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**Chairman: Mr. Mihai MAGHERU (Romania).**

**AGENDA ITEM 26**

**Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and  
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near  
East (A/3931, A/3948, A/SPC/29) (continued)**

1. Mr. OGAWA (Japan) noted with appreciation that despite the grave difficulties encountered as a result of the new political disturbances in the Near East, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) had been able to continue its activities and had continued systematically to provide relief for the Palestine refugees. However, it was discouraging to learn, from the report of the Director of the Agency (A/3931), that there had been no new developments with regard to the repatriation of refugees, that the Government of Israel had taken no affirmative action to facilitate the implementation of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) concerning repatriation and compensation, and that, in the absence of a solution for that political problem, the Agency's attempts to carry out the task assigned to it by the Assembly, namely, the reintegration of the refugees into the economic life of the Near East, either by repatriation or by resettlement, would continue to be hampered.

2. His delegation sympathized with the lot of the refugees and understood their anxiety for repatriation. Japan, too, had faced a serious problem of repatriation after the Second World War in connexion with the millions of Japanese abroad who had wished to be repatriated even though their homes had been destroyed, their families had been dispersed and conditions in Japan had been entirely different from those which they had formerly known. Thanks to the assistance of several countries and its own persevering efforts, the Japanese Government had almost entirely solved that problem.

3. While the situation was admittedly quite different in the Near East, the feelings of refugees in wanting to return to their homeland were everywhere the same. His delegation knew that the question of repatriation of refugees raised very difficult political problems, but it was primarily a humanitarian question whose solution required the co-operation of all the countries concerned, in particular of the country to which the refugees wished to return.

4. Japan had shown its interest in the problem by

regularly contributing to the Agency since 1954, even before it had become a Member of the United Nations. It felt, however, that the contributions to the Agency should be used in a more constructive way than they had been in the past, in order to hasten the resettlement of the refugees with the full co-operation of the host countries. Otherwise, those contributions might not continue much longer. The States which made contributions expected them to be used for humanitarian purposes. If they were to learn that the intended use of their well-meant contributions was being thwarted because of political disputes, they might be discouraged from contributing in future.

5. The refugee problem presented many difficulties, but his delegation hoped that it could be solved in the near future if all the countries concerned showed goodwill and a humanitarian spirit.

6. Mr. Itaat HUSAIN (Pakistan) paid a tribute to Mr. Labouisse, the former Director of the Agency, for the devotion with which he had addressed himself to a particularly difficult task, and to Mr. Carver, the Acting Director, who had shown zeal and energy in carrying on with that task.

7. His delegation had the greatest sympathy with the Palestine refugees who, having been brutally driven out of their homes, had been languishing for ten years in camps in the expectation of obtaining justice. Unfortunately, Pakistan itself had to shoulder the problem of 7 million refugees who, after Pakistan had attained independence, had sought asylum on its soil in an utterly destitute condition. Although that put an unbearable strain on Pakistan's slender resources, his Government had made a modest contribution to the Agency every year and in 1959 would be contributing 100,000 Pakistan rupees.

8. The poignant plight of the refugees was due to the fact that General Assembly resolution 194 (III) had not been implemented. The cause of that situation was the behaviour of Israel, which had found many reasons against the repatriation of the refugees while opening its doors wide to the Jewish immigrants who were pouring into Israel from all countries of the world. No argument, however eloquent, could conceal the fact that the right of the refugees to return to their homes took precedence of the so-called rights which the State of Israel was adducing as reasons against their return. The General Assembly resolutions mentioned by the representative of Israel, and the innumerable citations on which he had rested his case, did not affect the letter or the spirit of resolution 194 (III) which gave the refugees the right to return to their homes or to receive compensation. It had been argued that the refugees wishing to return to their homes should, according to paragraph 11 of that resolution, have done so at the earliest practicable date, and that the resolution also required them to live at peace with their neighbours. The successive Directors of the Agency had

reported that the implementation of the General Assembly resolutions on the question could not be effective because of lack of co-operation on the part of Israel. As Israel had persistently defied the United Nations resolutions and prevented the refugees from exercising their choice, the representative of Israel was not entitled to say that it was now too late to take action under General Assembly resolution 194 (III). The right of the refugees to return to their homes could not depend on the consent of Israel. Similarly, it was futile to argue that the refugees could not return to Palestine because conditions in Israel had changed since the time when the refugees had left. As the representative of Saudi Arabia had pointed out (103rd meeting), the changed circumstances could not affect the fundamental rights of the refugees who still desired to return to their own country and had resisted all attempts at permanent settlement in the host countries.

