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MEETING**



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Chairman: Mr. Abdul Samad GHAUS
(Afghanistan).

AGENDA ITEM 34

The policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa: report of the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (continued) (A/8022, A/SPC/L.181, A/SPC/L.182)

1. Mr. KANIARU (Kenya) recalled the strong stand taken against the policies of *apartheid* by the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Organization of African Unity, the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Lusaka in 1970, specialized agencies, many individual Member States, other bodies such as churches, and individuals from all walks of life. In a very real sense, all were agreed that *apartheid* was evil, immoral and repugnant to the principles affirmed in the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international conventions and United Nations decisions. The régimes of South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia, however, did not subscribe to those ideas. The world had been amazed and indeed horrified by South Africa's disregard of international opinion and its failure to heed the appeals made by the General Assembly, the Security Council and OAU for the elimination of *apartheid*. In view of the high-handed attitude of the Pretoria régime, every effort had been made to obtain results, and States had been invited to sever all forms of relations with the régime.

2. The unfortunate failure of those efforts was well set forth in the report of the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (A/8022), which contained excellent documentation and practical recommendations. For instance, in paragraph 111 of that report, the Special Committee concluded that the situation in South Africa was sufficiently grave to warrant measures of a mandatory nature under the Charter; it recommended, in paragraph 123, a more comprehensive consideration of *apartheid* by the Security Council; it also recommended, in paragraph 126, that material assistance should be provided to the oppressed people of South Africa and their liberation movement and in paragraph 132 that all States should intensify their domestic legal measures against all organizations which supported *apartheid*.

3. The Lusaka Manifesto,¹ which had been proposed to the Pretoria régime in 1969 as a basis for intercourse between South Africa and the independent African States, had been repeatedly rejected. The entire world had appealed in vain to South Africa to renounce its inhuman policies. It was now necessary to ask how South Africa had so far successfully defied all enlightened world opinion. The reason was clearly that Member States had not been at all eager to co-operate, had applied double standards and, while condemning *apartheid* in public, had maintained trade, diplomatic and consular relations with the offending country. It was because of the divergent interests of the members of the Security Council that that body had been unable to take effective action where the interests of Africans were at stake. His country's Foreign Minister, speaking in the General Assembly (1845th plenary meeting), had warned the States that applied double standards that very soon a choice would have to be made between support for freedom and slavery, between short-term economic gain and long-term accommodation with Africa. One should ask whether those States could in all honesty deny their racism, whether economic benefits mattered more than the enslavement of the 13 million innocent, peaceful Africans who had been denied their basic human rights and whether investments in South Africa by the great Powers robbed them of the will and power to crush the racist régime of South Africa.

4. The main States giving economic support to South Africa were specified by name in the excellent analysis contained in document A/AC.115/L.276;² they were the United Kingdom, the United States of America, France and such other States as Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy. Of the first three, which were permanent members of the Security Council, one actually sold arms to South Africa, one intended to do so and the other merely honoured the terms of contracts entered into prior to 1963. The figures for the volume of trade and investments appearing in table B 10 of that document were indicative of the alarming support which had been provided by those countries to the South African régime during a technical United Nations economic boycott of South Africa. He drew particular attention to paragraph 118 of the same document, which emphasized the heavy dependence of South Africa on its main trading partners, especially where capital goods were concerned, while noting that South African trade was in no way crucial to the

¹ Manifesto on Southern Africa, adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its sixth ordinary session; for the text, see *Official records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 106, document A/7754.

² Mimeographed; for a summary, see document A/8022, chap. III, sect. C.

economic activity of any of the developed countries. The situation was much the same in regard to foreign investments in South Africa. Again the culprits were the United Kingdom, by far the greatest investor in South Africa, the United States of America, France, Switzerland and the Federal Republic of Germany. With respect to diplomatic and consular relations, annex III to document A/8022 showed that diplomatic relations with South Africa were maintained primarily by Western and Latin American countries, together with a few from other regions.

