



Chairman: Mr. Abdul Samad GHAUS  
(Afghanistan).

**AGENDA ITEM 34**

**The policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa: report of the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (continued) (A/8022 and Add.1, A/8109, A/8117, A/SPC/L.181, A/SPC/L.183-186)**

1. The CHAIRMAN announced that Liberia had joined in sponsoring draft resolutions A/SPC/L.183, A/SPC/L.185 and A/SPC/L.186 and that Trinidad and Tobago had added its name to the list of sponsors of the four draft resolutions A/SPC/L.183 to A/SPC/L.186.
2. Mr. CORNELISSEN (Netherlands) said that South Africa's policy of *apartheid* violated the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, which had been unanimously adopted by the General Assembly at its 1883rd plenary meeting (resolution 2625 (XXV)). In adopting that Declaration, all Member States had adhered once again to the principle of equal rights and self-determination, according to which every State had the duty to promote through joint and separate action universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with the Charter.
3. His delegation, in reiterating its rejection of the principle and practice of *apartheid*, wished to comment on the question of joint and separate action raised by the persistent violation of human rights. Firstly, his delegation felt that any form of joint action contemplated should be placed within the framework of the United Nations and should conform to the Charter. Secondly, any such joint action should not hamper unnecessarily any separate action by a Member State. Joint and separate actions should be complementary and in harmony with one another.
4. His delegation had recently made a statement in the Fourth Committee (1882nd meeting) referring to the policies of Portugal and South Africa which were the result of long historical processes, and had thought that it was therefore unlikely that the proponents of those policies would be easily persuaded to adopt a more enlightened outlook. Yet, sustained efforts in that direction should be made. His delegation feared that intensified isolation might cause those Governments to entrench themselves even deeper into their positions and, furthermore, might prevent any effective joint action. It was essential to maintain contacts, not only on the official level, but also with the churches, the press, youth organizations or other groups which might be capable of influencing public opinion. That type of separate action could not fail to have some effect.
5. With regard to joint action by the United Nations, his delegation supported the proposal to establish the office of a High Commissioner for Human Rights.<sup>1</sup> Existing bodies concerned with human rights were limited in their ability to ensure the implementation of the various United Nations human rights instruments. As President Kaunda had said in his address before the General Assembly on 19 October 1970, (1872nd plenary meeting) that what was needed now was not more law but an effective system of implementing all the conventions which had been adopted. While a High Commissioner for Human Rights could not completely fill the gap as regards implementation, he would at least be in an advantageous position to make persistent efforts to bring about a change in South Africa's policies. By safeguarding human rights in the entire world and not concentrating on any particular régime or society, he might build up prestige and authority which Governments would find almost impossible to ignore.
6. Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that one of the purposes of the Charter had been to promote and encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. That purpose had been reinforced in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. That Convention had declared as an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof.
7. Racism had also been declared a crime by the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which had described genocide as "an odious scourge".
8. The progressive world rejected the shameful policy and the practice of racial discrimination and *apartheid*, which the United Nations had described as a crime against humanity. Many United Nations resolutions had been adopted with the aim of curtailing diplomatic and trade relations with South Africa, including the supply of arms and military equipment. Those resolutions had been re-

<sup>1</sup> See agenda item 46.

flected in decisions taken by many other international organizations and meetings, including the conferences of African States and the conferences of the non-aligned countries.

9. The close attention given to the situation in southern Africa and the deep concern felt by the entire world community were based on very sound reasons. *Apartheid* in South Africa was not a local phenomenon; the racist régime had extended its aggressive policies to the non-white population of the occupied Territory of Namibia and was suppressing the national liberation movement in the African continent.

10. South African racism was uniting with Southern Rhodesian racism and Portuguese colonialism in maintaining the supremacy of the white minority. The means used by those régimes for ensuring supremacy were the same; so, too, was their military and political strategy. They represented a direct danger to neighbouring African States and, particularly in the case of South Africa, constituted a threat to international peace and security. That was why the Soviet Union regarded *apartheid* in South Africa, not as a local problem, but as a serious international problem.

