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Chairman: Mr. Emilio ARENALES CATALAN
(Guatemala).

AGENDA ITEM 25

Admission of new Members to the United Nations (A/3662, A/SPC/L.15 and Add.1 and 2, A/SPC/L.16 and Add.1 and 2, A/SPC/L.17) (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN announced that Iraq and Japan had joined the eleven Powers in sponsoring the draft resolutions on the admission of the Republic of Korea, (A/SPC/L.15) and Viet Nam (A/SPC/L.16).

2. Mr. O'BRIEN (Ireland), speaking as the representative of a country which had for many years had practical experience of the problems of partition, said that the partition of a country might be accomplished either by foreign annexation or by the secession of a territory dominated by an intransigent minority. Generally, both elements were present in varying degree; there could be no doubt, however, that whenever a historic nation was partitioned against the will of the great majority of its people, the latter would seek by every possible means to reunify their country. Even if they accepted the fundamental principle that unity should be achieved by peaceful means—and he believed that to be true in the cases now before the Special Political Committee—there was an ever-present danger of spontaneous violence, since no partition line was ever perfectly drawn. Partition was an expedient which by its very nature tended to create a vicious circle of bitterness, recrimination, violence and reprisal. It was therefore clear that everything possible should be done to remove the threat to peace which it constituted.

3. In seeking a peaceful solution to any case of partition, four common factors would be paramount: the role of the national majority seeking reunification; that of the national minority supporting partition; that of the foreign Power or Powers which has brought about partition; and that of world opinion, which found its most powerful expression in the United Nations. A successful solution to the problem depended on the understanding shown by each of the four elements. He believed that wherever possible a solution should be found without recourse to the United Nations, which he regarded as a tribunal of last resort.

4. Turning to the specific cases of Korea and Viet-Nam, he suggested that it had been a mistake to treat them en bloc, since the two problems were of a very

different order of complexity. He believed that the more important the part played by foreign intervention and the less important that of the intransigent minority in bringing about partition, the simpler the problem was to solve. The division of Korea was in the main the result of foreign intervention. The case of Viet-Nam differed from it in the relative importance of local as distinct from extraneous factors. Partition in Viet-Nam was the result of a very complex combination of factors, including anti-colonial resistance, social struggle, civil war and various kinds of foreign intervention.

5. Since the problem of the reunification of Korea was intrinsically the less complex, he believed that attention should in the first instance be concentrated on it. He pointed out that the Government of the Republic of Korea, the territory with the majority of the population, would welcome free elections throughout Korea under United Nations supervision and would be prepared to abide by the result of such elections. There did not appear to be any substantial body of opinion in Korea that would be opposed to reunification. The main responsibility for the continued partition of Korea lay with the Peking Government, which upheld the local régime in North Korea. He appealed to the representatives of countries, and especially Asian countries, which had close diplomatic relations with the Peking Government, to use their influence to induce it to consent to free and supervised elections in Korea. The position, as he understood it, was that the North Korean authorities, in agreement with the Peking Government, were prepared to accept the principle of elections under international supervision but not under United Nations supervision. He appreciated that the Peking Government would not find it easy to agree to supervision by the United Nations, and he therefore wondered if it would not be possible for the General Assembly to name certain nations whose supervision of elections in Korea it would be prepared to accept as adequate and impartial. To be acceptable both to the General Assembly and to Peking they should not belong to either of the two great systems of military alliances and they should also be nations which themselves had experience of free elections. Such a compromise, assuming that the Peking Government did not desire to prevent reunification, would make possible the holding of elections throughout Korea.

6. He reserved the right to state his delegation's attitude concerning the draft resolutions before the Committee at a later stage in the debate.

7. Mr. JUNG (India) said that the draft resolution (A/SPC/L.17) jointly sponsored by his delegation and the delegation of Indonesia had been submitted because of their belief in the principle of universality of membership in the United Nations.

8. His delegation regretted the continued inability of the Security Council to admit the Mongolian People's Republic, which India regarded as fully qualified for admission. States should not be excluded from membership because of their internal political, economic and social systems. The United Nations ought to represent the world as it was. Past attempts to exclude States on such grounds, practised by one side or another, had resulted in resort to package deals, and there was a danger that recourse would be had to similar undesirable expedients in an effort to solve the problem of the admission of partitioned States.

