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Chairman: Mr. Carlet R. AUGUSTE (Haiti).

AGENDA ITEM 36

The policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (continued):

- (a) Reports of the Special Committee on the Policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (A/5692, A/5707, A/5825 and Add.1, A/5932, A/5957);
- (b) Reports of the Secretary-General (A/5850 and Add.1, A/6025 and Add.1)

1. Mr. ARKHURST (Ghana) said his delegation was convinced that if the recommendations adopted by the General Assembly in the past with respect to the question of apartheid had been heeded by the South African Government, the whole problem of racism in southern Africa would have been on its way towards a solution. That Government, however, with the connivance of certain other Members of the United Nations, had contemptuously flouted the Organization's decisions. The continued practice of the racist policy of apartheid would inevitably lead to a race war which could not be confined to Africa. Recent events in southern Africa indicated clearly that racial tensions were building up and that the inevitable explosion was nearer than many imagined. Members of the United Nations should realize that time was running out and that it might soon be too late to control a situation which even now constituted a threat to world peace.

2. The reasons why a relatively minor Power such as South Africa had been able to flout world opinion was because South Africa's three major trading partners—all of them permanent members of the Security Council—were unwilling even to consider the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa. He quoted in that connexion the statement made to the Security Council on 15 June 1964 (1131st meeting) by the then Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, Sir Patrick Dean, concerning the special responsibility and interests which the United Kingdom considered it must bear in mind in its approach to proposals for action by the Council.

What those interests were could be seen from the fact that British trade with South Africa amounted to about 30 per cent of South Africa's total trade. British investments constituted three fifths of all foreign investments in South Africa. The flow of those investments, including undistributed profits, had averaged \$36 million annually in recent years, had reached \$38 million in 1962 and had been steadily increasing since then. The extent of British hypocrisy and cynicism with regard to the question of racism in South Africa was demonstrated by the fact that its intensified condemnation of the policy of apartheid coincided with its steadily increasing financial and economic involvement in that country. The argument that British investments in South Africa were private and that the United Kingdom Government therefore could not be held responsible for them was untenable, for a large number of Members of Parliament and most of the influential members of at least one major British political party had always been connected in one way or another with companies having considerable stakes in South Africa. As examples he listed a number of such persons and the companies having financial interests in South Africa with which they were or had been connected. The financial stake of the British political power structure in Southern Rhodesia was equally great, and it was therefore not surprising that United Kingdom policy in that Territory should be similar to the policy it had pursued in South Africa before abandoning millions of Africans to the arbitrary rule of the white settlers there. That was why Africans in general were so apprehensive with regard to the United Kingdom's position on Southern Rhodesia in the current crisis.

3. The United Kingdom argued that economic sanctions would be difficult to apply because they would require the eventual use of force, and Sir Patrick Dean had told the Security Council in June 1964 that in any case coercion could not bring about a peaceful solution. At that time Lord Caradon, who was now Sir Patrick's successor as the United Kingdom's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, had said that Sir Patrick's statement that the policy of apartheid posed no threat to peace in South Africa sounded strange when set against the Prime Minister's repeated assertion that the greatest danger in the world was that of race conflict. Sir Patrick had contended that the United Nations was in danger of self-deception if it supposed that the concepts of a peaceful solution and of coercion could be reconciled. Lord Caradon had commented that it was extraordinary to contend that coercion had no place in international peace-keeping, for without coercion the law of the jungle would prevail; and he had gone on to say that to adopt the "watch and wait" policy advocated by

Sir Patrick was to give positive encouragement to a system of economic and political slavery.

4. Meanwhile the Labour Party had come to power and Lord Caradon himself was the United Kingdom's chief spokesman in the United Nations. Yet the United Kingdom's policy towards South Africa remained unchanged, as had been demonstrated by Lord Caradon's statement at the previous meeting. Actually that was not surprising, for it was a Labour Government which had forced through the Central African Federation against the protests of an African majority and it was the current Labour Government which was selling out to the racists in Southern Rhodesia. Africans had come to believe that where African problems were concerned all United Kingdom Governments were the same. Even the United Kingdom arms embargo against South Africa in 1964 was meaningless, for it had been imposed too late to have real impact, and in any case it was being sidetracked; a British-controlled firm was now building three new arms factories for the South African Government.

