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Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects (continued):

(a) *Report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations;*

(b) *The authorization and financing of future peace-keeping operations 1*

Chairman: Mr. Carlet R. AUGUSTE (Haiti).

AGENDA ITEM 101

Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects (continued) (A/SPC/L.117 and Add.1 and 2):

(a) Report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (A/5915 and Add.1, A/5916 and Add.1, A/5972, A/6026);

(b) The authorization and financing of future peace-keeping operations (A/5966/Rev.2)

1. Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America) observed that peace-keeping was at the very heart of the work of the United Nations and recalled that the Secretary-General himself had provided a very useful definition of peace-keeping forces. Addressing the Harvard Alumni Association in 1963, he had said that those forces had little in common with the forces referred to in Chapter VII of the Charter but that their existence was not in conflict with the provisions of that chapter, that they were not fighting forces and that they operated only with the consent of the parties directly concerned. The United Nations had had recourse to the use of such forces on several occasions, from the action taken in Greece in 1947 to that taken in India and Pakistan in 1965.

2. The report of the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly to the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (A/5915/Add.1, annex II) and the discussion in that Committee had helped to define the nature of those operations. Unlike enforcement actions, they were voluntary in that they did not place obligations on Member States to contribute personnel, materials or services and that they were undertaken in a country's territory only with the consent of that country; moreover, they had taken various forms, ranging from observation and supervision to the maintenance and restoration of law and order.

3. It was heartening to note that the United Nations had been able to undertake peace-keeping operations

throughout the years even in the face of opposition based on issues of principle. That had been made possible by the diplomatic and executive talents of the Secretary-General, the generosity and dedication of the participating countries and, above all, the underlying good sense shown by the overwhelming majority of Member States even though none was fully satisfied with the arrangements made in all cases. The fallacy of assuming that the total agreement of all interested parties was indispensable to co-operation must be avoided. There as elsewhere, pragmatic adaptation to each particular case was perhaps the surest method. In any event, the search for necessary improvements should not impair existing arrangements and the considerable progress already made in developing peace-keeping procedures should not be allowed to be frustrated by a small minority. As his delegation had stated at the 15th meeting of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations the United States Government was not prepared to accept a situation in which the capacity of the United Nations to act for peace could be stopped by the negative vote of a single Member or the effectiveness of the Organization could be determined by the level of support forthcoming from its least co-operative Members.

4. A number of fundamental principles had emerged in the past and could serve to guide future action. They could be summarized as follows:

5. First, the Security Council had primary responsibility for initiating and supervising peace-keeping operations and there was certainly general agreement that the maximum possible use should be made of that organ. Experience in the Congo, Cyprus and Kashmir had demonstrated that the Council was capable of meeting its responsibilities, and the enlargement of its membership should encourage the further strengthening of its peace-keeping work. The United States was still of the opinion, which it had proposed in September 1964 to the Working Group of Twenty-One,^{1/} that all proposals for the initiation of peace-keeping operations should be considered first in the Security Council and that the Assembly should not authorize or assume responsibility for such operations unless the Council had demonstrated its inability to act.

6. Second, the General Assembly had "residual" authority to initiate and supervise peace-keeping operations. The real question was whether, in the face of a veto by a permanent member of the Council, the Assembly could, on its own account, authorize the establishment of peace-keeping operations. It appeared that the overwhelming majority of Member States answered that question in the affirmative, and

^{1/} A/AC.113/30, mimeographed.

the International Court of Justice itself had confirmed the arguments on which recognition of the complementary powers of the Assembly was based.^{2/} To accept the minority view on that subject would be absurd in theory and intolerable in practice, for all member countries had agreed to refrain from the use of force save in self-defence, and the restraints thus imposed on each had been accepted only on the assumption that the United Nations could act successfully when peace and security were threatened. The United States, for its part, had never considered that any one Member should have the power unilaterally to frustrate the initiation of peace-keeping operations not involving enforcement action. It had defended and continued to defend the authority of the Assembly to undertake peace-keeping operations free from the veto even of the United States itself, and it appealed to other countries to recognize that it was in their long-term interest to adopt the same view.

7. Third, the General Assembly alone was competent to apportion the expenses of peace-keeping operations among Member States. That principle, recognized by a large majority of Member States, was confirmed by Article 17 of the Charter, by twenty years of practice and by the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, which the General Assembly itself had accepted. With respect to financing as well as authorization, the powers of the Assembly should be preserved and no Member should be able to veto a financial plan accepted by everyone else.

8. Fourth, the expenses of peace-keeping operations should as far as possible be the collective financial responsibility of the entire membership. That principle, asserted without qualification in General Assembly resolution 1874 (S-IV), had the support of the majority of Members because it offered the best way of sharing the financial burden equitably, because it recognized that every Member had an interest in preserving peace and should therefore make a contribution towards its preservation and because it took account of the fact that Member States would be more likely to place military contingents at the disposal of the United Nations for an operation if it had the support of a large number of Members as attested by widely shared financial participation. While the voluntary method of financing warranted consideration in certain cases, experience showed that it placed an unduly heavy burden on troop-supplying countries and did not always assure continuity of funds. That was demonstrated by the fact that at that very moment, when the Special Political Committee was examining the question of peace-keeping operations, the Secretary-General was some \$7 million short in financing the operation in Cyprus. In any case, those who thought voluntary financing was the solution had the obligation to demonstrate that it was viable in specific situations confronting the United Nations.