9. While his delegation wished to see Korea and Viet-Nam admitted to membership as soon as possible, it was against the admission of a truncated State, and considered that unification should precede admission. Article 6 of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Indo-China expressly provided that the demarcation line in Viet-Nam was provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary. Was the Assembly now going to admit not only just a part of a State, but one with only a provisional boundary? To admit any one part of either country would in any case imply abandoning the United Nations objective of unification. It would accentuate and even give recognition to separatism, and make permanent what was intended to be temporary.

10. His delegation feared that admission of any one part of either of the two partitioned countries would make most difficult the task of those countries which were endeavouring to persuade both sides to facilitate unification. The argument had been advanced that the Republic of Viet-Nam had been recognized by over forty countries; almost as many countries had recognized the People's Republic of China, but that did not seem to have carried the case of seating the People's Republic of China in the United Nations any further. The same applied to the argument regarding democracy; was it sure all the Member States practised democracy?

11. His delegation believed in the principle of universality, and therefore would not oppose the two thirteen-Power draft resolutions (A/SPC/L.15 and Add.1 and 2, and A/SPC/L.16 and Add.1 and 2); but it would abstain from voting on them. It hoped that the Committee would adopt the draft resolution which it had sponsored jointly with the delegation of Indonesia (A/SPC/L.17).

12. Mr. VOUTOV (Bulgaria) said that his Government had always supported the principle of universality in the United Nations. It would continue to support the admission of any country fulfilling the requirements of Article 4, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter, and it was the duty of all Member States to do likewise. In that connexion, he referred to the absence of the People's Republic of China from the Organization and declared that failure to restore their rights to the Chinese people was detrimental to the prestige of the United Nations. He attributed the exclusion of the representatives of the People's Republic of China to the pressure exerted by the United States, which objected to its political and social system.

13. Another instance affecting the representation of Asian countries in the United Nations was the con-

tinued exclusion from membership of the Mongolian People's Republic, which had made application as early as 1946^{1/} and had repeatedly stressed the significance it attached to the role of the United Nations. In that case it was the Kuomintang representative who had used the veto in the Security Council. But the real opposition to the admission of the Mongolian People's Republic came from the United States, which in 1946 had recognized in the United Nations that the Mongolian People's Republic was a sovereign State. Other countries which, like the United States, now declared that it was not a sovereign State, had been equally inconsistent in their attitude. But it was an undisputed fact that the Mongolian People's Republic had been independent since 1921 and that its Government had vastly improved the condition of the people. Today it maintained diplomatic and economic relations with many countries, including most of the Asian States. Its independence was thus proved, and to deny it admission to membership in the United Nations was an act of discrimination unworthy of the Organization.

14. Turning to the two thirteen-Power draft resolutions, he stated that they too were discriminatory. It had been recognized by General Assembly resolution 918 (X) that the peaceful unification of Korea and Viet-Nam should be accomplished before their admission was considered. To admit only a part of each country to the United Nations would be contrary to the terms of the 1953 Armistice Agreement and the 1954 Geneva agreements, contrary to the interests of their peoples, a threat to peace in the area and a violation of the principles of the Charter. He denied that the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was aggressive, citing the concrete proposals it had made for the peaceful unification of Korea.

15. It had been asserted that the Government of South Korea was democratic and peace-loving and that therefore South Korea was qualified for membership in the United Nations. But no facts had been given to support that assertion. That was because, in actual fact, the name of Syngman Rhee had become synonymous with foreign agent and warmonger all over the world, while South Korea was regarded as a model American war base, brought up to date with atomic weapons. Not long ago, Syngman Rhee had given an interview to American radio correspondents in which he had stated that there was no way to unite Korea by peaceful means. His Government had repeatedly violated the armistice and had constantly refused to take any steps whatsoever towards the peaceful unification of Korea.

16. The Bulgarian delegation opposed the admission of South Korea, unless the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was admitted simultaneously.