5. As the representative of a country which was a member of the Afro-Asian Group he felt it was his duty to make a few comments on the increasing involvement of Japan in the industrial and economic development of South Africa. It was distressing to the people of Ghana that Japan should be prepared, for the sake of economic gain, to accept the status of "honorary white men" for persons of Japanese origin conferred upon them by South Africa. His delegation therefore appealed to Japan to reconsider its relations with South Africa in the context of Japan's own position in the Afro-Asian world.

6. In the last analysis, however, it was the Western Powers which were South Africa's major trading partners, and they bore the greatest responsibility for racial peace in Africa.

7. Mr. GUELLAL (Algeria) said he would like at the outset to pay a tribute to the Rapporteur of the Special Committee for the way in which that group had accomplished its task.

8. Those Member States which had experienced colonial domination feared that if the whole of Africa was not liberated the danger of a comeback by colonial Powers and interests might persist. Pockets of colonialism tended to be bridge-heads for colonial or semi-colonial ventures. Moreover, the existence of colonial enclaves stood in the way of the healthy development of the national life of the surrounding countries. The complete liberation of Africa was therefore a pre-condition for the preservation of the freedom already attained on that continent.

9. With regard to the specific problem of apartheid, the time had come when the United Nations must take a definite decision. It no longer had simply to determine whether apartheid was a matter of concern to the United Nations or whether the policies of the South African Government constituted a threat to international peace and security, for those questions had already been answered in the many debates on the subject held by the Assembly and the Security Council. In the past, efforts had been made to deal with the problem by persuasion, by the expression of

regrets, by appeals to the South African Government and by condemnation; but those methods had been totally unavailing. Some saw the problem strictly in terms of a denial of human rights and fundamental freedoms, but it was more than that: its most significant aspect was that it involved a race conflict between blacks and whites. Apartheid was based on the premise that the black-skinned peoples were inferior. If that premise was accepted it would mean that all non-white peoples, not only in South Africa but throughout the world, would have to be regarded as inferior and a race conflict between whites and non-whites would inevitably result. The danger of a world-wide split on the basis of colour had been feared for many years. It was being made more acute by the existence of a régime in South Africa which claimed that it was leading a crusade against communism and oppressed the non-whites in the name of "Western civilization". The issue was a momentous one, for a vast social and economic revolution was taking place throughout the world. In that process, colour was one of the visible symbols of the existing inequality between whites and coloured peoples, for it so happened that the non-whites were economically and socially under-privileged. Yet when the world sought to reason with the South African racists, they merely became more defiant, like the Zionists and the settlers in Southern Rhodesia.

10. Mr. BARROMI (Israel), speaking on a point of order, objected to the Algerian representative's reference to Zionism as being tantamount to re-opening a debate already concluded by the Committee.

11. The CHAIRMAN asked the representative of Algeria to try to relate his remarks as closely as possible to the topic under discussion.

12. Mr. GUELLAL (Algeria), continuing his statement, said that the South African Government, far from heeding the repeated appeals by the Assembly and the Security Council that it should desist from its discriminatory racial policies, had become increasingly aggressive and contemptuous in its attitude towards the United Nations. The repression it had embarked upon and the related massive build-up of armed forces, the resistance of the African inhabitants and the opposition of the independent African countries—whose capacity to fight a war against apartheid should not be underestimated—were all factors making the racial question in South Africa a very serious threat to peace and stability throughout the continent.

13. In the face of that situation the Western Powers had tried to avoid making a choice by arguing that the South African authorities should be given time to solve the problem themselves and that interference would merely aggravate the situation by uniting the advocates of apartheid and making them more militant. Such arguments, however, conveniently overlooked what had actually been happening in South Africa. Where the Africans had had any rights at all, they had been taken away; when there had been some degree of integration, it had been abolished; where there had been even a glimmer of hope, it had given way to despair. In addition, there was no longer any effective opposition to apartheid among the white settlers themselves, and any legislation introduced by the ruling party could be put through Parliament

with almost no debate. Indeed, it was probably no longer even in the power of the authorities themselves to reverse the trend towards increased repression.

