441st meeting, and his delegation had consequently abstained from voting on it.

33. The present situation, therefore, was the following: on the one hand, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was to be dissolved, whereupon two of its component Territories would become independent, while Southern Rhodesia, the most highly developed of the three Territories, would not; on the other hand, the Power ultimately responsible for the future of Southern Rhodesia would not consider granting it independence before amendments broadening the basis of representation in the legislature had been made to the Constitution.

34. While not approving of the prevailing situation in Southern Rhodesia, his delegation trusted that the United Kingdom Government would not evade its special responsibilities with regard to that Territory and that it would bring all its moral and political influence to bear in order to foster the emergence of an independent African State, with a non-racial and truly democratic régime, as soon as possible.

35. Mr. MUDENGE (Rwanda) considered that the question of Southern Rhodesia was one of the most distressing to be discussed at the eighteenth session of the General Assembly. Southern Rhodesia, with a Government composed entirely of Whites determined to maintain their racial supremacy without regard to the interests of the 3 million Africans, was prepared to assume independence when the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was dissolved on 31 December 1963. It would have a Constitution specially designed and adopted by the Whites, although unacceptable to 95 per cent of the population.

36. The present Constitution of Southern Rhodesia granted the right to vote to only a very small number of Africans under the pretext of maintaining "civilized" standards. However, the pretext was a false one, for, in order to have the right to vote, it was sufficient to be rich or to have a large income; if that condition was fulfilled, one was apparently "civilized" even though he might be illiterate.

37. An indigenous inhabitant of Southern Rhodesia had only a slight chance of being able to vote if he was not rich, for he had to give proof of four years of secondary education. That was an almost impossible condition for him to fulfil because the Southern Rhodesian Government neglected secondary education. That attitude was not surprising on the part of a Government which was anxious to avoid creating an African élite capable of competing with the Whites for specialized employment in the civil service and industry or of speaking up in defence of their people. The report of the Director of Native Education for 1962 indicated that out of 330 Africans who started school, only one was likely to reach Form IV of secondary school.

38. The majority of Africans were likewise unable to satisfy the means qualifications prescribed by the electoral law, for, as was proved by the figures published in the *Central African Examiner* in March 1963, the annual income of the average African was £87. Thus, in view of the rate of increase of African incomes, the Southern Rhodesian Africans would have to wait forty-nine years before fulfilling those requirements. The electoral law also provided that the Governor might, by proclamation, vary the means qualifications according to the increase or decrease in the purchasing power of money. Therefore, the government which would replace the present Governor after the attainment of independence would have the right to increase the minimum income required if it considered that too many Africans were apt to become registered voters on the "A" roll. That would not be the first time that such an arbitrary increase had been decreed, for between 1951 and 1961 the minimum income required had been multiplied threefold, whereas during the same period the income of the Africans had not even doubled.

39. The intention to maintain the African in a position of inferiority as the result of economic inequality was revealed in many ways. Thus, as Patrick Keatley pointed out in his book *The Politics of Partnership*, the African farmer received less than the white farmer for his maize, even if he like his white colleague, delivered it, to the Grain Marketing Board, for about 8 per cent of the African farmer's money was retained for the Native Development Fund, about whose plans and activities he was not consulted. Furthermore, the wage of a European was often ten times greater than that of an African doing the same work, and when an economic crisis struck Southern Rhodesia, as had happened in 1960, unemployment among Africans soared whereas the Europeans were not affected. Official figures published in 1962 indicated a net decline of 1.2 per cent in the number of Africans employed during the period 1956-1961, although the population had increased by 12 per cent during the same period. During the same five years, the number of white wage-earners had increased by 11 per cent.

40. Racial discrimination was felt also in the health services. The figures quoted by Patrick Keatley in that respect were eloquent: eight and a half beds per 1,000 Europeans in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1960, as against three beds per 1,000 Africans. In the hospitals, the wards reserved for Europeans were utilized to the extent of only 65 per cent, as against 138 per cent in the wards reserved for Africans. The preventive medicine services were concentrated in the urban centres where the Europeans were in the majority. In addition, European and Asian children were regularly examined by physicians



in their schools, whereas nothing of the kind was provided for African children, who were, however, much more vulnerable to disease because of malnutrition.

41. Discrimination existed also in ownership of land, for an African, in order to be able to buy a piece of land, must not only have the necessary money, but also furnish proof that he was a competent farmer. A European, on the contrary, could buy any number of acres of land without the authorities bothering to inquire whether he cultivated his fields well, badly or not at all.

42. The situation was the same with regard to loans, subsidies and mortgages, as well as to access to the higher posts in the civil service. Finally, discrimination was recognized in the laws themselves, as was proved by the legislation concerning unlawful organizations and the maintenance of law and order.

