United Nations GENERAL ASSEMBLY

TWENTY-SIXTH SESSION

**Official Records** 

SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE, 759th

, M E E T I N G

Wednesday, 27 October 1971, at 10.50 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Cornelius C. CREMIN (Ireland).

## AGENDA ITEMS 37 AND 12

- The policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (continued) (A/8403, A/8422 and Corr.1, A/8467, A/8468, A/SPC/145):
- (a) Report of the Special Committee on Apartheid (A/ 8422 and Corr.1);
- (b) Reports of the Secretary-General (A/8467, A/8468);
- (c) Report of the Economic and Social Council (chapter XVII (section C)) (A/8403)

1. Mr. COLERIDGE-TAYLOR (Sierra Leone) said that apartheid was not just another international problem, but a question of national honour and personal dignity. Not to oppose apartheid was to accept a principle which negated the equality and the common destiny of mankind, the application of which reduced both its supporters and its victims to the same sub-human level. However, he was more concerned with the victims of *apartheid*, and he proposed to treat the question as a moral, social, political and economic problem to which all enlightened humanity should address itself, for apartheid challenged and violated absolute and sacred values. Although resolutions and debates had not solved the problem, the atrocities of apartheid must be denounced. The film entitled "Dumping Grounds" enabled Committee members to realize the agonies suffered in the "homelands", where people, generally broken families, were dumped, on the pretext that they were being prepared for self-determination and independence. In fact, only women, children and the aged were sent to distant reserves. The able-bodied men continued to constitute 75 per cent of the South African labour force. Thus apartheid was no more than a modern form of slavery. The repressive legislation conceived by the white minority, the oppression that enabled it to govern and its belligerence in external relations were aimed at maintaining a constant supply of cheap manpower that would disappear under any form of emancipation.

2. To be deprived of freedom of movement, free access to education, the right of association, to be forced to live in poverty on unproductive land, to be harassed by a brutal security force obsessed by the idea of racial superiority, to know that justice and equality before the law would be beyond reach, all because a person's skin was black, were some of the indignities suffered, some of the heads of the hydra of *apartheid* that must be destroyed. In view of the sad list of martyrs and heroes of the struggle against *apartheid*, indifference or silence were just as culpable as collaboration. Those States which were known to have relations with South Africa were under a greater obligation than the others to work actively towards establishing a new country, by holding talks with South Africa on the elimination of *apartheid*.

3. Any money channelled into Pretoria helped to fortify *apartheid*, and every delivery of arms served to encourage its military ventures. That was why his country once again asked the friends and trading partners of South Africa to apply a universal boycott until South Africa renounced its policy of *apartheid*, because, under a total and universal boycott, the racist minority of South Africa would be bound to capitulate. His delegation supported the proposal of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* for a declaration on the elimination of *apartheid* (see A/8422 and Corr.1, para. 252). The evils of *apartheid* and the measures adopted by the United Nations should be made known, if only as a warning to future generations. That would require increased publicity aimed particularly at young people.

4. The dialogue between racial groups would be, in principle, a most worthy exercise. But it should take place between the whites and the non-whites of South Africa. Furthermore, the subject of the dialogue could only be the elimination of *apartheid*: South Africa must therefore show that it was willing to liberalize its policy. However, either South Africa wanted to talk and nothing else, and that was unacceptable, or it wanted merely to convert to *apartheid* those with whom it was conversing. It would be useless for his country to reconsider its position unless South Africa modified its own. The offer of a dialogue was no more than a ruse to lure the African States into the economic sphere of South Africa. South Africa needed the rest of Africa and therefore isolation of that régime would constitute a potent weapon against *apartheid*.

5. His country's contribution to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa was on the way and it was taking steps to increase that contribution in the coming years. Saluting the heroes of the struggle against *apartheid*, it would continue to support that struggle materially and morally, because if *apartheid* refused to die a natural death, it would have to be publicly executed.

6. Mr. ISSAKA (Togo) said that contrary to the claims of mendacious propaganda, nothing had changed in South Africa: the South African régime had relinquished neither its philosophy for "separate development" nor its policy of *apartheid*, both of which had been condemned by the international community. A brief glance at the report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/8422 and Corr.1) was sufficient proof. Arbitrary arrests and condemnations following a summary trial continued, and witnesses had seen the deplorable conditions imposed on black people in South African prisons. The report also stated that tens of thousands of Africans had been expelled from the urban areas and agricultural regions in the white zones and sent to the overpopulated and poor reserves, or "resettlement camps" where 50 per cent of the children died of malnutrition before reaching the age of one. The film "Dumping Grounds" shown the previous week confirmed those facts.

