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Chairman: Mr. Mihail HASEGANU (Romania).

AGENDA ITEM 30

The policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa: reports of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa and replies by Member States under General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII) (A/5497 and Add.1, A/SPC/80, A/SPC/81, A/SPC/82, A/SPC/L.95) (continued)

At the invitation of the Chairman, the Right Reverend R. Ambrose Reeves, former Bishop of Johannesburg, took a place at the Committee table.

1. The Right Reverend R. Ambrose REEVES, former Bishop of Johannesburg, said that he had asked for a hearing because as the Anglican Bishop of Johannesburg he had been in constant and intimate contact with South African affairs for eleven years—from 1949 until his detention and deportation by the South African Government in 1960 on the ground that it was not in the public interest for him to remain in his diocese.

2. He had been alerted to the possible grave consequences of the policy of apartheid by the passing of the Suppression of Communism Act, 1950. Year by year, the implementation of that racist ideology had convinced him that apartheid was an affront to the Christian gospel. On that conviction he had based his continuing opposition to apartheid, a conviction repeatedly strengthened by the tremendous inroads made by the Government in South Africa, into the rule of law. A recent Act of Parliament empowered the Minister of Justice to detain indefinitely any person who he thought might continue his activities against the Government after his release from prison, and permitted the arrest and detention of any person by any police officer for interrogation for ninety days, or until the authorities obtained satisfactory answers to their questions. A succession of laws had increasingly restricted the movement of people both within and outside South Africa, and had directly or indirectly restricted their freedom to express their opinions, criticize Government policies, and assemble for those purposes. In some ways the laws which had done so indirectly were the more serious, because

they exposed persons to subtle and sinister pressure from officials: many who had opposed the Government had been constantly harried and intimidated. Successive laws had whittled away the few rights that Africans still possessed in the urban areas, and the Bantu Laws Amendment Act, 1963, had removed the last vestige of their freedom and security. The Bantu Education Act, 1953, and the Extension of University Education Act, 1959, had dealt serious blows at educational freedom for Africans. The spectacular increase in the number of African children receiving some education since the passing of the Bantu Education Act had been more than offset by the serious decline in educational standards. It was difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Africans were being educated for serfdom. Moreover, the economic life of the Indian community numbering half a million, had been deliberately and systematically attacked, notably through the application of the Group Areas Act, 1950. The one-and-a-half million Coloured people had also suffered greatly, particularly through the enforcement of job reservation and similar economic measures.

3. The mass of legislation restricting and denying the basic freedom, and denying all participation in political life to four-fifths of the population, was a crime against humanity. It was a sin thus to humiliate and degrade human beings and brand them with the stigma of inferiority and serfdom, particularly when the only reason was the colour of their skin.

4. It might be said that, even if that condemnation of apartheid was justified, it ignored the changes of opinion in certain sections of the white community in South Africa, the recent policy of creating bantustan homelands for the Africans, and the possibility of partitioning South Africa between Whites and Blacks. Important as those matters were, their evaluation should not be clouded by wishful thinking. The Rev. Beyers Naude, formerly Moderator of the Dutch Reformed Church in the Southern Transvaal, had indeed resigned to become director of the Christian Institute of South Africa; but his admittedly courageous action did not indicate any substantive change among most churchmen in South Africa. Representatives of the Dutch Reformed Church had signed a quite moderate statement at the Coltesloe Consultation between leaders of the non-Roman churches in South Africa, but their action had been repudiated by their own churches, which had then withdrawn from the World Council of Churches. Moreover, the present role of the churches in South Africa could easily be overestimated, for, as the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Durban had pointed out recently, they must bear a large share of responsibility for the state of affairs in South Africa because they had sadly failed to be the nation's conscience. The uneasiness among white people both inside and outside the churches was growing steadily less as the repressive measures against the opponents of apartheid grew more severe.

5. With regard to bantustans, the South African Prime Minister had stated clearly on 16 March 1963 that there was no intention of increasing the amount of land held by Africans. The combined land of the 110 African Reserves was only 13 per cent of the area of South Africa and contained no known mineral resources, major commercial or industrial areas, or ports. The Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa—known as the Tomlinson Commission—reported in 1955 that if the land in the reserves was to be rehabilitated and made viable for farming, alternative employment would have to be found for 2,500,000 of their present inhabitants. If the millions of Blacks now living and working in the white areas were to be accommodated in those reserves, work would also have to be found for them, which would mean the creation of over 100 new towns and cities and a vast expenditure of money. Even so that Committee had recognized that its proposals depended on the incorporation in South Africa of the High Commission Territories (which the United Kingdom Government showed no sign of being willing to hand over) and on the use of white capital for developing the reserves, which the South African Government had on ideological grounds refused to allow. The Government was at the moment spending only 2 per cent of its total budget on the reserves, and only half of that for economic development. It hardly appeared to mean business.

