

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMISSION FOR WESTERN ASIA (ESCWA)

**AN OVERVIEW OF THE ARAB SECURITY SECTOR AMIDST
POLITICAL TRANSITION: A REFLECTION ON LEGACIES,
FUNCTIONS AND PERCEPTIONS**

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I. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Security sector support (SSS), also widely referred to as security sector reform (SSR), can be described as “the transformation of the security system which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, so that it is managed and operated in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework”.¹ Ideally, the reform process should embrace all branches of the security sector, from the armed forces to customs authorities. The focus of the following sections is more on the security bureaucracies affiliated with ministries of the interior, rather than those which are affiliated with ministries of defence or which are under the direct command of the presidency or monarchy.

Two core objectives of SSS processes are critical in the case of countries witnessing democratic transition:²

- (a) Establishment of effective governance, oversight and accountability in the security system;
- (b) Improved delivery of security and justice services.³

To achieve these, any comprehensive SSS process should enhance and empower the following key elements:

- (a) *Oversight and accountability*: This can be achieved through the following:
 - (i) *Internal control* by the services themselves by the legalization of their mandates through laws enacted by parliament, internal directives and the fostering of a professional work culture;
 - (ii) *The executive*, which exercises direct control and estimation of budget, and sets general guidelines and priorities;
 - (iii) *The legislature*, which exercises parliamentary oversight by passing laws that define and regulate the police services and their powers, and by adopting the corresponding budgetary allocations;
 - (iv) *The judiciary*, which both monitors the police, security and intelligence services and prosecutes wrongdoing by their employees;
 - (v) *Civil society groups, media, think tanks and research institutes*, which monitor the police, security and intelligence services, primarily on the basis of public sources. These groups may include civilian review boards and public complaints commissions;
 - (vi) *Individual citizens*, who may seek to redress violations by the security and intelligence services via special tribunals, independent ombudsmen, commissioners or inspectors-general, as well as national and international courts;⁴

¹ OECD, 2007a.

² For more information on the general objectives of SSR processes, see the United Nations Security Council Reports or the United Kingdom Government's Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) reports.

³ OECD, 2007a, p. 21.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 112-118.

(b) *Capacity-building*: Retraining and capacity-building of the security services. This includes improving police training, staff development and internal practices, as well as reviewing police structure, strategic management, capacity, and practices;⁵

(c) *Legal mandate*: Defining a clear legal framework and mandate. In addition, integrating human rights norms into laws pertaining to the security sector. This should include the separation of the executive, police and internal intelligence agencies;

(d) *Civilianization*: Emphasizing the civilian nature of the police force. This may include civilian leadership and administration, and differentiating uniforms and ranking systems from those in the army;⁶

(e) *Decentralization*: Shifting from strong central administration to local administration, possibly including some selected police divisions;

(f) *Professional, depoliticized identity*: Building a new identity based on a strong professional culture and meritocracy. This includes depoliticizing the police force and removing or mitigating political influence in policing, the aim being to ensure that the professional identity of the security apparatus supersedes all other identities or affiliations, whether ethnic, racial, religious, political, ideological, or gender-based.

These elements constitute the core pillars of SSS and successful democratization processes in many other former transitioning countries in the world. Arab countries currently in transition can certainly draw lessons from those experiences in their efforts to reform a very complex sector.

⁵ Capacity-building is meant to include women. Training curriculums should also educate about violence against women. For example, many Arab women never report incidences of rape, not only because they could face stigmatization but also because they do not trust the police, who often discourage them from reporting crimes or even seek to excuse the perpetrators.

⁶ It is worth recalling that Arab police forces are often heavily armed while on patrol, an image that is threatening in itself. Keeping order does not always necessitate the display or use of force; consider, for example, the Metropolitan Police in the United Kingdom, who do not carry guns or other lethal weapons.

II. THE REGIONAL CONTEXT: AN INHERITED CHALLENGE

Until very recently, political change in some Arab countries was led not by popular uprisings, but by military coups. Indeed, the history of political change after the Second World War, also known as the post-colonial era, which witnessed the creation of the sovereign Arab state, is often viewed through the actions of military officers turned politicians. During this turbulent transition, military officers positioned themselves as the protectors of the state and people, gaining support through nationalist rhetoric that promised liberation and social justice.⁷ Initially, the military was overtly involved in most aspects of national governance, choosing not to reduce its heavy involvement in affairs of state. Over time, however, the prestige of Arab officers waned and their governance systems proved unable to cope with internal and external affairs of state.

According to James Gelvin, Arab states had to “force-march” economic development, which included a web sprawling from highly centralized governments of employment opportunities, social benefits with guarantees, health care, and education, as well as subsidizing consumer goods and rewarding loyal elements of the population. The development philosophy at the time was that the state was best positioned to direct resources. It was thought that governments could manage resources efficiently where markets were underdeveloped. Gelvin also points to what he terms the “logic of decolonization”.⁸ During the colonial era, economic policies were dictated by colonial powers. In the post-colonial era, national governments attempted to gain popular backing through the redistribution of national wealth, thereby establishing a compliance bargain between ruler and ruled. By the 1980s, confronted with falling oil prices, Arab governments were forced to renegotiate the social contract. A number of Arab states suffered greatly, having borrowed massively at low interest rates, but then having to assume further debt to service debts and attempt to fund benefits for the compliance bargain. By that time, the development philosophy had changed: state-economic development, including public ownership of manufacturing and commerce, was overtaken by neoliberal economic policies. In desperate need of debt relief, Arab states had to cut expenditures, liberalize trade, balance their budgets, remove price controls, deregulate business, privatize public enterprises, and end comprehensive subsidies on consumer goods. In place of those subsidies, international lending institutions recommended subsidies targeted only to the very poor. Gelvin highlights the fact that Arab governments had to make further cuts in the ruling bargains they had struck with their populations.

With declining popular support, coercion was increasingly used as a means to maintain political and social stability. This was coupled by a shift in power from the ministry of defence to the ministry of the interior. According to Mouin Rabbani, an independent Middle East analyst, if, in 1970, it was the minister of defence and the chief of staff who were most familiar to the public, by 2010, that visibility had largely been appropriated by the Minister of the Interior and head of intelligence.⁹ In most instances, the latter reports directly to the head of state, as was the case in Egypt, where General Intelligence reported to former President Hosni Mubarak. It was in this way that control and management of the security establishments became so personalized. In Egypt, Mubarak used to exercise more or less direct control over policy and key appointments, playing judge and jury on disagreements over mandates and expenditure. In Yemen, several of the male relatives of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh held the most vital security positions and districts. In Libya, Mu’ammarr al-Qadhafi was the self-appointed head of the revolutionary sector, effectively determining key decisions concerning all branches of the security establishment. This personalization of the security sector also rendered it beyond the scrutiny of the cabinet or parliament.¹⁰ The lack of civilian control of the security sector would remain a recurring theme within the Arab world.¹¹

⁷ Be’eri, 1982, p. 75.

⁸ Gelvin, 2012.

⁹ Rabbani, 2011, p. 283.

¹⁰ Sayigh, 2007, pp. 17-19.

¹¹ ESCWA, 2013a.

Elsewhere in the Arab world, the security sector could not be built around a leader or monarch because of demographic issues like religious or ethnic pluralism. Post-civil war Lebanon is a case in point, where each of the various security establishments have been built around a particular confessional identity in order to share power among the different communities. The result, however, has been the splintering of the Lebanese security sector into different spheres of influence for political and confessional leaders, essentially turning national security into a consensus-based exercise among its ruling elites. Even appointments in the security establishment are subject to sectarian and regional power politics. For instance, on 6 May 2008, the Lebanese Government led by Fouad Siniora removed Brigadier General Wafik Shoukeir from his post as head of airport security amid allegations that Hizbullah had installed surveillance equipment in airport facilities. Hizbullah saw Shoukeir's dismissal as an attack against them, particularly since it was preceded by another government decision to dismantle Hizbullah's telecommunication network, which the party considered vital to its military capabilities vis-à-vis Israel. On 8 May, violence erupted across Lebanon after Hizbullah and its allies took over parts of Beirut, attacking the offices of opposition groups. Civil war was prevented only through a regional and internationally brokered deal called the Doha Agreement. To this day, Hizbullah, a non-state actor, remains a leading influence on internal and external security matters in Lebanon. The situation in Yemen, where several competing security services have conflicting duties, provides an interesting parallel. These services monitor each other as much as they do the population, and each organization is supported by different groups in society.¹² The cases of Lebanon and Yemen give credence to research on fragile states suggesting that non-state actors are the main providers of justice and security for 80 to 90 per cent of the population.¹³

Foreign influence in the region further legitimized the oppressive mandate of the security sector. Cold War politics and competing regional interests elevated the importance of autocratic governments and their security establishments. Foreign assistance to the security sector was rendered accordingly, becoming a tool used by foreign powers to align the commitments of recipient states with their own political or strategic objectives. During that period, Arab regimes sought regional allies, while amassing external support for autocratic leaders and building the capacity of security institutions to safeguard and impose a stagnant autocratic system of government maintained by national security entities with overlapping and, at times, deliberately conflicting mandates.¹⁴

Another milestone for the Arab security establishment was the fight against terrorism following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States. Muslim extremism gave national security establishments a renewed sense of legitimacy, providing an opportunity for the ruling elites to portray themselves, both domestically and internationally, as the protectors of secularism, moderate Islam and stability. The so-called fight against militant Islam was, however, coupled with extremes.

According to the Arab Human Development Report 2009, most Arab countries passed broad and vague anti-terrorism laws which allowed undefined periods of pre-trial detention, widened applicability of the death penalty, curtailed freedom of expression, and increased police powers to search properties, tap telephone calls and intercept other types of communication.¹⁵ The Arab security sector was also characterized by the lack of judicial independence and the continuous state of long-term emergency laws. Infringements on judicial independence were marked by the use of extraordinary forms of justice, particularly in the criminal domain. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), "forms of extraordinary justice, including military courts and State security courts, represent a negation of the rule of natural justice and detract from guarantees of a fair trial".¹⁶ These military courts became the norm in many Arab states, with civil courts heavily influenced by the ruling government.

¹² Al-Mikhlaifi and Al-Rahabi, 2012, pp. 2-6.

¹³ OECD, 2007a, p. 67.

¹⁴ ESCWA, 2013a.

¹⁵ UNDP, 2009, p. 60.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 62.

Resilient to change, internal security institutions became the primary protectors of the political order. Internal security was seen to be loyal to ruling elites and sectarian or ethnic patronage networks, rather than to the notion of the state.¹⁷ With little regard for civil liberties and human rights, these concentrated power structures fuelled distrust, often posing a major threat to human security.¹⁸ During the time of autocratic rule, constitutionally ambiguous and unaccountable police states became synonymous with some of the stagnant autocratic governance system in the Arab region. As will be established in the below sections, the governance deficit of the Arab world was inextricably linked to the malpractices of the overmandated security sector. These trends reinforced each other symbiotically, causing a downward spiral of governance and civic liberties indicators. As the security sector has become so synonymous with the regime, governance indicators related to oppression and democratization also inevitably reflect the nature and performance of the security sector itself.

It is worth noting that the development of the Arab state in its post-independence autocratic form reached another landmark when Arab rulers began preparing for their successors. The need for the security sector to preserve the regime became especially important. The intelligence agencies, or *Mukhabarat*, reinforced by such special police units as the recently disbanded State Security Division in Tunisia, became the most influential entity in the daily life of the Arab citizen. As the journalist Rami Khouri wrote in the aftermath of the storming of the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate offices by protesters, “the exaggerated role of the police, armed forces and intelligence services in the Arab world in the past half-century has been the single most important cause of the Arab world’s frightening mass political stagnation, economic mediocrity, rampant corruption, intellectual hollowness, cultural arrest, and global marginalization”.¹⁹ The general perception among Arab commentators was that the security establishment operated above the law, and that, “with maintaining law and order their ostensible *raison d’être*, domestic security agencies derive their power precisely on account of their license for lawlessness”.²⁰

According to Mouin Rabbani, the function of security agencies went beyond the stifling of domestic dissent: “With loyalty and obedience rather than professionalism and integrity as their criteria, they also vet judges and generals, appoint editors and university deans, fix elections and determine legislation, control the media, regulate political parties and unions and non-governmental associations, and even compose Friday sermons [...] In practice, the *Mukhabarat* is also the chief justice, speaker of parliament, prime minister, mayor, university president, editor-in-chief and even chief cleric”.²¹ The role of the security sector in the Arab world was all-encompassing, and any potential activity could fall under their jurisdiction.

