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Chairman: Mr. Eugeniusz KULAGA (Poland).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. FARACE (Italy),
Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 36

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East (*continued*) (A/7577, A/7614,
A/7665, A/SPC/133, A/SPC/134, A/SPC/L.175):

- (a) Report of the Commissioner-General;
(b) Report of the Secretary-General

1. Mr. EL-ZAYYAT (United Arab Republic) expressed his delegation's appreciation to the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and to his staff. With regard to the note by the Commissioner-General regarding the financing of UNRWA operations (A/SPC/134), his delegation considered that the suggestion to include the costs of international staff in the United Nations budget should be studied carefully and hoped that the necessary action would be taken to enable the Secretary-General to respond favourably to it.

2. On 29 November 1947, the delegations of thirty-three Member States had voted for the partition of the Arab country of Palestine, in an action unparalleled in the annals of the United Nations. The result had been an Arab Palestine of 725,000 Arab and 10,000 Jewish citizens and a Jewish Palestine of 499,020 Jewish and 404,780 Arab citizens. The partition lines had been carefully traced and made an integral part of General Assembly resolution 181 (II) concerning partition.

3. Immediately after the partition, a nine-man meeting of the Jewish Agency had taken place to discuss, among other things, the text of Israel's Declaration of Independence. In an article published in the Israel newspaper *Haaretz* on 30 October 1967, Mr. Ben-Gurion had said that though the jurists of the Jewish provisional Government had claimed there could be no State without fixed frontiers and Israel's frontiers had been fixed in the United Nations resolution of 29 November 1947, he had contested the views of the jurists and had pointed out that the United States had not

declared her frontiers in 1776 and had expanded its frontiers to include eventually fifty States.

4. By a majority of five votes to four, the World Zionist Organization had decided to refrain from making any mention of the frontiers in its draft Declaration of Independence. In the same article Mr. Ben-Gurion had gone on to state that by virtue of the victories of the Israel army, the frontiers of Israel had been further expanded.

5. The Zionists, at the time of partition, had owned less than 6 per cent of the land area of Palestine. By the time the Armistice was signed in 1949, all but a fraction of the Arabs living in the territory that had become Israel had had to go into exile. While the Palestinians were denied the income from the lands and properties they had left behind, Israel had not only used that income, but had begun to receive so-called "reparation" and donations amounting to billions of dollars. Fortified behind the armistice lines of 1949, Israel had refused to permit the Palestinians to return and to abide by General Assembly resolution 194 (III), which called for the repatriation and/or compensation of the Palestinians. Nor had it respected its signature on the Protocol of Lausanne of 12 May 1949.

6. Although there had been no room in Palestine for the Palestinians, there had been room for the new Jewish immigrants. Mr. Yigal Allon, in his book *Sepher Ha Palmach*, vol. 2, page 286, had described that the Zionists had spread rumours to scare the Arabs and make thousands of them flee from their villages in the Huleh.

7. By virtue of legislation enacted, such as the Law of the Return, and in keeping with the basic Zionist philosophy, the limit of the immigration to Israel was the total number of those from any part of the world whose religion was Judaism. Territories were to be made available to them—the territories occupied and others to be conquered in a future war. The people who had inhabited those lands for generations had had to abandon them to satisfy racist Zionism—thus becoming Arab refugees, displaced persons, figures in a report by a United Nations agency, cold material for the Special Political Committee of the United Nations to discuss for some three weeks in November or December each year.

8. Palestinians who had left had been brutally barred from returning. Those who had not abandoned their lands had to be constantly "encouraged" to leave. The latest form of such encouragement was collective punishment, so-called "neighbourhood punishment", a policy that had been exposed and condemned by the Third Committee at the present session. An American journalist, Rowland Evans, had recently asked the Prime Minister of Israel whether it was not against human nature to expect an innocent

bystander, who had seen a planned act of aggression committed by his friends or family, to report that act to the authorities. In reply Mrs. Meir had admitted in the end that: "There are some things we do that we do not like."

9. The repressive measures applied by Israel against Jerusalem had been condemned by both the General Assembly and the Security Council. Several measures had been taken by the Israel occupying forces in Gaza to change the institutional and demographic character of the area, with the calculated design of ultimate annexation. It was no wonder that the resistance against the so-called "benevolent occupation" was increasing. The remedy was surely not in more acts of repression.

10. However, faced with the repressive acts and the refusal of Israel authorities to allow anyone to investigate conditions and the violation of fundamental human rights, faced with the lack of determination of the United Nations to enforce its resolutions, the Arab people of Palestine had no alternative but to wage a struggle which, as had been stated by the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic during the general debate of the current session of the General Assembly (1761st plenary meeting), was a struggle for their right to exist, to return to their homes and to exercise their right to self-determination. The Palestinian people's struggle deserved the support of all forces that had faith in the right of every man, regardless of his race, colour or religion, to live in his land, to defend his existence and to determine his future.