6. The type of self-government allowed to the reserves was even more of a sham than the measures taken to meet their economic needs. So far only the Transkei had been allowed a Legislative Assembly, the majority of which would be ultimately dependent on the white government for their positions. The white Parliament in Cape Town would retain control over the Transkei's defence, external affairs, currency, public loans and banking, the maintenance of internal security, immigration and constitution. Self-government was the last word that could be used to describe what was happening.

7. Partition, which was being advanced as an alternative both to integration and to apartheid, would divide the country into a white State in the south, and a black State describing an arc around the north and east and including the High Commission Territories. That plan also would depend upon the unlikely incorporation of the High Commission Territories into South Africa, and the time might well have come for the United Nations to guarantee those Protectorates against violation of their borders until they became independent, and to guarantee their sovereignty afterwards. The rights of their peoples should be watched extremely carefully in any consideration of possible developments in South Africa.

8. It had been suggested that such a division of South Africa would be an alternative to outside pressure, which was held likely to cause suffering primarily to the non-whites it was designed to help, and to strengthen the resolve of the white minority to keep all power in their own hands. The non-whites were suffering dire poverty at the present time and so would hardly be the group to suffer most as a result of international pressure. The contention that the resolve of the white minority might be strengthened by outside pressure was valid only so long as that pressure was ineffective. Once the nations decided to act together, the situation would probably be different. The white minority had been split and confused by

overseas reactions to Sharpeville, withdrawal from the British Commonwealth, and the boycott in the United Kingdom. The idea of partitioning South Africa might be superficially attractive, but it was fantastic to imagine that such a division would settle anything. It was incredible that the Africans would give up their claim to a share in the really wealthy areas of South Africa which they had helped to create. White South Africa would be surrounded by an aggrieved, hostile black State intent on securing a real share in the total wealth of the present country and supported in its efforts by the entire African continent. Partition was as much an escape into fantasy as apartheid, and it would be wiser to keep attention on the real situation of South Africa; outwardly a stable and prosperous country but already in the throes of conflict between massive force and acts of sabotage and terrorism.

9. The South African Government seemed only too well aware of that situation, to judge by its massive build-up in arms. Since 1960, expenditure on defence and the police had risen from £40 million to £104 million. Within the last four years the permanent force had increased from 9,000 to 15,000 men, with a citizen force of 40,000 and in addition a commando force in which every white male citizen was required to serve for four consecutive years if he had not previously been a member of either of the other two forces. The Minister of Defence had made it clear on 24 June 1963 that the first of the three main tasks of the armed forces was to assist the police to maintain internal order.

10. That situation demanded international action if further deterioration were to be prevented. It was worse than useless for some representatives to condemn apartheid in vehement terms and then do all they could to prevent Member States from taking effective action. Member States with financial interests in South Africa should realize that a country in a near-revolutionary situation, was both an unreliable trading partner and an insecure guardian of overseas capital. There was, however, no painless way to put an end to the present injustice and suffering in South Africa; any realistic approach to the problem would demand sacrifice. The loss of trade might cause temporary hardship to some, perhaps many, workers; but the time had come to cease speculating on the consequences of action and to get down to a detailed study of the ways in which international pressure might be applied and to plans to deal with at least some of the resulting losses. Means should in particular be devised by which the resources of the specialized agencies might be made available, perhaps through the International Red Cross, to help the families of persons suffering because of their opposition to apartheid.

11. The choice before the world was clearly between effective international action and the probability of bloodshed on a vast scale. Most South Africans were living in a full-fledged police state, under a tyranny which was a flagrant contradiction of the basic principles of the United Nations Charter. South Africa might even become the cause and the focal point of a race war which even the United Nations might find it impossible to contain. There were already signs that a new solidarity of non-white people, increasingly concerned with the fate of the non-whites in South Africa, was being forged across the world.

12. The white minority in South Africa, many of whom had no other homeland, must not be overlooked.

Action was needed to save them from themselves. In the long run they would probably be more deeply corrupted by the policy of apartheid than any other ethnic group in South Africa. Some way must be found to give them adequate guarantees for their future in South Africa, though such guarantees might have little meaning for them until they were compelled by effective international action to recognize that they could no longer maintain the policy of apartheid.

