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Chairman: Mr. Humberto LOPEZ VILLAMIL
(Honduras).

AGENDA ITEM 35

The policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (concluded) (A/6688 and Add.1, A/6818 and Corr.1, A/SPC/L.147/Rev.1 and Add.1 and 2, A/SPC/L.149):

(a) Report of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (A/6864 and Add.1);

(b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/6825, A/6873 and Corr.1)

1. Mr. IYALLA (Nigeria) said it was evident that virtually all the members of the Committee agreed on the evils and dangers of apartheid, so that it seemed almost superfluous to reiterate the condemnation of that policy. On the other hand, his delegation regretfully noted that there was not an equally universal determination to promote the speedy non-violent elimination of that system. The Committee's overriding purpose at the present stage should be to seek feasible ways and means of developing international interest and involvement which would enable all the Governments to join in the offensive against apartheid as a common enterprise.

2. His delegation therefore fully associated itself with draft resolution A/SPC/L.147/Rev.1 and Add.1, which provided the necessary framework for the mobilization of international opinion against apartheid. He particularly welcomed the provisions of operative paragraphs 9 and 13 (c) of the draft, because a wider international understanding of the problem might lead to greater compliance with the pressing admonitions to States contained in various paragraphs of the draft, and should also generate humanitarian support and assistance for the victims of apartheid.

3. His delegation also attached great importance to paragraph 12, which sought to ensure that international efforts for promoting the elimination of apartheid were co-ordinated.

4. Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea) explained that for more than three months he had been unable to discharge his duties as Chairman of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, because he had been detained while en route to Dar es Salaam, where he was to preside over the meeting of the Subcommittee of the Special Committee. For the same reason he had been unable to take part in the International Seminar on Apartheid, Racial Discrimination and Colonialism in Southern Africa held at Kitwe, Zambia, in July and August 1967 or to assist in the preparation of the report of the Special Committee (A/6864 and Add.1). He wished to thank all those who had expressed their concern regarding his detention.

5. Reviewing the accomplishments of the Special Committee since the last session of the General Assembly, he said that it had not yet had sufficient time to study in detail the recommendations of its Subcommittee (A/6864, para. 52) or those of the International Seminar at Kitwe (A/6818, para. 123), which would undoubtedly contain important suggestions, particularly regarding the international campaign for the elimination of apartheid. He recalled a document which he had submitted at the Kitwe Seminar (*ibid.*, annex VI), outlining the main features of the situation in southern Africa and the vicious role of the Pretoria régime. Only a few days after the conclusion of the Seminar, South African armed forces had entered Zimbabwe to put down the African freedom movement by force of arms, the South African Prime Minister had declared that the frontiers of the racists whom he represented extended to the boundaries of Southern Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique, and his régime had aimed violent threats at Zambia, the United Republic of Tanzania and all the African States which supported the idea of the liberation of Africa.

6. He particularly welcomed the clear recognition, expressed at the Seminar and in the draft resolution before the Committee (A/SPC/L.147/Rev.1 and Add.1), of the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of South Africa. Paragraph 2 might, in fact, be the most important clause in the draft resolution.

7. As he had pointed out in a statement which was read to the European Conference against Apartheid, held in Paris in May 1967 opposition to apartheid was, first and foremost, the concern of the South African people, and it was important to ensure that any international action taken really helped that people in its legitimate struggle.

8. At the same time, he wished to make it clear that he was not advocating military intervention by the United Nations, nor was he suggesting that the Western Powers should send their sons to die for

freedom in Africa—even though some were doing precisely that elsewhere, allegedly for the cause of freedom. Nevertheless, it was the ineffectiveness of the United Nations, due to the negative attitude of the Western Powers, which had precipitated the conflict that threatened all southern Africa. The liberation of that region was inevitable, but it would be accomplished with a minimum of bloodshed and other grave consequences if the United Nations and the Powers concerned supported the South African people in their legitimate struggle.

9. The Special Committee had always maintained close ties with the liberation movements and all adversaries of apartheid and had always worked in agreement with them. The Committee had no choice but to follow the same course. The draft resolution before the Committee called for a greater effort to combat apartheid; the members could rest assured that the Special Committee would faithfully discharge all the responsibilities entrusted to it.