9. In his statement at the 101st meeting (A/SPC/29), the Acting Director of the Agency had pointed out that even if the refugee problem was wholly settled tomorrow a large number of refugees would for several years require the modest assistance of the Agency and their children would need the education now being provided by that body. Such being the case, the wisdom of winding up the Agency and replacing it by another body seemed questionable. The sensible course, on the contrary, would be to increase its funds so as to enable it to continue its work. In all fairness, however, those funds should come from the countries responsible for establishing the State of Israel and not from those which had been opposed to the plan of partition.

10. His delegation failed to understand the third choice contained in paragraph 22 of the Acting Director's statement, namely, that the General Assembly could make arrangements for a study of the whole problem. The question had already been thoroughly studied and discussed, and all that was required to settle it was a realistic approach. His delegation would support any resolution providing for such an approach. The problem was still there and was a threat to the peace in the Middle East; the time had come to give up the ostrich policy. If the United Nations could not induce a State which was its own creation to carry out the decisions of the General Assembly, it was to be feared that public opinion would judge its inadequacy severely.

11. Mr. KHALIDI (Jordan) paid a tribute to the work of Mr. Labouisse, the former Director of the Agency, and congratulated Mr. Carver, the Acting Director, and the staff of the Agency for the manner in which they had overcome the difficulties encountered during the past year.

12. It had been pointed out on many occasions that the problem of the Palestine Arab refugees was an impediment to stable conditions in the Middle East. In a recent statement, Mr. Labouisse had made a penetrating analysis of the economic, psychological and political reasons why, despite ten years of effort by the Agency to resettle the refugees in host countries and make them self-supporting, the results obtained had been disappointing. Mr. Labouisse had explained that, purely on economic grounds, it was not possible for all refugees to be fully assimilated in the countries where they had found asylum. Even major projects like that of irrigating the Jordan Valley could not absorb more than a quarter of the refugees. There had been a suggestion that they should be moved to other Middle Eastern

countries, such as Iraq, where they could more easily be absorbed into the national economic life. Unfortunately, the refugees were opposed to that suggestion and, as Mr. Labouisse had said, they were encouraged in their attitude by unscrupulous agitators who exploited their misery. Their desire to return to their homes outweighed any other consideration, and it should not be forgotten that they had been encouraged in their hopes by various General Assembly resolutions, in particular resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948. Unfortunately, Mr. Labouisse had said, nothing had been done to implement that resolution. Except for a small category of people who at one time had been repatriated under the so-called "family reunion plan", the Government of Israel had refused to readmit any of the Arab refugees, and no refugee had yet received compensation for the loss of property.

13. In the introduction to his report (A/3931), the Director of the Agency pointed out that although the Agency was not directly concerned with political events in the Middle East, every incident of that kind had a direct impact upon its work amongst and on behalf of the refugees. He added that, in the absence of a solution of the problem on the political plane, the Agency would continue to be hampered in its efforts to carry out one of the tasks assigned to it by the General Assembly, namely, the reintegration of the refugees into the economic life of the Near East, either by repatriation or by resettlement. The Director indicated that the Israel Government had taken no affirmative action to facilitate the implementation of resolution 194 (III) concerning repatriation and compensation. One might add that the Israel Government had not only failed to take any action but had done everything in its power to prevent the Agency from fulfilling its aims. In those circumstances, there seemed to be no way for the Agency to carry out the tasks which the General Assembly had entrusted to it. The Director had none the less said that the picture was not entirely black. That welcome note was due to the co-operation which the Agency had been getting from the host Governments and to the signs that there was a growing appreciation on the part of the refugees of the desirability of self-support and of rehabilitation in the broad sense of an improvement in their conditions of life and prospects for the future.

