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The policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa: report of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (continued) 1

Chairman: Mr. Abdulrahim Abby FARAH
(Somalia).

AGENDA ITEM 31

The policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa: report of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (continued) (A/7254, A/7259, A/7270)

1. Mr. EL-FATTAL (Syria) said that his delegation wished to convey its condolences to the Saudi Arabian delegation for the premature death of Mr. Omar Azouni.

2. Twenty years earlier, while Western colonialism had been drawing up its neo-colonial strategy against the peoples of Asia and Africa, a white minority in South Africa had been embarking on a new and vicious offensive against fundamental human rights. Ironically enough, that same year had witnessed the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: the year 1968, which had been designated an International Year for Human Rights, was also the twentieth anniversary of the rise of nazism in South Africa. In 1968, the struggle against apartheid had entered a new stage which would inevitably compel the United Nations radically to revise its strategy and tactics in order to eradicate apartheid once and for all. His delegation believed that the means of fighting apartheid should be geared to match the rising tide of southern African national liberation movements.

3. His country's bitter experience in the Middle East had made it clear that verbal condemnation could only encourage those who opposed the objectives of the United Nations. Resounding speeches and additional still-born resolutions would be of little use. Instead, objectives should be defined in revolutionary terms, and three basic questions should be answered once and for all: who were the enemies, how should they be fought, and what progress had been achieved in previous confrontations with them?

4. It was evident that the Pretoria régime was the declared enemy. However, some delegations shirked the duty of singling out the undeclared enemy, in whose

hands South Africa was merely a tool. Those who helped and connived with South Africa in committing crimes against humanity were equally guilty, including the United Kingdom, the United States, West Germany and the other Powers who had chosen to back the colonial situation by proxy. The many documents before the Committee substantiated that accusation. His country's own unhappy experiences with those Powers had proved that their desire for profit overrode all other human considerations. Moreover, there had been recent indications that the close ties between the United States, the United Kingdom and West Germany on the one hand and South Africa on the other were being strengthened in a more open and unabashed manner.

5. From 18 to 21 October 1968, Mr. Joseph Palmer, II, the United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, had paid an official courtesy visit to South Africa. According to The New York Times correspondent in Johannesburg, that visit had marked a change in the United States attitude towards Pretoria. According to that source, discussions had apparently been held regarding the key position of South Africa in Western military strategy because of its position at the foot of Africa, its command of the sea route around the Cape of Good Hope and its stand against communism. That visit to Mr. Vorster was closely linked with the strategy of pushing Western domination into the heart of Africa by encouraging Israel to advance towards the Nile River, on the one hand, and helping South Africa to extend its power towards the Zambezi River, on the other. It was no coincidence that both Israel and South Africa openly claimed to have an informal alliance with the United States.

6. As for the second question, namely, how to confront South Africa and its allies, the report of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa stated that the liberation movement in South Africa had reluctantly come to the conclusion that armed struggle was the only means left for the achievement of the rights and freedoms recognized in the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (see A/7254, para. 93). His delegation fully agreed with that conclusion and considered that the liberation movement deserved the moral and material support of the international community. His people and Government, themselves engaged in a war of national liberation, would not fail to support that sacred struggle against imperialism and colonialism, for they were convinced that colonialism, wherever it manifested itself, derived its power, doctrines and aims from the same source.

7. The third task of the Committee was to assess the progress and results of the common struggle against apartheid in the course of the preceding year. His

delegation had carefully analysed the report of the Special Committee and had been impressed by the relevance and adequacy of the information it provided. Moreover, it had carefully studied the data in the report entitled Foreign Investment in the Republic of South Africa issued by the Unit on Apartheid of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs of the Secretariat.^{1/} It had also followed closely the activities of the Special Rapporteur appointed by the Commission on Human Rights and of the delegation of the Committee of Twenty-four^{2/} at the International Conference of Human Rights held at Teheran in April and May 1968. From all it had read and observed, his delegation had concluded that the situation had deteriorated.