7. All that was the result and possibly the ultimate aim of the so-called "separate development" policy. But oppression in South Africa, initially directed against coloured people, who were accused of encouraging communist penetration, had then spread to liberal white circles. At the current time it was being directed against religious circles, which could hardly be suspected of communist subversion. Indeed, those whose mission it was to teach ethics and respect for human dignity, and, more generally, those who still had a conscience and the courage to heed it, could not remain indifferent to the crimes of the South African régime against humanity.

8. If there had been no change in the situation in South Africa, it was because complicity with South Africa remained the same. The Western countries refused to give up the profits they derived both from their investments which were very remunerative because of the use of cheap labour, and from their arms deliveries. His Government condemned all sales of arms to South Africa, as it had in the past. The Security Council's resolutions made no distinction between arms which could be used in antiguerrilla operations and those which served to defend the against threats from abroad. Resolution country 181 (1963) of 7 August 1963, in particular, called upon all States to cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa. He appealed to the Western countries to curb the greed that blinded them and thus to guarantee their interests in the future, for a free and just southern Africa would be a safer trading partner for them than it was today.

9. The provisions that the Special Committee was adopting, in collaboration with the trade union movement, to inform world public opinion of the evils of *apartheid* and encourage Governments and private enterprise to respect United Nations resolutions on the matter, constituted an action which might well have a far-reaching effect and bring important pressures to bear upon South Africa, always provided that all the workers' organizations gave their assistance.

10. Faced with the lack of progress made in the struggle against *apartheid*, certain African States were trying a new approach. To eliminate the fear, which must be at the root of the policy of *apartheid*, they wanted to assure South Africa of their peaceful intentions, as though the Lusaka Manifesto (see General Assembly resolution 2505 (XXIV)) had not already given it such assurance. However justified the reprisals taken by the Africans might appear, the Europeans of South Africa feared them less than the establishment of an equitable régime which would cause them to lose the extravagant privileges they currently enjoyed. In an atmosphere of unprejudiced competition, they might find themselves in the inferior position in which the coloured people were at the current time.

11. His Government remained sceptical about the outcome of any contact with the authorities of Pretoria,

because, as his Minister for Foreign Affairs had said at the 1960th plenary meeting, such contact would be possible only if the white minority had previously agreed to a dialogue with the black majority, to which it continued to deny all right to the most elementary human dignity. The South African Government claimed to have initiated a dialogue with its own populations: but that would be valid only if it did so with competent people, such as the representatives of popular South African movements. In accepting to hold talks only with those who approved its policy, the South African régime was condemning itself to a dialogue of the deaf, which was doubtless what any dialogue with the African States would turn out to be. In fact, it was the kind of propaganda South Africa needed to reduce the effect of the sanctions and escape from its isolation, but there was nothing to indicate that the South African authorities intended to negotiate with the leaders of black movements. It should be stressed, however, that only the South African people itself would be competent to negotiate the future of South Africa.

12. The establishment of a just peace in the world should be the concern of everyone, and to establish peace injustice must be fought. The United Nations should not wait until it was too late, as it had in the case of the Middle East. It was still possible at the current time to establish permanent peace in Africa on the basis of the Lusaka Manifesto, and thereby to avoid a catastrophe.

13. Mr. BENKOW (Norway) noted that despite the measures taken by the United Nations, *apartheid* was being strengthened and extended; however, if the policy of *apartheid* was not considered at each session of the General Assembly, that would be a victory for the South African minority Government.

14. Racial discrimination was the guiding principle adopted by the South African Government for the development of South African society, and for 25 years that Government had totally disregarded General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, even though a policy which violated the Charter of the United Nations could not fail to cause grave concern to all Member States.

15. Apartheid was a policy of violence both by nature and in practice, and it was for that reason that his delegation endorsed the statement made at the preceding meeting by the representative of Somalia, concerning the need to continue the campaign against *apartheid* until the South African Government showed a willingness to carry out the kind of consultation and conciliation called for by the Security Council's Group of Experts in 1964,<sup>1</sup> or the kind of dialogue called for by the Lusaka Manifesto.

16. The policy of *apartheid* affected southern Africa as a whole, for the South African Government had taken the lead in opposing the implementation of the policies of justice, freedom and self-determination which were supported by all of Africa and the majority of States Members of the United Nations. In defiance of world opinion and of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice,

<sup>1</sup> See Official Records of the Security Council, Nineteenth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1964, document S/5658, annex, para. 115.

of 21 June 1971, the South African authorities were implementing *apartheid* in Namibia and causing tension and violence among its people. In Southern Rhodesia, South Africa had ignored the mandatory sanctions imposed by the Security Council on the illegal régime in Salisbury, and, through its direct support, was contributing to the continued existence of that régime. Moreover, by supporting the colonial policies of the Portuguese Government, South Africa was extending its damaging influence to vast areas.

