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MEETING**



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Chairman: Mr. Carlet R. AUGUSTE (Haiti).

AGENDA ITEM 101

Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects (continued) (A/SPC/L.117 and Add.1 and 2, L.121, L.122 and Add.1):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (A/5915 and Add.1, A/5916 and Add.1, A/5972, A/6026);  
(b) The authorization and financing of future peace-keeping operations (A/5966/Rev.2)

1. Mr. CABRERA MUÑOZ-LEDO (Mexico) said that his delegation's position with regard to the authorization and financing of future peace-keeping operations had already been fully explained by the Mexican representative at the 23rd meeting of the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations<sup>1/</sup> and at the 2nd and 9th meetings of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (A/5915/Add.1, annex I). The Committee's discussions had dealt mainly with the question of procedural decisions which would authorize the Special Committee to continue the work assigned to it in operative paragraph 3 of resolution 2006 (XIX). That was both wise and appropriate, for that Committee, with its present membership, had proved its effectiveness and had made a major contribution to the resumption of the General Assembly's work. His delegation could not, therefore, agree to any modification of its structure or alteration of its mandate, especially since such changes would inevitably be made in haste owing to the very heavy agenda of the twentieth session. The various statements made in the Committee—particularly that of the Irish Minister for External Affairs and those relating to draft resolutions A/SPC/L.121 and A/SPC/L.122 and Add.1—would undoubtedly help the Special Committee to continue its work successfully.

2. His delegation, together with eighteen other delegations, had sponsored draft resolution A/SPC/L.122

<sup>1/</sup> A/AC.113/35 (mimeographed).

and Add.1 for the reasons set forth by the Canadian representative in his statement at the 483rd meeting. His delegation hoped that if the draft failed to obtain unanimous support it would at least obtain a substantial majority, so that the result of the vote would truly reflect the many favourable opinions on that subject expressed during the general debate.

3. Mr. KARASIMEONOV (Bulgaria) considered that, in view of the decision taken by the General Assembly at its nineteenth session that the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations should complete its work (1331st plenary meeting), it would be inadvisable for the Special Political Committee to come to any decision on the problem of peace-keeping operations at the present session.

4. Under the Charter, primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security belonged to the Security Council, acting on behalf of Member States. That function had been conferred upon the Security Council, and not the General Assembly, because the membership of the Council reflected the fundamental United Nations principle of the unanimity of the five great Powers. In the course of its history, the United Nations had had to face up to constant attacks by countries which had sought to transform the Organization into an instrument serving their imperialist and colonialist interests. Only the principle of unanimity had saved the United Nations from betraying its Charter.

5. The campaign against the principle of unanimity was based on the attempt to prove the existence of the General Assembly's residual powers, an expression which did not appear in any part of the Charter. Of course, the General Assembly was entitled to discuss questions relating to the maintenance of peace and to make recommendations to the Security Council, but all such matters on which action was necessary had to be referred to the Council itself. It was therefore clear that the term "primary responsibility" in Article 24 had been preferred to the term "exclusive responsibility" in order to allow the General Assembly to participate in the discussion of peace-keeping matters. The term did not in any way imply the existence of a "residual responsibility" for the General Assembly. Had the authors of the Charter wished to limit the powers of the Security Council, they would have done so explicitly.

6. Some delegations had drawn a distinction between actions of the Security Council taken under Chapter VII of the Charter and the kind of actions usually referred to as "peace-keeping operations". That distinction was artificial; it would be incorrect to convert a current expression into a new concept. An "operation"

could be nothing other than an action taken under Chapter VII in the event of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. Various kinds of action were provided for, ranging from measures not involving the use of armed force to action by air, sea or land forces. Whenever the Security Council decided to undertake action, it was in application of Chapter VII.