11. Why was South Africa openly defying the generally accepted principles of international law and humanity, and repudiating its obligations under the Charter? The answer lay in the wide political, economic and military support which it received from a number of Western States, and which permitted it to survive, persevere in its racist policies and to increase its onslaught against the national liberation movement. Those Western States were increasing their co-operation with South Africa and were failing to implement the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. The arms embargo had not been fully observed. In that connexion, the intention of the United Kingdom Government to resume the sale of arms was nothing less than a challenge to public opinion, the principles of the Charter and the decisions of the Security Council.

12. Documents of the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa and statements by various delegations had contained numerous data on the development of economic and military co-operation between certain Western States and the South African Government. The figures for foreign investments in South Africa and the profits derived by foreign monopolies from the exploitation of the African population were already well known. The foreign monopolies and the South African racists were united by a common tie—material interests—which prevailed over moral or humanitarian principles.

13. As a background to the incredible sufferings of the South African people, the close economic ties between the countries of NATO and the South African racists were vividly illustrated by the hypocrisy of those who, while preaching condemnation of *apartheid*, in fact calculated the profits received as a result of the continued existence of that shameful policy. When it came to implementing the Security Council decisions and severing economic and military links, hatred of the national liberation movement and greed for money and profits prevailed.

14. In his work *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Lenin had indicated that monopolies had grown out of colonial policy and that the activities of the imperialist monopolies were inseparably linked with the seizure of colonial territories and the suppression of the national liberation movements. He had shown that while the imperialist monopolies would fight desperately among themselves for "spheres of influence", they invariably sank their differences when they had to suppress the struggle of the oppressed people for their freedom and independence. In the view of his delegation, that principle was convincingly reflected in the policy of the imperialist monopolies, whose profit-seeking interests linked them with the racist-colonial régimes in southern Africa and whose basic strategic aim was the retention of the remaining colonial Territories within the colonial system.

15. The progressive forces of the world were trying to compel the racists of South Africa to abandon their scandalous policy and the imperialist Powers to abandon their support of the South African régime. The successful solution of that problem would not only strengthen basic human rights and freedoms, but would contribute to international peace and security.

16. His country was strictly implementing the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly on *apartheid*. In that connexion, his delegation welcomed the statement by the representative of the Sudan (699th meeting). The Soviet Union maintained no relations of any kind with the South African régime, and had always favoured the adoption of the most effective measures, in conformity with the Charter, to eliminate racial discrimination and *apartheid*. The Soviet people indignantly repudiated the hateful policy of *apartheid* and considered it their duty to help in every way the struggle of colonial and oppressed peoples.

17. Mr. HELLSTRÖM (Sweden) said that the current celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations and the tenth anniversary of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples fell under the shadow of the policies pursued by the South African régime. Those anniversaries sharpened the international community's awareness of the absurdity of the continued existence of *apartheid* and its total denial of fundamental rights to the vast majority of the people in the Republic of South Africa and in Namibia, illegally held and for all practical purposes treated as a colony by South Africa. The tenth anniversary of the Sharpeville massacre, in which sixty-nine peacefully demonstrating black workers had been shot to death, also served as a sinister reminder of the inability of the world community to exert sufficient pressure on the Government of South Africa to abandon its policy of *apartheid*.

18. Developments in southern Africa had belied hopes that the Sharpeville tragedy would become a turning point in the ignominious policy of so-called separate racial development. On the contrary, since then thousands of Africans and others had been detained, imprisoned or tortured for violating *apartheid* laws or for suspected opposition to the Government's policy. South Africa's nearly 16 million blacks, Coloureds and Asians, who were denied their basic political or civil rights and whose wage

scale was far below the one enjoyed by whites, had become merely a pool for the supply of cheap labour to South Africa's booming economy. Despite the fact that *apartheid* had been recognized by a large majority of Member States as constituting a threat to international peace and security and had been declared a potential threat to international peace and security by the Security Council, the South African régime had not heeded the warnings on the international community. The *apartheid* system had not softened its barbarity, but continued to grow increasingly harsh.