Over the past five years, this state of affairs appears to have worsened. Grave human rights abuses increased and governance deficits rose. The strains of governance in some Arab countries became increasingly complicated by information and communications technology, a growing young population, and the mismanagement of economic liberalization, where the privatization of state assets benefited the family and friends of the regime and weak state institutions were unable to provide essential services to the majority of the population. Most Arab economies were also unable to generate the requisite employment opportunities. Unemployment grew, the gap between the rich and the poor widened and repression became more pronounced. This state of affairs is summarized by James Gelvin,²² when he analyses four factors that led to what came to be known as the Arab Spring or Arab uprisings: (a) inefficient command economies were replaced by neoliberal economic policies, which led to capital cronyism and inequality and significantly disrupted the “benefits-for-compliance ruling bargain”; (b) the surge in delayed employment, marriage and

¹⁷ Sayigh, 2007, p. 22.

¹⁸ Kodmani and Chartouni-Dubarry, 2009, p. 96.

¹⁹ Khouri, 2011b.

²⁰ Rabbani, 2011, p. 284.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Gelvin, 2012.

social participation for a mobilizable young population; (c) the massive inflation that drove up world food prices and caused a significant decline in Arab household incomes; and (d) the lack of representative institutions. The uprisings that began in Tunisia in December 2010 were a demonstration of those grievances. A review of data from between 2005 and 2010 reveals steadily growing governance deficits, human rights abuses and limitations on freedom, despite favourable official and aggregate growth rates.

The Human Development Index (HDI) (table 1) shows that all the countries in transition made gains in human development between 2005 and 2010. Bahrain, Jordan, Libya and Tunisia scored high in 2010, with Yemen by far the worst performer. It is sobering, however, to consider that in the Democracy Index (table 2), all countries scored better in 2006, the year the index began, than they did in 2010. It should be recalled that human development reflects only three quality of life indicators: health, education and living standards. However, as the Democracy Index (table 2) shows, the improvements in human development were not accompanied by parallel advances in democracy. In fact, democratic conditions in all countries, with the exception of Libya, worsened between 2006 and 2010, with only Tunisia and Libya's scores markedly improving in 2011.

TABLE 1. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX

Human Development Index (HDI) – Composite (0-1, where 1 indicates better performance)				
	2005	2009	2010	2011
Bahrain	0.80	0.81	0.81	0.81
Egypt	0.61	0.64	0.64	0.64
Jordan	0.67	0.69	0.70	0.70
Libya	0.74	0.76	0.77	0.76
Syrian Arab Republic	0.62	0.63	0.63	0.63
Tunisia	0.67	0.69	0.70	0.70
Yemen	0.42	0.45	0.46	0.46

Source: UNDP. Human Development Index.

TABLE 2. DEMOCRACY INDEX

Democracy Index – Composite (EIU) (0-10, where 10 indicates better performance)						
	2006	2008	2010	2011	Change 2006-2010	Change 2006-2011
Bahrain	3.53	3.38	3.49	2.92	-0.04	-0.61
Egypt	3.9	3.89	3.07	3.95	-0.83	0.05
Jordan	3.92	3.93	3.74	3.89	-0.18	-0.03
Libya	1.84	2	1.94	3.55	0.1	1.71
Syrian Arab Republic	2.36	2.18	2.31	1.99	-0.05	-0.37
Tunisia	3.06	2.96	2.79	5.53	-0.27	2.47
Yemen	2.98	2.95	2.64	2.57	-0.34	-0.41

Source: EIU. Democracy Index.

Note: The Democracy Index is a composite index resulting from the simple average of five category indices: (a) electoral process and pluralism; (b) functioning of government; (c) political participation; (d) political culture; and (e) civil liberties.

In the Failed States Index (table 3), it is interesting to note that Bahrain, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen exhibit higher scores regarding the likelihood of regime collapse, indicating that their ability to function as states has decreased over the analysed period. Notably, Tunisia showed the greatest risk of collapse and was the first country in the region to initiate change through popular uprisings. However, the indicators should be taken with a degree of scepticism, as evidenced by the Syrian and Libyan scores, with the former recording an improvement in its scores in 2011, exactly when the protracted civil conflict started, and the latter steadily hovering around the Tunisian average, despite the military action of 2011 and its tribal divides.

TABLE 3. FAILED STATES INDEX^{a/}

Failed States Index – Composite (FFP) (0-120, where 120 indicates a state being the most at risk of collapse and violence)								
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Change 06-10	Change 06-11 ^{b/}
Bahrain	N/A	57	56.8	59	58.8	62.2	1.8	2
Egypt	89.5	89.2	88.7	89	87.6	86.8	-1.9	-2.7
Jordan	77	76.6	77.3	77.9	77	74.5	0	-2.5
Libya	68.5	69.3	70	69.4	69.1	68.7	0.6	0.2
Syrian Arab Republic	88.6	88.6	90.1	89.8	87.9	85.9	-0.7	-2.7
Tunisia	65.4	65.6	65.6	67.6	67.5	70.1	2.1	4.7
Yemen	96.6	93.2	95.4	98.1	100	100.3	3.4	3.7

Source: Foreign Policy and Fund for Peace. Failed States Index.

Notes: ^{a/} The Failed State Index is comprised of 13 underlying indicators: mounting demographic pressures; massive movement of refugees or internally-displaced persons; chronic and sustained human flight; uneven economic development; poverty and sharp or severe economic decline; legitimacy of the state; progressive deterioration of public services; vengeance-seeking group grievance; violation of human rights and rule of law; security apparatus; rise of factionalized elites; and intervention of external actors.

^{b/} For Bahrain, figures are for the period 2007-2011, since data for 2006 is not available.

N/A is short for not applicable.

From the above data, it may be concluded that gross domestic products (GDPs) and improvements in human development and quality of life were insufficient to sustain the existing governance structures in those Arab countries, where the security sector was at the forefront of efforts to maintain the socioeconomic and political status quo. Nor were those gains sufficient to counterbalance the strong correlation between the absence of voice, accountability, participation, functioning and fair public institutions, and the higher likelihood of a failing state. If stability and peace are to flourish in the Arab region, it is clear that states must begin to consider different governance options and, in particular, ones that are not underpinned by the security sector. The Arab uprisings have proved that a governance status quo cannot remain in power indefinitely through partial reform and repression.

III. THE CHALLENGES: SSS AND ARAB TRANSITIONS

The conceptual framework set forth in section I constitutes pillars of SSS and characterizes successful democratization in former transitioning countries. In Spain, such steps were gradually introduced after the death of General Francisco Franco in November 1975, leading up to the transfer of power to the Socialist Party following landmark elections in October 1982.²³ In South Africa, a comprehensive national defence reform programme was introduced in the White Papers of October 1994 (box 1). This included recreating a professional identity for intelligence personnel, bolstered by a code of conduct rooted in democratic values, respect for human rights, and adherence to the principle of political neutrality.²⁴ More recently, Indonesia introduced the New Paradigm, a democratization framework which included the demilitarization of the police and parliamentary oversight over the police and intelligence services (box 2). As a result, two parliamentary committees now monitor Indonesian security apparatuses.²⁵ In Georgia, the demilitarization of police was partly implemented between 2004 and 2005. As a result, the Minister and Deputy Minister of the Interior, as well as the chief of domestic intelligence, are now all civilians. The Ministry of the Interior also signed a memorandum to monitor detention centres with a human rights ombudsman.²⁶ In Chile, following the end of the repressive regime of General Augusto Pinochet, the Senate established the civilian National Intelligence Agency. A new law introduced shortly thereafter requires every security agency to provide all requested information to that body.²⁷

Highly professional security agencies in consolidated democracies are also monitored by such external bodies as the Intelligence and Security Committee in the United Kingdom or the Security Intelligence Review Committee in Canada. These bodies are typically empowered to examine the activities of intelligence agencies, and to report back to government or parliament. The following boxes illustrate SSS reforms during transition phases in South Africa and Indonesia, respectively.

In order to achieve the aforementioned objectives, a number of critical hurdles need to be overcome. In Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen, where the revolutions have succeeded in bringing down the government, six hurdles have been identified, which also apply elsewhere in the Arab world:

- (a) Extreme political polarization, leading to political violence and the politicization of the SSS process;
- (b) Internal resistance and sabotage by anti-reform factions within the security sector;
- (c) Limited capacity and resources of the newly elected governments;
- (d) Weak democratic institutions;
- (e) Limited knowledge and experience of SSS requirements among stakeholders;
- (f) Incomplete demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR).

²³ Serra, 2010, p. 27.

²⁴ Born and Leigh, 2005, p. 48.

²⁵ ICG, 2000, p. 7.

²⁶ Darchiashvili, 2008, p. 33.

²⁷ Weeks, 2008, p. 52.

Box 1. South Africa: A focus on human security

In South Africa in 1976, the apartheid state saw the first real backlash from its majority black African population. The government responded with a new national strategy, relying heavily on the state's coercive instruments for the maintenance of security at home and intimidation of enemies abroad. The military, police and intelligence agencies were granted extraordinary powers to employ state-sanctioned violence against opponents inside and outside the country. The strategy operated at the political, economic and ideological levels, affecting all areas of society and impacting the lives of every citizen. Virtually all significant policy decisions were now made by a powerful but largely unaccountable inner circle of national leaders, consisting of the Prime Minister (later the State President) and the Ministers of Defence, Police, Foreign Affairs, and Justice, along with certain senior defence and intelligence officials.^{a/} The new strategy authorized South Africa's security forces to seek out internal enemies, target dissidents living abroad, and destabilize hostile neighbouring states. The country soon had the largest and most developed security sector on the continent, and its prisons were full of domestic dissidents. In 1994, with the end of apartheid, multiracial national elections installed majority rule under the leadership of Nelson Mandela's African National Congress (ANC) Government. One of its first initiatives was to redirect the roles of intelligence agencies and the military, and to create a civil defence secretariat to maintain accountable civilian control of the military.^{b/} The ANC would also redefine the role of the South African security sector by implementing a human security-based agenda. The new leaders tried to reduce high crime rates and domestic violence by mitigating the social problems contributing to crime and building the capacity of the South African Police Service and other law enforcement and criminal justice agencies. They also sought national and regional solutions to organized crime and trafficking in human beings, arms, narcotics, and other contraband.^{c/} Furthermore, they committed their armed forces and intelligence organizations to regional peacekeeping operations. The 1999 White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions analysed international peace operations, noting requirements for civilian experts, civil police and military forces, and argued that South Africa should be prepared to furnish personnel in each of these categories. Since then, South Africa has sent peacekeeping forces to conflicts across the continent, including, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Liberia, and the Sudan. The country has also hosted negotiations between warring parties from Burundi, Congo and Côte d'Ivoire. There have been problems with South Africa's new approach, however, including some dissent from the state's traditional military apparatus. Furthermore, not all of the peacekeeping operations have been a complete success. Nevertheless, the new focus on human security in many ways facilitated the relatively smooth transition from apartheid oppression to democratic civilian control of the security sector.^{d/}

Sources: a/ Cock and Laurie, 1989, p. xiii.

b/ Cilliers and Reichert, eds., 1995.

c/ Mistry and Kiplin, 2004.

d/ Ferreira and Henk, 2008, pp. 501-525.

Box 2. Indonesian security sector transformation

Indonesia bore the brunt of the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. The mass protests which followed austerity measures by the New Order Government led to the fall from power of President Suharto in 1998. Military reform was a priority of the 1998 Indonesian revolution. After intense public pressure, the military, which had previously been a major political force within the country, was forced to introduce internal reform. In order to reconceptualize the military's future role, a seminar was held in 1998 that produced the so-called New Paradigm, which elaborated four guiding principles of military reform in the post-Suharto era. These acknowledged the following: it is not always necessary for the military to be at the forefront of national politics; the military would not seek to occupy political positions or influence the decision-making process; the military would exert its influence indirectly rather than directly; and the military would work in partnership with other national entities.^{a/} Another important feature of the New Paradigm was the military's willingness to acknowledge past mistakes, with several prominent generals apologizing for misdeeds under the Suharto regime.

