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Chairman: Mr. Carlet R. AUGUSTE (Haiti).

AGENDA ITEM 72

Question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Union of South Africa (A/4419 and Corr.1 and Add.1 and 2; A/SPC/L.59/Rev.1, A/SPC/L.60/Corr.1) (*continued*)

1. Mr. UDOVICHENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the fascist ideology of racism was the very basis of the policy of *apartheid*. The nationalist party now in power in the Union of South Africa deserved therefore to be treated like Hitler's National Socialist party, on which it was modelled and for whose triumph it had worked during the Second World War. The peoples of the whole world condemned *apartheid* because they feared a revival of fascism, certain recent manifestations of which in Western Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States had deeply disturbed them. There was no doubt that the theories of the present Union Government were doomed to failure, but it was the duty of the United Nations to do everything in its power to hasten the collapse of a philosophy founded on man's hate for man.

2. The Union of South Africa was now a country where terror, inhuman exploitation, economic bondage and slavery were the rule, and the reason was that the Union Government was receiving enormous sums, amounting to £1,580 million at the end of 1959, from the United Kingdom, the United States, Western Germany, France and some other European countries. The money was being used to buy capital equipment for a country where all the wealth was owned by a handful of racists and foreign capitalists. In that connexion, he recalled that all the banking operations in the Union of South Africa were in the hands of four banks, the two most powerful of which were English. The country's large firms were owned not only by South African racists but by foreign companies on both sides of the Atlantic. Many directors of English banks and companies were also directors of South African companies. That being so it was understandable that the Union Government should state explicitly that its withdrawal from the Commonwealth did not involve the breaking off of economic ties between the Union of South Africa and the United Kingdom. The imperialists were not the least embarrassed by the internal situation in South Africa. The fascist dictatorship, imposed with the help of 25,000 armed police, served their interests, since

it ensured a plentiful supply of free labour recruited from among the hundreds of thousands of non-whites "detained" for trivial reasons.

3. The Union Government and its agents the industrialists encouraged foreign investment in the economic development of the country by vaunting a system under which enormous profits could be made and whose stability, according to them, was not at all in danger, in spite of what the Press had to say. They also pointed out that American firms were making increasingly large investments in the Union. That was certainly true, for new capital investment by those firms had increased from \$140 million in 1950 to \$500 million in 1959. The unconcern of the Union Government was equalled only by that of some of the representatives of those firms, one of whom had stated only just before the Sharpeville incidents that the country was "perfectly safe".

4. There was no denying that the racist policy of the Union Government was a grave threat to international peace and security, as the Security Council itself had recognized in its resolution of 1 April 1960.¹ The Government concerned, however, paid no heed either to warnings or appeals, or to the censure expressed by the United Nations, which had been trying for nine years to protect the rights of the defenceless peoples of South Africa. The South African racists were determined to maintain their attitude of provocation, but the United Nations could no longer tolerate it. In December 1960, the General Assembly had unanimously adopted resolution 1514 (XV), containing a Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. It reflected the wishes of all the peoples of the world and must be put into effect without delay. To stamp out colonialism, concrete measures must be taken, beginning with an effort to end the coercion exerted on the African peoples and to ensure that they were granted their basic rights.

5. The reason why the situation in South Africa had become more serious in 1960 was mainly because the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council had not been applied, either by the Union Government or by the chief administrative officer of the United Nations. Far from taking the rapid and energetic action required to carry out the mandate entrusted to him by the Security Council on 1 April 1960, Mr. Hammarskjöld had used delaying tactics. When, at least he had gone to the Union of South Africa, after nearly ten months' delay, he had not seen fit either to ascertain the real situation in the country or to get into touch with the oppressed peoples. As an African newspaper had emphasized, his failure to meet the non-white leaders could only breed suspicion about him among the population. Those who were sincerely worried about the situation in South Africa could

¹ Official Records of the Security Council, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1960, document S/4300.

not agree with him² that his "exchange of views in general had served a most useful purpose". Mr. Hammarskjöld's attitude during his trip had merely given further proof of the fact that, in the South African affair as in others, including that of the Congo, he was conniving with the colonialists and betraying the interests of the oppressed peoples, in flagrant violation of the principles of the United Nations. It was to be regretted that Mr. Bunche, who himself had frequently been the object of racial discrimination, should have seen fit to defend Mr. Hammarskjöld before the Committee.