13. The situation in South Africa was deteriorating steadily. An increasing number of persons were detained without trial, imprisoned because of their opposition to apartheid, banished to remote places, or even summarily deported. Injustice followed on injustice. But the struggle for liberation continued, and the Government would never succeed in silencing those men and women, Whites and Blacks, who knew tyranny for what it was. Thousands in South Africa anxiously awaited the day when the representatives of the nations would agree that the situation in the Republic was too tragic for them to remain content with words. Those thousands were encouraged by the Member States who understood that the struggle in South Africa was one of justice against injustice, and were bewildered and dismayed when representatives of other countries urged their nationals to increase their investments in South Africa. Those who openly supported the state of affairs in South Africa would have to bear a large share of responsibility if the non-whites were at last driven to wide-spread violence. In common with civilized men everywhere, the victims of apartheid asked the United Nations, which had had the problem before it for seventeen years, to take effective action to end the intolerable situation and help to plan for people of all races in South Africa a better way of life than that which they knew at present. He prayed that they would not ask in vain, and that action would be taken before it was too late.

14. Mr. DOSUMU-JOHNSON (Liberia) asked that the statement of Bishop Reeves be circulated as a Committee document.

It was so decided.^{1/}

15. The CHAIRMAN asked if any delegation wished to put questions to Bishop Reeves.

16. Mr. TALEB (Algeria) observed that the information provided by Bishop Reeves should serve to enlighten some of those delegations which seemed to be unmindful of the condition in which the people of South Africa were living. In their struggle they had the full support of the Government and people of Algeria, who were determined to combat apartheid by every means at their command, for they were convinced that Africa would have no peace until colonialism and racial discrimination had been eliminated once and for all.

17. He was glad to note that Bishop Reeves, like Mr. Oliver Tambo, Deputy President of the African National Congress, had stressed the determination of the people of South Africa to reject any scheme involving partition of their country, for Algeria, too, at one point during its struggle for independence, had had occasion to reject similar proposals. He shared Bishop Reeves' concern over the build-up of the armed forces in South Africa, which offered clear

proof of the determination of the Government to maintain its policies of apartheid and he agreed with him that the United Nations, particularly the Special Political Committee, should consider ways of assisting the families of political prisoners.

18. He wished to take the opportunity of congratulating certain countries, notably Japan and Australia, which, although they had diplomatic and other relations with South Africa, had joined with the vast majority of the Committee's members in voting in favour of General Assembly resolution 1881 (XVIII) concerning the trial now in progress in South Africa.

The Right Reverend R. Ambrose Reeves, former Bishop of Johannesburg, withdrew.

19. Mr. DICKO (Mali) expressed his delegation's appreciation of the eloquent statement made by Bishop Reeves. He had been glad to hear such a statement made by a white man because racial discrimination was a problem which should be of concern to all mankind. In the light of the South African Government's determination to maintain the policies of apartheid, as demonstrated by both Mr. Reeves and Mr. Tambo, it was difficult for delegations like his own to heed the plea for objectivity made at the 386th meeting. The South African people could be assured that they had the support of all the peoples of Africa and of Mali in particular.

20. His delegation wished to congratulate the members of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa on their excellent report (A/5497 and Add.1). In combination with the report of the Secretary-General^{2/} submitted under the Security Council's resolution of 7 August 1963^{3/} it demonstrated that the policies of apartheid constituted a cynical and arrogant violation of the basic provisions of the United Nations Charter. The persistent refusal of the South African Government to heed the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council expressing the concern of the entire international community over the policies of apartheid and its provocative attitude towards other African Governments was creating a dangerous situation which could jeopardize international peace and security, as recognized by the Summit Conference of Independent African States at Addis Ababa in May 1963. The South African Government's determination to continue with its defiance of the United Nations was constantly being confirmed by the statements of the racist leaders of that country. He quoted in that connexion a statement made by Mr. H. F. Verwoerd in the South African House of Assembly on 25 January 1963 to the effect that the Government intended to keep South Africa white and that the white inhabitants must accordingly not only lead but also dominate (see A/5497, para. 83). The South African Minister for Foreign Affairs had likewise stated to a journalist on 24 March 1963 that the white South Africans were engaged in a cold war and were determined to hold on to what they had (*ibid.*, para. 79, footnote). A statement made by the same Minister on 17 June 1963 had shown that the South African leaders considered the United Nations a monstrosity and hoped for its destruction. As the United Nations was the supreme hope of all peoples

^{2/} Official Records of the Security Council, Eighteenth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1963, document S/5438.

^{3/} *Ibid.*, Supplement for July, August and September 1963, document S/5386.

