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Chairman: Mr. Mihail HASEGANU (Romania).

AGENDA ITEM 30

The policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa: reports of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa and replies by Member States under General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII) (A/5497 and Add.1, A/SPC/80, A/SPC/81, A/SPC/82, A/SPC/83, A/SPC/L.95) (continued)

1. Mr. ASIROGLU (Turkey) noted that according to the report of the Special Political Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (A/5497 and Add.1) the situation in the Republic of South Africa had worsened considerably and the South African Government, far from heeding the appeals of the international community, was adopting increasingly harsh measures for the elimination of all opposition to its policy of apartheid. Such a policy was absolutely incompatible with the principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The position of his Government on that subject was well known: it was opposed to racial discrimination and rejected prejudice based on a man's colour. It considered that the Government of the Republic of South Africa as a signatory to the United Nations Charter was in duty bound to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms. His Government had no diplomatic or consular representatives in South Africa and did not maintain trade relations with that country. In conformity with the Security Council's resolution of 7 August 1963<sup>1/</sup> it had informed the Secretary-General, in a note dated 21 October 1963<sup>2/</sup> that no arms or ammunition were being shipped from Turkey to the Republic of South Africa. Further, his delegation had voted both in the Special Political Committee and in the plenary Assembly for resolution 1881 (XVIII), in which the international community had once more condemned the arbitrary policy pursued in South Africa.

<sup>1/</sup> Official Records of the Security Council, Eighteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1963, document S/5386.

<sup>2/</sup> *Ibid.*, Supplement for October, November and December 1963, document S/5438/Add.1.

2. The tireless efforts made for more than ten years to persuade the South African Government to change its policy and adopt an attitude which would be compatible not only with the principles of the Charter but also with the interests of the white population of South Africa had failed to have any effect on that Government's rigid attitude. Certain delegations explained apartheid by the fact that the Whites feared they would be exterminated should the indigenous inhabitants take over. Such distressing feelings gave rise to a lack of flexibility or understanding on the part of the Whites concerning those that they wrongly regarded as dangerous or threatening. Several speakers in fact tried to allay the fears of the South African Government. The Nigerian Minister for Foreign Affairs, for example, had told the General Assembly (1221st plenary meeting) that nothing was farther from the minds of the African leaders than to expel the white citizens from the Republic of South Africa and had cited the example of other African countries where Whites and indigenous inhabitants lived in perfect harmony and equality. At the 382nd meeting the representative of Ecuador had cited as an example the multiracial society of Latin America and had recalled the wise words of Mr. Albert Luthuli, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, who categorically rejected racism and favoured the establishment of a multiracial society based on the principles of human rights and fundamental freedoms. He had also referred to Mr. Kwame Nkrumah and the President of Tanganyika, who unreservedly condemned racism on the African continent. If all those declarations of intent were not sufficient to dispel the doubts of the white population of South Africa, it would seem that the safeguards suggested by the Danish representative (380th meeting) should do so. His delegation hoped that the ideas and suggestions put forward by the Danish delegation would serve to create a climate favourable to the solution of the problem.

3. Mr. INGLES (Philippines), recalling that the Special Committee had adopted its report unanimously, said that his country was a member of that Committee and supported without reservation the conclusions and recommendations in the report (A/5497, paras. 434-517), particularly the further measures proposed to the General Assembly and the Security Council. As the opposition of the Philippines to racism wherever it occurred, and in that particular instance to racism in the Republic of South Africa, was shared by practically all delegations, the South African Government was now morally isolated from the rest of the world. That had been demonstrated by the vote on General Assembly resolution 1881 (XVIII).

4. It was encouraging to note that so far the general debate had revealed almost unanimous endorsement of the Special Committee's recommendations in general; the few misgivings expressed by certain delegations concerned specific points rather than the report as a whole, and came from those delegations which rejected the very terms of resolution 1761 (XVII).

