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Chairman: Mr. Mihail HASEGANU (Romania).

AGENDA ITEM 30

The policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa: reports of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa and replies by Member States under General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII) (A/5497 and Add.1, A/SPC/80, A/SPC/81, A/SPC/82, A/SPC/L.95) (continued)

1. Mr. ARCE (Bolivia) recalled that, although his delegation had not voted for paragraphs 4 and 8 of General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII), not being at the time in favour of the measures called for under those paragraphs, his Government had subsequently broken off diplomatic relations with the South African Government, always with the hope that it would be possible to resume relations once a democratic Government representing the people of South Africa had been elected.

2. Racial discrimination had been discussed at length in the United Nations and the time had now come for devising the necessary machinery for giving effect to the many resolutions and declarations already adopted. Racial prejudice was an anachronism in the modern world and international security called for the liberation of all peoples who were still dominated.

3. The fact that a number of Governments, including the Government of the Republic of South Africa, had not complied with the recommendations contained in resolution 1761 (XVII) did not diminish the serious threat to world peace. In that connexion the Bolivian delegation fully endorsed the recommendations contained in the report of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (A/5497 and Add.1), particularly the recommendation calling for consideration by the General Assembly and the Security Council of possible new measures, including expulsion of the South African Government from the United Nations (A/5497, para. 517). It also supported resolution A/SPC/L.96 submitted by the Special Political Committee and adopted by the plenary Assembly on 11 October (1238th meeting). The Bolivian delegation had based its support

on the South African Government's reprehensible conduct, which had called in question its right to recognition as an international entity. For, in the modern world, the three traditional features of a sovereign State—people, territory and government—were no longer sufficient in themselves; modern civilization regarded as essential a fourth element, namely a social purpose based on respect for human rights. In his view apartheid was the negation of all social purpose and South Africa's political and legal status in the United Nations should be reconsidered in that light. Not until a Government truly representative of the feelings and interests of the peoples of South Africa had been installed would the legal personality of the Republic of South Africa be restored in full.

4. In his speech to the General Assembly on 10 October (1236th meeting) the representative of the South African Government had stated that his Government had acceded to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water as a means of preserving world peace and security. The Republic of South Africa would, however, do better by signing a document proclaiming freedom and independence in South Africa, for there could never be universal peace while a part of the human race was living in slavery. The type of peace which the United Nations was seeking was opposed to any form of colonial or racial domination. Yet 80 per cent of all South Africans were still awaiting liberation. Peace was not the privilege of the few but the right of all. An analysis of the problem of apartheid always led to the same conclusion, namely, that despite all the efforts made by the United Nations to persuade the South African Government to mend its ways, it had proved impossible to convince that Government and its supporters of the necessity for doing so.

5. The new Bolivia, which had come into being on 9 April 1952 when peasants, workers and the revolutionary middle class overthrew the exploiters, was firmly anti-colonialist and anti-segregationist. His delegation therefore wished to make it clear that it proposed to continue supporting the cause of the liberation of the people of South Africa through the liquidation of the policies of apartheid; that the denial of freedom to colonial and dependent peoples constituted a grave threat to world peace; that the continuation of apartheid was an obstacle to the development and progress of the African peoples; that all Member States should comply strictly with the recommendations of the United Nations regarding apartheid and the ending of colonialism; and that the Bolivian Government would support all resolutions designed to end oppression and bring freedom to all the peoples of Africa.

6. Mr. ABEDI (Tanganyika) recalled his statement at the Committee's 379th meeting that the solution to the problem of apartheid was being made difficult by the intransigence of the Governments of the United

States of America, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, Italy and Belgium, countries which played an important part in strengthening the economy of South Africa. He had suggested that those countries should clarify their positions so that the Committee would be in a better position to advise the General Assembly.