19. Among the odious perversions of justice of the oppressive South African régime was the so-called Urban Areas Act, the main purpose of which was to reduce the number of black citizens living in white urban areas. However, since black labour was necessary to white industry, African men were allowed to remain in white areas conditionally, preferably as contract labourers without families. Black women and children were officially considered superfluous appendages, and more and more of them were being forced to return to the "homelands"—those poor, underdeveloped areas set aside by the South African Government for such purposes. Thus, the Urban Areas Act specified that no black woman could remain in any urban area for more than 72 hours unless she could prove that she had lived there continuously since birth, or for a continuous period of 15 years, or for 10 years working for one employer. The practical effect of that inhuman piece of legislation was that black women in South Africa were in fact prevented from living with their husbands working in white urban areas, that families were split up and the wives obliged to live in unnatural communities inhabited only by women, children and old people. Working women in urban areas had to send their children to rural relatives, and children lost all right to reside in urban areas.

20. What could States do through the United Nations and as individual nations to curb the evils of *apartheid* in southern Africa? Like the policies of *apartheid*, the struggle for freedom in the entire region had been intensified over the last decade. It was of paramount importance for the international community to assist in appropriate ways the efforts of the people of southern Africa to liberate themselves from their oppressors and to reach, with their meagre resources, a higher social and educational level in liberated areas. The General Assembly had repeatedly urged all States and organizations to provide moral and material assistance to the liberation movements in southern Africa. His delegation had studied with interest the relevant chapter of the current report of the Special Committee (A/8022, and, in particular, the recommendations made in paragraph 125. His delegation shared the view that the peoples struggling to gain their freedom had the right to expect moral and material assistance from the outside world, provided the assistance fell within the framework of the Charter and was in keeping with international law.

21. Recalling statements made by his delegation at previous sessions which had emphasized the role of public information in undermining the racial doctrine on which *apartheid* policies were founded, he stressed the importance of making more effective use of that instrument. The world

must be made more fully aware of the evil effects caused by the *apartheid* system inside South Africa. That was a very difficult task indeed, partly because news concerning the systematic violations of human rights in southern Africa did not receive the priority treatment in the world's mass media which they deserved. The United Nations had performed a great service in that connexion, but it depended to a large degree on informed and enlightened public opinion in the individual Member States. To that end, his Government had made additional resources available that year for the dissemination in Sweden of information on the *apartheid* system. Further studies on the question of dissemination of information were essential, and, in that connexion, the Secretary-General should be asked to prepare a detailed report considering the problem in all its aspects. He wished to express his gratitude to the Unit on *Apartheid* for the excellent work embodied in its series of special publications on the question.

22. A second set of instruments for concerted action which his country had supported was assistance both within and outside the United Nations system. For his country, such assistance took the form of helping victims of *apartheid* by providing them with legal and material aid and by helping to equip those working for freedom with the kind of knowledge and skills they would need when their aspirations were fulfilled. His delegation considered that international and national action aimed at the effective implementation of education and training programmes for the oppressed peoples of southern Africa would be facilitated if the United Nations carried out a detailed and comprehensive survey of what was needed for that purpose, so as to assist those who wished to provide such aid in accordance with relevant United Nations resolutions. Such a survey would not only lead to an increased flow of assistance, but would also draw the attention of world opinion to the rights of the oppressed millions of South Africa.

23. That kind of humanitarian assistance was not intended to replace actions which were the concern of other United Nations organs, especially the Security Council. His delegation had recently expressed its regret at the fact that weapons found their way into South Africa in spite of the pertinent resolutions of the Security Council. In that connexion, his delegation welcomed the decision of France to reconsider its policies on the question and expressed its earnest hope that the United Kingdom Government would not change its policy in the opposite direction. The Secretary-General had been asked to report to the General Assembly on the situation of arms imports in South Africa, but his delegation considered that information already available would serve as a sufficient basis for further consideration of the matter in the Security Council with a view to tightening the embargo and possibly making it binding on all Member States.

24. The growing political, economic and military involvement of the Republic of South Africa in the southern African region as a whole had the twofold effect of extending the doctrine and practices of *apartheid* to new areas and of increasing the threat to international peace and security. In that connexion, it was essential to recognize the importance of strengthening the economic and political stability of free Africa and the need for special measures to

assist those countries which were situated in the immediate neighbourhood of South Africa. His delegation wished to reiterate its position that the Security Council should resume its consideration of all aspects of the problems connected with South Africa's *apartheid* policy, including the question of sanctions. The Swedish Foreign Minister had stated before the General Assembly at its twenty-first session (1434th plenary meeting) that his country considered it proper and necessary, in principle, to apply economic sanctions in order to bring the policy of *apartheid* to an end and that such measures, to become effective, would require the participation of the major trading nations. In his delegation's opinion, the report<sup>2</sup> of the Expert Committee deserved serious consideration by the Security Council. In the absence of such consideration, the dark reality of the current South African scene might change into an even darker and more threatening future.