10. The United States representative had criticized the Special Committee for dividing the opponents of apartheid by imposing a certain point of view and by condemning countries which were not prepared to adopt measures which they deemed ineffective and impractical. The fact was that the Special Committee and the Afro-Asian States had patiently endeavoured to persuade the international community, including the United States, to take concerted action for the elimination of apartheid. When the United States had disapproved of the adoption of economic sanctions, it had been asked to propose a valid alternative, but had never given an adequate reply. Like the other Western Powers, it had refused to join the Special Committee in a constructive effort to find a solution.

11. At its eighteenth session (1238th plenary meeting), the General Assembly had adopted a resolution (1881 (XVIII)) by 106 votes to 1, calling for the release of all political prisoners. At its 1078th meeting on 4 December 1963, the Security Council had adopted unanimously a resolution (182 (1963)), also calling for the release of persons imprisoned for having opposed the policy of apartheid. Those two resolutions had been adopted on the recommendation of the Special Committee. That action had saved the lives of several leaders of the liberation movement but had not dissuaded the South African Government from persisting in its savage repression. He therefore called upon the United States and other Powers to join in efforts to exert greater international pressure. In that connexion, he reminded the Committee that thirty-six persons from South West Africa were being illegally prosecuted under the Terrorism Act at Pretoria, a thousand miles from their country. Although that question was on the agenda of another Committee, he appealed to the United States and the other Western Powers to use their great influence with Pretoria to put an end to that travesty of a trial if they were sincere in their respect for human rights. In the Committee of Twenty-Four ^{1/} the United States had voted for the resolution condemning that trial ^{2/} but the United

Kingdom and Australia had found it necessary to abstain.

12. It was also thanks to suggestions by the Special Committee that humanitarian assistance had been extended to the victims of apartheid. Nearly \$1 million had been contributed to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa. However, he noted with regret that the United States was not listed among the contributors.

13. The Special Committee had favoured the organization by the United Nations of an educational and training programme for South Africans under the auspices of the Western Powers, but the United States had made no contribution to that programme since 1965. The Special Committee had also taken various measures to promote the dissemination of information on matters relating to human rights, and it hoped the United States and the Western Powers would co-operate in those activities.

14. As the Secretary-General had pointed out in the introduction to his annual report for the period 16 June 1966 to 15 June 1967 (A/6701/Add.1), the United Nations had been unable to make substantial progress in combating apartheid because of the attitude of the great Powers and of South Africa's main trading partners, which had refused to support decisive and effective action to ensure implementation of the United Nations resolutions. It could not be denied that the United States had opposed all the proposals advanced to bring about effective action against apartheid.

15. Despite all the obstacles, the Special Committee would persist in its efforts to discharge its responsibilities and would co-operate with all the organs of the United Nations, the specialized agencies, liberation movements, the Organization of African Unity, the anti-apartheid movements and all non-governmental organizations opposed to the policy of apartheid, with a view to intensifying the struggle against that scourge, which threatened not only southern Africa, but the United Nations and the entire world.

16. Mr. FARAH (Somalia), supported by Mr. JIMENEZ (Philippines), suggested that, as there was no need for a special resolution on the Trust Fund at the present session since the previous resolutions had a continuing validity, a passage should be included in the Committee's report to the General Assembly to the effect that the Committee had decided, after considering the report from the Secretary-General on the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa (A/6873 and Corr.1), to which was annexed a report of the Committee of Trustees of the Fund, and the statement by the Chairman of the Committee of Trustees at the 563rd meeting, to note with appreciation the contents of the two reports on the Fund, and to renew the appeal of the Special Committee for continued support for and contributions to the Trust Fund.

It was so decided.

17. Mrs. GAVRILOVA (Bulgaria) said that her delegation would vote for draft resolution A/SPC/L.147/Rev.1 and Add.1 despite the fact that it represented a compromise, reflecting as it did various political outlooks and interests. A great deal of time and effort had gone into the preparation of the draft,

^{1/} Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

^{2/} Document A/AC.109/L.428.

which reflected the basic situation in South Africa and contained the basic demands of the world community for an end to apartheid. At the same time, it should not be forgotten that there had been thirty or so resolutions on the subject before the present draft and that the policy of the South African racists had been debated and condemned in the General Assembly for two decades. As the South African Government and the monopolists of some Western Powers had refused to implement United Nations resolutions, it would have been only logical to expect each successive resolution to be couched in more categorical terms.

