

United Nations
**GENERAL
ASSEMBLY**

EIGHTEENTH SESSION

Official Records

**FOURTH COMMITTEE, 1438th
MEETING**

Friday, 4 October 1963,
at 10.40 a.m.



NEW YORK

CONTENTS

	Page
<i>Agenda item 75:</i>	
<i>Question of Southern Rhodesia: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (continued)</i>	
<i>General debate and consideration of draft resolution A/C.4/L.774 (continued). . . .</i>	31

Chairman: Mr. ACHKAR Marof (Guinea).

AGENDA ITEM 75

Question of Southern Rhodesia: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (A/5446/Rev.1, chap. III; A/5448 and Add.1-5; A/C.4/603; A/C.4/L.774) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE AND CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTION A/C.4/L.774 (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN announced that Burma had asked to be added to the list of sponsors of the draft resolution submitted at the previous meeting (A/C.4/L.774).
2. Mr. SONN VOEUNSAI (Cambodia) said that all delegations were conscious of the importance of the question before the Committee, a question which had been considered over the past two years by a number of United Nations bodies as well as by the Heads of African States and Governments who had met at Addis Ababa in May 1963. A resolution on decolonization adopted unanimously at that meeting was evidence of the determination of the African States on the issue, which was indeed a matter of concern to all countries throughout the world which supported the principle of self-determination.
3. The question had two basic aspects: on the one hand, colonial rule must be ended, and, on the other, racial discrimination must be abolished and equal rights extended to all the population. Those two aspects were closely linked, since the right of self-determination was clearly a right of the whole people and not of a privileged minority.
4. The sources of information regarding Southern Rhodesia were many. The facts set out in the reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples had not been challenged. There was also the memorandum which had been submitted by Ghana to the Security Council (S/5403 and Corr.1). A large number of petitioners from the Territory had appeared before United Nations bodies or submitted memoranda. Representa-

tives of the administering Power had spoken on the subject, and the previous year Sir Edgar Whitehead himself, then Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, had given his views to the Fourth Committee (1366th and 1367th meetings). In addition, nearly all the delegations present had made known their positions on the subject.

5. The principles which should guide the Committee in seeking a solution were enshrined in the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples (General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)) and in the Preamble to the United Nations Charter in so far as it dealt with fundamental human rights and the dignity and worth of the human person.

6. The United Kingdom representative in the Security Council (1066th meeting) had claimed that the objections to the reversion of certain powers to the Southern Rhodesia Government upon the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland constituted an attack on the agreements reached at the Central African Conference held at Victoria Falls in July 1963. That was not so. The Victoria Falls agreements were to be welcomed in that they provided for the dissolution of the Federation and made possible the accession of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to independence. The point which must be borne in mind was that General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) called for the transfer of powers to the peoples of dependent territories in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire; the Southern Rhodesian people had not had an opportunity to express their desires in the election of the Government to which the transfer of powers was contemplated. The Government led by Mr. Winston Field had come to power as the result of elections in which only about 3 per cent of the population had voted. The establishment of two electoral lists and of income and educational qualifications for the vote had the effect of depriving the Africans of representation, whereas the low level of their income and education was itself the consequence of discriminatory practices. Elementary logic demanded the establishment of the principle "one man or woman, one vote". The real problem was the long-standing practice of discrimination in all fields. It had originated in the referendum held in 1923 among the Europeans and had been perpetuated by a series of undemocratic electoral systems culminating in the 1961 Constitution, which had been put into force immediately after being condemned by the great majority of Members of the United Nations.

7. His delegation rejected the formal arguments advanced by the United Kingdom regarding the incompetence of the United Nations in the matter and the incapacity of the United Kingdom to intervene in Southern Rhodesia. The United Nations was entitled to consider questions of world interest such as the abolition of colonialism and of racial discrimination, in pursuance of the principles of the Charter. Nor was the parliamentary convention which had been cited a

genuine obstacle to intervention by the Administering Power.

8. The need for a solution to the problem was becoming increasingly urgent. As the Sub-Committee on Southern Rhodesia had pointed out in its report (A/5446/Rev.1, chap. III, appendix), the situation was steadily deteriorating; there had been arrests and imprisonments, the main nationalist party had been banned and disturbances had sometimes led to loss of life. Above all, the Africans were determined to fight for their independence and their fundamental rights. It was clear, moreover, that the movement for the abolition of colonialism could not be halted. The new proposal for the transfer of armed forces to the minority Government increased the seriousness of the situation.