5. All the efforts of the United Nations and the African States had been aimed at a solution of the South African problem which would enable all the people of that country to participate in the administration of its affairs. The objective had never been killing or the expulsion of the white population, but merely the introduction of democracy. The African States hoped for a peaceful transition in South Africa, however long that might take. However, the decision on whether the change would be peaceful or not rested with South Africa and its allies. The position of the African countries had been made quite clear in the Lusaka Manifesto; if its approach was accepted by the Pretoria régime, there could be no question of attacks on South Africa. However, the independent African States took a sceptical view of South Africa's assurance that it did not intend to attack independent territories to the north. South Africa's military budget, which had risen from about \$60 million to about \$380 million in the last ten years, could not be intended solely for the internal suppression and enslavement of the country's 13 million Africans. It was essential, therefore, that the arms embargo should be strictly enforced. If all countries which had relations with South Africa adhered to Security Council resolutions 181 (1963), 182 (1963), 191 (1964), 282 (1970) and 283 (1970), the Pretoria régime would be weakened, not just internally, but also in Namibia, where it had illegally extended its laws and policies of *apartheid*.

6. Recalling that South Africa had been expelled from the British Commonwealth of Nations because of its racial policies, he suggested that the time had perhaps come for the Committee seriously to consider recommending to the General Assembly and the Security Council the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations. The policy of *apartheid* had pervaded every aspect of South African life to the point where separate hospitals and medical schools were maintained for different races. Because of its attitude, the medical group of South Africa had been expelled from the Commonwealth Medical Association in August 1970. In regard to employment, a chronic labour shortage kept the South African railways in a permanent state of crisis since the Government tried to recruit Africans only when the system was on the verge of collapse. The régime had rejected attempts to rectify the situation by employing and training Africans, and the laws maintaining *apartheid* were stringently enforced. Thirteen per cent of the land in South Africa had been set aside as homelands for 13 million blacks, while the remainder had been reserved for 4 million whites. Political prisoners were believed to number 1,500, and many blacks were banned from public appearance. Between mid-1968 and mid-1969, the prison population had averaged over 88,000. One inhabitant out of every 40 was sentenced to imprisonment, and 95 per cent of those were Africans. Of 166 people who had been sentenced to

death 84 had been hanged; 340 had died under terrible conditions in prison. Recent trials under the Suppression of Communism Act and the Terrorist Act had led to heavy prison sentences, bannings and restrictions. Indeed, the executive and judicial branches of the South African Government had joined together in ruthless suppression of the African population.

7. It was encouraging to note that the English press in South Africa had continued to discuss racial issues, albeit with restraint and at the risk of censorship. A few correspondents, as was the case with those of the *Rand Daily Mail* for example, had suffered for exposing the racist régime. Perhaps the most remarkable development had been the decision by the World Council of Churches to provide financial aid to liberation movements, including some listed in South Africa as terrorist movements. Two priests had been deported as a result in an effort to instil fear into those who would challenge *apartheid*. The South African Prime Minister had threatened to take action against his country's churches unless they withdrew from the World Council of Churches, but the General Assembly of Presbyterian Churches had declined to do so. The Presbyterian Church had also voted to merge with two black churches to form the United Presbyterian Church of South Africa and had endorsed theological criticisms of the racial policy of *apartheid*. Those were progressive measures that should be commended as practical break-throughs in race relations.

8. The fact that the Conservative Government of the United Kingdom intended to resume the sale of arms to South Africa had caused a world-wide furor. In that connexion, his country had made clear its position that such arms could be used only to strengthen South Africa's hold in Namibia, to strengthen the policy of suppression of Africans in South Africa and to threaten the peace, independence and territorial integrity of African States which opposed *apartheid* and actively supported freedom movements. The sale of arms would also strengthen the defence of the rebel colony of Southern Rhodesia and could only increase tensions in a situation that was already critical. The danger of an armed conflict was clear, as had been recognized by Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, a former colonial governor in Africa, in an article in the Kenyan newspaper *Daily Nation*, of 26 September 1970. Document A/AC.115/L.276, in paragraph 159, referred to the inevitability of an armed conflict.