8. The major trading partners of South Africa had substantially increased their trade with and investment in South Africa, the embargo on arms was still not respected by many Western countries and South Africa had been able to extend its military striking force to the frontiers of Zambia and the United Republic of Tanzania, threatening both countries with military action. The only ray of hope his delegation could discern was that there existed an emerging national liberation movement and an increased awareness throughout the progressive world of the menace to peace and security in that area.

9. His delegation was particularly grateful to the Special Committee for its efforts to pursue the campaign against that policy. Its visits to Europe had contributed to that campaign. His delegation wished to suggest that such visits should be extended to the capitals of Africa, Asia and Latin America, as well as to other peace-loving countries, in order to obtain more support for the African national liberation movements and to explain to what extent the situation in the southern part of Africa threatened peace and security. Moreover, by visiting the major trading partners of South Africa, the Committee would be in a position to open the eyes of their peoples to the dangers arising from their monopolies in southern Africa.

10. One important development in the colonial situation in South Africa was generally glossed over. Since Israel's war of aggression in June 1967, the Israel occupiers had stubbornly prevented the clearance of the Suez Canal, thus diverting routes of trade and communication to South Africa. That had provided the South African economy with new resources and had substantially improved its strategic position in the eyes of NATO. The Special Committee should, therefore, at its earliest convenience, begin to collect data on the effects of the closure of the Suez Canal on the economy and the strategic position of South Africa. Such a study would reveal the connexion between the ever-growing aggressiveness and arrogance of Israel and South Africa, and would unmask the motives behind the thrust of Pretoria towards the Zambezi and that of Tel Aviv towards the Nile.

11. In conclusion, his delegation wished to state that it had full confidence in the ability of the people of South Africa to obtain their freedom. The peoples of

the Third World had everything to gain and little to lose in their battle against apartheid, colonialism and imperialism.

12. Mrs. GAVRILOVA (Bulgaria) said that South Africa, after Viet-Nam and the Middle East, was the region which was charged with the greatest tension and held the greatest potential danger of a military conflict, which would have dire consequences not only for Africa, but for the entire world. It was evident from the report of the Special Committee (A/7254) and from the introduction to the annual report of the Secretary-General (A/7201/Add.1) that there had been no improvement in the racist policy of the Government of the Republic of South Africa; on the contrary, there was evidence that apartheid was being strengthened both inside that country and beyond its frontiers. The International Year for Human Rights had been the occasion for the sentencing of scores of patriots of Namibia, which South Africa had illegally continued to maintain in colonial bondage in defiance of all the decisions of the United Nations.

13. The Pretoria régime was attempting to convert apartheid into an export article and to extend it by means of reactionary sister régimes in neighbouring African States. All the information available indicated that South Africa was attempting to build up a racist bulwark for imperialism and neo-colonialism on the African continent and to create a military bloc aimed against both the national independence of the new African States and the liberation movement which was relentlessly spreading throughout Africa. The militarization of South Africa was by no means of a defensive nature, for none of the neighbouring countries had threatened that country with war.

14. It should come as no surprise that Western imperialist circles were vitally interested in the success of that policy and were strengthening the South African régime by every means. At the same time they were condemning apartheid in the United Nations and even participating in international movements and funds to help the victims of that policy. For several years now the representatives of the peoples of the world had censured the policy of the major imperialist Powers which politically and economically supported the South African régime. The competent bodies of the United Nations had adopted decisions and resolutions appealing to those Powers to put an end to their economic relations with South Africa and to cease their deliveries of military equipment to that country.

15. For several years already, United Nations documents and the speeches of representatives of various Member States had emphasized that the chief barrier to the implementation of United Nations resolutions by the South African Government was the open and secret ties existing between the imperialist countries and the racist Pretoria régime and the all-round assistance which they afforded it. The Committee, in its annual examination of the question of apartheid was encountering the same old barriers. Each year, it had to note that previous resolutions and recommendations had not been complied with, and that the racist South African régime had grown stronger. That was why many delegations held the view that it would be necessary for the United Nations not only to condemn categorically the Government of South Africa, but also to

^{1/} United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.68.II.K.8.