14. The representative of the United States had said (102nd meeting) that, whatever the causes of the Palestine refugee problem, success in solving it ultimately depended on the degree to which the Israel Government and the Arab host Governments would co-operate in United Nations efforts to that end. Although the Arab countries had shown themselves willing to co-operate in the efforts of the United Nations, the same did not apply to Israel which, as the representative of the United States had recalled, had the previous year opposed repatriation as a solution to the refugee problem. Israel had refused to accept the decision of the General Assembly as embodied in paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III). In addition, there had never been any possibility of implementing that resolution even though it was based on the principles of international law, of equity and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

15. The records of the Conciliation Commission for Palestine proved that the Government of Israel, as far back as 28 July 1949, had considered that the return of

the Arab refugees to their former places of residence was impossible. On 11 March 1956 it had declared its unwillingness to come forward with a programme for compensation.<sup>1/</sup> The question was whether the General Assembly, instead of limiting itself to an expression of disappointment and regret over the attitude of Israel, should not order Israel, under pain of sanctions, to comply with the provisions of resolution 194 (III).

16. The Governments of the Arab States had, for their part, more than once indicated their readiness to abide by the provisions of the United Nations resolutions if they were given the assurance that Israel would comply at the same time.

17. In those circumstances, it was difficult to understand why the United States representative had attributed the failure of the Agency's integration efforts to the attitude of the Governments concerned and to the refugees themselves.

18. It was a fact that the Governments of the Arab countries were not urging the refugees to accept settlement outside their ancient homeland, which was now the territory of Israel, but it was the refugees themselves who were primarily opposed to settlement elsewhere than in their former homeland. The General Assembly itself still insisted on repatriation and compensation as means of solving the problem. There were eleven resolutions to prove that its stand in the matter had not changed since 1948. The Arab States were acting in conformity with the spirit and letter of those resolutions when they refrained from advising the refugees to accept a programme of permanent resettlement outside their former homeland.

19. While sincerely commending Mr. Carver and his staff for their efforts in preventing the outbreak of an epidemic, and in overcoming the difficulties created by events in Lebanon, he regretted that the food ration was still so low.

20. That matter was directly related to the Agency's financial situation. In that connexion, he urged the Committee to bear in mind the condition for any significant improvement in the basic standards of relief, namely, in the words used by the Director in his report (paragraph 40), that the Agency should have the assurance in advance of considerably more funds than were presently being contributed. The Jordanian delegation also hoped that the Committee would not agree to the continuation of the precarious state of affairs described by the Director when he asked, in addition to the amounts necessary for financing the two chapters of his 1959 budget, for the payment of \$6.5 million to establish his working capital reserve.

21. The Jordanian delegation deplored the fact that over 540,000 refugees were residing in Jordan and that there were still 190,000 frontier villagers and Bedouins eking out an unhappy existence along the armistice demarcation line between Jordan and Israel. The General Assembly should review resolution 916 (X) of 3 December 1955 with the object of authorizing the Agency to extend its services to those unfortunate people.

22. His delegation hoped that the Member States would find it possible to increase their contributions

and to make their payments in time to enable the Director of the Agency to meet the urgent need for improvement of the standards of the services.

23. He found it strange that the Acting Director of the Agency had made a statement on 7 November 1958 (101st meeting) which might make it appear that the Agency's relations with the host Governments were not entirely satisfactory, whereas many passages of the report gave a different impression. He referred in particular to paragraphs 59, 61 and 63 of the report and to paragraphs 20 and 25 of annex H, and also to paragraphs 1, 2, 11, 13 and 15 of annex H of the annual report of the Director of the Agency to the General Assembly (A/3686 and Corr.1) at its twelfth session.

24. The delegation of Jordan considered that the proposed search for better systems for accelerating the rate at which refugees were becoming self-supporting would be pointless. The solution of the refugee problem lay purely and simply in the implementation of the General Assembly resolutions. Continued failure to apply them would inevitably increase tension and resentment and would strengthen the refugees in their conviction that their requests for repatriation and compensation should be met.

25. The representative of Israel himself appeared to have been aware of those facts and, in offering to compensate the Palestine refugees, his primary purpose had been to create the illusion that his Government was abiding by the resolutions of the United Nations. That offer was all the more misleading in that its author had put it forward after having invited all the Arab States to follow the example of the Jordanian Government and grant citizenship to the Palestine Arab refugees, which action, according to Mr. Eban himself, would deprive them of refugee status. If all the Arab States were to grant citizenship rights to the refugees, all that Israel would have to do would be to obtain from the international community the sums necessary for the payment of compensation and then distribute them according to its own reckoning and its own selection of recipients.