7. If the peaceful measures to combat apartheid recommended in resolution 1761 (XVII) had been carried out in full by all Member States, the South African Government would have been compelled to reform its policies. His own country, which had never had diplomatic relations with the South African Government, had closed its ports to vessels flying the South African flag, was boycotting South African goods and refraining from exporting goods to that country, and had refused landing and passage facilities to South African aircraft. It could thus be seen that it was faithfully carrying out the instructions of the United Nations. Some Member States, on the other hand, were sabotaging the resolution. The United States representative had urged at the 379th meeting that the United Nations should play the role of harbinger of a peaceful solution in South Africa and should not be allowed to become a catalyst of violence in that country. He had not, however, stated by what methods other than those proposed in resolution 1761 (XVII) a peaceful solution could be brought about, nor had he acknowledged that the policies of apartheid were themselves catalysts of a violence which it might not be possible to halt without resort to further violence. The United States representative should be in a position to appreciate the plight of Africans in South Africa by comparing it with the situation of Negroes in his own country. Even though Negroes in the United States were not in a majority, antagonism against them had risen so high that in certain cases Federal forces had had to be called in to restrain the exponents of segregation. It would be the height of folly to expect the Whites in South Africa, who were in a minority and feared retaliation by the Africans for the sufferings and humiliations they had heaped upon them, to decide of their own accord to relax their hold on the reigns of government. In its mounting frustration the South African Government was not only enacting increasingly oppressive and punitive laws but was resorting to the practice of torturing its opponents. He read out in that connexion a statement concerning the imprisonment and torture of opponents of apartheid published in The Tanganyika Standard of 5 October 1963 by a South African refugee who had escaped to Bechuanaland. The United States representative should suggest ways of convincing the South African Government that its policies were unacceptable and that the world would not allow them to continue. In halting shipments of arms to South Africa the United States had taken a step in the right direction, but it was not sufficient. South Africa already had enough arms to be able to subdue almost all individual African States, and the States of Africa should be warned that those arms were not intended exclusively for purposes of internal security. What Africa expected of countries having economic and diplomatic relations with South Africa was that they should sever those relations. That was a matter of life and death for Africa and a stand must be taken one way or the other with regard to it. Tanganyika had proved that people of different races could live together in equality and harmony and it felt that there could be no compromise when a choice had to be made between that policy and the segregationist policy of South Africa. If any country abstained on that issue, Tanganyika could only regard

it as being against Africans. President Nyerere of Tanganyika, in addressing the Norwegian Students' Association, had said that South Africa depended on international trade to uphold an economy geared to racialism and that it used the weapons it procured from other countries to maintain the structure of racial privilege. A country could not be said to be neutral as long as it sold to South Africa the goods which enabled the ruling minority there to oppress the non-white majority. There could be no neutral position in regard to trading with South Africa: countries which engaged in such trading were thereby supporting apartheid and those who refrained were opposing it. Even the refusal to supply arms did not constitute neutrality, for to have any real significance it must be followed by other steps.

8. The South African Government should be expelled from membership of the United Nations. It was incredible that a world organization should lack the ability to expel a member when any club could and did expel members at will. World public opinion saw in South Africa's policies a disease which might spread if it was not quarantined. It was indeed a perversion of diplomacy that an honourable nation such as the People's Republic of China should be prevented from joining the United Nations while the Republic of South Africa was being protected from expulsion. The position was so unreasonable that it could not have arisen but for the veto power enjoyed by certain Member States. Pressure should be exerted to do away with their privileged position, for no nation, however powerful, should be allowed to dictate terms to the community of nations or block its decisions.

9. A solution to the South African problem was being impeded by two circumstances. The first was the moral decadence in some of the larger nations, which did not demand of themselves as nations the same adherence to moral principles which they required of their citizens. Where individuals were expected to place principles above personal material gain, such nations did not consider themselves bound to do likewise. The United Kingdom had private investments in South Africa amounting to some £900 million and it maintained a naval base at Simonstown. United States investments amounted to about \$500 million. Similarly, 35 per cent of South Africa's imports came from the United Kingdom and 20 per cent from the United States, while large numbers of British subjects were currently emigrating to South Africa. Surely it would be wise for the United Kingdom and other nations which had vested interests there to realize that the country was bound to be ruled by Africans sooner or later and to refrain from jeopardizing those interests in the future.