^{1/} The complete text of the statement by the Right Reverend R. Ambrose Reeves was subsequently circulated as document A/SPC/83.

for the maintenance of international peace and security, a Government which hoped for its destruction could not be called representative of the people of the country.

21. The South African Government itself had proposed that the racial problem in South Africa should be solved by the establishment of a multiracial state. Under that scheme the areas now reserved to Africans would become colonies, as it were, under the supreme authority of the Whites, who would continue to inhabit the healthiest and richest parts of the country and to monopolize the direction of the country's affairs. The multiracial State thus envisaged would be but a refinement of the policies of apartheid—in other words a fraud. The Government had already undertaken an educational programme designed to ensure the success of the policy of separate development of the races and the emergence of a multiracial State. That system of education sought to create in the Africans an inferiority complex, as indicated in a statement by Mr. Verwoerd, when he was Minister of Native Affairs, to the effect that education should not be such as to awaken vain hope among the indigenous inhabitants but should conform to the policies of the State (*ibid.*, para. 286). It was clear from all the information available to the Committee what were the real purposes of the Government and certain proposals which might at first glance appear tempting must be examined in the light of those purposes. His delegation was hostile to the idea of any kind of racial or multiracial society. It preferred the concept of a non-racial society, such as existed in many countries in Europe and elsewhere whose citizens were of differing racial origins but were not separated into different political and social entities on the basis of race or colour. In its view the only solution to the problem of apartheid lay in recognition and application by the white minority in South Africa of the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in other words respect for human dignity and the equality of races. The Members of the United Nations should act collectively and individually to convince the South African rulers of the absurdity of their claim to be entitled to continue ruling the majority while denying them their inalienable rights. The Whites of South Africa should begin now to prepare the conditions which would enable them to continue living there in the future. If they waited, hatred and violence would gain the upper hand and it would be too late, for history showed that sooner or later the will of oppressed peoples always prevailed.

22. The adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 1881 (XVIII) calling on the Government of South Africa to abandon the trial of African nationalists opposed to apartheid had shown that the international community was outraged by that policy. To give effective expression to that sense of outrage all States Members of the United Nations should implement the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. If the method of persuasion and the measures already contemplated by the Security Council and the General Assembly proved ineffective, the United Nations should then have recourse to the sanctions provided for in Articles 5, 6, 41 and 42 of the Charter. His own Government had already implemented the decisions reached at Addis Ababa and the Security Council's resolution of 7 August 1963. It would also support any other measures which the United Nations might decide to take to compel respect for the principles of the Charter in South Africa.

23. Mr. M'BALE (Congo, Leopoldville) observed that the new information supplied by Bishop Reeves only served to corroborate what the Committee already knew about conditions in South Africa. The Special Committee in submitting three successive reports (A/5497 and Add.1) had rendered the United Nations a valuable service, enabling it to keep abreast of the new developments which had occurred in South Africa since the time when the Special Committee had been established. Thanks to the efforts of that body, which served as a focal point for the study of the problem of apartheid, delegations now had before them a series of texts irrefutably establishing the facts of the situation. The United Nations had taken vigorous action with respect to the problem of apartheid during 1963, action in which some of the great Powers had played a larger part than in the past, and it appeared that all save one or two Members of the Organization were now clearly aware of the importance of the problem. Increasingly they were coming to realize that apartheid was not a question of interest to only one country or group of countries but was rather an international problem which could jeopardize world peace. Failure to solve it was, moreover, a blot on the record of the United Nations, which could hardly expect to be looked to as the guardian of the principles on which universal coexistence was founded if it was incapable of making one of its Members respect them. His delegation could not see why infringement by some Members produced an immediate reaction while in other cases it met with excuses and delays.

24. It was a source of great satisfaction to his delegation to note that countries in all parts of the world had applied operative paragraph 3 of the Security Council's resolution of 7 August 1963. The minority régime in South Africa had, of course, refused to abide by that resolution, but its refusal was only the latest in a lengthy catalogue of insults to the United Nations. His own country had been condemning the policies of apartheid ever since it became independent. Indeed, one of the first acts of the Congolese Senate had been to demand that South African consular representatives should be barred from the festivities marking the end of the colonial régime in the Congo. His country had never had diplomatic relations with the régime in South Africa and it had vigorously supported all resolutions on the subject of apartheid adopted at Addis Ababa, Dakar and New York. Mr. Cyrille Adoula, Prime Minister of Congo (Leopoldville), when speaking at the 1234th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, had noted the parallel between apartheid and Nazism and had stated that the only solution to such problems lay in self-determination, adding that his Government would reject any solution which disregarded that principle and aimed at perpetuating racial or colonial hegemony in disguise.