Box 2 (continued)

Indonesia has since reduced the number of military officials in parliament, placed the military under civilian leadership and oversight, introduced regulations that oblige military officers to resign from service before taking up civilian positions, split the police and military into two separate branches, and introduced doctrinal changes.²⁷ However, problems persist. The military remains involved in the country's business sector, defence spending continues to be relatively high in terms of gross domestic product (GDP), and many claim that the military has maintained backdoor control of politics. Nevertheless, the democratic process and transformation of the Indonesian military has generally been regarded as a success.

Sources: a/ Sebastian and Iisindarsah, 2012, pp. 29-56.

b/ Sukma and Prasetyono, 2003.

Extreme political polarization alone should not be a major hurdle to SSS per se. Political diversity, with its heated debates and general difference of opinion, should be celebrated as gains of the revolutions in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen. However, these differences have polarized many countries and negatively affected SSS processes. In the aforementioned transitioning countries, political and criminal violence is cheap, effective and low risk. "I have 186 dead officers and more than 800 injured so far, petty officers preventing security chiefs from entering their offices, a presidential palace being torched on a weekly basis by a hundred or so kids [...] and Egypt's largest Government complex was blocked for four days, so when will I have time to reform? [...] When these political polemics end", said the Egyptian Minister of the Interior, General Mohammed Ibrahim, in a press conference on 19 February 2013.²⁸ This was one of the rare times a serving minister spoke publicly about the limitations of the security forces and reform. In that respect, the Egyptian and other post-Arab Spring ministries of the interior face a dilemma. On the one hand, they are responsible for defending state institutions, which are under constant attack by violent groups. On the other hand, if any protestors are killed or injured, the ministry of the interior is accused of brutality. These security groups have limited experience in non-lethal riot control tactics. "The pattern we have here is that the officer gets attacked with shotguns and Molotov cocktails. If he flees, he is accused of negligence and is tried. If he fights back, he is accused of brutality and also is tried. What exactly is he supposed to do?" This conundrum was put forward by a major in the Egyptian Central Security Forces who witnessed the attacks on the Presidential Palace in January 2013.²⁹ Another consequence of extreme polarization is the politicization of the SSS process by rival politicians. On talk shows, political figures call for SSS to be implemented and police brutality to end. At the same time, those same political figures praise security officials known for their support of brutal tactics. Some politicians even call on them to intervene in the political process by cracking down on their political rivals.

Therefore, the initial challenge of Arab countries in transition is to build consensus among different constituents on how to depoliticize the security sector, and to prepare for civilian control of the armed forces, which is so vital to the success of security sector support and democratization.³⁰ This may be hard to achieve, given the distrust between the emerging parties. Under such circumstances, SSS itself may backfire if it is implemented before true national reconciliation, and could have more adverse effects than benefits.

A second challenge is strong resistance to reform from some within the Arab security sector.³¹ Some decision makers within the ministry of the interior perceive the reform process only as an increase in the material capacities and budgets of their respective institutions. While that is certainly part of the process, aiming to enhance sector performance, other elements of SSS are usually not prioritized. Such elements

²⁸ Abo Elnnaga, 2013.

²⁹ Ashour, 2012.

³⁰ ESCWA, 2013a.

³¹ Ibid.

include effective civilian oversight, transparency measures, promotion based on merit rather than year of graduation, and revision of police academy curricula. The concept of accountability, in particular, faces strong resistance. One example from Tunisia is the case of Colonel Moncef al-Ajimi, the former director of the Tunisian Intervention Forces. Al-Ajimi was officially accused of firing on peaceful protestors in the towns of Thala and Qasarin during the Tunisian revolution. Former Minister of the Interior Ali Larayedh attempted to remove Al-Ajimi from his position while he was on trial. In response, hundreds of policemen from the Bouchoucha barracks physically blocked access to Al-Ajimi and then organized a strike to protest his attempted dismissal.³² Thousands of Intervention Forces members withdrew from key locations in several Tunisian cities and returned to their barracks. “We will not be a scapegoat for the families of the martyrs”, said one of the protesting policemen.³³ As a result, Larayedh had to keep Al-Ajimi in his post and a military court eventually found Al-Ajimi not guilty. While the Military Prosecutor appealed against the verdict,³⁴ the incident reflects the level of resistance to accountability faced by newly elected, post-revolution governments.

A third challenge is the inefficient use of limited capacity and resources.³⁵ The elected post-revolution governments in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia are faced with serious economic challenges. Egypt’s public debt exceeds 1,310 billion Egyptian pounds (US\$188 billion), or 85 per cent of its GDP. While there is much less public debt in Tunisia and Libya, with 15.8 and 4.2 per cent of the GDP, respectively,³⁶ their governments continue to suffer from insufficient resources for SSS. The economic crisis, however, did not prevent some countries in transition from increasing the bonuses of policemen by 300 per cent in the 2012 budget to “enhance the security performance”.³⁷ Tunisia spends 9.53 per cent of the state budget on the Ministry of the Interior for the same reason. There is limited public information on how such resources are spent and what the outcomes of such spending are. This undermines both transparency and accountability.

Related fourth and fifth challenges are weak democratic institutions and the limited knowledge and experience of SSS of many stakeholders.³⁸ In Egypt, the People’s Assembly, or lower house of parliament that was elected after the revolution, was not recognized by SCAF following a Constitutional Court verdict in June 2012 that deemed parts of the electoral law unconstitutional. It was the Assembly which approved amendments to Law No. 109 (1971) on the organization of the police force. The new version of that Law removed the President’s right to act as the head of the Supreme Council of the Police, and amended articles relating to salary controls and the status of certain ranks. Nevertheless, some members of parliament and activists expressed frustration with the amendments. “There were more than 70 Egyptians killed in Port Said stadium [...] [referring to riots that took place during a football match in the city of Port Said in 2012] And all the revolutionary parliament does is try to amend a few articles on salaries and pensions”, said one member of parliament.³⁹ There is clearly a large gap in both the dissolved lower house of parliament and the current Consultative Assembly or upper house, between the revolutionary demands of eradicating torture, ending impunity and reflecting transparency, and knowledge of how to translate such demands into SSS policies and procedures. As early as in July 2011, understanding in Tunisia of such limitations led the government and the Ministry of the Interior to collaborate with an international organization and several SSS experts.⁴⁰

³² Quoted in Ashour, 2012.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ ESCWA, 2013a.

³⁶ Ashour, 2012.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ ESCWA, 2013a.

³⁹ Conversation with author, Cairo, 24 May 2012.

⁴⁰ Tunisian Minister of the Interior, Ali Larayedh, Ali. Conversation with author, Geneva, 22 November 2012.

A final challenge exists mainly in Libya and Yemen, and to a much lesser extent in the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula, which is the challenge of DDR. The DDR process is key to the success of both SSS and democratization processes in those countries. If it fails, or only partially succeeds, armed organizations will emerge as a challenge to democratically-elected governments, as the case of Libya currently demonstrates, despite the progress that has been made. In February 2012, the Libyan Ministry of the Interior announced the appointment of 10,000 armed revolutionaries to its ranks, while the Ministry of Defence announced the reintegration of 5,000 others into army units.⁴¹ At that time, such numbers were small compared to the estimated 125,000 persons who were thought to be armed following the revolution.⁴² The collective reintegration of armed brigades proved to be highly problematic, undermining the command-and-control structure within both the Ministries of Defence and the Interior, because those brigades took their orders from their immediate commander, rather than from the Minister of Defence or the Interior. The Kufra events of February-June 2012, in which tribal clashes in the remote south-east of the country left over 100 people dead, not only exposed the limited capacity of the army and security forces to contain tribal violence, but also the weak command-and-control structure in the Ministry of Defence. Such weakness is sensed by other armed non-state actors, which refuse to disarm when the state cannot guarantee their safety. This ultimately undermines the DDR process altogether and further complicates SSS and democratization. A similar situation exists in Yemen, albeit the forces of the ancient regime were not undermined to the same extent as in Libya. According to United Nations Security Briefings in 2004, some 10-15 million weapons were in circulation in Yemen, with a population of 18.5 million.⁴³ Investor Relations Information Network (IRIN) data from 2006 gave an estimate of 17 million weapons.⁴⁴ Clearly, firearms are easily available in Yemen, being found in particularly high quantities in rural areas, and forming an integral part of tribal life and culture. Personal weapons are relied upon to exert power and settle inter-ethnic disputes as well as to symbolize status and wealth.

⁴¹ United Nations Security Council, 2013.

⁴² Blanchard, 2011, p. 19.

⁴³ Chairman of the Security Council Committee, 2004.

⁴⁴ IRIN News, 2006.

IV. THE SECURITY SECTOR AND HUMAN SECURITY

SSS and human security are two interrelated concepts that entered development and democratization literature following the end of the Cold War. The concept of human security was employed in the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report,⁴⁵ whereas “security sector reform was not coined until 1998, notwithstanding the fact that the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security agreed on by the OSCE⁴⁶ four years earlier brought into the mainstream the notion that lies at the core of security sector reform: the democratic control of the military and other security actors”.⁴⁷

The two concepts have the same objective, namely, to provide individuals with security and end the impunity of state actors. In a sense, both are critical reactions to the security-provision role of the state, or whoever controls the state. Both concepts emphasize that the security of the state and the security of its people are not necessarily synonymous. In some instances, the state or, rather, the entity that controls it, has sometimes shown itself to be not the loyal guardian of the population under its jurisdiction, but the greatest threat to its well-being.

However, the means SSS and human security employ to attain their common objective differ. Human security tends to emphasize the role of non-state actors and, in particular, civil society, as security providers, whereas SSS focuses more on the role of those actors in oversight and monitoring. SSS has a state-intensive modus operandi in which all armed entities within state boundaries must operate under such official bureaucracies as the ministries of the interior, security or defence. Such bureaucracies are controlled and monitored by elected and public institutions, as well as by civil society.⁴⁸ On the other hand, the “broad” approach to human security, normally adopted by UNDP and the Commission on Human Security, tends to downplay the role of the state and the legitimate use of force, and play up the importance of indirect threats and human development.⁴⁹ Proponents of that approach usually argue that some of the most critical security threats to individuals, including the ramifications of climate change and HIV/AIDS, have not been on the security agenda of states. Such issues are beyond both the political and the technical dimensions of any SSS process. The “narrow” approach to human security, usually linked to Canadian policies, was behind such projects as those to ban anti-personnel landmines, and programmes to counter human trafficking and the recruitment of child soldiers. However, the fusion between human security and SSS is at its clearest in the International Criminal Court (ICC), where the accountability of the security sector is upheld and violations of human security and crimes against humanity committed by state actors are investigated by an international tribunal.

The way in which the Arab revolutions began is perhaps an irony of history. Mohammad Bouazizi, a vegetable cart vendor, set himself on fire after a municipal officer in the Tunisian provincial town of Sidi Bouzid confiscated his cart and publicly humiliated him. He went to the local governor’s office to complain but no one would even meet him. Rendered defenceless by the uncaring nature of state authority, humiliated and prevented from earning a living income, he set himself on fire. According to Rami Khouri, “his personal anguish was also the pain and vulnerability of millions of other Tunisians, and several hundred million Arabs”.⁵⁰

⁴⁵ UNDP, 1994.

⁴⁶ OSCE is short for Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

⁴⁷ Law, 2005, pp. 17.

⁴⁸ ESCWA, 2013a.

⁴⁹ Bajpai, 2003, pp. 196-199.

⁵⁰ Khouri, 2011a.

That case is one demonstration of the current relationship between the authorities and the population in the Arab world. Allegedly, the January 2011 revolution in Egypt was also sparked by police brutality. Such human rights abuses have seriously undermined human security.

