



Chairman: Mr. Cornelius C. CREMIN (Ireland).

*Tribute to the memory of H. E. Mr. Wasfi Al-Tal,
Prime Minister of Jordan*

1. The CHAIRMAN extended the Committee's condolences to the Jordanian delegation on the assassination of Mr. Wasfi Al-Tal, the Prime Minister of Jordan.

2. Mr. AZZOUNI (Jordan) thanked the Chairman for the condolences he had expressed on the assassination of the Prime Minister of Jordan who had devoted his time and himself to the common cause of the Arab countries and the prosperity of his own country.

AGENDA ITEMS 38 AND 12

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (*continued*) (A/8366, A/8383 and Add.1, A/8403, A/8413, A/8432, A/8476, A/8526, A/SPC/147, A/SPC/148, A/SPC/L.225, A/SPC/L.226, A/SPC/L.227, A/SPC/L.228/Rev.1, A/SPC/L.229):

- (a) Report of the Commissioner-General (A/8413);
- (b) Report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (A/8476);
- (c) Report of the Secretary-General (A/8366);
- (d) Report of the Economic and Social Council (chapter XVIII (section D)) (A/8403)

3. The CHAIRMAN announced that the general debate on the item under consideration would probably be closed two days later, on Wednesday, 1 December. There was even reason to hope that the voting on the draft resolutions submitted to the Committee could be concluded the same day.

4. Mr. MIKUCKI (Poland) said that the problem of the Palestine refugees with which the United Nations had been concerned for 23 years was, in the first place, a problem of international peace and security since there could be no lasting peace in the Middle East unless the rights of the Arab people of Palestine were restored. Secondly, it was a problem of human rights since the fundamental rights of the refugees in Palestine had been violated; they had been deprived of their property and forced to leave their homes. Thirdly, it was the problem of the defiant attitude adopted by Israel towards the decisions taken on that question by the United Nations, particularly in view of the fact that Israel owed its existence to the Organization. Fourthly, it was a humanitarian problem and, in that connexion, Poland would continue to assist the refugees through bilateral arrangements.

5. The report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine in the Near East (A/8413), which dealt mainly with the humanitarian problem, should therefore be considered in connexion with the other aspects of the question. His delegation thought that the extent of the humanitarian activities and the devotion of the staff of UNRWA deserved high appreciation. It paid tribute to the former Commissioner-General, Mr. Laurence Michelmore, and welcomed the appointment of the new Commissioner-General, Sir John Rennie. As far as the tragedy of the Palestinian people was concerned, however, it thought that UNRWA could make no decisive contribution to the solution advocated in paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), adopted by the General Assembly on 19 December 1948. That resolution, like many others based on the same principles, had not been implemented.

6. The Israeli aggression of 1967 had aggravated and complicated the problem. Also resolution 2672 D (XXV), adopted by the General Assembly on 8 December 1970, which called upon the Government of Israel to take steps immediately for the return of the displaced persons, had not been implemented.

7. The problem of the Palestine refugees was fundamentally of a political nature. It was the result of a policy based on war, the acquisition of territories by force and disregard for resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council. The aggravation of the problem was due to persistence in applying the same policy. The current process of changing the structure of the population of the occupied territories by expelling the Arab population, destroying the houses and property of the Arabs and confiscating their land, was typical of all occupiers striving for *Lebensraum*. Moreover, neither the staff nor the property of UNRWA had been spared. In that connexion, paragraphs 21 and 22 of the main report of the Commissioner-General (A/8413) and the facts set out in his special reports (see A/8383 and Add.1) were of particular importance.

8. The policy of terror and brutality under which the Arabs of Palestine suffered was identical to that pursued by all occupiers and it would inevitably meet with the same fate since it gave rise to increasing resentment, resistance and determination to fight the occupiers. The struggle waged by the Arab people of Palestine would receive support from all progressive peoples throughout the world.

9. In the view of his delegation, a political solution would require the liquidation of Israeli aggression and the implementation of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. For that reason, his delegation would fully support all measures designed to promote the implementation of those resolutions.

At the Chairman's invitation, Mr. Saadat Hassan (Palestine Liberation Organization) took a place at the Committee table.

10. Mr. HASSAN¹ welcomed the fact that the representatives of the People's Republic of China were now present in the General Assembly. The Palestinian people and the Palestine Liberation Organization expressed their gratitude to the Chinese people and Government for the unhesitating support which they had given them. Only the Palestine Liberation Organization was empowered to speak for the Palestinian people. The latter had given their mandate to the Organization which was struggling for their emancipation and liberation.

11. The question of Palestine was extremely complex and could not be arbitrarily simplified. One half of the Palestinian people were currently living in exile and the other half knew the tragedy of military occupation. That situation had resulted from the establishment of foreign settlers in Palestine and the forcible eviction of the Palestinian people.

12. Twenty-four years earlier, the United Nations had agreed to become a tool in the hands of the major Powers, particularly the United States of America, when it had recommended the partition of Palestine, contrary to the principle of self-determination embodied in the Charter. The Middle East was still living in a state of tension which would persist until the abnormal situation had been rectified. The United Nations had limited itself to taking measures to remedy the results of the original aggression instead of treating the causes.