11. His delegation had noted that paragraph 10 of the report of the Commissioner-General (A/7614) stated that the International Committee of the Red Cross had supplied information on the displaced persons who had returned in 1967, but that it had no statistics for 1968 and 1969 for those who had returned to the West Bank, because the arrangements had been handled by the Government of Israel. His delegation wished to emphasize the importance of international supervision in that respect and to urge that Israel might not be allowed to frustrate the will of the international community with regard to displaced persons, as it had done with impunity in the case of the refugees for the last twenty years.

12. United Nations appeals to Israel had been of no avail. An admission that the Charter had no weight, that United Nations resolutions were nothing but "political statements" as they had been described by an Israel jurist-diplomat, was an admission of the failure of the Organization. A serious attempt should be made to protect the Charter and implement United Nations resolutions.

13. But first, were the Israel authorities solely responsible? Were they indeed free agents? That was a point that had not been examined so far. The organic relationship between Israel as a State and Israel as an agent of the World Zionist Organization could be discerned in Israel's so-called Status Law of 24 November 1952. The document affirmed that Israel regarded herself as a creation of the entire so-called Jewish people. Paragraph 4 of the Law stated that the State of Israel recognized the World Zionist Organization as an authorized agency which would continue to operate in Israel for the development and settlement of the country. Paragraph 5 stated that the mission of gathering in

the exiles, which was the essential task of the State of Israel and the Zionist movement, required constant efforts by the Jewish people in the Diaspora, and paragraph 7 stated that details of the status of the World Zionist Organization would be determined by a covenant to be made in Israel by the Government and the Zionist Executive.

14. Israel complained that the Arabs did not recognize it. Did Israel recognize the two and a half million Palestinians? If it did would it then respond to the Palestinians' call for the establishment of a secular democracy in Palestine, of all its inhabitants and for all its inhabitants? Would it even respect the United Nations resolutions concerning Palestine and give them a chance to bring about justice and peace? Some Israelis certainly would, but the essential question was: were the people of Israel free agents? As could be seen from the above-quoted paragraph from the Status Law, they apparently were not. The State, as Mr. Ben-Gurion had declared in London in December of 1968, was incomplete. To complete it, more territory must be acquired for the international Zionist movement to send more settlers to occupy. More Arabs must be dislodged, more Jews must be made to desert their countries and "ingather" in Palestine. That was, as could be seen from the Status Law, the central task of Israel.

15. In all colonial situations, there were three parties: the native population of the country, the settlers and the metropolis from which the settlers received support—political, psychological, financial and military. In the Zionist-Israel case, perhaps it had been a mistake to direct attention to the settlers and not to the metropolis, to the Israel authorities in Palestine and not to the Zionist organized movement and its capitals.

16. The United States draft resolution (A/SPC/L.175) would recommend to the General Assembly to recall twenty-three previous resolutions, to note with deep regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees had not been effected, that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine had been unable to find a means to achieve progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) and to request the Commission to exert continued effort towards the implementation thereof. But would it be enough to call again upon all charitable Governments to make their most generous efforts? Most obviously not. The time had come for the United Nations to face the real issue. It was not dealing only with a humanitarian problem or the problem of a people deprived of their right to self-determination. It was also the problem of the effective existence of the United Nations itself.

17. Twenty-two years had passed since thirty-three hesitant and pressed delegations had passed the resolution that had created, among other things, those hundreds of thousands of refugees and had allowed a grave injustice to be committed against the Arab people of Palestine. But a graver injustice lay in the fact that the resolution itself had proved to be only the beginning of a wicked policy of expansion and the immoral national dislocation and uprooting of Arabs and Jews alike. A graver injustice lay in the fact that the United Nations, which had been responsible for the beginning, was apparently unable to decide the end; the end of the tragedy of the Palestinians.

18. The time had come, in the view of his delegation, to take the action anticipated by the signatories of the Charter and effectively to put an end to the reckless and lawless policy pursued by the joint Zionist and Israel forces. Was it unreasonable for the General Assembly, at the present session, to refer the matter to the Security Council, which should consider the persistent violations of the United Nations Charter and the defiance of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions by Israel?

19. The United Nations should address itself to the real centre of authority and responsibility: namely, world Zionism, through the Member States which sheltered, aided and abetted its organization and even considered its activities as charitable.