^{2/} Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

call to account the governing circles of countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom which supported the South African régime either directly or indirectly.

16. It was paradoxical that many Western States Members of the United Nations, who were political and economic partners of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Territories under Portuguese administration, could at the same time recognize the struggle against apartheid and the existence of national liberation movements in those countries as lawful. It was right to ask how long the great Powers of the West would continue that double game. Many delegations had been justified in insisting that the question of apartheid should be placed once again before the Security Council. But it would be meaningful to do so only if the Council were categorically to condemn the Government of the Republic of South Africa and its principal economic and military partners, the ruling circles of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and the other States referred to in the report of the Unit on Apartheid of the Secretariat entitled Foreign Investment in the Republic of South Africa. The Security Council must recommend that United Nations Members should apply against South Africa the same economic and military sanctions as in the case of Southern Rhodesia; it must call upon all States Members, specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations to expand their assistance to liberation movements in South Africa and to all victims of apartheid; it must compel South Africa immediately and unconditionally to comply with United Nations resolutions concerning the withdrawal of its administration from the Territory of Namibia.

17. The racist régime of Mr. Vorster's Government was not an internal matter, nor was it limited to the African continent. Like the military intervention of the United States in Viet-Nam and the aggression of Israel against the Arab countries of the Middle East, the policy of apartheid affected the whole of mankind, for it was in fact a manifestation of fascism on African soil, and the destruction of fascism was in the interests of all the peoples of the world.

18. As a result of the systematic research carried out by United Nations bodies over the previous twenty years, the problem of apartheid had been clearly presented in world opinion. The racist régime of Pretoria and Salisbury were morally isolated; the policy of apartheid and its extension in southern Africa had been rejected and condemned by the whole of progressive mankind. Even the partners and friends of the South African Government overseas no longer dared to defend that policy openly or to acknowledge their ties with its authors.

19. In his letter of 9 April 1968 (A/7123), the Permanent Representative of South Africa, Mr. Botha, had attempted to justify theoretically the South African régime. He had held that political separatism was a perfectly appropriate means of governing multiracial States. He had even recommended that policy to other Governments, pointing to the prosperity and well-regulated development of South Africa. Such prosperity, of course, was for the industrialists and property owners of the white minority and for their overseas partners, while "well-regulated develop-

ment" meant imprisonment, hangings, beatings and other forms of terrorism of the coloured population that had converted South Africa into a country reminiscent of the darkest days of the Dark Ages. There was nothing new in the apartheid administration recommended by the Permanent Representative of South Africa; it was merely a nazi colonialist method of pitting one ethnic, national or racial group against another so as to ensure their subjugation.

20. The racists of the Pretoria régime were aware that there was a progressive method of administering multinational and multiracial States, a method which guaranteed the total equality of all groups before the law, with equal and parallel development of all nationalities within the context of a single State. That democratic method of administration was in accordance with the character of the contemporary world, in which there remained few homogeneous national States. There were excellent examples throughout the world of completely harmonious multinational Governments, particularly in socialist States, of which the prime example was the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a great socialist fraternity of nations which had been in existence for half a century. Socialist Cuba, too, was an example of such a society.

21. The letter of the representative of South Africa was designed to confuse world public opinion. The United Nations must resist such attempts only by perseverance could it overcome the South African racists. Her delegation was convinced that African patriots would succeed in overthrowing the South African régime. Her country knew from experience that there was no other course, and would continue to help the struggle for national liberation in Africa with all the means at its disposal. It maintained no political, economic or cultural ties with the racist Pretoria Government or with the illegal Southern Rhodesian régime. It participated in all United Nations activities directed against the policy of apartheid and in applying economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, and it was prepared to comply fully with any future measures directed against those régimes.

22. In conclusion, she wished to express her delegation's deepest sympathy at the untimely death of the representative of Saudi Arabia.

