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Chairman: Mr. Mihail HASEGANU (Romania).

AGENDA ITEM 30

The policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa: reports of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa and replies by Member States under General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII) (A/5497 and Add.1, A/SPC/80, A/SPC/81, A/SPC/82, A/SPC/83, A/SPC/L.95) (continued)

1. Mr. MENSNIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) noted that the South African Government's shameful policy of racial discrimination had already been analysed in detail by many speakers. It was a policy which aroused the indignation of all progressive men. The peoples refused to accept the continuation of apartheid, that odious form of colonialism and facism, in the twentieth century, the century of man's great conquests over nature and in outer space, the century in which most of the peoples of Asia and Africa had broken the chains of colonialism and had embarked upon the road of independent development. Their indignation and concern had found expression in General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII), in the establishment of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, in the resolution adopted unanimously by the Summit Conference of Independent African States, held at Addis Ababa in May 1963, and in the Security Council resolution of 7 August 1963.^{1/}

2. Apartheid, in fact, was not an isolated phenomenon. It was a cruel system, based on a racist ideology, under which a tiny minority of white settlers persecuted the overwhelming majority of Blacks and under which the South African Government raised racial hatred to the status of official policy. As a result, all social, economic and political relations in the country were based on racial antagonism. Those special features of apartheid had been eloquently highlighted by Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegations who had spoken at the plenary

meetings, by the many representatives who had put cogent arguments before the Special Committee, and by individuals engaged in the struggle against apartheid, like Mr. Oliver Tambo and the former Bishop of Johannesburg, the Right Rev. R. Ambrose Reeves. Finally, the Special Committee, which was to be congratulated on its work, had included in its report (A/5497 and Add.1) many facts which clearly showed the inadmissibility of the situation in South Africa. Everything went to show that world opinion would no longer tolerate that refuge of racism—the Addis Ababa resolution, the proposals to expel the Republic of South Africa from several international organizations, and the multitude of resolutions in which the social organizations of nearly all countries protested against the policies of the South African Government.

3. It was high time to drop sterile exhortations and to take decisive and effective measures against the racist Government of South Africa. Those who asserted that South Africa could not remain indifferent to the voice of world conscience should at last understand that their hopes were vain. It was well known that the South African Government was still flagrantly violating the twenty-eight resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council. At the present session (1236th plenary meeting) the representative of the Republic of South Africa had repeated the hypocritical arguments which he employed year after year and had tried to distort the facts. Speaking of the "remarkable achievements" in the matter of "separate development", he had again preached racist theories which had been condemned by the Nürnberg Tribunal and by all peoples throughout the world. To understand the tragic situation of the indigenous peoples and of the persons of Indo-Pakistan origin who represented four-fifths of the country's population it was necessary only to analyse the facts given in the Special Committee's report and quoted by the representatives: the denial of rights, the poverty, the extremely high mortality rate, particularly among children, the forced transfers to the reservations, the state of emergency in several regions, the police raids and repressions, and the formation of ban-tustans, which were nothing but ghettos.

4. The deep concern aroused by the rapid expansion of the armed forces and the police was fully justified because those measures, as the Special Committee had emphasized, reflected the gravity of the situation in the country and were likely to have grave international consequences. Already during the Congolese crisis, South Africa had helped to equip Tshombé's army. But today there was the South African Government's collusion with Mr. Winston Field's Government in Southern Rhodesia and with the Portuguese and other colonialists, a collusion which extended even to the holding of joint military manoeuvres. The South African people's struggle for national freedom was thus a part of the historic effort of the African

^{1/} Official Records of the Security Council, Eighteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1963, document S/5386.

people to expel the colonialists from the African continent once and for all. Moreover, it was clear that the racist Government of the Republic of South Africa would never have been able to persist in its policies without the economic, political and military support of certain Western Powers. As the representatives of Guinea (379th meeting), Tanganyika (383rd meeting), Indonesia (387th meeting) and other countries had rightly pointed out, the key to the drama now being enacted in South Africa was held by the allies of the Republic of South Africa, who had close political, economic and military ties with that country.