20. The Prime Minister of Israel, when asked by an American correspondent in a television interview on television station WNEW (channel 5) on 23 November 1969 how many Palestinian refugees Israel would be prepared to take back had given no reply. It was obvious that she could not when the essential task of her State was to make room in the Middle East for the ingathering of all the millions of so-called Jewish people on earth.

21. Many Jews, however, did not agree with the Zionist viewpoint. For example, in 1917, Mr. Edwin S. Montagu, the only Jewish Member of the British Parliament, had circulated a letter entitled "The Anti-Semitism of the Present Government", in which he had argued that the British Government should not support the Zionist Movement because the establishment of a separate State for Jews of all the world would make foreigners of those Jews who did not wish to emigrate and who professed profound loyalty to the countries in which they had made their homes.

22. If Israel wished to remain a Member of the United Nations it must be made to forget its impossible dream and to desist forthwith from defying the world Organization and the will of the international community, including millions of Jews. If not, the Organization should further empower the United Nations Security Council to impose the necessary sanctions and to take other effective measures applicable in such a case. His delegation hoped that the Committee, conscious of the great responsibility of the United Nations, and mindful of the challenge it was facing, would take the necessary action to face the problems that confronted it and not leave it to another year.

23. The representative of Israel had made reference to President Nasser's remark about "blood and fire". For the benefit of those who had heard the mutilated quotation, he wished to emphasize that the blood referred to was Arab blood which, in the absence of any visible alternative, had to be sacrificed. The "fire" might easily be the fire of napalm dropped on Arab men and women, including the refugees.

24. Mr. DRACOULIS (Greece) said that, in the view of his delegation, the crux of the matter and the key to some improvement of the situation lay in the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2452 A (XXIII) by concrete and clearly defined measures. His delegation would welcome a spontaneous move on those lines from Israel.

That would reflect a realistic approach and a desire on the part of Israel for mutual understanding and the beginning of a fruitful co-operation with its Arab neighbours.

25. His delegation wished to congratulate the Commissioner-General of UNRWA and his staff on their devotion to the cause of peace and on the excellent and exhaustive study contained in his report (A/7614). All Members of the United Nations should provide assistance to UNRWA, for if the Organization had thus far been unsuccessful in reaching a political settlement of the refugee problem, at least it should fulfil its humanitarian obligations.

26. With regard to the report of the Commissioner-General, his delegation had the following observations:

(a) As the work and activities of the Agency were being unavoidably disrupted by the persistent hostilities in the area, the implementation of certain UNRWA programmes, particularly those pertaining to education and training, might be deferred to a more convenient time, if the tension could not be eased.

(b) The cases of mistreatment of UNRWA personnel, as mentioned in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Commissioner-General's report, were inadmissible. Violations of the international status of the members of the Agency, which exercised its functions under a mandate from the General Assembly of the United Nations, must not be condoned.

(c) With regard to General Assembly resolution 2452 A (XXIII), it must be noted that, as stated in the report, although information for the years 1968 and 1969 was still unavailable, it was a fact that only a very limited number of refugees had been able to return.

(d) In view of the results obtained, it appeared that the co-operation between UNRWA and several other agencies such as UNESCO, WHO, the ILO, UNICEF and others, had been skilfully co-ordinated. It was also gratifying to note that regular or special contributions from Member States and voluntary organizations had been received as expected.

(e) His country, as a regular contributor both to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and UNRWA since their inception, had noted with regret the deterioration of the Agency's financial situation.

Unfortunately, however, his delegation had no solution to suggest. The most practical way to cope with the situation might be to appoint a committee of three to study the Agency's budget with a view to reducing all expenditures which might be deferred owing to the constant deterioration of the political situation. The Committee could also suggest new ways and means of finding a solution, such as the issue of special stamps for financing UNRWA activities. All delegations would undoubtedly agree on one thing: that the essential funds needed by UNRWA must be provided, as the refugee relief programme was the greatest challenge to the United Nations and its most praiseworthy humanitarian achievement.

27. Mr. ANSARI (Iran) said that, despite the continued efforts made by the United Nations over the past twenty

years, the question of Palestinian refugees had become increasingly complicated. The task facing the Commissioner-General of UNRWA had likewise become much more difficult, as could be clearly seen in his report (A/7614). The fact that certain States refused to comply with the decisions and resolutions of the United Nations had unfortunately discredited the Organization before world public opinion and had given rise to a certain feeling of scepticism.