9. There were some who held that the situation was not explosive; he would ask them whether they thought that it was necessary to wait until the people rose in violent revolt before heeding their appeals. His delegation was convinced that the situation did indeed represent a threat to international peace and security. It had come to the conclusion that an immediate remedy was required and it considered that the measures proposed in operative paragraph 3 of the resolution adopted by the Special Committee (A/5446/Rev.1, chap. III, para. 282) should be put into effect. In the interests of peace, none of the powers or attributes of sovereignty should be transferred to the minority Government of Southern Rhodesia. His delegation fully supported, as an interim measure, the draft resolution submitted at the previous meeting (A/C.4/L.774).

10. He would like to launch a final appeal to the United Kingdom to bring about a solution of the problem. The statement by Mr. Butler, quoted by the United Kingdom representative at the 1434th meeting, that the United Kingdom Government was awaiting proposals from the Southern Rhodesia Government for amendments to the Territory's Constitution should be regarded as the expression, not of a wish, but of a strict requirement. Without such amendments the transfer of powers would be unthinkable. The logical step for the United Kingdom would be to convene a constitutional conference at which all parties in the Territory would be represented. Despite the United Kingdom's attitude so far, his delegation did not abandon hope that country would give way to the persuasion of enlightened world opinion.

11. Mr. SUPIT (Indonesia) said that the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was to be commended for its work on the question of Southern Rhodesia and his delegation fully supported the conclusions set forth in the report of that Committee and the resolutions it had adopted.

12. Despite the efforts of the United Nations, which had been discussing the question of Southern Rhodesia since 1961, the situation had continued to deteriorate, as a result of the negative attitude of the administering Power. The matter had recently been taken up by the Security Council,^{1/} where a very conciliatory draft resolution, supported by the majority of members of the Council, had been vetoed by the United Kingdom.

13. Despite its moral defeat in the Security Council, the United Kingdom delegation had not given any further grounds for hope of a peaceful settlement. The

United Kingdom seemed determined to pursue its course of action, which was not calculated to reduce tension in Africa in view of the solemn promise by the Heads of African States and Governments at Addis Ababa in May 1963 to give practical support to the African nationalist leaders if necessary.

14. His delegation had already had occasion, in the General Assembly, to express its views regarding the United Kingdom policy of inaugurating federations for the purpose of maintaining British military and economic interests. In the case of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the United Kingdom had bowed to the demands of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland for the dissolution of the Federation. Those two countries were to be congratulated on the victory they had achieved. In Southern Rhodesia, however, the administering Power was attempting to entrench the white minority Government by transferring military powers to it, presumably in the hope of preserving United Kingdom interests in the colony. A similar policy of maintaining its interests by transferring powers to minority groups had been followed by that country in numerous other colonies. In that way the United Kingdom sought to preserve its interests and sphere of influence while appearing to abandon its colonial possessions. Effective decolonization had only come about where the United Kingdom had been confronted with effective militant opposition on the part of the people. Another United Kingdom manoeuvre was to sow dissension among communal groupings, thus threatening peace in various regions of the world.

15. It was in Southern Rhodesia that United Kingdom colonial policy appeared at its worst. The Africans had been ignored and privileges had been accorded to an alien group. The United Kingdom was now trying to consolidate that situation by speaking of "self-government". His delegation considered Southern Rhodesia to be a Non-Self-Governing Territory—a colony whose entire population was entitled to self-determination. It fully supported the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on that subject. A United Kingdom "convention" could not be an obstacle to the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) or a cover for arbitrary acts by a racist minority Government.

16. The proposed transfer of armed forces rendered the situation still more alarming. Although aware of the seriousness of the situation, the United Kingdom in that the only course was for the United Nations to leave the whole matter in its hands, so that it might use its powers of persuasion with the Field Government. Yet the situation now prevailing was the result of the failure of the United Nations to intervene. The United Kingdom had had a free hand in Southern Rhodesia for over forty years and the Committee could hardly be expected to look for any sudden miraculous improvement in the situation. The only likely development was that the Africans would meet force with force in order to obtain the fulfilment of their legitimate aspirations.

17. The path to peaceful decolonization was set out clearly in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), which had the support of the great majority of Member States of the United Nations. Furthermore, the various resolutions adopted on Southern Rhodesia, as also the draft resolution at present before the Committee, showed the path which should be followed.

18. His delegation was convinced that a formula could be found to satisfy all concerned. At the same time,

^{1/} See Official Records of the Security Council, Eighteenth Year, 1064th-1069th meetings.

it must be realized that the march of history was irreversible and that the transfer of armed forces to the minority Government would not affect the determination of the Africans, with the support of progressive forces throughout the world, to recover their rightful place in the community of nations.

19. His delegation was proud to be a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.4/L.774, which reproduced the draft resolution which had been debated in the Security Council (S/5425/Rev.1). He trusted that the text would receive overwhelming support as a step to prevent a further deterioration of the situation.