7. One way of increasing the Organization's effectiveness in the peace-keeping field would be to widen the membership of the Security Council in favour of African and Asian countries. That measure would make it more difficult for certain Western Powers to hide their true intentions behind the rules of procedure. In addition, use should be made of all the possibilities offered under the Charter. So far, armed forces had been drawn chiefly from a single group of States without a special agreement being concluded with the Security Council. In the interests of peace, United Nations contingents should come from States with differing social systems. To that end, the Bulgarian Government had offered to provide forces in accordance with Article 43 of the Charter. His delegation endorsed the proposals submitted by the Soviet Union in its memorandum of 10 July 1964<sup>2/</sup> and supported its suggestion that a model draft agreement should be prepared for submission to the Security Council.

8. The draft resolution submitted by Ireland and certain other delegations (A/SPC/L.117 and Add.1 and 2) represented an attempt to substitute the General Assembly for the Security Council. The Bulgarian delegation rejected the draft as a flagrant violation of the Charter. The heart of the proposal was contained in the ninth preambular paragraph, which reaffirmed the residual right of the General Assembly to recommend peace-keeping operations. Although no reference was made in the latest version of the Irish text to the Uniting for Peace resolution, the spirit of that illegal and pernicious document still pervaded the Irish proposal. Draft resolution A/SPC/L.121, although it no longer attempted to amend the Charter by suggesting amendments to the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, was also unacceptable. The words "residual right" had disappeared from the preamble, but the intention was still to substitute the General Assembly for the Security Council.

9. With regard to the financing of peace-keeping operations, it was inadmissible that the General Assembly, which was not authorized to take any decision regarding peace-keeping operations, should be allowed to decide how they were to be financed. Any such solution, whether interim or not, was incompatible with the Charter. Operative paragraph 4 of draft resolution A/SPC/L.121 was therefore unacceptable. In any case, the proposed allocation of expenses was not the only possibility. If it so wished, the Security Council could decide that the expenses should be paid by the countries concerned or by voluntary contributions. Each case required a separate decision. Moreover, it could only be detrimental to the interests of the small countries that the

permanent members of the Security Council should have so large a share of the expenses.

10. A decision could not be taken at the present stage of the discussion. He therefore considered that all the proposals should be referred back to the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations until a more favourable atmosphere existed for the solution of the whole problem.

11. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) said that as lengthy interpretations of the applicable Articles of the Charter had failed to solve the problem of peace-keeping operations he would not adduce any further legal arguments. The question was a political as well as a legal and financial one. His delegation had no illusions about the possibility of finding an over-all solution for the many incidents that might call for peace-keeping operations. The only hope, therefore, was to find a common denominator upon which the major Powers could agree. Probably in deference to those Powers, the Committee had ventured no farther than recognizing the symptoms of the problem and had failed to consider the real factors giving rise to those symptoms. The whole problem revolved around two points, namely where responsibility for deciding to undertake peace-keeping operations lay and the authorization of the financing of such operations. There could be no question that, under the provisions of the Charter, peace-keeping operations were the primary responsibility of the five permanent members of the Security Council. When one of them exercised the veto, the Council was precluded from taking action. On more than one occasion, however, the other permanent members, in disregard of that veto, had sent armed forces to trouble spots for the purpose of settling disputes, invariably on terms favourable to their own interests. No distinction should be drawn between the major Powers where one or another of them intervened by means of armed force. Invariably such independent action had been undertaken either to maintain the balance of power or to secure strategic, political or economic advantages. Moreover, in almost every small country which might be of strategic or economic importance the major Powers had collaborators operating as members of legally constituted political parties or groups, to say nothing of the network of spies, "agents provocateurs" and even saboteurs who were at the beck and call of the major Powers. Sometimes the United Nations was confronted with a different situation, in which the major Powers tried to attain their ends by remote control, as it were, rather than by direct military action. Again, the major Powers sometimes concurred in the Security Council because they were vying with each other for the favour of one or another of the States which were parties to a conflict. That situation could be more dangerous for the small States than the inability of the Security Council to take action as a result of the use of the veto.