18. World indignation was growing, but the present draft resolution was in some respects less categorical than that adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session (2202 (XXI))—a fact which would hardly be appreciated by the people affected, living as they did far from the precincts of the United Nations and perhaps unaware of the difficulties encountered in arriving at an agreed text.

19. Likewise, there was no reference in the draft resolution to solidarity with the fighters in national liberation movements, nor was there any mention of those countries and organizations which refused to respect the resolution concerning economic sanctions against South Africa.

20. Perhaps the present draft resolution to some extent reflected lack of confidence in the outcome of the struggle against apartheid. Some might argue that a mild resolution would have a better chance of being implemented by the racists, but it could also be argued that any weakening of the condemnation of apartheid would only encourage those responsible for that policy. The South African racists, for their part, were expecting people to tire of the struggle in the end, and to accept their conduct as an accomplished fact.

21. It was the view of her delegation and, indeed, of the majority of members of the Committee that the stubbornness of the South African régime and its allies in defying world opinion and United Nations resolutions should be answered with condemnation in even more categorical terms and with demands for immediate action, and it was to be hoped that the Special Political Committee and the Special Committee would take that majority view into account in its future work.

22. The CHAIRMAN announced that the delegation of Trinidad and Tobago had asked to be added to the list of co-sponsors of draft resolution (A/SPC/L.147/Rev.1/Add.2).

23. Mr. GAILLARD (Acting Secretary of the Committee) read out a statement (A/SPC/L.149) submitted by the Secretary-General in accordance with rule 154 of the rules of procedure, concerning the administrative and financial implications of draft resolution A/SPC/L.147/Rev. 1 and Add.1 and 2.

24. Mr. KANNANGARA (Ceylon) pointed out that his Government had given its unqualified support to every constructive effort by the United Nations to secure the reversal of the South African Government's racial policies. To that end all countries should unite in bringing to bear on that Government

the moral weight of world public opinion. It was intolerable that apartheid should continue to outrage the universal conscience at a time when the coloured peoples of the world were emerging from bondage.

25. While his delegation generally supported draft resolution A/SPC/L.147/Rev.1 and Add.1 and 2, it would abstain on paragraph 3. Experience did not encourage the belief that mandatory economic sanctions would ever be applied universally in the context of apartheid. Since 1952, Security Council and General Assembly resolutions condemning apartheid had reflected the international community's growing anger, bitterness and frustration at South Africa's apparently steadfast determination to pursue its misguided racial policies. Chief among the reasons for the tragic failure of the United Nations to accomplish any of its major objectives was the political attitude of certain of the great Powers. Their lack of enthusiasm had led to the failure of economic sanctions and the impotence of the Security Council had weakened the resolve of liberal elements in South Africa, renewed the confidence of the architects of apartheid, thrown the coloured peoples of that country into despair and greatly undermined the prestige of the United Nations.

26. The United Nations had urged all States to cease the sale of arms and strategic materials to South Africa and had called for collective economic measures. The great Powers concerned had nevertheless continued to supply arms to South Africa and it could well be wondered whether they would permit the Security Council to act under Chapter VII of the Charter or would make the slightest attempt to enforce economic sanctions. Their token support for resolutions was hardly likely to influence the South African Government. His delegation was deeply concerned that repeated requests for action by the Security Council against that background could gradually undermine the authority of the Organization. Furthermore, his Government did not believe that sanctions were the only means of achieving a peaceful solution. Given the impossibility of ensuring the universal application of economic sanctions and the inertia of the Security Council, his delegation believed that other possible solutions should be kept constantly under review. The Secretariat might provide an objective analysis of the reasons why Mr. Hammarskjöld, the then Secretary-General, had been unable to arrive at any mutually acceptable arrangement for bringing South Africa's conduct into line with the Charter of the United Nations during his discussions in South Africa in 1960. Such an analysis might indicate ways in which to reopen the exchange of views at the highest levels. Similarly, a reappraisal of the work of the group of experts on apartheid established by Security Council resolution 182 (1963) might offer new ideas for progress.

27. There was a consensus that a solution to the problems created by apartheid must be found quickly if a racial war was to be avoided, yet annual threats of economic sanctions against South Africa would lead only to a hardening of that policy.

28. His delegation urged a new attempt by the United Nations to reopen its discussions with South Africa in a last effort to bring about a change of policy, or

at least a real commitment to such a change, before the outbreak of violence. The United Nations had a duty to the peoples of southern Africa to make that attempt; it must not take too lightly any decision which would plunge them into a holocaust. The Committee must heed the appeal of the Prime Minister of Lesotho to the General Assembly during its current session (1565th plenary meeting) that the dialogue between himself and his South African counterparts should not be disrupted. All constructive views on the elimination of apartheid should be considered seriously and dispassionately.