Mr. Carducci-Artenisio (Italy), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

20. Mr. NDAWULA (Uganda) congratulated the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples on its admirable report on Southern Rhodesia. The Committee's work was even more commendable in view of the fact that it had had many other territories to consider.

21. The delegation of Uganda was of the opinion that tension in Southern Rhodesia had begun to rise more quickly with the introduction of the 1961 Constitution. At the seventeenth session of the General Assembly much of the Fourth Committee's debate on the Territory had centred on the coming into force of the Constitution, which, while giving Africans their first representation in its Legislative Assembly, kept them in an inferior position through a two-roll, weighted voting system. The situation had become more tense when, in mid-December, the United Federal Party Government of Sir Edgar Whitehead had been defeated at the polls by Mr. Winston Field's right-wing Rhodesia Front, which advocated continued white domination.

22. The Field Government had released some political prisoners but had quickly proceeded to pass new and even more restrictive legislation, the aim of which, according to the nationalists, was to eliminate all the politically active Africans in the colony. Under those "hanging laws", offences such as testifying before the United Nations could be punished by up to twenty years imprisonment and some minor offences were punishable by death.

23. The situation had taken a more serious turn since the end of July, when the report of the Special Committee had appeared. As a result of the new and worsening situation the thirty-two African Member States had unanimously decided to support the request made by the representatives of Ghana, Guinea, Morocco and the United Arab Republic (S/5382) that the Security Council should consider the question. The delegation of Uganda had been one of those designated by the African representatives to participate in the debate on their behalf. He would not now restate the case that had been put to the Security Council, but would merely repeat briefly what his delegation had said of the Council's 1066th meeting to the effect that its main preoccupation was that, following the passing of the Rhodesia and Nyasaland Act 1963, the United Kingdom Government was going to hand over to the minority Government of Southern Rhodesia the last vestige of control that it might have exercised. His delegation had added that the African Members of the United Nations were fearful that once all powers, as also the armed forces and aircraft, had been transferred to the minority Government in Southern Rhodesia, the situation would have reached a point of no return.

24. At the 1434th meeting of the Fourth Committee the United Kingdom representative had repeated his delegation's argument that Southern Rhodesia had all the attributes of a self-governing colony, and had stated that attacks had been levelled against successive Governments of Southern Rhodesia, but that it was not his concern to deal with those matters. In that connexion he would refer the United Kingdom representative to General Assembly resolution 1747 (XVI).

25. The United Kingdom delegation denied the competence of the United Nations to concern itself with the internal affairs of Southern Rhodesia, despite the fact that, as it well knew, the only reason for the United Nations' concern was that the majority of the indigenous people were being denied fundamental human rights.

26. The United Kingdom representative had informed the Committee that the Minister responsible for Central African Affairs had stated in the House of Commons that the United Kingdom Government "would look to the Southern Rhodesian Government to make proposals . . . for any amendments of their Constitution which would result in broadening the basis of representation of the legislature". That was all very well, but it was another matter to induce Mr. Field to make such proposals of his own volition. At the annual congress of the Rhodesia Front Party, in September, Mr. Field had said that Southern Rhodesia was accused of being "rigid" in its approach to independence and had commented that it seemed to cause surprise that his Government should endeavour to keep its promises. He had warned that times ahead would not be easy and had said that his Government intended to retain portions of the army and air force at top strength, adding that it dared not weaken in the face of the external threat with which it might be faced. The congress had unanimously adopted a resolution whole-heartedly supporting him in his determination to gain independence for Southern Rhodesia provided that there were no conditions attached and that the 1961 Constitution remain unaltered.

27. That was the situation with which the United Nations must concern itself. It was utterly wrong to maintain that the situation in Southern Rhodesia was an internal or domestic situation and that consideration of it was therefore precluded by Article 2 of the Charter. It was perfectly clear that, not only in Southern Rhodesia but in South Africa, Mozambique and Angola, there was such tension that unless the trend was arrested immediately war was the inevitable result in the not far distant future. That was the meaning of the arms build-up in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

28. Speaking in the General Assembly on 1 October 1963 (1222nd plenary meeting), the Chairman of the United Kingdom delegation had stated that his country had accepted the principle of self-determination without qualification and that it had accepted that the majority should rule. The delegation of Uganda welcomed that pronouncement if it applied also to Southern Rhodesia.