25. The absence from the Committee's discussions of the representative of the Republic of South Africa merely served to aggravate the problem. At the same time the Congo (Leopoldville) could not regard the present South African Government as representing South Africa; it represented only the white minority which was oppressing a majority that had been unable to choose its own Government. No equitable solution of the problem of apartheid was possible without the final elimination of the present racist Government and its replacement by a democratic Government freely elected by the majority of the South African people.

26. The problem now was how to attain that goal. The Congolese, being anxious to avoid bloodshed and

to exhaust every possibility of finding a peaceful solution, proposed that a total economic and military embargo should be placed on South Africa. All the countries which were exporting arms to South Africa should be called upon to cease such exports, since they were in fact consolidating apartheid. The minority Government of South Africa was responsible for many racial crimes, but it had to be remembered that the killer's responsibility was shared equally by the person who gave him the knife.

27. When they abolished the slave trade, men had considered that they had reached a certain degree of perfection; but there was, in fact, no great difference between slavery and apartheid. Member States had a moral obligation to take all necessary measures to eliminate the practice of apartheid; and that must be done at the current session, since the danger was great and imminent.

28. Mr. BARROMI (Israel) said that his country attached particular importance to the question of racial discrimination in general, and apartheid in particular, because of the historic experience of its own people. The people of Israel had been the victims of discrimination throughout the ages, and the ghetto itself was but another version of apartheid. They therefore considered it both a right and a duty to take a position in the forefront of the battle against every form of discrimination, particularly racial discrimination.

29. The struggle for human rights was one of the central tasks of the United Nations. Every man or woman was entitled to freedom and equality, and there could be no true international peace without full human rights. Such fundamental ideas were gaining increasing support, as had been shown by the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1881 (XVIII). That resolution, which perhaps signified a turning-point in the annals of the United Nations, was the expression of a powerful movement of public opinion that was gaining in strength and scope in all the countries of the world. The problem of racial discrimination in South Africa had led to an awakening of human conscience and the mobilization of the moral forces which were the very essence and justification of the existence of the United Nations.

30. In contrast to the favourable development of international public opinion was the sad reality that still prevailed in the Republic of South Africa. The Secretary-General's report had clearly revealed the refusal of the South African Government to make any changes in its racial policy. However, it had also revealed, in the answers received from forty-four States, a remarkable consensus on a number of important points, particularly regarding an embargo on arms and other military supplies. In that connexion he wished to emphasize that his Government had been among the first to take steps to prevent arms manufactured in Israel from reaching the Government of South Africa. Under a resolution adopted in June 1961, it had taken all necessary steps to ensure that no arms, ammunition or strategic materials could be exported from Israel to South Africa in any form, directly or indirectly. Steps had also been taken to ensure that no material of such nature exported to other countries could reach South Africa. That resolution had been scrupulously implemented since its adoption.

31. There had been no substantial change in the situation in South Africa and the General Assembly must therefore persist in its efforts to foster positive developments, so that the Government of South Africa

would conform without further delay to the need of a radical change. In that connexion the Israel delegation had taken note of the proposals made by the representatives of Denmark (380th meeting) and Liberia (385th meeting) for persuading the nations which had the closest relations with South Africa to adopt concerted measures that would be of decisive efficacy. The impatience of the African nations was easy to understand. Declarations of good intentions, as other representatives had already emphasized, were not sufficient when the question at issue involved human suffering, persecution and violation of rights. The persistence in a part of Africa of a régime based on the negation of human rights and the subjection of one group to another was today intolerable and its abolition took on a character of inescapable urgency. Yet a final solution could not be far off. A system of such flagrant injustice could not survive in a world that was in rapid evolution and had witnessed in such a brief period the political emancipation of the great majority of the African peoples; while within the United Nations there was a united stand against the policy of apartheid of the South African Government. It was evident that in the present era of international interdependence and co-operation no country could succeed in living in contradiction to principles unanimously accepted by all other nations of the world.

32. The Israel delegation shared the views of other speakers that the solution to South Africa's problems must in the final analysis come out of South Africa itself and that contact must be established between the two sectors of population in that country, so that together they could build a new multiracial South Africa. That was what the United Nations, as the authorized expression of world opinion, expected from them.

33. While it was true that the Security Council could play a very important role in the matter because of its authority and the guarantees it was in a position to give, the General Assembly must continue to offer its contributions. Hitherto it had done so through its committees, particularly the Special Committee. However, the fact-finding phase could now be considered at an end and it was the Assembly's duty to start on tracing the shape of things to come. In his delegation's view, the task of preparing a suitable plan should be assigned to a special group or committee created by and responsible to the General Assembly. Such a plan would then have to be presented to the peoples and Government of South Africa with all the weight of the moral authority of the United Nations.

