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Chairman: Mr. Max JAKOBSON (Finland).

AGENDA ITEM 34

The policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa: report of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (continued) (A/6356, A/6412, A/6486, A/6494)

1. Mr. KESTLER FARNES (Guatemala) said that Guatemala had always vigorously condemned the racist policy of apartheid ever since it had been a member of the Committee on South West Africa. That policy was contrary to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and it led to outrageous acts which were unthinkable in the present day and age; certain groups were not being allowed to exercise the most elementary rights, such as freedom of movement within national borders, in order to maintain the privileged position of the European community.

2. It was important to realize that the problem had become international in scope and that it was now one of the world's most serious worries, as the General Assembly had recognized in resolution 2054 A (XX). The seminar on apartheid held at Brasilia in August and September 1966 had likewise included in its agenda an item entitled: "Effects of apartheid on international relations, such as the danger of race conflict and threat to peace and security".

3. In considering the problem, several points should be mentioned. First, it must be recognized that, despite United Nations efforts, the situation was becoming more serious because of the attitude of the South African Government, which was openly defying world opinion and the resolutions of the General Assembly by increasing its acts of racist oppression, as was evident from paragraph 106 of the report of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (A/6486). Paragraph 107 likewise indicated that the South African Government had intensified repression against opponents of apartheid and that indefinite imprisonment without trial, solitary confinement and ill-treatment

in prison, arbitrary banishment, harsh sentences and mass removals of communities had become normal features in that country.

4. He emphasized that, as the situation deteriorated, the likelihood of a peaceful solution became fainter; that had also been noted by the Special Committee, which pointed out in paragraphs 108 and 110 of its report that the South African Government was seeking to intimidate the great majority of the people by force, thus risking the growth of a spirit of revenge among the victims of its oppression and aggravating the danger of violent resistance.

5. However, what was most serious was that the international community was unable to take effective action to put an end to that dangerous situation, because of the attitude of some States which were unwilling to support such action. Paragraph 95 of the report indicated that the situation had deteriorated and that its international effects, particularly on the neighbouring territories—South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland—had assumed graver proportions.

6. So sombre a picture might give the impression that there was a feeling of discouragement; however, the efforts made had not been entirely in vain, since the international community was becoming increasingly aware of the inhuman policies being practised in South Africa. In addition, the report of the Special Committee, and the report of the seminar on apartheid (A/6412) were a valuable contribution to the study of the problem.

7. His delegation was convinced that the only way to bring stability to the region was to set up a nationality structure based upon the harmonious coexistence of the various racial groups. It therefore urged the Committee to pay heed to world public opinion, which condemned violations both of human rights and of the principles of the Charter, and to state in the strongest terms its opposition to the policy of apartheid and adopt practical and effective measures. In addition, it deplored the attitude of the South African Government and would vote in favour of any measure which would bring about a peaceful solution as soon as possible, since it was convinced that the determination of the African peoples to free themselves might stand in the way of any future settlement.

8. Mr. KULAGA (Poland) said that apartheid was not, as the representative of South Africa had tried to convince the General Assembly at the 1417th plenary meeting, the development of each group towards self-government, but a sinister mixture of servitude, colonialism, racism and nazism maintained by the imperialist monopolies. Innumerable legislative measures restricted the freedom of the Africans and

non-Whites in South Africa such as the Group Areas Act, the Bantu Laws Amendment Act and the Industrial Conciliation Act. The most cruel of those measures were probably the pass laws, which were a source of continual humiliation for the Africans and a pretext for arbitrary measures, including arrest, imprisonment and the forced separation of families.

9. The fact that the basic element in apartheid was colonialism could not be doubted in the face of certain facts: the Africans, who represented three quarters of the population, possessed only 13 per cent of the most barren land, whereas the Whites, who represented 19 per cent of the population, had 87 per cent of the land at their disposal, including the industrial regions and the gold and diamond deposits. The experts participating in the seminar on apartheid had pointed out that infant mortality was very high among non-Whites and that the wages of Africans, on the average, were equal to one fifteenth of those of Whites. That explained the high per capita income enjoyed by the White population in Africa and the substantial profits made by foreign monopolies amounting to \$260 million a year according to the study prepared by the Secretariat at the request of the Special Committee (see A/AC.115/L.56/Rev.2, p. 22).