17. The draft resolution proposing that South Viet-Nam should be admitted to the United Nations (A/SPC/L.16 and Add.1 and 2) was contrary to the 1954 Geneva agreements on Indo-China, under which South Viet-Nam was merely an area for the re-grouping of the French armed forces and the régime established there could not be regarded as a legal government representing the interests of the Viet-Nameese people. That régime, which was maintained in power by the

^{1/} See Official Records of the Security Council, First Year, Second Series, Supplement No. 4, document S/95.

United States, openly opposed the Geneva agreements and had rejected the proposals of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam for consultations on the question of holding free general elections for the purpose of unifying the country. The United States had reintroduced the question of admitting South Viet-Nam to the United Nations in order to perpetuate the division between North and South, thus enabling it to use South Viet-Nam as a base for military aggression against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the People's Republic of China. By becoming co-sponsors of the resolution on the admission of South Viet-Nam, France and the United Kingdom had violated the obligations they had assumed when they signed the Geneva agreements on Indo-China.

18. The Bulgarian delegation was resolutely opposed to the proposal to admit South Viet-Nam to the United Nations because the admission of part of the territory of Viet-Nam would be an illegal act contrary to the national interests of the Viet-Nameese people. The Geneva agreements were a confirmation of the victory of the people of Viet-Nam, with their ancient national history, over the French colonialists. The agreements had been signed on behalf of the people of Viet-Nam by the present Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam which had thus been given factual recognition as the only Government entitled to represent the entire Viet-Nameese people. That Government was consistently pursuing a peaceful policy and making every effort to create favourable conditions for the unification of Viet-Nam by peaceful means. The Bulgarian delegation would vote against the thirteen-Power draft resolution, on the grounds that the admission of South Viet-Nam to the United Nations would violate the principles of the Organization, the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination and the Geneva agreements on Indo-China. The task of the United Nations was not to facilitate the violation of the Geneva agreements but to contribute to their implementation. Only after that had been accomplished could the question of admitting Viet-Nam to membership in the United Nations be discussed.

19. Mr. MALOLES (Philippines) urged the USSR, for the sake of its own prestige, not to continue its opposition to the admission of Viet-Nam and the Republic of Korea to membership in the United Nations in the face of the wishes of a large majority of the General Assembly. The International Court of Justice, in the advisory opinion requested from it by the General Assembly in connexion with the admission of new members ^{2/}, had expressed the view that the veto could not be made to depend on conditions outside those specified in Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Charter. The privilege of the veto, which was equivalent to the right to disregard the collective will of eighty-two nations and to override their interests and welfare, could not be admitted except on grounds of the highest legal and moral validity without raising doubts as to whether that privilege should be allowed to remain in the Charter.

20. It had been said repeatedly that the case of Outer Mongolia was the basic reason for the USSR veto against the admission of Viet-Nam and the Republic of Korea. However, Outer Mongolia had not yet proved

that it met the conditions laid down in Article 4 of the Charter, nor had it secured approval by an appropriate General Assembly resolution. The General Assembly had passed such resolutions in regard to Viet-Nam and the Republic of Korea.

21. The USSR and its supporters placed too much emphasis on the Assembly's decision to hold in abeyance the question of admitting countries with problems of unification. The Assembly had held the matter in abeyance to a point at which unification had become a permanent roadblock. The unification of Viet-Nam and Korea was impossible until universal free elections could be ensured. Neither North Viet-Nam nor North Korea were prepared to agree to such elections. The Assembly had already expressed the general feeling that the Republic of Korea and Viet-Nam should be admitted because of their proven capacity to act democratically and comply with international obligations. The unification of Viet-Nam and Korea must ultimately be attained, but the most practical way of achieving it would be to admit the Republic of Korea and South Viet-Nam to the United Nations and later to incorporate in them, after free and universal elections, those northern sections which were not yet ready to live and grow in a democratic system.

22. If the USSR was sincere in its desire for the unification of Viet-Nam and Korea it could join other Governments in a declaration of willingness to abide by the verdict of free nation-wide elections carried out under United Nations supervision. If the USSR would give such an undertaking, the Philippine delegation would support a draft resolution to the effect that such elections should be held.

23. The leaders of the USSR had professed a desire for an understanding with other nations which would lead to peace. The relaxation of the USSR's unyielding opposition to the admission of Korea and Viet-Nam would contribute significantly to a lowering of tension and to the establishment of a favourable political climate. He hoped that the recent scientific successes of the USSR might be matched by a sense of responsibility for the maintenance of world peace.