29. His delegation greatly regretted that the United Kingdom representative had used the veto in the Security Council on a draft resolution on Southern Rhodesia. In the view of the delegation of Uganda that act was in flagrant defiance of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Nevertheless, his delegation had derived great moral satisfaction from the fact that the draft resolution had received affirmative votes from eight members of the Security Council. Thus the members of the Council had indicated that they had heeded

the clarion call sounded by the African States regarding the explosive situation in Southern Rhodesia, which had been characterized by the Special Committee as constituting a threat to peace and security.

30. His delegation hoped that the Fourth Committee would again, and soon pronounce itself clearly on the matter by adopting draft resolution A/C.4/L.774 and would urge the United Kingdom, in the words of the Sub-Committee, "to take a more direct and positive position concerning future action" (A/5446/Rev.1, chap. III, appendix, para. 50).

31. Furthermore, his delegation called upon the United Kingdom Government to comply with the resolutions of the General Assembly and to take action to give the majority of the people in Southern Rhodesia a new constitution worthy of the high traditions of the United Kingdom which, over the past fifteen years, had dismantled, in an orderly manner, the greater part of its colonial empire.

32. Mr. LORINC (Hungary) said that a positive solution of the problem under discussion could be achieved through a conscious application of the new elements in the debate, which was taking place in a specific international situation. The question of independence and sovereignty had not the same meaning in 1963 as it had in 1923.

33. Three clear stages could be discerned in the history of Southern Rhodesia. First there had been the Matabele Wars of 1893 and 1896, during which the inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia had been dispossessed of their lands. At that time Africa had been in the process of being colonized and partitioned by the colonial Powers on the basis of the decisions of the Berlin Congress, sovereignty and independence being denied to the peoples of Black Africa. The second stage had opened with the holding of a plebiscite in 1923 among the white settlers of Southern Rhodesia, who had decided in favour of "self-government" rather than union with South Africa. The United Kingdom Government had accordingly granted them the right of self-government, without any consultation of the African inhabitants. No African State had been in a position effectively to oppose that decision. The third and present stage of Southern Rhodesia's history was marked by far-reaching changes in which a solution to the problem under discussion might be found.

34. The chief characteristic of the present world situation was peaceful coexistence. The full equality of all peoples and nations, regardless of colour, was an accepted principle. The United Nations had become an important international factor in the struggle against colonialism. About one half of its Members were newly independent countries. In Africa itself the independent States were rising to their responsibilities and the Committee was now witnessing in the debate at Addis Ababa the application of the resolutions on decolonization and other issues adopted in May 1963 by the Summit Conference of Independent African States.

35. It was a historical fact that in 1923 the United Kingdom had conferred the right of self-government on the white settlers of Southern Rhodesia. It was an equally valid fact, however, that the present settler Government of Southern Rhodesia could not be regarded as the government of the people of Southern Rhodesia. The situation there had to be judged in the light of the 1960 Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples and the resolution on decolonization adopted at the Addis Ababa Conference.

The forcible application by the United Kingdom of 1923 colonial standards to the 1963 situation in Southern Rhodesia was historically outdated, morally wrong, legally and politically untenable and militarily dangerous for the peace of Africa.

36. The United Kingdom Foreign Secretary had declared in the General Assembly (1222nd plenary meeting) that the lesson of the twentieth century and the nuclear age was that force could never solve anything and that however strong the political emotions which might inspire the desire to employ it, they must be resisted. That was an attempt to apply the principle of peaceful coexistence as a brake on the national liberation movements and the struggle against apartheid. It was contrary to the true meaning of peaceful coexistence. It was true, however, that the use of force by European colonial Powers in Africa to maintain their control could never solve anything.

37. Just as it would have been impossible in 1923 for the problems of Southern Rhodesia to be discussed at an inter-governmental forum under the chairmanship of a representative of Black Africa, so too the application of 1923 colonial principles to the 1963 situation in Africa could not be justified and could only endanger peace in Africa and throughout the world.

38. His delegation was of the opinion that the first step towards a solution lay in the operative part of draft resolution A/C.4/L.774. It supported the draft resolution on the understanding that it would be followed by another covering the whole problem of Southern Rhodesia and based on the resolution of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

39. Mr. VALENCIA (Ecuador) said that, after a thorough study of all the facts, his delegation was convinced that the position it had taken in the General Assembly in June 1962^{2/} and again in the Fourth Committee in October 1962^{3/} was still valid and could not be changed in any way. It could be summed up in the following terms.

40. To deny the competence of the United Nations on the basis of Article 2 paragraph 7, of the Charter was tantamount to arguing either that Southern Rhodesia belonged entirely to the United Kingdom, in which case the United Nations could not intervene in what could be regarded as the United Kingdom's internal affairs, or that Southern Rhodesia was a fully independent sovereign State abiding by the principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in which case the United Nations again could not intervene in its internal affairs. A glance at the present situation in Southern Rhodesia was sufficient to show that Southern Rhodesia was neither a part of United Kingdom territory nor an independent sovereign State.