5. The Soviet delegation could not pass over in silence some of the proposals made by the representative of Denmark at the 380th meeting, who had been mainly concerned with the future of South African society after the eradication of apartheid and with the role which the United Nations would have to play during the period of transition. In the Soviet delegation's view that method of tackling the problem was designed to distract world opinion from the present situation and from the urgent need to find a solution to the problem, i.e., to eliminate racial discrimination and apartheid in South Africa forthwith. His delegation was convinced that the South African people itself would be able to settle the future of a society which it would wish to base on democracy and equality of rights. At the present time solemn declarations, however well intentioned, came up against the intransigence of the Verwoerd Government. That could be seen from Mr. H. F. Verwoerd's remarks in the House of Assembly on 25 June 1963 and from the fact that the South African Government had replied to the Security Council resolution of 7 August 1963 with a new wave of repression and trials. Two weeks earlier the General Assembly had adopted unanimously resolution 1881 (XVIII), which expressed the reaction of peoples and Governments to the arbitrary rule of force. Yet the lives of the detained persons were still in danger and there was no sign of any change in the attitude of the Verwoerd Government.

6. The Soviet delegation had always been guided by the principle that the United Nations had to put an end to the inhuman policy of apartheid. Being firmly opposed to all forms of racial enslavement, it regarded it as essential that the United Nations should, at the present session, take the most decisive and effective measures—including economic, political and other sanctions—to put an end once and for all to racial discrimination in the Republic of South Africa. The USSR would vote in favour of any such measures.

Mr. Ingles (Philippines), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

7. Mr. TANG (China) recalled that his Government was opposed to all forms of oppression, particularly racial discrimination. That was what the representative of China had stated before the General Assembly as recently as 3 October 1963 (1227th plenary meeting). The concept of racial discrimination was foreign to the Chinese mind and ever since the time of Confucius the Chinese had been taught to believe in the brotherhood of man. In modern times the Chinese constitution of 1911 had provided for equal rights for the principal ethnic groups, namely Chinese, Manchus, Mongolians, Moslems, and Tibetans. In spite of the numerous difficulties bound to face any young republic, those ethnic groups had lived in harmony and mutual respect. It was only under the Communists

that the Tibetans had known discrimination and oppression.

8. The Government of the Republic of China, reflecting national sentiment, had always maintained that the policy of apartheid was quite incompatible with the obligations assumed by the Government of South Africa under the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As the representative of China had told the Security Council on 5 August 1963 (1053rd meeting), apartheid was not only morally indefensible but also politically self-destructive. The Government of the Republic of China had therefore endeavoured to persuade the South African Government to change its racial policies without delay. The time had come to introduce reforms, whatever the efforts made by the South African Government to improve the standards of living of the Bantu people.

9. The Republic of China had voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII) and Security Council resolutions of 1 April 1960^{2/} and of 7 August 1963. In a letter addressed on 30 August 1963 to the Chairman of the Special Committee (see A/5497/Add.1, annex V), the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations had pledged his Government's continuing co-operation with the United Nations in its efforts to effect changes in the racial situation in South Africa. His Government had also informed the Secretary-General on 27 September 1963^{3/} that it had not sold or shipped arms or ammunition of any type or military vehicles to South Africa nor was such sale contemplated.

10. Turning to the Special Committee's report (A/5497 and Add.1), he noted with regret that the Government of the Republic of South Africa had intensified repression by adopting a series of new measures such as the General Law Amendment Act, 1963, the application of which had caused untold suffering among the Bantu population of Johannesburg. Indeed, the policy of apartheid had become a matter of concern to all States and all peoples. His delegation noted with satisfaction that the Special Committee considered its task to be not merely to prepare the ground for the adoption of a further resolution but to seek a constructive solution to the grave situation arising from the intensification of the policies of apartheid. The Special Committee appeared already to have suggested the broad outlines of a solution by recalling in paragraph 449 of its report General Assembly resolution 616 B (VII) declaring that the peaceful development of a unified community in multiracial societies such as South Africa was best assured when patterns of legislation and practice were directed towards ensuring equality before the law of all persons regardless of race, creed or colour, and when economic, social, cultural and political participation of all racial groups was on a basis of equality.

11. The complex situation in South Africa called for patience and bold measures. His delegation shared the hope that recourse would always be had to peaceful ways of seeking a solution.

12. Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia) said that the Special Political Committee, which was examining once again the inhuman policies of apartheid in South Africa,

^{2/} *Ibid.*, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1960, document S/4300.

^{3/} *Ibid.*, Eighteenth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1963, document S/5438 and Add.1.

had before it a well-documented and reliable report submitted by the Special Committee (A/5497 and Add.1). He congratulated the Chairman and members of the Special Committee on the able manner in which they had discharged their task.

13. South Africa had immense natural resources. It was the world's largest gold producer, supplying more than 50 per cent of the gold mined in the western world. Its diamond production, which had reached the record level of 2.6 million carats in 1957, had earned South Africa £76.8 million in that year. The country had an abundance of other minerals and it was also a major producer of fruit and grains.

14. Unfortunately, the racist Government of the Republic of South Africa had completely deprived the great majority, numbering more than 80 per cent of the population, of the benefit of those resources. It deliberately kept the indigenous inhabitants under a régime which was worse than slavery. The Bantu Laws Amendment Act, 1963, prohibited the Blacks from living outside the reserves. About 80 per cent of the best land in the country was reserved for the privileged white minority and an indigenous person could not live on those lands without a special permit. Approximately 33 per cent of the indigenous inhabitants lived in the cities so that they could serve the white minority. They were forbidden to leave the slum areas reserved for them or to enter them without special permission from their masters or the police. The others were confined to reserves, which they could leave only to work in a mining or agricultural area. But that was not the worst of it: under the notorious General Law Amendment, 1962, which was known as the Sabotage Act and the General Law Amendment Act, 1963, known as the "No-Trial Act", Africans were thrown into goal by the thousands. It was reliably reported that in 1963 alone more than 7,000 persons had been held as political prisoners and that at least 4,000 members of the Pan-Africanist Congress had been arrested and were awaiting trial.

15. According to the memorandum of 4 September 1963 from the International Labour Office (A/AC.115/L.29), the Republic of South Africa, by reason of its declared policy of apartheid, was not acting in conformity with the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation, under the terms of which all human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, had the right to pursue both their material well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity of economic security and equal opportunity. The Verwoerd doctrine, which recognized four separate classes, namely Europeans, Asians, Africans and persons of mixed race, established discrimination in employment and before the law and restricted the opportunities open to the last three groups, thus leading the country rapidly towards disaster.

16. The International Commission of Jurists in its memorandum of 6 September 1963 (A/AC.115/L.30) had said that the separation of different groups on grounds of race, colour or creed was in itself an affront to human dignity.

17. The South African Government's policy had been the subject of more than twenty-five United Nations resolutions. In response to the Organization's request, many Member States had deemed it their duty to implement the provisions of those resolutions. The Governments of the African-Asian countries, for example, at their historic conference at Bandung in

April 1955, had deplored racial segregation and had vigorously supported the courageous stand taken by the victims of racial discrimination, especially the people of African and Indo-Pakistan origin in South Africa. At the Conferences of Independent African States at Accra, Monrovia, Lagos and Addis Ababa, those States had resolutely condemned racial discrimination and segregation all over the world and particularly in South Africa. At the recent conference at Addis Ababa the African Heads of States had appealed to all States, and more particularly those which had traditional relations and co-operated with the Government of South Africa, to apply strictly General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII), and had appealed to all Governments which still had diplomatic, consular and economic relations with the Government of South Africa to break off those relations.

18. As for the South African Government, it was pursuing not only a policy of subjugation but also an armaments policy which was the logical product of apartheid. South Africa was reported to be spending more on armaments than ever before: its current expenditure on modern weapons was estimated at \$220 million per year. Military service had been intensified and apart from the arms belonging to the Government it was known that the 3 million Whites living in the country owned privately more than 2 million firearms and that the white women of South Africa were participating in military manoeuvres. In those circumstances, could it be denied that the situation in South Africa constituted a serious threat to the peace and security of the continent and of the entire world?