14. He referred in that connexion to the law permitting police officers to detain anyone, without a warrant, for unlimited successive periods of ninety days, the Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1963 abolishing the right of black South Africans to live outside the native reserves, and the legislation making strikes by Africans illegal. Now South Africa had begun implementing the final measure of segregation, i.e., the virtual partition of the country by the creation of eight black States within its borders. Under that arrangement the white minority, numbering scarcely more than 3 million, would retain more than 86 per cent of the fertile land and virtually all South Africa's industry and mineral wealth, while the remaining poor land would be allotted to the 13 million Africans. In view of all those considerations it was difficult to see how intervention could make matters worse than they already were.

15. In response to the resolutions adopted by the United Nations on the subject of apartheid, most Member States had either broken off or refrained from establishing diplomatic, commercial or other relations with South Africa. That country's major trading partners, however, had failed to apply those resolutions even though they knew that each dollar invested in the South African economy was, in effect, a vote of confidence in the system of apartheid. One of the arguments put forward against the practical effectiveness of using pressure to force South Africa to change its ways was that sanctions would hurt the very people they were designed to help. The answer to that was that there was not one African leader in South Africa who would not welcome the imposition of sanctions and there were few Africans who would not accept the inconvenience they might cause if apartheid could thereby be destroyed. There were also the arguments that South Africa constituted the strongest bulwark against Communist penetration in Africa and, last but not least, that South Africa's racial policies were an internal affair and that the imposition of sanctions under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter or on any other basis would be contrary to the spirit of the United Nations. Those were the arguments of the very Powers that were responsible for the perpetuation of apartheid, yet it seemed to have been accepted that they should have the authority to decide what means and policies the Africans should adopt when dealing with African problems.

16. The method of appeals and persuasion had failed, and today the South African Prime Minister could tell his followers that the Western Powers were only trying to win what he called a popularity contest in Africa and were not prepared to do anything that would hurt the interests of the white South Africans. With the evidence all about them of vast economic expansion and huge investments, the South African racists had no reason to doubt their leader's affirmations. Economic sanctions had failed for reasons of which everyone was aware and to continue to think merely in terms of a boycott of South Africa as a means of ending apartheid was wishful thinking. That

attitude of the Western Powers was the logical outcome of their policies and interests, and it would be unrealistic to expect them to change it of their own accord. The destruction of the South African régime could come about only through the concerted efforts of the South African national liberation forces themselves. There was every legal and moral justification for the destruction of the régime in order to prevent the situation from deteriorating into a catastrophe and to forestall the establishment of other racist régimes. The decision of the African countries to prepare for a military show-down with the racist régime of Pretoria and its puppets in Salisbury was clear evidence that those countries did not intend to sit idly by. Algeria, for its part, was giving unqualified support to the South African liberation movement.

17. By failing to apply sanctions in the case of South Africa, the United Nations had shown that it had deteriorated into an organization largely controlled by the great Powers. Yet the current session offered an opportunity to raise the moral level of the United Nations by insisting that those who claimed that their societies were based on humanitarian principles should at least refrain from supporting apartheid. In the modern world, race relations were the legitimate concern of peoples everywhere, and no problem cried out more urgently for solution than that of apartheid. His delegation would accordingly suggest that the Special Committee should be enlarged to include countries playing an important role in international trade, the four permanent members of the Security Council responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security and Member States appointed in accordance with the principle of equitable geographical distribution.

18. If a solution was not found soon, the course on which the South African Government had embarked would inevitably lead it to conflict with the rest of the African continent.