41. It followed that Southern Rhodesia was a Non-Self-Governing Territory as defined in Chapter XI of the Charter. That fact had been recognized in General Assembly resolution 1747 (XVI). It could not, therefore, be argued that Southern Rhodesia, though not a sovereign State, was not a dependent territory. Furthermore, resolution 742 (VIII) had laid down that a Non-Self-Governing Territory only ceased to be such when

^{2/} See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Plenary Meetings*, vol. III, 1114th meeting.

^{3/} *Ibid.*, Seventeenth Session, Fourth Committee, 1336th and 1357th meetings.

it acquired full independence or when it entered into association with another State or group of States freely and on the basis of absolute equality. In any case Article 73 of the Charter laid down the essential condition that the Territory should have a full measure of self-government, which could not be taken to mean limited self-government. Consequently the United Kingdom, as administering Power, was under an obligation to implement the United Nations resolutions, in particular resolution 1760 (XVII) and the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.

42. He acknowledged that it was the traditional policy of the United Kingdom to help dependent peoples to attain freedom and independence with every possible guarantee of a stable and prosperous future. That policy had received the highest praise and many States Members of the United Nations had expressed their gratitude for the understanding and generous assistance which the United Kingdom had enabled them to obtain independence without running into artificially created obstacles. The stubborn resistance of the United Kingdom Government to an almost unanimous decision of the General Assembly on the problem now before the Committee stood in stark contrast to its customary attitude.

43. The already explosive situation in Southern Rhodesia had grown even worse owing to various factors involving the responsibility of the United Kingdom. Firstly, the undemocratic Constitution of December 1961 had been introduced against the wishes of 400,000 Africans, who in a referendum had expressed their opposition to it, whereas only 41,000 votes of the white minority had been cast in its favour. Under that Constitution 3.6 million Africans had been deprived of their rights, for the Constitution guaranteed them only minimal rights and did not include the political and social rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As for the Constitutional Council, its method of election made it an instrument of the ruling white class. Moreover, with a white majority in the Legislative Assembly, the decision of two-thirds of its members was sufficient to ensure the adoption of a law even if it violated human rights. The electoral system based on the two classes of voters was discriminatory and tended to perpetuate domination by the white minority. The December 1962 elections had brought to power Mr. Winston Field's Rhodesia Front Party, the most reactionary party of the white settlers, as was proved by the repressive measures it had enacted against the African majority.

44. Secondly, there was a latent danger that the pernicious policy of apartheid would extend to Southern Rhodesia, where racial discrimination was rife. If that were to happen, the United Nations struggle against apartheid would receive a severe setback.

45. Thirdly, with the dissolution of the Federation the United Kingdom Government was planning to give the Field Government control over the armed forces. In the present explosive situation that would spell imminent danger to peace in Africa and the minority Government in Southern Rhodesia would have effective means to intensify its repressive policy against the African population. The United Kingdom had tried to allay fears by saying that the Field Government had no intention of utilizing these armed forces in external adventures which might compromise the security of other countries. Since the United Kingdom had also insisted that it lacked control over the Southern

Rhodesia Government because the Territory was allegedly a self-governing colony, its statements could not fail to give rise to some anxiety. The United Kingdom had also asserted that the Field Government was completely independent in its conduct of internal affairs. It followed that the armed forces could be used to consolidate the supremacy of the white minority group now in power. In the present circumstances the reversion of those forces to Southern Rhodesia would aggravate the situation and give rise to justified fears in the countries neighbouring Southern Rhodesia.

46. All the foregoing facts had aroused the legitimate concern of the thirty-two independent African States which had taken part in the Addis Ababa Conference. The result had been an appeal to the Security Council, which had met in September 1963 but had achieved nothing owing to the veto of the United Kingdom—the first occasion upon which the veto had been used in defence of purely colonial interests. It had been a desperate last bid by the United Kingdom to preserve the privileged position of a group of European settlers in Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom should remember, however, that it had been alone in its opposition to the draft resolution, which had obtained eight votes in favour, and that the draft resolution possessed undoubted moral force since it clearly indicated the majority opinion of the Security Council.

47. His delegation had no doubt about the urgent necessity for the United Nations to give priority to the problem of Southern Rhodesia, which was daily growing worse while the United Kingdom remained deaf to the many appeals directed to it.