19. His delegation considered that the best way to isolate South Africa and compel it to respect human dignity would have been to comply strictly with resolution 1761 (XVII). It regretted that operative paragraph 4, in particular, had not been implemented by certain countries of Western Europe, which had continued to send South Africa strategic materials, including arms and ammunition, thus helping to aggravate the already explosive situation on the African continent. The Ethiopian Government, for its part, had taken steps to implement the resolution in its entirety. His delegation was convinced that if those few Western European countries co-operated, the United Nations would soon attain its principal objective, namely to guarantee equal rights and freedoms to all citizens of South Africa irrespective of race, colour or creed. In that connexion, he welcomed the contribution made by the Scandinavian countries to the search for a just solution of the problem of apartheid.

20. With respect to the theory which had been advanced by certain people and to which the United Kingdom representative had referred (386th meeting), his delegation could not accept the idea of partition in any form. In its opinion, any discussion of that suggestion would be out of place. The indigenous population of South Africa had totally rejected it and it could in no way contribute to a solution of the problem. It was therefore to be hoped that the United Kingdom delegation would not pursue the idea any further.

21. On the other hand his delegation was in favour of an idea which had already received wide support in the Committee: the establishment in South Africa of a non-racial government enjoying the confidence of all citizens and founded on the democratic principle of "one man, one vote". In that connexion he wished

to make it clear that once the indigenous people of South Africa were able to choose their Government, all citizens would live in equality and brotherhood. What was more, a Government which enjoyed the confidence of the citizens was the best guarantee for all, irrespective of colour, creed or race.

22. With regard to the report of the Special Committee (A/5497 and Add.1), he considered it essential that the recommendations made in paragraphs 509-517 should be endorsed and applied immediately. Paragraph 511, in particular, should be adopted; it recommended that the General Assembly should call upon all Member States to take requisite measures speedily to implement the relevant provisions of General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII) and the Security Council resolution of 7 August 1963. His delegation unreservedly supported paragraphs 512 and 513, which recommended that assistance should be provided to South African nationals who were persecuted and obliged to leave their country because of their opposition to apartheid. It also supported the recommendation in paragraph 514 that Member States should be requested not to provide, directly or indirectly, any military or technical assistance to South Africa in any form whatsoever. The additional measures recommended in paragraph 515, relating to economic and technical assistance from international organizations, transport, immigration and an embargo on the supply of arms, ammunition and petroleum, should be immediately endorsed and the General Assembly should see that they were carried out.

23. The recommendation in paragraph 516—that Member States should be urged to give maximum publicity to the efforts of the United Nations with respect to the question of apartheid, and to take effective steps to counteract propaganda by the Government of South Africa—seemed to his delegation a vital point which should be covered in the resolution to be adopted by the General Assembly.

24. In conclusion he urged Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and all those States which still maintained trade and diplomatic relations with South Africa, to comply with resolution 1761 (XVII) in order to avoid disaster and ensure peace.

Mr. Haseganu (Romania) resumed the Chair.

25. Mr. RANA (Nepal) observed that, despite the lessening of international tension, the United Nations was once again confronted by the problem of the South African Government's policies of apartheid. Over the many years for which it had concerned itself with the question, the United Nations had met with nothing but scorn from the South African Government, which persisted in invoking Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter to deny the jurisdiction of the Organization in that essentially human and international question. Despite all efforts at dissuasion, the policy of apartheid was applied more ruthlessly than ever. Nepal, which had no relations with South Africa, opposed apartheid not only as a threat to international peace but also because Nepalese national policy was directed towards the creation of a better society in which, in the words of His Majesty King Mahendra, the domination of one man over another did not exist.

26. His delegation was alarmed at the massive military build-up in South Africa, which was designed to strengthen the Government's machinery of op-

pression, and at the legislation calculated to gag all opposition to the policies of apartheid, in defiance of the most elementary principles of justice. In particular, the executive authorities could now detain indefinitely, without trial, anybody suspected of violating the laws of the country. It was disturbing to find that political prisoners could be condemned to death for no other crime than their opposition to apartheid. Only a few days previously the General Assembly in resolution 1881 (XVIII) had requested the South African Government to release all such political prisoners, but its resolution had gone unheeded. Indeed, in its stubborn disavowal of the principles of equality and justice, the South African Government had no match; it had made a virtue of its policies of apartheid.

