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**SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE, 380th  
MEETING**



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## CONTENTS

### Agenda item 30:

*The policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa: reports of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa and replies by Member States under General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII) (continued) . . . . .*

Page

13

Chairman: Mr. Mihail HASEGANU (Romania).

## AGENDA ITEM 30

The policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa: reports of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa and replies by Member States under General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII) (A/5497 and Add.1, A/SPC/80, A/SPC/81, A/SPC/L.95) (continued)

1. Mr. AMONOO (Ghana) noted with satisfaction that in spite of the refusal of certain Member States to participate in the work of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, that Committee had carried out its mandate with thoroughness, restraint and objectivity, and had presented a well-documented report (A/5497 and Add.1). The Special Political Committee had also heard the lucid statements of the Special Committee's officers to whom the delegation of Ghana wished to express its gratitude.

2. The report was an eloquent testimony to the persistent efforts of the United Nations to find a workable solution for coping with the obnoxious racial policies of the Government of South Africa. Yet he would not be surprised if the Secretary-General, in his report to the Security Council to be submitted before the end of the current month, were to state that the Republic of South Africa had turned a deaf ear to all the pleas of the United Nations—the General Assembly and the Security Council had adopted twenty-eight resolutions on the question—and of other peace-loving countries.

3. The Summit Conference of Independent African States, which had met at Addis Ababa 22–25 May 1963, had solemnly condemned racial discrimination in all its forms in Africa and all over the world, had decided to co-ordinate sanctions against South Africa, and had instructed the Foreign Ministers of four African countries to inform the Security Council of the explosive situation that prevailed in South Africa. The resolution which the Security Council had adopted on 7 August 1963<sup>1/</sup> by a large majority constituted a departure

from previous resolutions in that it solemnly called upon all States to cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa. The delegation of Ghana welcomed the fact that the United States of America had voted for the relevant paragraph at the 1056th meeting of the Security Council and had announced that it would suspend all arms shipments at the end of 1963. The countries of Africa expected the United States to go further and to impose a total embargo on arms shipments to South Africa. In that connexion, President Nkrumah had deplored the fact that the great Powers and some of the smaller ones continued to export arms to South Africa without asking themselves how the arms would be used.

4. The international repercussions of the military build-up of the Republic of South Africa demanded the special attention of the Committee. As long as the great Powers were unable to give assurance that the arms supplied to South Africa for its external defence would not be used against African States, their policy would constitute a serious threat to international peace and security. South Africa was spending \$219 million annually on its armed forces, which were being trained in the use of nuclear weapons. Military service played an ever-increasing part in the lives of white people and, apart from national armaments, 3 million Whites privately owned 2 million fire-arms. The presence of regular officers of the South African Army in Katanga, the positions of responsibility occupied by officers of the South African Air Force in Southern Rhodesia, the military guarantees given by South Africa to the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique, were all part of the military record of South Africa on the African continent.

5. Under pressure from African States, the United Kingdom and France had announced that they would no longer supply arms that could be used to back up apartheid, but the distinction between such arms and others was unreal and he urged the two Powers to impose a total embargo on arms shipments to South Africa. In that connexion, the delegation of Ghana noted with great satisfaction the position taken by Mr. Harold Wilson, the Leader of the Labour Party in the United Kingdom, who had dwelt at length on the question of the arms build-up on the grounds that it posed, in the words of Mr. Wilson, a threat to the integrity of neighbouring territories and a challenge to the whole world. The African States were happy to note that a number of countries, including Canada, had prohibited the export of small arms to South Africa. Unfortunately, Italy continued arms shipments as indicated by export licences granted in recent months.

6. The formation of an anti-apartheid committee in Paris under the presidency of Jean-Paul Sartre, which would endeavour to dissuade the French Government from selling arms to the Whites in South Africa, was to be welcomed.

<sup>1/</sup> Official Records of the Security Council, Eighteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1963, document S/5386.

7. An arms embargo was not enough. A total boycott of trade with South Africa must be ordered. It was regrettable that the Security Council at its 1054th meeting had not adopted the paragraph on that subject in the original draft resolution of 6 August 1963. In that respect the Security Council resolution had retreated from General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII). At its eighteenth session, the General Assembly should again invite Member States to boycott South Africa diplomatically, politically, and economically. A trade boycott, especially an embargo on oil imports, would soon paralyse the South African economy.

8. Even before the adoption of recent General Assembly resolutions, in particular resolution 1761 (XVII) and before the Summit Conference at Addis Ababa had called for sanctions against South Africa, the Government of Ghana had stopped all trade with that country, had prohibited the landing of South African aircraft and banned South African shipping from all ports of Ghana. So far as Ghana was concerned, the present Government of South Africa was an alien Government which represented a white minority, and Ghana would not recognize it until the principle of "one man, one vote" had been accepted and a new Government had been constituted.

