



General Assembly

Distr.: Limited
24 June 2015

Original: English

International Law Commission

Sixty-seventh session

Geneva, 4 May to 5 June and 6 July to 7 August 2015

Draft report of the International Law Commission on the work of its sixty-seventh session

Rapporteur: Mr. Marcelo Vázquez-Bermúdez

Chapter VI

Crimes against humanity

Addendum

Contents

| <i>Chapter</i> | <i>Paragraphs</i> | <i>Page</i> |
|---|-------------------|-------------|
| C. Text of the draft articles on crimes against humanity provisionally adopted by the Commission at its sixty-seventh session | | |
| 2. Text of the draft articles and commentaries thereto, as provisionally adopted by the Commission at its sixty-seventh session | | 9 |



2. Text of the draft articles and commentaries thereto, as provisionally adopted by the Commission at its sixty-seventh session

9. The text of the draft articles, together with commentaries, provisionally adopted by the Commission at its sixty-seventh session, is reproduced below.

Article 1

Scope

The present draft articles apply to the prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity.

Commentary

(1) Draft article 1 establishes the scope of the present draft articles by indicating that they apply both to the prevention and to the punishment of crimes against humanity. Prevention of crimes against humanity is focused on precluding, *ab initio*, the commission of such offenses, while punishment of crimes against humanity is focused on criminal proceedings against persons after such crimes have occurred.

(2) The present draft articles focus solely on crimes against humanity, which are grave international crimes wherever they occur. The present draft articles do not address other grave international crimes, such as genocide or war crimes. Although a view was expressed that this topic might include those crimes as well, the Commission decided to focus on crimes against humanity.

(3) Further, the present draft articles will seek to avoid any conflicts with relevant existing treaties. For example, the present draft articles will avoid conflicts with treaties relating to statutes of limitations, refugees, enforced disappearances, and other matters relating to crimes against humanity. In due course, one or more draft articles will be considered to address any such conflicts.

(4) Likewise, the present draft articles will seek to avoid any conflicts with the obligations of States arising under the constituent instruments of international or “hybrid” (containing a mixture of international law and national law elements) criminal courts or tribunals, including the International Criminal Court (hereinafter “ICC”). Whereas the Rome Statute¹ establishing the ICC regulates relations between the ICC and its States Parties (a “vertical” relationship), the focus of the present draft articles will be on the adoption of national laws and on inter-State cooperation (a “horizontal” relationship). Part IX of the Rome Statute on “International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance” assumes that inter-State cooperation on crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC will continue to operate outside the Rome Statute, but does not direct itself to the regulation of that cooperation. The present draft articles will address inter-State cooperation on the prevention of crimes against humanity, as well as on the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, extradition, and punishment in national legal systems of persons who commit such crimes, an objective consistent with the Rome Statute. In doing so, the present draft articles will seek to support the principle of complementarity. That principle recognizes that, in the first instance, national jurisdictions are the appropriate place for prosecution of crimes against humanity if adequate national laws and institutions are in place and the relevant State is willing and able to prosecute alleged offenders. Finally, constituent instruments of international or hybrid criminal courts or tribunals address the prosecution of persons for the crimes within their jurisdiction, not steps that should be taken by States to prevent such crimes before they happen.

¹ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, done at Rome on 17 July 1998, United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 2187, p. 3 (hereinafter “Rome Statute”).

Article 2

General obligation

Crimes against humanity, whether or not committed in time of armed conflict, are crimes under international law, which States undertake to prevent and punish.

Commentary

(1) Draft article 2 sets forth a general obligation of States to prevent and punish crimes against humanity. The content of this general obligation will be addressed through the various more specific obligations set forth in the draft articles that follow, beginning with draft article 4. Those specific obligations will address steps that States are to take within their national legal systems, as well as their cooperation with other States, with relevant intergovernmental organizations, and with, as appropriate, other organizations.