27. The report of the Special Committee (A/5497 and Add.1) brought out clearly the effects of the policies of apartheid. His delegation, a member of which had served as Rapporteur of the Special Committee, had had ample opportunity to indicate its Government's position in the matter. It highly commended the Special Committee on its report and expressed the hope that that Committee would continue its work until the South African Government was forced to relinquish its hateful policies.

28. U ON SEIN (Burma) said that apartheid was entirely alien to the way of life, traditions and culture of Burma and utterly repellent to its people. It was once again apparent that the South African Government still maintained a completely negative attitude to the efforts of the United Nations.

29. His delegation's position with regard to Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter was that the United Nations was competent to deal with the problem of apartheid and with other problems involving flagrant violation of basic principles and human rights. The competence of the United Nations in such matters had been fully established. The question of racial discrimination in South Africa was very serious. It involved the broader problem of relations between white and coloured people throughout the world; and in that connexion it should be borne in mind that two-thirds of the world's population was non-white.

30. For over a century the South African white community had been deliberately seeking to induce Africans to leave their tribal life and work as labourers for the Whites in urban areas. The discovery of diamonds and gold in the second half of the nineteenth century had changed the economic and social pattern in South Africa. Coloured Africans could become neither property-owners nor skilled workers. The South African Government had laid down its official policy for relations between Whites and non-whites, in the form of complete social segregation and the downright denial of political rights to non-whites. The urban African was treated as a migrant labourer and not as a town dweller. He enjoyed no property rights or political rights. The existing laws of South Africa were mere legal devices drawn up by an all-white Parliament in order to inflict repression and indignities on the non-white population of the country. The statements by Mr. Oliver Tambo (379th meeting) and the Right Rev. R. Ambrose Reeves (387th meeting) had again brought out the seriousness of the situation.

31. The recommendations made in the report of the Special Committee deserved careful consideration, and his delegation was grateful to Denmark and the other Scandinavian countries for the position they

had taken on the question of apartheid. With regard to the application of General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII), Burma exported no arms, ammunition or military vehicles to South Africa and maintained no diplomatic or other official relations with the Government of that country. Furthermore, in November 1962, his Government had prohibited all private commercial relations between Burma and South Africa. Consequently there were no longer any relations whatsoever between the Union of Burma and the Republic of South Africa. It should also be mentioned that South African aircraft and vessels had never been allowed any facilities at Burmese air and sea ports.

32. The situation in South Africa was now worse than ever. However, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 1881 (XVIII) unanimously with the sole exception of South Africa itself, which had voted against the resolution. The United Nations had a responsibility to find a solution to the problem of apartheid, and the efforts undertaken must be pursued until the non-white population of South Africa had regained full rights and complete equality.

33. Mr. NEDA (Romania) said that the favourable atmosphere in which the Committee had been working since the beginning of the session fostered the hope that its work would have positive results. The public concern manifested throughout the world showed a sincere desire to see an end to the policy of apartheid.

34. The Committee had before it the reports of the Special Committee; they contained a wealth of material, detailed study of which would impart a better knowledge of the measures taken by the South African Government and would indicate precisely what was impeding the solution of the problem. The policy which should be applied to eliminate apartheid had been clearly defined at the international meetings of African or African-Asian States. Two such meetings were particularly important: the Third Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference, held at Moshi, Tanganyika in February 1963, and the Summit Conference of Independent African States, held at Addis Ababa in May 1963. Those Conferences had not merely condemned apartheid; they had also adopted specific measures to aid the non-white population of South Africa. The resolution adopted at those Conferences showed that there were limits to the peoples' patience; the decisions taken by the Economic Commission for Africa and by the Forty-seventh International Labour Conference would also be recalled in that connexion.

35. To all appearances, the South African Government intended to continue rejecting the resolutions adopted by the United Nations, refusing to adopt any peaceful solution to the problem, and accordingly redoubling its efforts to create a militaristic State. As the report of the Special Committee indicated, the budget of the South African military and police forces had quadrupled between 1960 and 1963. In recent years a large share of that budget had gone into building modern munitions factories, and in that enterprise the South African Government had enjoyed the full support of the Western Powers. The South African leaders realized that their principal suppliers of arms would sooner or later have to discontinue their deliveries; that could be anticipated, for a few of those who supplied South Africa with arms and ammunition had already undertaken to halt such supplies. That was why the South African Government was now accelerating the construction of its own munitions factories.