29. His delegation doubted the usefulness or propriety of the request to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in paragraph 7 of the draft resolution to deny assistance to South Africa. The obvious forum in which to initiate any change in the Bank's lending policy was its Board of Governors. His delegation urged countries which felt that a refusal by the Bank to assist South Africa could contribute to changing that country's racial policies to place the matter on the agenda of the 1968 meeting of the Bank's Board of Governors.

30. Mr. PIÑERA (Chile) said that, as it had indicated in the general debate, his delegation utterly rejected the policies of apartheid. While it was understandable that many countries should find great difficulty in disrupting trade relations of long standing, his delegation condemned the attitude of those who profited from the sacrifices of others.

31. It would vote for draft resolution A/SPC/L.147/Rev.1 and Add.1 and 2 although, in paragraph 5, the word "deplores" would have been preferable to "condemns".

32. Mr. VIERA LINARES (Cuba) said that his delegation would vote for draft resolution A/SPC/L.147/Rev.1 and Add.1 and 2 because it considered that any international repudiation of apartheid should be supported. Particularly useful were the appeals for assistance to the people of South Africa in paragraph 8 and the request to the Special Committee in paragraph 12 to intensify its co-operation with other special organs concerned with racial discrimination and colonialism in southern Africa.

33. His delegation nevertheless felt that apartheid should be more strongly and explicitly condemned and that the main supporters of the South African régime should be identified. The International Seminar on apartheid held at Kitwe and statements during the current debate had shown that South Africa was intensifying its aggressive policies, that the United States and its allies were enabling it to do so and that imperialism was counting on South Africa to maintain its control of other Territories in the area. To correct that situation, more effective action was required.

34. His Government was confident that apartheid would eventually be eliminated and its supporters overwhelmed by the people of South Africa.

35. Mr. KUTAKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) welcomed the important provision for the abolition of the Pretoria régime's inhuman policy of apartheid in draft resolution A/SPC/L.147/Rev.1

and Add.1 and 2. It very properly condemned apartheid as a crime against humanity, recognized the legitimacy of the South African people's struggle for human rights and fundamental freedoms described the situation as a threat to international peace and security and stressed the need for universally applied mandatory economic sanctions. He nevertheless felt compelled to point out that the draft resolution did not always pursue its recommendations to their logical conclusion and did not fully reflect all the important views which had been expressed during the debate. While condemning the actions of South Africa's main trading partners—particularly the United States, the United Kingdom and certain others—and the activities of foreign financial and other interests which were encouraging that Government to persist in its racial policies, it did not contain a direct appeal to those Governments to put an end to the activities of the financial circles supporting South Africa. During the debate, moreover, the unholy alliance between Pretoria, Portugal and the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia had been condemned as a threat to the security and territorial integrity of the peoples of southern Africa and an attempt to deprive them of their elementary rights. It was all the more unfortunate, therefore, that the draft resolution did not condemn that conspiracy. Nor did it condemn the actions of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which were contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and to the principles which the United Nations family should respect. The Bank should have been asked, in strong terms, to refrain from such actions.

36. Although those omissions had weakened its effect, his delegation would vote for the draft resolution as a whole because it would emphasize the determination of the United Nations to eradicate apartheid.

37. He recalled that, in the general debate, his delegation had expressed the hope that the Committee of Trustees of the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa would examine applications for assistance meticulously to ensure that the funds were used to the greatest effect, exclusively to combat apartheid and assist its victims. He asked that the Committee's report should take note of that wish.

38. The CHAIRMAN said that, if there was no objection, those views would be recorded in the Committee's report.

It was so decided.

39. Mr. PEREZ CADALSO (Honduras) said that draft resolution A/SPC/L.147/Rev.1 and Add.1 and 2 reflected the universal condemnation of the injustice prevailing in a major area of Africa, in violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Yet, the resolution should not merely be a new manifestation of the universal condemnation of apartheid; it should be a positive contribution to the achievement of the legitimate rights of millions of human beings suffering under that system and to the realization of substantial changes before South Africa's refusal to yield in the face of world opinion led inevitably to a violent struggle to secure those rights.

