



Monday, 12 October 1970,
at 11 a.m.

NEW YORK

Chairman: Mr. Abdul Samad GHAUS
(Afghanistan).

AGENDA ITEM 34

The policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa: report of the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (continued) (A/8022, A/SPC/L.181, A/SPC/L.182/Rev.1)

1. The CHAIRMAN said he would first give the floor to delegations wishing to speak in explanation of vote on draft resolution A/SPC/L.182/Rev.1, adopted by the Committee at its previous meeting.

2. Mr. KAGAMI (Japan) said his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution. It wished, however, to draw attention to operative paragraph 6 of the resolution adopted by the Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries (see A/SPC/L.181), which it found unacceptable. Consequently, although it had cast an affirmative vote in the separate vote on the sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs of the draft resolution, it would have voted against the seventh preambular paragraph, which referred to the resolution adopted by that conference, if that paragraph alone had been subject to a separate vote. He reaffirmed his delegation's full support of Security Council resolution 282 (1970). Japan had consistently and scrupulously observed the arms embargo against South Africa. It had no diplomatic relations with that country and did not extend to it any military or economic assistance.

3. Mr. RAKOTOFIRINGA (Madagascar) explained that his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution because it had wished to reaffirm its traditional strong opposition to *apartheid* and its support of the arms embargo against South Africa—a position which had recently been reiterated by the President and the Foreign Minister of the Malagasy Republic. However, it had reservations with regard to the sixth preambular paragraph and had been unable to take a position on the seventh preambular paragraph since it had not participated in the Conference referred to therein.

4. Mr. COTTON (New Zealand) said the fact that his delegation had abstained in the vote on the draft resolution should not be construed as signifying any change in the New Zealand Government's position with regard to *apartheid*. As the Prime Minister of New Zealand had recently stated, New Zealand would continue to prohibit the supply

of arms or military equipment to the Government of South Africa and to dissociate itself from that country's racist policies.

5. Mr. CUMES (Australia) said his delegation had abstained in the vote on the draft resolution because it had shared the reservations expressed by several speakers with regard to the wording of the draft. However, that action did not signify any change in Australian policy; as in the past, his Government was strongly opposed to the vicious and barren policy of *apartheid*. Moreover, the Australian Government had never been a supplier of arms to South Africa, even before the adoption of Security Council resolutions on the subject. It had no intention of changing its policy in the future.

6. The CHAIRMAN said the Committee would now resume its debate on the question of the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa.

Mr. Hierro Gambardella (Uruguay), Vice-Chairman, took the chair.

7. Mr. NYAKYI (United Republic of Tanzania) said he wished to convey his delegation's appreciation to the Chairman and the Rapporteur of the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa for their valuable contribution to the work of the Special Political Committee.

8. The question of the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa had, in one form or another, been on the agenda of the General Assembly since the founding of the United Nations twenty-five years ago. However, the numerous efforts made during that period to bring the shocking situation in South Africa to an end had proved fruitless; that situation had steadily deteriorated and there was little hope for improvement.

9. As the Secretary-General had noted in the introduction (A/8001/Add.1) to his report on the work of the Organization, the South African Government had not only refused to associate itself with all the efforts of the United Nations, withheld its co-operation and rejected the resolutions of the General Assembly—it had proceeded even further and enacted new measures to consolidate racial discrimination and racial segregation as State policy. South Africa was able to follow its outrageous policy with impunity because of the failure of a number of States which maintained political and economic relations with that country, particularly its major trading partners, to implement the relevant resolutions and decisions of the United Nations.

10. The repressive measures used by the Government of South Africa were common knowledge. An extensive but

not exhaustive summary of them was given in a study issued by the Unit on *Apartheid* entitled “*Apartheid in Practice*”¹—a document to be commended to those who were interested in gaining a fuller picture of the legislation which had gradually and steadily transformed South Africa into a police State. Those Member States whose actions or omissions either directly or indirectly sustained the system of *apartheid* would do well to read it carefully. They would gain an idea not only of the injustice which was rife in South Africa but, more important, of what they as Governments and their investments were helping to entrench.

