

United Nations
**GENERAL
 ASSEMBLY**

TWENTIETH SESSION

Official Records

**SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE, 478th
 MEETING**



*Monday, 6 December 1965,
 at 11.5 a.m.*

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
<i>Statement by the Chairman</i>	<i>1</i>
<i>Agenda item 36:</i>	
<i>The policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (continued):</i>	
<i>(a) Reports of the Special Committee on the Policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa;</i>	
<i>(b) Reports of the Secretary-General</i>	<i>1</i>
<i>Organization of the Committee's work</i>	<i>6</i>

Chairman: Mr. Carlet R. AUGUSTE (Haiti).

Statement by the Chairman

1. The CHAIRMAN informed the Committee that he had received a letter from the President of the General Assembly (A/SPC/101/Add.1) stating that at the 1388th plenary meeting it had been decided to re-allocate item 99. "Peaceful Settlement of Disputes", from the agenda of the First Committee to that of the Special Political Committee.

AGENDA ITEM 36

The policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (continued) (A/SPC/107 and Corr.1, A/SPC/L.118 and Add.1, L.119 and Add.1):

- (a) Reports of the Special Committee on the Policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (A/5692, A/5707, A/5825 and Add.1, A/5932, A/5957);
- (b) Reports of the Secretary-General (A/5850 and Add.1, A/6025 and Add.1)

2. Mr. ARCHIBALD (Trinidad and Tobago) expressed the satisfaction of his delegation as a member of the Latin American group that a representative of Haiti had been elected to the office of Chairman of the Special Political Committee.

3. If the debate so far had done nothing else, it had demonstrated that apartheid remained a vital concern of the United Nations and must continue to be given the highest priority. Apartheid was clearly a major element in the way of life which the South African Government and its followers were determined to perpetuate, and his delegation was convinced that no amount of persuasion or verbal condemnation would bring about a change in that policy. On the other hand, the determination of the liberated countries of Africa to rid the continent of that obnoxious practice was equally strong and equally unshakable. The question was, therefore, which side would prove the stronger,

for between two such extremes no compromise, no political accommodation, was possible. It would appear that the South African Government possessed the physical means of defending itself even against the united opposition of free Africa, for it was obviously the strongest single military Power on the continent.

4. There was, however, much more to the African situation than just the question of the present distribution of conventional military resources. In the first place, if armed conflict broke out in Africa because of apartheid it might well take a form that was not traditional to the West and not conducive to the most efficient use of Western armaments. In the second place, the question of freedom throughout Africa was closely linked with the issue of apartheid. The statements made by the African representatives during the current debate and at earlier sessions had made it clear that if racial discrimination was permitted to continue in any part of Africa its insidious influence would have repercussions across the continent. Moreover, it was not Africa alone which would suffer, for the prestige of the United Nations and its influence in international affairs were also at stake. Not only was the doctrine of apartheid contrary to the principles of the United Nations but its continued application was weakening the bonds of mutual respect between Member States which alone could hold the Organization together.

5. It had been argued that owing to continuing internal difficulties the United Nations would be unable to carry out the large-scale operation which would be required to compel the South African Government to pay heed to the views of the world community, and the weakening effect of the dissension which had prevailed during the nineteenth session was cited in that connexion. Yet if that dissension could be likened to a body blow which had temporarily paralysed the Organization, apartheid could best be described as a running sore which would, in the long run, prove far more debilitating.

6. His country, in particular, had reason to deplore the effects in human terms of the policy of apartheid, for in Trinidad and Tobago racial diversity was a factor enriching the life of the community.

7. His delegation took very seriously the Guinean representative's warning that the war which was in preparation in South Africa would affect the world. If it did, it would not spare the United Nations.

8. Mr. JUARBE Y JUARBE (Cuba), speaking on a point of order, said he hoped the preceding speaker's reference to a Latin American group had been a slip of the tongue, for his delegation knew of no grouping in the United Nations which included all the Latin American countries at the present time. The Latin

American group which had previously existed had been destroyed when a number of Latin American countries brought into the United Nations the imperialistic criteria imposed by the United States Department of State on the Organization of American States.

9. Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) said that all Members were well aware of the reason why Cuba had been temporarily excluded from the deliberations of the Latin American group, namely of the attitude assumed by Cuba with regard to Venezuela, which on several occasions had suffered the effects of indirect Cuban intervention.