9. Fifth, the cost of peace-keeping operations should be shared equitably among Member States having regard to their capacity to pay and to the international character of those operations. Resolution 1874 (S-IV) made the twofold assertion that economically

developed countries were in a position to make relatively larger contributions than were other countries and that the special responsibilities of the permanent members of the Security Council should be borne in mind in connexion with their contributions. It was clear from the debates in the Special Political Committee and in the plenary Assembly that there was widespread support for a special scale of assessment for peace-keeping operations, a proposal which likewise had the support of his delegation.

10. Sixth, General Assembly procedures for authorizing, supervising and financing peace-keeping operations should provide an appropriate voice for those Members which bore the principal responsibility for supporting them. It was with that in mind that his delegation had submitted to the Working Group of Twenty-One in September 1964^{1/} a proposal for setting up a special finance committee of the General Assembly, to include the permanent members of the Security Council and a relatively high percentage of those Member States in each geographic area that were large contributors. The General Assembly, in approving financial arrangements for peace-keeping operations, would act only on recommendations adopted by a two-thirds majority of that committee. The United States, noting that the delegations of Nigeria and France had submitted proposals concerning the same problem, was prepared to consider any reasonable procedure for achieving that objective.

11. Seventh, the Secretary-General was the most appropriate executive agent for managing peace-keeping operations, and as the chief executive officer of the United Nations he had the right and the duty to implement the directives of the Security Council, the General Assembly and other United Nations organs. He had exercised that responsibility at various times over the past twenty years and he should continue to do so.

12. Those were the general principles which his delegation believed should guide the Organization in dealing with the peace-keeping problems, and they were broadly compatible with the guide-lines set forth in paragraph 52 of the report submitted by the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly to the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations. The guide-lines had the widespread support of the Members of the United Nations.

13. Turning to the proposals initially submitted by the Irish delegation (A/5966 and Rev.1 and 2), he said that they represented a challenge to every Member of the Assembly to reconsider its position on peace-keeping operations. The response to that challenge would profoundly affect the Organization's capacity to discharge its principal responsibility under the Charter.

14. Some of the principles he had outlined were reflected in the draft resolution submitted to the Committee (A/SPC/L.117 and Add.1 and 2). The draft recognized the special responsibility of the Security Council to initiate and supervise peace-keeping operations. It affirmed the authority of the General Assembly in cases where the Council was unable to act. It maintained the right of the General Assembly to assess Member States for the expenses

^{2/} Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962: I.C.J. Reports, 1962, p. 151.

of peace-keeping operations. It also called for collective financial responsibility, subject to the right of opting out to be accorded by the General Assembly to the five permanent members of the Security Council, that right being coupled with increased financial responsibility for the other permanent members.

15. His delegation believed that full collective financial responsibility could not be achieved in practice until there was a change in the attitude of certain permanent members of the Council. He had already made it clear that his country adhered to the consensus reached previously. However, his delegation's adherence to the principles he had just enunciated implied that as an interim measure it was prepared to accept the opting-out arrangement, if that was the wish of the majority of the Assembly. In the absence of full collective responsibility, there should at any rate be as much shared responsibility as possible. As he had already said at the 15th meeting of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, it was important that the membership, although unready to apply Article 19 of the Charter, should continue to support in practice the principle of collective financial responsibility and adopt equitable means by which those willing to share the responsibility could act in concert.

16. The proposal originally put forward by the Irish representative also contained the concept of a special fixed scale of assessment that would apply to all operations regardless of their size and regardless of the special circumstances that might be involved. His delegation believed that the regular scale of assessment was appropriate for relatively small peace-keeping operations and for a small portion of larger operations. His delegation had reservations about a proposal which might lead to one country having to pay as much as 50 per cent of the cost of an operation. Under existing domestic United States legislation, his delegation was not authorized to accept more than 33 1/3 per cent of the total expenditure.

17. The United States delegation reserved the right to return to a discussion of the new procedure for the initiation of peace-keeping operations by the General Assembly. For the moment, he would simply express reservations on that procedural change, which would have the effect of counting abstentions as negative votes. Such a change could result in the rejection of a peace-keeping operation favoured by a very substantial majority of Members—by a vote, for example, of 77 in favour, 10 against and 30 abstentions.

18. Finally, his delegation wished in its turn to make some constructive proposals. The Secretary-General had urged Member States to earmark military units which could be made available to the United Nations on request. Such measures had already been taken by some countries. Earmarking had practical advantages. It signified a country's serious intention to participate in peace-keeping operations under certain circumstances. Furthermore, it would make it possible to ascertain in advance the units and resources available, and to train the earmarked units in terms of probable United Nations needs.