5. In the past fifteen years the United Nations had made many studies showing that the doctrines of racial superiority had no scientific basis, that racial prejudice was not only morally wrong but economically unprofitable and that racial discrimination corrupted those who were guilty of it as much as it degraded its victims. The United Nations had deplored and condemned the policy of the South African Government. Faced with that situation, the General Assembly had finally adopted resolution 1761 (XVII), which had been hailed as an important step forward because in it the General Assembly for the first time recommended Member States to take positive action to bring pressure to bear on the South African Government. It was heartening to note that during the first year that the resolution had been in effect the majority of Member States had taken steps to impose economic sanctions on South Africa, including the arms embargo called for by the Security Council in its resolution of 7 August 1963. Unfortunately nearly two-thirds of South Africa's trade was with countries which were still opposed to resolution 1761 (XVII). If some appeared to be absolutely convinced of the inefficacy of economic measures that might be recommended by the Assembly it was because the South African Government was relying on its major trading partners not to observe the provisions of that resolution. The question, therefore, was whether the Member States were going to allow self-imposed dilemmas and imaginary obstacles to stand in the way of a solution.

6. The Philippines had put an end to all imports from South Africa in May 1963. Previously it had imported primarily foodstuffs, to a value of about \$12 million in 1961 and \$7 million in 1962. The Philippines did not manufacture arms, ammunition or military vehicles but it had banned the export to South Africa of strategic materials of direct military value, a measure which the Security Council itself had not been prepared to recommend. His Government was currently seeking other markets for its exports of timber and it should be noted that whereas the value of Philippine exports of that product to South Africa had amounted to almost \$1 million in 1951, it totalled no more than \$200,000 for the current year. The Philippines had also refrained from establishing diplomatic relations with the South African Government, had closed its ports to all vessels flying the South African flag and had decided to refuse landing and transit facilities to aircraft belonging to the South African Government and companies registered under the laws of South Africa. At the same time the Philippine Government had anticipated the additional measures proposed by the Special Committee: it had decided to refuse to register or licence any corporation or partnership organized under the laws of South Africa for the purpose of conducting business in the Philippines, to refuse to issue any permit or licence for the sale in the Philippines of securities of corporations organized under the laws of the Republic of South Africa and to reject any application for a licence to act as broker, dealer or salesman of securities that might be filed by South African nationals.

7. There was no question that the boycott of South African goods might cause difficulties and even temporary economic dislocation in quite a few countries, and concerted action by the United Nations could help immeasurably in facilitating the necessary economic adjustments. If the small developing countries, whose economies were highly vulnerable to trade fluctuations, were willing to make the necessary sacrifices, South Africa's major trading partners, considering the ex-

tent of their economic resources, could surely afford to adopt the same attitude. Instead of being left for the African countries alone to settle with South Africa's major trading partners, the problem should be studied by a group of experts as proposed by the representative of Denmark. The group of experts could be attached in one way or another to the Special Committee.

8. The Philippine delegation considered irrelevant any discussion as to the binding nature of resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. The Organization would lose its very reason for existence if the principle were accepted that resolutions adopted by the two principal organs of the United Nations, each acting within its own sphere of competence, could be disregarded at will by any Member State. The Charter had to be regarded as a whole. While there was admittedly ample leeway for reconciling seemingly contradictory provisions of the Charter, no provision released Member States from the obligation assumed under Article 56 "to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization" particularly in order to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race. The obligation to observe the injunctions of resolution 1761 (XVII) rested equally on all Member States and not merely on the Republic of South Africa. The Philippine delegation therefore supported unreservedly the Special Committee's decision to request action by both the Security Council and the General Assembly. As the Special Committee had said, considering the extreme gravity of the situation and its serious international repercussions, the General Assembly and the Security Council must continue to keep the matter under active consideration so that it could take timely and effective measures providing for stronger political, diplomatic and economic sanctions against the Republic of South Africa (see A/5497, para. 517).