(2) In the course of stating this general obligation, draft article 2 recognizes crimes against humanity as “crimes under international law.” The Charter of the International Military Tribunal (hereinafter “IMT”) established at Nürnberg² included “crimes against humanity” as a component of the IMT’s jurisdiction. Among other things, the IMT noted that “individuals can be punished for violations of international law. Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.”³ Crimes against humanity were also within the jurisdiction of the Tokyo Tribunal.⁴

(3) The principles of international law recognized in the Nürnberg Charter were noted and reaffirmed in 1946 by the General Assembly of the United Nations.⁵ The Assembly also directed the International Law Commission to “formulate” the Nürnberg Charter principles and to prepare a draft code of offences.⁶ The Commission in 1950 produced the “Principles of International Law recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal,” which identified crimes against humanity to be “punishable as crimes under international law.”⁷ Further, the Commission completed in 1954 a Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, which included the offense of crimes against humanity, and which stated in Article 1 that “[o]ffences against the peace and security of mankind, as defined in this Code, are crimes under international law, for which the responsible individuals shall be punished.”⁸ The gravity of such crimes is clear; the Commission has previously indicated that the prohibition of crimes against humanity is “clearly accepted and recognized” as a peremptory norm of international law.⁹

² Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 6 (c), done at London on 8 August 1945, United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 82, p. 279 (hereinafter “Nürnberg Charter”).

³ *Judgment of 30 September 1946, International Military Tribunal*, in *Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal*, vol. 22 (Nürnberg 1947), p. 466.

⁴ Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, art. 5 (c), done at Tokyo on 19 January 1946 (as amended 26 April 1946), 4 Bevens 20. No persons, however, were convicted of this crime by that tribunal; rather, the convictions concerned war crimes that occurred outside Japan and against persons other than Japanese nationals.

⁵ *Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal*, G.A. Res. 95 (I) (11 December 1946).

⁶ *Formulation of the Principles Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and the Judgment of the Tribunal*, G.A. Res. 177 (II) (21 November 1947).

⁷ *Yearbook ... 1950*, vol. II, p. 376, para. 109 (Principle VI).

⁸ *Yearbook ... 1954*, vol. II, p. 150 at art. 1.

⁹ *Yearbook ... 2001*, vol. II (Part Two), p. 85 at (5) (commentary on draft Article 26 of the Draft

(4) The characterization of crimes against humanity as “crimes under international law” indicates that they exist as crimes whether or not the conduct has been criminalized under national law. The Nürnberg Charter defined crimes against humanity as the commission of certain acts “whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.”¹⁰ In 1996, the Commission completed a Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, which provided, *inter alia*, that crimes against humanity were “crimes under international law and punishable as such, whether or not they are punishable under national law.”¹¹

(5) Draft article 2 also identifies crimes against humanity as crimes under international law “whether or not committed in time of armed conflict,” which should be read as including both international and non-international armed conflict. The Nürnberg Charter definition of crimes against humanity, as amended by the Berlin Protocol,¹² was linked to the existence of an international armed conflict; the acts only constituted crimes under international law if committed “in execution of or in connection with” any crime within the IMT’s jurisdiction, meaning a crime against peace or a war crime. As such, the justification for intruding into matters that traditionally were within the national jurisdiction of a State was based on the crime’s connection to inter-State conflict. That connection, in turn, suggested heinous crimes occurring on a large-scale, perhaps as part of a pattern of conduct.¹³ The IMT, charged with trying the senior political and military leaders of the Third Reich, convicted several defendants for crimes against humanity committed during the war, though in some instances the connection of those crimes with other crimes in the IMT’s jurisdiction was tenuous.¹⁴

(6) The Commission’s 1950 “Principles of International Law recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal,” however, defined crimes against humanity in Principle VI (c) in a manner that required no connection to an armed conflict.¹⁵ In its commentary to this principle, the Commission emphasized that the crime need not be committed during a war, but maintained that

articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts) (maintaining that those “peremptory norms that are clearly accepted and recognized include the prohibitions of ... crimes against humanity ...”); see also Study Group of the International Law Commission, *Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law*, document A/CN.4/L.682, para. 374 (13 April 2006), as corrected by document A/CN.4/L.682/Corr.1 (11 August 2006) (identifying crimes against humanity as one of the “most frequently cited candidates for the status of *jus cogens*”).

¹⁰ Nürnberg Charter, *supra* note 2, at art. 6 (c).

¹¹ *Yearbook ... 1996*, vol. II (Part Two), p. 17 at para. 50 (art. 1). The 1996 draft Code contained five categories of crimes, one of which was crimes against humanity.