13. The Palestine Liberation Organization was not asking for additional funds to meet the deficit in UNRWA's budget. That aspect of the problem must remain the responsibility of the United Nations. The United Kingdom had helped to create the problem with the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917, which was designed to preserve British hegemony in the Palestine area. When the United Kingdom had been weakened by the Second World War, the Zionist settlers had turned to the United States of America, the new imperialist Power, which had assumed the role of protector of the Zionist movement and had forced the United Nations to adopt the contradictory position in which it now found itself. Nazi Germany, by its policy of racism and mass murder, had given the Zionist movement the impetus it had needed. The Western countries, as a whole, were responsible for the tragedy of Palestine. It was the Western countries, too, which, by making a mockery of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, had helped to make the Organization ineffective.

14. The Palestinian people had the same international rights and obligations as other peoples. The Charter of the United Nations recognized the principle of self-determination for all peoples and made no exception for the Palestinian people. Similarly, the draft International Covenants on Human Rights (see General Assembly resolution

2200 (XXI)) were universal in character. It was no longer merely a question of giving the refugees food and shelter. Their situation was not the result of a natural disaster but of a preconceived policy of aggression. The Palestinian people could only welcome the fact that the peoples of Africa and Asia had managed to free themselves from colonialism and foreign domination. But, on the other hand, they, like the people of Rhodesia and South Africa, remained under the yoke of a racist State and must continue their struggle for national independence. In the case of Palestine, the situation was complicated by the fact that entire populations of settlers were occupying the lands of the Palestinians and systematically exploiting their national resources. In order to survive, the régimes in Israel, Rhodesia and South Africa applied policies of continual repression of the indigenous population.

15. The struggle for the liberation of Palestine would be a long and arduous one. From 1949 to 1968 less than 13 per cent of the representatives in the Knesset had been of Palestinian origin. The Zionist settlers who had invaded Palestine believed that antisemitism was a permanent phenomenon and that in order to escape it they must resist any integration or assimilation. As a result of immigration, the Zionist movement had in 1947 managed to create a situation similar to that currently prevailing in Rhodesia, where an alien minority dominated an indigenous majority. But even that was insufficient for the Zionists. They then set as their goal the establishment of an exclusively Jewish State. Although 400,000 Jewish settlers had already entered Palestine, the Zionist leaders, with the support of the United States Government, had begun to implement a programme of terror and violence, forcing the Palestinians to emigrate to neighbouring Arab States. The Palestinians had resisted every step of that process of colonization. By 1939, at the culmination of the first period of their national liberation movement, the Palestinians had already suffered more than 20,000 dead and wounded. The United Kingdom had armed the Zionist settlers and encouraged the formation of Zionist paramilitary organizations, while at the same time disarming the Palestinian population. It had required no less than 100,000 British soldiers to quell the Palestinian insurrection. Again, in 1947 and 1948, the Palestinians had had to resort to arms, but thanks to better organization and international support, the Zionist movement had been able to achieve its goals.

16. Then the second period of the Palestinian liberation movement had begun. A new type of Palestinian had appeared, the Palestinian freedom fighter, who thought that the only way to regain his rights and liberate his homeland was to wage a prolonged armed struggle.

17. The Palestine question and the Middle East crisis were essentially different. The Palestine question was the primary problem, while the Middle East crisis was only its corollary. The Middle East crisis was a direct result of Israel's aggressive war against the neighbouring Arab States in 1967 but was only one link in the chain of aggression that had begun with the Zionist colonization of Palestine. As a consequence of the aggression of 1967 the Zionist movement had completed the colonization of Palestine and had started to colonize the Arab States. The occupation of Palestine and the seizure of the territory of Arab States were both acts contrary to the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force.

¹ Mr. Hassan took the floor in accordance with the decision taken by the Committee at its 786th meeting to authorize members of the Palestine Liberation Organization to address the Committee without such authorization implying recognition of that organization.

18. Numerous attempts had been made to reach a settlement of the Middle East crisis, but it was unlikely that those plans would succeed because of the determination of Israel to keep the lands it occupied. Because of the very nature of the Israeli State and its relationship with the United States of America, neither the plan of the Secretary of State of the United States of America, Mr. William P. Rogers, nor resolution 242 (1967) of the Security Council would succeed. Israel was an aggressive, expansionist, chauvinist and racist State; it was a military base for the colonial Powers, to be used as a whip whenever the Arab masses sought to free themselves from foreign domination and Arab reactionary régimes. Israel was the sub-contractor in the Middle East of the world-wide imperialist designs of the Government of the United States of America. While the United States contributed to UNRWA for tents, it supplied Israel with the most sophisticated weaponry to destroy the tent-dwellers. The motive behind the Rogers plan was clearly not peace and justice but a wish to enable Israel to consolidate its hold on the occupied territories, to continue to eradicate the Arab character of Palestine and to provide Israel with shelter from Arab retaliation. Moreover, the plan had led to the attempted liquidation of the Palestine resistance movement by the special forces of the Hashemite régime. The struggle of the Palestinian movement would continue even without the collaboration of certain Arab régimes.

19. The Palestinian revolution gave hope to those Arab masses suffering under reactionary Arab régimes and that was to be welcomed, for the movement was an organic part of the Arab revolution. It was also an integral part of the world-wide struggle for national liberation. The movement was supported by those countries and peoples who knew foreign occupation and who had regained their independence. As long as one of them was still struggling against imperialist forces, all the others were threatened. Finally, the Palestinian movement had the support of the socialist camp and all progressive and peace-loving peoples in the world.

