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Chairman: Mr. Humberto LOPEZ VILLAMIL
(Honduras).

AGENDA ITEM 35

The policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (A/6688, A/6818 and Corr.1; A/SPC/L.146):

(a) Report of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (A/6864);

(b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/6825)

1. Mr. FARAH (Somalia), Rapporteur of the Special Committee on the Policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, introducing the Special Committee's report (A/6864), said there was no doubt that, in spite of the efforts made by the Special Committee and all those who supported it, work against apartheid, no progress had been made towards eradicating that disgraceful blot on the record of modern times. The General Assembly's condemnations of the South African Government's racial policies were still going unheeded. The arms embargo called for by the Security Council had repeatedly been violated, and South Africa's main trading partners were continuing to support the racist Government by increasing their economic collaboration with it.

2. In the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization for the period 16 June 1966 to 15 June 1967, the Secretary-General himself had conceded that there had been no improvement in the situation in South Africa (see A/6701/Add.1, para. 102). In fact, as was clear from the Special Committee's report, the application of apartheid had in some ways been intensified and the danger of violent conflict increased. During the past year the Special Committee had submitted factual notes on the build-up of military and police forces in South Africa. Recent events had shown that those forces had been established to perpetuate the policies of apartheid, not only in the Republic of South Africa but also throughout the whole southern African region. The South African Govern-

ment was still determined to pursue its policy of racial separation and segregation. Under the Group Areas Act, many thousands of non-Whites had been ordered to move out of their homes and communities. As the South African Institute of Race Relations had stated in June 1967, the Group Areas Act involved the ultimate mass uprooting of settled communities, whatever their race, with the resultant destruction of community and commercial life. The destruction of society in South Africa had been carried down to the smallest unit, the family. Every day there were reports of families being torn apart because of some slight and often imperceptible difference in the colour or physical appearance of their members. The breaking up of homes and families, caused by the application of the race classification laws, was a source of great personal distress to the persons concerned and to all those who had any feelings of humanity.

3. The South African Government was continuing to introduce new legislation in violation of all fundamental human rights. Under the Terrorism Act of 1967, the term "terrorist" was so broadly defined that it could be applied to anyone whom the South African authorities wished to punish. For harbouring or assisting a person accused of being a "terrorist", penalties under the Act ranged from five years of imprisonment to capital punishment. The Act was retroactive to 1962, and applied to terrorism against the Republic in or outside South Africa and South West Africa. In South West Africa thirty-seven nationalists were at present being tried under the Act in disregard of the Territory's international status. Reports that the accused had been tortured and might be sentenced to death gave grounds for the deepest concern.

4. Under the Suppression of Communism Amendment Act No. 24 of 1967, listed or convicted so-called communists were debarred from law practice. As the South African Government's interpretation of the term "communist" was absurdly loose, the Act made it virtually impossible for persons opposing the Government's racist policies to practise law. Thus, it was becoming even more difficult for the opponents of apartheid to obtain proper legal representation.

5. Arbitrary punishment was being imposed to an ever-increasing extent on the opponents of the Government's policies. Anyone who spoke out for freedom, justice and equality was liable to a banning order, house arrest, arbitrary imprisonment or banishment without charges or trial. The most disturbing aspect of the situation was the fact that the South African Government was bent on exporting its discredited system to neighbouring territories as a means of enabling white minority Governments to retain their hold over non-white populations.

6. It was that particular development which was intensifying the risk of racial conflict. There had been ominous reports about the confrontation in South West Africa, and South African and Rhodesian forces had only recently been engaged in joint operations against South African and Zimbabwe nationalists in Southern Rhodesia. Since every civilized means of bringing about peaceful change was denied them, the African nationalists were now planning to engage in armed struggle to defend their inalienable rights.

7. In the introduction to his annual report, the Secretary-General had listed the various measures taken to deal with the situation, and had stated that "these efforts have not had a significant impact" (see A/6701/Add.1, para. 117). Bringing about a climate of international opinion which was opposed to apartheid, and in which apartheid would be unable to flourish, was a long and slow process. International seminars and conferences played a valuable role in keeping the question of apartheid before the public, and the publication of facts about apartheid was an essential adjunct to all aspects of the anti-apartheid campaign. But the crux of the problem of eliminating racial discrimination was expressed in the Secretary-General's observation that "the effectiveness of the United Nations in exercising a significant influence towards a peaceful and just solution to the difficult problems in South Africa will depend essentially on the willingness and ability of the permanent members of the Security Council and the main trading partners of the Republic of South Africa to harmonize their positions and take more effective measures to persuade the South African Government to abandon its present course and seek a solution consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly" (*ibid.*, para. 118).