24. Mr. KIDRON (Israel) said that the only criteria which the United Nations could properly apply to requests for admission were laid down in Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Charter. Since the Charter did not establish any standards by which a State's willingness and ability to carry out its obligations could be judged, its declaration of acceptance of those obligations, with the consequent implication that it considered itself capable of carrying them out, must have great weight with those organs of the United Nations which were called upon to decide on the application. The rejection of such an application, which implied a refutation of a State's claim to be willing and able to fulfil its obligations under the Charter, was a very grave matter. The Republic of Korea and Viet-Nam had made declarations to that effect, and Israel saw no reason why they should not be accepted. The suggestion that their declarations were less valid than those of the other States admitted since the signature of the charter, or those of the fifty-one original original Members of the United Nations, was untenable. Israel would therefore support the two thirteen-Power draft resolutions (A/SPC/L.15 and Add.1 and 2, A/SPC/L.16 and Add.1 and 2), without prejudice to the eventual reunification of Korea and Viet-Nam, to which the United Nations was committed.

^{2/} See Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Article 4), Advisory Opinion: I.C.J. Reports 1948, p. 57.

25. According to Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Charter, admission to membership in the United Nations was by decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The normal course was for applications to come from the Security Council to the General Assembly, and the Charter made no provision for initial action by the Assembly. However, that procedure was not precluded and had been used effectively in the past. Nevertheless the role of the Security Council was decisive. The delegation of Israel therefore viewed with sympathy the joint draft resolution of India and Indonesia (A/SPC/L.17). It did not consider that support for that draft, even as it stood, was incompatible with support for the candidacies of Viet-Nam and the Republic of Korea. Suitably clarified, the joint draft resolution could serve as an appropriate complement to the other two.

26. Mr. BOGDAN (Romania) felt that the important positive results achieved to date in the question of the admission of new Members had been due first to the consistent observance of the principle of universality without any discrimination and secondly to the fact that the admission of new Members had been regarded as a way of strengthening the United Nations and making it more effective. Those considerations were equally valid in the case of the Mongolian People's Republic and in those of Korea and Viet-Nam.

27. The discussions which had taken place in the General Assembly and in the Security Council had shown that there was no valid reason why the Mongolian People's Republic should not be admitted immediately to membership in the United Nations. Its entire policy was in accordance with the Charter. In international relations its programme was one of peaceful co-operation, and broad social advances had been made at home. The existence of Mongolia as an independent and sovereign State had been acknowledged by the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom at the 1945 Yalta Conference. In 1946, the United States representative had renewed that recognition in the United Nations. In 1955, the General Assembly had almost unanimously declared itself in favour of admitting the Mongolian People's Republic. The claim of the Philippine representative that the Mongolian People's Republic had yet to prove itself was therefore somewhat surprising. It was only the present negative attitude of the United States which prevented the Mongolian People's Republic from becoming a Member of the United Nations. The Romanian delegation strongly urged that the Mongolian People's Republic should be admitted to membership in the United Nations as a matter of principle involving the responsibility of Members in regard to the fundamental provisions of the Charter.

28. There was no relationship whatsoever between the admission of the Mongolian People's Republic and the admission of Viet-Nam and Korea. The primary task of the United Nations in regard to Korea and Viet-Nam was the unification of those countries in the interests of peace and security in Asia and throughout the world. That position was supported by the almost unanimous resolutions of the Assembly and by the decisions of the Geneva and Bandung conferences. Any attempt to solve the question of the admission of the two countries to membership in the United Nations at the expense of unification would be against their own interests and harmful to peace and co-operation

among all States. The adoption of the thirteen-Power draft resolutions would sanction the perpetual division of both Korea and Viet-Nam. The draft resolutions proposed the admission to membership in the United Nations of South Korea and South Viet-Nam only, ignoring the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. Some of the supporters of the draft resolutions had spoken of the need to observe the principle of universality, but in practice they wished that principle to be applied to the benefit of certain States while others were still victims of discrimination. The principle of universality ought to mean the elimination of all discrimination. In fact, the Government of South Korea and South Viet-Nam did not in any way represent the entire Korean and Viet-Name people, and the policy of both was fundamentally opposed to the peaceful and democratic unification of the two countries.