10. Racism in South Africa was closely related to nazism: in fact, a large number of Nazi officers were instructors in the South African army. There were also numerous reports indicating that the Federal Republic of Germany was participating in the production of weapons and gas in South Africa as well as in the establishment of a rocket-tracing centre.

11. A few figures would show the importance of the contribution made by foreign monopolies to the system of colonial exploitation in South Africa: foreign investments represented nearly \$4,500 million, of which three fifths came from the United Kingdom and 11 per cent from the United States; such investments brought in earnings twice as high as in other countries.

12. Like all systems of oppression, apartheid, termed a crime against humanity in General Assembly resolution 2105 (XX), sought to entrench itself and to expand. It gave rise in that way to countless contradictions in the social and political spheres. The régime could not survive except by force and without recourse to increasingly intense militarization, which was attested by statements by Mr. Fouché, Minister of Defence. Not only did apartheid maintain itself by force, but it showed a tendency to spread beyond the frontiers of the Republic of South Africa to South West Africa, Swaziland and the newly independent States of Botswana and Lesotho. It was also expanding northwards, since the authorities of the Republic of South Africa were supporting the racist régime in Rhodesia, in direct violation of Security Council resolution 217 (1965). The apartheid system likewise fitted perfectly with the doctrine of assimilation of the Portuguese authorities in Angola and Mozambique.

13. The argument of the Western countries had always been that apartheid did not constitute a threat to peace and security and that the use of the measures set forth in Chapter VII of the Charter was therefore not justified. However, the Declaration appearing in

General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) stated that "the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation" was "an impediment to the promotion of world peace...". In addition, Security Council resolutions 182 (1963) and 191 (1964) described apartheid as seriously disturbing international peace and security. The refusal of the Republic of South Africa to put an immediate stop to all discrimination and all repressive measures, as the Council had demanded, had only aggravated the situation, which, according to those resolutions, should now be considered a threat to international peace and security.

14. In logistic terms, the fact that South Africa was delivering an average of 100,000 gallons of oil a day to Rhodesia should also be regarded as a serious threat to peace within the meaning of resolution 221 (1966) adopted by the Security Council on the initiative of the United Kingdom and with the support of the United States. Paragraph 5 of that resolution stipulated that such supplies were to be prevented, "by the use of force if necessary".

15. Above all, consideration must be given to the danger of racial conflict presented by the policy of apartheid both inside South Africa and in the African continent at large. The aggressive character of that racist policy and the militarization of the régime were endangering the security of neighbouring independent countries. The Chairman of the Special Committee had presented an informed account of the situation, and Poland shared the feelings of the African countries in that regard.

16. The application of the measures provided in Chapter VII of the Charter, and in particular mandatory economic sanctions, would therefore be perfectly justified. The experts who had attended the seminar on apartheid at Brasilia had recognized that fact, judging such measures to be essential, urgent and feasible, thus endorsing the conclusions on the subject of sanctions against South Africa of the 1964 conference in London and the 1966 conference at Oxford. Economic sanctions remained the only peaceful means of putting an end to the policy of apartheid. But there again, efforts were thwarted by the resistance of certain Western Powers, which advocated more thorough study of the possibility of applying sanctions. Yet sanctions were a tried method which had been successfully applied every time those countries thought their political and ideological interests were at stake. Was not the United Kingdom about to ask for mandatory sanctions against the Smith régime in Rhodesia? Had it not recognized the validity of the principle of sanctions? Meanwhile, the prevarication of certain Powers was allowing South Africa to build up its stocks and prepare for a possible economic blockade. The same dilatory manoeuvres had enabled South Africa to sidestep the effects of the ban on supplies of equipment and munitions. After the vote on Security Council resolution 191 (1964) the Minister for Defence had been able to make the ironic statement that South Africa was in a position to export arms and munitions to the neighbouring States and even to the Western countries. It might be wondered whether economic sanctions too would be imposed only when they could no longer be effective, and when South Africa was able to meet its power requirements,

especially with the assistance of the atomic reactors it was being supplied with by the United States.