9. Stress should be laid on the special responsibility which rested with the Security Council as a result of its own finding—in the first operative paragraph of its resolution of 1 April 1960—that "the situation in the Union of South Africa is one that has led to international friction and if continued might endanger international peace and security".<sup>3/</sup> In its resolution of 7 August 1963, the Council went farther and expressed its conviction that the situation in South Africa was "seriously disturbing international peace and security". As was known, some members of the Council felt that the situation in South Africa had not, as at 7 August 1963, developed to the point where it could be considered a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression within the scope of Chapter VII of the Charter. In view of the rapidly deteriorating situation it was to be hoped that the Council would now recognize the existence of all the elements necessary for a finding that the situation in South Africa was indeed a threat to the peace. Was the Security Council going to wait until there was an actual breach of the peace and was it going to abdicate its clear duty under the Charter to act before that breach of the peace took place? Perhaps there was a subconscious attempt to establish a distinction between the violence now being practised by the minority against the majority in South Africa and the violence that would certainly erupt if the oppressed majority found itself—and that was how the situation was developing irresistibly—with its back to the wall.

<sup>3/</sup> *Ibid.*, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1960, document S/4300.

10. Even now some were cautioning the United Nations against effective action, whereas in South Africa peaceful opponents of apartheid were being bludgeoned into perpetual silence. They contended that the measures recommended would only harden the South African Government's attitude. That Government, however, had perfected its methods of repression to such a point that a more cruel attitude was difficult to imagine. Others were cautioning the United Nations against applying coercion to the South African Government, though that Government was using force to impose its will on the majority of the population. The United Nations was, admittedly, committed to the use of peaceful means, but there were means short of the use of armed force which were permitted by the Charter. They included the economic sanctions recommended by the General Assembly in its resolution 1761 (XVII); such measures did not lose their peaceful character simply because they went beyond moral pressure. The Philippine delegation did not think that the Assembly should be swayed from that course of action until it had been given a fair trial or until it was conclusively shown that economic pressure was ineffectual. The representative of Denmark had rightly said that the United Nations should not relax the pressure now being exerted on the Government of South Africa and should consider further ways of increasing that pressure, while reassuring the South African Government that the abolition of apartheid would not mean the doom of the white minority. Indeed, the General Assembly had already given such an assurance in resolution 616 B (VII), which declared that the goal of the United Nations was the establishment of a multiracial society in which harmony and respect for human rights and freedoms and the peaceful development of a unified community were best assured when patterns of legislation and practice were directed towards ensuring the equality of all persons before the law. The Philippine delegation thought it wise to recall that principle, since that would strengthen the resolve of the white elements in South Africa which were opposed to apartheid. Nor would it have any objection to the presence of the United Nations in South Africa to ensure an orderly transition if the Government of South Africa abolished apartheid. It could understand the concern for the fate of the white minority in South Africa, but it must be recalled that, at the present time, it was the oppressed majority in that country which was in need of United Nations protection.

11. The Philippine delegation also considered that a group of experts attached in some way or other to the Special Committee could study the possibility of installing a multiracial society or evolve some other acceptable alternative for the period following the abolition of apartheid. It shared the view of other delegations, however, that such steps could only be supplementary to the main task, which was how to increase the pressure now being exerted on the South African Government through the universal application and further strengthening of the measures recommended in resolution 1761 (XVII). The group of experts suggested at the 380th meeting by the representative of Denmark could begin by considering the most effective means of applying the economic sanctions decreed by the General Assembly and the Security Council and of assisting and advising Member States which might have difficulty in imposing such sanctions. In that way a basis could be laid for concerted and effective action which would compel the South African Government to abandon apartheid if it desired to stay in power.

12. The South African Minister for Foreign Affairs had told the General at the 1236th plenary meeting that his country's policies were not motivated by fear. The South African Government believed firmly that it would not be abandoned by its big trading partners, and that conviction had bolstered its confidence. It was therefore incumbent upon the Member States concerned to show that such confidence was unfounded. The Chairman of the Special Committee had emphasized the special responsibility of the Western Powers, which accounted for the lion's share of the foreign trade of the Republic of South Africa. It should also be added that a particularly heavy responsibility rested with those Western Powers which had especially close relationships, not to say ties of kinship, with the white minority in South Africa. The Philippine delegation did not think that the withdrawal of South Africa from the British Commonwealth, or even its expulsion from the United Nations, could diminish in any way the influence which those Western Powers exercised over the South African Government. It therefore called upon the Western Powers concerned to intensify their efforts to induce that Government to abandon a policy which they themselves had condemned. No diplomatic action undertaken by the various Member States should be considered as an alternative to the joint economic action envisaged in resolution 1761 (XVII) or used as an excuse for delaying the collective implementation of that resolution.

