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Chairman: Mr. Max JAKOBSON (Finland).

AGENDA ITEM 34

The policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa: report of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (*continued*) (A/6356, A/6412, A/6486, A/6494)

1. Mr. ARCHIBALD (Trinidad and Tobago) warned delegations against giving in to the sense of hopelessness which was bound to invade all those struggling against apartheid. The disillusionment must not dull their observation of the situation, which could become even more ominous that it was at present.

2. The present situation was characterized by two essential facts. The first was that the Members of the United Nations were unanimous in their condemnation of apartheid. The second was that resolution 2054 A (XX), in which the General Assembly called for an increase in the membership of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, was unable to be implemented because three of the permanent members of the Security Council, along with other trading partners of South Africa, had abstained in the voting on the resolution and had declined to serve on the Special Committee.

3. Those two facts, seemingly in absolute contradiction to each other, deserved the attention of all. Hence the Committee should consider not so much what was happening in South Africa itself, but the situation revealed by the refusal of certain countries to serve on the Special Committee. The fact was that the refusal betrayed in a flagrant manner the true nature of the problem. It showed clearly that the conflict was no longer between the South African Government and the rest of the international community, but between the South African Government and its trading partners on the one hand and free Africa and its allies on the other.

4. Western investment in the South African economy was not a by-product of the policy of certain countries.

It was rather to be understood, as the very cause of that policy. That was the heart of the matter. Once the central role of foreign economic interests in the South African situation was admitted, all the rest fell into place. It was then no longer possible to be amazed by the military assistance given to South Africa nor by the inability of the Western countries to soften the South African Government by diplomatic approaches or persuasion. The South African Government did not have to make any political concession to its trading partners, West or East, now that both West and East had proclaimed the principles of the paramountcy of the economic interest. Thus, it would seem advisable for the Special Political Committee to concentrate on the crisis in international relations developing in southern Africa. It should be recognized at once that there was a confrontation between South Africa and its partners on the one hand and free Africa and its allies on the other. That could best be done by giving equal weight to the pronouncements made on either side. If the word of South Africa and its partners was to be accepted when they stated that nothing would be done about apartheid, the word of free Africa must also be accepted when it asserted that, on the contrary, everything would be done to remove that disgraceful policy from the face of the earth.

5. There was no doubt that South Africa's trading partners had endeavoured to persuade the South African Government not to flout so obviously the norms of civilized conduct; they would prefer not to be directly upholding a policy they had condemned and would not themselves apply. But they had nevertheless decided that their immediate economic interests must take priority over any other consideration, and having taken that decision, they were doing everything in their power to protect those interests. That being the case, they did not intend to move against the South African Government, since any such move would cast doubt on the stability of that Government, and such doubts might adversely affect their economic interests.

6. The present situation implied very serious risks for the world—the risk that the fruitful partnership begun between Europe and Africa with the post-war liberation of the dependent Territories would be disrupted; the risk that the relationship between the various geographical groups within the United Nations might be poisoned at the source; the risk that the hopes of harmony among the races might be destroyed for several generations to come; and the risk that a war might break out in southern Africa, with international repercussions.

7. His delegation did not underestimate the dilemma facing the economic allies of South Africa now that

their alliance had assumed such grave political overtones. Undoubtedly, the choice they had to make might seem to them an exceedingly hard one; but they must remember that life was still harder for the victims of apartheid, and that with their allies the latter were likewise making their choice.

8. Mr. JIMENEZ (Philippines) said that the end of the Second World War had marked a decisive turning-point in the history of colonialism. The empire-builders who hitherto had regarded themselves as a chosen race and as entrusted with a civilizing mission had little by little been obliged to give up their former possessions, whether through political wisdom or whether they had become resigned to doing so through mere necessity. In the midst of that disintegration of empires of the past, a great many peoples, inspired by the common ideal of freedom and dignity, had at long last seen their national aspirations materialize with this accession to independence. Thus there had been reason to hope that the age of colonialism was over, and that all peoples would from now onwards enjoy peace and prosperity, making the United Nations the instrument of true international co-operation.