43. To sum up, discrimination existed in every department of life, and amendments would not be sufficient to cause it to disappear. The present system in Southern Rhodesia had to be changed completely, and the only way to accomplish that was to organize democratic general elections on a basis of universal suffrage without delay. The Parliament resulting from those elections would draw up a new constitution guaranteeing equal rights to all Rhodesians and ensuring the well-being of the whole population and not merely that of a small minority. He hoped that the United Kingdom would not turn a deaf ear to the appeal which the Rwandese Minister for Foreign Affairs had recently made in the General Assembly (1235th plenary meeting); he hoped that it would not grant independence to the minority Southern Rhodesian Government and thereby let its last chance of atoning for the errors committed in the last century go by. The United Kingdom, which still had sovereignty over Southern Rhodesia, must not grant it independence until it had a constitution and a government approved by the majority of the citizens.

44. Another factor to be taken into account was the very dangerous situation which existed in the country because all political activity unfavourable to the white settler régime was forbidden and because the United Kingdom proposed to hand over to Southern Rhodesia a considerable portion of the armed forces of the Federation. As the petitioner Mr. Nkomo had pointed out at the 135th meeting of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the laws on unlawful organizations, on the maintenance of law and order and on the preservation of constitutional government denied the indigenous population any possibility of political activity. It must also be pointed out that no African party could hope for more than token support from the African people unless it was approved by Mr. Nkomo. If, however, it was approved by Mr. Nkomo, such a party would be considered the successor to the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union and, therefore banned. As a result, the Africans were deprived of any constitutional means of making their grievances known and were virtually forced to have recourse to unconstitutional action. It was for such reasons that The Guardian of 1 April 1963 had come to the conclusion that a clash between Europeans and Africans was inevitable and that The Times had felt constrained to publish, in its issue of 7 April 1963, a pessimistic article in which the possibility of "another Algeria" was evoked.

45. The situation was rendered even more dangerous by the fact that European civilians were allowed to possess weapons and that their demand for arms and munitions had greatly increased, whereas the Africans were not allowed to possess weapons nor even to carry so much as a stick. Moreover, the military budget of Southern Rhodesia had increased from £3.5 million in 1955 to £8 million in 1962. Since Southern Rhodesia had no exterior enemy, those arms must be destined to be used against enemies at home. That hypothesis, suggested by the Ghanaian delegation in the Security Council, had been judged absurd by the United Kingdom representative, but it would not be forgotten that there had been precedents; Portugal, for example, had not hesitated to use its air force against peaceful African villages. Then, even if it was to be presumed that Mr. Winston Field would be unwilling to authorize such action, there was no way to foresee what his successor might do under pressure from the settlers. So long as considerable armed forces existed in Southern Rhodesia under the control of the white minority, there would be a grave threat to the African majority.

46. Furthermore, the air force which the United Kingdom proposed to hand over to Southern Rhodesia was too costly for that country, and the United Kingdom would have to pay for a large proportion of its maintenance costs without, however, being able to control the use that would be made of it. It followed that if the Rhodesian air force was used against the African population, the United Kingdom would be an accomplice of that action, which could not be committed without its help, and would then have to give an accounting to world public opinion.

47. Furthermore, as the Ghanaian representative had pointed out in the Security Council, no country within range of the Rhodesian air force could feel safe. Thus, there would take place, on the African continent, the arms race which the United Nations had for so many years been seeking to eliminate from the rest of the world.

48. It was precisely because of the fear of such a chain reaction that the Rwandese delegation regretted that the draft resolution (S/5425/Rev.1) which had been submitted by Ghana, Morocco and the Philippines to the Security Council in September 1963 had not been adopted owing to the veto of the United Kingdom. Also, it was because the Rwandese delegation was deeply disturbed by the situation in Southern Rhodesia that it had, in conjunction with all the Africans, supported the draft resolution (A/C.4/L.774 and Add.1 and 2) recommended by the Fourth Committee to the General Assembly. It was pleased that that draft had been adopted by the Committee by an overwhelming majority.

49. Mr. BEJASA (Philippines) said that the issues had been clarified and the lines drawn; all the world could now do was to wait for the United Kingdom Government to act. He would therefore limit himself to picking out and scrutinizing some of the main points in the document entitled "Southern Rhodesia: some facts and figures" (A/C.4/606), which had been circulated on behalf of the Government of Southern Rhodesia at the request of the United Kingdom delegation in order, as the latter had said, at the 1434th meeting, to correct the misinformation, distortion and prejudice on which the case against Southern Rhodesia was based.