11. Nor had the evil system of *apartheid* been confined to South Africa; it had been extended and applied to the Territory of Namibia in defiance of the will of the international community, and had been embraced by the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia. Indeed, Portugal and South Africa had been giving assistance to that minority régime, thus enabling it to defeat the sanctions imposed by the United Nations. It was common knowledge that South Africa was also involved militarily in Rhodesia, and there was evidence to show that it was similarly involved in the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola.

12. The idea had been advocated that free Africa should encourage and accept South Africa's overtures as characterized by that country's so-called “outward looking” policy. That supposedly new phenomenon had found favour with South Africa's Western friends who were actively canvassing for its acceptance by Africa on the ground that it would lead to the gradual erosion and elimination of *apartheid*. However, the effect of South Africa's involvement in Namibia, Rhodesia and elsewhere in Africa did not lend support to that argument, nor did the pronouncements of the Pretoria régime. On the contrary, they showed unmistakably that the real intentions of the South African racists were to create conditions in southern Africa which would assure the perpetration of *apartheid* in South Africa. The only new element in the policy was that it laid greater emphasis on Africa—the result of the South African Government's realization that the role of Africa in the fight against *apartheid* was crucial.

13. In considering the argument that co-operation of the kind South Africa was seeking would eventually lead to the collapse of the system of *apartheid*, it had to be borne in mind that South Africa was at present not without allies; many influential Members of the United Nations maintained close relations with the racist régime in the diplomatic, economic, social, military and other fields. As a member of the United Nations and other international organizations South Africa was in constant touch with a large section of international opinion. However, those contacts had not caused the South African racists to relax their repression; on the contrary, assured of the continued friendship and support of the Western countries, they saw no reason to relinquish their hold on the African population.

14. South Africa's allies also argued that the current policy of isolation had led South Africa to enact further

repressive measures out of sheer desperation, thus further entrenching *apartheid*. However, it was friendship and co-operation between the West and South Africa, rather than the lack of friendship between free Africa and South Africa which sustained the racists. Thus, if the sanctions imposed against Southern Rhodesia had been foolproof, the minority régime would have been defeated. In the same way, if the limited measures adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly had been firmly applied by Member States, some advance towards the solution of the problem would have been made.

15. There were, however, even more fundamental reasons for refusing to co-operate with South Africa. First, the kind of co-operation advocated would be contrary to the letter and spirit of the United Nations resolutions on *apartheid* and in particular to General Assembly resolution 2506 B (XXIV) which invited all the States to desist from collaborating with South Africa in a number of areas in the economic field. Secondly, co-operation between States presupposed the acceptance by the States concerned of the equality and dignity of man. A Government which served only a small part of its people while condemning the vast majority to perpetual servitude not only deprived itself of the right to rule but deserved the unreserved condemnation of the entire world. To extend the hand of friendship to such a régime would make a mockery of the basic principles of the United Nations Charter and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The United Republic of Tanzania, for its part, was not prepared to sell out to the South African régime.

16. It was clear from the foregoing that if an international strategy was to have any chance of bringing *apartheid* to an end, it must concentrate on three areas. First, it must prevent any further erosion of the limited measures already adopted and must ensure that those measures were implemented by all States Members of the United Nations, including Portugal. Secondly, it must seek to impose realistic and courageous measures, even if that meant foregoing substantial economic benefits. For those countries which did not have strong links with South Africa, boycotting the régime would be largely a matter of form. But even those who would be compelled to abandon short-term economic profit would in the long term gain immensely both economically and otherwise. Lastly, the strategy must be supported by the effective application of the relevant provisions of the Charter.

17. The countries which had repeatedly called for the application of Chapter VII of the Charter had never underestimated the effect of such a step on the world economy. However, the consequences of failure to take timely action would be even more disastrous. It could not be repeated often enough that the race war in South Africa would not be a localized affair; it would soon plunge the whole area into a racial conflagration. Large areas of Mozambique and Angola had already been liberated by the nationalist movements operating in those territories. The military intervention by South Africa in those territories and in Rhodesia was a further proof of the intensification of the struggle. The Pretoria régime, alleging that large-scale preparations were being made against South Africa, had threatened that if guerrillas entered South Africa, South Africa would resist and would pursue them back into the

¹ Document ST/PSCA/SER.A/9.

countries from which they had come. Those threats, however contemptible, could not be dismissed. The arrogant and aggressive attitude displayed by the Fascist *apartheid* régime vividly demonstrated the seriousness and explosive nature of the situation in that part of the world.