34. Some misgivings had been expressed regarding projects and suggestions which appeared to be lacking in realism. But the United Nations could not act like the board of directors of a company whose calculated acts were based on cold figures. The United Nations was the depository of a sacred mandate and its power was derived from the living fount of the human spirit. There must be faith in the irresistible force of a just idea stated with clarity and daring and defended with courage. The vision of a future of interracial co-operation based on equality and full reciprocal respect, of brotherhood for all the peoples of Africa, could scatter the gathering storm-clouds and awaken generous and constructive forces among the sons of different races on which the destiny of the Republic of South Africa rested.

35. Mr. MARTIN (Canada) said that while the overwhelming vote in favour of resolution 1881 (XVIII)

had shown that all Members were agreed on the objective to be achieved—the realization of a free society in South Africa with equal rights for all individuals and races—there was still no agreement on the means of attaining that end. There had been demands from some quarters that South Africa should be expelled from the United Nations or that the Security Council should impose sanctions on that country. The Canadian delegation, however, though it regarded the South African Government's racial policies as abhorrent and degrading, did not necessarily consider that the best remedy was to force South Africa outside the boundaries of the world community, since expulsion would make it even more difficult to persuade the white population of South Africa to seek a way out of its present untenable position and might even intensify the difficulties of the non-white population. Only by the exercise of restraint was there any possibility of convincing the South African Government of the need to come to terms with the great movement of independence and freedom which had swept through Africa during the past twenty years. To adopt a resolution calling for action which would not be carried out because of lack of unanimity regarding the means to be employed would not bring a peaceful solution to the problem any closer.

36. It might be asked whether fear was not one of the principal reasons for the South African Government's persistence in a policy which was universally condemned. In that respect the suggestion of finding a means of reassuring the white minority that, if they granted political rights and ultimately political power to the black majority, they would not in turn themselves become the victims of racial discrimination, was of particular interest.

37. The Canadian delegation agreed with the representative of Denmark that responsibility for considering suitable steps to influence the South African Government should rest with the Security Council. The permanent members of the Security Council were often able to exert decisive influence because of their great responsibility in many aspects of international affairs; and the Security Council was the body specifically empowered under Chapter VII of the Charter to decide upon action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression, while it also had a responsibility under Chapter VI for making recommendations regarding situations the continuance of which was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. The division of responsibilities between the Council and the General Assembly had been carefully considered at the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco and the balance set forth in the Charter was the result of exhaustive negotiation. In the Canadian delegation's view the balance should be preserved in the interests of the Organization and the interests of peace itself.

38. One suggestion which his delegation felt should not be rejected out of hand was a solution in South Africa based on a federal approach. Such a scheme would have to be divorced from the apartheid policy of white supremacy, which was rightly rejected by all other Members of the United Nations, and would have to be equally acceptable to all segments of the population. It would also be necessary for the South African Government to consider an equitable division of South Africa's resources. From such an approach there might emerge a strong and united Southern Africa which, by combining the abilities of four dis-

tingent races on a basis of equality and respect, could be accepted as a welcome and strong member of the African community of nations and could assume its place as a Member of the United Nations.

39. In voting with the overwhelming majority on resolution 1881 (XVIII) Canada had not done so lightly, since a principle was at stake which could have incalculable consequences if applied to other cases in which the Organization's concern about the domestic policies of one of its Members was less clear and less justifiable. Canada had voted in condemnation of South Africa because it wished to reaffirm its total opposition to a policy which was an affront to human dignity and because it had concluded that the situation was one in which the conscience of mankind was aroused to such an extent that no other honourable course was open.

40. History had shown that many seemingly insoluble problems had ultimately been solved by discussion and negotiation. It would therefore not seem too much to expect that South Africa and the other African States would find it possible to meet and seek solutions to their problems in the common interest. Canada would gladly do anything it could to help in that respect.

41. The Canadian Government, which strongly disapproved of the racial policies of the Government of South Africa, would shortly make known the action it had taken in response to the Security Council resolution adopted on 7 August. His delegation would continue to judge on their merits any proposals put forward for the peaceful solution of such an important and difficult problem.

42. Mr. SOSROWARDOJO (Indonesia) said he had been much moved by Bishop Reeves' analysis of conditions in South Africa. The first-hand information in the statement made would be of great value to the Committee in its search for a speedy solution of the problem of apartheid.