13. The Philippine delegation would support any resolution which conformed closely to the recommendations of the Special Committee. It hoped that the General Assembly would adopt a text which recognized that the present situation in South Africa constituted a threat to peace and so paved the way for enforcement action by the Security Council. It was also to be hoped that the Special Committee would be able to continue its task and that its terms of reference would be expanded to allow it to examine ways and means of assisting or advising Member States encountering difficulties in applying the economic sanctions recommended by the General Assembly, and to draw up plans for concerted action that would enable such sanctions to be imposed with the maximum effectiveness. As suggested by the representative of Denmark, the Special Committee, with the assistance of experts—who might be seconded from the Secretariat or chosen from among the members of the Committee—could also be authorized to examine alternative solutions, on the understanding that the only acceptable ones were those which provided for the total abolition of apartheid.

14. Mr. RODRIGUEZ CAMUSSO (Uruguay) said that his Government was opposed to anything which might constitute the slightest concession to racial discrimination, as was confirmed by article VIII of the Uruguayan Constitution, which guaranteed equality for all before the law, without any distinction other than talent or merit.

15. A close examination of all that had been done in the United Nations about the policy of apartheid in South Africa led to certain conclusions. First, the South African Government had over and over again violated many provisions of the Charter and, furthermore, had made no secret of its intention to continue to do so. It was true that the basic provisions of the Charter, such as those concerning human rights, could be—and were—interpreted in various ways, according to the widely different political theories of the contemporary world. In the case of South Africa, however, there was a deliberate violation in order to de-

find the theory that men were divided into categories according to their colour. There was a violation of Article 1, paragraph 3, for example, since in stressing those hateful distinctions the South African Government rejected international co-operation. South Africa also disregarded Article 2, paragraph 2; according to Mr. E. H. Louw, its Minister for Foreign Affairs, either South Africa would have to abdicate or the Whites would have to stand together and fight for their survival as a white nation (A/5497, para. 74). It also disregarded Article 2, paragraph 5, since it refused to pay any attention to the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. Moreover, South Africa had responded to all appeals and generous offers of assistance in seeking a solution by insults and gross misstatements. With regard to Article 4, paragraph 1, it was certainly questionable whether South Africa had shown itself able and willing to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter. Other Articles could be quoted to the same effect.

16. South Africa was also acting in contravention of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; it was arming itself at an alarming rate and openly declared that it was doing so in order to defend "white supremacy". The South African Government responded to the increasingly strong moral pressure of the resolutions adopted each year by the United Nations by further discriminatory legislation and increased repression. As the Special Committee had noted in its report, the non-whites were being trained for a condition of slavery. What could be said for a Government which alleged that "good racial relations cannot exist where education is given under the control of people who create the wrong expectations on the part of the native himself" (A/5497, para. 286) or "there is no place for him [the Bantu] in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour?" (A/5497, para 290).

17. Since the course that had been followed so far had failed to achieve effective results, it would appear that the time had come to resort to more drastic methods, through the Security Council.

18. In order to act realistically and serve the noble aim of the United Nations, not only must it be understood that South Africa would not renounce its racial policy, but the reasons for that obstinacy, which was tantamount to suicide, must be specified. The Special Committee went to the heart of the matter when it noted that "because of racial discrimination, the white population of the Republic of South Africa has been able to enjoy one of the highest standards of living, while the non-whites are denied an equitable share of the national income" (A/5497, para. 325).

19. That had been confirmed by Bishop Reeves, who at the 387th meeting had noted that the African reserves "contained no known mineral resources, major commercial or industrial areas or ports". Colonialism, that implacable and destructive virus which had enslaved nations, exterminated peoples and overthrown continents, was today engaged in its last battle, and as its field of action diminished so the struggle became more ferocious. In essence, the South African policy was a survival of the state of mind which had given birth to colonialism. One element with a high degree of technical knowledge had raised its standard of living at the expense of the ruthless exploitation of the mass of the population, which had formerly been defenceless and unaware of its rights. If that historical fact was recognized and given its true weight, it would

be possible to evaluate the feasibility, which did not exist, of bringing apartheid to an end.