19. Mr. Janusz LEWANDOWSKI (Poland) said that the United Nations' perennial concern with the racist policies of the Government of South Africa had its origin in the attempt by Nazi Germany to build up a world empire based on racial and national discrimination supported by a slave economy. The world community had paid the highest price to defeat that attempt, and after the war had guaranteed fundamental human rights in the United Nations Charter. In the face of the general trend, however, a Government officially declaring racism as its policy had been installed in South Africa only three years after the defeat of Nazi Germany. The reason was that racism could not be abolished without liquidating the colonial system, just as the colonial system could not be maintained without racial supremacy. Racial discrimination had always been and continued to be a justification and an instrument for colonial domination.

20. From the time of Cecil Rhodes, the white settler State in South Africa had been founded on racist principles. Over recent years, however, racial legislation had been introduced with increasing frequency in defiance of twenty-eight General Assembly resolutions and five resolutions of the Security Council. The rapid progress of decolonization during the last decade had evoked a new wave of concern over the situation in

South Africa, which had been built up as a fortress of colonialism. Recognizing the danger, ministers from ten African States meeting at Addis Ababa in 1960 had adopted a programme of sanctions against South Africa. In 1963, at the request of the Heads of State of independent African countries, the General Assembly and the Security Council had taken measures for the application of sanctions against the Government of South Africa. Poland, which had never supplied arms or equipment to South Africa nor maintained diplomatic relations with it, had issued regulations in compliance with the United Nations resolutions, and similar steps had been taken by many other countries. Unfortunately, that action had not been effective because the countries which received about 80 per cent of South Africa's exports and supplied about 70 per cent of its imports had not complied with those recommendations.

21. The reports submitted to the Committee provided it with all the information needed to form a picture of the present situation. In that connexion, he wished to thank the Chairman of the Special Committee for his work. It was clear from the documents that the situation in the Republic of South Africa was still deteriorating. New racial legislation was being introduced, repressive measures had been intensified, and the ill-treatment and torture of political prisoners had become everyday practice. The continuous efforts of the United Nations had made no impact on the course of events. It seemed doubtful whether the conscience of the racists could be stirred. Their determination to continue with their policy was bolstered by their confidence in the support of foreign financial, military and political forces, which could render United Nations action ineffective and protect them from interference. The Committee's documentation showed that the United Kingdom and the United States alone accounted for over 70 per cent of foreign investment in South Africa in 1962, and they were the main participants in the profits. British earnings from South African investments had risen from \$59 million in 1959 to \$80 million in 1962. United States earnings had reached \$86 million in 1963. Profits from investments in South Africa were higher than in any other part of the world as a direct result of the racist structure. The African had been turned into a slave to provide the means to bribe the conscience of South Africa's friends and to pay for the military build-up. The measures announced by certain countries to put a curb on the supply of military equipment to South Africa seemed to have had very little effect. Yet the world community was justified in expecting the compliance of those countries with its efforts to check the inhuman racial practices in South Africa.

22. Poland fully supported the recommendations made by the Special Committee and shared its view that urgent and decisive action was imperative. Such action was possible, necessary and urgent for the following reasons: first, the doctrine of apartheid concerned the entire international community and could not be regarded as an internal affair of the Government of the Republic of South Africa. Secondly, the present policy of that Government constituted a threat to peace within the meaning of Chapter VII of the Charter, since it had created turmoil both within the country and beyond its boundaries. South Africa

had already illegally occupied the Trust Territory of South West Africa and had made known its intention to extend its control over Bechuanaland, Swaziland and Basutoland. Thirdly, apartheid endangered the very lives of 13 million Africans, since it tended to bring about a reduction in the natural increase of the African population. Fourthly, the Government of the Republic of South Africa was the second régime which had attempted during the last quarter of a century to build up a slave empire. Following in the path of Nazi Germany, the South African racists were arming themselves and seeking territorial expansion. Their presence had encouraged other racists in Southern Rhodesia and was poisoning the international atmosphere with dangerous doctrines.

23. If the recommendations of the Special Committee were to be effective, they must be implemented by all Member States. It was therefore a matter of the utmost importance that the members of the Security Council, and particularly its permanent members, should support them. Poland was determined to cooperate in and comply with all decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council aimed at solving the problem of South Africa's apartheid policies.