50. According to the document under the 1923 Constitution "the franchise system for elections to the Legislative Assembly was based on the principle of

the common roll with property and education qualifications. It was never racial". However, nothing was said about the fact that the white settler minority had drafted the electoral law in such a way that the property and education qualifications could be met only by Europeans: while the racial element was theoretically absent, it was in practice the decisive factor. The document went on to say that after the Second World War the "marriage of Western skills and capital to under-employed manpower and unexplored resources generated a spectacular economic take-off". However, it seemed to the Philippine delegation that the so-called marriage had in fact been a relationship in which the European exploited African slaves and plundered the Territory's wealth. The document also stated that under the 1961 Constitution electoral registration was "in no way dependent on race". However, as in the case of the 1923 Constitution, the deciding factors continued to be income and education, which depended in great measure on the race of the person concerned. According to the most favourable statistics, the average annual income of African wage-earners was £87 as against £1,209 for European workers; thus, most Africans earned too little to be able to vote on the "A" roll, and the Government denied the population the power to challenge, or even to hope to challenge, the political supremacy of the settler minority. The Southern Rhodesian Government dangled before the eyes of the African population the prospect of greater political influence; but the working of the electoral system was well known, and had been described in detail in the memorandum submitted by the delegation of Ghana to the Security Council (S/5403 and Corr.1).

51. The Southern Rhodesian Government's document alleged that there were no legal impediments to any black Southern Rhodesian becoming prime minister, member of Parliament, judge of the High Court, head of a government department of practising in any profession and that attainment of those positions was purely a question of merit and qualifications. He wondered, however, whether Africans were really given opportunities for advancement equal to those of the white settlers, and whether, in particular, equal educational facilities were available to them. The annual expenditure of public funds on education amounted to £103 for each white child but only £7 for each black child; white children had free education up to the age of eighteen years, but not black children. Four out of five white children went to secondary school, but only one out of 148 black children.

52. The Southern Rhodesian Government claimed credit for an enlightened land policy. However, the facts showed that while 223,000 white settlers had 41 million acres of fertile land, 3,600,000 Africans had to be satisfied with 44 million acres of poor land—a case of agricultural apartheid.

53. The United Kingdom delegation had asked for the circulation of the document prepared by the Southern Rhodesian Government in order to correct what it called misinformation, distortion and prejudice. In the view of the Philippine delegation, it was the Southern Rhodesian Government's document which misrepresented the situation. However, that Government was not alone to blame: The United Kingdom had to share responsibility for the Territory's tragic situation, which was not new since it had begun to develop at a time when the United Kingdom Government had had effective control of the Territory.

54. His delegation had listened with great interest to the very constructive suggestion of the Italian delegation that a crash education programme should be instituted in Southern Rhodesia and voting qualifications for the African population lowered. Any evidence of goodwill on the part of the United Kingdom Government would be welcome, but the most direct evidence of that kind would be the exercise of its authority or its influence over the Government of Southern Rhodesia with a view to bringing voting qualifications really within the reach of Africans. That was the first and most urgent requirement. In its desire to accommodate the 223,000 white settlers, the United Kingdom disregarded the 3,600,000 Africans, who had never been able to enjoy, even in a limited measure, the wealth and resources of their own country. Southern Rhodesia was probably the last test—the only test that generations to come would remember—of British colonial policy. How the United Kingdom acted might well determine history's judgement of the United Kingdom as a colonial Power.

55. Mr. CADIEUX (Canada) said that the basic consideration in his Government's attitude on the difficult and complex question of Southern Rhodesia was the necessity of universal respect for human rights and essential freedoms. Peoples should have the right to decide their own destinies, and individuals should be protected against discrimination of every kind. Canada's desire was to encourage the progress of all non-self-governing peoples which aspired to independence, and it felt that after a period of peaceful and orderly transition all inhabitants should have equal rights in the economic, social and political life of their country. However, each territory had its special problems, which should not be ignored if the aspirations of the population were to be satisfied.

56. At a time when the principles of parliamentary democracy were accepted in most of Africa, a minority of 200,000 persons could not hope to deny for long to a majority of three and a half million the right to full participation in the political life of Southern Rhodesia. It was understandable that Africans should seek rapid progress and wish to exercise their political rights in the same way and under the same conditions as the peoples of neighbouring countries which had attained or were about to attain independence. It was therefore desirable that all interested groups in Southern Rhodesia should reach agreement on a programme of methodical constitutional development which would enable Africans to acquire political responsibility, as also greater opportunities for economic, social and educational development.

57. The General Assembly had suggested certain lines of action to the United Kingdom. The question of Southern Rhodesia was a difficult and complicated one, and it had to be handled with particular care and patience in view of the fact that the United Kingdom was at present engaged in delicate negotiations relating to the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the accession of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to independence. In the circumstances, it seemed to the Canadian delegation that the method of informal and private talks would be most likely to lead to progress. That should be the main consideration underlying the draft resolutions to be submitted to the General Assembly.