40. In the past, intolerance of every kind had given rise to oppressive régimes and many crimes had been

committed in the name of liberty, justice and religion. Mankind had nevertheless overthrown all such régimes. The present century was one of great social change in which South Africa's policy of apartheid was one of the last bulwarks of obscurantism and intolerance. There must inevitably be changes in that policy and all hoped that they would be brought about by reason and not imposed by developments.

41. His country, opposed as it was to discrimination of whatever kind, would vote in favour of the resolution as a whole.

42. Mr. RUMBOS (Venezuela) said that his delegation supported both the content and form of draft resolution A/SPC/L.147/Rev.1 and Add.1 and 2. It confirmed the international community's unwavering opposition to apartheid and unchanging support of the struggle for freedom. His delegation had no illusions that the draft resolution was a panacea for the problems of apartheid but he hoped that it would at least serve to inspire new ideas and promote some progress before the next session.

43. Mr. JARAMILLO-ARRUBLA (Colombia) said that his delegation supported the draft resolution as a whole. Throughout the 157 years of his country's independence, no Government, political party or segment of the population had ever embraced the absurd practice of racial discrimination, nor had any Government ever pursued a colonialist policy. His delegation hoped that the humane and democratic principles of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the United Nations Charter would soon prevail in South Africa, to alleviate the suffering and ensure the freedom of its people.

44. Mr. DE MEL (Ivory Coast) reserved his right to reply to references to his country during the debate.

45. Sir Leslie GLASS (United Kingdom) said that the draft resolution was lengthy and dealt with many different matters on which there might be a variety of views. His delegation therefore proposed, on its own behalf and on behalf of several other delegations that there should be separate votes on paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.

46. Mr. LOURENÇO (Portugal) said that, in the past, his delegation had expressed serious reservations as to the legality of the current debate. He would not dwell on the substance of the item but wished to express his deep concern at the fact that the discussion had involved matters subject to the internal jurisdiction of a Member State.

47. During the debate, several gratuitous allegations had been made against his country. He repudiated them entirely and reserved his right to reply to them in detail at a later stage.

48. Mr. STANGHOLM (Norway) requested a separate vote on the phrase "as a crime against humanity" in paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/SPC/L.147/Rev.1 and Add.1 and 2.

49. The CHAIRMAN put that phrase to the vote.

The phrase "as a crime against humanity" was adopted by 89 votes to 1, with 10 abstentions.

50. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote paragraph 1, as a whole, of the draft resolution.

At the request of the representative of Sierra Leone, the vote was taken by roll-call.

Czechoslovakia, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Cuba, Cyprus.

Against: Portugal.

Abstaining: France.

Paragraph 1 as a whole was adopted by 104 votes to 1, with 1 abstention.

51. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote paragraph 2 of the draft resolution.

At the request of the representative of Cuba, the vote was taken by roll-call.

Somalia, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama,

Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Portugal.

Paragraph 2 was adopted by 105 votes to none, with 1 abstention.

52. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote separately paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the draft resolution.

Paragraph 3 was adopted by 85 votes to 10, with 9 abstentions.

Paragraph 4 was adopted by 92 votes to 2, with 8 abstentions.

53. Mr. HILMY II (United Arab Republic), speaking on a point of order, requested that his delegation's affirmative vote also be recorded.

54. The CHAIRMAN said that due note would be taken of that request.

Paragraph 5 was adopted by 80 votes to 8, with 16 abstentions.

Paragraph 6 was adopted by 82 votes to 2, with 17 abstentions.

Paragraph 7 was adopted by 83 votes to 1, with 18 abstentions.

55. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote draft resolution A/SPC/L.147/Rev.1 and Add.1 and 2 as a whole.

The draft resolution as a whole was adopted by 89 votes to 1, with 13 abstentions.

56. Sir Leslie GLASS (United Kingdom), explaining his vote, said that his delegation was in agreement with the fundamental aims of the sponsors of the resolution, but did not altogether share their views on effective means of achieving its aims. In the first place, much of the content of the resolution was based on a particular and widely contested political theory as to the effect of international trade and investment. Those matters were being discussed under another item on the General Assembly's agenda, and his delegation's views on the matter had been fully expressed at the Fourth Committee's 1720th meeting of the current session. He would not restate them, but clearly his delegation could not be expected to consent to propositions based on a fallacious theory. Secondly, some parts of the resolution were based on the assumption that racial discrimination and colonial rule were one and the same thing. The history of United Kingdom colonial policy and practice effectively disproved that assumption, and his delegation naturally rejected it and any proposal which stemmed from it. Thirdly, his delegation rejected the assumption, which was implicit or explicit in many parts of the resolution, that the present situation in South Africa was such as to justify invoking the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Moreover, that question should be left to the judgement of the Security Council itself. Fourthly, he had abstained on the inclusion of the phrase "as a crime against humanity" in paragraph 1, because that phrase had a technical legal meaning and was inappropriate in that context.