48. In applying the decisions taken at the Central African Conference held at Victoria Falls, the United Kingdom still had power to bring about a solution which would safeguard the rights of the African majority and ensure peace in Africa. A heavy responsibility lay on the United Kingdom. Confident that that country would remain true to its great historic traditions and its constant desire to help dependent peoples in their struggle for liberty, his delegation appealed to the United Kingdom to heed the voice of the independent States of Africa, which enjoyed the support of the majority of States Members of the United Nations. It hoped that the United Kingdom would do everything in its power to prevent Southern Rhodesia from becoming another battlefield in the struggle against colonialism. The implementation of United Nations resolutions, especially 1760 (XVII), would ease the present tension in Central Africa.

49. His delegation endorsed the legitimate demands of the African States and would therefore support any measures designed to satisfy them, such as the explicit recognition of the right of the people of Southern Rhodesia to self-determination and independence; the prevention of any transfer of armed forces to the minority Government of Mr. Winston Field in the present circumstances; the amendment of the Constitution to ensure due respect for the rights of the majority and to permit the formation of a truly democratic Government representative of all the inhabitants of the Territory—the only Government to which the United Kingdom should grant the attributes of sovereignty; restoration of political liberties in Southern Rhodesia and abrogation of measures designed to perpetuate racial discrimination and repression; broadening of the franchise in order to put an end to the present division of the electorate into two classes; and agrarian

and educational reforms to give Africans and Europeans equal opportunities.

50. His delegation would vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/L.774.

51. Mr. EL-SHAFEI (United Arab Republic) said that, in the process of decolonization which had marked the present decade, legal manoeuvres were sometimes employed to delay the attainment of the aspirations of the subjugated peoples. When the community of nations, acting in accordance with the Charter and the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, demonstrated concern for the fate of those peoples, it was opposed on grounds of non-competence and its resolutions were considered ultra vires. Even if the question of jurisdiction was established, agreements or obligations were invoked to obstruct the process of decolonization. Yet co-operation was repeatedly pledged by the same Power was defying the will of the majority of nations. Over three million Africans in Zambia were among those still oppressed.

52. Chapter XI of the Charter had always been and still was the main rule of conduct between countries responsible for administration, on the one hand, and dependent countries and peoples on the other. The administering Powers were accountable to the other signatories to the Charter and no other interpretation could withstand examination. To evade that responsibility to the international community through any sort of convention was contrary to logic, morality and the established rule of international law.

53. It was against that background that the question of Southern Rhodesia had been approached in the United Nations. Since the sixteenth session of the General Assembly the question had been under constant consideration by the General Assembly, by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and, more recently, by the Security Council. The United Kingdom Government had opposed the submission of the question to the Security Council and by vetoing the Council resolution had shown that it had no intention of setting up in Southern Rhodesia a Government representing the people of the country but that, on the contrary, it wished to keep its hands free to support the racist settler régime with armed forces and aircraft. The intention of the United Kingdom Government as revealed by its representatives in the Special Committee and in the Security Council was evidently to seek a compromise solution to prevent any deterioration of the situation; it maintained that the question of the independence of Southern Rhodesia was an open question and it was looking to the Southern Rhodesia Government to make proposals for amendments to the 1961 Constitution which would result in broadening the basis of representation.

54. After the London talks in April 1963, Mr. Winston Field had stated that it had become apparent to him that the main difficulty in the way of Southern Rhodesia's attaining its proper status on dissolution of the Federation, i.e. independence within the Commonwealth, was the opposition of certain new members of the Commonwealth and of the African Asian group. He had expressed the view that the matter was one for settlement between the United Kingdom Government and the Government of Southern Rhodesia and had added that those countries to which he had referred would continue to threaten withdrawal from the Com-

monwealth whenever they were not granted every demand. "Sooner or later", he had concluded, "a stand will have to be taken, and I believe that it should be now." Nothing had been said about compromise or the broadening of the franchise. After the Victoria Falls Conference, at which Mr. Field had been assured the control of gigantic armed forces, there had been threats from Salisbury to achieve independence even without the consent of the United Kingdom.

55. The financial consequences of the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland had a great influence on the arrangements the United Kingdom Government would like to make. The final liquidation of the Federation was awaiting agreement on those financial consequences.

56. That was the context in which efforts at persuasion and compromise had been contemplated. After the Victoria Falls Conference what was in sight was a pre-independence conference, and not a constitutional conference in which representatives of the African population would participate to formulate a new constitution for Southern Rhodesia.

57. Since the question of independence was declared to be still open, the African population had no alternative but to wait. The question was, however, how long they were to be deprived of their fundamental rights and obliged to pay taxes and to obey laws not of their own making.