Viewed in that light, the statements of the South African Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the effect that the United Nations was the main enemy of South Africa, took on their full significance.

36. The great majority of Governments, as could be seen from their statements in the report of the Special Committee and in the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council, had taken a clear-cut stand with regard to the United Nations resolutions. Their attitude marked a new stage in the struggle against apartheid, for matters no longer stopped at condemnation; political, economic and military sanctions had begun to be applied.

37. Yet some countries still maintained close relations with the Government of South Africa. Four-fifths of South African trade was conducted with those countries, which drew vast profits from their investments in South Africa, largely through the work of that country's 14 million people of African and mixed blood. Indeed, some Western countries had admitted that they were prevented from taking measures against South Africa specifically by the existence of those economic relations with South Africa, which were of vital importance to them. It could therefore be said that the solution of the problem largely depended on the position of the main Western countries.

38. The statements made by Mr. Oliver Tambo and the Right Rev. R. Ambrose Reeves had shed light on some aspects of the situation in South Africa. Not only was the policy of apartheid a serious affront to human dignity, but it also perpetuated a hotbed of discord on the African continent. The increasingly brutal measures taken by the South African Government would undoubtedly endanger international peace for, as he had already said, there were limits to anyone's patience. Romania, which had always taken a firm stand where apartheid was concerned, looked upon the application of the measures specified in resolution 1761 (XVII) as an important factor in bringing international force to bear on the Government of the Republic of South Africa. His delegation had also supported the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 7 August 1963, and it considered that the strict application, by all States, of the measures provided for in operative paragraph 3 of that resolution would deprive the South African Government of the support and encouragement it needed for its policy of apartheid.

39. Mr. TALEB (Algeria) refused to believe that the international conscience had already forgotten the misdeeds of fascism or would long remain silent in the face of the tragic consequences of the South African Government's policy of apartheid. What was needed was not a resolution but a specific and practical solution to the problem. Now that the cancer gnawing a part of the African continent had been located, the aim must be not to conceal it, as some countries wished, but to excise it.

40. Since the adoption of resolution 1761 (XVII) it had been the Algerian Government's constant concern to translate into action the decisions which the United Nations had taken to put an end to the policy of apartheid. His Government had been the first to respond to the Secretary-General's appeal and to state its intentions in regard to the implementation of resolution 1761 (XVII). In its statement (see A/5497/Add.1, annex V) it had made clear its decision to apply fully and without delay the provisions of operative paragraph 4 of that resolution. The Algerian

Government solemnly reaffirmed to the Committee its determination to give the South African people every assistance in regaining their fundamental rights; and that was how it interpreted the unanimous appeal, the cry of alarm, uttered by all the African Heads of State at their meeting at Addis Ababa.

41. Despite the patience which the Africans had been showing for years, some delegations did not hesitate to become the conscious or unconscious champions of the South African Government and had the audacity to ask those same Africans to bridle their emotions and keep cool heads. When the Charter was flouted, the dignity of the Africans trampled underfoot and the life of a whole nation threatened, it was to be wondered how those delegations maintained their characteristic phlegm. Some had tried to demonstrate the uselessness of an economic boycott of South Africa which, they maintained, would only bring misery to the very people it was meant to help. But much more than bread, the Africans in South Africa needed respect, dignity and freedom—in short, to be treated as human beings.

42. While proclaiming themselves the allies of the Africans, some were trying—to say the least—to humour the Pretoria Government. But there was no half-way house between Africa and Pretoria, and those Powers which still maintained very close relations with the South African Government would have to make a choice. They could not escape their responsibility. Neither the nations of the world nor the Organization could afford to wait any longer if South Africa was not to be plunged into a violent conflict, with incalculable results. Africa had suffered too much to be confronted again with a struggle which was already threatening international peace and security. It was necessary to be realistic and to spare Africa that new trial. Was action at last to be taken to that end? The answer to that question could now come only from those countries which continued to be on the best possible terms with the South African Government: Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, to mention only the most prominent. To those who demanded guarantees for the white minority in South Africa it could be said that the Africans, who had felt the bite of colonialist and racist oppression, would hold out the hand of welcome to all who were willing to work for a new era on the African continent. Africans were Africans; revenge was not in their nature. His delegation therefore asked those who desired the "balkanization" or "Israelization" of South Africa to reject any attempt to partition the country. Mr. Oliver Tambo and the Right Rev. R. Ambrose Reeves had expressed to the Committee their steadfast opposition to any such pseudo-solution, which was no more realistic in the present case than it had been as a means of ending the war in Algeria.