6. The CHAIRMAN requested the representative of the Ukrainian SSR to continue his statement without indulging in personal remarks.

7. Mr. UDOVICHENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the shootings ordered by the Union Government, like its decision in March 1961 to leave the Commonwealth, showed to what lengths it could go with its insane policy, which was a possible source of conflicts in Africa and a threat to the entire world, as were all theories of racial superiority.

8. The Ukrainian delegation fully endorsed the measures advocated by the conferences of African States held at Addis Ababa and Accra. It would vote for the draft resolution submitted by twenty-four African States (A/SPC/L.60 Corr.1).

9. Mr. Krishna MENON (India) said that the situation in South Africa was growing worse year by year. No Member of the United Nations, of course, could claim that it had never, on any point, transgressed the provisions of the Charter, but the Union of South Africa did so constantly and officially. Yet it could not maintain that it did not understand the Charter, for Field Marshal Smuts, a former Prime Minister of the Union, had helped to draft it. Member States might eventually have to ask themselves whether there really was room for the Union in the Organization.

10. Like ancient Greece, where a minority of citizens ruled over a mass of slaves, the Union of South Africa today deprived six out of seven of its inhabitants of all civil and political rights. The lack of equality within the Union in turn prejudiced equal relations between nations—the two aspects of the question were, in fact, linked in the Preamble to the Charter.

11. Furthermore, the policy of *apartheid* had serious economic and social repercussions. According to official statistics, the average income of a white man in the Union was £115 a month, compared with £15 for an African. The reason was that Africans were refused access to all the better paid professions, on the grounds of race and not of lack of ability. The leaders of the Union of South Africa, who allowed persons of Asian origin and persons of mixed blood to earn slightly more than Africans, had established a sort of hierarchy of caste which they made use of as a system of government. The truth was that the income of 87 per cent of the population was below subsistence level and 61.6 per cent were unable to pay rent; 92 per cent of the land was owned by whites and only 8 per cent by Africans. The South African authorities often neglected to include Africans in their official population figures, thus degrading the Africans to a sub-human level.

12. In many States, including India, racial discrimination was actually practised, but those States were at least trying to eradicate it. The Union of South Africa, on the contrary, had made an ideal of discrimination and embodied it in its official legislation. The pass laws, which branded Africans as inferior, were in reality an instrument of oppression which gave the police excessive and arbitrary powers. Since December 1960, the pass laws applied also to women, who could now be molested by young police officers and summarily arrested, regardless of whether they were forced to leave their children untended. Those laws had roused the indignation of a section of the South African Press, which deserved a tribute. Faced with such resistance, the Government had enacted legislation which, in effect, prohibited any protest of that kind.

13. In the educational field, the example of the University College of Fort Hare Transfer Act, 1959 would suffice. The University College of Fort Hare, founded in 1916 by philanthropists—mainly religious communities from the United States, Canada and the Union of South Africa itself—was originally intended to be open to all races without distinction. Since 1 January 1960, the College had been under the control of the Minister for Bantu Education and now was merely tribal in character. White students and those of mixed blood or of Asian origin were not admitted, apart from special exemptions granted exceptionally to persons of those groups. Teachers at Fort Hare had been dismissed for opposing the *apartheid* policy and their dismissal for holding non-conformist views had deeply upset university circles in the Union. Moreover, a new University Council, consisting entirely of whites, had replaced the former governing body composed of both whites and Africans. Furthermore, it had been decided that the College would be financed from the Bantu Education Account, which meant that the poorest section of the population would have to meet the expenses out of their own pockets. It was sufficient to recall the words of the present Prime Minister, Mr. Verwoerd, to understand the attitude of the Union Government towards Bantu education. He had told the Union Assembly in 1953 that the education given to the Bantus should correspond to the prospects open to them in life and should be in conformity with Government policy. In his view, good relations between races could not be guaranteed if education was left in the hands of people who encouraged false hopes among the indigenous people. Such a situation, according to him, would arouse feelings of frustration.