¹² Protocol Rectifying Discrepancy in Text of Charter, done at Berlin on 6 October 1945, in *Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal*, vol. 1 (Nürnberg 1947), at pp. 17–18. The Berlin Protocol replaced a semi-colon after “during the war” with a comma, so as to harmonize the English and French texts with the Russian text. *Ibid.*, p. 17. The effect of doing so was to link the first part of the provision to the latter part of the provision (“in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal”) and hence to the existence of an international armed conflict.

¹³ See U.N. War Crimes Commission, *History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws of War* (His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1948), p. 179 (“Only crimes which either by their magnitude and savagery or by their large number or by the fact that a similar pattern was applied at different times and places, endangered the international community or shocked the conscience of mankind, warranted intervention by States other than that on whose territory the crimes had been committed, or whose subjects had become their victims.”).

¹⁴ See, e.g., *Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al.*, *Trial Chamber, Judgment*, Case No. IT-95-16-T, 14 January 2000, para. 576 (noting the tenuous link between the crimes against humanity committed by Baldur von Schirach and the other crimes within the IMT’s jurisdiction) (hereinafter *Kupreškić 2000*).

¹⁵ *Yearbook ... 1950*, vol. II, p. 377 at para. 119.

pre-war crimes must nevertheless be in connection with a crime against peace.¹⁶ At the same time, the Commission maintained that “acts may be crimes against humanity even if they are committed by the perpetrator against his own population.”¹⁷ The 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity referred, in Article 1(b), to “[c]rimes against humanity whether committed in time of war or in time of peace as they are defined in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Nürnberg, of 8 August 1945 and confirmed by resolutions 3 (I) of 13 February 1946 and 95 (I) of 11 December 1946 of the General Assembly of the United Nations ...”¹⁸

(7) The jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereinafter “ICTY”) included “crimes against humanity.” Article 5 of the ICTY Statute provides that the tribunal may prosecute persons responsible for a series of acts (such as murder, torture, or rape) “when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population.”¹⁹ Thus, the formulation used in Article 5 retained a connection to armed conflict, but it is best understood contextually. The ICTY Statute was developed in 1993 with an understanding that armed conflict in fact existed in the former Yugoslavia; the Security Council of the United Nations had already determined that the situation constituted a threat to international peace and security, leading to the exercise of the Security Council’s enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. As such, the formulation used in Article 5 (“armed conflict”) was designed principally to dispel the notion that crimes against humanity had to be linked to an “international armed conflict.” To the extent that this formulation might be read to suggest that customary international law requires a nexus to armed conflict, the ICTY Appeals Chamber later clarified that there was “no logical or legal basis” for retaining a connection to armed conflict, since “it has been abandoned” in State practice since Nürnberg. The Appeals Chamber also noted that the “obsolescence of the nexus requirement is evidenced by international conventions regarding genocide and apartheid, both of which prohibit particular types of crimes against humanity regardless of any connection to armed conflict.”²⁰ Indeed, the Appeals Chamber later maintained that such a connection in the ICTY Statute was simply circumscribing the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICTY, not codifying customary international law.²¹

(8) In 1994, the Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereinafter “ICTR”) and provided it with jurisdiction over “crimes against humanity.” Although Article 3 of the ICTR Statute retained the same series of acts as appeared in the ICTY Statute, the chapeau language did not retain the reference to

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 123.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 124.

¹⁸ Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, done at New York on 26 November 1968, United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 754, p. 73. As of August 2015, there are 55 States Parties to this Convention. For a regional convention of a similar nature, see European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitation to Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes, done at Strasbourg on 25 January 1974, Council of Europe, *Treaty Series*, No. 82. As of August 2015, there are eight States Parties to this Convention.

¹⁹ *Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia*, S.C. Res. 827 (25 May 1993), art. 5 (hereinafter “*Statute of the ICTY*”).

²⁰ *Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction*, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, 2 October 1995, para. 140.

²¹ See, e.g., *Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, Trial Chamber, Judgment*, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, 26 February 2001, para. 33 (hereinafter *Kordić 2001*); *Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeals Chamber, Judgment*, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1999, paras. 249-51 (hereinafter *Tadić 1999*) (“The armed conflict requirement is satisfied by proof that *there was* an armed conflict; that is all that the Statute requires, and in so doing, it requires more than does customary international law.”).

armed conflict.²² Likewise, Article 7 of the Rome Statute, adopted in 1998, did not retain any reference to armed conflict.