24. Mr. PACHECO (Brazil) said that his delegation's opposition to the policy of apartheid was deeply rooted in the sociological formation of the Brazilian people who were united by an indissoluble spiritual bond, free of prejudice. The information placed before the Committee revealed the existence of a state of political tension in the Republic of South Africa which represented a threat to peace not only in that country but throughout the whole of the continent. Unfortunately the situation was deteriorating, causing racial hatred to spread throughout Africa.

25. Despite all the efforts of the United Nations, it had to be acknowledged that all its recommendations and proposals for correcting the policies of the Government of South Africa had produced no results. Apartheid was a subject that concerned all countries, and many bodies looked to the United Nations to exert its strong influence in that matter, for the situation could not be kept under control indefinitely. Faced with the overwhelming reality of the situation, the Committee must once again consider the kind of measures that should be taken to exert influence over the Government of the Republic of South Africa.

26. Mr. SOKOLOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the creation of the United Nations and the drafting of the Charter had both been the outcome of the defeat of Nazi Germany. Yet once again, after twenty years, a racist and Nazi State had come into being. Despite all the decisions of the United Nations, a racist régime was oppressing millions of Africans through its policy of apartheid. It was difficult to discern any progress towards the elimination of that system; indeed, the situation in the southern part of Africa had deteriorated even further as a result of the declaration of independence by the racist minority in Southern Rhodesia. The creation of yet another hotbed of racism formed part of a general imperialist plan to build a barrier against freedom on the African continent.

27. The answer to the question how the Verwoerd régime succeeded in defying the United Nations and world opinion was to be sought in the economic interests of the Western monopolies in South Africa and the consequent political support given by them to Verwoerd. South Africa not only offered a large market for the sale of industrial goods, but was a source of mineral and strategic raw materials. South Africa provided roughly 50 per cent of the uranium, 50 per cent of the platinum, 20 per cent of the chromium and 70 per cent of the gold mined in the entire capitalist world. Foreign capital invested in South Africa amounted to \$4,500 million, of which roughly two thirds came from the United Kingdom and one seventh from the United States. Foreign capital controlled a considerable part of the South African economy, in particular the mining and electrical industries. The United Kingdom, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and other Western countries accounted for more than 55 per cent of the total foreign trade of South Africa, including over 57 per cent of its imports and 54 per cent of its exports. The average level of dividends in South Africa was approximately double that in Europe. In many cases, profits reached 27 per cent, the highest rate in the world. Every year, South Africa paid foreign investors £240 million. Such high profits attracted many capitalist countries to invest in South Africa, and they were unconcerned by the international condemnation of apartheid or the slave labour and cruel exploitation in the country. They turned a deaf ear to appeals for sanctions, for they were interested only in the profit rate.

28. The Federal Republic of Germany played a special role in supporting the policy of apartheid. Former nazis were doing all they could to provide not only economic aid but close military co-operation. The most dangerous feature of that co-operation was in atomic projects. The atomic energy commission of the Federal Republic was financing the construction of a uranium enrichment plant in South Africa, and German scientists were carrying out research on long-range rockets at a tracking station in South West Africa. Criminal work was also being performed on the production of poison gases of the type manufactured by nazi Germany towards the end of the war. The scientists working on that project were headed by a former member of the Wehrmacht. The vice-President of the South African national scientific and industrial research council had stated that the gases were more toxic than any known substances. A member of the South African Atomic Energy Commission had recently called for the production of nuclear weapons for use against the Afro-Asian States. Many more examples could be given of links between the German seekers of vengeance and the South African racists. But the Federal Republic of Germany was not the only State interested in strengthening South Africa's military potential.

29. South Africa was regarded by the United States, the United Kingdom and several other Western countries as the last bastion of colonialism in Africa. After a visit by General Norstad, former commander-in-chief of the NATO armed forces, South Africa had decided to purchase new military aircraft and anti-aircraft rockets. The Western countries must be con-

demned for assisting Verwoerd in that way. The existing régime not only denied Africans their fundamental rights, but created a threat to peace and security both in Africa and throughout the world. Recent events in Southern Rhodesia had increased that threat, by strengthening the "unholy alliance" between South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia. Despite protests from the international community and in defiance of United Nations resolutions, Verwoerd had hastily expressed support for the Smith régime and affirmed that South Africa would continue to maintain friendly relations with Southern Rhodesia.