9. He was afraid that he would hear at the present session the same old appeals for persuasion and conciliation and the same old arguments against sanctions. The experience of Ghana, which had tried to establish friendly relations with South Africa by inviting it to the Conference of Independent African States at Accra, 15-22 April 1958, proposing an exchange of High Commissioners, and inviting Mr. Louw, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa, to Ghana, had convinced it that all such efforts were in vain and only hardened the South African racist leaders in their policies of apartheid. The President of the Republic of Ghana had said that South Africa was probably the biggest impediment to the liberation and unity of the African continent. In his encyclical *Pacem in Terris*, Pope John XXIII had declared that racial discrimination could no longer be justified—a further reason why the African States could not accept the existing situation in South Africa.

10. A careful reading of the Special Committee's report (A/5497 and Add.1), especially paragraphs 62-96 and 305-323 of document A/5497, clearly showed that the present leaders of South Africa had no intention of complying with United Nations resolutions or of respecting the rights and dignity of Africans. On the contrary, where there had been certain rights, where there had been a minimum of integration, they had been taken away. All of the measures which had been taken, and which were described in the report of the Special Committee, generated resentment and produced an explosive situation that might engulf the African continent in a racial war.

11. The United States of America, which made itself the champion of democracy and had voted for the arms embargo, could use its influence to discourage its allies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from sending arms of any kind to the Government of South Africa. It could also, along with other countries, put an end to all student exchanges, educational grants and links of all kinds which involved the acceptance of segregation and which only strengthened the position of Mr. Verwoerd, Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa, since the beneficiaries of such schemes were never opponents of the Government. It would be advisable, on the

other hand, to strengthen links with the majority of the population and to offer the advantages of such schemes to young people who managed to leave that forlorn country. Another useful move would be to discourage United States investments in South Africa, which added to the foreign currency reserves used by the South African Government for its military expenditure. Such restraint seemed feasible since United States investments in all southern Africa hardly amounted to \$413 million as compared with United Kingdom investments of \$2,800 million in South Africa alone, could not but be strongly felt by the Government of South Africa.

12. Ghana, as a member of the Commonwealth, had tried everywhere and at every opportunity to prevail upon the United Kingdom to bring effective pressure to bear on South Africa for the abandonment of apartheid. If the United Kingdom had refused to have any dealings with South Africa at the time it withdrew from the Commonwealth, South Africa would have begged to be readmitted. But because of United Kingdom investment and because of increased migration from the United Kingdom, Ireland, the Netherlands, Western Germany, Italy, Greece, Portugal and other countries, South Africa was now boasting that it was stronger economically and was not unduly worried about the disapproval of the world community. But the United Kingdom had a moral influence in South Africa and could afford to make the necessary sacrifices. His delegation therefore appealed to the United Kingdom to do all in its power to persuade the Government of South Africa to mend its ways.

13. In 1962 (327th meeting) the representative of Ghana had pointed out in the Special Political Committee that South Africa had decided to accept Japan as a White country. He was uncertain about the reply of the Japanese representative. His delegation would, however, wish to be assured during the current year that Japan had refused to accept that designation and that the Japanese people were proud of their colour and were part and parcel of the African-Asian family.

14. The statements of the Foreign Ministers of Denmark, Sweden and Norway at the 1215th, 1222nd and 1233rd plenary meetings, respectively, condemning apartheid and calling for effective measures were welcome. His delegation would give the proposals of the Nordic countries its close attention.

15. The situation in South Africa was deteriorating and required urgent action by the Organization. There was no doubt that the problem posed in South Africa threatened to spread throughout the world. It transcended the framework of economics, of ideologies, of law and of normal institutional limitations and entered the realm of the relations between man and man. The consequences of apartheid were being felt not only in South Africa but also in the High Commission Territories of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland and perhaps even in Southern Rhodesia. If the evil genius of apartheid was not contained, and in fact destroyed, there would be no peace in Africa. John Brown's soul went marching on in South Africa today, and it would find no rest until justice had been done.

16. Some of the concrete measures which the Organization should take during the current session had been listed in paragraphs 460-517 of the report of the Special Committee, and represented a minimum programme of action. He wished to state that certain suggestions for the partition of South Africa between Whites and Blacks were unacceptable to his delegation. It did not believe

that partition would resolve the problem because, in the first place, it would not remove apartheid from South Africa. What was desired was that apartheid should disappear from the face of the earth.