10. He wished to congratulate all the members of the Special Committee on the Policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa for the excellent work they had done, as reflected in its reports. The information given therein, and in the statements made in the debate so far, showed that the situation resulting from the application of the policies of apartheid was becoming increasingly serious as the South African Government ruthlessly pursued its intention to deprive the African inhabitants of their rights. He had studied with great care the recommendations drawn up by the Special Committee (A/5957) and would like to deal first with those in sections B to G of part III of that report. His delegation was in favour of the suggestion to set up a United Nations trust fund to co-ordinate and direct activities involving relief and assistance to victims of racial discrimination and repression. With regard to the suggestion concerning the dissemination of information on the dangers of apartheid he recalled that his delegation had dwelt on the importance of that matter during the general debate in the General Assembly at the nineteenth session. He was therefore glad to note that it was given the attention it warranted both in the recommendations of the Special Committee and in the operative provisions of draft resolution A/SPC/L.118 and Add.1. He also supported the recommendations in sections D and E concerning consultations among South Africans and investigation of the treatment of prisoners. With regard to the recommendation in paragraph 176 concerning action by inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations, he recalled that Venezuela had always urged such organizations to participate in the effort to put an end to the policy of apartheid, and had supported the relevant amendments to the Constitutions of the International Labour Organisation and the World Health Organization. In that connexion, however, it would be well for the General Assembly and all other bodies concerned to bear in mind the observation made by the Secretary-General that measures designed to combat apartheid should not be allowed to hamper the constructive work being done by the organizations in question and that the organizations should not adopt divergent positions on the matter but should take into account the action decided upon in the principal organs of the United Nations.

11. He was in favour of the recommendation to enlarge the membership of the Special Committee and was glad to note that Algeria's constructive suggestion on that point had been incorporated in draft resolution A/SPC/L.118 and Add.1.

12. With regard to the recommendations in part II, section A concerning action calculated specifically to put an end to the policy of apartheid, he drew attention in particular to paragraphs 108 and 140 of the report. Member States were aware that the issue was a test of the ability of the United Nations to find peaceful solutions for problems which were of world-wide concern and to ensure that the standards of the international community were respected. So far the measures taken by both the General Assembly and the Security Council in their efforts to make South Africa conform to those standards had had no effect, and the reason for that failure was to be found, as the Special Committee on Apartheid had stated, in the fact that South Africa's major trading partners had not seen fit to implement the resolutions of the United Nations with respect to economic sanctions and the supplying of arms to the apartheid régime. If the non-white population of South Africa ultimately lost all faith in the possibility of overcoming apartheid and resorted to more drastic measures, it was those major trading partners of the South African Government which would bear the blame.

13. The United Nations had been told that the time had not yet come to apply the measures provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter, but if action was deferred much longer it might well be too late. South Africa's major trading partners continued to propose that the United Nations should do no more than make appeals and utter platitudes in the hope that the Pretoria Government would eventually have a change of heart; but time had shown that only firm action by the entire membership of the United Nations would compel it to heed world public opinion before a catastrophic conflict broke out.

14. Venezuela accordingly welcomed the statement by the Danish representative (476th meeting) concerning Denmark's willingness to apply sanctions upon which the Security Council might decide under Chapter VII of the Charter. It would like to hear similar statements from the representatives of South Africa's major trading partners, for it was only they who were in a position to take action that Pretoria would be unable to ignore. The countries which now had no links with South Africa could do little more than they had done already. Venezuela had no diplomatic or commercial relations with South Africa and firmly rejected all attempts by the latter to resume contacts with it. But such action on the part of countries like his own were of little avail against a problem of such magnitude as that of apartheid.

15. It was in the light of those observations that his delegation would examine the draft resolutions before the Committee.

16. Mr. CAMPOS TORRES (Guatemala) pointed out that the United Nations would shortly celebrate the seventeenth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Yet in South Africa a handful of white men were oppressing 13 million Africans, thereby spurning not only the Declaration itself, but the United Nations Charter and various resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. The oppressors claimed to be the bulwark of Western civilization and a bastion of Christianity, possessing an absolute right to dominate the southern part of

Africa. The delegation of Guatemala utterly condemned and rejected the racial policies of the South African Government, and, in accordance with its beliefs, Guatemala maintained no diplomatic or trade relations whatever with the South African Government.