The availability of those units was, of course, subject to a national decision to participate in each particular case. It was nevertheless true that the advantages of the system were more than psychological. The system could be further strengthened if, for example, an effort was made within the Secretariat itself to plan the way in which possible future peace-keeping operations could be carried out. The Organization could thus identify in advance the personnel, equipment and services that might be necessary. It could also solicit the earmarking of the necessary personnel, equipment and services from various Member States, encouraging contributions from countries in all geographic areas. The units thus earmarked could be trained in the specialized skills needed for United Nations operations. The Organization could also prepare training manuals and encourage the standardization of equipment and procedures. Furthermore, a programme might be organized to train officers and specialized personnel, such as communications specialists, whose scarcity had often hampered previous peace-keeping operations. Aid to earmarking countries could be made available through the United Nations or through individual Member States.

19. Of course, the crucial ingredient in the United Nations capacity to keep the peace was political and moral. The United States was determined to rely on the United Nations, to use the Organization as the Charter obliged it to do, and to have confidence in the Organization's operating capacity. The stakes were so high that the United States was willing to take chances on the Organization's capacity to act and to back it up, even when some of its particular decisions went against the immediate desires of the United States. The risks of a United Nations without the capacity to act were far greater than the risks of a United Nations with that capacity, and the ultimate national interests of each Member State were best served by supporting the Organization's capacity in that area. It was therefore necessary to have confidence in the Organization's ability to take on increasingly difficult peace-keeping tasks. It would, of course, make mistakes, but the alternative, namely, the immobilization of the United Nations in one of its key areas of activity, was too great a risk for the world community to take.

20. It was therefore necessary to crystallize the agreement which already existed with regard to many aspects of peace-keeping. Unanimous agreement was desirable, but the interests of those who were willing to co-operate in establishing a workable system should not be frustrated by the demands of a few countries. As Mr. Stevenson had said to the General Assembly the previous year (1323rd plenary meeting), one could not escape the deep sense that the peoples of the world were watching the United Nations, waiting to see whether the Organization could overcome its present problem and take up with fresh vigour and with renewed resolution the great unfinished business of peace.

21. Mr. NIELSEN (Norway) said that his delegation shared with many others the view that peace-keeping operations formed the very core of the activities of the United Nations. It was hardly an exaggeration to say that the question of solvency must be cleared up if the Organization was to be able to function.

22. When the nineteenth session of the General Assembly had decided that the question of the applicability of Article 19 should not be raised with regard to the United Nations Emergency Force and the United Nations Operation in the Congo, it had simultaneously decided that the financial difficulties of the Organization should be solved by voluntary contributions. Many delegations had then believed that there was an understanding that those contributions would be rapidly forthcoming. Some countries, including Norway, had attempted to advance the process by making unconditional voluntary contributions prior to the General Assembly decision; other countries had later followed suit. It was regrettable, however, to note that the expected generous response had not materialized.

23. His delegation wished to appeal to all Member States to hesitate no longer and to come forward with substantial contributions. In that connexion, the Committee might be well advised to issue a renewed appeal to Member States based upon the unanimous General Assembly decision of 1 September 1965 (1331st plenary meeting).

24. One of the immediate tasks facing the Committee was to find an agreed method of financing the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East. There was also disagreement over the assessments for certain minor items in the regular budget.

25. Those issues could not be said to involve major positions of principle, and the amount of money at stake was limited. Those Member States which objected to carrying their share of the financial burden involved had given the impression that the issues were closely tied to the question of the applicability of Article 19; but that question had been solved on 1 September 1965. It was to be hoped that the related issues would not now be shelved by the Member States in question, but that the spirit of compromise which had been in evidence on 1 September would ease the way towards a solution of those minor outstanding matters.

26. With regard to the respective roles of the Security Council and the General Assembly relating to matters of peace-keeping, he expressed doubt whether it was possible now to arrive at an agreed interpretation of the provisions of the Charter. It might therefore be preferable to refer that question and related matters to the Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations, inviting it to take cognizance of the points of view expressed in the Special Political Committee.

27. The Norwegian delegation believed that the functions and powers of the Security Council and the General Assembly should be viewed as complementary. It followed from the principle of the primary responsibility of the Council that due regard should be given to the permanent members, not only because of their special voting weight in the Council, but also because experience had shown that it was not realistic to institute major peace-keeping operations without their consent, or at least their acquiescence. Nevertheless, the right of assessment rested with the General Assembly, as the Charter provided. The Norwegian delegation considered that the Special Committee

on Peace-Keeping Operations should continue its search for a set of general provisions for sharing peace-keeping expenses among Member States, in accordance with the principle of collective responsibility. In that connexion, he wished to warn Members of the danger of continuing a system of financing based exclusively upon voluntary contributions. Such a procedure should be used only in exceptional circumstances, for as the Cyprus operation had shown, it did not give the Secretary-General an assured basis for the rational conduct of important peace-keeping operations.