10. The second circumstance impeding solution was the failure to realize that the weaker nations of the world were capable of uniting in a common cause. The Western nations should realize that since the Summit Conference of Independent African States at Addis Ababa the African nations were on the road to unity and should take into account the possibility that the African-Asian nations might join in imposing economic sanctions on some of the supporters of the South African Government. In his opinion, the time had come for all the African-Asian States to consider seriously the imposition of a boycott on specified services or goods provided by one nation which presented the greatest difficulty in the way of effective sanctions against South Africa. The Times of London

had recently suggested in an editorial that an improved form of the so-called Bantustans might be the solution to the problem of apartheid, and the South African representative had claimed at the 1236th plenary meeting that his Government had the right to confine the Africans to the bantustans on the fallacious ground that when the Whites had come to South Africa they had found the land empty, but he had not explained why the 13 million Africans should not make the same claim. The fact was that all the land belonged to African tribes which had been pushed out of their holdings to make way for the better organized and more powerful white intruders. The delegation of Tanganyika could never even consider the Bantustan proposal. The whole of South Africa, like Tanganyika and the other former colonial territories, belonged to the Africans. The Whites there would have to bow to democracy and be satisfied with the status of citizenship accorded to all inhabitants of the country. Those who did not wish to do so should leave South Africa and return to their ancestral homelands.

11. Mr. CORREA DA COSTA (Brazil) noted that although the tone of the General Assembly's resolutions condemning the policies of apartheid—which his delegation had always been among the first to denounce—had become increasingly severe over the years, they now risked being discredited through fruitless repetition. It was therefore of paramount importance that eloquence should now be curbed and suitable ways and means found to compel the Government of the Republic of South Africa to abandon its racial policies.

12. While it was true that the United Nations debates, by publicizing violations of basic human rights in South Africa, had aroused the universal condemnation of world public opinion—a positive gain in itself—it was equally true that the General Assembly's recommendations had not produced the desired results. Moreover, the Security Council's resolutions had been very limited in scope in comparison with those approved by the General Assembly. That was because the General Assembly's resolutions, not being mandatory, could be worded as strongly as the vast majority of Member States desired, whereas resolutions of the Security Council, which could approve mandatory measures, were apt to be diluted in substance. That discrepancy between the two types of resolution should be borne in mind throughout the Committee's debates.

13. So far one practical step had been taken; namely an embargo on the supply of arms, ammunition and military vehicles to the Republic of South Africa approved by the Security Council in its resolution of 7 August 1963.^{1/} That was a step in the right direction, inasmuch as it sought to weaken the military power of the Government of the Republic of South Africa. By itself, however, that was not enough, since if the South African Government were able to manufacture its own weapons, the embargo would obviously become meaningless. Therefore, all Member States in a position to supply the South African Government with know-how, patents or strategic materials used in the production of arms and ammunitions should be called upon to refrain from doing so. Such a step should be followed by an embargo on the supply of oil, a measure which would undoubtedly represent a

severe blow to the economic and military potential of the South African Government.

14. The implementation of such measures, of course, called for action by the Security Council. Indeed, the recommendations contained in General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII) and those made by the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa would be fruitless unless the Security Council, which was the body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, itself adopted them. It was thus to the Security Council itself that all appeals must be addressed.

15. The suggestions put forward by the representative of Denmark at the Committee's 380th meeting deserved special consideration. They appeared to be based on the reasonable assumption that the white minority, if it could be persuaded that the alternative to apartheid was neither mass migration nor annihilation, might become more willing to revise its policies.

16. Despite the fact that the problem of racial discrimination in South Africa had been before the General Assembly for more than ten years, some delegations seemed to feel that it was possible to wait another ten years for the South African Government to evolve away from apartheid under the pressure of world opinion. Such an attitude, however, overlooked the profound emotional significance of the problem to all African peoples. It was a mistake to think that the African countries, in the wake of their liberation after centuries of white oppression, would have the patience to wait another ten years in the hope that the present racial policies of the South African Government would be mitigated. The keynote was: reform now.

17. Mr. LOBODYCZ (Poland) congratulated the Special Committee on its outstanding report (A/5497 and Add.1); its comprehensive analysis of the situation in South Africa offered valuable material for discussion and would enable the Special Political Committee to draw the appropriate conclusions.

18. The report made painful reading. The restrictions imposed by the South African Government on the non-white population were an anachronism, yet it dared to claim, through its Department of Information, that the white man in South Africa was helping the black man to bridge in one span the gap between the Stone Age and the atomic era. The current trial against eleven leading opponents of apartheid showed how the South African authorities conceived their role in the atomic era. In voting in favour of the fifty-five Power draft resolution (A/SPC/L.96) adopted at the 381st meeting of the Special Political Committee, the Polish delegation had once again condemned those policies.