18. In the event of a conflict, the Western countries would almost certainly intervene on the side of the racists since, although they had not yet intervened directly, they were already supporting them. It was imperative that effective international action should be taken to reverse that trend.

19. His delegation had warmly welcomed the Security Council's action in closing certain loopholes in the 1963 embargo, particularly the Council's rejection, as invalid, of the restrictive interpretation which countries breaking the embargo had persistently put on the scope of the ban.

20. The alleged difference between arms for internal repression and arms for external defence had been shown to be fictitious and existed only in the minds of the suppliers. The war in Indo-China had exploded the absurd myth that bullets from a helicopter, bomber or submarine would kill only people from outside the borders of South Africa while sparing those within its borders: so too had the war which was being waged by guerrillas in Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies against regular armies equipped with the most modern fighter bombers, tanks, submarines and helicopters.

21. Although arms suppliers claimed that their arms were intended to be used not to combat aggression against independent African States, but to repel an alleged communist menace in the Indian Ocean, that claim did not coincide with the intentions of the South African Government. The communist bogey was a ploy. Mr. Vorster's recent statement in Parliament that the freedom-fighters, if put to flight, would be pursued right into the countries from which they came, proved the racist régime's aggressive designs against African countries. It was clear that the fighters would be pursued by means of French and United Kingdom fighter bombers, tanks, submarines and helicopters.

22. While the international community had rightly condemned France as the leading offender against the arms embargo, and the United Kingdom for its declared intention to lift the embargo, what was to be said of those countries which outwardly observed the embargo while secretly co-operating with South Africa in the production of arms? A recent publication of the Anti-*Apartheid* Movement of London entitled "South Africa's Defence Strategy" had referred to the ease, and often enthusiasm, with which Western Governments permitted South Africa to purchase licences and blueprints for military equipment. It stated that while the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium formally pledged support for the arms embargo, they sanctioned the supply of military technical information, permitted their firms to invest in South African arms firms and did nothing to discourage their citizens from migrating to take up posts with South African arms firms, while Italy and France supplied military weapons and allowed skilled technicians to migrate and sell patents for military equipment.

23. The South African armaments industry was geared to the production of *apartheid*-enforcing arms. A year after the Sharpeville incident, the South African Minister of Defence had announced his Government's intention to be ready for internal trouble, and four years later, could boast that South Africa was already practically self-sufficient in the production of small weapons, ammunition and explosives. Since then, it had been able to secure licences from a number of Western countries for the manufacture of various types of weapons.

24. His delegation was very gratified that the General Assembly had come to accept *apartheid* as a crime against humanity. It was, however, distressed to note that some countries could not accept that reality: if the whole international community was not willing or ready to apply the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter, those at least who were willing should be allowed to do so. The heroic people of South Africa had pledged themselves to undertake that task.

25. The vast majority of Member States, including his own, abhorred violence and respected the rule of law. What existed in South Africa, however, was the rule of the gun. The freedom fighters should have the right to retaliate against the *apartheid* régime, which had been the first to resort to violence. To deny them that right amounted quite clearly to condoning the actions of that régime.

26. The last twenty-five years had clearly shown not only that South Africa would never willingly comply with United Nations resolutions, but also that its Western allies were more concerned with profit and kinship than with moral principles.

27. His delegation shared the view of the Special Committee and of the Secretary-General that the measures proposed by the General Assembly and the Security Council remained the most appropriate means of peacefully averting the impending catastrophe, while non-compliance should, as with Rhodesia, lead to mandatory sanctions.

28. Mr. BAKO (Chad) said that the conclusions of the report of the Special Committee concerning the lack of progress in combating *apartheid* had the merit of being clear and frank. From the Special Committee's well documented and detailed study it was clear that the United Nations had failed in its efforts to convince the South African Government to renounce its cruel and anachronistic policy of *apartheid*. In spite of—or perhaps because of—the resolutions on the arms embargo, and on the economic and other sanctions, the supply and production of arms had not ceased to expand. The encouragement given by certain countries which continued to maintain economic and commercial relations with the Pretoria régime enabled it to perfect its policy of oppression. That complicity, which had been condemned by OAU at its meeting at Addis Ababa and by the conference of non-aligned countries held at Lusaka (see A/SPC/L.181) would, if continued, undermine confidence in the United Nations.