28. Norway had no strong views on the kind of assessment scale it would like to see adopted, and would be willing to go along with a special scale which expressly recognized the situation of the developing countries. It further believed that the Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations might take concrete steps towards the establishment of a special fund for financing peace-keeping operations. The Norwegian delegation had no objection to an opting-out arrangement for Member States which declared in advance their unwillingness to be associated with a particular peace-keeping operation.

29. Draft resolution A/SPC/L.117 and Add.1. and 2 covered those points, and in general the Norwegian delegation agreed with it. At the same time, he wished to support the proposals made by some speakers with regard to the earmarking of national armed forces for peace-keeping operations. The Norwegian Government had been among the pioneers in that field, and was pleased to note that a number of other countries had followed its example.

30. Despite the many problems existing in the field of peace-keeping, the Organization had in fact been able to mount peace-keeping operations at a time when differences of opinion were most marked. Those operations had been launched on an *ad hoc* basis, and in his view the Organization should be careful to ensure that the possibilities for pragmatic action did not diminish. In addition to the Security Council and the General Assembly, there was a third important organ involved in peace-keeping operations, namely, the Office of the Secretary-General. It was in large measure thanks to the smooth functioning and great prestige of the Office of the Secretary-General that the latest operations had been carried out with success. It was called upon to carry out decisions which, in many cases, were taken without detailed operational instructions. It was therefore of the utmost importance that the authority of the Secretary-General should not be tampered with. The present Secretary-General had used his authority with care and restraint, and nothing should be done to curtail his capacity for action.

31. The United Nations was no static body, but a living organism which adjusted to the shifting needs of the time. The Norwegian delegation therefore believed that the Organization should not look back too narrowly to the attitudes prevailing in 1945 when it was founded, but rather view the Charter as a framework within which the Organization could grow and develop.

32. Mr. ECHARIA (Kenya) said that one of the fundamental reasons for the existence of the United Nations was the maintenance of international peace

and security. For that purpose the Organization had engaged in peace-keeping operations in certain areas where peace had been threatened. That was a most important function of the United Nations, and Kenya would accordingly support all measures aimed at strengthening the Organization's responsibility in the field of peace-keeping. There were two ways of achieving that end; by amending the Charter to give the General Assembly power to authorize a peace-keeping operation whenever the Security Council, because of the lack of unanimity of the permanent members, failed to fulfil its primary responsibility with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security, or by establishing a permanent source of finance for carrying out peace-keeping operations.

33. With regard to the first alternative, Kenya was in favour of the insertion of a new chapter in the Charter to deal with the problem presented by the existence of the right of veto, at present reserved to the five permanent members of the Security Council. The United Nations should be able to act promptly in an emergency; the veto had too often been used not for the furtherance of the aims of the Charter but as a weapon serving the foreign policies of the great Powers. The United Nations must be safeguarded against the whims of national interests which had too often seemed to guide the actions of some Members at a time when priority should have been given to world peace and security.

34. While it was clearly stated in the Charter that the Security Council had the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the delegation of Kenya believed that if the Security Council was deadlocked by a veto, it was incumbent upon the General Assembly to reach a decision in an emergency situation.

35. With regard to the second question—that of financing—the delegation of Kenya firmly believed that if peace in the world was to be maintained all Members of the United Nations must be prepared to meet the costs involved. It would therefore prefer to see the establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping fund to which all Members would pay a compulsory annual contribution. In addition, Member States would be invited to make further contributions in accordance with their capacity to do so. The assessment of contributions to the fund should be on the same basis as the assessment for the regular budget; in other words, it would be based on national income.

36. The draft resolution submitted to the Committee (A/SPC/L.117 and Add.1 and 2) was unacceptable to the Kenyan delegation on some important points. The scale of assessment proposed in it left too much of the burden to the permanent members of the Security Council; his delegation felt that the economic capacity of Member States offered a fairer basis, and that contributions should be assessed according to national income. In addition, the proposal that permanent members of the Security Council which did not vote for a particular operation should be exempted from meeting any of the cost did not appear realistic, for it would be an inducement to permanent members, acting on the basis of that

provision, to cast a negative vote or abstain in order to avoid the expenses involved. For that reason the Kenyan delegation believed that the establishment of a permanent United Nations peace-keeping fund was the only realistic solution to the problem of financing peace-keeping operations.

37. Mr. SEPULVEDA (Chile) said that the problem before the Committee could have the gravest consequences for the future of the United Nations itself. The latent conflict which the problem of financing peace-keeping operations had touched off during the nineteenth session of the General Assembly clearly demonstrated how serious a situation it could bring about. Crisis had been averted, but it could easily recur unless an equitable solution was found for the future. His delegation felt strongly that a new formula must be found to enable the United Nations to restore the institutional balance and to safeguard peace whenever it was possible to do so by direct negotiations or through the regional organizations. His country had on many occasions expressed its faith in the noble mission of the United Nations, and it was ready to co-operate in the effective execution of any peace-keeping operations which might prove necessary in the future.