26. Citing a statement by Mr. Roger Baldwin, former Executive Director of the American Civil Liberties Union, defining the responsibility of the United Nations in respect of the Palestine refugees, he expressed the belief that the Committee should recommend to the General Assembly that it apply itself diligently to the implementation of the resolutions which it had adopted ten years ago.

27. Mr. BABAKOS (Greece), after associating himself with the tributes paid to Mr. Labouisse and Mr. Carver, said that he was pleased that the Agency had surmounted the financial crisis with which it had been confronted at the beginning of 1957. He pointed out that Greece, in response to the appeal by the General Assembly at the last session, had made a further effort and had increased its voluntary contribution in 1958. Moreover, instead of making its contribution in kind, as it had done in the past, it had decided for the present year to contribute in cash.

28. The Greek delegation was pleased with the efforts that had been made to ensure the economic independence of the refugees but regretted that no progress had been made in respect of repatriation and compensation. The situation was all the more serious in view of the fact that the Agency's mandate was coming to an end.

<sup>1/</sup> See Official Records of the General Assembly, Eleventh Session, Annexes, agenda item 23, document A/3199, para. 13.

29. His delegation associated itself with the tributes that had been paid by a number of delegations to the humanitarian work carried out by the Agency. Nevertheless, the humanitarian approach was not by itself sufficient to solve the problem of the Palestine refugees. The Agency was the most suitable body not only for continuing the humanitarian work of the United Nations but also, thanks to the extensive experience acquired by its staff, for accelerating a solution of the refugee problem whenever an improvement in the political situation made that possible. The General Assembly should continue to press for the basic principles which it had laid down in 1948. Only by the faithful application of those principles could the Agency comply with its dual function of alleviating the sufferings of the refugees and bringing about conditions under which international aid could be brought to an end.

30. Mr. ZABARAH (Yemen) pointed out the extent to which the Agency's task was made difficult by the defiant attitude in which Israel had persisted for nearly ten years. Because of the shortage of funds available to it in the past, the Agency had been able to provide the refugees only with limited aid representing the bare minimum necessary for life. It was obvious that the restitution of the Arab property of immense value that was held illegally by Israel would be of considerable assistance to the international community and would enable the refugees to set out on the road to economic independence. The Yemeni delegation considered that it would be just and fair for the United Nations to appoint a trustee of Arab refugee property.

31. Referring to the Agency's report, he said that it hinted at slightly more cheering prospects than those of preceding years. His delegation noted with deep relief that certain activities which had been interrupted would be started again and would be continued at least until the end of 1958, and that a larger number of refugees would become economically independent. By reason of the generosity of the Arab host countries, many young persons had received scholarships which would enable them to engage in university study or obtain vocational training. In that way, close to 1,000 refugees would learn a trade or profession that would enable them to become self-supporting. Unfortunately, however, those refugees represented only a small number; thousands of others who wished to become economically independent had not had the opportunity to do so, and it was regrettable that, very often, vocational-training programmes could not be carried out due to lack of funds. Thus, it was for reasons beyond the control of both the refugees and the Agency that the refugees had been unable to become economically independent.

32. The delegation of Yemen did not share the view of the United States representative that the mandate of the Agency should be terminated. It believed, on the contrary, that the Agency should continue its activities until the refugee problem had been completely solved.

33. Certainly the lot of the refugees under the Agency's mandate was deserving of sympathy. Yet there was also another category of Palestinians whose position was particularly difficult. They were the villagers who lived near the demarcation line. They were not entitled to the same relief as the refugees because they had not been driven from their homes. That argument, however, was unjustified since those

villagers had lost their sources of income without acquiring any new means of livelihood. In actual fact, their lot was no different from that of the refugees, and he hoped that any resolution adopted by the Committee on the refugee problem would take their situation into account.

34. The attitude of the refugees themselves had not changed since the day they had been forced to leave their country. Their love of their native land and homes had not diminished; they wanted to return to their country, and no one could blame them. He pointed out that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the right of every person to return to his own country. Although it was the responsibility of the United Nations to ensure that that principle was applied, the Arab refugees found themselves prohibited from returning to their country. All the resolutions adopted to that end remained a dead letter because of the attitude of Israel. It did not befit the dignity and prestige of the United Nations to reaffirm those resolutions at each session and yet avoid taking a firm stand on the inadmissible attitude of Israel. His delegation felt that more effective measures should be taken to bring about the implementation of the Organization's resolutions. Members would be right to discontinue any help to the defiant State until it complied with the resolutions of the Assembly.