19. Apartheid had many aspects, political, economic, educational, social and legal. His delegation intended to concentrate, however, on the question of its international repercussions. Apartheid had been recognized to be a source of international tension and a threat to the peace. Twenty-seven General Assembly resolutions and two Security Council resolutions had been adopted condemning it. As the international repercussions grew more dangerous, however, the South African Government made increasing efforts to evade its international responsibilities. It had recently launched a frontal attack on the United Nations itself, calling the Organization South Africa's main enemy. Meanwhile, the threat to international peace and security posed by the South African Government, itself

^{1/} See Official Records of the Security Council, Eighteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1963, document S/5386.

a replica of the Nazi system, and based on the theory of a master race, continued to grow. The Security Council resolution of 1 April 1960^{2/} had recognized that the situation in South Africa was one that had led to international friction and, if continued, might endanger international peace and security, while its resolution of 7 August 1963 stated categorically that the situation in South Africa was seriously disturbing international peace and security. Clearly, apartheid must create the deepest resentment, both in South Africa and in other countries, particularly on the African continent. The Polish delegation sympathized with the view expressed by the representative of Guinea, who had said at the 379th meeting that as soon as the African peoples recovered their independence they would not tolerate the odious system of apartheid on their continent. The South African Government's internal policy and its arbitrary action outside its borders were inevitably creating an explosive situation. South Africa itself was being turned into a military camp, as was amply illustrated by the Special Committee's report. The state of psychological mobilization being introduced by the Government was particularly noteworthy. Moreover, in pursuing its policy of discrimination, it had not hesitated to provoke incidents outside South Africa, as in the case of the kidnapping in Bechuanaland in August 1963. It also advocated the extension of apartheid to other territories. As the report of the Special Committee recalled, the Prime Minister of South Africa openly contended that the extension of apartheid to Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, under South African guardianship, would be to their advantage (see A/5497, para. 422). The representative of Ghana had already drawn attention in the Special Political Committee (327th meeting) to the expansionist tendencies of the South African Government and the dangers that might arise from them.

20. At a time when the United Nations was bending its efforts towards the complete implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples (General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)), the policy of the South African Government was an open challenge, for apartheid was a form of colonization. At the 1214th plenary meeting, the Chairman of the delegation of Niger had called it colonization from the inside. The Special Committee had reported a statement made in the South African Parliament to the effect that attempts were being made to set up colonial enclaves in the African reserves as a means of consolidating white supremacy.

21. The United Nations could not remain indifferent to the threat to international peace constituted by the situation in South Africa. A policy of aggression in Africa had provoked a chain reaction once before. At the 1229th plenary meeting, the Emperor of Ethiopia had recalled his appeal in 1936 to the League of Nations for help for his defenceless nation against the Fascist invader. His appeal had gone unheeded, but history had testified to the accuracy of his warning. Poland had realized it only too well, when a few years later it had experienced Nazi aggression encouraged by the atmosphere of connivance that had accompanied Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia in 1936. The appropriate conclusions should be drawn now in connexion with the situation in South Africa, in the interest of its suffering people, the interest of all countries and the interest of peace.

22. The Polish delegation shared the view of previous speakers that practical and effective measures were needed to break down the resistance of the South African Government. The Polish Government's position had been defined in its reply to the letter from the Chairman of the Special Committee (see A/5497/Add.1, annex V). Poland had already broken off trade relations with South Africa and Polish ships had been ordered not to enter South African ports. The Polish Government had no diplomatic or consular relations with the present Government of the Republic of South Africa. The Polish delegation in the Special Political Committee would be moved by the same considerations. It would not be satisfied with mere appeals or pious hopes. The United Nations must act with determination and take concrete measures which would mobilize the whole international community in an effort to end the shameful system of apartheid which was an affront to human dignity and a denial of the principles of the Charter.

23. Mr. DJERDJA (Yugoslavia) also congratulated the Special Committee on the successful completion of its task. Its report offered comprehensive, clear and impressive documentation on apartheid, that sinister manifestation of present-day racism which was an ever-increasing source of anxiety to the United Nations and to the world at large. The report's survey of the action taken so far and its recommendations for the future would be of great assistance to the Special Political Committee in its task of finding a remedy for the dangerous disease now poisoning South Africa and threatening to spread to the whole African continent.