57. His Government was in accord with the sponsors of the resolution in detesting all manifestations of

racial discrimination and racial domination. Its considered views on the policy of apartheid had been expressed by the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom at the Committee's 472nd meeting and they had not changed since then. In 1967, the United Kingdom had contributed \$40,000 to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, and \$100,000 to the educational and training programme for South Africans, in addition to a previous contribution of \$70,000 to the same programme. It had been represented on the Advisory Committee which had considered the integration and consolidation of educational and training programmes for South West Africa, South Africa and Portuguese Territories. In addition, various private organizations in the United Kingdom were providing humanitarian assistance to the victims of apartheid.

58. The people and Government of the United Kingdom abhorred apartheid as a violation of basic human rights. They were convinced that it was impractical and anachronistic. Apartheid could not even serve the unacceptable purpose for which it was designed. As no human society could hope to insulate itself for long from the overwhelming current of world opinion, the South African Government's racial policies could not survive unchanged.

59. Mr. FINGER (United States of America) said that his delegation had abstained on the resolution. For reasons expressed during the general debate, the United States unreservedly associated itself with the international consensus that the policies of apartheid were incompatible with South Africa's obligations under the United Nations Charter and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It had on occasion expressed that view directly to the South African Government. It was committed to the principle of equality everywhere, including South Africa; and, to that end, it would support appropriate, effective and peaceful measures which might be taken by interested Governments, either unilaterally or through the United Nations, to convince the South African Government of the inherent dangers of pursuing the policy of apartheid.

60. On the other hand, some of the recommendations contained in the resolution did not meet the criteria by which the United Nations should be guided in its actions. In particular, his Government did not believe that the policy of apartheid, abhorrent though it was, at present constituted a threat to international peace and security as defined in the Charter, thus warranting coercive measures under Chapter VII. Accordingly, his delegation would have voted against the seventh preambular paragraph, if it had been put to the vote separately, and had voted against paragraph 3. It had abstained on the phrase "as a crime against humanity", which had a special meaning and was inappropriate in the present context.

61. Furthermore, some of the resolution's provisions were too general and all-inclusive. For instance, his delegation had voted against paragraph 5, because the allegation that the so-called main trading partners of South Africa were encouraging South Africa to persist in its racial policies was an over-simplified formula adopted by certain countries for their own particular purposes, and which hindered the Organization's efforts to identify the real causes of the apartheid

problem and devise appropriate solutions for it. In paragraph 7, the quotation from the letter of the President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development was incomplete, since the Bank had expressed its desire to co-operate with the United Nations by all legitimate means "to the extent consistent with its Articles of Agreement" (see A/6825, annex IV). The text of paragraph 8 could have been made more precise by inserting the words "human and political" before the words "rights recognized in the United Nations Charter". Finally, his delegation had some reservations about the financial implications of paragraph 13 (a), particularly as it now appeared that the Special Committee's meetings could be serviced more effectively and economically at Headquarters.

62. In spite of those reservations, his delegation had abstained on the resolution because it concurred with some of the provisions and agreed basically with the view held by the overwhelming majority of Member States that apartheid was totally repugnant to the concepts on which the Organization was based.

63. Mr. FERRETTI (Italy) said that his delegation deeply sympathized with the objectives of the resolution but had been unable to vote for it as it contained some unacceptable provisions and assertions.