35. Mr. Eban (Israel) said that the debate which had ensued since his previous statement (106th meeting) had only strengthened the convictions of his delegation. He wished to point out that his Government was not impressed by the stream of invective from the Governments of neighbouring States which themselves had created the Palestine refugee problem by commencing hostilities against Israel. The dogmatic refusal of those Governments to accept the only practical and humane solution to the problem paralysed any chances of settlement. On the other hand, he had listened with respect and interest to the comments by the delegations of friendly countries. He pointed out once again that the general opinion was that repatriation did not represent the sole feasible solution to the refugee problem. The true solution was to make the refugees economically independent. His delegation would like to ask those advising repatriation to think about the situation which his country had to face. No other country had assumed as proportionally heavy a burden in the absorption of refugees as Israel, which had already received 1 million newcomers, 450,000 of whom were from Arab countries in Asia and Africa. No other country was surrounded by hostile neighbours as Israel was. No other country had been advised to open its gates to sworn enemies, thousands of whom had become citizens of foreign and hostile Powers. Reference had been made to cases in which, after a war, refugee problems had been settled by repatriation, and the examples of Japan and Pakistan had been cited. In those cases, however, the persons repatriated had returned to a country towards which they had not been hostile and with which they were bound by numerous ties. Those who saw repatriation as a solution should therefore take into the account the unique and unprecedented situation with which Israel was faced.

36. He felt the delegations of the Arab States should be given credit for being candid. They did not hide the fact that the Arab refugees would return to Israel territory with the intention of destroying the State of

Israel and ending its independence. The gist of Mr. Shukairy's statements was that the repatriation of the refugees and the independence of Israel were incompatible. It followed, therefore, that to accept the repatriation of Arab refugees would be tantamount to signing Israel's death warrant.

37. In point of fact, the practical aspect of the problem was more important than the legal aspect, and a solution should be conceived in the light of the relations between Israel and the Arab countries. Moreover, all the Assembly's resolutions proposed the repatriation of refugees within the context of a peace settlement. Resolution 194 (III) of 1948 was directed mainly to peace negotiations between Israel and the Arab countries; paragraph 11 contained a formula for settlement of the refugee problem within the framework of such negotiations. The frequent quotation of that paragraph out of context therefore had tended to falsify the perspective in which the problem was viewed. The General Assembly had not intended that the Arab States should send refugees back to Israel and maintain a state of war against Israel at the same time. Under those circumstances, his delegation asked delegations of goodwill to consider what their own Governments would do in similar circumstances.

38. Since much of the discussion had revolved around the import and purpose of the General Assembly resolutions, he would like to correct some mistaken impressions which might have been gained from the statements made by delegations from the Arab countries. They had stressed the universally binding force of the resolutions of the Assembly. The Governments of the Arab countries, however, had not hesitated to ignore the main provision of the 1948 resolution, which called upon them to negotiate an agreement with Israel with a view to final settlement, while proclaiming loudly that another provision of the same resolution demanded unconditional repatriation. In actual fact, the resolution stated that repatriation should not be put into effect unless practicable and unless there existed a situation in which the Israelis and the Arabs could live side by side in peace. He made quite clear that resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 had not provided for immediate repatriation since at the time it had been questionable whether peaceful coexistence between the refugees and Israel citizens had been likely. The climate was even less peaceful at present than in 1948, and it was no accident that international public opinion had moved away from the idea of repatriation, which had been considered problematic even in 1948. Hence, it was difficult to take the Arab States seriously when they advocated absolute respect for the General Assembly's resolutions, especially as they had been the first to take up arms and oppose a resolution of the Assembly. Throughout the crisis which had brought Israel into conflict with the Arab countries, the latter had maintained that they were in no way bound to comply with the Assembly's recommendations and had denied their binding force. Numerous statements by their representatives proved the point.

39. Those States had claimed that United Nations policy had remained anchored exclusively to the doctrine of repatriation. He had already explained that that was not the case. There had been a steady evolution in the jurisprudence of the General Assembly. The present policy of the United Nations aimed at a permanent re-establishment of the refugees and their

removal from relief, and the implementation by the Governments of the Middle East of projects capable of supporting substantial numbers of refugees. Seven or eight resolutions of the General Assembly and the terms of reference of the Agency all recommended integration and economic aid to the refugees pending a final practical and juridical solution to the problem.