14. The education of the Africans was so organized that they were reduced to the role of producers of goods and services and could not aspire to the status and wages of skilled workers. Moreover, there was complete segregation even in places of work, so much so that the different races were unable to use the same toilet facilities. The Union Government had, incidentally, just extended racial segregation to the country's territorial waters. Worse still, a veritable system of forced labour existed in the Union of South Africa. Thus, the Farmers' Prison Co-operatives in the various districts collected funds for the construction of prisons in places convenient for farmers. The Department of Prisons sent to them Africans who had been arrested, frequently at the rate of 1,000 or so a day, for not carrying their passes, for arrears of tax payment, for being in town without the written authorization of a white official, or for other trifling reasons. Each morning, the farmers came to the prisons to obtain their

² Official Records of the Security Council, Sixteenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1961, document S/4635.

team of convicts. They paid one shilling and ninepence per worker if they supplied their own armed guard, and two shillings if they needed a guard supplied by the Department of Prisons. That type of problem might be of interest to the International Labour Organisation.

15. On the political level, mention must be made of the Unlawful Organisations Act, enacted after the Sharpeville massacre, which suspended the African National Congress and the Pan African Congress for one year. It thus supplemented the Suppression of Communism Act, amended in 1951, which provided for the prosecution of African leaders who sought to bring about political, industrial, social or economic change. At that rate, any member of the legislative body of a democratic country would be liable to arrest, for his role was precisely to bring about progress and thus change the structure of society. A tribute should be paid, incidentally, to those judges of the Union of South Africa who had just acquitted members of the African National Congress falsely accused of high treason.

16. The policy of *apartheid* was not only inhuman; it was also paradoxical in the present situation in the Union of South Africa, a country in a state of full industrial development. New industries, if they were to develop or even keep going, had increasing need of manpower from the country districts. But the laws based on the policy of *apartheid* actually tended to prevent the permanent urbanization of the African workers whom the country could no longer do without. Such rearguard action was bound to fail: despite *apartheid*, half the workers employed in industry today were non-whites. Hence, the opinion expressed by the Prime Minister of Australia that *apartheid* could not in fact be applied.

17. India was firmly opposed to the policy of *apartheid* for humanitarian and historical reasons. Nevertheless, it had always shown patience and moderation in debates on the question. It regretted, moreover, that the discussion was taking place in the absence of a representative of the Union of South Africa. The Union's attitude in the matter was, indeed, not only discourteous but untenable, for while it had invoked Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter to secure its rights, it had not opposed the inclusion of the item on the agenda. What was more serious was that the Union had year after year ignored the General Assembly's repeated appeals, though they had been couched in moderate terms. The sort of war of extermination which the Union Government was conducting on its territory was indeed a menace to the whole African continent. As was evident too from its attitude to South West Africa—a problem which was becoming increasingly acute every day and must soon come to a head—the Union Government was actually trying to build a sort of colonial empire. At a time when the colonial system was nearing its end everywhere, when there were already twenty-five independent States in Africa, a policy thus running counter to history constituted a very serious danger. Action was imperative.

18. The Committee had two draft resolutions before it (A/SPC/L.59/Rev.1 and A/SPC/L.60/Corr.1). There was no fundamental difference of opinion between the sponsors of the two drafts; the only difference was in the strength of the terms used. The Ghanaian representative had requested him, as one of the sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.59/Rev.1 to allow draft resolution A/SPC/L.60/Corr.1 to be put to the vote first. His delegation had no objection,