9. His country was categorically opposed to all forms of racial discrimination and to the humiliation of individuals on the basis of their colour. It was one of the five African States charged with the duty of explaining Africa's feelings on the sale of arms to South Africa. His Government had ordered the immediate closure of the South African Consulate at Nairobi, had banned South African aircraft and ships from Kenyan ports and air space and had halted all forms of trade with South Africa. His country had lost more than K£2 million annually as a result of the trade ban, but it considered that to be a worth-while sacrifice in the international war against *apartheid*. It had actively supported the struggle against *apartheid* and assisted the liberation movements through its contributions to OAU. It intended to continue to fight racism in southern Africa until the whole of Africa was free and African dignity was restored.

10. He hoped that, on the occasion of the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly, the Committee would adopt a strong resolution on the matter, inviting the Secretary-General to request Governments to submit timetables for action at an early date.

11. Mr. CHALIKULIMA (Zambia) said that his delegation had read with appreciation the report of the Special Committee which he considered an honest attempt to uphold the principles of the United Nations Charter, to which some States regrettably continued to pay only lip service. He urged all delegations to reflect on the considerations which had led to the establishment of the United Nations and on the contributions their countries had made to the realization of its objectives.

12. The policy of *apartheid*, which, although defined as a separate development, actually amounted to a policy of racial supremacy, was not only a grave danger to international peace, but also an insult to the conscience of mankind and must be met with determined resistance. For that reason, his delegation welcomed General Assembly resolution 2506 (XXIV), which, *inter alia*, invited all States to desist from collaborating with the Government of South Africa in economic, financial, social and other activities. It was his delegation's conviction that unless resolute and stern measures were taken to isolate the racist régime of South Africa and unless the latter was made to realize the futility of its policies, it would continue to flout with impunity the decisions of the United Nations.

13. His delegation also welcomed the designation by the General Assembly (resolution 2544 (XXIV)) of the year 1971 as the International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, as well as the Special Committee's appeal, as noted in paragraphs 26 and 27 of its report, for action on the part of the international community to combat *apartheid* by intensifying existing efforts on behalf of the oppressed people of South Africa. Indeed, in view of South Africa's contempt for the United Nations, his delegation urged that the racist régime should be totally isolated by expulsion from the United Nations and that all diplomatic, social, economic and military contacts with that country should be severed immediately.

14. Despite the Security Council's call to all States in its resolution 282 (1970) to implement an unconditional arms embargo against South Africa, there had recently been signs that some members of the Security Council might overlook those provisions. In that connexion, he drew the Committee's attention to recent statements made by the new Conservative Government of the United Kingdom to the effect that it might consider selling selected arms to South Africa for external defence, and also to the delivery of submarines to South Africa by France. The argument advanced by the proponents of continued arms sales to South Africa was centred on the ideological conflict between East and West, which was irrelevant in the African context. With the closure of the Suez Canal and the existence of a power vacuum in the Indian Ocean, the Cape route had assumed renewed importance for the defence of the West. It was argued further that South Africa, the bastion of racial oppression and the self-appointed custodian of Western civilization in Africa, should be sufficiently armed to repel any external aggression. In that connexion,

rather lame attempts were made to distinguish between arms for external use and those for internal repression.

15. His delegation could not be hoodwinked into accepting that fictitious distinction, which was at best an attempt to camouflage open support for the repressive measures of the South African régime against the aspirations of the majority, who wished to assume their rightful place in the affairs of their country. In view of the facts contained in the Special Committee's report on South Africa's huge defence expenditures, its tremendous military strength, its missile bases and radar networks, it was difficult for the independent black States of Africa to accept South Africa's assurances that they were safe from attack. One might wonder why a giant air base had been constructed by South Africa just a few miles from Zambia's border. In the absence of any known aggressor, what sort of external aggression did South Africa fear? What would prevent the racist régime from deploying its submarines to attack African villages, or indeed to blockade the ports of independent States? Since even the combined forces of the United Kingdom and South Africa could not withstand an attack by a major Power, it was his delegation's conviction that the arms now being procured by South Africa were to be used primarily for internal repression and for blackmailing African States which sympathized with the cause of the African majority. The South African régime was threatened only by its own policies. It had introduced abominable laws which enabled it to move people like cattle and which had reduced the indigenous people to a state of perpetual slavery in the land of their birth. The new Bureau of State Security, created primarily to suppress the black man, had come to be dreaded even by Afrikaners. The South African Foreign Minister had recently proclaimed that all South Africans possessed self-government of varying forms at various levels; he had neglected to add that, besides compressing more than 75 per cent of the indigenous people into areas considered too arid for white settlement and constituting only 13 per cent of the total area of the country, South Africa had established the "self-governing republic" of Robben Island, reserved for black nationalists only.