43. Apartheid was a social evil almost without parallel in world history. Because of the régime of terror and oppression which it had to use to maintain itself, it also constituted a serious threat to international peace and security. The most significant contribution of recent months to the United Nations seventeen-year study of the problem of apartheid was the report presented by the Special Committee (A/5497 and Add.1). The information in the report would help in an assessment of the true situation in South Africa, and its conclusions and recommendations provided for a wide variety of specific measures which the Indonesian delegation hoped to see embodied in the programme of action that it expected the eighteenth session of the General Assembly to formulate. The Special Committee should be given an opportunity to continue its valuable work; the Indonesian delegation gladly undertook to do everything in its power to help in the completion of its task.

44. Despite seventeen years of work and thirty-six resolutions, the United Nations was no nearer to its goal of persuading the South African Government to abandon its policies of apartheid. It was clear from the South African representative's statement to the General Assembly (1236th plenary meeting) that the Government of South Africa was beyond appeal or entreaty. By their actions, the present rulers of South Africa had forfeited their chance of being a constructive party to any peaceful, evolutionary solution.

Nevertheless, the United Nations must continue to seek a peaceful and speedy solution, regardless of whether the Government of South Africa wished to co-operate voluntarily or would succumb only to pressure. It was for the sake of the white minority no less than for the voiceless millions of South Africa that the United Nations must, consciously and decisively, opt for peaceful integration rather than the only other alternative, tragic racial war.

45. The Indonesian delegation had been gratified by the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII), which had for the first time translated general censure into terms of action. The measures called for in the General Assembly resolution had been restated in the resolution subsequently adopted by the Security Council, and Indonesia had complied fully with the provisions of both resolutions. The Indonesian Government had halted all trade with South Africa. It exported no weapons or ammunition or military vehicles to that country. Indonesian ports were closed to all vessels flying the South African flag and Indonesian ships were under specific instructions not to enter South African ports. Landing and passage facilities had been denied to all South African aircraft and the Indonesian Government maintained no diplomatic or consular relations with the Government of South Africa, nor would it, as long as that Government continued to pursue its policies of apartheid.

46. The two resolutions had rightly been described as a decisive turning-point. Unfortunately, the difficulty over their implementation showed how the will of the majority could be thwarted by the policies of a handful of nations whose interests were at stake. Nearly all previous speakers had stressed the responsibility that rested upon those countries which maintained, and deliberately continued to maintain, close diplomatic, military and trade relations with the present Government of the Republic of South Africa. It was no coincidence that some of them were also exponents of colonialism or world-wide trade monopolies, for colonialism and racism often went hand in hand. Those countries should realize that their attitude could only be interpreted as a wilful dissociation from the efforts of the United Nations to achieve a peaceful solution. The Indonesian delegation was frankly appalled by the hypocrisy of those countries which failed to support an arms embargo yet called for a peaceful solution, and of those who claimed that given time the South African Government would of its own volition mitigate its régime of oppression. The real truth was that tension in South Africa was progressively increasing, thus confirming the urgent necessity for the more effective measures called for in the Special Committee's report.

47. The Indonesian delegation believed that a peaceful solution could still be found, provided the United Nations acted speedily and in complete unity. The past had shown that appeals and condemnations not backed up by effective measures would not persuade the Government of South Africa to abandon apartheid. The only means whereby South Africa could be brought back to reason was external pressure applied forcefully and effectively, which meant universally.

48. Indonesia did not reject the Danish representative's proposal that the United Nations should proceed along two lines of action, one of continued pressure and the other of evolving and offering an acceptable alternative to apartheid. It believed, however, that

only after effective pressure had made itself felt would the South African Government be willing to relinquish its position of domination and consider an alternative which would guarantee the place of the white minority in a new society. The Indonesian delegation did not rule out the possibility of carrying out both lines of action simultaneously in the near future, but it believed that the prerequisite of effective pressure had not as yet been fulfilled. A solemn declaration by the General Assembly of the kind envisaged by the Danish representative would, it feared, fail to achieve the intended effect. It might indeed be mistakenly interpreted as a softening of the Assembly's most recently adopted position. The Danish representative's other suggestion namely that a group of experts should be appointed to study the alternative possibilities and the phases of development towards a new South African society and possible future United Nations involvement, was quite practicable. The Indonesian delegation would have no objection to such a body, although it would prefer it to be attached to the already existing Special Committee, which had already proved its worth and which for practical reasons as well as reasons of principle should continue to be closely linked to any new enterprise concerning apartheid.