17. In the course of the debate, not a single voice had been raised in defence of apartheid. Guatemala would have liked a representative of South Africa to explain his Government's policies. But all efforts to secure the presence of the South African delegation had proved vain. Since no defender of apartheid was present, and therefore no dialogue was possible, he would base his argument on statements made by officials of the South African Government.

18. The Prime Minister, Mr. Verwoerd, had claimed that the path chosen by his Government satisfied the basic requirements of justice for all sections of the population. So it would seem that some basis for justice existed in South Africa. The Christian Council of South Africa, however, had stated that the Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1964 infringed the basic Christian concepts of family life and the dignity of the individual. Other representatives of the Church had also condemned apartheid. Thus the Government of South Africa could find no legal or moral basis for its policies, yet continued to invoke justice and Christianity in its own defence.

19. In spite of the resolutions of the Security Council of 7 August (181 (1963)) and 4 December 1963 (182 (1963)), certain delegations had maintained that the situation in South Africa did not constitute a threat to peace. In their academic approach to the question, they seemed to overlook the fact that men were being tried in South Africa for defending the very principles upheld by the Committee. Action was needed because the Pretoria régime paid no attention to words. Mr. Verwoerd had stated that South Africa could not bring its policy into line with United Nations resolutions. South Africa—he had said—would not allow its life and its future to be decided by foreign interests. In the opinion of Guatemala, the supporters of apartheid were the foreigners and their victims the real South Africans. A reading of the reports of the Special Committee showed that the Africans had no deep-seated enmity towards the whites. All they asked was equality. Unless the United Nations took effective action in the near future, a really dangerous situation would arise, since violence would be the only way of gaining equality.

20. The United Nations should have no illusions about the South African Government's attitude towards it. Mr. Verwoerd had said that South Africa's policy was to remain a Member of the United Nations as long as it was considered to be in the interests of South Africa, and no longer. The time for compromise was past. Mr. Verwoerd had stated that South Africa was ready to use its economic and military power to defend its interests. It was therefore useless for the United Nations to imagine that resolutions of the General Assembly or the Security Council could have any effect on the white South African racists.

21. It had been stated in the Committee that a naval blockade of South Africa was beyond the Organization's means. That might well be true, but another type

of blockade still remained—a moral one. If every Member State applied the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council to the letter, there would be no need for a naval blockade. Something positive must be done to alleviate the situation of the African population, which lived like prisoners in an occupied country.

22. The question whether or not there existed a threat to international peace and security in South Africa had been discussed at the International Conference on Economic Sanctions against South Africa, held in London in April 1964. The Conference had unanimously concluded that the policies of the present South African Government constituted a most serious threat to the peace, and an increasingly dangerous one. The Conference had also considered the question of economic sanctions, and had decided that they were politically timely, economically feasible and legally appropriate. The cancer of apartheid must be eradicated before it could spread, as it had already done in Southern Rhodesia. South Africa's military budget had increased five-fold between 1960 and 1965. Action should be taken before South Africa became a nuclear Power. He appealed to all Member States to do their utmost to avoid the catastrophe that would result from the failure to apply economic sanctions to South Africa.

23. Mr. RAMANI (Malaysia) observed that since the United Nations first began discussing the problem of racial discrimination in South Africa the very word "apartheid" had acquired such an odious connotation that the South African Government itself had begun to replace it with the term "separate development". Anyone reading the long series of resolutions on the subject adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council must inevitably be struck by the repeated expressions of regret that the South African Government had consistently refused to heed the appeals made to it by the United Nations to abide by its obligations under the Charter. Yet in spite of the failure of those appeals some Members still told the Committee that it should consider the obstacles and difficulties in the way of enforcement action, avoid any ill-considered action, and so forth. The persons who uttered those admonitions seemed to equate any action with violence. One delegation had said that the only alternative to violence was the path of conciliation, co-operation and consultation. Yet those suggested methods could not be applied unilaterally and there was no prospect of their providing a solution as long as the Government of South Africa disregarded the appeals of the United Nations, refused to enter into a dialogue and even boycotted the meetings where apartheid was being discussed.