38. At the nineteenth session, the great majority of Members had felt that it was neither wise nor equitable to penalize debtor States by depriving them of the right to vote; it had been thought that so radical a measure might cause some great Powers to leave the United Nations and thus bring about its collapse. But that attitude might make it impossible in the future to finance further peace-keeping operations by means of compulsory assessments established by the General Assembly, at least pending general agreement on the matter. It could not be validly argued that the General Assembly renounced its residuary right to discuss and make recommendations on all matters affecting peace and security, in particular in order to take measures which were necessary for the maintenance of peace where the Security Council was unable to carry out its primary responsibility because of the veto. His delegation refused to believe that it was the intention of the Charter expressly to assign the powers of action of the entire Organization to the five great Powers with permanent seats in the Security Council, regardless of the will of the majority of the States Members of the United Nations, particularly when the need arose to carry out the Charter's fundamental purpose: the maintenance of peace. It was inconceivable, from the standpoint of either democracy or legality that the vote of a single Member, however great, could override the votes of the 116 other States which now made up the membership of the United Nations.

39. While the institutional and political crisis provoked by the possibility of the application of Article 19 had been overcome, the financial problem remained. Therefore, what was needed was not only to give future peace-keeping operations an unchallengeable legal basis which could win the widest possible support, but also—and the two matters were closely linked—to devise a system of financing under which the cost of operations would be apportioned

equitably and in a manner acceptable to all. In his delegation's view, any formula for the organization and financing of future peace-keeping operations must have an equitable basis. In particular, it was essential that where the Security Council was paralysed the General Assembly should be authorized to recommend peace-keeping operations. The small and medium-sized Powers were able, through the General Assembly, to make a collective contribution to the primary task of the Organization: the protection of peace. They could therefore not give up their right to play a part in peace-keeping operations, even if that right was only a residuary one.

40. The present debate showed that peace-keeping operations were a necessity which had not been provided for adequately at San Francisco. Such operations were not completely identical with the enforcement action which the Security Council was empowered to take under Chapter VII of the Charter. In addition, his delegation considered that it was incumbent on the General Assembly to assume a responsibility in that sphere which had not been clearly defined. It had been proposed that the Charter should be amended to define the respective responsibilities of the General Assembly and the Security Council; but that would be a long and a difficult task, and it was essential that the United Nations should be in a position immediately to deal with any emergency situation which might arise. For that reason, the Chilean delegation advocated that a provisional formula should be adopted until the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations had worked out a definitive agreement.

41. In its reply to the Secretary-General, (A/6026, annex I) his Government had expressed its agreement with the broad guide-lines laid down by the Secretary-General and the President of the nineteenth session in their report (A/5915, Add.1, annex II). With regard to the respective responsibilities of the General Assembly and the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, his delegation considered that the functions and the powers of both of those organs were complementary and not contradictory. It also shared the opinion expressed in the document that questions should be examined, in the first instance, by the Security Council; but that if it was unable to act, the Assembly had the power to adopt resolutions and make recommendations, in conformity with the responsibilities incumbent upon it by virtue of the provisions of the Charter.

42. The problem of the organization and financing of future peace-keeping operations was a difficult and delicate one which would call for complex and lengthy negotiations. For that reason, his delegation agreed with the Irish delegation as to the need for provisional measures pending a final solution.

43. His delegation considered that draft resolution A/SPC/L.117 and Add.1 and 2 was timely and deserved the Committee's study. The aim of the system it proposed was to give the recommendations of the General Assembly the greatest possible financial effect, so that the Assembly could apportion the cost of peace-keeping operations equitably. The proposed formula was a realistic one, and his delegation was prepared to support it, without prejudice to any

amendments which might be submitted. However, his delegation agreed with the Colombian representative who had pointed out (463rd meeting) as to the possible dangers of fixing a quorum as large as three-quarters of the membership of the United Nations in connexion with measures to be adopted under General Assembly resolution 377 (V). That might in effect amount to another form of collective minority veto. Consequently, his delegation reserved the right to participate at the appropriate time in the discussion of the draft resolution or any amendments submitted to it.

44. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the maintenance of international peace and security was the essential task of the United Nations, and that study of the methods for the practical application of the measures provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter was of particular importance. The deterioration of the international situation—the consequence of repeated acts of imperialism and colonialist aggression in Asia, Africa and Latin America—was a cause of concern to all peace-loving peoples. The attempts of the imperialist Powers to crush national liberation movements by force were flagrant interventions in the domestic affairs of small countries. In many regions of the world, for example in Southern Rhodesia, fires had been lit which threatened international peace and security. For that very reason, all peaceful peoples placed their hopes in strengthening the effectiveness of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. If the problem was to be solved, the first necessity was an analysis based not on sentiment but on rational examination of all the facts. With that end in view, his delegation felt that it should reiterate the conclusions and proposals it had submitted during the discussion in the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations—constructive proposals aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the United Nations.