20. Prompted by the suffering of the Palestinian people, the murder of 10,000 Palestinians in Jordan during the past year and the cries for freedom emanating from the more than 20,000 Palestinian prisoners in the gaols of Tel Aviv and Amman, the Palestine Liberation Organization replied to those who told it to be realistic that their realism was another name for cynicism, the aim being to impose a foreign will on the peoples of the Middle East with no concern for their material or social well-being. Any solution not based on the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people and the full restoration of their inalienable rights must be rejected. The Palestine liberation movement rejected the concept of a truncated Palestinian State in a part of Palestine. A Palestinian State could not be set up in an area which was not Palestine.

21. The Palestinian revolution suffered setbacks and failures, but despite the conspiracy of silence in the Western countries, it was sufficient to read the Israeli press to realize that its freedom fighters were very active.

22. The Israelis were developing a plan for the de-Arabization and annexation of Gaza. More than 15,000 people had been displaced in mid-July after the systematic destruction

of shelters. Again, the Israeli authorities, on the pretext of security, had begun in Gaza the arrest and banishment of several hundred women and children. Nor was the nature of the occupation essentially different on the West Bank. Virtually every Palestinian teacher, lawyer and intellectual was under house arrest and unable to communicate with his people. But seldom a day passed without an act of resistance on the West Bank or in Gaza. Israeli methods only strengthened the will to resist. The threat which Israel represented for Palestine and the Arab masses was not solely military but a very real threat aiming at economic, political, social and cultural domination of the Middle East, all based on the chauvinism and expansionism which were an integral part of the Zionist philosophy. There could be no compromise with aggression and injustice. The Palestine liberation movement would continue its struggle to promote a just and lasting peace and to establish a popular democratic State, thus putting an end to the perpetual state of tension in the area and to the military base of Israel and restoring to the Jew his dignity and freeing him from the abnormality of Zionism.

23. Mr. TARCICI (Yemen), speaking on a point of order, said that Mr. Hassan's statement should be reproduced *in extenso* because of the public interest in the fate of the Palestinian people.

24. The CHAIRMAN said that, if there was no objection, he would take it that the Committee had decided, as authorized by the General Assembly, to publish the full text of the statement by Mr. Hassan as a verbatim record.

*It was so agreed.*²

25. Mr. GHAUS (Afghanistan) drew attention to paragraph 4 of the introduction to the report (A/8413) of the Commissioner-General which recalled that, more than 20 years before, the General Assembly had devised a framework for the just solution of the refugee problem and which clearly reflected the causes of the United Nations failure to achieve that aim. In spite of the fact that the General Assembly, at its twenty-fifth session (resolution 2672 D (XXV)), had called again on the Government of Israel immediately to allow those who had fled from their homes and camps to go back to their original dwellings, no change in the situation had occurred with regard to their return.

26. Since the unjust partition of Palestine, which had created the refugee problem, the humanitarian aspect of that essentially political issue had acquired such magnitude that it overshadowed the root-cause of the tragedy, and attention had come to be concentrated during the past few years on the financial aspects of the problem. Given the growing ranks of the refugees coupled with the chronic financial difficulties of UNRWA, efforts had had to be made to find additional financial resources to avoid major reductions in its activities. But the humanitarian concern should never make the United Nations lose sight of what brought the refugee problem into being. It could be asked why the entire international community should continue to shoulder a burden that it had not helped to create and why

² The full text of the statement was subsequently circulated as document A/SPC/PV.789.

UNRWA, which had been meant to be a temporary organization, should tend to become permanent. The attitude of those who were inclined to accept the non-implementation of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) as a fact of life and the refugee problem as a permanent feature of the Middle Eastern scene was dangerous and tantamount to condoning the fruits of aggression, which the United Nations had denounced time and time again. UNRWA had not been set up to perpetuate the state of affairs in the Middle East or to subsidize the aggressive policies of those who arrogantly defied the principles of the United Nations.

27. In spite of the efforts of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA and its Chairman and the generous response of Governments, which had to some extent averted the financial crisis during the current year, a deficit of almost \$6 million was foreseen for the coming year. His delegation hoped that those who were in a position to do so would increase their contributions in cash and kind in order to prevent some drastic reductions in UNRWA's expenditures which would affect primarily the vital field of education. It could reasonably be assumed, owing to the growing number of refugees, the rise in prices and the inflationary trends in the world that, no matter how eloquent the appeals or how generous the response, the total contributions would never offset the chronic deficit in UNRWA's budget.

28. There was yet another factor which might influence more adversely the level of contributions to UNRWA: it would become more difficult for the peoples of the world to understand why the United Nations did not manage to enforce its decisions with regard to the refugees, and why their Governments were constantly asked to contribute to UNRWA when a fraction of the income from the properties left behind by the refugees would suffice to alleviate the hardships of their involuntary exile. Their disenchantment would be brought about by the apathy with which Members of the United Nations had approached and continued to approach the just solution of the problem. After all, for more than 20 years Members had been trying to implement a resolution that was by no means unclear or equivocal. Without denying the financial facts, his delegation was convinced that the key to the problem was essentially political.