24. The lesson of the ineffectiveness of the League of Nations had not been lost on the authors of the Charter of the United Nations, who had accordingly provided efficient safeguards against a repetition of the situations which had brought the earlier organization to an end. Thus the instrument for effective action was available and had only to be applied. What was it that the Charter called upon the United Nations to do in such circumstances?

25. In order to answer that question it was necessary to determine whether the present situation in South Africa called for Security Council action under Chap-

ter VI of the Charter or under Chapter VII. In its first resolution on South Africa and its policies (134 (1960) of 1 April 1960) the Council had stated that the situation had already "led to international friction", but it had taken action under Chapter VI. By the time it adopted its next resolution on South Africa (181 (1963) of 7 August 1963), the Special Committee had produced exhaustive documentation on the situation in that country, in particular on the arms build-up. The Council had accordingly stated its conviction that the situation was "seriously disturbing international peace and security", thus clearly placing the matter within the scope of Chapter VII in the terms of Article 39, and had called for an arms embargo against South Africa, action which could only be justified under Article 41. Similarly, Security Council resolution 182 (1963) of 4 December 1963, which repeated the call for an arms embargo, was also indubitably based on Article 41. The Council was thus already dealing with the South African situation under Chapter VII. With reference to the arms embargo, it was pertinent to note that the report of the Special Committee (A/5932) gave detailed information on the continued supply of arms and the construction of arms factories in South Africa by certain Western Powers, yet none of the countries concerned had refuted the charges.

26. Those who were reluctant to resort to Chapter VII had called attention to a sub-committee report of 1946 relating to the Spanish question, which said that a very sharp instrument had been entrusted to the Security Council under Chapter VII, and that the Council must be careful that that instrument was not blunted nor used in any way that would strain the intentions of the Charter. In reply, it could be argued that that instrument was unlikely to be blunted by proper use, but could become rusted by disuse. Those who wished to avoid recourse to Chapter VII had also mentioned the India-Pakistan conflict, but there was no analogy between that case, in which both sides had agreed upon a cease-fire and also to solve their differences by peaceful means, and that of South Africa, which had persistently refused to abandon its policies or engage in a dialogue.

27. Of course, Chapter VII should not be used until all the remedies mentioned in Chapter VI had been exhausted. But peaceful methods had been patiently recommended in twenty-eight General Assembly resolutions over twenty years; the Security Council had acted under Chapter VI, and since that action had proved fruitless it had already been obliged to move forward to Chapter VII. The fact that a few great Powers were unwilling to resort to action under Chapter VII was a source of encouragement to South Africa, but if Chapter VII was to remain unused even when its use was justified, then the hopes of the smaller nations and indeed those of mankind as a whole would be disappointed, and the very future of the United Nations endangered.

28. The Committee had been warned that the imposition of economic and other sanctions against South Africa was a complicated task, far beyond the legal, constitutional and financial capacity of the United Nations, and it had been urged to avoid rash action which, it was alleged, might do the Organization great

harm. His delegation, however, believed that the Organization would be even more seriously weakened if it failed to operate as an effective mechanism to protect the victims of oppression. South Africa had ignored previous United Nations resolutions; moral pressure had thus proved ineffective, and it was now necessary to apply other types of pressure, beginning with economic pressure.

29. The partial interruption of economic relations with South Africa was feasible and could be made effective, despite the arguments of those who sought to prove that a blockade would be expensive and impractical. The real problem derived from the fact that those countries which had the power to impose effective sanctions were disinclined to do so. South Africa's economy was basically industrial, and petroleum products were its lifeblood. South Africa imported almost all its oil, and a concerted effort to cut off supplies would have an immediate effect. Such an effort would involve three groups of States; the suppliers or exporters, who would have to withhold supplies; the carriers, who would have to refuse tankers for transport, and the foreign companies established in South Africa, which would have to refuse to accept or process any deliveries. Each group consisted of one or two States, all of whom were Members of the United Nations; therefore, the General Assembly should request and the Security Council give effect to such a partial interruption of economic relations. That could be expected to produce definite psychological and economic effects, at least until South African industry reached a stage where it could dispense with petroleum imports, a goal it was now striving to reach with the help of its powerful friends, but which would take years, if not decades, to attain.