64. In particular, he had some reservations regarding the phrase "as a crime against humanity" in paragraph 1. He accepted the phrase as an expression of moral condemnation; but, from a legal point of view, it was not clear whether the policy of apartheid pursued by a given Government constituted a crime against humanity in accordance either with the definition given by the Nürnberg International Military Tribunal and the Agreement establishing the Tribunal signed in London in 1945, or with any other existing definition such as that contained in article II, paragraph 2, of the draft convention on the non-applicability of statutory limitations to war crimes and crimes against humanity,^{3/} as drafted by the Working Group of the Commission on Human Rights. His delegation had not been able to vote for paragraph 3 of the resolution, either. Though the General Assembly was entitled under the Charter to draw the Security Council's attention to a situation which it regarded as a threat to international peace, it was for the Council itself ultimately to determine whether the situation was actually endangering peace and security and, if it was, to decide on effective measures to deal with it. Paragraph 5 was also unacceptable, since Member States could be condemned only for violating actual provisions of the Charter, and in that case only by the Security Council itself.

65. On the other hand, his delegation whole-heartedly supported the proposal for a wider dissemination of information on the evils of apartheid. When public opinion throughout the world was fully informed as to the exact nature of apartheid, it would no longer be possible for any Government to continue such a policy.

66. Mr. McGOUGH (Argentina) said that his delegation had abstained on the resolution, as it considered that action under Chapter VII of the Charter to deal with the policy of apartheid would create an unde-

sirable legal precedent. At the same time, he wished to reiterate his country's belief that apartheid was a pathological phenomenon which should be eradicated as soon as possible. In Argentina, there had been no racial discrimination of any kind since 1813; and the fundamental freedoms accorded at that time to citizens of all races had been confirmed by further legislation in 1853.

67. Mr. LAGERFELT (Sweden) said that his delegation had abstained on certain paragraphs of the resolution, either because their provisions were incompatible with the General Assembly's constitutional role or because they contained assertions which were unacceptable. But he had voted for the resolution as a whole because its general aims were entirely in keeping with the views and policies of his Government. The pressure of world opinion, as expressed in overwhelming votes by the United Nations, should be brought to bear on the South African Government continuously and with increasing force.

68. His delegation emphatically endorsed the condemnation of the policies of apartheid and agreed that all States should comply strictly with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. It also believed that the explosive situation in South Africa and southern Africa as a whole continued to constitute a grave threat to international peace and security, and it was particularly glad that the General Assembly would once again be drawing the Security Council's attention to the situation and requesting it to resume consideration of the question.

69. Mr. BOS (Netherlands) said that, as the Government and people of the Netherlands were fundamentally opposed to the policy of racial discrimination and domination, his delegation regretted that it had not been able to vote for the resolution.

70. With regard to paragraph 3, he had noted the sponsors' efforts to avoid any conflict of authority between the General Assembly and the Security Council, but was unable nevertheless to share the conviction that action under Chapter VII of the Charter was essential to solve the problem of apartheid.

71. He could not agree, either, that economic sanctions were the only means of achieving a peaceful solution. In the light of practical experience, and of the many studies undertaken on the subject of economic sanctions, his delegation doubted whether sanctions were effective or indeed desirable. The imposition of sanctions might, in fact, lead to conflict instead of ensuring a peaceful and stable future for the South African people. There were still other means which could be used to convince the South African Government of the fallacy of its policy.

72. Paragraph 5 contained an all-embracing condemnation of States alleged to be co-operating politically, economically and militarily with the South African Government. Charges that South Africa's trading partners were also co-operating politically and militarily with the Pretoria Government were completely unfounded.

73. Mr. THALBERG (Austria) said that his Government's rejection of all forms of racial discrimination, including apartheid, had been emphasized unequiv-

^{3/} See Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 6, para. 155.

vocally in a statement by the Austrian Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs at the current session of the General Assembly (1578th plenary meeting). Austria, having been part of a multinational and multiracial community for centuries, had been among the first countries to condemn racial discrimination and apartheid.

74. Accordingly, his delegation endorsed the spirit and intentions of the resolution but, as some of the recommendations contained therein were unacceptable, it had been obliged to abstain.

75. It noted with satisfaction that the resolution reiterated the General Assembly's intention to achieve a peaceful solution of the problem of apartheid, and it would itself support any positive and constructive action to improve the situation in South Africa. But recommendations for United Nations action should be confined to what was genuinely practicable and feasible. Failure to fulfil impracticable recommendations created a feeling of frustration, and might eventually damage the Organization's prestige. The peaceful co-existence of peoples of different language, race and creed could be an asset rather than a liability for world peace, and the people of South Africa was bound in the end to recognize that basic truth.

76. Special efforts were required to deal with the humanitarian aspects of the problem of apartheid. His Government had decided to contribute to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa and was glad to learn that, as a result of the efforts made by the Committee of Trustees for the Fund, some help was now being provided to the victims of apartheid.