29. Each year new occurrences hampered the proper functioning of the Agency, resulting in further deterioration of the lot of the refugees and heightened tensions in the area. In 1971, according to the special reports of the Commissioner-General (see A/8383 and Add.1), the occupying authorities had demolished, following a well-established pattern, many rooms built by the Agency or privately built in Gaza, causing the displacement of about 2,000 families, comprising some 15,000 displaced persons: 350 families had gone to El Arish in Sinai and about 30 to the West Bank and the rest had found refuge in other dwellings in the Gaza Strip. On that point the Commissioner-General had stated in paragraph 13 of his special report (see A/8383) that it was evident that for many their current living conditions must be worse than before and that the health hazard must be greater. Once again the Israeli authorities invoked the exigencies of security for resorting to such measures of repression which were in

reality aimed at thinning out the population of Gaza and changing its Arab character. Similar measures had been undertaken by Israel in Jerusalem and elsewhere in occupied Arab territories. He recalled that the occupying Power in war was responsible for the welfare and safeguarding of human rights of the peoples of the occupied territories. It was the responsibility of Israel to keep its so-called security measures within the limits allowed by the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. The least that Israel could do was to extend its co-operation to UNRWA in the discharge of its duties instead of resorting to actions which obviously added to its difficulties.

30. A movement towards the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) should be urgently initiated; it had become evident that, unless the right of the Arab people of Palestine to its homeland was fully restored, the refugee problem could not be solved. Any other solution would be in the nature of a palliative. As long as the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian refugees were not satisfied in accordance with the principles of justice and equity, the situation in the Middle East would remain charged with tension and the chances of a lasting peace dim and elusive.

31. His delegation wished to express its gratitude to Mr. Michelmores, the former Commissioner-General, without whom the situation of the refugees would be even worse than it was.

32. Mr. MAHJoubi (Morocco) conveyed his delegation's condolences to the Jordanian delegation on the assassination of the Jordanian Prime Minister, for which he blamed all those who, because of irresponsibility or indifference, had been unwilling to bring a final solution to the problem of the Middle East.

33. After thanking Sir John Rennie, the new Commissioner-General of UNRWA, and his staff for the dedication and courage they had shown in carrying out their work, he made a number of comments of a historical or topical nature regarding the creation of the State of Israel, as his delegation regarded the last statement by the Israeli representative as a fabrication of untruths and distortions of history.

34. According to the preface to one edition of *The Jewish State*, by Theodor Herzl, Herzl had been neither the first nor the only one to conceive of a Jewish nation. That preface indicated that, while Herzl had envisaged the establishment of a Jewish State, his idea was that that State should be able to deal as an equal with the great European nations and eventually even to compete with them. The author of the preface had referred to a number of works that had appeared before Herzl's book, including the books by Moses Hess, entitled *Rome and Jerusalem*, published in 1862, and *Plans for the Colonization of the Holy Land*, published in 1867.

35. Readers of those works were struck by two ideas. The first was that it was the ambition of the Zionists to create, in a colonialist spirit which antedated that of the European countries by 30 years, a State that would be the equal and the rival of the great European Powers. The second

concerned the validity of the arguments advanced to justify the creation of the State of Israel, which were based on the persecutions to which Jews were subjected. Actually, perusal of the books published in the 1860s showed that Zionist ideas had existed before the persecutions.

36. In the aforementioned book, which had first been published in 1896, Theodor Herzl had outlined a strategy for the creation of a Jewish State. He had indicated what the objectives of that strategy should be and the stages and means by which they should be attained, such as the organization of a Jewish company to liquidate the property of Jews in the countries in which they were living and arrange for their establishment in the new State. He had said that the protests of the persecuted Jews should be amplified in order to alert international opinion and induce it to accept his plan. Evidence of that could be seen in the passage in which he had written: "We shall all play the same tune with countless violins, flutes, harps, violas and double basses, electric lights, decorations, choirs, and magnificent ornaments, and we shall sing with the first singers." All the harassments suffered by the Jews started up a sinister threnody by Zionist elements recruited in London, Paris, New York, Washington and Amsterdam.

37. A review of the programmes of action drawn up at the various Zionist congresses warranted the suspicion that the considerations cited to justify the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine had been deliberately exaggerated and that there had been abuse of the humanitarian sentiments of the international community, shocked as it was by Hitlerism. The plan of action put forward by the first World Zionist Congress at Basle in 1897 advocated, first, that a certain number of Jews should be encouraged to settle in Palestine; secondly, that the Jews of the entire world should be organized by means of associations; thirdly, that Jewish national consciousness should be strengthened by intensive propaganda disseminated through information media which it would be useful to acquire; and, fourthly, that the consent and support of countries in which associations intended to establish ties among Jews would be created, should be obtained.

38. The succeeding congresses had laid the groundwork for the whole Zionist structure, which was based on two postulates: Jews were to be forbidden to accept the nationality of the States in which they were residing and to be kept everywhere in a status of temporary residence, and Jewish suffering was to be promoted. It was therefore reasonable to ask whether the persecutions were the cause or the result of Zionism.

39. The Second World War and the horrors of Hitlerism, of which both Jews and non-Jews had been the victims, had enabled the Zionists to carry out their plan with the complicity of nations that were eager to ease their conscience. In the first stage, Jewish immigrants had been authorized to settle in Palestinian territory, where they made every effort to acquire the best land and strategic positions. In allowing that emigration, the United Kingdom had prepared the way for the great tragedy of the Palestinian people. In the second stage, after military preparation carried out with the help of the administering Power, the Palestinian Arabs had been gradually expelled by force. Herzl had foreseen that stage when he had written

that the Jews, if they wished to rid the country (Palestine) of its ferocious animals, would naturally not use spears and arrows but organize a joyful collective hunting party; in that way they would hunt the animals and throw powerful bombs among them.