As mentioned earlier, the 1994 Human Development Report fully introduced the concept of human security, equating security with people rather than territories. Human security is characterized by seven main categories: economics, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security.⁵¹ Threats to personal security include such threats from the state as the use of torture, threats from other groups, such as ethnic tensions, and threats from individuals or gangs in the form of violence. Personal security clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the security sector. While some may argue that human security is difficult or impossible to accurately quantify, the categories outlined above are useful indicators of how secure a state's population feels.⁵² The security sector is supposed to ensure the personal security of citizens. In some Arab states, however, they are often a cause of insecurity. While crime rates are generally low, Arab citizens often fear the security forces, violence against women is habitually ignored, thugs are at times associated with the security services, corruption is rampant, and the authorities are frequently unable to contain communal tensions. As Omar Ashour puts it: "The philosophy behind SSR is rooted in human security, the idea that the primary objective of the security apparatus is the security of the individual citizen, not that of ruling regimes."⁵³

One of the most important aspects of human security is political security, meaning that people should be able to live in a society that honours their basic human rights.⁵⁴ This mainly concerns states which regularly practice political repression, systematic torture, ill treatment, disappearance, or abuse of police or military power. State control over ideas and information through censorship or the threat of violence are also considered a threat to human security.⁵⁵ Although some Arab states have permitted a certain degree of political pluralism, albeit if controlled entirely by the government, political opposition has been stifled through the liberal use of force.⁵⁶

The Arab Human Development Report 2009, which outlined the challenges to human security, identified disproportionately powerful security apparatuses as among the principal threats.⁵⁷ Many of the communities highlighted in the World Bank's Voices of the Poor research identified insecurity as a significant obstacle to development.⁵⁸ According to the ministers of development of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), "security matters to the poor and other vulnerable groups, especially women and children, because bad policing, weak justice and penal systems, and corrupt militaries mean that they suffer disproportionately from crime, insecurity and fear. They are consequently less likely to be able to access government services, invest in improving their own futures and escape from poverty",⁵⁹ as the case with Mohammad Bouazizi has illustrated.

⁵¹ UNDP, 1994.

⁵² Paris, 2001, pp. 87-102.

⁵³ Ashour, 2012, p. 3.

⁵⁴ UNDP, 1994, p. 32.

⁵⁵ Hastings, 2012.

⁵⁶ Nuruzzaman, 2013, pp. 57-58.

⁵⁷ UNDP, 2009, p. 53. The other threats mentioned were a fragile and fragmented civil society and dysfunctional elected assemblies.

⁵⁸ World Bank. Voices of the Poor.


⁵⁹ OECD, 2007b, p. 8.

While the World Development Report 2004⁶⁰ lists education, health, water, sanitation, and electricity as the services with the most direct link with human development, the OECD argues that the poor will be unable to benefit from those services without security. It has written that “without reform of security policies and institutions that address incentives and expectations, other development capacity-building will largely be futile. Enhancing the delivery of security and justice, therefore, is a key challenge for development”.⁶¹ Good governance is also frequently included as necessary to human development, as societies without good governance and rampant abuse, corruption and bribery create a climate of fear and injustice. Such societies are characterized by a mistrust of government, stifled development, environmental destruction, and inequity.⁶²

OECD cites the World Bank in demonstrating the tremendous costs disorder, insecurity and injustice have on development, highlighting the cases of El Salvador and Colombia, where the total cost of insecurity was estimated at 25 per cent of GDP in the late 1990s.⁶³ For its part, the Arab world has been notorious for high military spending, which has diverted vast resources away from development.

Table 4 and the graph below illustrate the potentially crowding-out effect that military expenditure can have on social expenditure, particularly in countries with limited budgets. Average national military expenditure in the Arab region has consistently been more than twice the world average and more than triple the average of emerging economies from such comparable regions as East Asia and the Pacific (EAP) and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). Even the lower income countries in the region that are most in need of fiscal resources show this pattern. Public health expenditure has meanwhile been remarkably lower than in EAP and LAC. In 2007, seven out of the ten countries with the highest military spending to GDP worldwide were from the Arab region.⁶⁴

Figure I. Graph comparison of military expenditure as a percentage of GDP



Source: Calculated by ESCWA, based on World Bank, 2012.

⁶⁰ World Bank, 2004.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Cordonier Segger and Rana, 2008; and Thomas, 2001, pp. 159-175.

⁶³ OECD, 2007b, pp. 8 and 9.

⁶⁴ Obviously, military expenditure does not necessarily include all security sector-related expenditures, particularly outlays under the aegis of the Ministries of the Interior, and, therefore, only partly captures the proportion of government budget earmarked to overall security sector expenditure.

TABLE 4. MILITARY EXPENDITURE VS. SOCIAL EXPENDITURE, AVERAGE
(Per cent of GDP)

Country/territory	Average military expenditure		Average public education expenditure		Average public health expenditure	
	2000-2005	2006-2011	2000-2005	2006-2011	2000-2005	2006-2011
Bahrain	4.40	3.36	-	3.10	2.79	2.66
Egypt	3.24	2.50	4.80	4.06	2.32	2.12
Iraq	2.38	4.54	-	-	1.01	2.58
Jordan	5.74	5.22	-	-	4.86	5.30
Kuwait	6.92	3.79	6.30	4.24	2.49	1.92
Lebanon	4.91	4.29	2.64	2.46	3.44	3.93
Oman	11.89	9.86	4.05	3.72	2.56	1.99
Palestine	-	-	-	-	-	-
Qatar	3.88	2.25	2.14	-	2.37	2.07
Saudi Arabia	9.80	8.93	7.27	5.97	2.99	2.78
Sudan	3.77	4.24	-	-	1.07	1.88
Syrian Arab Republic	5.49	4.22	-	5.09	2.21	1.45
United Arab Emirates	8.40	5.73	1.84	1.09	2.44	1.81
Yemen	6.16	4.62	9.63	5.15	2.42	1.62
Arab region	5.9	5.18	5.07	4.17	2.38	2.44
East Asia and the Pacific	1.49	1.64	3.76	4.05	4.66	4.51
Latin America and the Caribbean	1.36	1.38	4.16	4.39	3.15	3.62
World average	2.40	2.52	4.24	4.65	5.68	6.04

Source: World Development Indicators 2012.

Note: The sign (-) indicates that data are not available.

Such heavy investment in the security sector is indicative: security is a priority. By propping up a massive security apparatus, Arab states have created funding shortages or inefficiencies in social spending and public infrastructure, where investment is needed most. Given that many of these states face dire economic straits, the overwhelming focus on the security sector has arguably done less, not more, for human security in the Arab region. Governments have focused almost exclusively on their own survival instead of the well-being of their own populations.

The security sector has affected regional human security in other ways.⁶⁵ In several Arab states, the military directly controls parts of the economy. Following the privatization of many public companies in the late 1980s, the Egyptian military essentially took control of some state-owned enterprises. This led neither to state capitalism nor to a genuine free market economy.⁶⁶ In many countries in the region, it is not known how much money does not pass through the governments' treasury because there is no civilian oversight of the data.⁶⁷ Some analysts estimate that in certain countries, including Egypt, the military controls portions of the national economy.⁶⁸

As mentioned above, the Arab region has demonstrated growing human rights and governance deficits. The Freedom in the World Index, compiled by Freedom House, shows that Libya, the Syrian Arab Republic and Tunisia performed worst in terms of political rights, with Libya and the Syrian Arab Republic consistently scoring the lowest score on the scale between 2006 and 2011. They do not perform much better with regards to civil liberties, with Libya consistently scoring the lowest possible score between 2006 and 2011, followed by the Syrian Arab Republic. Although the data should be used with caution, such results resonate with the events of the Arab uprisings.

⁶⁵ ESCWA, 2013a.

⁶⁶ Sayigh, 2012, pp. 6-8.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 17.

⁶⁸ Tadros, 2012.

TABLE 5. POLITICAL RIGHTS, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD INDEX

Political Rights (Freedom in the World) (1-7 where 7 indicates worse performance)							
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Change 06-11
Egypt	6	6	6	6	6	6	0.0
Libya	7	7	7	7	7	7	0.0
Syrian Arab Republic	7	7	7	7	7	7	0.0
Tunisia	6	7	7	7	7	3	-3.0
Yemen	5	5	5	6	6	6	1.0

Source: Freedom House. Freedom in the World Index.

TABLE 6. CIVIL LIBERTIES, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD INDEX

Civil Liberties (Freedom in the World) (1-7 where 7 indicates worse performance)							
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Change 06-11
Egypt	5	5	5	5	5	5	0.0
Libya	7	7	7	7	7	6	-1.0
Syrian Arab Republic	6	6	6	6	6	7	1.0
Tunisia	5	5	5	5	5	4	-1.0
Yemen	5	5	5	5	5	6	1.0

Source: Ibid.

According to the Freedom House paper Freedom in the World 2012: The Arab Uprisings and their Global Repercussions, Tunisia experienced the largest single-year improvement in the history of the Freedom in the World report, attaining electoral democracy status and scores that placed it near such “partly free” countries as Colombia and the Philippines. The author of the report believes that the important gains made by Egypt have been undermined by the military’s continuing political influence, its hostility to the media, its campaign against human rights organizations, and its degrading treatment of female protesters. Both Egypt and Libya moved to the “semi-free” category in 2013,⁶⁹ with some militant Muslim groups also demonstrating hostility to media critics and human rights organizations. While it remains to be seen how the Arab uprising will reinforce the notion of citizenship, it will inevitably strengthen civic values by and for the security cadres should the democratization process advance.

Political rights and civil liberties are also extremely significant to the development of the security sector, where non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play a significant role in ensuring accountability, a role that has been curtailed in the Arab world. NGOs have frequently been targeted, harassed or disbanded. Many Arab states also created opaque legal regulations under the pretext of reform, which eventually made civil society activity illegal. For example, the Law of Associations in Egypt was revised in 2002. It required 16,000 Egyptian NGOs to re-register in order to comply with the new legal codes. The government then disbanded a number of high profile organizations. Tunisia made similar changes to its association laws, which eventually forced the Tunisian Human Rights League to suspend its activities. In addition, the Jordanian Society for Citizens’ Rights was closed by the Ministry of the Interior for allegedly violating the Societies and Social Institutions Act. By officially tolerating NGOs but unofficially restricting their activities, Arab security services have limited the ability of NGOs to challenge government policy and publicize human rights abuses. Some states thus appear to tolerate NGOs while actually remaining largely unaccountable.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ Puddington, 2012.

⁷⁰ Heydemann, 2007, pp. 6-8.

Lack of freedom from fear was caused not only by repression and political intimidation, but by policy brutality, arbitrary arrest and corruption.⁷¹ As the table below illustrates, confidence in the local police force of the transitioning countries is low. A number of Arab citizens can recount personal experiences of police abuse, extortion or violence.⁷² This created a climate of fear and mistrust. Freedom from fear is an important element of human security.

TABLE 7. RESPONDENTS' CONFIDENCE IN THE POLICE FORCE


Egypt	49 per cent
Syrian Arab Republic	48 per cent
Tunisia	50 per cent
Yemen	39 per cent

Source: Gallup. WorldView.

Note: Variable: percentage of surveyed individuals that responded affirmatively to the question: "In the city or area where you live, do you have confidence in the local police force, or not?" for the most recent available year (2010 for the Syrian Arab Republic, 2011 for Tunisia and Yemen, and 2012 for Egypt).

The Arab Opinion Index 2011 reflected a wider range of Arab viewpoints.⁷³ Figures I and II below illustrate citizens' satisfaction with the level of security in their country and confidence in their main public institutions.

Figure II. Respondents' satisfaction with the level of security in their countries



Source: ACRPS, 2012.


⁷¹ Nuruzzaman, 2013, p. 57.

⁷² Planty, 2012.

⁷³ The Arab Opinion Index gathered information through face-to-face interviews carried out by qualified local polling bodies on behalf of the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. Respondents formed representative samples of the twelve Arab countries in which the survey was conducted: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen. Taken together, these countries represent 85 per cent of the total population of the League of Arab States. Responses were gathered from February-July 2011, with a total of 16,173 respondents. The Arab Opinion Index was conducted using a multistage cluster sampling approach, which is self-weighted and is particularly appropriate in cases where there is incomplete data on the countries being surveyed. The main results, included in this report, are reported with a 95 per cent confidence limit, with an in-built margin of error of 3.5 per cent.

Respondents were less optimistic about the situation in their countries than in their own households. On average, 48 per cent of respondents were satisfied with the level of security in their countries, with 21 per cent being very satisfied and 27 per cent somewhat satisfied, compared to 49 per cent who were dissatisfied. While the majority of respondents in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Mauritania, and the Sudan were satisfied with the level of security in their countries, majorities in the other countries were dissatisfied.⁷⁴

Figure III. The level of citizens' confidence in their main public institutions
(The overall average of surveyed communities)



Source: Ibid.