29. His delegation appealed to those States to re-examine their relations with South Africa. After twenty-five years of untiring but hopeless efforts, the international community must pass from words to effective action. His delegation

hoped that Member States would become aware of the serious danger posed by *apartheid*, and the growing need for the implementation of Chapter II, Article 6, of the Charter concerning the expulsion of Member States from the Organization.

30. Mr. BOMBA (Central African Republic) said that his country was deeply distressed by the flagrant violations of human rights in South Africa whose Government, heedless of United Nations decisions, was continuing to increase its repressive legislation and its inhuman exploitation of the native population, thus threatening to unleash a violent racial conflict which would endanger world peace and security.

31. The odious and brutal methods of *apartheid*, condemned by the General Assembly as a crime against humanity, were identical to those of nazism which certain countries had fought and defeated in Europe but which they now tolerated and even encouraged in South Africa. In addition, Pretoria's main trading partners, in defiance of General Assembly resolution 2396 (XXIII), had increased their trade links with South Africa and their investments in that country.

32. In its Manifesto on Southern Africa,² OAU had proposed a serious basis for the peaceful settlement of those problems; thus far, however, that proposal had been rejected by the racists of South Africa, who clearly had no intention of abandoning their policy and of fulfilling their obligations under the Charter. His delegation felt that there was an urgent need for the international community to recognize the key role of the liberation movements by giving them material assistance. His country, which had undertaken to work for the complete liberation of Africa would, for its part, supply as much aid as possible. Instead of persisting in its negative and static policy concerning *apartheid*, the United Nations should adopt effective measures aimed at isolating the Pretoria régime by the application of Chapter VII of the Charter, and by inducing South Africa's main trading partners to abide by United Nations resolutions.

33. He paid tribute to the Chairman and members of the Special Committee for the way they had discharged their task and for their excellent report. The warm welcome which his delegation had given to draft resolution A/SPC/L.182/Rev.1 confirmed its commitment to the struggle against *apartheid*.

34. Mr. PLAZA (Venezuela) said that an analysis of the positive side of the problem of *apartheid* showed that the United Nations had done all in its power to put an end to a situation which had been universally repudiated. If they had been scrupulously implemented, the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council would have produced favourable results. The Special Committee and its sub-committees had, for their part, worked with commendable zeal.

35. In contrast to the Organization's constructive attitude, many States—including permanent members of the Security Council and of course South Africa itself—had followed a very different path. The arrogant obstinacy with which South Africa was flouting not only the United Nations but also the conscience of the world had been clearly expressed in the South African Prime Minister's statement, quoted in paragraph 120 of the report (A/8022) of the Special Committee, that he had "high hopes . . . that there can be co-operation as between nations and States regardless of the domestic policies of such States".

36. His own country's repudiation of *apartheid*—a policy that was repugnant to the Venezuelan people—was the logical consequence of his Government's political philosophy.

37. The Government of South Africa, on the other hand, far from restricting its policy of *apartheid* had in recent years—probably as a result of the ineffectiveness of measures to combat *apartheid*—extended its policy to other regions to the point where international peace was gravely jeopardized. As the Special Committee's report clearly showed, the indifference of many States to United Nations resolutions was due to the fact that they were more concerned about the preservation of their economic interests than about the principles of the Charter.

38. The clear contradiction between the attitude of the United Nations and that of its individual Members produced an extremely dangerous situation. First, the prestige of the Organization depended on the ability of the United Nations to adopt effective measures to put an end to *apartheid*, or at least to lead to its progressive eradication. Secondly, as was well known, that policy was an imminent threat to world peace by reason of its expansionist character and because of the inherent violence provoked by any action which curtailed people's freedom. Thirdly, for those countries which ignored United Nations recommendations by investing in South Africa, there was clearly a danger that their substantial investments—which were currently yielding such rich dividends as a result of the policy of *apartheid* and its inherent low labour costs—might suddenly be threatened when the inevitable consequences of South Africa's policies occurred. Fourthly, the greatest danger was to South Africa itself, despite that régime's apparent unwillingness to understand the situation. History illustrated the inevitable fate of oppressive régimes which persisted in denying basic human rights.