29. The sponsors of the thirteen-Power draft resolutions had argued that the Assembly had adopted similar resolutions by a large majority in previous years. The real point was that resolutions must be in accordance with the basic principles of the United Nations if they were to become applicable. The prestige of the United Nations would not be enhanced by the adoption of draft resolutions which could lead nowhere. The Romanian delegation would oppose any action not in accordance with the interests of the unification of Korea and Viet-Nam and with the fundamental principles of the Charter.

30. Mr. ZULETA ANGEL (Colombia) said that his delegation's co-sponsorship of the two draft resolutions on Viet-Nam and the Republic of Korea was in accordance with its previous position on that subject. The situation in regard to the admission of the two States was quite clear. The Assembly had already adopted resolutions finding Viet-Nam and the Republic of Korea qualified for membership in the United Nations. There seemed to be no doubt on that point, and even the representatives of the USSR and Bulgaria had expressed their willingness to vote in favour of admitting the Republic of Korea, provided that the so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea was admitted simultaneously. According to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice,^{3/} however, a Member State could not, in voting on the admission of new Members, make its acceptance contingent upon the admission of other applicants. To allow the imposition of such conditions would be to give one Member of the United Nations almost unlimited power to discriminate against applicants for membership on grounds not set forth in Article 4 of the Charter. The reason why the Republic of Korea and Viet-Nam had not been admitted was because the USSR had used its veto in the Security Council. The representative of the USSR had said that his delegation could not be reproached for using its veto to prevent the admission of the Republic of Korea and Viet-Nam because the right of veto was clearly set forth in the Charter. Whether the right of veto existed in regard to the admission of new Members was not absolutely clear; at any rate the right should only be used in accordance with the Principles and Purposes of the United Nations, and the trend towards universality which was fundamental to the United Nations should therefore be respected.

^{3/} *Ibid.*

31. The USSR had abused its right of veto in order to prevent the admission of Viet-Nam and the Republic of Korea to membership in the United Nations and the position that had arisen was that the Assembly, which represented the community of nations, had expressed its will only to see that will rendered ineffective by the opposition of a single Member State.

32. While the Colombian Government respected the advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice, it did not agree with the Court that the Assembly could not decide on the admission of a new Member without a previous recommendation from the Security Council.^{4/} The Court's opinion was a variance with the Charter, in which it was clearly stated that admission would be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. According to the Court's interpretation, the decision rested not with the Assembly but with the Security Council. Furthermore, that interpretation was contrary to the letter and spirit of the Charter, since it subordinated the Assembly to the Security Council and allowed the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council to be decisive.

33. Colombia believed that the veto should not be used in the Security Council when applications for membership were considered. If the majority felt otherwise, it should at least see to it that the right was not abused. No Member State should be allowed to disregard the general will and to impose conditions upon the admission of new Members which were at variance with the requirements set forth in Article 4 of the Charter.

34. The representative of Czechoslovakia had rightly stated that applications for admission to membership in the United Nations should be judged only on the basis of the requirements set forth in Article 4. The Colombian Government agreed that political, religious or ideological considerations should not be taken into account. It had given practical effect to that view by voting for the admission of States with political, religious and ideological policies very different from its own.

35. The Colombian delegation hoped that the weight of world public opinion would finally persuade the Soviet Union to abandon its intransigent position with respect to the admission to membership in the United Nations of the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Viet-Nam. Their admission would surely enhance the prestige of the United Nations, a point to which the representative of Romania had attached considerable importance.

36. Mr. STRATOS (Greece) said that Greece had consistently taken the view that any State which fulfilled the requirements set forth in Article 4 of the Charter should be admitted to membership in the United Nations. It therefore felt, as did the great majority of the Member States, that the Republic of Korea was clearly entitled to membership. Moreover, that country had been defended against attack by a United Nations armed force, in pursuance of a resolution of the Security Council. The admission of the Republic of Korea would certainly be consistent with the principles which many Member States, including Greece, had fought to uphold in Korea.

37. Some delegations had expressed the view that the admission of the Republic of Korea would only retard the re-unification of that country. Greece felt, on the contrary, that its admission would facilitate re-unification. It therefore supported the first thirteen-Power draft resolution (A/SPC/L.15 and Add.1 and 2).