23. U SOE TIN (Burma) said that, since the end of the Second World War, the African and Asian nations had followed with concern the trend of developments in South Africa. The most audacious of all assertions made by man, that of superiority based on the colour of skin, became all the more deplorable when made by colonial settlers in a land where their dark-skinned brethren had dwelt for centuries. The racial policies of the Government of South Africa, a Member nation which had accepted the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, had been under constant discussion in the United Nations since the first session of the General Assembly in 1946. In the various resolutions adopted on the subject, the General Assembly had consistently declared that the racial policies of the Government of South Africa were a violation of that country's obligations, under the Charter, to promote the observance of rights and fundamental freedoms. But despite all peaceful efforts made within the United Nations, as well as friendly appeals from allied

Powers, the South African Government continued to flout the world's moral indignation.

24. The report of the Special Committee (A/7254) had confirmed that the situation in South Africa was fast deteriorating, with resulting dangers of a violent racial conflict. The intensified application of apartheid and the recent repressive legislation had driven the opposition, which had started as a peaceful civil disobedience movement, underground, and had convinced its leaders that their legitimate rights could be regained only through armed struggle. The white minority Government of South Africa had not only continued to enforce its racial policies with more determination within its territories but had also attempted to extend the influence of its racial philosophy to neighbouring territories, particularly Namibia and Southern Rhodesia. In the introduction to his annual report to the General Assembly (A/7201/Add.1), the Secretary-General had drawn attention to the dangers of collision in South Africa.

25. Racial discrimination was repugnant to the traditions of Burmese culture and civilization and his country was opposed to racial discrimination in all its manifestations. His country's sympathies were entirely with the coloured people of South Africa who had suffered and were still suffering from severe repressive measures, from a very systematic discrimination in all respects of life and from a very thorough exploitation by a determined white minority government seeking to reserve the affluent society and a booming economy for the Whites themselves. It could therefore understand the resentment of African representatives at the conduct of the racist Government of South Africa and felt that strong words of condemnation could be used and adoption of extreme measures advocated with full justification. However, harsh condemnation alone would not serve the required purpose and extreme measures could at times be self-defeating and it would refrain from indulging in these measures. In an endeavour, under the United Nations auspices, to prevail upon the Government of South Africa to abandon its policies, his country, like many other Member States, had severed all relations with that country. It also strongly supported the Security Council resolutions of 1963 and 1964 calling for an embargo on the sale and shipment to South Africa of all types of arms and military equipment. It was regrettable that those resolutions had been undermined by some of the Member States themselves and that the Security Council had not considered the question since June 1964. The reluctance of the main trading partners to join in effective international action, and the collaboration of powerful foreign economic and financial interests with the South African Government, had encouraged the racist régime to persist in its obnoxious policies. South Africa's main trading partners should therefore ponder on their grave responsibility for the deteriorating situation in southern Africa and co-operate with the United Nations in adopting effective measures to ensure the elimination of apartheid.

26. His delegation was convinced that only the timely, effective and practicable action by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter recommended by the Special Committee would make it possible to avert the present threat to international peace and security.

27. Mr. CUEVAS CANCINO (Mexico) said that, at the twenty-second session (562nd meeting), his delegation had suggested means of piercing South Africa's armour that might still prove useful. It strongly supported the statements made at the present session by the representative of Chile (604th meeting) and Brazil (600th meeting). It was beyond question that the only future for mankind lay in the constant mixture of all its peoples and the composition of a universal culture to which all human populations would make personal and unique contributions, thus producing new and powerful currents which would set a single coherent goal for the future. There was much scientific data to prove that any culture which prohibited the integration of various human groups was destined to perish.

28. The elimination of the policy of apartheid would require both international and domestic efforts. His delegation would vote in favour of draft resolutions designed to isolate the Republic of South Africa and thus compel it to change its policy, if that was the wish of the majority of the Committee. He thought, however, that it would be a serious error to overlook the existing political elements which, even if minor, did indicate mental changes within the Republic itself which would serve as a foundation for the peaceful elimination of apartheid, a solution desired by all Member States.