40. He did not wish to give the impression that no progress had been made in integration. In that connexion he feared that the representative of Jordan had misunderstood his reference to the granting of Jordanian citizenship to refugees living in Jordan. The Israel delegation regarded that as a progressive step but also wished to point out the legal precedent in international law which would be created by a situation in which a person could adopt the citizenship of one country and retain the right to return to another, the more so if relations described juridically as a state of war prevailed between the two countries. The Israel delegation believed that the processes of integration had probably been broader and deeper than the statistical data of the Agency reflected. Though it was unfortunately true that a long-term solution was still far off, all the necessary conditions existed for economic integration of the refugees. Israel was willing to contribute to a regional and international enterprise leading to the integration of the refugees, and it considered that the primary task of the international community was to use its full influence to modify the present obdurate opposition of the Arab Governments to the programme of integration with which the General Assembly had been identified for over eight years.

41. It was in that context that he wished to make reference to what he had said previously about compensation (106th meeting). The earlier position of the Israel Government on that question had been logical in the context of the political relations prevailing between Israel and the Arab Governments, which proclaimed and maintained a state of belligerency with Israel and, by boycott and blockade, denied Israel the financial capacity necessary to carry out its compensation policies. It had thus been reasonable and just to make any implementation of Israel's compensation undertaking dependent upon a state of peace in that area. On the other hand, the compensation undertaking existed and in the eyes of Israel was not a mere abstract principle.

42. The Israel Government's present compensation offer had given rise to many misguided interpretations. Mr. Shukairy had made an issue of the fact that Israel envisaged compensation as a collective process. However, all the precedents of compensation were in favour of the collective approach; the more so since it was the only method by which the refugee community as a whole would benefit from a compensation project. If compensation were made on an individual basis, only a tiny proportion of refugees would be eligible for it. The great mass of refugees, who had been agricultural labourers or industrial workers, would not qualify. In that connexion he wished to correct an error regarding the ownership of land in Palestine under the Mandate. The Government had owned 70 per cent of the land and the contention that 94 per cent of the land had been owned by the refugees was therefore completely baseless. Nor was it true that there existed in Israel properties earning vast surplus sums which could be made available for refugee compensation on an indi-

vidual basis. He referred in that connexion to the report prepared under the auspices of the Conciliation Commission for Palestine,<sup>2/</sup> in which the value of the immovable property which could be the subject of an Israel compensation undertaking had been estimated at about £P100 million, a sum not far short of what had been made available for refugee relief through international aid.

43. Turning to the political reasons for his Government's offer, he said that his country had wished to break the deadlock which had hitherto paralysed all action. The year 1960 was drawing near, and with it the end of the Agency's present mandate. The future policy of the Agency would probably be geared more closely to a permanent economic solution of the problems of the refugees, and that was the solution which Israel wished to facilitate by its offer of compensation. Since a large sum in hard currency would be involved, Israel assumed that it could apply for international aid. The Israel delegation did not believe that Mr. Shukairy need interest himself in the sources from which Israel might be able to draw such a sum. That was a matter which concerned the domestic affairs of Israel or its bilateral relations with other States. On the assumption, however, that the funds could be made

available and that an effort at regional integration was actually undertaken, it was the view of Israel that the compensation problem should be detached from all political considerations. Representatives should hesitate before discouraging the offer made by Israel. Even though it concerned only one aspect of the problem, it was of real value, if only through the momentum which it could create and the psychic changes which it might provoke. His delegation doubted very much whether the interests of the refugees were served by dogmatic insistence on an impracticable slogan.

44. In itself, however, compensation could not solve the whole refugee problem. Such limited repatriation as Israel had undertaken in the past, and was not excluding for the future, was not the basic solution, for it would not enable the bulk of the refugee population to become absorbed into the economy of the area. For a solution of the problem, the Arab Governments would have to abandon their resistance to integration. The experience of many Governments, including his own, had shown that a refugee population which in a short-term view might be considered as an economic burden soon became an asset and a reinforcement to the host country. In conclusion, he hoped that the Arab Governments would understand the value of a policy of regional integration to which the international community and Israel would contribute their full share.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.

<sup>2/</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Supplement No. 18, annex A.