16. South Africa regarded States which practised racial equality as a direct threat to its diabolical system. His country, with its philosophy of humanism, continued to be the victim of South African military blackmail. South African soldiers were positioned in Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Namibia to defend white supremacy and had, on many occasions, violated Zambia's territorial sovereignty and air space on the pretext that it had been harbouring freedom fighters. His delegation wished to assure the Committee that Zambia had no aggressive intentions against any State, even if it had the capacity to carry them out, but neither did it have the moral right to prevent oppressed people from fighting for their freedom, just as the countries which currently supplied arms to South Africa had desired to liberate themselves from Nazi domination. He appealed to the United Kingdom and France to reflect on that aspect of their own history, to respect the aspirations of their fellow human beings and to subordinate economic expediency and self-interest to a concern for human emancipation.

17. His delegation was very apprehensive over the decision by the Portuguese authorities to construct the Cabora Bassa

hydroelectric project in which both South Africa and a number of western European countries had taken a keen interest. His country would have no objection to the Scheme if it were a purely economic venture, but unfortunately it was part of South Africa's policy of creating a buffer zone of puppet States on its northern frontiers. His own country had resisted both South Africa's overtures and its threats, deciding to orient its economy towards its East African neighbours; the forthcoming construction of the railway between Zambia and the United Republic of Tanzania bore witness to that resolution. If Zambia, a relatively poor developing country, could make such a great sacrifice in defence of human rights, it would not be demanding too much to expect highly industrialized States to make an almost negligible sacrifice by severing economic ties with South Africa and by withdrawing from the Cabora Bassa project.

18. Turning to the question of discriminatory sports policies, he recalled that in South Africa black men were not permitted to compete against whites. In the past, when similar measures had been taken by international sporting bodies to bar South African all-white teams from competing with outside sporting bodies, the South African régime had complained that it was wrong to introduce racial groups in sport. However, the separation of different racial groups in sport appeared to be a political issue in itself. Therefore, South Africa, as a gesture of its good intentions, should repeal all laws which prohibited racially mixed sports, allowing individual citizens to choose for themselves with whom they wished to compete. Otherwise, the only way to eliminate such discriminatory policies would be to apply against them the same political weapon used against the Coloured and black peoples of South Africa. His delegation was prepared to endorse any measures, including mandatory sanctions, which the Committee might recommend in order to ostracize South Africa from the international sporting world. Moreover, it was prepared to include a provision which would extend those measures to countries which flouted them. His delegation was fully convinced that only the total isolation of South Africa could change its policies and that the United Nations should begin seriously to think and act in accordance with that view.

19. Mr. ARAUJO CASTRO (Brazil) said that, in keeping with the history and traditions of Brazil, the Government and people of his country formally repudiated and strongly condemned the policies of *apartheid*, a system of social control based on racial considerations, comprising a set of repressive policies embodied in instruments of law whose net effect was the domination and exploitation of the non-white majority of the people of South Africa. The setting up, strengthening and expansion of the *apartheid* system were a direct and deliberate result of the political will of the white minority and represented the exercise of a political option to institutionalize massive inequality in the realm of the fundamental rights, based on brute force and unacceptable discrimination. The moral implications of that choice were appalling since it was predicated upon the untenable idea of racial supremacy which ran counter to the fundamental unity of the human race and to the logic of history, which for centuries had pointed in the direction of the gradual emancipation of men from political domination and from obsolete forms of social organization such as