Arab public opinion becomes more confident when asked about essential branches of government. The majority, namely, 77 per cent of Arab nationals, were very confident or somewhat confident in their countries' militaries. National militaries have the single highest level of support among Arabs. Interestingly, the confidence Arabs expressed in their national police forces is lower at 55 per cent, with the results aggregated, while 40 per cent expressed a lack of confidence in their countries' police forces. Fewer than half of those surveyed expressed confidence in their governments and its legislative bodies. Some 47 per cent had confidence in their countries' governments compared to 44 per cent who expressed a lack of confidence. The majority of respondents, at 54 per cent, had no confidence in their countries' legislative bodies, while 36 per cent expressed confidence.⁷⁵

The opinions of Arab youth must also be considered, given that they have been so instrumental in the recent uprisings. In the 2012 Arab Youth Survey, 42 per cent of respondents identify corruption as the biggest challenge facing the region, while 41 per cent considered civil unrest to be the biggest obstacle to growth. Some 41 per cent were very concerned about human rights abuses and 40 per cent were very concerned about civil unrest.⁷⁶ Human rights abuses, corruption, and civil unrest are firmly within the purview of the security sector. Without serious attempts to address these critical factors in human security, it is unlikely that there will be any real reform or change in Arab public opinion at large.

The surveys summarized above can be complemented with related statistics from such other sources as Institutional Profile Database, Gallup WorldView, World Economic Forum, and the World Bank. Although these are useful in measuring security sector performance, it is also essential to have reliable data obtained directly from the concerned ministries.

⁷⁴ ACRPS, 2012.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 46.

⁷⁶ ASDA'A Burson-Marsdeller, 2012.

The Arab public is now able to use its power to protest against what it sees as injustice by the security services, and it has used it at a great human cost. Take, for example, the Tunisian woman who was charged with indecency after being raped by police officers. When the case was made public, mass protests prompted the Tunisian President to issue the woman a state apology, an unthinkable outcome just a few years ago.⁷⁷ One can also look at the Port Said incident in Egypt, where 72 Al-Ahly football fans were killed. This was followed by weeks of protest.⁷⁸ State security services are no longer dealing with a quiescent Arab population. With an increasingly concerned and vocal citizenry, Arab public opinion regarding their security services has taken on increased importance.⁷⁹

Diminishing civil and political rights cannot be discounted as the cause of the protests. This is an illustration of the belief that a poorly regulated or unprofessional security sector, or one that appears to have a licence for behaving with no regard for the law, as was the case with the response to the Arab uprisings, has a deleterious impact not only on human security, but also on government and political stability.⁸⁰ Furthermore, as was the case in a number of Arab revolutions, the engagement of the security establishments with the popular uprisings in fact risked to hasten the demise of the rulers that they were supposed to prop up.

The absence of the rule of law across the region lies behind many of those issues. Rule of law, as defined by the 2012 World Justice Project Rule of Law Index, comprises four major components: that government officials and agents are accountable under the law; that laws are clear, publicly available, immutable and fair, and protect fundamental rights, including the security of persons and property; that the process by which the laws are enacted, administered, and enforced is accessible, efficient and equitable; and that justice is delivered by an adequate number of competent, ethical, independent and adequately resourced representatives of their communities.⁸¹ Rule of law scores in all the Arab Spring states are low in comparison to the rest of the world, but the lowest scores relate to free speech, corruption, open government and regulatory enforcement.⁸² In a state which subverts the rule of law, human security is vulnerable. Government agents and politicians are rarely held accountable. Laws are highly unstable, are often ignored or enforced on a whim, or are easily overruled through such measures as emergency or anti-terror provisions. When laws to prevent human rights abuses or permit political freedom do exist, they are often ignored by the regime. Justice organizations frequently lack judicial independence or are impotent.⁸³ The human security cost is high, with corruption dragging down economic and health security, and with people frequently living in fear of the security sector's excesses, abuses and lack of accountability.

It is important to note, however, that Arab security services in question appear to ensure relatively low crime rates. Homicide being a good indicator of crime in general, table 8 below shows that crime in Arab states is much lower than in many other regions. This begs the following questions: What role should the ideal security sector play, and should it be measured merely by low crime rates?

⁷⁷ CNN Wire Staff, 2012.

⁷⁸ Montague, 2012.

⁷⁹ ESCWA, 2013a.

⁸⁰ Sayigh, 2007, p. 4.

⁸¹ Agrast et al., 2012, p. 3.

⁸² Ibid., p. 41.

⁸³ ESCWA, 2013a.

TABLE 8. HOMICIDE RATES OF SELECTED ARAB COUNTRIES, PER 100,000 CITIZENS

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Egypt	0.7	0.4	0.7	0.4	0.9	1	1.2	
Libya						2.9		
Tunisia						1.1		
Jordan			1.3	1.8				
Yemen	3.6	3.2	4.6	4.2	4.1	3.9	4.2	
Other Arab countries:								
Morocco	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.4	1.4	1.4
Iraq						2		
Lebanon		3.1	3.8	2.1	2.6	6	1.9	2.2
Palestine	2.7	4.2	4.1					
Other countries:								
Argentina	7.6	5.9	5.5	5.3	5.3	5.8	5.5	5.5
Brazil		22.2	22.0	21.0	20.4	22.8	21.7	22.4
Indonesia						0.6	0.6	0.4
South Africa	42.5	39.8	38.8	39.7	37.9	36.8	33.8	31.8
Thailand	9.8	6.5	7.2	7.0	6.5	5.8	5.4	5.3
United States	5.7	5.5	5.6	5.8	5.7	5.4	5	4.8

Source: UNODC, 2011. Data is collected through publicly available sources and produced by governments and international and regional agencies, as well as local health service providers.

Note: Blank cells mean data was unavailable.

Whereas security should be for all, the citizen as well as the state, various security entities are loyal to particular leaders rather than to notions of national or public interest.⁸⁴ Ideally, and in keeping with SSS aims, security sector actors will become good citizens and ensure the rights of security cadres while endeavouring to make those cadres more responsive to their society's needs. It seeks implicitly to spread security from power centres to wider society or state, which also entails expanding the security agenda to include such human-security issues as environmental security, and civil emergency or crisis-management capabilities.⁸⁵

The Arab security sector continues to face major challenges that undermine its ability to support human security. Not only are the ramifications of HIV/AIDS and climate change far from the agendas of most Arab ministries of the interior, but also have only Comoros, Djibouti, Jordan, and post-revolution Tunisia ratified the Rome Statute of the ICC. Four of the seven countries that voted against the Rome Statute were Arab, the others being China, Israel and the United States.⁸⁶ While the “*Mukhabarat State*”⁸⁷ was severely undermined by the revolutions, many of its subcultures survive. In Egypt, a study by the Al-Nadeem Center reported cases of alleged torture and deaths in 2012.⁸⁸ In Libya, Human Rights Watch estimated that more than 8,000 persons had been illegally detained, 50 per cent of whom were being held in government custody without formal charge or access to lawyers, while the remainder were held by armed groups over which the government had no control, and which had no authority to detain citizens.⁸⁹ A survey carried out in March 2013 by the Yemen Polling Center found that 59.6 per cent of the national sample had

⁸⁴ Laipson, 2007.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Scharf, 1998.

⁸⁷ A term used by John Waterbury to describe the political dominance of the security and military apparatuses over all other State institutions in the Arab World. See Waterbury, 1998, pp. 146-149.

⁸⁸ Nadeem Center, 2012.

⁸⁹ Human Rights Watch, 2012.

been asked for a bribe in interactions with the police in the past twelve months, 59.5 per cent had no or little confidence in the police force and 90 per cent of rural areas did not even have a police station.⁹⁰ In Tunisia, the deaths of two detainees after a prolonged hunger strike in protest against mistreatment brought the issue of prison reform to the fore. That is a matter that all Arab states will have to deal with at some point, most urgently the Arab Spring countries. “Some of the prisons still have the same policies of the toppled regime. We need to revise the whole national prison system in the country”, said Radya al-Nasraoui, head of the Tunisian Anti-Torture Association.⁹¹

The continuing legacy of the *Mukhabarat* state and the consistency of the aforementioned violations and perceptions reflect a major gap between the behaviour of the security sector and the human security of the average Arab citizen. In order to bridge that gap, some critical issues must be addressed. The first is the culture of impunity and the related culture of belittling human rights and, in particular, the rights of less fortunate social classes. Albeit the culture of impunity was undermined by the Arab revolutions,⁹² significant room for improvement remains. In addition, “the culture of belittling human rights should be addressed at the very early stages of training in Arab police academies”.⁹³ This will require a comprehensive review of the curricula and training manuals of police academies and other police institutes. That review should focus on the demilitarization of the police force and on altering materials to reflect the concepts of human security, rather than state and/or elite security, and of police functions as a public service. The compulsory four-year residence in police facilities that insulates students from the society with which they will be interacting should be abandoned.

A second issue pertains to communication strategies and community relations, which need to be significantly enhanced in order to reflect two critical developments. The first is the change in the procedures, rhetoric, behaviour, dogma and organizational structure of the ministries of the interior or security following the revolutions. The second development concerns how the ministries handle public complaints through their internal monitoring procedures, which should include the investigation process, its results, and any ramifications. Such procedures will improve public perceptions of the security forces and, therefore, also enhance public confidence in and cooperation with the police force.⁹⁴

A third issue is psychological evaluation and rehabilitation of security officials.⁹⁵ As noted above, the Arab revolutions were largely fuelled by police brutality, making such institutions as the Intervention Forces in Tunisia, the State Security in Egypt, and the Internal Security in Libya targets of the revolutionary activists. Policemen and security personnel who worked in other departments felt the brunt of the rage and many were unjustly smeared. This engendered bitterness, vendetta-like behaviour and animosity between the ministries of the interior and, to a lesser degree, the ministries of defence, and the youth revolutionary forces.⁹⁶ This situation should be addressed with a thorough psychological evaluation and rehabilitation programme for officers, followed by a vetting process to separate officers who committed violations from the public and to possibly hold them accountable. In addition, a dialogue programme between the Ministry of the Interior and a wide representation of civil society actors and youth revolutionary forces will be essential to address grievances.

⁹⁰ Al-Bukhari, 2013.

⁹¹ Bin Mansour, 2012.

⁹² In Egypt, for example, State Security Officer Captain Osama al-Konaisy, who, in January 2011, tortured to death Said Bilal, a detainee without charge, was sentenced to 15 years in prison; and the head of the Port Said Security Directorate, General Essam Samak, was sentenced to another 15 years for his responsibility in the Port Said Stadium massacre in which more than 70 football fans were killed in February 2012.

⁹³ ESCWA, 2013a.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ashour, 2012, p. 9.

A fourth issue is the prison system in the Arab world, which is a critical threat to human security. The brutal massacres in several political prisons are reminders of that threat. Reportedly, more than 1,200 political prisoners were killed in June 1996 in Abu Salim Prison in Libya.⁹⁷ In Arab Spring countries, many of the practices followed by the regime survived the revolutions, as was earlier noted by the head of the Tunisian Anti-Torture Association.⁹⁸ Thorough legal and institutional reform of the Arab prison system, backed by strong political will, is long overdue. Such reform is currently possible, at least in Arab Spring countries.

⁹⁷ Arab Penal Reform Organization, 2006.

⁹⁸ Bin Mansour, 2012.

V. THE WORKING CULTURE OF THE SECURITY SECTOR: THE PICTURE FROM WITHIN

The working culture of any institution largely derives from its main purpose. An unaccountable security sector preoccupied with upholding a regime will have an outlook different from a security sector that operates within an accountable and transparent governance system. As mentioned above, the working culture of some Arab security sectors focuses on maintaining a socioeconomic and political status quo.