12. In the meantime a giant Power had emerged in Eastern Asia and the major Powers in the Security Council were just as uncertain as the smaller countries about the impact that it would have, particularly on the Asian and African countries. It must be asked what United Nations peace-keeping operations would

<sup>2/</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex no. 21, document A/5721.

be worth if the undeclared war in the Far East could not be confined to the relatively small area where it was now being waged. If the situation got out of hand, what sort of peace-keeping operations would suffice to deal with the various conflicts in Asia and Africa which might result? Moreover, he wondered whether, given the emotionally-charged situations on those continents, the large-scale peace-keeping operations which would be required to meet such contingencies might not even set off a major racial conflict, for the major Powers did not act when it was in their interests to remain on the sidelines. Why, indeed, had not one of those major Powers dared to bring before the Council the grave issues underlying the war in the Far East? The answer was that the major Powers had become the arbiters of what should or should not be discussed. It seemed to be their prerogative to resort to the arbitrary use of force and they did so with impunity; there was no talk of mounting peace-keeping operations to restrain them. The small States could perhaps exert moral influence on the great Powers but it must not be forgotten that many of them were in the debt of one or another of the great Powers for economic assistance and it was natural in such circumstances that they should respond by voting as the donor requested on certain occasions.

13. It was thus understandable that the major Powers should reject any plan which would give the General Assembly the authority to decide on peace-keeping operations.

14. He then cited a number of cases in which none of the permanent members of the Security Council had used the veto and it had thus been possible to undertake peace-keeping operations with or without their unanimous support. In the Congo the operation had not been supported by the Soviet Union and it had simply had the effect of aggravating the situation there. The Western Powers, having a stake in the natural resources of the Congo, had by-passed the small Powers, except for those which had taken sides in the conflict for the reasons he had indicated, and in the end they had obtained what they wanted. It would hardly be logical, therefore, to expect the Soviet Union to contribute to the expenses involved in that operation. In the recent Kashmir crisis the Soviet Union had again refrained from invoking the veto. The result, however, had not been a solution of the Kashmir problem but only the restoration of the precarious cease-fire. In the case of Palestine, the President of one of the great Powers had engineered the partition of the Holy Land in 1947 by exerting personal pressure on the representatives of three Member States and no other Power had invoked the veto. In 1956 three Member States, two of them permanent members of the Security Council, had invaded the territory of an Arab State. The Soviet Union and the United States had acted together in compelling those Powers to withdraw, and again the veto had not been used. The conflicts in Korea, Yemen and Cyprus were other cases in point. When, as the representative of Saudi Arabia, he had been asked why his delegation had abstained in the voting on Korea in the General Assembly, he had replied that the USSR and the United States had partitioned Korea without consulting any of the smaller Powers.

What was now happening in Viet-Nam was not so very different from what had happened in Korea. A major Power was involved in the struggle in Viet-Nam and, as though by a gentleman's agreement, the question was not being discussed in either the Security Council or the General Assembly. He mentioned the war in Viet-Nam in order to ask whether peace-keeping operations should be undertaken only when it suited the permanent members of the Security Council. With respect to Viet-Nam there was no question of the Security Council being paralysed by a veto. What was happening was that the whole United Nations, including the Security Council, was simply being by-passed. From all those examples it should be clear that the problem of the veto was not as serious as it appeared to be.

15. There were unquestionably certain situations which called for action and the assumption of collective fiscal responsibility, but he did not see how a plan to meet those contingencies, such as that proposed by the Irish representative, could be adopted without amending the Charter, a procedure which would require the unanimous consent of the permanent members of the Council. In the absence of such an amendment, it would appear that the only alternative was to continue dealing with each situation as it arose. In doing so the Organization could not apply the concept of the juridical equality of States for the purpose of apportioning the amounts which each should contribute, for two reasons: first, any fiscal allocation on a percentage basis, however modest, might prove too burdensome for some of the small Powers; secondly, it would not be fair to assess a small country for any amount, no matter how small, when the situation calling for action had been created precisely by the efforts of the major Powers to gain paramount influence in certain parts of the world.