28. If from the beginning the provisions of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) had been implemented and if the repatriation or compensation of refugees had taken place in accordance with paragraph 11 of that resolution, the question would certainly not be before the Organization now. If, as the representative of Jordan had pointed out, each Member of the United Nations would ensure that the Organization's resolutions were respected and implemented, the world would not be the sad witness to a tragedy which affected the lives of thousands of human beings. The precarious situation in which they had lived for over twenty years and their unfulfilled hope for a better life had created in the refugees a feeling of discontent and despair.

29. In an editorial of 22 November 1969, *The New York Times* had stated that the refugee relief approach to the Palestinian problem was reaching the end of the line and that, though UNRWA had served well, no people after twenty-one years was going to sit passively as refugees on relief.

30. What could be done to relieve the sufferings of the refugees and alleviate the task of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA until such time as a reasonable solution to the problem could be found? The persons who had been displaced after the hostilities of June 1967 must be allowed to return to the homes and the camps they had occupied before the hostilities. To that end, during the previous session of the General Assembly, his delegation and five others had submitted a draft resolution which had been adopted by the Committee and almost unanimously adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 2452 A (XXIII).

31. It was regrettable that the Agency had had to go on providing for over 200,000 displaced persons because that resolution had not been implemented. Their return should be made possible without delay, in accordance with that resolution and Security Council resolution 237 (1967).

32. The tense atmosphere in the area had made the Agency's task all the more difficult, while financial limitations and increased costs had raised new problems. His delegation was pleased to note that despite all those difficulties the Agency had continued its services without interruption. His country would continue to give moral and material support and to make its annual contribution to the Agency, and was always prepared to collaborate in the relief operations carried out by Governments of countries in the area which had received refugees.

33. Drawing attention to the contribution made by Iran in providing shelters and other facilities, to which reference was made in paragraph 6 of the Commissioner-General's

report, he welcomed the fact that other Governments and organizations had made supplementary contributions, and that specialized agencies such as UNESCO and WHO had helped to improve living conditions for the refugees.

34. Despite all that assistance, however, the situation had deteriorated because of growing needs and the increased cost of living. The Agency's accumulated deficit overshadowed all other administrative and operational questions. The only ways of escape from those financial difficulties were to cut back expenses or increase the Agency's resources. It could be seen from the Commissioner-General's report that any reduction of the Agency's services would result in further privations for the refugees and would have dangerous political repercussions. There was thus no alternative but to increase the Agency's resources. His delegation earnestly hoped that Governments and voluntary organizations would respond generously in making additional contributions, and that a just and equitable solution would soon be found to the tragic situation which had existed for over twenty years.

35. Despite all the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to bring about a peaceful settlement, the difficulties had not all been overcome. New efforts must be made to find an honourable solution. The atmosphere of tension and uncertainty in the area directly affected the situation of the refugees and made a solution even more difficult. As the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs had observed during the general debate at the current session of the General Assembly (1776th plenary meeting) that the way to a peaceful settlement in the Middle East lay in the implementation of Security Council decisions, particularly resolution 242 (1967). All States must become aware of their responsibilities, and act accordingly. As the Secretary-General had observed when he addressed the Committee at the preceding session (612th meeting), the Palestine refugees were the innocent victims of the Middle East situation and their problem was one of the most important problems of the Middle East for which efforts must be made to find a solution. He hoped that such efforts would be made before it was too late.

36. Mr. NEKROUF (Morocco), exercising his right of reply, said that the Committee had once again heard the Israel representative, in taking advantage of the right of reply to his delegation's statement at the previous meeting, air his personal views, repeat himself and finally acknowledge the grave facts of the situation.

37. The Israel representative had taxed him with having made a hostile and venomous statement which had shown the deliberate intention of the Arabs to wage war on Israel. That personal judgement of the Israel representative could have been foreseen in advance, but there was nothing in the Moroccan delegation's statement that that representative had been able to refute.

38. As for the allegation that he had distorted the Israel Prime Minister's statement, the actual wording of that statement was even more damaging. She had said that she frankly did not want a Jewish people soft, liberal, anti-colonialist and anti-militarist, for that would be a dead people. The Israel representative had rendered the last part of that ambiguous statement in his own way by stating that

the people of Israel did not want to die. His delegation and many others would interpret it as referring to a lifeless or apathetic people. The statement was a true and frank definition of Zionism by the Head of Government: colonialism, militarism and the absence of any softness or liberalism.

39. The Israel representative had asked why the Arabs, who were aspiring to freedom and wanted to exercise their rights over their own countries, denied the same rights to the Jews. They would always deny the right of Jewish immigrants to Palestine, while recognizing the rights of indigenous Jews.