indeed, it was sympathetic toward the latter draft which was on the whole very close to the one it was co-sponsoring. However, his delegation could not support sub-paragraphs (i) to (v) of operative paragraph 5, since they prescribed certain definite measures to be carried out by States. India had broken off all diplomatic and commercial relations with the Union long ago, and had suspended all communications between the two countries and forbidden the mutual exchange of workers. It was conscious, however, of the fact it was only one of the ninety-nine Member States in the Organization and it felt that a formula should be found of which the actual principle would be acceptable to all. That was the purpose of operative paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/SPC/L.59/Rev.1, which requested all States to consider taking such separate and collective action as was open to them to bring about the abandonment of the policy of *apartheid*. While understanding the force of the feelings which inspired the African countries, and their desire to abide by the decisions of the Accra, Monrovia, Casablanca and Addis Ababa conferences, his delegation would also consider it inappropriate to suggest measures which not all States would be willing to apply. Moreover, the Security Council was, after all, the proper organ competent to apply economic sanctions. Lastly, it would be regrettable if any resolution were to obtain even one vote fewer at present than the previous year, because such a result would certainly give rise to tendentious interpretations in the Union of South Africa. The same would apply, in fact, if three or four Member States dug in their heels and abstained as in the past. Draft resolution A/SPC/L.59/Rev.1 contained nothing incompatible with the Charter and did not aim at humiliating the Union of South Africa. It should, therefore, be unanimously adopted with no abstentions or absentees when the roll-call vote was taken.

19. Mr. GALKIN (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that *apartheid* was not only contrary to the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights but a defiance of commonsense, progress and international collaboration. Not only had the Government of the Union of South Africa taken no notice of the eight resolutions in which the General Assembly had requested it to reconsider its policy; it had even, so to say, perfected that policy. The very basis of *apartheid*—and this could never be repeated too often—was a desire to make exploitation as advantageous as possible for the exploiters. The purpose of the racist laws of the Union of South Africa was to provide legal protection for the interests of the whites. *Apartheid* was rooted in the colonial régime; there was no difference of principle between the two and in both cases it was a question of exploiting the masses for economic ends. It was therefore not fortuitous that those who profited from the exploitation of the non-whites in South Africa were attempting to conceal the effects of *apartheid*; that was why the purely platonic statements made by the representatives of certain western countries could not be taken seriously. United Kingdom capital investments in the Union of South Africa amounted to nearly 1,000 million pounds sterling and represented 62 per cent of foreign investments in South Africa. Recently there had been a rapid increase in the amount of United States capital. As regards profits, a recent report showed that those were five to ten times higher than before the war.

20. Following the bloody incidents in Sharpeville the situation in South Africa had been examined by the

Security Council. In the resolution which the Council had adopted on that occasion on 1 April 1960, the Secretary-General had been requested, in consultation with the Government of the Union of South Africa, to make such arrangements as would adequately help in upholding the Purposes and Principles of the Charter. Preparations for that mission had taken no less than ten months, at a time when the victims of *apartheid* had been waiting impatiently for the Secretary-General's arrival. Their hopes had been dashed, for Mr. Hammarskjöld had been content with the programme prepared for him, which had excluded any meeting with the victims of the Union's policy. He had done nothing positive and it was not surprising that the report which he had subsequently submitted to the Council also contained nothing precise. In any case nothing else could be expected from a man who was himself the representative of a group of countries of which the least that could be said was that they were scarcely seeking a radical solution to the problem.

21. Yet an end must be put to the situation prevailing in South Africa. After the General Assembly's resolution on the independence of colonial countries and peoples a more realistic attitude on the part of the Union Government might have been expected. The South African leaders, however, were continuing to defy world opinion and their attitude was now threatening the peace of Africa and the whole world, without their understanding that the time of oppression was over.

22. The sympathies of the Byelorussian people went out to those who were struggling against colonialism and he considered that the time had come to take action. Because of the pressure exerted by the colonialists, all United Nations resolutions had remained a dead letter. During the current debate the western countries had opposed any sanctions that might be taken against the Union of South Africa and were recommending further appeals. They had contradicted themselves by stating on the one hand that a new appeal must be made to the Union of South Africa and, on the other, that previous appeals had been in vain and that the situation had even deteriorated. It was also useless to entrust a new mission to Mr. Hammarskjöld, for what he had done on a previous occasion was scarcely encouraging. If the western countries really wanted to fight against *apartheid*, they must support the proposals calling for sanctions against the Union of South Africa. The Byelorussian SSR, for its part, would support draft resolution A/SPC/L.60/Corr.1 which recommended such sanctions.