43. The cancer gnawing South Africa was spreading to every side of international life. That was shown, from one point of view, by the South African Government's refusal to allow the International Commission of Jurists to send an observer to the trial of the South African patriots, which was to be resumed on 29 October; and, from the other point of view, by the International Olympic Committee's recent refusal to allow the South African Olympic Games Council to participate in the Tokyo Olympic Games unless the Pretoria Government abandoned its policy of apartheid by December 1963. The time had come to ponder the

words Alan Paton had written a few years previously in his book Cry, the Beloved Country.^{4/} "Cry, the beloved country, for the unborn child that is the inheritor of our fear." Now that child had grown up, and the terror that had once paralysed him had given way to a fierce determination to free himself for ever from racial discrimination and colonialism.

44. Mr. JABRI (Syria), speaking in exercise of his right of reply, recalled that at the 390th meeting the representative of Iraq, in a passing reference to Zionism and Nazism, had equated the two. That fleeting allusion, which had been made with due regard for the Committee's rules of procedure, had evoked feelings of guilt in the Israel representative, who had felt obliged to reply. His reply, in its turn, now prompted the Syrian delegation to set the record straight. As the Iraqi representative had pointed out, there was very little difference between Zionism, as practised against the Arab minorities in Israel, and apartheid as practised by the racist Government of South Africa; and therefore, little difference between Zionism and Nazism. In support of that statement, he quoted a passage from a book by Don Peretz entitled Israel and the Palestine Arabs,^{5/} describing the many restrictions imposed on the Arabs of Israel, who were living under martial law. In February 1956, Mr. Elias Kussa, an Israel lawyer, had sent the Secretary-General a telegram, quoted in the Jerusalem periodical Ner, asking the United Nations to intercede with the Israel Government to stop the oppression and humiliation of the Arabs.

45. The CHAIRMAN read out rule 111 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly and asked the Syrian representative to confine himself strictly to the exercise of his right of reply.

46. Mr. JABRI (Syria) read out the remainder of Mr. Kussa's telegram. He then quoted the report of Mr. Mordecai Stein, another Israel lawyer, on the wretched medical conditions prevailing in the Arab villages under Israel military administration, which had been published in Lebensfragen in December 1955. He went on to mention the opinion of Mr. Arnold J. Toynbee, a historian who could not be accused of bias and who had had the courage to expose Israel's treatment of the Arab minority and to equate the treatment of the Arab refugees with that of the Jews under Hitler. Lastly, evidence such as that published in the American Mercury of August 1957 and in an article in The New York Times of 22 October 1963, from which he read some extracts, showed that the representative of Iraq had been fully justified in equating racism, apartheid, Zionism and Nazism.

47. Mr. BARROMI (Israel), speaking in exercise of his right of reply, expressed keen regret that the appeal he had made the previous day had had no effect. The diversionary tactics used by the Arab States, which persisted in introducing an alien element into the debate, were not in keeping with a sincere desire to advance the Committee's consideration of the question of apartheid. He would not have been speaking now if the word "Nazism" had not been used once again in connexion with Israel—a somewhat unexpected insult coming from the representatives of countries some of which had actively collaborated with Hitlerite Germany. Moreover such an insult was an outrage to the memory of millions of victims of

^{4/} New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948.

^{5/} Washington, The Middle East Institute, 1958.

Nazism and to those who had fought and died in the struggle against Hitlerism.

48. It was unfortunate that the Chairman's appeal had not been heeded; he hoped that there would be no recurrence of such incidents. He had noted the new word, "Israelization", used by the representative

of Algeria. If it meant the progress of democratic ideas and political stability in contrast to dictatorship, totalitarianism and military rule, it was to be hoped that "Israelization" would spread to a great many countries, including Israel's neighbours.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.