40. In speaking of the Arab preoccupation with the demolition of houses by Israel, the Israel representative had acknowledged the fact of such demolition and tried to justify the unjustifiable by pleading that it was a necessary measure. He was certain that that was not the view of most delegations. It was intolerable that buildings should be destroyed and whole families made homeless on the pretext that such buildings had sheltered Palestinian patriots.

41. In response to Israel's undertaking to stop destroying houses if the Palestinians would stop killing Israelis, he would say that a people occupied by force had a right to resist by force. Collective punishment by any occupier was indefensible. The Zionists knew what to expect from the situation which they had created.

42. Alan R. Taylor, in his book *Prelude to Israel; an Analysis of Zionist Diplomacy, 1897-1947*,¹ had observed that for sixty years the Zionists had been ready to use almost any means to gain their objective, but that in setting up their State in the midst of another people without that people's consent they had incurred the risk of hostile opposition; the Israelis were now suffering from that situation, and the hostile opposition which it had engendered might one day make its position untenable. The Israelis had known of those risks before the proclamation of their State, and had been warned of them by Mr. Kalvaryski, in an essay in the book *Towards Union in Palestine*² and by L. Magnes, President of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and of a number of Jewish organizations. General Dayan himself had said that the assassins could not be blamed for their hatred of the Israelis, who had taken over a land which they had inhabited for generations, and who were unable to plant a tree or build a house without the use of guns and steel helmets. He had also said on another occasion that the *fedayeen* were not merely criminals and mercenaries but were moved by idealism and patriotism, the importance of which should not be underestimated.

43. Mr. TEKOAH (Israel), exercising his right of reply, said that he was pleased that the Moroccan representative had now provided the true version of the Israel Prime Minister's statement, and not the distorted version which he had given earlier. Mrs. Meir herself or her representatives were the people best qualified to interpret its meaning.

44. His delegation had taken note of the statement by the representative of the United Arab Republic that the Arab

States would continue to wage war on Israel and intended to eliminate it as a sovereign State. That statement was in keeping with the declared intention of President Nasser. The Committee would no doubt bear those warlike declarations in mind when considering what should be done about the Arab refugees.

45. The real problem was the war which the Arab States had been waging against Israel since 1948. The preoccupation of the United Arab Republic with war was well illustrated in a report in *The Washington Post* on 25 November 1969 that Canada was to file a protest about press censorship exercised by that country over an account by the Canadian Minister for Foreign Affairs of an interview he had had with President Nasser. In upholding the 1947 partition lines, the representative of the United Arab Republic had omitted to mention that the Arab States had destroyed those lines by their invasion of Israel in 1948. It had been reported in *Al Ahram* that in response to Israel's request for recognized and safe boundaries the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic had expressed a willingness to concede the territory occupied by the synagogue in Tel Aviv with a ten-yards-wide perimeter. The allegations of the Arab States about the demolition of buildings by Israel were of small concern compared with their threats to exterminate an entire nation.

46. It was understandable that the representative of the United Arab Republic should join other Arab delegates in exploiting the agenda item for a renewed attack on Israel. Egyptian representatives had been doing the same for twenty-two years in an attempt to divert attention from Egypt's grave responsibility for the creation and continuation of the refugee problem. It was Egypt that had led the Arab States in the invasion of Israel in 1948, and an Egyptian, Azzam Pasha, who had announced that the war would be one of extermination and massacre. Shortly after the invasion the Jordan daily *Falastin* had stated that the Arab States had encouraged the Palestine Arabs to leave their homes temporarily in order to be out of the way of the Arab invasion armies. Egypt had been foremost ever since in pursuing aggression against Israel and preventing a solution of the refugee problem.

47. The frustrated invasion of 1948 had been followed by years of Egyptian terrorist warfare and blockade, throughout which Egypt's attitude to the refugee question had been made clear. Its Minister for Foreign Affairs had declared on 11 October 1949 that the Arabs intended the refugees to return as masters—more explicitly, to annihilate the State of Israel. President Nasser, too, had stated on 1 September 1960 that if the refugees returned to Israel, Israel would cease to exist. Egypt had thus done everything to perpetuate the refugee problem as an instrument of belligerence against Israel. It had rejected the recommendation of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East in 1949, the UNRWA proposal in 1951 to settle 70,000 refugees from the Gaza Strip in Sinai and the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the refugees should be regarded as a human asset in the over-all development of the area and integrated into the economy of the Middle East countries in general.

48. The attitude adopted by Egypt and other Arab States had been summed up by the Research Group for European

¹ New York, Philosophical Library, 1959.

² M. Buber, J. L. Magnes and E. Simon, ed. (Jerusalem, P.HUD (Union) Assn., 1947).