29. So far, apartheid appeared to have been considered exclusively in particular terms. The new approach of examining the problem from the general standpoint might produce a solution. It could be a mistake to assume that the policy of apartheid was unique even in comparatively recent history. The Spanish colonists had established similar conditions in his own country and it was only in 1910 that the modern Mexico, founded on the principle of ignoring all racial distinctions, had been established. The phenomenon of apartheid, which was motivated by colonialism, was therefore by no means unique in the annals of history.

30. His delegation shared the Special Committee's disappointment at the United Nations relative inefficacy in combating apartheid and its concern about the danger of violence. It therefore viewed the conclusions contained in paragraphs 93 and 98 of the report (A/7254) with misgiving, since any armed conflict would lead to untold human suffering. Every effort should be directed towards avoiding that armed conflict and towards achieving by peaceful means the necessary human equality which would one day inevitably prevail in southern Africa. Account should therefore be taken of the positive elements which, although minor, did exist in that country. In recent months, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa had made his first visit to an independent African State; changes in the South African cabinet had strengthened the so-called enlightened movement and removed from office the opponents of any departure from the policy of absolute racism; there had been a strike of students at Cape Town University in favour of the appointment of a South African professor of negro origin and an unsuccessful mass protest by students in another city for the same reason; the pastoral letter of the Protestant Bishops in the Republic of South Africa had also protested against the policy of apartheid. Those elements which, although limited, were posi-

tive, should be taken into account by the Committee because the best allies in the fight against apartheid were the South Africans themselves, whatever their colour, and the Organization's efforts at the international level could be considered successful if they achieved a domestic change of mind.

31. At the twenty-second session, his delegation had recommended that the various problems affecting the southern part of the African continent should be studied separately because the United Nations would be undermining its own efforts if it continued to group together similar elements whose interests were not necessarily identical.

32. His delegation strongly supported the various conclusions made by the representative of Brazil and particularly that United Nations efforts should be guided not by hatred of the oppressor but by love for the oppressed. The Special Committee should continue its action from the educational standpoint rather than in a militant spirit and should support any dissident elements in the Republic itself through the campaign of information and persuasion suggested by the Brazilian representative. To the uninterrupted efforts of the United Nations should be added others directed primarily at South African youth which, like youth throughout the world, would not remain static in positions determined by their predecessors.

33. Mr. TAKAHASHI (Japan) said that, after a thorough study of the report of the Special Committee (A/7254), his delegation had noted with concern that the situation in the Republic of South Africa showed no sign of improvement. It was deeply regrettable that, at a time when the United Nations was commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the South African Government continued to deny the greater part of its own citizens the fundamental human rights enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

34. The determined opposition of his country's Government to all forms of racial discrimination was well known. Its people had encountered such discrimination in various parts of the world when, a hundred years previously, it had emerged from isolation and had begun the process of modern development. Japan had been the only country that had made an effort to include the principle of racial equality in the Covenant of the League of Nations. That effort had not been successful but the principle had been incorporated in various Articles of the United Nations Charter.

35. The South African Government quoted Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter to deny the right of the United Nations to take effective action to eliminate apartheid. That position was certainly unacceptable since the United Nations could not remain indifferent to any form of racial discrimination which was condemned in so many Articles of the same Charter. His delegation reiterated its appeal to the South African Government to recognize that the abolition of racial discrimination was historically inevitable and to understand that there would be no peace and prosperity in southern Africa without harmonious co-operation among all peoples concerned.

36. Many people had argued that, other means having failed, it was necessary to resort to enforcement action to bring an end to apartheid in southern Africa. His delegation fully understood the strong moral sentiment which motivated such arguments but was convinced that, in the final analysis, the solution should be sought in a thorough assessment of the situation in all its aspects and a careful consideration of the merits and demerits of various forms of action which could be taken. The solution by peaceful means of the many difficult problems confronting the international community was a cardinal principle of the Charter. To be truly effective, proposals for the solution of the apartheid problem must be practical and realistic. If any substantial part of the world community did not support a particular measure, it was bound to fail.