8. The Special Committee's reports showed that there had actually been an increase in the volume of trade between South Africa and some of its major trading partners, and that fresh trading partners had appeared on the scene. New ways of circumventing United Nations decisions had been found, and new manufacturing plants had been built. In spite of those regrettable developments, the Special Committee was still convinced that economic sanctions and the related measures it had recommended were the only effective means of bringing about a peaceful change in South Africa, and that the United Nations as a whole should continue to make every effort to ensure that the sanctions were fully applied. Although the South African Government had demonstrated its defiance of Security Council resolutions in the most reckless manner, the Council had not considered the situation in South Africa since June 1964. That situation had continued to deteriorate, but certain members of the Council, by obstructing effective action, had given solace to the South African régime. In view of the grave situation in South Africa and the potential threat to peace all over southern Africa, the Special Committee recommended that the General Assembly should request the Security Council to consider the situation without delay.

9. The Special Committee also recommended that the General Assembly should reiterate its recognition of

the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of South Africa for equality and freedom; it emphasized that the problems of southern Africa, being closely inter-related, should be considered in the broader context of the explosive situation in that part of the continent; it hoped that the General Assembly would give serious consideration to the recommendations made by the International Seminar on Apartheid, Racial Discrimination and Colonialism in Southern Africa; it recommended greater co-ordination of the efforts of the various United Nations organs and specialized agencies dealing with the problems of South Africa and southern Africa; and it emphasized the need for the dissemination of more information on the evils and dangers of apartheid in order to enlist the support of world public opinion, especially in North America and Western Europe, for effective international action.

10. As the President of the twenty-first session of the General Assembly had said at the opening of the present session, the last-ditch colonial and pro-colonial forces were surreptitiously entering into coalitions "in preparation for a new struggle against the Charter itself, a struggle which threatens in Africa to degenerate into the ugliest kind of war imaginable, a racial war" (1560th plenary meeting, para. 24). The United Nations had a special and inescapable responsibility to deal expeditiously with the situation in South Africa, which constituted a challenge to its principles and purposes and to the exercise of those fundamental human rights which were essential for a meaningful existence.

11. Mr. KHATRI (Nepal), Acting Chairman of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, recalled that for the past twenty years the majority of the Members of the United Nations had year after year been expressing their deep anxiety regarding the challenge posed by the policies of apartheid of the South African Government. Unfortunately some Member States, particularly some permanent members of the Security Council, had utterly failed to realize the gravity of the situation. The major and minor trading partners of the Republic of South Africa seemed to have little or no interest in helping to solve the problem of apartheid; and, when the General Assembly had decided to enlarge the Special Committee on Apartheid (resolution 2054 (XX)), only the Soviet Union had responded favourably to the decision. The Special Committee included among its members only one country from the entire continent of Europe, namely, Hungary. Unless it was enlarged to include some of South Africa's major trading partners and some of the more influential States of Asia and Latin America, it would not be able to deal with the problem of apartheid as thoroughly as it was expected to do. It would be helpful, too, if the Organization of African Unity could intensify its campaign against apartheid by sending political missions to other parts of the world to arouse international opinion.

12. In view of the continued failure of the United Nations to induce South Africa's trading partners to recognize the seriousness of the problem, some sections of the international community were now doubting whether the Organization was capable of dealing with apartheid. But the United Nations could not function as

a separate entity, independently of the positions taken by the permanent members of the Security Council. The majority of Member States were now trying to appeal to the conscience of the major trading partners of South Africa; and they hoped that all countries still trading with South Africa would soon be convinced of the justice of the anti-apartheid cause. They realized that, in refusing to co-operate with the majority of Member States, the Western Powers were guided largely by internal mercantile interests and policies of external economic expansion. Were it not for those policies, Ian Smith would not have been able to continue his minority rule over the people of Zimbabwe, and the Republic of South Africa would not have dared to flout the General Assembly's resolution terminating its mandate over South West Africa. The South African Government had also violated Security Council resolutions by continuing to maintain normal trading relations with Southern Rhodesia. He hoped that the Security Council would take note of that violation and adopt firm measures to ensure the implementation of its resolutions.