Serious consideration must be given to the structure of the security sector in any discussion on SSS. Some aspects of the Arab security sector in transition countries have been patrimonial in nature, rather than institutional. As defined by Eva Bellin, institutionalization is a coercive apparatus that is rule-governed, predictable and meritocratic. It has established career advancement and recruitment paths. Promotion is based on performance, not politics. There is also a clear delineation between the public and private that forbids predatory behaviour towards society. Discipline is maintained through the continuous mainstreaming of a service ethic and strict enforcement of a merit-based hierarchy. In contrast, some Arab security services are patrimonial by design. In such a system, staffing decisions and advancement are based on cronyism, the distinction between public and private missions are blurred, and discipline is maintained through the exploitation of such social divisions as tribal, ethnic and sectarian identity.⁹⁹

In many of the Arab Spring states, police were seen as the “right hand” of the regime. In Yemen, for example, police loyal to the former regime stormed the Ministry of the Interior six months after President Ali Abdallah Saleh had stepped down.¹⁰⁰ Following the revolution in Egypt, a group of officers have attempted to create a trade union and demanded the resignation of others officers seen as being too close to the former regime, arguing that police reform is impossible while many officers remain sympathetic to that regime.¹⁰¹ Marsha Pripstein Posusney contends that the level of military institutionalization influences officers’ calculations about the potential risks of a return to barracks. Under patrimonial systems, officers have reason to fear that their positions would be jeopardized by political reforms,¹⁰² and in transition countries, where the security sector is in the nascent stages of institutionalization, have thus attempted to hold on to power.

Another structural factor contributing to many Arab security sector cultures is the high degree of centralization. All Arab security sectors receive their funding from the central or national government.¹⁰³ In many other states, police and security forces tend to receive at least parts of their funding from local governments or decentralized governmental authorities. Because the security sector is not dependant on the local citizen for funding, it has naturally come to see the regime paying its salary and filling its coffers as its employer and *raison d’être*.

All of these structural factors are rooted in the fact that most Arab transition countries have been ruled by some kind of strong man. According to Goldstone, this is why security services generally have no real ideological power behind them. Instead of creating a real ideological mission, the strong man uses his own personal power and support network at the expense of formal institutions. This tends to make the security sector vulnerable if the strong man is challenged, as has occurred in several Arab transition countries, as it has no real mission or ideology beyond personal power, enrichment and patronage networks.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁹ Bellin, 2004, pp. 139-157.

¹⁰⁰ Al-Haj, 2012.

¹⁰¹ Bradley, 2012.

¹⁰² Pripstein Posusney, 2004, p. 133.

¹⁰³ Tosun and Serdar, 2008.

¹⁰⁴ Goldstone, 2011, pp. 8-16.

Take, for example, the British police service's statement of common purpose, which is essentially the mission statement of the British police services: "The purpose of the police service is to uphold the law fairly and firmly; to prevent crime; to pursue and bring to justice those who break the law; to keep the peace; to protect, help and reassure the community; and to be seen to do this with integrity, common sense and sound judgment".¹⁰⁵ This is in contrast to the purpose of the security services of some Arab states undergoing transition, which has essentially been status quo maintenance and patronage network extension. In the Tunisian security sector, the principle of blind obedience is enshrined in law. According to the Law on the General Status of Internal Security Forces (Law No. 82-70 of 6.8. 1982) the principal duty of police officers is to obey orders of their superiors (article 46). Contrary to the police codes of most democratic states, that law does not provide for the possibility of refusing to carry out orders in the event that those orders are manifestly unlawful.¹⁰⁶

Police culture is strongly linked to performance, which is, in turn, closely linked to poor labour conditions that include low wages that encourage corruption; long working hours; pressure to produce quick results; lack of adequate equipment and training, including in the use of surveillance cameras, data analysis programmes, and the proper securing of crime sites; a lack of specialization; a lack of performance reporting channels and tools; the division of duties; and insufficient forensic medical staff.¹⁰⁷ In the five southern regions of the Sudan, there are only 5,000 of the requisite 38,000 police, 500 of the 4,800 necessary prison wardens, and only 22 of the 750 judges required.¹⁰⁸ In Tunisia, the judicial police are the investigative arm of the internal security forces and are responsible for collecting evidence, conducting investigations and writing formal investigation reports for cases before the courts. The judicial police have neither the equipment nor the training to conduct professional investigations and lack fingerprinting, DNA and other evidence-gathering equipment. Investigations rely solely on confessions, which are the only evidence submitted in court. Under the toppled regime of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, torture to extract signed confessions was common. Furthermore, there are no provisions requiring the presence of legal council from the time of arrest until the end of the investigation.¹⁰⁹

According to interviews conducted with Tunisian policemen by Derek Lutterbeck, police officers worked an average of twelve or more hours per day, whereby they assumed several different duties, ranging from directing traffic or public order tasks to monitoring political opponents. In addition, police officers were poorly paid, with an average monthly salary of around US\$230, which is less than the wages of a bus driver and only around half of that of a lower-level bank employee.¹¹⁰

The preoccupation of many Arab regimes to prevent political change and undermine human rights made the security establishment highly results-driven, with officers routinely resorting to brutality because of pressure from their superiors to solve crimes, as well as mistreating and abusing fellow officers who they do not see as achieving results.¹¹¹ With those pressures, it is perhaps unsurprising that officers are often prone to mistreating the public. As Tamer Badran, a former police major who was part of the security detail guarding Mubarak's sons until his resignation in 2006, asked: "How do you expect a police officer to do his job and be courteous when he works 12-hour shifts, six days a week, for little pay?. The training is not good enough. The equipment is not good enough. The problems have been there for years".¹¹²

¹⁰⁵ Police Foundation and the Policy Studies Institute, 1996.

¹⁰⁶ Lutterbeck, 2012.

¹⁰⁷ Sedra and Burt, 2011, p. 8.

¹⁰⁸ OECD, 2007b, p. 37.

¹⁰⁹ Hanlon, 2012, p. 6.

¹¹⁰ Lutterbeck, 2012.

¹¹¹ Harding, 2011.

¹¹² Ibid.

The security sector is not the only one responsible for governance shortcomings. Reforming ministries of the interior will be key to any reform. Many ministries do not utilize modern management practices or computer-based administrative systems, and lack human resources and career development departments, let alone an inspector general's office to ensure discipline or an internal affairs section to handle public complaints.¹¹³ Furthermore, ministers of the interior and defence are rarely civilians; they are almost always raised from within the institution itself. Those factors can contribute to an insular, paternalistic, reform-averse culture that continues to view itself as the servant of a regime, rather than the servant of the nation's citizens.¹¹⁴ Heads of institutions frequently have ties to the former regimes, or ambitions of their own. In Yemen, for example, Acting President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi has initiated an administrative shakedown which removed the son of former President Saleh, Ahmed Ali, as well as one of his chief rivals within the military, Ali Mohsen.¹¹⁵

The governance deficit has also impacted capacity and organization of the security sector. According to Yezid Sayigh, "performance has remained erratic. The Arab security sector suffers from poor functional differentiation between the various services, with overlapping mandates and duplication of roles, proliferation of organization and chains of command, and massive inflation of personnel numbers and payrolls, leading to ineffective performance and financial inefficiency".¹¹⁶ There are an estimated 900,000 military personnel in Egypt, while the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior employs around 1.5 million people.¹¹⁷ In 2012, Egypt's combined budget to defence and interior affairs was estimated at some US\$8 billion, on top of which an estimated US\$1.3 billion in military assistance is provided by the United States.¹¹⁸ It is difficult to establish the size and expenditure of Tunisia's security sector, which is predominantly controlled by the Ministry of the Interior but includes the police, the national guard, the judicial police, intervention forces and presidential guard forces. There are no official published statistics and the Ministry website offers no details. According to the media, the security sector is comprised of 150,000-200,000 individuals. This figure might have been exaggerated, however, and other sources put the actual number as 40,000-80,000, half of whom are paid informants.¹¹⁹

Significantly, security sector culture is not the only issue facing SSS. Judicial reform goes hand in hand with the holistic view of SSS that will be necessary to ensure true democratic reform and improve the performance of the security establishment. Judicial reform must evolve in parallel to security reform.¹²⁰ Security forces must know that they are not immune to prosecution and that the rule of law rules the land. Judicial oversight has traditionally been lacking in the Arab security sector; it remains to be seen whether the new governments will institute truly democratic judiciaries or continue to co-opt them to serve their own interests.¹²¹ The OECD report *Enhancing Delivery of Justice and Security* defines justice and security as court prosecutors, juries, prisons and non-state actors, as well as police.¹²² Changing the culture of those institutions should be a key focus of any SSS programme. Moreover, security will be determined by developing social and political awareness and democratic reform.¹²³

¹¹³ Planty, 2012, pp. 3-4.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ ICG, 2013.

¹¹⁶ Sayigh, 2007, p. 20.

¹¹⁷ Ashour, 2012, p. 6.

¹¹⁸ Sayigh, 2012.

¹¹⁹ Hanlon, 2012, p. 6.

¹²⁰ ESCWA, 2013a.

¹²¹ Bergling et al., 2012, pp. 108-109.

¹²² OECD, 2007b.

¹²³ Kodmani and Chartouni-Dubarry, 2009, p. 97.

Ellen Laipson argues that changing security culture is fundamental to remaking the pact between state and society. In summer 2007, she wrote that such traditionally marginalized groups as intellectual and business elites and popular movements were calling for changes in the way power is exercised and states are governed, emphasizing that “the security sector should be part of this larger story”.¹²⁴ Bassma Kodmani and May Chartouni-Dubarry add that the political economy of the security sector is also indicative of the manner it relates to the overall national context. The security sector often has its own schools, colleges, higher education and professional training institutions, as well as hospitals and social services, which give it a high degree of autonomy and contribute to cultivating a specific security culture.¹²⁵

In Egypt, the uprising had a major impact on the security cadre, which faced public animosity and physical and verbal attacks. An Egyptian presidential candidate described mood of the security establishment as one of a defeated army.¹²⁶ The situation is similar in Tunisia, where the police fear their victims might seek revenge or prosecution. Police syndicates have held crime strikes, demanding better working conditions and government protection while on duty. Adel Jebali, a member of the National Union for Security Forces, observed that “people perceive us to be criminals”.¹²⁷ Reactions in Yemen have been similar, with the police being widely disparaged by the public, and breaking into pro- and anti-regime factions who have had violent clashes in the past.¹²⁸ In the Arab world of the future, where regimes and security forces alike will have to contend with public opinion, a new and institutionalized security sector which sees itself as a servant of the people and not the regime will be an important necessity.¹²⁹

¹²⁴ Laipson, 2007, p. 101.

¹²⁵ Kodmani and Chartouni-Dubarry, 2009, p. 99.

¹²⁶ Ashour, 2012, p. 9.

¹²⁷ As quoted in Hanlon, 2012, p. 7.

¹²⁸ Al-Haj, 2012.

¹²⁹ ESCWA, 2013a.

VI. PERFORMANCE AND MEASURING DELIVERABLES: A POSSIBILITY?

A. GENERAL CHALLENGES IN MEASURING HUMAN SECURITY AND SSS

Based on the aforementioned challenges and recommendations, measuring progress in SSS is essential. However, there are a number of challenges in doing so. To borrow from Adcock and Collier¹³⁰ and Cohen,¹³¹ measurements in the social and political sciences should incorporate the following methodology:

- (a) Conceptualization: definition of the background concept and understandings, as well as the objective of the measurement;
- (b) Systematization: specific formulation and precise definition of the concept; identification of main pillars of the concept and division of the pillars into central elements or components;
- (c) Operationalization: identification of relevant metrics and indicators for each one of the elements or components;
- (d) Standardization: data collection and scoring; aggregation of variables, if required.

The type of measurement used and its scope will largely depend on two factors: the nature of the variable in question and the objective of the study.

Variables can be divided into two types: outcome and process.¹³² Such concepts as governance, development and poverty are outcome variables. Measurement is carried out not in order to explain how or why a certain level was attained, but to describe the state of the variable in reference to a baseline or reference interval. That type of assessment is particularly useful when comparing countries or studying performance over time. Measurement can be of particular interest in relation to the transition to democracy or economic liberalization, or with respect to the effects of an intervention. The aim of assessment is to establish a benchmark, usually the state of the variable at the start of the process or intervention, and then follow the evolution of the variable throughout the process, in order to monitor progress and make any necessary corrections. The degree of success may then be evaluated. Variables are dynamic and, therefore, change with time. Measurements being case-specific, they are not designed to compare different processes or even the same situation in two different contexts.