40. He recalled the atrocities which the Jews had committed in Palestine, such as the Deir Yassin massacre in 1948, in which 250 Arabs had been killed, the massacre committed on the night of 29 October 1956, the destruction of two thirds of a town of 16,500 inhabitants and, in 1967, the shelling of the Arab quarters between the Gates of St. Stephen and Damascus solely on the pretext, according to a Jewish writer, that until such time as Jerusalem had become wholly Jewish, it could be put to fire and sword. As Chaim Weizmann had declared, the world would judge the Jewish State by its treatment of the Arabs.

41. In view of the context in which the tragedy of the Palestinian people must be placed, his delegation did not believe that the problem of that people could be settled by silence or indifference. The distribution of relief to 1.5 million refugees could only be a stop-gap, until such time as the international community resorted to stronger methods. Israel should be told to respect the resolutions of the United Nations and the specialized agencies. The international community and the United Nations had a moral and political obligation to seek a just and lasting solution. The Committee was bogged down in endless debate on subsidiary matters. The refugees, for their part, had never lost hope. Even though whole branches of the Palestinian people had perished or been broken off, the tree itself would live, for it drew its strength from justice, courage and dignity.

42. Mr. KALACHINSKY (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that his delegation had taken note of the report of the Commissioner-General (A/8413) and the other documents dealing with the item. Those documents showed that the measures taken to bring about a settlement of the Middle East conflict had not effectively met even the minimum material and spiritual needs of the Palestinian population. In paragraph 4 of the Commissioner-General's report, for example, it was stated that "there was by the end of the year little to lessen the frustrations of the refugees". World public opinion could not remain indifferent to that situation, and the representatives of almost all the delegations that had taken part in the debate had expressed their concern regarding the lot of the Palestinians who were exiled and homeless. They had spoken of arbitrary acts and violence, of torture and terror, of want, hunger and all the suffering that the Palestinian refugees had to endure. In that context, the statement by the Israeli representative (788th meeting) struck a singular note. He had attempted to prove that the occupying authorities were concerned only with the well-being of the refugees, were building access roads to their camps, offered jobs to those who wished to work, and facilitated access to education so that, for example, among the textbooks sent from Cairo only seven works had been eliminated because they contained unacceptable, i.e., seditious, statements about Israel.

43. The Israeli representative's statement was in no way corroborated by the Commissioner-General's main report,

or his special report (see A/8383). That fact was eloquently confirmed by the supplementary report (see A/8383/Add.1) concerning the situation of the refugees in the Gaza area, which had been distributed to delegations in the preceding week. Those documents showed that the Israeli occupants had carried out reprisals in refugee camps, destroyed dwellings, made searches, and questioned and arrested thousands of inhabitants allegedly suspected of anti-Israel activities. As was stated in paragraph 21 of the Commissioner-General's main report (A/8413), "The Israeli authorities had also issued an order declaring all camps to be closed areas, entry into and exit out of which would be regulated". His delegation could testify that Hitler's occupying forces had proceeded in exactly the same way in the Byelorussian territories that they had invaded.

44. In his statement the Israeli representative had been pursuing obvious political aims. He had sought to prove the impossible, in other words to give the impression that the situation of the refugees was not bad and that there was no need for haste in seeking a solution to the Palestinian problem and the Middle East conflict.

45. Another important aspect of that problem must be borne in mind. The leading circles of Israel and the Zionist forces of other countries had recently launched a psychological offensive against the Arab States, seeking to cast the blame on them for the situation which had arisen in the Middle East, on which the fate of the Palestinians depended. In the United States of America, no fewer than 45 research centres were participating in that campaign, without counting other departments of universities and colleges. He cited as an example the Rand Corporation in the United States, which was working for the Pentagon. Over the past four years it had taken part in more than 30 important research projects dealing with the problem of the Middle East. A work by someone by the name of Draper, of the Hoover Institute at Stanford University, on Israel in world politics and the roots of the third Arab-Israeli war, showed the orientation of works of that kind. That so-called specialist, basing his arguments on the Zionist positions, carefully selected the facts in such a way as to show that the war between Israel and the Arab countries which had aggravated the situation of the refugees and caused their number to increase by several hundred thousand, had not been caused by the Israel militarist cliques. That book had been published in the United States of America,³ and its author had sought in every way to defend the reactionary circles in that country that had helped Israel to acquire its armaments and carry out its act of aggression.

46. But the manoeuvres of falsifiers of history such as Draper were doomed to failure. The whole world knew that it was Israel which, by its acts of aggression, had seized Arab territories and, flouting the Charter and United Nations decisions, refused to withdraw its troops from those territories, pursuing a policy of pillage, violence and savage terror against the Palestinian people and the other peoples of the region.

47. His delegation's position regarding the solution of the Palestinian refugee problem was clear and logical. It

favoured the application of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) and all the other United Nations resolutions on that problem, the withdrawal of all Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories and the return of the expelled inhabitants.