49. Before embarking upon any new action, however, the General Assembly or the Security Council, or both, should again call upon all Member States to implement the provisions of resolutions 1761 (XVII) and the Security Council resolution of 7 August 1963. The key to effective pressure was in the hands of the small group of countries that were South Africa's traditional trading partners. They held the decisive responsibility for the success or failure of the United Nations efforts to find a peaceful solution, and it was to those nations that the most urgent appeals should now be addressed, individually as well as collectively. At the present stage of the struggle, there was no room for ambiguous neutrality, and ways must be found of applying sanctions. Without unremitting pressure, there was no hope of persuading South Africa to accept any peaceful alternatives which the United Nations might offer. Those who shrank from applying pressure should be reassured that in trying to break the ruling class of South Africa, the United Nations was not seeking to destroy it. It had been made clear by eminent African leaders both inside and outside South Africa that their goal was harmonious integration and not the annihilation of the white minority. The ideals behind the African Nationalist struggle in South Africa were in accordance with the spirit of the Charter. It would not be out of place, therefore, for the General Assembly to request the South African Government to enter into direct discussions with the leaders of the Nationalist movement. Frank discussions between the parties directly concerned might lay the basis for further meaningful contacts and might help to clarify the specific kind of society and form of government which the African leaders desired.

50. He concurred in the recent statement of the United States representative (379th meeting) that the United Nations should play the role of a harbinger of peaceful solutions and not a catalyst of violence. At the same time, however, the Organization must take care not to precipitate violence simply by remaining inactive.

51. Mr. EL-ZAYYAT (United Arab Republic) said that he would like to have some clarification from the United Kingdom representative of four points in

the important statement made by the United Kingdom delegation at the 386th meeting. First, the statement had contained no mention of the attitude which the United Kingdom Government intended to take with regard to operative paragraph 3 of the Security Council resolution of 7 August 1963 regarding the shipment of arms and ammunition to South Africa. The Secretary-General's recent report to the Security Council reproduced a statement by the United Kingdom expressing the view that operative paragraph 3 was not mandatory but merely a recommendation, and describing the present position of the United Kingdom Government as being that no arms that could be used in the enforcement of apartheid would be exported by the United Kingdom to South Africa. The United Kingdom Government would distinguish, however, between arms likely to be used for internal repression and those required for external defence and more particularly the defence of the routes round the Cape of Good Hope. That reply might be compared with the statement of the United States at the 1052nd meeting of the Security Council that it intended to halt all sales of arms and ammunition to South Africa by 31 December 1963. He wondered whether the United Kingdom had anything to add regarding its compliance with the Security Council resolution.

52. Secondly, the United Kingdom representative had appeared to be trying to dissuade the Committee from endorsing the Special Committee's recommendations. He had urged it to study any proposals that might be made objectively and to be prepared to entertain all suggestions, including presumably the suggestions that an area might be set aside for the white population or that the South African Government's present policy of setting up bantustans should be pursued. Did the United Kingdom, then, envisage the United Nations as having the authority to seek a solution in South Africa which might, for example, involve the partition of that country and the creation of separate self-governing units? He would like to know whether that was in fact the United Kingdom's opinion and, if so, how the United Nations was to implement its recommendations or decisions in that respect.

53. Thirdly, the United Kingdom representative had asked whether there might not exist in South Africa

the beginning of a change of mind. Rather than ask the Committee, he should ask his South African colleague. The Special Political Committee would be greatly interested to hear from the United Kingdom on behalf of the South African delegation, or directly from that delegation, that there was a change of mind and an admission of the failure of the policies hitherto defended by the Government of South Africa. South Africa, however, was boycotting the Committee and maintaining its position that apartheid was no concern of the United Nations. Both the United Kingdom and Canada had referred to the desirability of a dialogue with the South African authorities. It would appear, however, that the only dialogue that was possible was with the people of South Africa, represented in the Committee by Mr. Oliver Tambo and Bishop Reeves.

54. Fourthly, the United Kingdom representative had made frequent use of the words "nation", "community" and "society". He had suggested that it should be recognized that there was a community in South Africa which believed itself, with some justification, to be as African as any African nation represented in the Committee. That nation was determined to preserve itself in a society in which its traditions would remain valid. Did the United Kingdom believe South Africa to be a nation of 4 million or 16 million people? Did the South African representative represent South Africa with its present population and boundaries, or a community within that country? The delegation of the United Arab Republic believed that it was the erstwhile Union of South Africa, a union of 16 million people, that was a Member of the United Nations. It was on behalf of all its population that the South African Government had accepted the obligations contained in the Charter and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. If the United Kingdom representative believed that the representative of South Africa represented only that community which believed itself to be African, it confirmed the claim of many delegations that the whole of South Africa was not, in the present circumstances, properly represented in the United Nations.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.