20. Over and over again, South Africa, recognizing it as its only defence, had taken refuge behind Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, alleging that its policy of apartheid was a matter of domestic jurisdiction. Uruguay was firmly in favour of the principle of non-intervention, which was the only defence of militarily weak countries. The history of South America was proof of that. In the case in point, however, the principle did not apply. In that connexion, he recalled that the Uruguayan delegation had signed the report submitted in 1953 by the United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa.<sup>4/</sup> Uruguay had also clearly defined its position on every occasion on which there had been a question of human rights.

21. It must not be forgotten that some delegations refused to display greater firmness towards South Africa. In other parts of the world, political differences had repercussions on trade relations with certain countries, a fact that Uruguay deplored. In the case of South Africa, however, the matter was more serious because human rights were at stake, and it was to be hoped that all Governments would be driven by their consciences to adopt a more positive attitude. The supreme object of all higher politics was the full flowering of mankind. Thus, there could be nothing more noble than the United Nations efforts to free more than 12 million human beings from the scourge of racism. Uruguay would continue to participate in those efforts to the full extent of its powers and with complete respect for the provisions of the Charter.

*At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Oliver Tambo, Deputy President of the African National Congress of South Africa, took a seat at the Committee table.*

22. Mr. TAMBO (Deputy President, African National Congress) of South Africa said that many persons who might have represented all the oppressed people of South Africa more appropriately than himself were at present in gaol. He quoted from letters describing the ill-treatment in prison of the Africans now on trial. The condition of those leaders was perhaps an indication of the fate of thousands of other prisoners to whom there was no access.

23. One of the issues which the General Assembly must decide was that the United Nations was to do about any further acts of violence by the South African Government. The people of South Africa were grateful for what had been done by the various groups represented in the United Nations, but despite the unprecedented unanimity of the world in condemning apartheid, there had been no change for the better. The Africans of South Africa had furnished the United Nations with facts indicating the nature of apartheid and also giving some hint of the ultimate results if that policy was allowed to continue. As early as 1958, the people of South Africa had become convinced that if nothing was done to bring pressure to bear upon the South African Government in addition to their own efforts, they would be compelled as a last resort to rebel against tyranny and oppression. At the first meeting to the All-African People's Conference at Accra in December 1958 a resolution submitted by the South African delegation, advocating an international boycott of South African goods, had been adopted and put into

<sup>4/</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighth Session, Supplement No. 16.

effect in a number of countries by various organizations. At the second Conference of Independent African States at Addis Ababa in 1960, again on the initiative of South Africa's political leaders, a resolution had been adopted asking for sanctions and for the isolation of South Africa from Africa and the rest of the world. It had subsequently been brought up for discussion at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly. In 1959, the African National Congress of South Africa had sent the Secretary-General of the United Nations a memorandum asking for sanctions against South Africa.

24. Such action had been taken because it was felt that the world and the United Nations had a definite role to play in South Africa. The Africans of South Africa knew that sanctions would involve them in suffering, but they also knew that apartheid would never be abandoned and racial discrimination would never cease to be the official policy of South Africa unless those sacrifices were made. It had also been realized that a boycott of South African goods would involve sacrifices for others outside South Africa, but it had been felt that they would be negligible in comparison with the ultimate sacrifice which the whole world would have to make if apartheid was allowed to continue in South Africa.

25. The African National Congress had proposed sanctions because it did not believe in or want violence. It had not called on the world to invade South Africa. It was convinced that if the Republic of South Africa was effectively isolated through economic, diplomatic and other measures, it would be impossible for the South African Government to operate the system of apartheid. It was impossible to separate racial discrimination in South Africa from the country's economic structure. The only way in which the economy could be attacked from outside was through sanctions. The only attack that could be made on apartheid from the inside was a last resort method. There would inevitably be great loss of life, but the economy would in the end be destroyed, and apartheid would be eliminated.