17. It was no secret that the policy of apartheid and its intensification were essentially bound up with the economic interests of the Western Powers in South Africa. The study on foreign investment in the Republic of South Africa prepared by the Special Committee (A/AC.115/L.56/Rev.2) was particularly revealing. Other equally instructive information appeared in annex V to the report of the Expert Committee^{1/} established by Security Council resolution 191 (1964) and in the report of the Special Committee itself (A/6486). The unavoidable conclusion was that the investments continued to grow despite the urgent appeals of the General Assembly. The only exception was the year 1960, marked by the Sharpesville Massacre and African demonstrations followed by brutal repression: the foreign monopolies had been fearful of possible changes in conditions which they regarded as highly propitious for their investments. All those documents established a direct connexion between capital exported by the Western countries and the system of exploitation which was the *raison d'être* of apartheid. That was the reason for the Western countries' opposition to any effective steps against apartheid.

18. Had not Mr. Hermann J. Abs, head of the Deutsche Bank, stated in 1963 that "South Africa is considered by West Germany as a country in the first line for safe investment" and that in his view "one should continue to do business as usual".^{2/} In the same way a United States investor, Mr. Charles Engelhard, had said in January 1963, after a visit to the Republic, that "there are not many countries in the world where it is safe to invest and South Africa is just about the best of the lot".^{3/}

19. As long as that situation continued, the Western countries would continue to condemn apartheid morally while refusing to undertake any political commitment. The United Nations would continue to adopt resolutions which, for some States, would remain a dead letter. The situation would continue to deteriorate and the danger of racial and communal conflict would become daily more threatening.

20. He did not intend to add anything new to the very long list of conclusions reached by the Special Committee and the General Assembly. He stressed, however, that certain decisions had already been taken

^{1/} Official Records of the Security Council, Twentieth Year, Special Supplement No. 2.

^{2/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 36, document A/5932, para. 214.

^{3/} Ibid., para. 210.

with a view to halting and containing the aggressive expansionism of apartheid. For example, the Assembly had revoked South Africa's Mandate over South West Africa, since South Africa had flagrantly abused it. The Assembly could and should pursue that course and take the necessary measures to extirpate apartheid at its source, i.e., in South Africa.

21. He might wish to intervene again when a draft resolution was submitted. His delegation would support any proposal which took account of the essential elements of the situation in South Africa and which recommended effective measures to put an end to apartheid.

22. The CHAIRMAN informed the Committee that Mr. Ngcobo, Treasurer-General of the Pan-Africanist Congress (South Africa) had sent him a letter dated 23 November 1966 requesting permission to make a statement to the Committee. The letter had been distributed at the request of the representative of Guinea (A/SPC/114). He recalled that at the eighteenth session of the General Assembly (378th meeting) the Committee had granted a similar request. At the present session the Committee had followed the same procedure in connexion with another item. He therefore asked the Committee to authorize him to invite Mr. Ngcobo to appear before the Committee.

23. Mr. ALO (Nigeria) said he was not opposed to the request for the hearing, but he would like to point out that the request granted earlier in the session had been submitted through the intermediary of a delegation which was an accredited member of the Committee.

24. The CHAIRMAN explained that that rule had been observed in the present instance; the procedure was the same as that followed in response to the request for a hearing in connexion with the item on Palestine refugees.

25. Mr. MIRZA (Pakistan), supported by Mr. DIOUF (Senegal), said he was entirely in favour of granting the request for a hearing submitted by Mr. Ngcobo and that in view of the petitioner's knowledge of the question he thought it would be useful to hear him as early as possible in the course of the debate.

26. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the petitioner should be heard by the Committee on the following day, Tuesday, 6 December, at the morning meeting.

It was so decided.

27. The CHAIRMAN reminded the Committee that the list of speakers would be closed on Wednesday, 7 December, at 1 p.m.

The meeting rose at 4.5 p.m.