9. But today, twenty years later, a sinister and subtle form of colonialism was rife, namely the policy of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa. Had not the late Mr. Verwoerd, the architect of the theory of apartheid, stated that the whole world depended on the white nations and that Africa would degenerate into anarchy and disorder without their protective hand at the helm? The question to be asked was by what right the white minority in South Africa arrogated unto itself the so-called sacred mission to civilize and educate the vast majority of other peoples of that unhappy land by inhuman repressive measures. It was a well-known fact that the South African Government refused to recognize even the most elementary rights of the human person, and that the participation of an individual in the social, economic and political activities of the country depended not on his capacities or his personality, but on his colour or race.

10. The United Nations could not remain insensible of the injustices and affronts which the indigenous population of South Africa had to bear. It had adopted a multitude of resolutions calling upon the South African Government to renounce its policy of apartheid. But the Republic of South Africa had adopted an attitude of defiance and had stepped up its repressive measures. There were those who maintained that the resolutions adopted by the Organization could not be applied, since they constituted interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign State and thus violated Article 2 of the Charter. The reply to that was that the States Members of the Organization had undertaken to fulfil their obligations in good faith, and one of those obligations was precisely that of encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion. They had also undertaken to apply in good faith the resolutions adopted by the United Nations. Yet, since 1964 the Government of the South African Republic had made it clear that its policy was to remain in the Organization so long as it was in its interest to do so.

Fortunately, such a selfish concept was not shared by all the Members. In that connexion, his delegation noted with deep regret that, according to the conclusions of the report of the Special Committee (see A/6486, chap. IV), the international community had been prevented from taking effective measures because of the continued lack of co-operation of South Africa's chief trading partners; that the Security Council had not considered the situation during the past year, in spite of General Assembly resolution 2054 A (XX), which described the policy of apartheid as a threat to international peace and security; and finally that the decision to increase the membership of the Special Committee had not been implemented owing to the refusal of certain Member States to serve on it.

11. He recalled that his delegation had been one of the sponsors of resolution 2054 A (XX), urgently appealing to South Africa's major trading partners to cease their increasing economic collaboration with the South African Government. It had also supported the decision to enlarge the membership of the Special Committee and the establishment of the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa to aid the victims of apartheid. Believing that world public opinion was an effective instrument for combating apartheid, his delegation was happy to note that the report of the Special Committee attached particular importance to the widest possible dissemination of information on the dangers of apartheid as a means of securing support for United Nations efforts to solve that grave problem.

12. True to its ideals of liberty and equality, his delegation would continue to take an active part in the work of the Special Committee. President Marcos had stated that, in order to combat apartheid policies, the Philippine Government would comply in good faith with the General Assembly resolutions and the decisions taken by the Security Council, including an embargo on trade with South Africa. The situation in South Africa justified the imposition of economic sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter, but they must be applied by all, including, in particular, South Africa's main trading partners. The world could not wait for the outbreak of a bloody revolution in that country, which would be inevitable if the present Government of South Africa persisted in its policy.

13. His delegation favoured the establishment of a centre to mobilize world opinion against apartheid and to make its evils known. If they were better informed of the situation, the peoples of the various countries would urge their leaders to take prompt and peaceful action to induce the South African Government to abandon its repressive and inhuman policies. The pressure of public opinion might also convince the main trading partners of South Africa that lip-service would not solve the problem and that to continue trading with South Africa could only aggravate the situation. The storm signals were unmistakable, yet some Members of the Organization, concerned above all to safeguard their own interests, pretended to ignore them. If the United Nations again adopted ineffectual resolutions, it was to be feared that the oppressed people of South Africa, bereft of all legal or political remedies, might choose the course of armed struggle in their quest for justice and equality.

14. The Special Committee was trying to prevent bloodshed by recommending economic sanctions and appealing to the major trading partners of South Africa to apply them. In seeking to secure justice by peaceful means, States Members of the United Nations would be helping to build a better and more prosperous world in an atmosphere of dignity, freedom and brotherhood.