30. The Byelorussian delegation wished to thank the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa for the excellent report (A/5957) it had produced. His delegation supported its conclusions and recommendations and agreed that urgent and decisive action was imperative. The situation required measures by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. The Byelorussian delegation considered that the Security Council should place an obligation upon all States to apply economic sanctions in order to compel the South African Government to abandon its policy of apartheid. In that connexion, the Western Powers should be condemned for attempting by all possible means to prevent such a decision. It was important that the Special Committee should continue with its work.

31. The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic maintained no relations with the Republic of South Africa. It categorically condemned the policy of apartheid and unreservedly supported the national liberation movement in its struggle against colonialism.

32. Mr. GALINDO (Colombia) said that the reports of the Special Committee on apartheid and the statements of previous speakers, particularly the Chairman and the Rapporteur of the Special Committee, (469th meeting) concerning the intolerable situation in South Africa, had inspired a two-fold reaction in his delegation. On the one hand, his delegation condemned the policy of apartheid, which violated all the principles set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations Charter—two documents which had been designed to sanction the defeat of nazi racism and to proclaim mankind's condemnation of aggression by individuals or by nations. On the other hand, his delegation was deeply concerned by the fact that United Nations resolutions were being systematically ignored, not only by the Republic of South Africa, which was a signatory of the Charter and thus subject to its provisions, but also by other Member States, which should be setting a good example for the rest of the world. The situation in South Africa was all the more shocking to his delegation because racial prejudice was entirely unknown in Colombia, where all races lived together in unity and harmony and there were equal rights and opportunities for all.

33. The United Nations had been established to guarantee peace with justice and freedom; that peace must be based on the sincere intention of all peoples to avoid domestic or international action tending to promote hatred or inequality or to imply the existence of superior classes, races or nations. That was a funda-

mental principle of the Charter, which must be defended against any violations. The contention that a State was free to follow any domestic policy it chose was entirely invalid, for no State had the right to pursue, in the name of freedom and national sovereignty, a policy that endangered its neighbours. Racist policies tended to spread to other nations, as was shown by the case of Southern Rhodesia. By intensifying racial conflict, the policy of apartheid represented a threat to peace in Africa and throughout the world which must be ended in the name of international security, lest it cause a world conflict which would have disastrous consequences for all—including those powerful nations which provided South Africa with technical and financial assistance.

34. His delegation supported the protest against apartheid expressed by many other delegations, and considered the speedy implementation of the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions essential. It was ready to support a new appeal, calling on South Africa to abandon its racist policy and requesting all Member States to fulfil their obligation to refrain from co-operating with that country as long as it was ruled by the racists. His delegation would also support any other measures designed to extend the protection of international law to the Africans, who were persecuted, and in many cases killed, solely on account of their race and colour. At the present time, however, the most urgent need was to ensure the rapid and effective application of sanctions against the racist régime and to aid its victims.

35. Mr. BARROMI (Israel) recalled that since 1952, when the United Nations had first taken up the question of apartheid, the General Assembly had adopted no less than fifteen resolutions on that subject, while the Security Council had adopted five such resolutions between 1960 and 1965. Israel had always voted in favour of those resolutions, which had become progressively more severe and had been approved by an ever-increasing majority, owing to a change of attitude on the part of Member States, combined with the admission of many new States with a natural interest in the problem of apartheid. As a result, the latest General Assembly resolutions on apartheid, those of 1963, (1881 (XVIII)) and 1978 (XVIII)) had been adopted almost unanimously, signifying the condemnation of apartheid by all States, irrespective of their ideological and political views. The 1963 resolutions had shown that apartheid was not an exclusively African problem, but represented a threat to all mankind. In view of that unequivocal expression of disapproval by world public opinion, Israel had hoped that South Africa would change its policies, but that optimism had, unfortunately, proved to be unfounded.