30. The representatives of many States having close economic ties with South Africa had endeavoured to show that economic considerations made such ties difficult, if not impossible, to break. The main spokesman for that group of States had been the United Kingdom representative (472nd meeting), who had advanced an almost philosophical explanation of their position, arguing that trade was not a weapon to be used to express political detestation of a régime in a particular foreign country, for if trade were dependent on the results of a prior political test of the Government of the country concerned it would soon wither away. That principle was intrinsically valid, but irrelevant in the special case of South Africa, which had persistently and contemptuously ignored the repeated appeals of the United Nations that it abandon its policies. The United Kingdom representative himself had given no indication that he saw any likelihood of South Africa being persuaded to change its ways. He had admitted that there was a continuing and mounting danger and that the policies of racial domination could endanger peace; yet the United Kingdom and its powerful allies were doing nothing to halt South Africa's progress towards disaster and contended that the United Nations too must remain an anxious but passive spectator.

31. Malaysia, on the other hand, believed that the United Nations could and should take positive action to eliminate apartheid, lest the watching world dis-

miss the Organization as a body too weak to ensure the implementation of the principles it championed. Malaysia would support any proposal to that end; it had already proved its readiness to make sacrifices for that cause, for its embargo on exports to South Africa cost it some £25 million a year. It was therefore justified in asking the larger countries to make a similar sacrifice. The basic issue in the apartheid question was one of colour rather than race: colour was the problem with which the United Nations would have to concern itself in the coming decades, and on its response to that test would depend its continued existence as a force for good in the world.

32. Mr. HILMY (United Arab Republic) proposed that the Malaysian representative's statement should be issued in full as a Committee document.

33. The CHAIRMAN said that the Malaysian representative's statement would appear in the official record of the meeting.

34. Mr. TUREL (Turkey) congratulated the Special Committee on its report (A/5957), which showed that the situation in South Africa continued to deteriorate, and that the Government of that country, ignoring the appeals of the international community, was adopting even severer measures in order to eliminate all opposition to its policy of apartheid. On becoming a Member of the United Nations every State assumed the obligation to conform to the principles of the Charter and to promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, or religion. The United Nations had spared no effort to preserve those rights and freedoms and despite many difficulties had made great progress in that direction, as was proved by the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Unfortunately the principles set forth in those declarations were still not respected in certain Member States, in particular South Africa, which was violating the Charter by pursuing its policy of apartheid—in reality a new form of slavery that must be totally eliminated.

35. Turkey had never practised any form of racial or religious discrimination and it attached the greatest importance to human rights and fundamental freedoms, which were confirmed in article 12 of its new Constitution. It was therefore totally opposed to apartheid. It had always voted in favour of United Nations resolutions condemning that policy and it had no diplomatic, consular, economic or trade relations with South Africa. Further, in conformity with Security Council resolution 181 (1963) it prohibited exports of arms or ammunition to South Africa. ^{1/}

36. Regrettably, certain other Member States also oppressed various ethnic and religious groups and resorted to economic pressure, brute force and even massacres in order to dominate them. For example, a minority group was persecuted by the majority in Cyprus, and the case was due to be discussed soon in the First Committee.

37. His delegation would vote in favour of any recommendation that would make it possible to eliminate apartheid, which was incompatible with the principles of the Charter and constituted a threat to international peace and security.

38. Mr. GHERIB (Tunisia) said that as his delegation had been responsible for the approach made by the Chairman to the Permanent Representative of the Republic of South Africa, he would like to comment on the letter received in reply (A/SPC/107 and Corr.1). Although he was not surprised by the reaction of the South African representative, he wished to point out the inconsistency involved in delivering lectures on the advantages of the South African Government's policies, while remaining absent from the discussion of apartheid. In view of the decision by the General Assembly and the Security Council that apartheid constituted a threat to international peace and security, the use of the term "allegation" in the South African letter was unfounded and represented a challenge to the authority of the United Nations. Furthermore, there was a flagrant contradiction between South Africa's refusal to attend the debate on apartheid and its statement that that decision should not be construed as implying any unwillingness to co-operate with the United Nations. He utterly condemned the South African attitude and read out the text of a draft resolution which he hoped would be unanimously approved by the Committee.

39. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the draft resolution might be distributed as an official document.