Migration Problems in the January-March 1957 edition of its Bulletin, which had stated that the Arab Governments had been applying to the refugees an abstract and inhuman policy, having systematically rejected all organization and employment for them in order to maintain a menacing population on the frontier with Israel, and that they sought to prevent any kind of adaptation and integration because they saw the refugees as a political means of pressure for obtaining the greatest possible number of concessions. Egypt's inhuman attitude had been demonstrated particularly in the Gaza area, which had remained under its occupation for nineteen years. The refugees had not been allowed to leave the area even to go to Egypt, and the camps had been kept under permanent curfew and military oppression. The Jordanian daily *Falastin*, having interviewed a group of 510 refugees who had escaped from Gaza into Jordan, had written on 19 May 1950 that the shabbily-clothed and undernourished refugees, each of whom had a card prohibiting him from employment, had said that they had been ill-treated by the Egyptian authorities. A kinsman of the present Jordanian chief of secret police, Subhi Zayd Al-Kilani, had stated that thousands of young Gazaites were fleeing under cover of the Haj pilgrimage to Mecca in the hope of finding work in Saudi Arabia and escaping the disgrace of living under Egyptian domination in the Strip. Radio Damascus had also reported Egyptian tyranny in the Strip and had stated that an orderly protest demonstration had been fired upon and one man killed. Observers had reported seeing wall posters in Gaza in October 1963 calling for "the overthrow of Egyptian imperialism". The Gaza gaols had always been full and torture had been commonplace.

49. The Cairo rulers' attitude to the Palestinians had been described by Mecca Radio on 10 March 1967 as the very methods which Hitler had used. The United Arab Republic should be looked upon as a defendant rather than an accuser. That country had been mainly responsible for the Arab war of aggression against Israel which had led to the refugee problem. His delegation charged it with using that problem as an instrument of belligerence, with cruelty towards the refugees, with frustration of all international efforts to help them to lead productive lives and with responsibility for the hardships which the warfare against Israel created for them and for others, including those arising from the security measures which Israel was compelled to take to protect itself against that warfare. At a time when the United Arab Republic was calling for the intensification of that war and when its President promised the region "fire and blood", the United Arab Republic, which had kept its people in abject poverty, illiteracy and sickness in order to cause bloodshed in Yemen, the Sudan and Israel, was more than ever the arch-criminal of the Middle East, and deserved nothing from the world community except contempt and repudiation.

50. Mr. EL-ZAYYAT (United Arab Republic), exercising his right of reply, said that he would challenge the Israel representative to produce the fictional number of *Al Ahram* in which he had alleged that the Foreign Minister of Egypt had been reported as saying that he would be willing to allow Israel the precincts of the synagogue in Tel Aviv as its fixed boundaries. The Committee would know what credence to give to his statement if he was unable to do so.

51. The Israel representative had distorted a passage in the statement he (the United Arab Republic representative) had just made into a declaration of intent by the Arab States to wage war on Israel until that country was annihilated. The passage concerned read:

"Israel complained that the Arabs did not recognize it. Did it recognize the two and a half million Palestinians? If it did would it then respond to the Palestinians' call for the establishment of a secular democracy in Palestine, of all its inhabitants and for all its inhabitants? Would it even respect the United Nations resolutions concerning Palestine and give them a chance to bring about justice and peace?"

52. If the Israel representative was claiming that the Israelis had liberated Gaza he should explain why the inhabitants of that area were now resisting Israel. That representative had referred at the 666th meeting to help being given by Israel towards the education of 5,000 refugee students in Egyptian schools in Gaza. How could he reconcile his allegations of ill-treatment of the refugees by the United Arab Republic with the fact that they were being offered education in Egyptian schools?

53. As for the Israel representative's remarks about the partition lines, Mr. Ben-Gurion had stated categorically that he did not accept such lines as binding on Israel. He intended to circulate to the Committee an extract from the publication *Middle East Forum*, on a Zionist plan of conquest. It might be recalled how in 1955 Zionist forces had invaded Armistice Commission headquarters and how Mr. Ben-Gurion had declared the armistice agreement between Egypt and Israel null and void.

54. As for the statement that the Canadian Government was to file a protest about censorship, no such protest had so far been received. In any event, no visiting Minister could publish remarks attributed to a Head of State without his permission. President Nasser had made it plain that his country was seeking a peaceful solution and was ready to comply fully with Security Council resolution 242 (1967). He challenged the Israel representative to say the same.

55. Mr. KHALAF (Iraq), speaking in exercise of his right of reply, said that his country had a perfect right to defend itself against espionage and subversive activities organized by the Zionists. Every country did the same.