slavery, serfdom and forced labour. From the political standpoint, the persistence of *apartheid* was a blow against the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination, which Brazil had always supported and affirmed. Economically speaking, the policies of *apartheid* corresponded to a systematic exploitation of the work of the African population, as shown, for example, by discriminatory wage differentials and by severe restrictions on the access of Africans to skilled and even semi-skilled occupations. The economic policy of South Africa was fraught with inner conflicts. On the one hand, an accelerated programme of industrialization was being carried out, while, on the other hand, Africans were systematically denied access to the benefits of development and to the consumption of goods produced. The development and modernization of the South African economy were distinctly linked to the strengthening of *apartheid* and the tightening of its provisions. Regulations and restrictions were constantly refined and rationalized, effectively limiting the African population to manual and agricultural occupations. In general terms, Africans were reduced to the condition of a pool of cheap labour, having no right to permanent residence outside the impoverished "reserves", to which they were assigned by the white racist authorities. They did not have the right to acquire freehold title to land anywhere in South Africa, were denied access to education and training in professional skills, and very little or no opportunity to climb the occupational ladder and had no control whatsoever over the terms and conditions of their employment. Such conditions could not be allowed to go unnoticed since they amounted to an all-pervasive repression of the rights and aspirations of the non-white population of South Africa and constituted a crime against humanity.

20. Turning his attention to the report of the Special Committee (A/8022), he would, first of all, like to comment specifically on paragraph 79 wherein reference was made to a "speculation that South Africa and Portugal, together with Argentina and Brazil, intended to form a South Atlantic Treaty Organization". His delegation was surprised and distressed to see a reference to those speculations in the report under consideration, which failed to make any mention of the clarifications repeatedly offered by the Brazilian Government. He called attention to a letter dated 8 July 1969 (A/AC.115/L.262)³ from the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Special Committee, to a statement made by his delegation in the Special Political Committee during the twenty-fourth session (647th meeting), and to a letter dated 19 August 1970 (S/9914)⁴ from the representative of Brazil addressed to the President of the Security Council, which all refuted those speculations. He hoped that the foregoing remarks would close the subject and that steps would be taken to correct the report of the Special Committee accordingly.

21. In connexion with that part of the Special Committee's report dealing with dissemination of information his delegation took note of the reference made in paragraph 135 to the need for studies on trade relations between South Africa and various regions of the world and believed

³ Mimeographed.

⁴ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-fifth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1970*.

that those studies should be presented in an integrated manner, in a single document, and in a format ensuring both easy comparisons of the trade relations between South Africa and the different developing countries and their relationship to trade levels between South Africa and its main trading partners. His delegation would also like to associate itself with the Special Committee's recommendation—in paragraph 133—that the Secretary-General should continue to promote wider dissemination of information on *apartheid* and welcomed the suggestion—in paragraph 136—that UNESCO should be requested to bring its report on *apartheid* up to date and extend its scope so as to cover the effects of racial laws applied to Namibia and Southern Rhodesia.

22. Security Council resolution 282 (1970) represented a very important landmark in connexion with the question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of *apartheid* and with the question of strengthening the embargo on arms and related equipment to that country. His Government attached the utmost importance to that resolution, and, although it was not mandatory in character, would comply fully with its text. It had already taken appropriate measures to ensure its implementation.

23. Mr. FARAH (Somalia), introducing draft resolution A/SPC/L.182 on behalf of its sponsors, recalled the circumstances in which States members of the African Group had in July 1970 requested the Security Council to consider the serious situation arising from continued violations of the arms embargo. Concern had been expressed at the time of the likelihood that States which had hitherto complied with the embargo would be encouraged by those violations to change their attitude. Furthermore, there had been considerable criticism of the indifference of some Member States to the embargo, and of the failure of the Security Council to fulfil its responsibilities in the matter.

24. Had it remained indifferent to those violations, the Council would have seriously impaired its moral and constitutional position. Happily, it had reasserted its authority by adopting resolution 282 (1970), which had not only reaffirmed its resolutions of 1963 and 1964 on the arms embargo, but had gone further by calling upon all States to comply fully with a series of measures which would strengthen the embargo. The resolution, widely welcomed by the international community, had been unopposed, with only three States abstaining in the vote, namely the United States, the United Kingdom and France.

25. The representative of Nicaragua, who had been the President of the Council at the time, had described the resolution as one which would represent an important new page in the history of the Council. The representative of Finland had considered that the essence of the embargo lay in its "political importance", adding that the embargo had become a test of the resolve of the international community to implement Article 56 of the United Nations Charter.