15. As a member of the Special Committee, his delegation wished to express its deep appreciation to the Chairman and Rapporteur of that Committee for their patience and perseverance in carrying out the task entrusted to them by the General Assembly.

16. Mr. MIRZA (Pakistan) said that racial discrimination had never existed in his country, and recalled that in 1946, when still a part of what was known as British India, it had been the first to bring the question of racial discrimination in South Africa before the United Nations. Since then, the people and Government of Pakistan had continued their efforts to show the world community that apartheid was an evil and degrading practice, which threatened the peace of Africa, Asia and the world. Pakistan had faithfully complied with the United Nations resolutions imposing an arms embargo and recommending an economic and diplomatic boycott of South Africa. It had been among the first to sign and ratify the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (resolution 2106 (XX)).

17. There were a number of aspects to the question of apartheid. First of all, it must be noted that the shameful policy of apartheid—a veritable caste system—was designed to secure significant economic gains for a white minority which constituted only 19 per cent of the total population of the country and which owned 87 per cent of the land. That system enabled it to exploit and oppress the original inhabitants, who were condemned to be its servants. Secondly, apartheid was a negation of democratic principles and of the right of self-determination, and a denial of the fundamental human rights and freedoms enunciated in the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Lastly, apartheid was undoubtedly a vestige of colonialism, which took a more dogmatic form in South Africa than in other parts of Africa or Asia; the European settlers in that country regarded themselves as a chosen people and believed that God had given them the country and its inhabitants to serve them. It had been alleged that the attitude of the white settlers was a defensive reaction and that they must fight the non-Whites, if necessary to the point of extermination, for their own survival; however, that argument was invalid if one considered that the non-white leaders, such as Chief Luthuli, Mr. Sobukwe and Mr. Mandela, had repeatedly declared that they wished to replace the apartheid system by a truly non-racial society.

18. Thus, however one viewed apartheid, its nature and its scope, only one conclusion could be reached: it was the worst form of subjugation of man by man in the contemporary world. The current situation in South Africa had been described in detail in annex II to the latest report of the Special Committee (A/6486), and the statement made at the previous meeting by Mr. Ngcobo, Treasurer-General of the Pan-Africanist

Congress, had added further particulars. The evidence showed that apartheid had brought misery to the majority of the population of the country, although the land abounded in riches. It was estimated that the average life span of a non-White was less than one half of the average life span of a White. The rate of infant mortality among the coloured population was 121.7 per thousand, as against 29.2 per thousand among the white population. The pass laws broke up families mercilessly, in order to guarantee cheap African labour for the mines, factories and farms owned by the Whites.

19. For the purpose of enforcing that system, South Africa and the illegally occupied Territory of South West Africa had been turned into a vast police state along nazi lines, where inhuman laws and repressive measures were the rule; a number of innocent persons had been thrown into prison and subjected to such torture that some had committed suicide. Unfortunately, there was little hope that the ruling white minority would change its attitude and comply with the United Nations resolutions. The United Nations alone could deliver the non-Whites, and it had no right to evade that responsibility.

20. The General Assembly had adopted more than seventy resolutions dealing directly or indirectly with the question, and in all of them it recognized that the situation created by apartheid threatened peace and security in the region. The acts of violence committed by the Whites against the non-White majority were bound to increase racial tension not only in South Africa, but throughout Africa. It was a fact that South Africa's posture had become increasingly aggressive. The South African mercenaries had helped to aggravate the Congo tragedy, and South Africa also supported the repressive colonial policies of the Portuguese authorities in Angola and Mozambique and assisted the Smith régime in Southern Rhodesia. The arms build-up in South Africa, the declarations made by its leaders, and the illegal construction of an air base in the Caprivi Strip were proof of the aggressive intentions of the South African Government, which not only openly defied the world community but was preparing to wage war on its neighbours in the nazi fashion.