56. Major-General von Horn, the former chief of staff of the Mixed Armistice Commission, had mentioned the Israel representative in his book. He had also described a visit from a member of the Israel delegation asking why General von Horn insisted on suggesting measures to which the Israel Government was opposed.

57. The Israel representative's contention that the Arabs had started the war of June 1967 was refuted in a book by a former editor of the Israel magazine *New Outlook*, in which he described a secret night meeting of the Israel cabinet at which they had decided to strike first, even though General Dayan had referred at a press conference the same evening to his Government's diplomatic approach to the problem, which he had said must be given a chance. The Israel diplomats in Washington had reported that the

United States would not intervene and call for Israel's withdrawal, as it had done in 1956.

58. Another statement by General Dayan negated the Israel representative's repeated protestations about his country's peaceful intentions. He had said that the frontiers reached after the June war were not final and that Israel's borders would some day extend beyond Jordan, perhaps to Lebanon and even into Syria.

59. Mr. TARCICI (Yemen), speaking in exercise of his right of reply, said that the Israel representative had no right to refer to relations between Member States and use them for his own purposes. Yemen's relations with the United Arab Republic were extremely friendly and based on bilateral and multilateral agreements within the League of Arab States.

60. The Israel representative's eloquence could not hide the reality. He might try to transform the aggressor into the victim but the fact remained that Palestine as a country had been removed from the map, although it still remained in the hearts of the Arab people, and that its inhabitants had become refugees. Everything else was mere words. Those Palestinians had now grown tired of interminable discussions and had decided that they could only improve their lot by taking up arms.

61. Mr. TEKOAHI (Israel), speaking in exercise of his right of reply, assured the representative of Yemen that he was fully aware of the brotherly relations between that country and the United Arab Republic. He had referred to the Yemen villages recently destroyed by the Egyptian expeditionary force and the use of gas against Yemen civilians.

62. The Arab representatives complained that he prepared in advance the evidence used in his replies. Were the representatives of the twelve tribes of Israel present to reply to those of the fourteen Arab States, he would have no need to do so.

63. He would certainly produce a copy of the 1 January 1968 number of *Al Ahrām* to which he had referred, as well as copies of two foreign newspapers—the Italian *Corriere della Sera* and the French *Le Canard enchaîné*—which had quoted the article.

64. The Iraqi representative had chosen to refer to a book which had been publicly condemned in the United Nations and in the author's own country. It had made defamatory statements about many people, including Mr. Hammarskjöld himself.

65. The Iraqi representative appeared to show a certain pride in the barbarous hanging of innocent Jews in Baghdad, although even he could not believe the story that they were Zionist agents. However, the Iraqi Government accused many people of being Zionist agents. *The New York Times* of 21 July 1968 had, for instance, reported the arrest of the new Iraqi Minister of Planning on just such a charge. On 11 July 1969, a reporter of *The Times* of London had said that he had noticed in Baghdad international airport a photograph with the caption: "Former President Arif with a group of CIA spies".

66. Mr. SALIH (Sudan), speaking in exercise of his right of reply, said that he would like the reference to the Sudan,

a sovereign State Member of the United Nations, removed from the record. His country had not complained to the United Nations about any threat to its security and its relations with the United Arab Republic were most friendly. Sudan had always been inspired by the example of the United Arab Republic in building a progressive society based on justice and the welfare of its people.

67. Mr. EL-ZAYYAT (United Arab Republic), speaking in exercise of his right of reply, said that the Israel representative had not accepted his challenge to produce the issue of *Al Ahrām* to which he had referred. The *Corriere della Sera* had copied the article from *Le Canard enchaîné*. That such distortions of facts should be used by a representative to an organization which was supposed to prevent the outbreak of the third world war was deplorable. The Israel representative was in no way entitled to set himself up as the defender of Arab States. The Israel representative's silence when challenged to say whether his country was ready to implement the United Nations resolution was eloquent.

68. Mr. KHALAF (Iraq), speaking in exercise of his right of reply, said that his country had no new Minister of Planning. The Minister of Planning had been in office for over a year.

69. It was not barbaric to try to punish spies, whatever their religion. The United States had condemned the Rosenbergs to death for spying and they also had been Jews. What was barbaric was to eliminate innocent people wholesale by making indiscriminate attacks on them and to treat Arabs as second-class citizens.

70. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia), speaking in exercise of his right of reply, said that the Israel representative's attempt to use the principle of "divide and rule" among the Arab States would only unite them against the Jews, who would be the ultimate loser. Thousands of Arabs could be killed, but there would always be more to replace them.

71. The Israel representative always asked who had started the aggression. That was the crux of the matter. Before 1920, the Palestinians—Jews and Arabs—had lived in peace. The trouble had started with the intrusion into the area of Zionists from eastern and central Europe.