39. In view of that situation, it was necessary to seek a new and different solution. The representative of Mexico (693rd meeting) had raised the possibility of suspending South Africa's membership in the United Nations pursuant to Article 5 of the Charter. His delegation was sympathetic to that idea because of the severe moral sanction it represented, but feared that such a suspension might turn out to be counter-productive in that it would remove the only existing restriction on South Africa's freedom of action, namely its annual appearance before the General Assembly, where the great majority of nations repudiated its conduct. Moreover, such a measure would be no more effective than those already adopted so long as there were nations which refused to comply with United Nations resolutions regarding trade and other relations with the

² Adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its sixth ordinary session; for the text, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 106, document A/7754.

Government of South Africa. Despite those negative aspects, however, the Mexican proposal had sufficient merit to deserve careful consideration in the Committee. If the resulting feeling in the General Assembly was favourable to the adoption of such a measure, his delegation would be prepared to support it.

40. For similar reasons, the representative of Somalia, who was Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, had suggested [*ibid.*] the desirability of an agreement on the part of the countries responsible for the non-fulfilment of United Nations decisions regarding *apartheid* under which none of them would benefit from the compliance of other States. His delegation considered it unlikely that such an agreement would be reached. Moreover, any agreement which was concluded, if it was not of a formal and legally binding nature, might experience the same fate as previous United Nations resolutions on the matter.

41. On the basis of those considerations, his delegation wished to propose that, apart from any other proposals on the question, consideration should be given to the possibility of preparing, at the current session, a specific, legally binding multilateral instrument on international measures regarding the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa, embracing the provisions laid down in the various resolutions adopted by the United Nations. The instrument would be submitted for the consideration of Governments and opened for signature by them. Indeed, his delegation believed the time had come to codify in a single instrument all the measures adopted so far, supplementing them where appropriate. Some States had explained that one of the primary factors which made it difficult to comply with United Nations decisions was the impossibility of ensuring that they would be respected as legally binding in the domestic sphere. That difficulty would disappear if the relevant provisions were embodied in an instrument which would be transformed into law by the signatory countries in accordance with their different constitutional procedures. The instrument could make provision for the progressive withdrawal of investments from South Africa over a reasonable period of time and for conditions under which States which had interests in South Africa could reduce any unfavourable effects on their economies, as well as for all matters relating to diplomatic and consular relations, communications, the arms embargo and other aspects of the question. The instrument could provide for the alleviation of the material losses it might entail for some States; in the final analysis, such losses were the basic reason for the reluctance of those States to abide by the decisions of the United Nations. The task of drafting the basic text could be entrusted to a representative *ad hoc* committee.

42. Mr. GOMEZ NAAR (Colombia) said he wished first of all to praise the Special Committee for its profound and exhaustive report. His country's point of view on *apartheid* in southern Africa was based on the racial integration which had taken place in Latin America as a result of the Spanish colonial policy of bringing the Christian faith and practice to the indigenous peoples of the New World. The Colombian people were the synthesis of various peoples, including Africans, whose evolution was leading them towards racial and social unity with invaluable benefit to the Colombian nationality.

43. His country therefore rejected all racist policies, including *apartheid*, because of its ancient and profound national commitment to human dignity and equality, the product of the aforementioned historical tradition. Colombia had condemned the segregationist policies of South Africa since the question was first debated in the General Assembly in 1946 and had voted for Security Council resolution 282 (1970), without doubt the most forceful and advanced document issued by the United Nations on the subject. Draft resolution A/SPC/L.182/Rev.1, which had been adopted by an overwhelming majority of the Committee, had been almost entirely based on that resolution.

44. His country had also participated in the struggle against *apartheid* through its membership in the United Nations Council for Namibia, and its representative had headed the Council's recent mission to Zambia and other African countries to improve the international status of Namibian refugees who had suffered political persecution from the South African Government.