13. Apartheid in South Africa, colonialism in South West Africa, the continued existence of the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia and the extension of the concept of metropolitan Portugal to cover Angola and Mozambique were merely part of an extensive plan to maintain the supremacy of white minority settlers in the southern part of the African continent. They were also part of a plot to ensure continued control by the mercantile interests of the western world over the rich gold and diamond mines in those territories.

14. At the same time, there were genuine grounds for satisfaction in the activities of anti-apartheid organizations, even in countries which had extensive economic relations with the Government of South Africa. In its recent visit to various European capitals, the Special Committee had found that many people in western countries had done valuable work in arousing the conscience of their compatriots and their Governments against the policies of apartheid, and he wished to thank them for it.

15. The previous speaker had outlined the Special Committee's main proposals; and he himself merely wished to express the hope that the Special Political Committee would recommend to the General Assembly a specific course of action which would help to put an end to the South African Government's despicable policy of apartheid.

16. Lastly, as apartheid was a violation of human rights, it would be most appropriate to organize a special international programme on apartheid during the International Year for Human Rights in 1968.

17. The CHAIRMAN said that, in accordance with the Committee's decision at its 551st meeting, he would invite the Reverend Canon L. John Collins to make a statement.

18. Canon COLLINS (International Defence and Aid Fund) recalled that, when he spoke before the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa in June 1965, he had sought support and practical assistance for the

International Defence and Aid Fund from Member States. The need for such support, and for money, was now much greater than ever. At that time, he had also warned that the violence used by the South African régime against its political opponents, and its victimization of the majority of South African citizens, were a serious threat to world peace and were bound to arouse a violent response. Not only was the liberation movement now committed to a policy of meeting violence with violence, but it was already in the early stages of an armed conflict. There was a threat not only of a violent upheaval inside South Africa but of the beginning of a racial war in southern Africa which could easily lead to a racial war on a world scale. It would not be proper for him to discuss the methods employed by the liberation movement in its struggle. The Fund existed to serve the victims of apartheid and so long as the liberation movement gave the humanitarian work of the Fund its whole-hearted support, the latter would carry on that work.

19. During the Seminar on Apartheid, held at Brasilia from 23 August to 4 September 1966,^{1/} he had said that no fundamental changes in South Africa's racial policies would be brought about by normal democratic process inside that country and that it seemed probable that only external pressures and the threat or execution of an internal revolution would produce the desired results. He had also warned that tyranny would arouse violence; and since then the attempts at release from tyranny had, in fact, become violent. As a Christian pacifist, he always counselled restraint and non-violence; but the South African liberation movement's leaders could not be expected to show any greater respect for non-violence than was common among men.

20. Despite all that had been done within the United Nations system and by the opponents of apartheid, the situation in South Africa had gone from bad to worse. The nationalists were more firmly established in power than ever, their tyranny over all effective political opposition was increasing daily and their flouting of world opinion was rewarded with growing economic prosperity. No fair-minded, humane person could blame the victims of apartheid if they despaired of outside support, became disenchanted with pious expressions of sympathy, doubted the effectiveness of the countless resolutions adopted at national and international meetings and, in desperation, tried to achieve their aims by armed conflict.

21. Those who wished to see an end to white supremacy and its evils in southern Africa should first of all reassure the liberation movements of their active support. What was required was active assistance in such forms as the movements themselves requested. Besides, the fact must be faced that the struggle was likely to be long. It was not easy to sustain a prolonged effort, particularly when one crisis followed another in international affairs. Such crises, while of vital concern, ought not to distract the opponents of apartheid from their purpose. Racism in southern Africa, just as much as any other international crisis,

^{1/} For the report of the Seminar, see document ST/TAO/HR/27.

could easily plunge the world into a racial war if it was not quickly and effectively dealt with at the international level. Lastly, the present situation in southern Africa was such that States claiming to oppose apartheid must be asked to give practical evidence of that opposition. It was notorious that many such States often allowed their own economic interests to stand in the way of their international obligations. The United Kingdom, the United States, France and the Federal Republic of Germany—some of the worst offenders—persistently aided the South African economy by increasing their trade with, and investments in, that country. Similarly, South Africa's trade with some Asian countries and certain independent African States was on the increase. In addition to passing anti-apartheid resolutions, the United Nations should concentrate upon influencing public opinion in countries whose Governments were helping the white minority in southern Africa.