17. His delegation considered that the problems of colonialism and *apartheid* in southern Africa were closely linked. It was pleased that the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, the United Nations Council for Namibia and the Special Commitee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples had held a joint meeting (see A/8388). It considered that such meetings should be held from time to time.

18. His delegation, which had participated actively in 1963 and 1964 in the formulation of the resolutions instituting the arms embargo against South Africa, agreed with the recommendation made by the Special Committee on *Apartheid* in paragraph 308 of its report that the Security Council should again consider that serious aspect of the *apartheid* problem.

19. Economic sanctions against South Africa, in order to be effective, must be mandatory and implemented loyally by all States. Without the full support of the main trading partners of South Africa, a policy of sanctions was bound to be futile.

20. His delegation noted that the Special Committee, in its report, emphasized the importance of the dissemination of information on *apartheid*. In addition, the representative of Somalia, Chairman of the Special Committee, had pointed out in his statement at the preceding meeting that it had never been more necessary to continue the campaign against *apartheid* with renewed determination and sincerity.

21. His delegation supported that statement and, like the representative of Somalia, considered that the efforts to enlist the support of the people of the world were beginning to show results.

22. He noted that the Organization of African Unity was to hold an international conference at Oslo in May 1972 for the support of victims of racism and colonialism. Its purpose was to formulate a strategy to be applied to South Africa and to focus world opinion on the problems of colonialism and racial discrimination.

23. His delegation was convinced that the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa had an important mission to fulfil. It hoped that Member States would show their solidarity with the people of South Africa by contributing to the Fund in greater number. His Government, subject to approval by Parliament, would increase its contribution to the Fund for 1972, as well as its different contributions to other United Nations programmes to aid the peoples of southern Africa. His Government also contributed to other programmes for aid to the people of South Africa, such as the International Defence and Aid Fund. 24. In conclusion, he recalled that Members of the United Nations had the duty to encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and to assist in eliminating prejudice. Since South Africa was the only country where racial discrimination had been taken as the guiding principle for the development of society, the Committee and the General Assembly must inform the South African Government of the views of Member States in the clearest terms.

25. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) said that since the perennial question of *apartheid* had been taken up by the United Nations, it had often been linked with that of colonialism. However, colonization had not always been accompanied by racial discrimination; in particular, the countries bordering on the Mediterranean, which was the melting-pot of civilizations where no one despised his neighbour because of the colour of his skin, had rapidly come to understand that people of colour were human beings. Brazil, once a Portuguese colony, was an example of a multiracial society.

26. On the other hand, the whites of South Africa, who had come from north-western Europe, particularly the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, and from Central Europe as well, had believed that they must preserve the colour of their skin. White South Africans suffered from a superiority complex which arose out of their fear of losing their identity by being submerged by millions of coloured people.

27. In the last third of the twentieth century, no one could accept the idea of racial discrimination, for men were all of one and the same race, all descended from *homo* sapiens. Was there any need to add racial discrimination to the ills of mankind?

28. In the absence of a solution to the problem as a whole, it might be possible to create a situation which could some day lead to a solution. Reviewing the possibilities for action, he noted that the repesresentative of Norway had, in particular, called for the application of economic and other sanctions. But the Security Council was paralysed because the great Powers dared not provoke the wrath of South Africa, which was one of the major exporters of diamonds and gold, to which the various national currencies were tied. Moreover, even in the days when South Africa was a colony of the United Kingdom, there had never been any armed intervention, whereas, in other colonies, revolts had been ruthlessly put down.

29. Everyone was willing to debate the question in the United Nations and to increase the number of organs dealing with it in order to appease the African and Asian countries by allowing them to express their emotions and their discontent. It was probably felt that they were less dangerous that way than if they were plotting in silence. However, the question could not be resolved by reports, and no tangible results had yet been achieved. Moreover, in view of the question of the solvency of the United Nations, organs would not be able to proliferate indefinitely. Education, through the offices of UNESCO, would make it possible to reach a solution. Nevertheless, he believed that fear might prove most effective and that goodwill would not be sufficient. The countries of Europe, like those of

Africa, would have to sacrifice something instead of confining themselves to pledges of support.

30. The Africans would perhaps be obliged to resort to subversion and guerrilla warfare, but that process might be a long one, for it was well known that South Africa was armed to the teeth, and might cause considerable suffering.

31. He wished to propose a solution which he had already suggested in the Fourth Committee<sup>2</sup> in regard to Namibia.

It would be necessary, in concert with South Africa, to accelerate Namibia's development and create conditions there under which South African and Southern Rhodesian non-whites could regain their dignity. The wealth of the country was such that there would be a rapid influx of labour, like that experienced by the United States of America in the last century, resulting in a labour shortage in South Africa. Only when there was a country where the non-whites of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia could feel at home would they cease to be the slaves of whites of European descent.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.

<sup>2</sup> See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Fourth Committee, 1891st meeting.