23. Mr. HOOD (Australia) said that the events which had occurred since 1959 had given added urgency to the question being examined by the Committee. To begin with, the procedures of the Security Council had been invoked for the first time the year before. More recently, there had been the outcome of the meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London. However, the Commonwealth aspect of the question was quite separate from the General Assembly consideration, and, while bearing in mind that the Security Council still had the question before it in the form in which it was submitted following the Shaperville incident the year before, it was necessary to decide in what way the General Assembly itself should treat the item.

24. South Africa had clearly disregarded many previous strong expressions of view by the General Assembly on policies which were repugnant to Charter

principles almost universally accepted. The provisions relating to human rights were among the most important in the Charter and any breach of them was a matter of legitimate concern for all. The Australian Government had stated that it felt most serious disquiet at South Africa's racial policies and deplored the results of the application of those policies. Australia neither supported nor condoned deliberate policies of racial discrimination, and, in addition to the question of principle involved, the policy of *apartheid*, as the Prime Minister of Australia had said, was unworkable. The least that could be hoped was that South Africa, through enlightened self-interest, would come to realise that.

25. The question arose whether the General Assembly should go further than heretofore in stressing its repeated requests that the Union Government should revise its policies. It must be borne in mind that the Charter expressly set a limit to intervention by the United Nations in a field of essentially domestic jurisdiction. Moreover, the Charter set further limits to the powers of the General Assembly. While that was controversial ground, it was none the less true that the Committee should pause before embarking on courses which, in effect, would run counter to the intention of the limitations specifically written into the Charter. The Australian delegation would keep those considerations closely in mind when examining the proposals submitted to the Committee.

26. Moreover, the real objective was to look beyond mere condemnation, and to open the way to an improvement in the situation; it was obvious that the Security Council, in its resolution, had been guided by that concern. It was essential not to preclude, by drastic recommendations, the possibility that by patience and contact such as that undertaken by the Secretary-General, the total volume of efforts and opinion both in South Africa and abroad might improve the situation. The interest of the non-European population of South Africa demanded that nothing should be done to harden the Union Government, through an imposed isolation, in its obstinate attitude. The weight of world opinion against racial discrimination in South Africa was formidable. It was natural that on the current occasion the General Assembly should wish to word its appeal more strongly, but punitive measures would probably be useless and might even complicate the task of those, particularly in the Union of South Africa itself, who were convinced that it was still not too late to reverse the present dangerous trend.

27. Mr. ELDEN (Turkey) expressed his delegation's distress and anxiety regarding the question before the Committee. It had to be recognized once again that no progress had been made.

28. What had particularly struck his delegation during the debate was that the tone of the speeches had become more bitter and the problem more acute, evidently because of the unchanged attitude of the Union Government. Whereas a few years earlier it had still been possible to doubt the competence of the Assembly, the question today had become one of such magnitude that it transcended the domestic sphere and, because of its reverberations, affected relations between States. The awakening of African nationalism had certainly increased the movement of sympathy for the coloured population of South Africa and the feelings of the African countries had found expression in the resolutions they had adopted at various conferences.

29. However, while condemning racial discrimination and appealing to the Union Government to comply with its obligations under the Charter, the Committee must not forget that all countries had problems which were peculiar to them and that, unfortunately, the principles on which the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights were based were not everywhere put into effect as they should be.

30. The Turkish people found it difficult even to conceive of the existence of such a serious racial problem as that before the Committee. The many peoples of different origins and races which had gone to make up the Turkish community had always been considered and treated as equals, without any distinction, and since the proclamation of the Republic that fact had been enshrined in the Constitution. Nevertheless the Turkish delegation was aware that conditions were not every-

where the same and that prejudices inherited from the past could not always be overcome overnight. It therefore considered that the solution to the problem of *apartheid* must lie in a progressive adjustment in keeping with the evolution of the principles of human rights. Such a solution depended upon the Union of South Africa itself.

31. While expressing its disapproval, the Assembly should redouble its efforts to discourage the Government of the Union of South Africa from persevering in the way it had traced for itself and to persuade it to reconsider its racial policy. It was in that spirit that the Turkish delegation would study the draft resolutions before the Committee.

The meeting rose at 5.35 p.m.