16. Before concluding his statement he would like to make a few suggestions which he hoped would be heeded by all Members and especially by the major Powers. First, the large and small Powers should resist the temptation to interfere in the domestic affairs of other States. Secondly, the major Powers should desist from partitioning countries into spheres of influence to suit their own purposes. Thirdly, civil wars should not be exploited to the advantage of any Power. Fourthly, peace-keeping operations should be confined for the most part to those situations where open aggression was perpetrated from without. Fifthly, whenever possible the financing of peace-keeping operations should be the responsibility of those States that had become involved in a conflict. Last but not least, the major Powers should sincerely devote themselves to the task of implementing the lofty principles enshrined in the Charter, thus setting an example for all the other Members of the Organization, and as they were the guardians of the peace they should assume the fiscal responsibilities involved pending a final solution.

17. Mr. JOUEJATI (Syria) said that the paramount importance rightly attributed by the Charter to the maintenance of international peace and security made it imperative that all Member States should do their utmost to establish appropriate machinery that would enable the Organization to perform that function. In

view of the complex nature of peace-keeping operations, which involved constitutional, political, financial and technical factors, the rules governing that machinery should be elaborated on the basis of a broad consensus. Since the great Powers were invested with special responsibility for the maintenance of peace, their obligations, financial and otherwise, were necessarily more extensive. It was therefore desirable, indeed essential, that they should be unanimously, closely and wholeheartedly associated with the peace-keeping machinery, lest the question of peace-keeping become a source of strife within the Organization, as at the nineteenth session. The crisis had been resolved through a gradual meeting of minds, for which the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations had provided a practical forum, thus setting a successful precedent which should be used as a basis for further constructive effort. The discussion should be allowed to continue, and should not be cut short by pressing the matter to a premature vote.

18. The Irish Minister for External Affairs was to be congratulated on having taken the initiative of submitting draft resolution A/SPC/L.117 and Add.1 and 2, but that draft did not offer a solution to the peace-keeping problem, for it by-passed the original controversy as to the nature and extent of the competence of the main United Nations organs, and might thus aggravate the problem rather than solve it. Furthermore, the draft gave the permanent members of the Security Council the right to evade financial responsibility for any peace-keeping operations of which they did not approve. If one or two great Powers assumed the bulk of the financial responsibility for a peace-keeping operation they might tend to try to use that operation to further their own interests, thus detracting from the international character of such operations and weakening the United Nations.

19. Draft resolution A/SPC/L.121, which was designed to remedy some of the shortcomings of draft resolution A/SPC/L.117 and Add.1 and 2, would, if adopted, modify the terms of reference of the Special Committee, and might render that body's work more complicated and controversial. It would be preferable for that Committee to set its own priorities and make its own plans.

20. Draft resolution A/SPC/L.122 and Add.1 took those considerations into account and merited support. However, the call for contributions in the last operative paragraph was so worded as to give the impression that those contributions were compulsory, and not voluntary, as originally intended, and the paragraph might therefore give rise to some reservations.

21. The Secretary-General was to be congratulated on his handling of previous peace-keeping operations, and it was to be hoped that the Special Committee would succeed in finding a solution to the peace-keeping problem, in order to facilitate his task in the future.

22. Mr. ARCHIBALD (Trinidad and Tobago) said that the United Nations was still faced with a dilemma: that of keeping world peace when the authority to do so was an attribute of government. Since the United

Nations was not equipped with full governmental authority, it would have to rely to a considerable extent on its moral influence. Consequently, all Member States should take care not to tarnish the United Nations image. In the field of peace-keeping, large and small countries alike might one day stand in need of all the help the United Nations could provide. Nothing enhanced so much the prestige of the United Nations as when it spoke with a single voice. That consideration should not be forgotten in any argument about the role of the General Assembly in peace-keeping.