17. In the Security Council, on 2 August 1963 (1052nd meeting), the representative of Ghana had said that the Organization could take effective action to protect the equality and dignity of man through the exclusion of South Africa from the United Nations. He had gone on to say that the Republic of South Africa was unworthy of membership in the United Nations and had outlawed itself morally by its attitude.

18. On 22 September 1963 The New York Times had reported that Mr. Dennis V. Brutus, President of the South African Non-racial Committee for Olympic Sports, and a British subject holding a valid passport from the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, had been extradited to South Africa by the Portuguese authorities and had been shot at and wounded. Such events showed that the crossroads had now been reached. There was no turning back; it was necessary to go forward until the principle of "one man, one vote" had been accepted and the freedom fighters of South Africa had gained their dignity as human beings, until apartheid had been uprooted not only from South Africa but also from South West Africa and until all forms of discrimination and oppression in the world had been abolished.

19. Mr. LANNUNG (Denmark) said that Denmark and the other Nordic countries believed that apartheid already constituted a threat to peace in the southern part of Africa and might one day result in a broader threat to international peace. Their approach should be seen as an effort to convince Governments that there was an alternative to violence if all countries were prepared to overcome national prejudices, and to look realistically towards the future. The Nordic countries' attitude rested on two basic premises. On the one hand, no mere condemnation or pressure would be likely to induce the white minority in South Africa to change its present policies. In order to achieve that, it would be necessary to convince that minority that the end of apartheid and white domination would not mean the end of the existence of the white population. On the other hand, even if the latter could be persuaded that such was the case, the white minority would still have to be made to understand that there was no escaping the universal demand that apartheid and white domination in South Africa must be abolished. Thus, the United Nations must direct its efforts along several fronts. While pressure on the Government of South Africa must be increased, the United Nations must at the same time hold out hope to the white minority by formulating positive ideals for a society to replace the present one based on apartheid, and it must give serious consideration to the problems that would inevitably face the Organization during the creation of that new society. The Nordic countries envisaged such a society as truly democratic and multi-racial, offering equal rights to all individuals irrespective of colour and race. There had been many signs that that concept was shared by the African States and by the great majority of the South African population. "Multiracial" did not imply special protection for racial minorities. Any true democracy by definition offered protection to minorities but it would be contrary to the very idea of multiracialism to give special protection on the basis of race alone.

20. Denmark whole-heartedly supported that line taken by the United Nations so far, namely that the

policies at present pursued by the Government of South Africa were contrary to the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Recently, however, it had been realized by most Member States that since persuasion had been of no avail, other means would have to be used. Hence General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII), the Security Council resolution of 7 August 1963, and the further specific measures proposed in the Special Committee's report (A/5497 and Add.1). Denmark supported the general policy of bringing pressure to bear on the South African Government and considered that all means open to the Organization under the Charter should gradually be applied to that end. However, clearly the steps taken should not be more extensive, and in consequence more disruptive to the economies of other States, than was necessary to bring about the desired effect. Furthermore, the observance of the steps taken should be easily controllable. With regard to the problem of gaining the support of those Member States which would necessarily, on account of trade patterns, have to play the decisive role, constructive progress could result only from agreement between those countries, primarily the African States, whose special interests and responsibilities naturally led them to advocate an unconditional policy of pressure, and South Africa's major trading partners which would eventually have to carry the main burden.

21. One aspect of the problem was that under the Charter, practical steps of that kind were reserved for decision by the Security Council, and any Member State could disregard recommendations adopted by the Assembly alone. For that reason, Denmark considered that resolution 1761 (XVII), while useful in so far as it proclaimed the principle of pressure, did not in itself bring the implementation of the principle much closer. The Security Council was the body best fitted to take action, and its members included representatives both of the African States and of South Africa's major trading partners. Moreover, under Article 29 of the Charter, the Security Council had the authority to set up such subsidiary organs as it deemed necessary for the performance of its functions. Denmark did not wish to exclude the Assembly from the field, especially as under Article 11 of the Charter the Assembly was empowered to make recommendations to the Security Council. At the present stage, however, the Assembly's best line of procedure would be to urge the Security Council, after receipt of the Secretary-General's report, to consider steps suitable for influencing the attitude of the South African Government and able to command such support from Member States as would render them effective. The Assembly should also express confidence that Member States would comply with the Security Council's recommendations in that regard.

22. It was impossible to predict with certainty what the results would be if the United Nations relied wholly on a policy of pressure, but there was a strong possibility that the results would be the opposite of what was desired. The European population in South Africa, left without hope of any acceptable alternative but evacuation, would entrench themselves still more in their misguided attitude, apply even more repressive measures against the non-white majority, and thus precipitate a major catastrophe. However heavily the responsibility for such developments would rest with the white minority, it must be the duty of the United Nations to do its utmost to prevent them.