25. Mr. AKATANI (Japan) said that he would confine his statement to the consideration of practical and realistic approaches to the elimination of the entrenched system of racial discrimination in South Africa, which virtually the entire international community was determined to oppose. Like President Nyerere of the United Republic of Tanzania, as he had stated during the commemorative session of the General Assembly (1867th plenary meeting) his delegation firmly believed that true peace and security for the world could never be realized or maintained without justice. Every possible effort must be made to restore justice in the southern part of Africa by eliminating the racial policy which denied to the African people their freedom and dignity as men. The essential fact was that in South Africa, racial prejudice was institutionalized by the legal system and rationalized by such an irrational political concept as "separate development".

26. His country had been and continued to be strongly opposed to any form of racial discrimination. It would continue to make every effort to ensure the elimination of *apartheid* and to appeal to the conscience of all the people in South Africa to reconsider their racial prejudices. In view of the lack of success in solving the problem of *apartheid*, his delegation expressed its sympathy with the impatience and the political and psychological frustration of many African countries. However, it was unable to agree with the contention that resort to force was necessary. If the legal system of racial discrimination in South Africa was to be changed by force, African countries would have to contemplate a long period of armed struggle with much bloodshed. If a free and just Africa was to appeal to the conscience of South Africa, as the representative of the Ivory Coast had stated (700th meeting), it was important to refrain from resorting to arms.

27. He did not believe that all the possible measures had been exhausted. First of all, the arms embargo against South Africa should be strictly observed. His delegation did not believe that it was possible to make a valid distinction between arms for external purposes and arms for domestic or internal purposes. Since any arms could easily be utilized for suppressing the African people in South Africa, it definitely opposed any kind of arms sale to that country. It

commended the many countries which had observed the arms embargo and asked all other countries to refrain from supporting South Africa by supplying it with arms. His country had strictly observed all the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly concerning the arms embargo, and his delegation had voted in favour of the resolution on the subject recently adopted by the General Assembly (resolution 2624 (XXV)) and would continue to support the arms embargo.

28. Turning to the question of economic investment in South Africa, he said that while his country had been strengthening its economic relations with African countries north of the Zambezi River in the form of investments and technical co-operation, it had constantly discouraged any investment in South Africa. In that connexion, the statement made by the representative of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (705th meeting) implying that Japan had direct investments in South Africa was without foundation. Several delegations had referred to his country's trade with South Africa during the general debate. As a trading nation, Japan had been increasing its trade with many countries in Africa, and, for example, its imports from Zambia in 1969 had surpassed its imports from South Africa during that year. Economic ties between his country and African countries, including economic and technical co-operation, would be further strengthened in the future.

29. Many General Assembly resolutions, as well as many of the speakers in the current debate, had called for the political and diplomatic as well as economic isolation of South Africa. In that connexion, he wished to make it clear that his country had no diplomatic relations with South Africa, nor had it any intention of establishing any in the foreseeable future. Since it could not agree to the use of force, and since it believed that *apartheid* and racial prejudices were based on historical, economic, political and other factors, his country was firmly convinced that it was essential to continue the dialogue with South Africa at all levels in order to create a better atmosphere for the transformation and eventual elimination of *apartheid*. That process of dialogue admittedly required a long period of patience and practical wisdom, but it was essential for political change.

30. On the other hand, like most other countries of the world, Japan believed that *apartheid* was against the principle of justice and equality for all peoples and that the firm commitment of the international community to oppose that policy must be demonstrated by action. It was known that opposition to *apartheid* was becoming stronger in South Africa itself and that the official policy of barring Africans from skilled or even semi-skilled employment was causing a serious shortage of skilled labour. It was becoming increasingly evident that *apartheid* was incompatible with the economic development of the country. His Government considered that the education and training of southern Africans could make a great contribution to the gradual elimination of *apartheid* and it wished to encourage progress in that field. Since 1966 his country had contributed \$20,000 annually to the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa and had made an additional contribution of \$20,000 for the year 1970. It had also made a contribution in 1970 of \$10,000 to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, in addition to

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twentieth Year, Special Supplement No. 2.*

a contribution in the same amount made the previous year on the occasion of the commemoration of the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.