24. The problem of apartheid had been on the agenda of the United Nations since 1946. By rejecting the South African Government's argument that it was a domestic matter, the United Nations had been able to reflect the world's growing anxiety in a number of resolutions, every year more strongly worded and adopted by a larger majority. Meanwhile, the situation in South Africa had continued to deteriorate and distrust and tension had grown among the neighbouring countries. In 1962, consideration of the problem had reached a turning point. General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII), and the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 7 August 1963, had recognized that apartheid constituted a threat to peace in Africa and elsewhere, that it was not an internal affair of South Africa nor even a phenomenon of local African significance, but a problem of broad international concern, a solution to which must be a task for the world community as a whole. Those resolutions had therefore formulated a new approach to the Government of the Republic of South Africa. They had contained recommendations for the severance of diplomatic relations, the boycotting of trade with South Africa, especially the trade in arms and ammunition, and the refusal of facilities to South African ships and aircraft. The South African Government, however, had continued to disregard the appeals of the United Nations and to pursue and intensify its policies of racial discrimination, ignoring the broader interests of the world community and indeed its own interests.

25. The Yugoslav delegation believed that the failure of the United Nations appeal could be attributed to the South African Government's belief that the United Nations was powerless and its decisions mere paper. For a number of years some Member States of the United Nations had seen fit to lend the South African Government political and material support in its poli-

^{2/} *Ibid.*, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1960, document S/4300.

cies of apartheid. Thus the Organization's attempt to induce that Government to abandon its dangerous course had been ineffective. Its intransigence had been increased by the existence of certain vestiges of colonialism in Africa, near its own borders in particular. The removal of all colonial administrations from Africa and the withdrawal of its mandate in South West Africa would considerably lessen the South African Government's possibilities of resistance. The Yugoslav delegation believed that pressure on South Africa should not be relaxed for an instant as long as the policies of apartheid continued. Yugoslavia had experienced for itself the horrors of a policy based on theories of racial supremacy and was able to sympathize with the feelings of the newly-independent African countries and the non-European majority in South Africa who were relegated to the status of slaves on the grounds of alleged racial inferiority.

26. The Charter of the United Nations made provision for a broad range of measures which could be applied in such situations. In accordance with those provisions, General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII) and the Security Council resolution of 7 August 1963 had called upon Member States to take a series of diplomatic and economic measures against the South African Government. Nevertheless, the situation in South Africa was unchanged and that Government's stand was more ruthless and defiant than ever. It was not that the measures themselves were insufficient. Had they been implemented by all Member States, they would at least have compelled South Africa to reflect seriously upon its policies. Unfortunately, the countries which were the largest suppliers of goods and arms to South Africa had failed to implement the two resolutions. That was the explanation for the South African Government's unchanged attitude and its con-

tinued defiance of world public opinion. The current trial of prominent opponents of apartheid on the basis of laws founded neither on ethics nor on legal principles, was a deliberate challenge to the United Nations. The General Assembly had responded by adopting by 106 votes to 1 (1238th meeting) the draft resolution submitted by the Special Political Committee (A/SPC/L.96).

27. If the South African Government was to be brought to see reason before it was too late, all Members of the United Nations must faithfully carry out the measures that were decided upon. Unless all Member States stood behind the decisions of the principal organs, no progress would be made. In the meantime, the roots of apartheid would have struck deeper and the cancer would have spread far beyond the confines of South Africa.

28. The Yugoslav delegation had followed the debate with the greatest interest, particularly the suggestions from those countries which were the most directly affected by the South African Government's policies. It saw a ray of hope in the General Assembly's unanimity on resolution 1881 (XVIII), adopted at its 1238th meeting, which gave grounds for hoping that in future the South African Government would meet with a greater degree of unity among Member States in implementing the decisions of the United Nations relative to South Africa, and that under such pressure the South African Government would revise its position before it was too late. The Yugoslav delegation pledged itself to share once more in the co-operative effort to find an answer to the problem of apartheid, so that the present relaxation of tension in the world could extend also to Africa, whose peoples desired only independence, equality and peace.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.