37. His country had faithfully and consistently complied with the decisions taken by the Security Council on the question and would continue to do so. It had strictly observed the arms embargo, had extended no military or economic assistance to South Africa and had refrained from diplomatic relations with that country. Japan was willing to join in all the United Nations efforts to seek a practical and realistic solution. It had contributed \$20,000 annually to the education and training programme for South Africans since 1966 and would contribute \$10,000 to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa in the near future. Despite allegations to the contrary, it had no capital investment whatsoever in South Africa.

38. The regrets and frustrations felt by all in their efforts to deal effectively with the problem of apartheid should lead neither to defeatist resignation nor to extremist rashness. The problem was an exceedingly complex one which could be solved only by continued patient yet determined efforts.

39. Mr. ODERO (Kenya) observed that, despite General Assembly and Security Council resolutions calling upon South Africa to abandon its criminal policies of apartheid, the white racist régime continued to defy the Organization and world opinion alike with impunity. For its part, the United Nations appeared unable effectively to implement its resolutions. The Organization's apparent failure in that critical area of its work and the continued suffering of millions of Africans in South Africa augured ill for mankind's future. The general plight of millions of indigenous South Africans had continued to worsen and his delegation had been concerned to note the deterioration of race relations throughout the entire southern area of the continent. The Kenyan Minister for Foreign Affairs had said at the present session of the General Assembly (1696th plenary meeting) that the policies of the South African Government must be resolutely opposed by all striving for justice, equality and human dignity. He had said that the political, economic and social oppression of 14 million Africans by 4 million Whites was a definite, serious threat to inter-racial harmony and world peace and that South Africa now symbolized the forcible extension of racist régime beyond its borders.

40. The minority racist régime in South Africa had been enabled to pursue its suppression of the Africans through the economic and military support of the

major Western Powers which continued to trade with that country in total disregard of the United Nations call for a trade embargo. It was ironical that the minority régime should find support from Powers which generally boasted of their democratic institutions. It was common knowledge that the Western Powers could contribute decisively to the defeat of the policies of apartheid by implementing the United Nations resolutions. His delegation unreservedly condemned those countries which continued to trade with South Africa in defiance of United Nations resolutions.

41. His own country was fundamentally and totally opposed to racial discrimination and the denial of human rights and thus condemned the policies of apartheid of the South African racist régime. Unless the Organization acted now to halt the trend towards oppression and criminal injustice in South Africa, the whole of southern Africa would face unprecedented racial conflict and bloodshed. Until the indigenous peoples took their legitimate place in their own country, no force on earth could shake their determination, and that of the people of Africa as a whole, to wipe out the practice of apartheid.

42. His delegation commended the Special Committee for the lucidity of its report; it supported the recommendations therein and urged all Member States, particularly the major Powers, to do likewise and implement those recommendations without delay.

43. Mr. ERELL (Israel), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, regretted that the Syrian representative should have taken advantage of the current debate to further his Government's campaign against Israel. It appeared that the Syrian Government was denouncing Israel in order to conceal its own flouting of the United Nations. That Government had officially rejected the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 (242 (1967)) and had rejected the mission of the Secretary-General's Special Representative under that resolution. Furthermore, it refused to recognize any permanent borders for Israel—for purposes which were obvious. The Syrian representative had also referred to the closure of the Suez Canal—presumably in the hope that the Committee had forgotten who had blocked it and who had driven the United Nations Emergency Force from Sinai. His own Government would be glad to see the Canal opened to unhindered navigation by all States at the earliest possible date, in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions. The Syrian Government would contribute more to advancing the purposes of the United Nations and to reopening the Canal if it were to fall in with the general will of the United Nations to see peace established in the Middle East.

44. As to the Bulgarian representative's remarks, he would point out that the accusation of aggression she had made had been rejected by the General Assembly and the Security Council in 1967.