26. The fact that the main trading partners of South Africa were unwilling to support sanctions was no reason why they should not be applied. The African States and others such as India had already decided to have no economic or diplomatic relations with South Africa. That had produced some effect, although it had been undermined to some extent by other countries. But if General Assembly resolution (1761 (XVII)) were implemented even by those countries alone which supported it, the effect would be considerable.

27. In so far as racial discrimination in South Africa was supported by the country's Constitution, it was the fault of the South Africa Act, 1909, passed by the United Kingdom Government which had legalized racial discrimination. At present the United Kingdom was South Africa's principal trading partner and thus the greatest source of strength for apartheid. It would be gratifying to know that the United Kingdom was at least trying to extricate itself from its complicity in apartheid. Instead, British firms boasted that in 1962, of all the countries trading with the United Kingdom South Africa was the source of the greatest profits.

28. Another disturbing factor in regard to sanctions was that South Africa was encouraging immigration from countries with white populations. A particularly large number came from the United Kingdom, and

British firms were also moving to South Africa. At the same time, the South African Government was deporting "foreign natives" from South Africa. Africans who had lived there for many years were being uprooted and deported, and their place was being taken by white immigrants. Thus, the emigration to South Africa was of a racist character and served the interests of apartheid.

29. It had been suggested that there were signs of a change of heart on the part of the South African Government. But recent statements by Mr. G. P. Jooste and Mr. H. F. Verwoerd belied that. The bantustan idea and the suggestion of partition were fraudulent devices designed to mislead the outside world.

30. Fears had frequently been expressed regarding the fate of the white inhabitants of South Africa if apartheid were destroyed. In that connexion he quoted statements by prominent South African leaders, some of them at present on trial, expressing their primary concern for democracy, irrespective of colour. South Africa belonged to all who lived there, Whites or Blacks.

31. The question of the type of régime that would replace apartheid was a matter for discussion later, when the time came, though his organization would cooperate in any plan which the United Nations might put forward at any time. Meanwhile, the most urgent matter was the application of sanctions to get rid of apartheid and he hoped that the Special Political Committee would work out the details of a plan to that end.

32. The situation in South Africa was deteriorating rapidly, and while the virtual unanimity of the recent voting in the United Nations was most gratifying, it was essential that such expressions of solidarity should be translated forthwith into action.

33. Mr. DIALLO Telli (Guinea) suggested that the statement by Mr. Tambo be circulated as a Committee document.

*It was so decided.*<sup>5/</sup>

34. Mr. DIALLO Telli (Guinea), on a point of order, said that as representatives of Member States had indicated the measures taken by their countries for the application of General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII) and the Security Council resolution of 7 August either in writing to the Secretary-General or to the Chairman of the Special Committee, or directly to the General Assembly or during the deliberations of the Security Council, the information was very widely scattered. He wondered whether it would be possible for the Secretariat to make a synthesis as soon as possible of the various steps taken by Member States in the matter.

35. The news of the opening of the trial of the eleven prisoners just given by Mr. Oliver Tambo was confirmed by a dispatch from the Agence France-Presse describing the atmosphere in which the initial hearing had been held. He read the despatch to the Committee. It should be recalled that following the unanimous adoption of resolution 1881 (XVIII), in which the General Assembly explicitly condemned the South African Government for continuing its policy of apartheid despite the reiterated appeals of the United Nations to it not to hold the trial in question, the South African

<sup>5/</sup> The full text of the statement by the Deputy President of the African National Congress of South Africa was subsequently circulated as document A/SPC/84.

Government had met in order to redefine its relations with the United Nations. Although the decisions of that meeting had not been made public, it was known that Mr. Verwoerd had called the resolution a piece of intolerable interference and a challenge by the United Nations to the South African Government; in other words, he had chosen unequivocally to defy the United Nations. Mr. Diallo Telli hoped that in the light of those new events, the Secretary-General would submit as soon as possible the report requested of him in operative paragraph 4 of resolution 1881 (XVIII). He felt

sure that the Special Political Committee and after it the General Assembly would wish to take up that challenge, not only for reasons of principle but for reasons of dignity and moral authority.

36. Mr. CHAI (Secretary of the Committee) said that the Secretariat would like to study the request of the representative of Guinea more closely to see to what extent it would be possible for it to assist the Committee.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.