58. Speaking at the Special Committee's 135th meeting, on 25 March 1963, the United States representative had said that if the Government of Southern Rhodesia maintained its present attitude, the fear that violence might follow could not be avoided. According to Southern Rhodesian officials, the Government's policy was to provide the means whereby all groups and races within the colony could develop their social and political aspirations in complete freedom and in accordance with their own customs. If that was so, it might be asked why a series of oppressive laws had been introduced by the Rhodesia Front Government and why the Land Apportionment Act had not been repealed. It might be argued that those laws applied to all the inhabitants of the Territory, but the truth was that it was the Africans who were really affected. His delegation challenged any authority to give facts about what had been achieved in education, social security and social welfare for the Africans and in preventing the harassment of political organizations.

59. At the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, petitioners from Salisbury had told the Fourth Committee that they advocated multiracialism and that if only the African leaders would co-operate and register for the elections they would foster a happy multi-racial society. That claim had been examined carefully by members of the Committee and had been proved to be baseless. So far nothing had been done; nor had it been the intention of either the previous or the present Government of Southern Rhodesia to achieve anything of the kind.

60. The problem of racial discrimination in Southern Rhodesia was acute and the Government acted in response to the dictates of the ruling racial minority. While in theory there was no racial discrimination with regard to voting, in fact there was, because the means and educational qualifications were so high as to render African participation negligible.

61. Freedom of association and speech within the limits constitutionally determined and accepted by the

nation and not merely by a ruling racial minority were essential for good government. In Southern Rhodesia those rights had been curtailed, particularly as they affected the African sections of the community. African political parties had been proscribed and freedom of speech stifled.

62. Inequalities of income were the direct result of discriminatory practices which affected the different racial groups in their productive and earning capacities. Furthermore, those disparities constituted essential elements of Government policy, necessary for the preservation of the peculiar socio-economic structure based on racial discrimination and domination.

63. As a result of the Victoria Falls Conference, the Federal air and land forces were to be transferred to the territorial Government. Doubtless Southern Rhodesia would like to retain as much of the Federal forces as it could afford and the entire air force. His delegation considered that the United Kingdom Government should stop the transfer of Federal air and land forces to the Southern Rhodesia Government until a solution satisfactory to the entire population of the Territory had been found.

64. Just before Sir Roy Welensky's visit to Cape Town in May 1963, The Daily Telegraph and Morning Post had reported that there was speculation in Salisbury that the visit might be to lay the foundations of a full-scale conference between the two countries. The Observer had reported on 19 May that the talks had led to a programme to build a new 83-mile railway link between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. At present Rhodesia had only three outlets to the sea: through the United Kingdom Protectorate of Bechuanaland—which might be closed if Southern Rhodesia defied the United Kingdom—through Portuguese territories and through the Congo, none of which routes was regarded as safe for the future. It was expected that the new line could be completed within six months. Clearly, therefore, the United Kingdom Government intended to wait until all possible channels of action were closed.

65. As an urgent interim measure the delegation of the United Arab Republic, together with a number of others, had deemed it necessary to bring the matter to the immediate attention of the General Assembly by means of draft resolution A/C.4/L.774.

66. Nobody could fail to appreciate the fact that the African countries, like many Members of the United Nations, always resorted to the United Nations and its various organs to seek just and equitable solutions. The United Kingdom Government should seize the opportunity and reshape its policy. It was equally important that friends of the United Kingdom should use their influence.

67. Finally, his delegation recalled that the Heads of African States and Governments who had met at Addis Ababa in May 1963 had affirmed their support for the African nationalists of Southern Rhodesia and had declared that if power in Southern Rhodesia were to be usurped by a racial white minority they would lend effective moral and practical support to any legitimate measures which the African nationalist leaders might devise for the purpose of recovering such power and restoring it to the African majority. His delegation endorsed that affirmation.

68. Mrs. MENESES DE ALBIZU CAMPOS (Cuba) expressed her delegation's satisfaction that the Federa-

tion of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was to be dissolved at the end of 1963. The attempt to extend the tyrannical rule of a minority of white settlers in Southern Rhodesia to two other African countries had failed. The idea behind the Federation had been to allow the 225,000 white settlers in Southern Rhodesia to share in Northern Rhodesia's copper wealth while they continued their political and economic domination of 3.6 million Africans.

69. Southern Rhodesia was the anachronistic vestige of an ambitious colonial programme in Central Africa. All United Nations appeals to the administering Power had gone unheeded. Resolutions 1747 (XVI), 1760 (XVII) and others had been ignored by the administering Power, which was fully responsible for the Territory. As recently as 1 October 1963, at the Fourth Committee's 1434th meeting, the administering Power had repeated its assertion that it could not accept that Southern Rhodesia was a Non-Self-Governing Territory or that the situation in that Territory was a threat to international peace and security.