45. However, it was now again being argued that the difficulties of the United Nations were the result of the rule of unanimity between the great Powers in the adoption of Security Council decisions. That reasoning led to a false conclusion; that it was essential to set aside the unanimity rule. But if the Charter was not respected the future of the United Nations would be in jeopardy. Moreover, those who supported that view generally only saw the external aspects of the situation. They considered that it was impossible, in certain cases, for the Security Council to reach a decision acceptable to all the great Powers. But it should first be asked in the interests of which great Powers, and in the pursuit of what policies, such deadlocks had been created. As the world knew, it was the colonial Powers which, by their efforts to prevent the adoption of draft resolutions directed against colonialist aggression, had brought about that situation. To achieve that end they had not voted openly against those draft resolutions, but had simply made use of the procedural machinery.

46. It was common knowledge that in the Security Council the Soviet Union had systematically voted against draft resolutions submitted by the colonial Powers, in the interests of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, thus preventing the imposition on the United Nations of decisions directed

against national liberation movements. On many occasions, the Soviet Union had blocked colonialist machinations threatening small countries. No one could be unaware of the fact that the world was witnessing a struggle against the forces of reaction, and that any attempt to place the policies of all the great Powers which were members of the Security Council on an equal footing was at variance with the course of contemporary history.

47. It was altogether mistaken to think that a departure from the unanimity could serve the interests of the smaller countries. In that connexion one might well wonder what the reason was for the sudden interest shown by certain colonial Powers in the smaller nations. If those "friends" of the former colonial peoples and those still under colonial rule were really prepared to defend the interests of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, they could do so easily and freely in the Security Council through action within the framework of the Charter. In that case there would be no threat of a stalemate.

48. It was clear that the colonial Powers which were trying to circumvent the Security Council hoped, first, to be able, in the Assembly, to influence the decisions taken by that body, and, secondly, to retain a decisive voice in the implementation of political decisions concerning the use of armed forces in the name and under the flag of the United Nations. It should not be forgotten in that regard that the Security Council had been excluded from the implementation of its resolution 143 (1960) of 14 July 1960 concerning United Nations operations in the Congo, which had ultimately led to the tragedy in the Congo and the assassination of Patrice Lumumba. It must also be stressed that at the present time it was becoming increasingly difficult to pursue openly the "gunboat diplomacy" which had long been the tool of colonialist interference in the affairs of other countries.

49. In the statement which the United States representative had made earlier in the meeting, he had said that in questions of maintaining international peace the stakes were so high that all countries should be prepared to support the United Nations even when some of its decisions ran counter to national interests. He had stressed the particular importance of political and moral factors. But what political and moral factors could he have had in mind? In order to judge the real attitude of the United States and certain other Western Powers, their actions, not their words, must be appraised. And their actions showed that those countries respected neither the United Nations Charter nor the authority of the Organization and the Security Council and that they did not hesitate at times to defy the fundamental principles of the United Nations when those principles were not consistent with the interests of their imperialist policies. An example was afforded by the armed intervention of the United States in the Dominican Republic, accompanied by persistent efforts to paralyse the United Nations and the Security Council under cover of an "inter-American force" set up in violation of the Charter and as a challenge to the Security Council. Such efforts were still being made, for at the Inter-American Conference now being held at Rio de Janeiro the United States was again trying to infringe the Charter

by pressuring the Organization of American States into setting up an "Inter-American Force" which would be called upon to act without reference to the Security Council.

50. The attention of representatives of Asian, African and Latin American countries should be drawn to the danger to national liberation movements, to the independence of small countries and to the future of the Organization which was inherent in the colonialists' plans against international peace and security. The question arose whether it was possible to reach a solution of the problem before the Committee. The Soviet Government answered that question affirmatively. It would be necessary, however, to put an end immediately and unconditionally to all violations of the Charter and to achieve genuine co-operation among all States on a footing of equality. The Soviet Government had already drawn attention to those important considerations in its memorandum of 10 July 1964^{3/} regarding certain measures to strengthen the effectiveness of the United Nations in the safeguarding of international peace and security. Under the Charter, the only organ authorized to take measures relating to the maintenance of international peace and security was the Security Council; the Charter did not confer on any other United Nations body or on any of its officials the right to settle the matters in question. Accordingly, the statement made on that subject earlier in the meeting by the United States representative was at flagrant variance with the Charter. The relevant provisions of the Charter were at present acquiring new significance in view of the increased representation of the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America in the Security Council. The first of the five permanent members to ratify the relevant amendments had been none other than the Soviet Union.

51. The adoption of the Soviet Union's proposals could ensure, within the framework of the Charter, broader participation by the Asian and African countries in the adoption of decisions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, including peace-keeping operations. The Soviet Union had proposed that a large number of countries should be invited to take part in the work of the Military Staff Committee, which under the Charter was to assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the use of United Nations armed forces. For surely it could not be regarded as normal that the Military Staff Committee was completely ignored. The Soviet Union had also proposed the establishment of regional organs of the Military Staff Committee in various parts of the world, including Africa, in accordance with Article 47 of the Charter and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies. Lastly, the Soviet Union suggested that agreements should be negotiated between the Security Council and interested States, as provided for in Article 43 of the Charter, in order to ensure the implementation of Security Council decisions, if necessary through the use of military contingents made readily available. It should be emphasized in that connexion that the statements made by certain Western Powers regarding

^{3/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 21, document A/5721.

the provision of so-called stand-by military contingents were clearly at variance with the terms of Article 43 of the Charter. The aim was to circumvent the Security Council and to provide for the use of such contingents from the Western Powers, which would in fact retain control over them.