38. The considerations which prompted Greece's support for the admission of the Republic of Korea also applied in the case of the Republic of Viet-Nam. The Greek delegation would therefore vote in favour of the second thirteen-Power draft resolution (A/SPC/L.16 and Add.1 and 2). It reserved its right to refer at a later stage to the draft resolution submitted by India and Indonesia (A/SPC/L.17).

39. U HLA KYAING (Burma) said that Burma believed in the universality of membership in the United Nations and had consistently voted for the admission of new Members which were qualified under Article 4 of the Charter. It regretted that the Mongolian People's Republic, which had applied for membership as early as 1946, had not yet been admitted. In conformity with its view that the United Nations should be universal in character, Burma would support any action to secure the admission of the Mongolian People's Republic.

40. With respect to the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Viet-Nam, it felt that the question of unification should be settled first. The admission of only one part of a country would only make its unification more difficult. Moreover, a solution was not likely to be found by the Assembly simply by adopting resolutions of a declaratory nature. For the reasons given, Burma would abstain from voting on the draft resolutions relating to the admission to membership in the United Nations of the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Viet-Nam.

41. Mr. EINAAR (Netherlands) said that the Netherlands Government was convinced that the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Viet-Nam were fully qualified for admission to membership in the United Nations, and had therefore gladly co-sponsored the draft resolutions relating to the admission of those two States. It noted with regret the inability of the Security Council to recommend their admission as a result of the negative vote of one of its permanent members. It was only right that the Assembly should again reaffirm its view that the two applicant States were fully qualified for admission to membership in the United Nations.

42. Mr. ZDOROVENIN (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the Byelorussian SSR had consistently held the view that a State applying for admission to membership in the United Nations should, irrespective of its political and social structure, be admitted, provided it fulfilled the requirements set forth in the Charter. Guided by that principle, the Byelorussian delegation had voted for the resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1955 providing for the admission of eighteen States (resolution 918 (X)). It had therefore welcomed the admission of Ghana and the Federation of Malaya.

43. Unfortunately the United States and a number of other countries had taken a radically different position with respect to the admission of new Members and had blocked recognition of the legitimate rights of China in the United Nations and the admission of the Mongolian People's Republic. At the same time, they were

^{4/} See Competence of Assembly regarding admission to the United Nations, Advisory Opinion: I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 4.

attempting to compel the United Nations to admit South Korea and South Viet-Nam.

44. The Mongolian People's Republic was being kept out of the United Nations simply because its political régime was viewed with disfavour by the United States and its supporters. None of the delegations which opposed the admission of the Mongolian People's Republic had impartially considered its qualifications for admission. They had merely followed the United States in contending that the Mongolian People's Republic was not an independent State. Moreover, the United States itself had not questioned and independence of the Mongolian People's Republic in 1946 when that State's application had first been considered in the United Nations. In point of fact, Mongolia had been an independent State for centuries. The fallacy of the United States argument could be judged from the fact that, at the tenth session of the General Assembly, fifty-two out of fifty-nine delegations participating in the vote had recognized that the Mongolian People's Republic was a State qualified for admission to the United Nations. The Byelorussian delegation therefore felt that it should be admitted forthwith.

45. With respect to the admission of South Korea and South Viet-Nam, the States supporting the applications of the two countries merely sought to perpetuate their division. The simultaneous admission of North Korea and South Korea, on the other hand, would in some measure serve the fundamental purpose of restoring the unity and independence of Korea as a single State. The fact that two States with different economic, political and social structures had emerged in Korea should be recognized. It was therefore wrong to claim that the Korean people would be represented in the United Nations had it not been for the Soviet Union's veto in the Security Council. The Soviet Union had never opposed the admission of the Korean people to the United Nations.

46. In the case of Viet-Nam, the general elections provided for under the 1954 Geneva agreements had not been held, because the United States and the régime it supported in South Viet-Nam were fearful of the result. The people of Viet-Nam desired the unification of their country. The general elections stipulated in the Geneva agreements should therefore be held.