70. The group of white settlers which held the reins of government in Southern Rhodesia, thanks to the support of the administering Power, tyrannized over the African inhabitants, who were deprived of their political rights. False elections had been held, against the wishes of the Africans, and the Government had declared its intention of continuing its repressive policy. Yet the administering Power now said that the only solution to the problem was one of compromise: in other words, the 3.6 million Africans were expected to reach a compromise with the administering Power, although the latter maintained that it lacked the power to do anything to stop the exploitation and ill-treatment of the Africans. The administering Power claimed that it had a convention with Southern Rhodesia, which was really a convention with the white minority. As the white minority had been created by the administering Power, that was tantamount to saying that the latter had a convention with itself, which meant that there was no convention at all. That claim could no longer be upheld in the United Nations, whose Members now included a large number of countries which had suffered from similar wiles on the part of the colonial Powers.

71. The minority Government of Southern Rhodesia could only remain in power by force, disregarding the angry protests of the Africans. The administering Power now proposed to strengthen the position of the minority Government by transferring to it the powerful air force of the Federation. That partly explained why the administering Power had declared that there was no possibility of the present Government of Southern Rhodesia being overthrown by force and had urged the Africans to seek a compromise solution.

72. While her delegation realized that on other occasions the United Kingdom Government had shown a greater sense of reality, it was disturbed to see a Member State persisting in upholding a régime based on force, in violation of the United Nations Charter and in disregard of United Nations resolutions. The United Kingdom Government had declared that the situation in Southern Rhodesia was not explosive, yet it could scarcely think that the people of Southern Rhodesia possessed infinite patience or that such patience was to be found among the thirty-two independent African countries which at the Addis Ababa Conference had reaffirmed their support for the African nationalists in Southern Rhodesia and solemnly declared that if power in Southern Rhodesia were to be usurped by a white

minority Government they would lend effective moral and practical support to any legitimate measures which the African nationalist leaders might devise for the purpose of recovering such power and restoring it to the African majority. Her delegation could not share the confidence of the administering Power and was concerned at the thought of an armed struggle. The gravity of the situation in Southern Rhodesia would be increased if the administering Power continued to transfer powers and arms to the minority of white settlers and to listen to requests for independence for the Whites.

73. Her delegation considered that resolution 1514 (XV) and others which had been adopted by the General Assembly should be applied in Southern Rhodesia and that the people of that Territory should be granted complete independence without delay. Her delegation would support any draft resolution along those lines.

Mr. Achkar (Guinea) resumed the Chair.

74. Mr. BENNANI (Morocco) observed that the question of Southern Rhodesia was perhaps the only question on which the majority of peoples represented in the United Nations had adopted a clear and unequivocal attitude. All the resolutions that had been adopted on the subject recognized the legitimate claims of the people of Southern Rhodesia. Despite the veto exercised by the United Kingdom delegation, the draft resolution submitted to the Security Council had been supported by a majority of members, with no other opposition.

75. According to the statements made by the United Kingdom delegation, the problem was merely one of granting complete independence to a country which already had a Government and Constitution of its own and was therefore self-governing. Unfortunately that was far from the case. It had been clearly demonstrated that the alleged Government of Southern Rhodesia was composed of white settlers acting entirely in their own

interests. It had also been established that the white settler Government was using racist measures to oppress the indigenous population and, following the example of South Africa, setting up apartheid as a system of government.

76. The General Assembly had recognized that Southern Rhodesia was a Non-Self-Governing Territory and therefore within the competence of the United Nations. The United Kingdom could not claim to be unaware of the discriminatory and racist nature of the 1961 Constitution. Obviously a Constitution under which the 225,000 white settlers had fifty seats in the Legislative Assembly while the 3.6 million indigenous inhabitants could have fifteen seats at the most was contrary to the Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and indeed the principles held by the United Kingdom itself with regard to democracy, right and justice. Nevertheless the United Kingdom persisted in its intention to transfer the attributes of sovereignty to the Government of Southern Rhodesia, thus handing the people over to the mercy of the racist white minority. The strategic interests of the United Kingdom in maintaining Southern Rhodesia under its control must be very powerful and were perhaps the main motives underlying the "special relationship" between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia.

77. The United Kingdom must realize that colonialism belonged to the past and that Africa was determined to do away with it. The obstinate attitude adopted by the United Kingdom could only bring it into conflict with the peoples of Africa, whose just cause would surely triumph in the end.

78. For those reasons his delegation would join with the majority in urging the United Kingdom to comply with the resolutions of the United Nations concerning Southern Rhodesia and, in particular, not to oppose the draft resolution now before the Committee, which he hoped would be adopted by a very large majority.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.