48. Until that goal was attained, the Byelorussian people, all the peoples of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries would continue to give assistance and fraternal support to the victims of Israeli aggression, and particularly the Palestinian people. One month previously a delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organization had gone to the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic. On that occasion, the representatives of Soviet public opinion had vigorously condemned Israel's imperialist aggression against the Arab peoples and had stressed their solidarity with the Arab people of Palestine in their courageous struggle against the Israeli occupants.

49. His delegation considered that the United Nations should take all necessary steps to ensure that Israel applied the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and withdrew its troops from the occupied Arab territories, so as to enable the Arab people of Palestine to enjoy their lawful rights.

50. Mr. EL AWAD (Sudan) expressed appreciation of the work done by the Commissioner-General and his predecessor and of the Working Group's efforts to minimize UNRWA's financial deficit. Although UNRWA was doing its best to relieve the suffering and hardships of 1.5 million Palestinians, the problem was not one of international charity. What the Palestinians wanted was their inalienable right to self-determination and independence, which had been recognized in General Assembly resolution 2672 C (XXV).

51. The non-aligned world considered that that was the true nature of the Palestinian problem. The Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Lusaka in 1970, at which more than half the world's population had been represented, had reiterated the views expressed by the General Assembly in its resolution 2535 (XXIV) and had adopted resolutions in which it had declared its full respect for the inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine in their usurped homeland, reaffirmed its support of their struggle for national liberation and against colonialism and racism, and declared that full respect for the inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine was a prerequisite for peace in the Middle East. At the preceding meeting, the representative of Israel had indicated clearly that, despite all United Nations resolutions and world public opinion, his country refused to change its position and to envisage a large-scale return of the refugees and the Arabs displaced in 1967. Israel denied the right of the refugees to return home by making a peaceful settlement between Israel and the Arab States a prerequisite for their return. The representative of the United States of America (782nd meeting) had taken the same position by stating that an over-all peace settlement must take into account the legitimate concerns of the Palestinians. The Sudanese delegation considered that such an approach was a deliberate misrepresentation of the problem which precluded any solution to the Palestinian refugee problem and the restoration of peace in the Middle East.

³ Theodore Draper, *Israel and World Politics* (New York, The Viking Press, 1968).

52. The Palestinian problem had been created by the Western imperialist Powers. The partition of Palestine had been decided upon at a time when the United Nations—as well as the majority of third world countries—had been under the domination of those Powers. That was why the voice of the Palestinian Arabs had not been heard and why certain great Powers supported Israel despite its contempt for United Nations resolutions. The Palestinian question was clearly a question of colonialism. The State of Israel had been created artificially and populated with foreign settlers, mainly Europeans. Thus Palestine, which for 3,000 years had never been under Jewish administration, had become a Jewish State. The arguments concerning the progress, security and economic development which the Israeli occupation had given the Palestinians were reminiscent of the outworn arguments in favour of Western colonialism in Africa and Asia, which were still being used by the Governments of Portugal and South Africa. In that connexion, he recalled that at the 1582nd meeting of the Security Council, on 27 September 1971, the representative of Israel had described the Arab States as “backward”.

53. The Sudan reiterated its support for the inalienable right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and independence, and would continue its efforts to relieve the sufferings of the Palestinian refugees by substantially increasing its contribution to UNRWA.

54. Mr. RAOUF (Iraq), replying to the representative of Israel, said it was true that Jews had been the victims of terrorist acts in Iraq in the 1940s, but those acts had been committed not by Iraqis but by Zionist agents and later by Israeli agents. That was easily proved on the basis of Zionist and Israeli sources.

55. The representative of Israel was certainly familiar with the book entitled *Haganah* by Munya M. Mardor.⁴ In chapter 10 the author had described how, as early as 1941, he had been given the task of convincing Jews residing in the Arab countries, Turkey and Iran to migrate to the future State of Israel. A route had been established from Iran to Iraq and hence by way of Transjordan or Syria and Lebanon to Palestine, with way-stations provided by Jewish families, sometimes in the form of import-export agencies, as had been the case in Damascus, Beirut and Baghdad. The “pioneer” movement (the Halutz) organized in Iraq by the Zionists during the Second World War and led by Mr. Ovaida Sehayek and his eight brothers and sisters had sought to encourage young Jews to emigrate to Israel. However, persuasion had not produced the desired mass emigration and the Zionists had then resorted to more effective methods and weapons. On 15 August 1948, at one of the first Israeli cabinet meetings, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion had stated that it was a duty to redeem the Jews in the Arab and European countries. An article in *Davar*, the official organ of the Mapai, the Prime Minister’s party, had advocated the formation of a group of intelligent and dedicated young Jews who would go to foreign countries, disguise themselves as non-Jews and organize anti-semitic campaigns with the theme “bloody Jew . . . go to Palestine”, which would certainly produce an effect on the Jewish population (Alfred Lilienthal, *The Other Side of the Coin*⁵).

56. In order to illustrate the methods used by the Zionists, he cited another Israeli source, an article by Shalom Cohen published in the weekly *Haolam Hazeh*, Tel-Aviv, 27 April 1966, entitled “This Can Happen Only in Israel”. The author expressed surprise that the history of the bombs which had exploded 15 years previously in the synagogues and other Jewish centres of Baghdad with a view to spurring emigration, which had previously remained secret, had caused no official or non-official reaction when it had been made public, although in other countries an effort would have been made to determine the responsibility for the affair.