52. On the question of the commander of United Nations armed forces, the Soviet Union took the view that a single commander should be appointed from each operation decided on by the Security Council; the appointment would be made by the Security Council on the recommendation of the Military Staff Committee and after consultation with the Governments directly concerned.

53. With regard to the reimbursement of expenses incurred in operations to stop aggression, that question, too, should be settled in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, i.e. it should be decided by the Security Council, which in each case would select the method of financing. In accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law, it was possible to envisage various solutions: reimbursement could be made by the aggressor; the expenses could be distributed among the Members of the United Nations; voluntary contributions could be made; or the parties directly concerned could pay the expenses. Whenever the Security Council adopted decisions on the establishment and financing of armed forces in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, the Soviet Union would be prepared to participate, along with other Member States, in paying the expenses involved in the maintenance of those forces.

54. The representatives of certain Western Powers were attempting to distort the position of the Soviet Union by alleging that it was denying the General Assembly the right to debate questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. While proposing the better utilization of the possibilities of the Security Council in matters of peace-keeping, the Soviet Union was nevertheless in favour of utilizing the powers in regard to such matters which the Charter vested in the General Assembly, particularly under Articles 11, 12, 14 and 35, which authorized the Assembly to discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security and, within the powers given to it by the Charter, to make recommendations on such questions to the countries concerned or to the Security Council. The Soviet Union had already indicated that any question on which it was necessary to consider action should be referred by the Assembly to the Security Council; if the latter was unable to take a decision on the matter, nothing prevented the Assembly from re-examining the question and, within the limits of its competence, making appropriate recommendations. The Assembly could also undertake a preliminary examination of the question and then make recommendations to the Security Council. That practice was in keeping with the Charter and had been confirmed by the recent decision of the General Assembly with regard to the situation of Southern Rhodesia. It was therefore strictly in conformity with the Charter that the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America should possess the necessary initiative in the consideration of peace-keeping issues not only in the

Security Council but also when appropriate, in the General Assembly.

55. His country was always prepared to strengthen the United Nations as an instrument for the maintenance of peace, and it had made specific proposals to that end; but it would never accept any violation or distortion of the provisions of the Charter. When attempts were made to destroy the Organization's very foundations, compromise was impossible.

56. The draft resolution submitted by the Irish and other delegations (A/SPC/L.117 and Add.1 and 2) was in direct contradiction to the basic provisions of the Charter. Under the pretext of amending rules 69, 88 and 89 of the rules of procedure, the draft resolution was aimed at reviving resolution 377 (V) and giving the General Assembly a residual right to recommend the mounting of peace-keeping operations by the United Nations. All the terms used were in violation of the Charter, which laid down that the Security Council was the only body empowered to take such action by armed forces as might be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. That was quite clear from the provisions of Article 42. Furthermore, the Irish proposal was not by any means a new one, as the United States and United Kingdom delegations had in March 1964 suggested a plan embodying the main features of the Irish proposal. One point in common between the two plans was the promise that there would be virtually no financial consequences for States Members of the United Nations, as the latter would—so to speak—be "hiring out" the United Nations flag to the colonial Powers.

57. It was clearly impossible, in the present debate, to consider in all its details the problem of increasing the effectiveness of the United Nations in the maintenance of peace. But that question should indeed be studied comprehensively and in depth. The Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations had already embarked on the task, but had not completed it. In that connexion, it should be remembered that the General Assembly had on 18 February 1965 adopted resolution 2006 (XIX) calling for a comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations, and had established a special body for that purpose—the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations. As the President of the General Assembly at its nineteenth session had stated (1331st plenary meeting), the task entrusted to the Special Committee should be completed, and a decision on the procedure to be adopted for continuing the study should be taken at the present session. In common with other delegations, the Soviet delegation was ready to abide by the General Assembly's decision that consideration of the problem should be continued, in the first instance, by the special body which had been established for the purpose. That view had already been expressed by the Iraqi representative at the General Assembly's 1354th meeting. The representatives of Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia and other countries had also suggested that the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations should continue its work; and the Soviet delegation was also in favour of comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects, in the light of the

Soviet memorandum of 10 July 1964,^{3/} the additional explanations provided by the Soviet delegation in the Special Committee and the views expressed by other delegations at the twentieth session. That Committee could then submit its report to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session, and thus provide a constructive atmosphere for considering all the questions concerned.

Mr. Inglés (Vice-Chairman) (Philippines) took the Chair.