23. There had been sound reasons at the beginning for conferring the primary responsibility for peace-keeping on the five permanent members of the Security Council. Furthermore, it was clear that any United Nations activity, if it was to be successful, should be firmly based on the Charter. However, a serious difference of opinion had arisen regarding the interpretation of the relevant sections of the Charter. Moreover, the capacity of the five permanent members to carry out their responsibilities for peace-keeping was liable at times to be severely limited by disagreement among themselves. It was precisely when the great Powers were in disagreement that world peace was the greatest danger. Furthermore, even assuming that the Peking Government took its seat at the Security Council, the permanent members would still represent a minority of the world population. Africa, Latin America and South East Asia were not represented. The second largest nation in the world, India, was not a permanent member. Under present conditions, the majority of mankind might well be disenfranchised at the moment of supreme choice between life and death.

24. His delegation believed that any progress achieved in the strengthening of the United Nations peace-keeping machinery would have a beneficial influence on the disarmament discussions and, conversely, any failure to make progress could be destructive. Since conflicts of interest would always rise between nations, the risk of war would always remain, unless some other means of settlement was available.

25. He wished to commend the efforts of the Irish delegation to produce a positive and constructive solution to the problem of peace-keeping. However, he had noted the adamant objections raised to the draft resolution and therefore considered that all present proposals should be referred back to the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations for further study. He hoped that those delegations which had raised objections would present their own suggestions. No better way existed of winning influence within the United Nations than by contributing to the task of improving its peace-keeping methods.

26. Mr. EL-BOURI (Libya) said that the question of peace-keeping was of the greatest importance, for the danger of war continued to threaten all mankind and it was essential that the United Nations should be in a position to operate as the main instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security. The crisis of the nineteenth session had been settled, but Member States should do everything in their power to prevent a recurrence

of that crisis, which would so weaken the Organization as to prevent it from fulfilling the purpose for which it had been established.

27. Despite all the efforts which had so far been deployed to find a solution to the peace-keeping problem little progress had been made, for both sides maintained their rigid positions and were unwilling to make concessions. The question was admittedly complex, but his delegation was convinced that the spirit of understanding that had made it possible to avoid a confrontation over the application of Article 19 would prevail, and a solution would be found that would be acceptable to all Member States and particularly to the permanent members of the Security Council. The various interpretations of the Charter and the views expressed in the Committee were not so different as to make agreement impossible. The world had changed since 1945, as had the Organization's responsibilities, and the spirit of the Charter must therefore evolve and adapt itself to the needs of a developing international community. The Charter undoubtedly conferred upon the Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, but it should also be recognized that when the Council was paralysed it was the General Assembly's duty to act if peace was threatened, for the United Nations must be enabled to take rapid action in the common interest under the provisions of the Charter.

28. His delegation congratulated the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly on their report (A/5915/Add.1, annex II) and approved in general the broad guide-lines set forth therein. It was obvious that any practical peace-keeping formula would have to be supported by a large majority of Member States and particularly by the permanent members of the Security Council, for the agreement of the great Powers was essential to the success of peace-keeping operations. The Irish Minister for External Affairs was consequently to be commended for his efforts to help the Committee to find a compromise solution; the proposals contained in draft resolution A/SPC/L.121 would provide the Organization with temporary peace-keeping machinery pending a final solution.

29. His delegation believed that the General Assembly should renew the mandate of the Special Committee, in order that it might continue its review of the entire question of future peace-keeping operations and their financing, including the proposals contained in draft resolution A/SPC/L.121. His delegation would vote in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.122 and Add.1. It was certain that all Member States would co-operate with goodwill in a spirit of conciliation in order to find a solution conforming to the principles of the Charter and acceptable to all.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.