31. He concluded by stating his delegation's firm conviction that Japan would continue to make the greatest possible contribution to the elimination of racial discrimination in southern Africa and to the restoration of justice and freedom for all the African peoples.

32. Mr. MOLAPO (Lesotho) said that his delegation was obliged to intervene on a point of clarification regarding a reference made during the preceding meeting by the Indian delegation to the situation of the African refugees in Lesotho, in the context of the repressive measures adopted by the Government of South Africa against the opponents of *apartheid*. His delegation was concerned over the fact that that reference might give the impression, intentionally or otherwise, that his country was in collusion with South Africa in practising repressive measures against South African refugees in Lesotho.

33. His Government was not in any way apologetic about the manner in which it had lived up to its moral obligations regarding the welfare of the political refugees. In fact, it might be of interest to delegations to note that Lesotho had been formed by refugees. Despite its particularly vulnerable position, it had not sacrificed its principles but had extended its protection to political refugees from South Africa. That was a very bold step for a country in its position, but one which it was not prepared to compromise if it was to remain true to its tradition as an oasis of freedom in southern Africa.

34. His country would continue to welcome *bona fide* political refugees from the Republic of South Africa, and he stressed that its criterion for judging *bona fide* refugees was not the same as South Africa's. Lesotho would continue to protect the refugees and honour its pledge not to return them to South Africa, but, at the same time, it would always place equal stress on requiring the minimum standards of courtesy to the host country and would not expect those refugees to meddle in its domestic political affairs.

35. The report of the Special Committee (A/8022) referred—in paragraph 96—to his country's intention to conclude with the Republic of South Africa an extradition treaty which would facilitate the return of criminals from either side. Just as his country had other agreements with South Africa relating to its economy, owing to its geographical situation, it followed that Lesotho could not do without a treaty normalizing the extradition of criminals across the border. He noted that, in the related negotiations, his Government was well aware that the word

“criminal” in South Africa had connotations of a political or racial nature which his own country did not endorse. For example, offenders under the Immorality Act were labelled criminals in South Africa. His Government would not return a refugee charged under such legislation to the Republic of South Africa. Demonstrations against *apartheid* were also criminal offences in South Africa, but his Government would not recognize them as such.

36. As the Prime Minister of Lesotho had announced before the General Assembly on 19 October 1970 (1873rd plenary meeting), his country had chosen the path of dialogue and negotiation in its approach to all those questions, not because its people were cowards or were tempted by rhetoric, but because they, more than any other people, shared the suffering of the black masses of South Africa, the majority of whom were related to them by blood, and because of their dedication to the solution of their immediate problems. Without that dialogue, his country could not have succeeded in obtaining for some of those refugees guarantees of safe transit to the outside world through the Republic of South Africa.

37. It might be of interest to the Indian delegation to note that there were in Lesotho refugees of Indian origin who had been forced to flee from certain provinces of South Africa not because of their opposition to *apartheid* but purely because of their origins. They were unable even to cross into South Africa for a day to shop or to seek medical facilities. His Government had not only offered asylum to refugees of that type, but had gone so far as to extend Lesotho citizenship to them.

38. Explaining that his intervention had been motivated by his delegation's desire to set the record straight and to make certain clarifications, he took the opportunity to commend the Indian delegation on its great contribution to United Nations efforts to eradicate the policy of *apartheid* and expressed the hope that its statement had not been intended to give the impression that the Government of Lesotho was somehow in collusion with the South African Government with a view to furthering that policy.

39. In conclusion, he stated his delegation's concern at the inclusion in the report of the Special Committee of a section entitled “The situation of certain South African refugees in Lesotho”. In the view of his Government, the fact that those refugees happened to be from South Africa in no way entitled the Special Committee to venture beyond its terms of reference. The case in point set a dangerous precedent which, in the future, might affect other sovereign African States which also offered asylum to South African refugees.

*The meeting rose at 4.40 p.m.*