There are two alternatives, depending on the main purpose of the measurement. When the objective is to compare performance, either between countries or over time, standard measures must be taken into consideration and only comparable definitions, sources and time periods used. Because comparison becomes more complex when the number of dimensions increases, a crucial step in this type of measurement is the construction of a synthetic index that aggregates the underlying variables. Measures must be comparable, standardized and aggregated. This type of measurement is appropriate for outcome variables. Where the objective of the measurement is a thorough study of a phenomenon, case-specific assessment metrics must be defined. Because the focus is on evaluation rather than comparison, as many dimensions as necessary may be utilized. As expansive a view as possible is sought; aggregation is, therefore, not recommended. The emphasis is thus on specific, detailed and largely qualitative measures. This type of measurement can be applied to either outcome or process variables.

Human security is an outcome variable that can be measured either through standardized, comparable metrics or through a detailed, qualitative evaluation. The former type of measurement would be undertaken

¹³⁰ Adcock and Collier, 2001.

¹³¹ Cohen, 2006.

¹³² Other types of variables may be of interest in the social or political sciences, but we will restrict to these two types since they cover the areas of study of this document.

when the objective of the assessment is to compare the state of human security among different regions or countries, or when the purpose is to study the progress of that variable over time. However, such measurement will not address specific areas that could guide policy recommendations. The second type of measurement, in contrast, would allow for a detailed evaluation of the state of human security that would take into account the specific challenges to or strengths of the country or region. While it could identify problem areas and consequently policy recommendations, the results would be so specific to the country of study that it would not permit comparison with other countries or even over time.

SSS can be classified as a process variable that may be measured through detailed, country-specific metrics relying mostly on qualitative indicators. Because the political system and actors involved in each country are so particular, cross-country comparisons are meaningless. However, it is possible to follow the four steps quoted at the beginning of the section for a country undertaking a reform of its security sectors and measure the progress according to the most essential dimensions and with the data available. In this way, a baseline could be defined (the state of the security sector before the process of reform) and the measurement could be used to appraise progress as the changes start to take place.

When measuring human security and SSS, the first challenge is to define the objective of the assessment and then choose the appropriate type of measurement and understand its limitations. It is then possible to implement the four steps described above. However, this entails dealing with the following difficulties:

- There are no unambiguous and generally agreed definitions of the concepts of human security and SSS. Because different definitions lead to different systematizations of the concept, the resulting measurements may be widely divergent. An explicit definition of the concept is required before the measurement is conducted. The ultimate subject of the measurement must be defined: should it be state-centric, actor-centric in the case of SSS, or individual-centric in the case of human security;
- Both concepts are multidimensional. The 1994 UNDP definition of human security considers seven broad pillars,¹³³ each of which has several subcategories. The security sector may be considered from several points of view, including, *inter alia*, the legal, political and administrative, and involves many actors. Furthermore, both concepts are dynamic: the priorities of the various dimensions change and new elements appear over time. In theory, it could be possible to take into account all the possible dimensions and dynamics inherent to the concepts, but those will be constrained by the paradox cited by Owen. “The more conceptually accurate (i.e. broad) a methodology attempts to be (closer to representing all possible threats), the less practically and analytically feasible it becomes”;¹³⁴
- Variables are highly context-specific and are not evenly distributed within a country. Threats to human security vary considerably from country to country and region to region, as do the characteristics of the security sector;
- In statistics, these two concepts are referred to as latent variables, because they are not directly observable but inferred through a range of indicators. Those indicators are imperfect measures of the latent variables because, in addition to the information that is of interest, they also contain a context-specific component. While statistical models of varying complexity exist that are designed to extract information from the latent variables contained within the observed variables, those usually require large samples, which are not common in the social sciences;

¹³³ UNDP, 1994.

¹³⁴ Owen, 2008.

- When using external sources of information, the quality of data may be in doubt and political agenda bias could affect the measurement;
- Particularly in the case of comparative measures, aggregation is essential in order to synthesize several indicators into a composite index that may be readily used for comparison or evaluation purposes. However, this is not straightforward, because it is normally necessary to combine various types of quantitative and qualitative variables, including expert assessments, information from surveys and hard statistical data. Furthermore, time periods may not completely coincide;
- There is frequently a lack of updated data, especially for the countries or regions where the assessment is most essential.

Therefore, in terms of the construction of a measurement tool, human security and SSS face several challenges in each of the four steps described above, ranging from agreement on a precise definition to aggregation of available indicators. In respect of human security, some measurement proposals have been made, including by Owen¹³⁵ and Werthes et al.¹³⁶ and, with regard to SSS, by Fitz-Gerald and Jackson and Stojanovic for SSS, but a great deal of research remains to be done on the matter.¹³⁷

B. MEASURING SSS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES IN TRANSITION

Justice and security are two critical components of governance that work in partnership. Security institutions provide protection to citizens and the state while justice, through the rule of law, keeps security actors accountable to its citizenry. This relationship is critical, because actors within the military and internal security are not democratically elected. When legal oversight is reduced, security institutions risk losing public trust. In the Arab region, however, there are often no constitutional norms that provide legal checks on officials. Even in countries where judicial oversight is enshrined in the law, governments rarely choose to exercise it.¹³⁸ Transparency is another issue. It is difficult for any kind of oversight to be carried out when information is not available. For example, during the Ben Ali regime no figures were published by the state regarding even the number of police officers.¹³⁹

The lack of statistics is one of the main challenges to research on the Arab security sector. Neither the World Development Report nor the Arab Development Report contain many statistics related to the security sector, and most other security sector research is devoid of any quantifiable data. This is in large part because the states in question rarely publish or collect any data regarding security sector performance. As mentioned above, the Arab security sector has largely been used as a tool of regime maintenance. Thus, the need to collect transparent data on crimes, performance, perceptions, and so on, has never existed. As long as the regime was maintained and dissent controlled, the security sector was doing its job. Nevertheless, some statistics are available on governance in the Arab world. In Arab states, where the security sector has essentially been the main element of control within the regime, any indicators of poor governance are a reflection of the performance of the security sector. Corruption, political freedom, private sector interference, and good governance all fall within the purview of that sector.

There is a positive association between the statistical capacity of a country and commonly used governance indicators: better production and dissemination of data is likely to contribute to public transparency and better governance, just as better governance is likely to foster the production and

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Werthes et al., 2011.

¹³⁷ Fitz-Gerald and Jackson, 2008, pp. 1-20; and Stojanovic, 2008.


¹³⁸ Sayigh, 2007, p. 18.

¹³⁹ Lutterbeck, 2012.

dissemination of data.¹⁴⁰ It becomes a chicken-and-egg situation: Is the lack of statistics and self-analysis the reason for the poor governance issues within the security sector? Or is poor governance the reason for the lack of clear statistics? Ultimately, that situation creates a serious challenge when dealing with SSS, because there are no real benchmarks or concrete information on the performance of the security services in Arab states.

Indicators that measure progress toward democracy in Arab states in transition further highlight this governance deficit. Although not many indicators focus on the security sector and therefore a comprehensive picture is not possible at this stage, some of them appear to highlight such a deficit. The Institutional Profile Database (IPD), for example, collects national experts' opinions around the world on a number of governance-related indicators including some security-related aspects. As reported in the graph below, the IPD data show that while the state's control over the security sector seems to be more or less in line with the average of other developing countries, the regional average differs (being worse) with regards to two indicators – the level of general security of people and goods, and the use of arbitrary violence by the state.

Figure IV. Comparison of security-related indicators



Source: Institutional Profile Database, 2013.

Note: 0 best – 4 worst

A2000: level of security of people and goods.

A2001: does the state ensure security across the country?

A2010: degree of political authority's control over the army.

A2011: degree of political authority's control over the police.

A2012: degree of political authority's control over the customs.

A2013: ability of political authority to reform the armed bodies.

A2020: does the state make use of arbitrary violence?

Moreover, some attempt of producing indicators at the regional level has been done by the Arab Reform Initiative, according to which the average score of Arab countries in terms of interference by security services and violations of the constitution by the executive authority seems to confirm that domestic security agencies have great influence. According to the Arab Democracy Index (table 9), the indicator named "interference by security services" means the number of cases in which a national requesting a licence or

¹⁴⁰ ESCWA, 2013b.

government documentation is asked to seek the approval of the security services first, or to obtain a certificate of good conduct or non-objection from them before taking a job.

TABLE 9. INDICATOR 24: INTERFERENCE BY THE SECURITY SERVICES^{*}

	Interference by the security services	
	2008	2009
Egypt	800	718
Yemen	720	568
Other Arab countries:		
Algeria	695	900
Jordan	585	507
Kuwait	--	412
Lebanon	625	742
Morocco	273	711
Palestine	732	335
Saudi Arabia	377	363

Source: Arab Reform Initiative and Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research, 2010, p. 59.


Note: ^{*} In the case of the Syrian Arab Republic, focus groups replace the opinion poll and resulting score was 183. This could raise issues of comparability and reliability of the result. In Kuwait and Yemen, no information besides the opinion poll was collected. For the first part of the question in Algeria, Saudi Arabia and the Syrian Arab Republic, the opinion of an expert was used. The score for Palestine has been reduced from the previous year because of a change in data sources and the expanded duties of the security agencies as the result of conflicts between Fatah and Hamas. Morocco's score rose significantly because of a change in data sources. The score in the previous report was based exclusively on the opinion poll whereas, in this report, it is also based on a field survey that was carried out in order to investigate the frequency of requests for clearance from the security sector. This part of the indicator scores 450 out of 500. The opinion poll also confirmed a decrease in the number of those who said they were required to seek clearance from security from 67.8 to 39.2 per cent, while the number of those who said they were not required to seek clearance increased from 22.4 to 44.6 per cent. The score for Algeria rose by 205 points in this report because of the change in the source of data and also because the question asked in the public opinion survey covered only the second part of the indicator: the first part was left out. Lebanon's score rose by 117 points because the first part of the indicator scored 500 points. That part related to information concerning the requirement to seek clearance or approval from the security agencies in order to obtain a document or take a job. The previous report had relied only on the opinion poll, as in the case of Morocco. Egypt's score dropped by 82 points in this report, and the change is believed to be because the score in the previous report was based on the first part of the indicator only and because the opinion poll was not conducted for the earlier report.

-- means that information is not available.

Mouin Rabbani perceives such excessive interference by the security sector as a means of maximizing the recruitment of informants, with the primary purpose being domestication, not operational support. Thus, the activities of the security establishment are not limited to monitoring, infiltrating and neutralizing real or perceived threats. Rabbani highlights the fact that in the Arab world, certificates of good conduct and security clearances are necessary for such basic administrative procedures as obtaining a passport or business licence or for joining the civil service, and such clearances are exploited in order to recruit informants and make the public aware that they are being constantly monitored.¹⁴¹ If ARI and Rabbani's views are correct, they could explain part of the relatively low performance by some of the countries when it comes to starting a business, as reported in the graph below.

¹⁴¹ Rabbani, 2011, p. 284.

Figure V. Country and regional ranking on “Starting a Business” indicator



Source: Doing Business, 2013.

Corruption was also identified as a major obstacle: It is often widespread and systemic, further eroding the mandate of legal oversight and rule of law. Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index ranks most states in the region as highly corrupt (table 10), while the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicator ranks the same states well below the mean for basic standards consistent with good governance practices and rule of law (table 11). With regard to the defence sector, the 2013 Transparency International Government Defence Anti-corruption Index paints a discouraging picture, with all the Arab countries listed in the bottom half of the ranking and five of them among the nine occupying the lowest of the world list.¹⁴²

TABLE 10. CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX, 2011, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL

Corruption Perceptions Index 2011 (0-10, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 10 as non-corrupt)	
Egypt	2.9
Libya	2.0
Syrian Arab Republic	2.6
Tunisia	3.8
Yemen	2.1

Source: Transparency International, 2011.

¹⁴² Transparency International, 2013.

TABLE 11. CONTROL OF CORRUPTION, WORLDWIDE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS

Control of Corruption (WGI) (-2.5-2.5 with higher number better)							
	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Change 05-10
Egypt	-0.52	-0.65	-0.68	-0.71	-0.43	-0.56	-0.03
Libya	-0.88	-1.03	-0.96	-0.86	-1.17	-1.26	-0.38
Syrian Arab Republic	-0.71	-0.99	-1.01	-1.08	-1.02	-1.05	-0.34
Tunisia	-0.09	-0.06	-0.11	-0.18	-0.09	-0.13	-0.04
Yemen	-0.79	-0.69	-0.70	-0.69	-1.05	-1.14	-0.35

Source: World Bank. Worldwide Governance Indicators.