57. Those documents, which were all of Jewish origin, proved without any possible doubt that the persecutions of Iraqi Jews were organized by Israeli agents. If Israel was really the refuge to which an allegedly mistreated Jewish population aspired, it was hard to see why it would have been necessary to bomb synagogues in order to make those Jews emigrate.

58. Mr. CAHANA (Israel), exercising the right of reply, reminded the representative of Iraq, who had referred to the Second World War, that at that time the Iraqi leaders had been collaborating with Nazi Germany to help the latter establish itself in the Middle East. That collaboration had begun as early as 1941, when Rashid El Keilani had taken power. In January of that year, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem had written a letter to Hitler saying that the Arabs supported the Nazis and the Axis. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs had replied on 8 April 1941 that the Nazis and the Arabs had a common enemy, namely, the Jews. At a time when millions of Jews were being massacred in Europe, the least which the persecuted Iraqi Jews could do was to organize themselves with the assistance of the Haganah and other Palestine defence groups. The Jews had often served as scapegoats when there were internal troubles in Iraq, an example being the recent public hangings. In those circumstances, flight to Israel was for them a gift of God. If Israel had not existed, they would have remained the captives of a brutal and barbaric régime.

59. He appreciated the interest which the representative of Morocco took in Zionist history and literature, but wished to point out that the United Nations was an organization of sovereign States and not a literary or historical society. Many of those States had been in conflict at one time or another. There was no point in engaging in academic discussions or levelling accusations concerning past events, especially when they were distorted; it would be better to face the future and seek solutions.

60. The list of speakers showed that some groups of delegations saw no point in taking part in a sterile debate which produced no constructive solution. The Committee was monopolized by Arab speakers and their well-known supporters, who had formed a coalition to attack one country. That tactic was not new, but in 1971 it had a specific purpose: in an editorial in *El Ahrām*, on 26 November 1971, Mr. Hasseinin-el-Heykal, considered as one of the interpreters of Egyptian policy, had stated that Egypt should persuade the United Nations to declare the struggle against Israel lawful.

61. All impartial delegations should judge the statements they heard by one simple criterion: did the speaker overtly

⁴ New York, The New American Library, 1964.

⁵ New York, The Devin-Adair Company, 1965.

or tacitly advocate a single solution to the refugee problem which would, in fact, reanimate Israeli-Arab hostilities? The Arabs could talk for hours and brainwash the members of the Committee, but it was necessary to compare one point of view—which in the interests of simplicity could be called the Arab view, although the Arab camp was not unanimous—with another point of view, that of Israel.

62. The Byelorussian representative had questioned the sincerity of Israel's concern for the refugees' welfare; he assured that representative that, despite the conflict with the Arabs, Israel considered the refugees—and all the Arabs—as its future neighbours and did not imagine the Middle East without the Arabs. If Israel was still obliged to defend itself from time to time, it did so reluctantly because it knew that, sooner or later, they would have to live side by side. It considered the refugees not as abstract figures or as statistics but as human beings and it was in its own interest to live in peace with them, if they would only accept Israel. In fact, Israel was torn between its temporary interest—its security—and its long-term future, which was to live in peace with its neighbours.

63. Mr. RAOUF (Iraq), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, asked what could be a more perverse logic than to blow up the Baghdad synagogue to prevent the Jews from remaining captive in a country allegedly given over to brutality.

64. On the subject of the status of Jews in Iraq, in addition to the Jewish sources which he had already quoted, he cited an article published in *The Jerusalem Post* on 21 July 1964 by a former Iraqi Jew. The article had mentioned an Israeli agent working secretly in Iraq to organize the emigration to Israel of some 120,000 Iraqi Jews, many of whom were to abandon “comfortable homes, prosperous business and secure jobs”. Those terms surely did not describe people who were hostages and prisoners in a country given over to brutality.

65. In connexion with the accusations of collaboration with the Nazis, he drew attention to a book by an American Zionist who, between 1942 and 1948, had published in newspapers the slogan “Give a dollar to kill an Arab”. The book, which was called *Perfidy*⁶ and had been published in 1961, was an account of the 1956 Kastner-Gruenwald trial. Gruenwald had accused Kastner, a high-ranking Israeli official, of collaboration with Eichmann.

66. Lastly, he recalled that, by refusing for weeks to see an emissary proposing a barter deal, Chaim Weizmann, the future President of Israel, had failed to save a million Hungarian Jews from the Nazi crematoria.

67. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) felt obliged to reply to the representative of Israel, who claimed that the Arab countries were subjecting the Members of the United Nations to an actual “brainwashing”. Yet the representative of Israel, whose excellent pronunciation of Arab names seemed to indicate that he was a Sephardic Jew from the Middle East, must himself have been subjected to such treatment, since he was advocating a doctrine alien to that region, evolved and propagated by the Jews of central and

eastern Europe, using Judaism for political and economic ends. The Jews of central Europe, the Khazars, had not been converted until the eighth century of the current era and were not Semites, even if they had adopted a Semitic religion, just as the Moslems of Black Africa were of Semitic religion but not Semitic race. Indeed, the Zionist ideology was the product of specifically European conditions: the persecutions to which Jews had been subjected in Europe since the Middle Ages, which had ceased only with the French Revolution. In the Middle East, on the other hand, no distinction had been made between Christians, Moslems and Jews, who had all spoken Arabic and had had an Arab culture. It was well known that several Arab scholars of repute had been Jews. In Iraq and elsewhere, Jews had played a leading role in the economic life of the Arab countries, where they had enjoyed the respect of the community. In Europe, it was not until the nineteenth century that Jews such as Disraeli, Sassoon and the Rothchilds had achieved a position of prominence and that the Jewish populations had been integrated into their adopted countries. It was then that Herzl had had a vision of their future, which he had certainly not envisaged as such a nightmare for the peoples of the Middle East. The Zionists had wanted to make a religion a nationality and had set out to look for a country: they had first thought of Uganda and had then decided on Palestine. Through the intermediary of the Kaiser, they had tried to have that idea accepted by the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, who had been reigning over that territory, but the Sultan had declined to favour one group of his subjects over another.