47. Mr. MILLER (New Zealand) said that the negative vote cast by the representative of the Soviet Union in the Security Council had once again prevented two fully qualified applicants from taking their rightful place in the United Nations.

48. The Republic of Korea had a unique relationship with the United Nations since 1948, when elections were held in that country under United Nations supervision. Subsequently a very large number of countries had recognized the Government of the Republic of Korea. In 1950, New Zealand was among the nations which had taken part in collective action under the Charter to repel the attack against Korea. In peace and in war, Korea had demonstrated beyond doubt its capacity to fulfil the obligations of membership in the United Nations. It was therefore fitting that the Assembly should reaffirm its determination that the Republic of Korea should be admitted to the United Nations.

49. It was equally fitting that the same determination should be reaffirmed in respect of the Republic of

Viet-Nam. The Government of that country had won widespread respect in all parts of the world. The argument had again been put forward by one or two delegations that it would be discriminatory to admit the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Viet-Nam to membership in the United Nations without at the same time admitting the communist régimes which were entrenched in the northern regions of the two countries. The question could not be presented as one of discrimination. A distinction should be drawn between the well established and recognized qualifications of the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Viet-Nam, on the one hand, and on the other the claims of the two northern entities whose assertion of an independent status and of a readiness to honour the obligations of the Charter must be viewed with the utmost scepticism. The Assembly should reject all attempts to obscure that essential distinction.

50. Mr. TOMEH (Syria) said that Syria had consistently supported the right of all States to be admitted to membership in the United Nations provided they fulfilled the requirements set forth in Article 4 of the Charter. That position was based on a fundamental principle of the Charter, that of universality. While that principle would militate in favour of the admission of the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Viet-Nam, the fact remained that in their case the principle of universality found only partial application, since neither represented the entire population of the country concerned. Moreover, the admission of the Republic of Korea would not further the purpose of the United Nations, set forth in General Assembly resolution 1010 A (XI), of bringing about by peaceful means the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea.

51. Since the admission of the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Viet-Nam would merely serve to perpetuate the partition of the two countries, the Syrian delegation would abstain from voting on the draft resolutions relating thereto.

52. Mr. SHARA (Nepal) said that Nepal believed in the principle of universality with respect to the admission of new Members to the United Nations. The United Nations should mirror the realities of international life and not be a sort of exclusive club of like-minded Governments having the same political and social system. Moreover, Nepal regarded the United Nations primarily as an instrument for achieving international co-operation in solving international problems. That was why it had always pleaded for the recognition of the People's Republic of China, without whose willing co-operation and assistance no lasting political settlement could be reached in the Far East and South-East Asia.

53. With regard to the admission of South Korea and South Viet-Nam, Nepal felt that the admission of only parts of those two countries might complicate the problem of re-unification. Since unification was of even greater importance to the peoples of the two countries concerned than membership in the United Nations, Nepal would abstain from voting on the two thirteen-Power draft resolutions. The Nepalese delegation would support the joint draft resolution submitted by India and Indonesia for transmitting all the proposals to the Security Council, because the final decision with respect to the admission of new Members rested with the Security Council.

54. Mr. ELEKDAG (Turkey) said that his delegation regretted the continued absence of the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Viet-Nam from the United Nations in spite of repeated resolutions adopted by the Assembly in favour of their admission.

55. Believing that the Assembly should recall its previous decisions and reaffirm its views in the matter, the Turkish delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolutions relating to the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Viet-Nam.

56. Mr. ZAMOR (Haiti) supported the draft resolutions recommending the admission of the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Viet-Nam, two States which had long fulfilled all the requirements for membership in the United Nations. Their admission had been blocked by the veto cast in the Security Council by the Soviet

Union after it had failed to secure the admission of North Korea and North Viet-Nam. Since the Soviet Union had not altered its position, little purpose would be served by the procedure proposed in the joint draft resolution submitted by India and Indonesia, since to refer the matter back to the Security Council would merely be to perpetuate a vicious circle. The General Assembly could do no less than reaffirm its previous position.

57. Mr. MAKHLOUF (Libya) said that, in view of the many factors involved in the question of the admission of new Members, his delegation would abstain from voting on the three draft resolutions before the Committee. However, it hoped that the various obstacles to a solution would be removed and that a favourable decision could finally be reached.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.