58. Mr. SCHLUTER (Denmark) said that his country had actively supported all efforts to ensure a United Nations presence in areas where trouble existed. It had taken part in most of the United Nations peace-keeping operations and, in co-operation with other Scandinavian countries, it had established a permanent stand-by force which could be made available to the Organization. Although peace-keeping operations were not explicitly envisaged in the Charter, they were indeed implicitly authorized as a supplement to the measures referred to in Chapter VI on the peaceful settlement of disputes. Peace-keeping operations differed fundamentally from the enforcement measures referred to in Chapter VII of the Charter, in that in practice the consent of the country concerned was required and participation with personnel and equipment was voluntary.

59. His country's foreign policy had always been based on the desire to support the United Nations and strengthen its authority. Denmark was, therefore, in favour of establishing the police force which was envisaged in the Charter and which should be the consummation of international disarmament efforts. But the serious crisis which the Organization had been facing showed that peace-keeping operations should, if possible, be launched in such a way that they did not meet with opposition from Member States, particularly the great Powers, and that some caution should therefore be shown in establishing a force to carry out such operations. Accordingly, his delegation supported the Irish proposal and the principle underlying it, namely, that it was essential to provide a stable foundation for the mounting and implementation of peace-keeping operations.

60. Broad agreement should be obtained on the principles for future peace-keeping operations and a comprehensive discussion of that difficult problem should be undertaken by the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, whose mandate should be extended. The Irish draft resolution could, in fact, be referred to that body.

61. On the other hand, in spite of the work done by the Special Committee, and notwithstanding the decision adopted by the General Assembly at its nineteenth session on 1 September 1965 the Organization's debts were still far from covered, and its finances must be urgently established on a sound footing. His delegation would support any measure likely to solve that problem—whether it be a resolution endorsing the Secretary-General's appeal for voluntary contributions or the convening of a pledging conference as suggested by the Canadian representative (A/5916/Add.1, 16th meeting).

62. Apart from the many problems which peace-keeping raised, it should also be remembered that, while peace-keeping operations had been initiated rapidly and efficiently in the past, the parallel establishment of suitable machinery for negotiations was equally important. His delegation approved the proposal in that connexion by the United Kingdom.

63. Lastly, he expressed the hope that the discussions would result in the adoption of a resolution reconstituting the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, referring to that Committee all questions relating to future peace-keeping operations, and endorsing the Secretary-General's appeal to Member States for voluntary contributions.

64. Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America), exercising his right of reply, said that the Soviet representative, realizing the weakness of his position, had referred to questions which were irrelevant to peace-keeping. First, he had accused the United States of blocking action taken by the Security Council in the interests of international peace and security. The records of the Council clearly showed, however, that the Soviet Union had exercised its right of veto more than one hundred times, while the United States had never had occasion to do so. Secondly, the Soviet Union asserted that it had used its right of veto in the interests of the Afro-Asian countries. If that were so, why had the Soviet Union so often voted differently from the Afro-Asian members of the Security Council? Lastly, it would appear from the Soviet representative's comments that it was necessary for peace-keeping operations to be subject to the veto of the Soviet Union in the interests of the Afro-Asian countries. In that connexion, he wished to point out that the Afro-Asian members of the Security Council had represented their countries with great vigour and effectiveness in the Assembly, in which they had a majority, and in the statements which they had made in the Committee, the Afro-Asian Powers had shown that they knew how to defend their own interests extremely well, and they should not be refused the right to do so.

65. The Soviet representative had also made much of the fact that his country had advocated an enlargement of the Security Council. That was also the attitude of the United States, which had been advocating an enlargement of the Security Council for more than ten years—i.e. much longer than the Soviet Union. It only when there had been an overwhelming majority in favour of amending the Charter that the Soviet Union had changed its mind.

66. The Rio de Janeiro meeting, to which the Soviet representative had referred, was discussing regional arrangements in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter.

67. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), exercising the right of reply, noted that the United States representative had spoken about countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, but had not referred to the way in which the United States had violated the Charter, disregarded Security Council resolutions, and ignored the wishes of the United Nations. Instead of making a general and pointless statement, he should rather have quoted specific facts taken from Security Council documents.

68. The Soviet delegation, for its part, had never countenanced any arrangements which might have violated the fundamental principles of the Organization or damaged the interests of the smaller countries of Asia, Africa and America, which it had always defended in the Security Council and in other bodies. When the Soviet Union had protested against certain decisions relating to peace-keeping operations, it had done so because the Western Powers—particularly the United States—had been implementing those decisions not in the interests of the United Nations or of small States but in their own imperialist interests. In that connexion, it was sufficient to mention events in the Congo, which were a typical example of the imperialist policy pursued by the Western countries, in particular the United States

of America. Further, the United States representative had failed to mention the moral and political principles that had guided his country in its armed intervention in the internal affairs of the Dominican Republic. Those were specific facts which spoke for themselves. Once again, it was noticeable that the statements of United States representatives in various United Nations bodies were not in keeping with the policy which the United States was pursuing in flagrant violation of the Charter.

69. The CHAIRMAN announced that, in accordance with the decision which the Committee had taken previously, the list of speakers was closed.

The meeting rose at 1.50 p.m.