68. It was then that the Zionists had turned to the United Kingdom Government. That Government had been afraid of a German expansion in the region: it had been trying to protect the routes of the British Empire and had seen in the creation of a Jewish State a pretext for intervening in the Near East whenever it saw fit. Balfour had therefore given the Zionists his support: he had also thought that American Jewish capital would be invested in the construction of a very useful railway line and, in 1917, had foreseen the possibility of using the Zionist movement to involve the United States of America, which had until then been isolationist, in the war.

69. History proved that Zionism was a political movement which was foreign to Palestine: even the language used in Israel was a mixture evolved by the Ashkenazim, or the European Jews, and not the language spoken in Palestine in the time of Christ, or earlier. The passionate argument “It is God who gave us this land” reduced the Divinity to the role of a real-estate agent and flouted the rights of the Palestinians. That imported ideology was a foreign body destined to be rejected by the organism, in which it was causing an infection, which in turn provoked a feverish reaction. He himself had tried unsuccessfully, before 1944, to make the Zionist organizations understand that such a reaction was inevitable; however, there again, he had come up against the results of “brainwashing”. It was quite obvious that the refugee problem could not be resolved by humanitarian aid, just as it was impossible to cure a disease of internal origin by external treatment. The Palestinians had resolved to fight to the bitter end for the respect of their rights, and the Arab countries had no other choice but to support them in their struggle. The representative of Israel had thought it possible to speak of a future: there

⁶ Ben Hecht, *Perfidy* (New York, Messner, 1961).

would be no future in Palestine, either for the Jews or for the Arabs, so long as a flag foreign to that region, symbolizing outmoded colonialist doctrines, flew over that country.

70. Palestine had become a chess-board, on which the United States of America and the Soviet Union were playing a political game; the United Kingdom, for its part, had withdrawn from the game after shifting to the United Nations its responsibilities in the matter. At the time of the creation of the State of Israel, the President of the United States of America had told State Department officials who had protested against the partition of Palestine that an insignificant number of his electors were Arabs. Again recently, while the refugees were doomed to live on 5 and 6 cents a day, 81 members of Congress were asking for funds to provide arms to Israel in order to maintain a balance of power in the Middle East. He wondered how the United States of America would react if Mexico were to assert its rights to Florida and the Soviet Union were to claim Alaska.

71. A religion was not a nationality. The Zionists, who demanded from Jews a double loyalty—to Israel and to their country of origin—were themselves creating a worldwide Jewish problem, and were aggravating tension in the Middle East by making emigration a duty and bringing to Israel people for whom there was no room.

72. Mr. MAHJoubi (Morocco), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that he had wished to place the statement made by the Israeli representative at the preceding meeting in its historical context and to show that the Israeli propaganda did not date from the 1930s but propagated colonial concepts dating from the nineteenth century. He did not understand why the Israeli representative criticized him for making a statement based on historical facts, accusing it of being academic: that proved at least that it was not spiked with acrimony and hatred, as was the statement by the representative of Israel. That representative was trying to circumscribe history to the period from 1930 to 1940: according to that theory, most of the countries of Asia and Africa would probably still be under the colonial yoke.

73. Mr. OSMAN (Egypt), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, recalled that on 2 December 1971 the General Assembly in plenary meeting would start to consider the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East" (agenda item 21). He would state his Government's views on that occasion and would therefore refrain, for the time being, from any comment on the article quoted by the representative of Israel.

74. Mr. CAHANA (Israel) said that he would not ask for the statement by the representative of Saudi Arabia to be reproduced *in extenso*, because it would be more suitable for a very long-playing record.

75. The CHAIRMAN announced that three draft resolutions on the item under discussion had been submitted and would be circulated the following day.

Question of procedure

76. Mr. BANGO BANGO (Zaire) said that he had been absent when the General Assembly that morning, at its 1997th plenary meeting, had adopted the draft resolutions concerning *apartheid* recommended to it by the Committee. If his delegation had been present, it would have voted in favour of all those draft resolutions, while expressing reservations on the sixth and eighth preambular paragraphs of the draft resolution on the establishment of Bantustans. It would be grateful if the Chairman could request the competent authorities to record its vote as just indicated.

77. Mr. TARCICI (Yemen) said that his delegation was in the same position and associated himself with the request made by the delegation of Zaire.

78. The CHAIRMAN said that he did not think such a procedure was possible but that he would arrange for it to be recorded that, if the delegations of Zaire and Yemen had been present, they would have voted in favour of all the draft resolutions concerning *apartheid*.

The meeting rose at 6.45 p.m.