45. Mr. EL-FATTAL (Syria), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the issue before the Committee was the analysis of all factors perpetuating apartheid and the search for ways to eradicate that policy. The Israel representative had been irritated because the covert and overt alliance between the

Israel authorities and those of Pretoria had been unmasked. His own delegation had not referred to the Israel policy of apartheid in Israel and in the occupied Arab territories. The alliance between Israel and Pretoria was evident: first, both countries based their policies on the concept of racial exclusivity, which explained why the Palestine Arabs had been evicted from their homeland; secondly, both were supported by the same imperialist Powers, and both aimed at buttressing Western imperialist influence and extending that influence to many parts of the world; thirdly, both were expansionist—there was no difference between the occupation of Arab territories and that of Namibia; fourthly, both had consistently refused to implement United Nations resolutions.

46. The Economist, commenting in August 1968 on statements by South African Ministers, had said that South Africa had been deeply impressed by the Israel example of raids against Al-Fattah bases across the Jordan, adding that there was a growing feeling in South Africa that the forces of the white south could deliver a quick blow against the camps of guerrillas operating against South Africa. Furthermore, the New York Post of 4 November 1968 had quoted a rabbi expelled from South Africa for his views on apartheid as criticizing Jews who benefited from the racial hell of South Africa. His delegation could offer much further proof of the close co-operation between Tel Aviv and Pretoria.

47. Mr. ERELL (Israel), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that no Government could have the benefits of both war and peace; the Syrian Government could not demand that its own sovereignty should be respected while refusing to respect the sovereignty of another Member State. The Government of Israel provided a greater degree of equality, social progress and political rights for its people than did the Syrian Government. There was no segregation whatsoever in Israel and no denial of political rights. There were Arab representatives in the Israel Parliament, but no Jewish representatives in the Syrian Parliament.

48. Mrs. GAVRILOVA (Bulgaria), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that it was customary in her country to call everything, including political phenomena, by its proper name; it was regrettable that the truth should have displeased the Israel representative.

49. Mr. KABINGA (Zambia) recalled that the Mexican representative had referred to the recent visit of the South African Minister for Foreign Affairs to "an independent African State" as representing a mental change in South Africa. His delegation did not regard that visit as evidence of any such change. The motives for it had been, first, to mislead the world into believing that there had been a change in South Africa and, secondly, to create an ad hoc frontier in the north of Rhodesia as a stepping stone for further aggression.

50. Mr. EL-FATTAL (Syria), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the closure of the Suez Canal was relevant to the situation in southern Africa in that it had benefited South Africa economically. His delegation therefore asked that the Special Com-

mittee should investigate to what extent the closure of the Suez Canal was contributing to the strengthening of South Africa's position. The closure had also improved South Africa's strategic position with regard to NATO.

51. As to the question of human rights in Israel, he wished to remind the Committee that 450,000 people had been evicted from the West Bank of the Jordan, while 120,000 Syrians had been evicted from the Golan Heights.

52. As to the close co-operation between Israel and South Africa, a magazine published by the Executive Secretariat of the Organization of the Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America in June 1968 had given news of a plan for Israel to intervene in South Africa, against the exploited African people, as a prospective supplier of Arava aircraft for use against African freedom fighters.

53. Mr. ERELL (Israel), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, completely denied the Syrian representative's accusation that there was any plan for co-operation between Israel and South Africa in the supply of aircraft for the South African armed forces.

54. His delegation urged all peace-loving Members of the United Nations to help create the atmosphere in which the Syrian Government would see its way to giving up cold war tactics and other tactics of warfare to turn instead to policies of peace.

55. Mr. EL-FATTAL (Syria) said that the Committee had heard no denial of the accusation that there was co-operation between Israel and the Pretoria régime in the economic field as well as in the military field. Every Member State had spoken during the current session to demand that Israel should withdraw its forces from Arab territory. Everyone knew who had started the war in June 1967; those responsible were evicting the population of the occupied territories in order to colonize them and, in the Golan Heights, nine Israeli settlements had been established.

56. The CHAIRMAN urged all speakers to exercise restraint in dealing with matters which might not directly contribute to progress on items before the Committee.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.