22. On becoming Prime Minister of South Africa, Mr. Vorster had sought to win the favour of the outside world, although he had made it clear that he could not surrender any of the principles of apartheid. It would be self-deception not to acknowledge that his campaign had achieved some success—as witness South Africa's booming trade, its wide and more cordial diplomatic relations, including relations with nearby African States, and the fading interest shown by the world Press in events in South Africa. That country was spending some £ 2 million annually on direct information services to improve its image. There was also an ample appropriation under the Foreign Affairs Special Account Act to promote the Republic's relations in an unorthodox fashion. The Act gave permanence to the practice begun in 1965 of allocating £ 250,000 of the annual Foreign Affairs budget to secret services to foster trade and diplomatic relations. Furthermore, the South Africa Foundation, after its success in London, was about to establish a permanent office in the United States. The Foundation issued vast quantities of literature and provided free jaunts to South Africa for journalists, publicity agents, industrialists and any others willing to go.

23. As a result of the Foundation's activities, the uncertainty which had prevailed, particularly after Sharpeville, had given way to an eagerness to do business with South Africa. Foreign investment was steadily increasing; imports and exports were breaking records. It was significant that, in the first four months of 1967, besides trading with wealthy Powers, South Africa had almost doubled its exports to Asia and had greatly increased its sales to African Territories.

24. South Africa's endeavours to improve its own image abroad, and to hinder the work of opponents of apartheid, meant that there was a need for established organizations, suitably financed and competently run, to present the other side. The International Defence and Aid Fund had undertaken to do its part in that connexion. It had recently begun to collate information on southern Africa with a view to countering the extensive pro-apartheid propaganda disseminated by South Africa through a variety of channels. He hoped that that extension of the Fund's work would

receive the goodwill and support of the Committee and the General Assembly.

25. To date, the Fund had been primarily concerned with South Africa and South West Africa, but, of late, demands upon it by the liberation movement in Southern Rhodesia had been increasing. Bearing in mind the recommendations of the International Seminar on Apartheid, Racial Discrimination and Colonialism in Southern Africa held at Kitwe, Zambia, from 25 July to 4 August 1967 (A/6818, para. 123), and recent developments in Southern Rhodesia, where South Africa was blatantly helping the rebel régime to evade sanctions and harry and victimize the opponents of white supremacy, the Fund must be ready to respond to requests for humanitarian aid from any of the liberation movements in southern Africa. It could not do so unless sufficient funds became available.

26. The struggle in southern Africa for freedom and justice for all must commend itself to every sensible and sensitive human being. The Fund would do all in its power to remain an effective servant of the liberation movements as long as they asked for its services.

27. In conclusion, he wished to pay a personal tribute to Chief Albert Luthuli, whose death had been a sad blow to all who had loved and admired him. But the cause he had served lived on and opponents of apartheid could best honour his name by doing all they could to ensure its speedy success.

28. Mr. FARAH (Somalia) thanked Canon Collins for his statement and for the valuable information he had supplied. He asked whether the Fund's present resources were adequate and whether it was still functioning satisfactorily inside South Africa, despite the banning of its branches there.

29. Canon COLLINS (International Defence and Aid Fund) replied that the Fund's resources were never adequate for its needs and at present lagged far behind. He greatly hoped that all sympathetic Member States would contribute as generously as possible, whether directly or through the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa.

30. The answer to the second question was in the affirmative, but he asked not to be pressed to elaborate.

31. Mr. TOURE (Guinea) assured Canon Collins that his delegation was deeply concerned at the tragedy in southern Africa, which was only a variant of the racial conflicts rife in other parts of the world. South Africa's principal trading partners, without whose support it would never have been able to inflict the inhuman policy of racial segregation upon its people, should remember that the Hitler régime had used similar slogans to subjugate part of Europe.

32. He hoped that the South African nationalists would make the world aware of the need to support the progressive forces in their struggle against the South African Government. On the eve of the International Year for Human Rights, States must consider

practical measures for curbing the barbarous régimes in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia and for eliminating all forms of racial discrimination throughout the world. He therefore proposed that the statements by the Rapporteur of the Special Committee, by its Acting Chairman, and by Canon Collins should be circulated in extenso as a working document.

33. Mr. WILLIAMS (Sierra Leone) supported the proposal.

It was so decided.^{2/}

The meeting rose at 4.25 p.m.

^{2/} The verbatim record of the present meeting was circulated as document A/SPC/PV.552.