23. The Special Committee, in paragraph 447 of its report, rejected as unfounded the claim of the Government of the Republic of South Africa that the choice in South Africa was between white domination and the end of the white community in the country. If the United Nations was to contribute to a peaceful development, it must do more to convince all population groups, and the European element in particular, that there were prospects of a happy and prosperous future in a society of free and equal men for everybody with roots in South Africa and the desire to live there. It was no longer sufficient for the Assembly to tell the South African Government what it should not do. The time had come for it to state openly the ideals by which it was guided and to make a solemn declaration of its desire to see established in South Africa after the abolition of apartheid a truly democratic, multiracial society with equal rights, liberties and privileges for all individuals. A declaration of intent, however, would hardly be sufficient. Guarantees would have to be given that those ideals would be upheld and assurances held out to allay the fear with which the white population regarded any change in the present conditions. The problems that would accompany a thorough change of heart, of policy and of society would be too heavy to be solved by the South African people alone. The United Nations might have to assist the people of South Africa in shaping the new society that must succeed apartheid. It should therefore declare itself ready, through the Assembly, to lend its assistance, if necessary, during a transitional period, in maintaining law and order and protecting life and civil rights as well as in laying the foundation of a new society.

24. It was hardly possible to predict in detail the direction which developments would eventually take in South Africa and the exact role that the United Nations would have to play, but it was highly desirable that the Organization should begin to study now the alternative possibilities and phases of development, and plan the part which it would take. Its best course would be to appoint a group of experts to study the matter and report to the Secretary-General, who would make progress reports available to Member States.

25. The Danish delegation did not intend to propose a draft resolution on those lines for the time being. The decisions to be taken and the actual wording of draft resolutions must obviously be the outcome of a broader meeting of minds between the delegations mainly concerned. It was primarily the task of the African nations and of the nations with the closest historical, commercial and political ties to the Republic of South Africa to find together a path towards the desired goal, namely a change of mind and policy in South Africa, brought about on the basis of the Charter, and with the help of the United Nations, to the benefit of the Organization itself and of the country and people of South Africa.

26. Mr. DOSUMU-JOHNSON (Liberia) asked that the statement of the representative of Denmark be circulated as a document.

*It was so decided.*<sup>2/</sup>

27. Mr. GASPARINI (Italy), exercising his right of reply, said that at the appropriate time his delegation would state its views on the whole problem of apartheid; he wished to recall, however, that Italy rejected all forms of racial discrimination and that it intended to co-operate toward the achievement of a peaceful and constructive solution of the problem in question.

28. He would confine himself for the moment to pointing out that in the statement made the preceding day (379th meeting) by the representative of Guinea, Italy had been mentioned as one of the main suppliers of arms to South Africa. His delegation regarded that inclusion as unwarranted and baseless. In 1962 the total export of arms from Italy to South Africa had amounted to less than \$20,000, an insignificant sum made up essentially of a few dozen expensive shotguns for sport purposes. The inclusion of Italy among the main suppliers of arms to South Africa was likewise shown to be unwarranted by the addendum to the Report of the Special Committee (A/5497/Add.1), where Italy was mentioned twice. The first reference stated: "Denmark and Italy are also reported to have prohibited export of small arms to the Republic of South Africa" (A/5497/Add.1, appendix II, para. 44). The other reference was in the foot-note to appendix II, para. 38, which mentioned a statement by Mr. Duncan, representative of the Pan-Africanist Congress, made in the Special Committee (A/AC.115/SR.16). According to the latter document, Mr. Duncan had mentioned Italy among the countries which had adopted policies of partial or total embargo and had said that the Committee should express its appreciation to those Governments and urge them to make their embargoes total and unconditional. The Italian delegation reserved the right to supply further information in that connexion. He drew the Committee's attention, however, to another statement found in the same summary record—a statement by the Secretary of the Committee that the Secretariat had learned from Press reports that South African merchants had been unable to purchase guns of a certain calibre and munitions in Italy. It was true that Mr. Duncan, in the same record, again mentioned Italy, together with seven other countries—some of which had not been mentioned by the representative of Guinea in his statement of the preceding day—in connexion with "small imports of rifles and pistols". That statement, in fact supported what he himself had said a moment ago.

29. Mr. AMONOO (Ghana) said he had learned from a Reuter's report that eleven persons had just been brought to trial and charged by the South African Government. The matter appeared urgent, and the African-Asian group would devote its full attention to it.

The meeting rose at 4.20 p.m.

<sup>2/</sup> The complete text of the statement by the representative of Denmark was subsequently circulated as document A/SPC/82.