36. The South African Government had ignored the appeal of the United Nations and had intensified its policy of repression, as was shown clearly in the report of the Special Committee. The Africans, in addition to being deprived of their civil rights and subjected to a régime of segregation and exploitation, were now being imprisoned in detention camps and gaols. Some African leaders had been condemned to life imprisonment and others had been executed. Thirteen million Africans were oppressed and humili-

liated by those who proclaimed the doctrine of racial superiority.

37. The sufferings of the African population had aroused the deepest sympathy in Israel, for the Jewish people had for many centuries been exposed to human injustice in all its forms. In Israel, opposition to apartheid and racial discrimination was not only a government policy derived from ideological principles, but represented the almost instinctive reaction of the whole population. The attitude of the Israel people was exemplified in the appeal launched on 20 May 1964 by Martin Buber and Haim Hazaz on behalf of Israel's intellectuals, calling on the South African Government to abandon the Rivonia trial, to eschew the use of force, to forsake the doctrine of racial superiority and to enter into a dialogue with the African population.

38. That appeal, like those from other countries, had gone unheeded, and the vision of a multiracial South African society based on mutual respect and co-operation had not been realized. In South Africa, however, there were admirable examples of solidarity among men of different races and religions who shared the same sufferings in their joint struggle against apartheid.

39. The cause of racial equality had suffered a further setback with the establishment of another State based on racial discrimination, Southern Rhodesia. Israel's reaction to that event had been predictably prompt and unequivocal. On 13 November 1965 it had sent a letter to the President of the Security Council<sup>1/</sup> stating that it would not recognize the illegal Rhodesian régime and was taking immediate steps to prohibit all ties with it, including economic relations. In the case of South Africa, Israel had taken steps, described in document A/AC.115/L.143/Rev.1.

40. The situation in South Africa called for the continuation of concerted, serious and responsible international action, and his delegation would give serious consideration to any proposals designed to achieve that end. For the first time in human history, there was a world-wide movement against the theory and practice of racial discrimination in all its forms. The present generation was offered two alternatives: the energetic reaffirmation of the principle of human equality and collaboration, regardless of race, religion or ethnic origin, or the survival of the doctrine of racial supremacy, which could lead to an outbreak of unimaginable violence, as was proved by the experience of the Jewish people. The Jews, who had been the first to suffer from Nazism, well understood the impatience and indignation expressed by African representatives with regard to the policy of apartheid. Israel's place was therefore in the anti-racist camp. The case of South Africa represented a test and a challenge for the United Nations, and it was to be hoped that the Committee would show the determination and abnegation that were necessary in order to meet that challenge.

41. The CHAIRMAN informed the Committee that in accordance with the unanimous decision taken at the

<sup>1/</sup> Official Records of the Security Council, Twentieth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1965, document S/6930.

470th meeting, the officers of the Committee had met with the Permanent Representative of South Africa and had handed him a letter expressing the Committee's surprise at the continued absence of the South African delegation during the debate on agenda item 36 and stating that the Committee would appreciate that delegation's presence during the discussion, the high level of which proved the desire of all concerned to engage in a fruitful dialogue.

42. The South African representative had replied that his delegation's absence had been dictated by his Government's interpretation of Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter. The decision not to participate had also been influenced by the fact that certain delegations had refused to listen to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa. The South African representative had stated, however, that he would submit the matter to his Government for its consideration, and inform the Chairman of its reply.

43. Mr. GHERIB (Tunisia) thanked the Chairman and the other officers for having faithfully fulfilled the mandate conferred upon them by the Committee. His delegation would await the reply of the South African Government before deciding on its future position.

44. Mr. JUARBE Y JUARBE (Cuba) thanked the officers for their efforts, but observed that the reaction of the South African representative had not presaged any change in his Government's position. If South Africa continued to refuse to participate in the Committee's debate, the situation would be serious. Certain delegations had for many years advocated a policy of persuasion in order to convince South Africa that it should abandon apartheid, but a dialogue was impossible if South Africa refused to listen. In those circumstances the Committee should consider what further steps it could take in the matter.

The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m.