26. However, since the embargo was not mandatory, but primarily depended on the willingness, co-operation and integrity of Member States, political action was required at other levels. The fifteen members of the Security Council

had already expressed themselves on the embargo; it was important that the remaining Member States should have an opportunity to state their position, since the success of the embargo clearly depended on the degree of unanimity among them.

27. The Organization of African Unity had made known its position regarding the pressing importance and urgency of *apartheid* at every appropriate international conference. Its Manifesto on Southern Africa had given rise to General Assembly resolution 2505 (XXIV), which had expressed the firm intention of the United Nations, acting in co-operation with OAU, to intensify its efforts to find a solution to the grave situation in southern Africa.

28. In September 1970 OAU had appointed a high-level delegation, led by the President of Zambia, to prevail upon the Governments concerned to stop selling arms to South Africa and also to stop assisting in the manufacture of arms in South Africa. As could be seen from document A/SPC/L.181, that decision had been fully endorsed by the recent Lusaka Conference of Non-Aligned Countries.

29. He recalled an appeal which the late Chief Albert Luthuli had addressed in May 1963 to the people of the United Kingdom, urging them to unite in protesting, vociferously and unremittingly, against the shipment of arms to South Africa. Chief Luthuli had added that while it might be futile, he nevertheless appealed in all sincerity to those who put profits before justice and human lives to pause and rethink their sense of values. Since that appeal, the South African Government had been able, through the arms trade with certain Member States, to effect a massive build-up of its military and police forces; even since the adoption of Security Council resolution 282 (1970), that arms trade had continued—ostensibly in fulfilment of existing contracts or in the context of an unreal distinction between arms for internal repression and arms for external defence. The States involved were France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America—countries which had a long association with African peoples and whose commitment to the defence of the rights of man should ensure their moral leadership in that matter.

30. Draft resolution A/SPC/L.182 would give an opportunity to all Member States: first, to declare openly their support for the arms embargo, secondly, to demonstrate in a tangible way their total opposition to the policies of *apartheid* and their determination to ensure that they would not be a party to the supply and manufacture of arms for South Africa, and thirdly, to demonstrate their political and moral support for the mission to be undertaken by the delegation of OAU.

31. He announced that the following delegations had expressed their countries' desire to join in sponsoring the draft resolution: Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guyana, Hungary, Indonesia, Nepal and Upper Volta.

32. In view of the need for an effective arms embargo—which was even more pressing than during Chief Luthuli's lifetime—he hoped that members would either join in sponsoring the draft resolution or give it their unqualified support.

33. Mr. TARCICI (Yemen) said that his delegation would like the name of his country to be added to the list of sponsors.

34. Mr. ANTOINE (Haiti) said that there was not the slightest justice in the disgraceful situation prevailing in both South Africa and Rhodesia, where minority régimes arrogated to themselves the right to dominate a large racial majority.

35. Mr. EDREMODA (Nigeria), speaking as one of the sponsors of the draft resolution, said that the mission mandated by OAU to five African States was further proof of the good faith of the African people in seeking, if possible, a peaceful solution to the problem of *apartheid*. He urged all members of the Committee to give their support to the draft resolution, the aim of which was to provide the mission with the moral backing of the United Nations.

36. Mr. AKAR (Sierra Leone), speaking as a co-sponsor of the draft resolution, said that Member States, particularly those in Africa, felt an understandable frustration in the

face of the tragic fact that despite everything that had been said thus far, *apartheid* still prevailed. He appealed to Member States to sink their geographical, religious or racial differences for the sake of humanity in support of the draft resolution, which offered a magnificent opportunity to prove that they believed in the dignity of man and would not permit people to be held in conditions of virtual slavery.

37. Mr. TEYMOUR (United Arab Republic), speaking as a co-sponsor of the draft resolution urged all members to give their support thereto.

38. Mr. BONILLA (Costa Rica) said that he had asked for his country to be included among the sponsors, since it fully believed in and practised the principle that all men were equal before the law and entitled to free access to all political positions, regardless of colour or birth. All those suffering under the oppressive policies of *apartheid* would always have the friendly support of his country.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.