72. The Israel representative had referred to the twelve tribes. He was not descended from any of them, but from those who had come from North Asia during the first centuries A.D. The Palestinians were the only semitic Jews. The Israel representative merely belonged to a semitic religion, just as the Christians and Moslems did. Yet he arrogated to himself responsibility for Jews all over the world. It was high time that the United Nations appointed a Committee to carry out a referendum among the Jews all over the world to find out how many considered themselves Israelis and how many considered themselves as members of other nationalities. Israel expansionism even wanted to bring pressure on the Soviet Union to allow Jews in that country to go to Israel. Prosperous Jews all over the world had no desire to leave their countries and go to Israel, where they would be surrounded by a hostile people, even though that people did not want to be hostile but only to be left alone.

73. He did not think that Iraq would have been so naive as to condemn anyone who was not a spy. Israel had not

protested to the United States at the execution of the Rosenbergs because the United States was supplying it with arms.

74. The Western Powers were providing the refugees with charity, even though such charity was a mere pittance, to insure themselves against anarchy in the area, which would threaten Western interests. He appealed to the Israel representative to change his tactics and to think of the refugees not only as refugees but as people who had lost their homeland. The Zionists who wished to remain in Palestine would be welcome to live among them, provided they gave up their territorial Zionism.

75. Mr. TEKOA (Israel), speaking in exercise of his right of reply, said that it was perhaps not surprising that the Iraqi representative should deny the existence of the Minister of Planning, even though he was listed as a member of the Iraqi Government in the *Statesman's Yearbook* for 1967-1968, because he had since been executed.

76. He assured the representative of the United Arab Republic that he greatly appreciated the newspaper *Al Ahrām* of which he was a regular reader. He would produce the copy of the paper to which he had referred as well as copies of other Egyptian papers carrying similar reports.

77. Israel's attitude to Security Council resolution 242 (1967) was shown by his own statement to the Security Council on 1 May 1968 (1418th meeting), a similar statement by the Israel Foreign Minister at the twenty-third session of the General Assembly on 8 October 1968 (1686th plenary meeting) and the statement in the Assembly during the general debate at the current session, made on 19 September 1969 (1757th plenary meeting).

78. He wondered if the representative of the United Arab Republic could deny that his Government had publicly repudiated the Security Council's cease-fire order and had announced its intention to carry out a war of attrition against Israel and say that it was prepared to conclude a peace agreement with Israel in implementation of the Security Council resolution.

79. Mr. KHALAF (Iraq), speaking in exercise of his right of reply, said that it was easy to make misleading statements like the one about the Minister of Planning, because representatives could not be expected to know the names of members of every country's Government.

80. Israel's willingness to negotiate for peace was belied by General Dayan's statement in his book *Diary of the Sinai*

*Campaign*³ that Israel had not achieved its war aims by direct negotiations with Egypt.

81. Mr. EL-ZAYYAT (United Arab Republic), exercising his right of reply, repeated his challenge to the Israel representative to say that his Government was ready to implement Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

82. He need not take the trouble of looking for the copy of *Al Ahrām*, to which he had referred, because it did not exist.

83. The Israel representative had asked whether the United Arab Republic was ready to sign a peace treaty. The answer was obvious: it was not ready to surrender to the conquering armies of Israel either now or in the future. The Egyptians had fought the British for eighty years; they were not in a hurry to make peace with the Zionists. The Israel Prime Minister's reply when asked on United States television on 23 November 1969 what her country would do if its land was occupied was significant.

84. Mr. ALO (Nigeria), supported by Mr. OULD GHANAHALLA (Mauritania) proposed that, in view of the important statements made at the present meeting and in particular that of the representative of the United Arab Republic, the proceedings of the meeting should be reproduced verbatim from the sound recordings.

85. Mr. TEKOA (Israel) seconded that request. The statements by the representative of the United Arab Republic had been very illuminating, especially the last one in which he unequivocally confirmed that his country intended to continue to fight Israel.

86. Mr. EL-ZAYYAT (United Arab Republic), speaking in exercise of his right of reply, confirmed that his country, people and present and future Governments would continue to fight the occupier of their land.

87. The CHAIRMAN said that, in the absence of any objection, he would take it that the Committee wished to avail itself of the opportunity given it by the General Assembly at its 1758th meeting to have the proceedings of the present meeting transcribed verbatim from the sound recordings.

*It was so decided.*⁴

The meeting rose at 7.5 p.m.

³ New York, Harper and Row, 1966.

⁴ The verbatim record of this meeting was circulated as document A/SPC/PV.675.