It was so decided. ^{2/}

40. Mr. JUARBE Y JUARBE (Cuba), speaking in exercise of his right of reply, recalled that the representative of Venezuela had stated that Cuba had been excluded from the Latin American group in the United Nations because it had intervened in the internal affairs of Venezuela. By that statement, the representative of Venezuela had admitted that the group he referred to did not represent all the Latin American Member States and could not therefore be called the Latin American group in the regional and geographical sense current in the United Nations. With regard to his accusation concerning Cuba, the facts of the matter were well known.

41. The CHAIRMAN observed that it was an established custom within the Committee that a right of reply existed in cases where a speaker or his country had been directly attacked. He had given the representative of Cuba the floor, thinking that the point he wished to raise had a bearing on the subject under discussion. However, it now appeared that the issue was one which did not concern the Special Committee, or even the United Nations. He therefore requested the representative of Cuba to be as brief as possible.

42. Mr. JUARBE Y JUARBE (Cuba) said that an extremely grave charge—that of interfering in the domestic affairs of another Member State—had been levelled at his country. He believed that the Committee was entitled to an explanation. The accusation made by the representative of Venezuela was based

^{1/} See Official Records of the Security Council, Eighteenth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1963, document S/5438/Add.1.

^{2/} The draft resolution was subsequently issued as document A/SPC/L.120.

on the discovery of a number of weapons on a lonely beach in Venezuela. Cuba had proved, on the basis of official documents of the United States Government, that those weapons had been supplied to the Government of Venezuela by the Central Intelligence Agency. Yet the representative of Venezuela had not protested against intervention in his country's internal affairs by the United States of America, but by Cuba. Simón Bolívar, the Liberator of Latin America, had been born in Venezuela. He had died unhappy, aware that his work in Cuba and Puerto Rico was unfinished. In line with the wishes of Bolívar, Cuba was not willing to be an accomplice of the United States in its constant efforts to impose colonialist policies on the Latin American countries. Cuba was not alone in its stand. It could always count on the support of those people who had never abandoned the teachings of Bolívar.

43. Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) agreed with the Chairman that the incident was outside the scope of the Committee's work. The decision taken by the Latin American group with regard to Cuba had been based not only on Cuba's aggressive policy towards Venezuela, but on its attitude towards other Latin American countries. It would be tedious to recall all such cases, so he would merely reaffirm his previous statement. He would like to remind the representative of Cuba that the ideals of José Martí, the Cuban patriot, had been betrayed by the present régime.

44. Mr. CAMPOS TORRES (Guatemala) said he wished to reserve his right of reply.

45. The CHAIRMAN said he hoped the incident could now be regarded as closed.

46. Mr. SHERIFIS (Cyprus) reserved his right to reply to the allegations made regarding the oppression of the Turkish minority in Cyprus.

Organization of the Committee's work

47. The CHAIRMAN informed the Committee that the Chairman of the Special Committee and the Minis-

ter for External Affairs of Ireland had suggested that the debate on apartheid should be concluded on Tuesday, 7 December during the morning meeting if possible, or at the afternoon meeting at the latest, so that the question of peace-keeping operations could be taken up again on Wednesday, 8 December. He therefore wished to suggest that explanations of vote should be reserved for the General Assembly. The Committee's report on peace-keeping operations would be presented to the General Assembly before its report on apartheid.

48. Mr. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that while he respected the Chairman's efforts to expedite the work of the Committee, he thought that representatives should not be deprived of their right to explain their vote before the Committee. With that amendment, he was prepared to accept the Chairman's suggestion.

49. Mr. JUARBE Y JUARBE (Cuba) expressed surprise at the proposal to terminate the discussion of apartheid on the following day. A long list of speakers still remained, and all of them must be allowed to take the floor. Small delegations, such as his own, had great difficulty in organizing their work unless they were informed well in advance of decisions to close the debate.

50. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the proposal was not a ruling by the Chair but a suggestion by the Chairman of the Special Committee and the Minister for External Affairs of Ireland. Its purpose was to expedite the work of the Committee, and the representative of Cuba could feel confident that nothing would be done to prejudice his interests.

51. Mr. XYDIS (Greece) suggested that, as a compromise, the debate on apartheid should continue until the afternoon of Wednesday, 8 December, leaving the rest of the week for the examination of peace-keeping operations.

52. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the Committee continue the discussion at the next meeting.

The meeting rose at 1.55 p.m.