21. However, there had been some progress. A beginning had been made in the formulation and implementation of a plan for financial assistance to the victims of apartheid. That measure was limited in scope, but other, more radical measures had been advocated by the International Conference on Economic Sanctions against South Africa held in London in 1964. The Security Council had recommended the cessation of the sale and delivery of arms to South Africa, and the General Assembly had called for economic sanctions in its resolutions 1761 (XVII) and 2054 (XX). Furthermore, the great majority of the participants in the seminar on apartheid, held at Brasilia in August and September 1966, had concluded that apartheid threatened international peace and security and that the Security Council should give urgent attention to the problem. The majority had also recommended action under Chapter VII of the Charter and had considered that mandatory universal sanctions under Article 41 of the Charter

were indispensable, urgent and feasible. It was logical, therefore, that the world community should affirm its resolve to eradicate the practice of apartheid through sanctions.

22. So far, all efforts had failed, owing to the refusal of South Africa's major trading partners to co-operate, but there was no reason to bow to the will of a small group of countries which were defying the resolutions of the United Nations in order to further their political and economic interests. His delegation believed that the Assembly's resolutions should continue to emphasize the urgency of the problem, and it endorsed the recommendations of the seminar on apartheid (see A/6412, sect. III) and those of the Special Committee (see A/6486, chap. IV). It was essential that the Security Council should take up the question of apartheid and proceed to act under Chapter VII of the Charter. It would not suffice for the Council to adopt a resolution; it should devise concrete measures to be implemented within a specified period of time.

23. In resolution 2144 B (XXI), the General Assembly appealed to the Security Council to take effective measures with a view to eradicating apartheid in South Africa. Only in that way could the problem be solved and a bloody holocaust avoided. His delegation would therefore support any proposal giving the Security Council primary responsibility for the elimination of apartheid.

Organization of the Committee's work

24. The CHAIRMAN recalled that two time-limits had been set in connexion with the organization of work. First, for the apartheid item, the list of speakers in the general debate would be closed on Wednesday, 7 December, at 1 p.m. Secondly, on the question of peace-keeping operations, draft resolutions were to be submitted not later than Wednesday, 7 December, at 6 p.m.

25. Mr. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) pointed out that consultations were in progress on new proposals concerning the question of peace-keeping operations. As it would be difficult to complete those proposals within the established time-limit, more time should be allowed for the submission of draft resolutions on that question. Perhaps the time-limit could be extended until Friday, 9 December, at 6 p.m.

26. Mr. BEAULIEU (Canada), as a co-sponsor of draft resolution A/SPC/L.130/Rev.2, recalled that the time-limit for the submission of those draft resolutions had already been extended. If it was extended again, it might not be possible to complete consideration of the question of apartheid and the question of peace-keeping. The time-limit which had already been established should be adequate.

27. Mr. NOLAN (Ireland) said that his delegation and the other co-sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.129/Rev.1 were surprised that a further extension should be thought necessary, after the one which had already been agreed on. If the Soviet proposal was adopted, there was no certainty that consideration of the question of peace-keeping could be completed; the co-sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.129/Rev.1 therefore had the strongest reservations regarding the Soviet proposal.

28. Mr. FATTAL (Syria) supported the Soviet proposal, which he believed would facilitate the work of a number of delegations and should lead to broader agreement on the question of peace-keeping.

29. Mr. CHAYET (France) said that while he understood the concern of the sponsors of the draft resolutions, he too would emphasize that negotiations were in progress and that an extension, unless it adversely affected the discussion in progress, which was doubtful, could only be advantageous. If it was necessary to have all the draft resolutions by 7 December, the established time-limit would of course have to be maintained, but since the Committee was in any event to continue the debate on apartheid on 8 and 9 December, there was no reason why the time-limit should not be extended until Friday, 9 December.

30. Mr. ACIKAR (Guinea) formally moved closure of the debate on the question under discussion, as it might otherwise continue for a very long time. Members of the Committee would then have time before the next meeting to consider the Soviet proposal, which he did not think gave rise to any problems.

31. The CHAIRMAN proposed that the final decision on that question should be postponed until the next meeting.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 4.30 p.m.