58. As a member of the Commonwealth, Canada desired a final solution that would respect the principles of freedom and democracy on which the Com-

monwealth was based, and it was confident that United Kingdom influence would be exercised solely towards that end. However, the Government and the whole population of Southern Rhodesia also had heavy responsibilities to bear, and had the duty of accelerating a peaceful transition to majority government by facilitating agreement on the basis of the compromises which would undoubtedly be necessary. The problem was difficult. The Committee's approval should go to the procedure most likely to achieve positive results in the Territory. It should be guided by those considerations in examining any draft resolutions submitted to it.

59. Mr. SHAMOUT (Yemen) said that in spite of the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee aimed at giving the Africans the right of self-determination, the Southern Rhodesian Government continued to deny the majority of the population the most elementary rights of citizenship. Although the General Assembly's resolutions and recommendations had confirmed that Southern Rhodesia was a Non-Self-Governing Territory and had called on the United Kingdom to implement the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, the administering Power had tried to evade its responsibilities by alleging that the Territory was a self-governing colony. All efforts to induce the United Kingdom to reconsider its position had failed, and no progress was in prospect: the United Kingdom had vetoed a draft resolution on Southern Rhodesia in the Security Council and had repeatedly stated that it was not in a position to intervene in the Territory.

60. Yemen still hoped that the administering Power would in the very near future heed General Assembly resolution 1747 (XVII) requesting it to put an end to discrimination in Southern Rhodesia and restore all the rights of the African majority. Yemen, part of whose territory was illegally occupied by the United Kingdom, could not but express its sympathy for the Africans in Southern Rhodesia and help them in their fight for freedom.

61. Mr. AMACHREE (Under-Secretary for Trusteeship and Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories) recalled that, at the Committee's 1443rd meeting, the representative of Ghana had referred to the two reports of the Secretary-General (A/5396 and A/5426) on the implementation of operative paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 1760 (XVII) and had expressed the hope that the Secretary-General would continue his efforts in the sense indicated. The Ghanaian representative had asked the Secretariat to submit a report on the action taken in the matter of Southern Rhodesia since the second report of the Secretary-General, and on the action envisaged in the future. At the 1436th meeting, the representative of Somalia, expressing doubt as to the usefulness of further resolutions on the question, had also suggested that all the elements for effective action were already contained in resolution 1760 (XVII).

62. As stated in his second report, the Secretary-General had indicated in a letter of 26 February 1963 to the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom that before considering any further action in implementation of paragraph 4 of resolution 1760 (XVII) he would take into account the views of the United Kingdom Government. In a letter dated 21 May 1963, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom had replied that, as a result of previous exchanges between his Government on the one hand and the Sub-

Committee on Southern Rhodesia and the Secretary-General on the other, his Government's attitude towards that resolution should be abundantly clear. He had also stated his Government's belief that the Secretary-General would understand the difficulties which lay in the way of its contemplating compliance with that resolution.

63. In view of the terms of the reply from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom and having regard to the Special Committee's own examination of the reports of the Sub-Committee and of the Secretary-General, as well as to the subsequent discussions in the Security Council, it had not been possible to take additional steps for the implementation of paragraph 4 of the resolution; the Secretary-General had, however, maintained continuous contact with the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom.

64. At the 1434th meeting, the representative of the United Kingdom had drawn the Committee's attention to the statement made by Mr. Butler, the Minister responsible for Central African Affairs, in the United Kingdom House of Commons on 16 July 1963, that:

"while the matter [i.e., the independence of Southern Rhodesia] is open, we have not got any further than the suggestion . . . that we would look to the Southern Rhodesian Government to make proposals to us for any amendments of their Constitution which would result in broadening the basis of representation of the legislature, to take effect as soon as practicable . . . That is where the matter lies".

65. In the light of all those facts, the Committee might wish to consider what further action by the Secretary-General might assist in the achievement of the objectives outlined in paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 1760 (XVII).

66. Mr. BUDU-ACQUAH (Ghana) thanked the Under-Secretary and expressed the view that the Secretary-General should continue his efforts for an honourable settlement of the problem.

67. The Ghanaian delegation hoped that the Secretary-General's efforts would be crowned with success. It thought that the Secretary-General might consider sending a representative to Southern Rhodesia for on-the-spot discussions with that country's Government. Such a step might greatly increase the possibility of a peaceful settlement.

68. Mr. AMACHREE (Under-Secretary for Trusteeship and Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories) thanked the Ghanaian representative for that suggestion, and said that he would communicate it to the Secretary-General.

#### Requests for hearings (continued)

#### REQUEST CONCERNING FERNANDO POO AND RIO MUNI (AGENDA ITEM 49)

69. The PRESIDENT informed the Committee that he had received a request for a hearing concerning Fernando Póo and Río Muni. He suggested that, in accordance with the usual practice, the request should be circulated as a Committee document for consideration at a later meeting.

*It was so decided.* <sup>1/</sup>

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.

<sup>1/</sup> See A/C.4/611.