77. Mr. BEAULIEU (Canada) said that his country unreservedly condemned all policies of racial segregation, and believed that measures should be taken to put an end to the policies of apartheid as soon as possible. His delegation supported many of the provisions contained in the resolution, but doubted whether some of the measures proposed would really contribute to the fundamental objectives which nearly all members of the Committee were hoping to achieve. For instance, although the situation in southern Africa might eventually constitute a threat to international peace and security, it was doubtful whether the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter were applicable in the present circumstances.

78. Accordingly, though his delegation was fully in agreement with the aims of the sponsors, it had been obliged to abstain on the resolution as a whole.

79. Mr. APALOO (Ghana) wished to contest the assertion made by a number of delegations that universally applied mandatory economic sanctions were not the most effective means of achieving a peaceful solution to the problem of apartheid. When the rebel clique of Ian Smith had illegally seized power in Southern Rhodesia, the United Kingdom itself had suggested that economic sanctions should be imposed on Southern Rhodesia in order to bring down the rebel régime. If the United Kingdom believed that sanctions would be effective in the case of Southern Rhodesia, why was it opposed to the universal application of sanctions in the case of South Africa?

80. Some delegations might argue that, as sanctions had not been effective against Southern Rhodesia, they might be equally ineffective if applied to South Africa; but that argument was entirely specious. Certain countries had indeed reduced or entirely abandoned their trade with Southern Rhodesia. But they had at the same time increased their trade with South Africa, and some of the merchandise which they shipped to South Africa was re-exported to Southern Rhodesia. Accordingly, by maintaining trade relations with South Africa, the countries concerned were also minimizing the effect of sanctions imposed on Southern Rhodesia. If they discontinued their trade with South Africa, they could help to put an end to the policies of apartheid in that country and also to bring down the rebel régime in Southern Rhodesia.

81. The statements made at the present meeting should, he thought, be reproduced in extenso.

82. Mr. CHANG (China) noted that the proposed sixteen-page pamphlet on apartheid referred to in the document dealing with the financial implications of draft resolution A/SPC/L.147/Rev.1 and Add.1 and 2 (see A/SPC/L.149, para. 5) was to be translated into ten languages, but not into Chinese which was an official language of the United Nations. Did the Secretariat imagine that there was no need to provide the Chinese people with information on the evils of apartheid? The omission of Chinese from the list of languages was inexcusable.

83. Mr. ALVARADO (Ecuador) said that his delegation had reaffirmed Ecuador's opposition to the policies of apartheid by voting for the resolution in its entirety.

84. Mr. MULLINS (New Zealand) said that his delegation had been obliged to abstain on the phrase "as a crime against humanity", which was a technical legal term with a special meaning developed in a different context. But because of New Zealand's rejection of the policy of apartheid, and having expressed its reservation on the use of that phrase, it joined in voting for paragraph 1 as a whole.

85. Mr. CUEVAS CANCINO (Mexico) said that his country regarded the policy of apartheid as mistaken, abhorrent and harmful not only to its immediate victims but to all mankind. He deeply regretted, therefore, that his delegation had not been able to vote for the resolution as a whole.

86. At the current session (562nd meeting), his delegation had advocated peaceful measures for putting an end to the policies of apartheid, and it could hardly be expected to vote for paragraph 3, which called for extreme measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. Paragraph 4 was also unacceptable, as it contained an appeal for direct action by the Security Council. Such appeals should not be made indiscriminately, but only in cases where direct action by the Security Council was likely to succeed. The statement in paragraphs 5 and 6 that the maintenance of trade relations with South Africa was contrary to the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions was inaccurate. The General Assembly had condemned the maintenance of trade relations with South Africa, but the Security Council had not. Further, as the Chilean representative had pointed out at the present meeting,

the condemnation expressed in paragraph 5 went somewhat beyond what the General Assembly was entitled to say. Finally, with reference to paragraph 7, he doubted whether the General Assembly was empowered to make proposals regarding the activities of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

87. The CHAIRMAN declared that the Committee had concluded its consideration of the item concerning the policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa.

88. If there were no objections to the Ghanaian representative's proposal, he would assume that the Committee wished the statements made at the present meeting to be reproduced in extenso.

It was so decided.^{4/}

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.

^{4/} The verbatim record of the present meeting was circulated as document A/SPC/PV.569.