45. Paragraph 78 of the report of the Special Committee contained a reference to a statement by Mr. Abdul S. Minty, Honorary Secretary of the British Anti-*Apartheid* Movement, to the effect that South Africa had established new diplomatic, trade and political ties with other countries such as Malawi, Uruguay, Colombia and Taiwan. He hoped that no special significance would be attached to a visit to South Africa by a few officers of a decentralized, independent Colombian industrial organization, an event which might have gone unnoticed by any Government. Fortunately the Special Committee itself had not seen fit to list his country among those which had established new relationships with South Africa.

46. By its denial of inalienable rights and freedoms, the policy of *apartheid* of South Africa violated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations Charter. That fact was more than sufficient reason for Colombia to maintain the steadfast position it had adopted on the subject of *apartheid*. As the representative of a small country, whose best protection and defence was international law, he could not view without anxiety and disgust any violation of that law.

47. Mr. PRAWIRODIRDJO (Indonesia) said that little could be added on the subject of *apartheid* except that the continuation and intensification of that heinous policy made it all the more obvious that strong and effective action must be taken. The peoples of the world stood almost as one man in opposition to South Africa's policies and viewed them as a crime against humanity. It was on that basis that the United Nations must formulate and implement effective measures to eliminate those policies forever. The General Assembly had adopted resolution 2506 (XXIV), endorsing most of the recommendations contained in the Special Committee's report at the previous session,³ condemning the South African Government's repressive acts against the political movement of the oppressed people of South Africa, urging action for the unconditional release of all political prisoners, reaffirming

³ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 25.

its recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle against *apartheid*, drawing the attention of the Security Council to the grave situation and recommending that it should resume consideration of the question of *apartheid*.

48. On 23 July 1970 the Security Council had adopted its resolution 282 (1970), endorsing all the Special Committee's recommendations for the review and strengthening of the arms embargo by calling on all States to implement the embargo fully without reservation or restriction. It had been reported that three permanent members of the Security Council, one of which was the main supplier of military equipment to South Africa, had abstained from voting on that resolution. In spite of the fact that the Security Council had been unable to agree to make the resolution mandatory, it had recognized that the constant build-up of South African military and police forces constituted a potential threat to international peace and security. Meanwhile, the General Assembly's repeated calls for the severance of economic relations with South Africa had not been complied with. Those States which were involved in economic and trade relations with South Africa were in fact assisting the consolidation of the *apartheid* régime. As his delegation had pointed out in 1969, business people trading with South Africa must be constantly reminded that South African products came from the blood and tears of the indigenous people. They must be shown that it was hypocritical for them to claim that they could live by a code of ethics in business and yet trade with a Government whose policies were based upon the exploitation of non-white workers in the context of the over-all policy of *apartheid*.

49. The recent meetings of OAU, held at Addis Ababa, and the non-aligned countries, at Lusaka, had spoken in even stronger terms of the developments taking place in South Africa, had called for concrete material and moral

assistance to the liberation movement and had drawn attention to the threat of international peace and security posed by the South African rulers' oppression and subjugation of the African peoples in southern Africa, assisted by collusion between certain developed countries of the West and the racist minority régimes. Every moment that the repressive policies of the South African Government continued to be enforced brought the threat of an open and bloody conflict ever more to the fore. Yet those policies were being extended further, more repressive legislation was being passed and laws were being even more stringently enforced, while South Africa's military forces continued to increase, along with foreign investments and foreign trade. The need for decisive measures was clearly greater than ever. It was for that reason that his country had been one of the sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.182/Rev.1, which the Committee had adopted at the preceding meeting. It was his delegation's earnest hope that, with the weight of Security Council resolution 282 (1970) behind it, that draft resolution would be adopted by the General Assembly and would result in definitive action by those Powers which continued to enable the South African Government to impose its criminal policy of *apartheid*.

50. Citing statements made by Dr. J. Verkuyl, a well-known orientalist and Professor of Missionary Theology at the Free University of Amsterdam, after a visit to South Africa in the spring of 1970, he stressed that not only was physical liberty at stake in South Africa, but that systematic efforts were being made through a number of churches to corrupt the minds of the people. The adoption of draft resolution A/SPC/L.182/Rev.1 by the General Assembly, in his delegation's view, would be a first step towards the elimination of that evil, and his delegation had therefore fully endorsed it.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.