These trends, namely, the chronic governance deficit in the Arab world, have had a profound impact on the performance of public institutions where accountability, transparency and meritocracy were not the established norms of governance. The security sector is no different. The capacity of the Tunisian police force is described by some experts as substantial: high educational standards are demanded of entrants and senior officers, most of whom attended police training academies in Europe, are highly educated. Police infrastructure, including police stations, communications equipment, vehicles and uniforms, is described as “solid”. However, and according to one National Guard officer, “the competence was there but the climate was terrible”.¹⁴³ Also significant is the fact that there are no laws governing the Tunisian intelligence sector.¹⁴⁴

Various security establishments are actively involved in businesses. As mentioned above, in Egypt, the military runs parts of some economic sectors ranging from tourism, real estate and manufacturing to arms and construction industries. Although legal, they are not subject to audit or public scrutiny.¹⁴⁵ Moreover, the presence of networks linking different countries in the region have developed into an outright informal black economy, the sustainability of which is ensured by some parts of various security sectors, clans and criminal groups.¹⁴⁶ Lack of transparency is a potentially huge issue, depending on the extent to which the security sector dominates economic networks.¹⁴⁷

This state of affairs increases the probability of malpractice and reduces professionalism within the security sector. While security sector jobs should be seen as an opportunity to serve the state, some aspects of internal security that is dominated by patronage networks exacerbates ill practices that inevitably contribute, in some Arab countries, to mass movements that demand change. Other countries in the region have long realized the need for reform and better public services. The security sector and judiciary are critical pillars of such services.

The issues can be more generally captured by analysis of the correlation between the above-reported governance indicators. The correlation between military expenditure and fundamental governance indicators over the past decade, with particular respect to “Political Stability and Absence of Violence”, appears to be stronger in the so-called Arab countries in transition, namely, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Libya, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, and Yemen than in any other developing country. While that would appear to be logical, one of the arguments of this paper is that the connection between military expenditure and poor governance indicators runs both ways.

¹⁴³ Hanlon, 2012, p. 7.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁴⁵ Sayigh, 2012.

¹⁴⁶ Sayigh, 2007, p. 26.

¹⁴⁷ Tadros, 2012.

TABLE 12. SIMPLE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MILITARY EXPENDITURE
AND WORLDWIDE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS

All developing	2000-2005	2006-2011	2000-2011
Control of corruption	0.11	-0.11	0.02
Government effectiveness	-0.09	-0.11	-0.15
Political stability and absence of violence	-0.12	-0.33	-0.16
Regulatory quality	-0.17	-0.14	-0.24
Rule of law	-0.01	-0.13	-0.09
Voice and accountability	-0.28	-0.33	-0.31
Arab transition			
Control of corruption	-0.25	0.27	-0.03
Government effectiveness	-0.40	0.12	-0.19
Political stability and absence of violence	-0.59	-0.62	-0.65
Regulatory quality	0.02	0.25	0.09
Rule of law	-0.20	0.11	-0.11
Voice and accountability	0.12	0.44	0.24

Source: ESCWA calculations from World Development Indicators and Worldwide Governance Indicators.

VII. SSS IN THE ARAB WORLD: PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS

From the above overview, three top recommendations can be developed for SSS in the Arab world. Those recommendations relate to the political, institutional and legal dimensions of the SSS process. They may be summarized as political consensus, institutional oversight and new police laws.¹⁴⁸

The political dimension: consensus

SSS is primarily a political process. Its technical and institutional dimensions only succeed when the political will exists and the capacity of reformist forces is high. This usually requires the consensus of the major political parties and actors on the fact that elected civilian control of the security apparatus is what differentiates democracies from autocracies. One example is the Chilean transition to democracy. “Chilean politicians have diminished the armed forces’ institutional powers and made policy decisions against military preferences”,¹⁴⁹ thus asserting civilian control regardless of institutional arrangements to safeguard the superiority of the military-security apparatus and of the ideological polarization of the Chilean reformist forces, the *Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia* (Coalition of Parties for Democracy) that led the democratization process.

Such consensus on SSS is far from developed in the Arab world. In Arab Spring countries, some political forces have attempted to manipulate the security apparatus in their own interests, calling for coups and crackdowns on their political opponents.¹⁵⁰ Once consensus is developed, an SSS committee with specific responsibility for and powers to reform and restructure the ministry of the interior should be established, answering directly to the top executive in the country, whether the president, as in Egypt, or the prime minister, as in Tunisia. The committee should include reformist figures from the ministries of the interior and justice, reform-minded judges, representatives from pro-reform police organizations/syndicates, the public prosecutor’s office civil society, including women activists, and independent SSS experts.

The institutional dimension: oversight

Another critical dimension is the institutional dimension of the SSS process. The most urgent recommendation in that respect is the establishment of proper oversight and monitoring of the behaviour and practices of security forces. The internal monitoring sectors (IMSS) within Arab interior ministries should be empowered to do more than investigate complaints. They should be given a mandate to monitor and regularly appraise the performance of police officers. This internal accountability mechanism must be transparent, with its results made available to the public, as should be the number of complaints made against officers annually and methods employed to investigate those complaints. This requires the publication of reliable, up-to-date reports and statistics at the local and national levels that would enable measurement of sector performance. Meanwhile, oversight by such external bodies as the public prosecutor’s office, parliament, national councils for human rights and civil society groups should be regulated by new laws (see below).¹⁵¹ Civil society groups, in particular, could sign a memorandum of understanding with ministries of the interior, regulating such a monitoring procedure and direct access to prisons and detention centres, as has been the case in Georgia.¹⁵² There will also be an urgent need to offer specific training for members of parliament and other civil society groups engaged in the process of monitoring the security sector, in addition

¹⁴⁸ The ensuing recommendations encompass the vast majority of the recommendations presented at the EGM on Security Sector Transformation in Arab Transitions: Working for Change, Beirut, 17-18 December 2012. See ESCWA, 2013a.

¹⁴⁹ Hunter, 1997, p. 455.

¹⁵⁰ Fayyid, 2013, p. 1.

¹⁵¹ Only Lebanon has signed the Optional Protocol of the Convention Against Torture in 2008, which calls for the creation of an independent body to investigate allegations.

¹⁵² Darchiashvili, 2008, p. 33.

to awareness campaigns on citizens' rights. Additionally, an independent ombudsman with direct access to the highest executive office in the country should be created in order to deal specifically with violations of the security sector, while a representative of the general prosecutor should be installed in each major police station to ensure judicial oversight and facilitate legal investigation. Finally, at the international level, the facilitation of periodic visits by the United Nations "Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" and "Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial summary or arbitrary executions" is essential. Both have been unsuccessfully demanding official visits to several Arab countries, the former since the mid-1990s and the latter since the mid-2000s.

A final recommendation to facilitate oversight is the long overdue vetting process within the ministries of interior and public prosecutor offices. In addition to vetting, rehabilitation would be appropriate, with the focus being on re-education rather than on punishment. Persons who committed torture, murder, extrajudicial killings and other crimes must be brought to justice and removed from ministries of the interior. It will also be necessary to remove officials who condoned or participated in inhumane treatment, including through doctoring evidence, faking charges, or accepting "confessions" made under torture. Positive vetting results can lead not only to removal from office, but to less extreme measures, including forced retirement, transfer to junior positions, annulment of promotion or temporary suspension of duty. Independent committees appointed by elected bodies should conduct the vetting process. Those committees should include former police commanders with reputations for ethical conduct, judicial figures, and representatives of human rights organizations and victims of torture. The files and documents of the IMSs should be reviewed by the committees in order to acquire a complete picture of the professional history of the officials under investigation. Vetting is a long and complex process in post-authoritarian and post-conflict societies. However, the time required varies significantly. In Greece, the process lasted ten months, while in Poland it took over six years. In some cases, political considerations limit support for vetting. For example, as part of a larger political compromise that ended apartheid, South Africa chose not to conduct a comprehensive vetting process.

The legal dimension: police law

In the light of the foregoing, new versions of the Police Law should be drafted with a view to reflecting the aforementioned institutional changes, and should contain clauses regulating external oversight, empowering internal monitoring, and criminalizing torture and degrading treatment. Definitions should be congruent with international law. Promotion criteria in Arab ministries of the interior should be significantly altered. At present, most Arab security sectors base their promotion criteria primarily on graduation class and time spent in the force. A meritocratic system in which promotion is primarily determined by performance, training and qualifications should be established and elaborated upon in the new police laws.

VIII. CONCLUSION

The recent Arab uprisings have made reform of the security institutions all the more necessary, because citizen protests rather than military officers have sparked this new period of revolution. There is no doubt that practitioners and local stakeholders should proceed cautiously as this process continues and the ultimate judgment of its success remains in flux, but demands of citizens to end the unjust rule have been confirmed. While this development is welcome, a road map to meet aspirations for change must be developed and firmly embedded within any governance reform initiatives. It is important to note that, aside from the technical issues encompassing the security sector, there is great potential and ample human capital for the success of SSS in the Arab world, provided that it is decoupled from politics. Even under autocratic systems, when the leader embodied the security sector, that sector failed to fulfil its *raison d'être*, namely, preserving the regime and securing its designated successor. It failed to predict and prevent the demise of the leaders in some Arab countries in transition, despite the vast resources and the *carte blanche* allocated to it.

At present, several Arab states have embarked on the path to SSS as part of their political transitions. It must be a broad and inclusive process that includes “the military, the police, the intelligence service, paramilitary services”,¹⁵³ as well as the “justice system, overseers in parliament and even private sector actors with a security role”.¹⁵⁴ Outdated legislative systems must be reformed, while civilian oversight and the institutional accountability of security agencies must be implemented.¹⁵⁵ In the past, the obstacles of such an initiative were clear. It was thought that significant changes in security would have a profound impact on the governance system. Today, the reality is different. It is within this spirit that in Egypt, “the revolution has given rise to a new generation of reformist officers. Many mid-ranking police officers responded to the systematic abuse by forming groups pushing for internal reform, while under Mubarak, any opposition to the many abuses of the security establishment was severely punished”.¹⁵⁶ In this regard, Egyptian Police General Abd al-Ghaffar maintains that the balance of power within the ministry is not the same. “This is the first time I see younger officers refusing to carry out orders violating the law”.¹⁵⁷ This new culture of institutionalization must be fostered if security services are to become functioning institutions with definitive guidelines.

In order to measure progress in this endeavour, domestic policymakers must empower security institutions to restore basic order, engage a broad range of stakeholders and use democratically elected civilian authorities to induce institutional accountability through the rule of law. Of utmost significance will be the examination of ways to measure progress towards SSS and the rule of law. The investigation of what to measure and how to measure it will provide a technical discussion on gaps and enable decision makers to make informed policies to address deficiencies. Transparency is key in this process: measuring performance will be the only way the new generation of Arab lawmakers will be able to make any concrete policies regarding the security sector.

In the Arab world of yesterday, the duty of the security sector was very specific: to uphold the governance system as represented by the leader. There was no need to benchmark performance, no need to hold officers accountable or give security managers greater ability to identify gaps or shortcomings within the respective services. There were no hearings, and no cases needed to be brought before oversight committees in parliament to request additional human or financial resources or explain failure. These issues were dealt with bilaterally with donor countries and with

¹⁵³ Sayigh, 2007, p. 5.

¹⁵⁴ Laipson, 2007, p. 100.

¹⁵⁵ Sayigh, 2007, p. 15.

¹⁵⁶ Ashour, 2012, pp. 9-10.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

the ruling elites behind closed doors. Presidents had managerial oversight over resources and promotions, which were part and parcel of the chronic institutional weaknesses. The Arab revolt has changed such practices. The new Arab security services must not only change their own *raison d'être* from one of regime maintenance to one of public service. They must become a force for the betterment of human security as opposed to an obstacle to it. They will have to open themselves up to civilian oversight, and create a new culture of institutionalization in which regular officers see themselves as serving the nation rather than the regime. For their part, new civilian leaders must ensure that the security sector receives better treatment and that it is transformed into an institution that is respected, not feared, by the populace.

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