(9) As such, while early definitions of crimes against humanity required that the underlying acts be accomplished in connection with armed conflict, most likely in part to address concerns about whether the crime was well-settled in international law and in part to distinguish international crimes from large-scale, violent, national crimes, that connection has disappeared from the statutes of contemporary international criminal courts and tribunals, including the Rome Statute. In its place, as discussed in relation to draft article 3 below, are the “chapeau” requirements that the crime be committed within the context of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such an attack.

Article 3
Definition of crimes against humanity

1. For the purpose of the present draft articles, “crime against humanity” means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:

- (a) Murder;
- (b) Extermination;
- (c) Enslavement;
- (d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
- (e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law;
- (f) Torture;
- (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
- (h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or in connection with the crime of genocide or war crimes;
 - (i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
 - (j) The crime of apartheid;
 - (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.

2. For the purpose of paragraph 1:

- (a) “Attack directed against any civilian population” means a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1

²² *Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda*, S.C. Res. 955 (8 November 1994), Annex, art. 3 (hereinafter “*Statute of the ICTR*”); see *Semanza v. Prosecutor, Appeals Chamber, Judgment*, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, 20 May 2005, para. 269 (“... contrary to Article 5 of the ICTY Statute, Article 3 of the ICTR Statute does not require that the crimes be committed in the context of an armed conflict. This is an important distinction.”).

against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack;

(b) “Extermination” includes the intentional infliction of conditions of life including, *inter alia*, the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population;

(c) “Enslavement” means the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and children;

(d) “Deportation or forcible transfer of population” means forced displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law;

(e) “Torture” means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of the accused, except that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions;

(f) “Forced pregnancy” means the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations of international law. This definition shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting national laws relating to pregnancy;

(g) “Persecution” means the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity;

(h) “The crime of apartheid” means inhumane acts of a character similar to those referred to in paragraph 1, committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime;

(i) “Enforced disappearance of persons” means the arrest, detention or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.

3. For the purpose of the present draft articles, it is understood that the term “gender” refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The term “gender” does not indicate any meaning different from the above.

4. This draft article is without prejudice to any broader definition provided for in any international instrument or national law.

Commentary

(1) The first three paragraphs of draft article 3 establish, for the purpose of the present draft articles, a definition of “crime against humanity.” The text of these three paragraphs is verbatim the text of Article 7 of the Rome Statute, except for three non-substantive changes (discussed below), which are necessary given the different context in which the definition is being used. Paragraph 4 of draft article 3 is a

“without prejudice” clause which indicates that this definition does not affect any broader definitions provided for in international instruments or national laws.

Prior definitions

(2) Various definitions of “crimes against humanity” have been used since 1945, both in international instruments and in national laws that have codified the crime. The Nürnberg Charter defined “crimes against humanity” as:

“murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.”²³

(3) Principle VI(c) of the Commission’s 1950 “Principles of International Law recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal” defined crimes against humanity as: “Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts done against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, when such acts are done or such persecutions are carried on in execution of or in connexion with any crime against peace or any war crime.”²⁴

(4) Further, the Commission’s 1954 Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind identified as one of those offenses: “Inhuman acts such as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or persecutions, committed against any civilian population on social, political, racial, religious or cultural grounds by the authorities of a State or by private individuals acting at the instigation or with the toleration of such authorities.”²⁵

(5) Article 5 of the ICTY Statute stated that the tribunal “shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible” for a series of acts (such as murder, torture, and rape) “when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population”²⁶ Although the Secretary-General’s report proposing this article indicated that crimes against humanity “refer to inhumane acts of a very serious nature ... committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds,”²⁷ that particular language was not included in the text of Article 5.

(6) By contrast, the 1994 ICTR Statute, in Article 3, retained the same series of acts, but the chapeau language introduced the formulation from the 1993 Secretary-General’s report of “crimes when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population” and then continued with “on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds”²⁸ As such, the ICTR Statute expressly provided that a discriminatory motive was required in order to establish the crime. The Commission’s 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind also defined “crimes against humanity” to be a series of specified acts “when committed in a systematic manner or on a large scale and instigated or directed by a Government or by any organization or group,” but did not include the discriminatory

²³ Nürnberg Charter, *supra* note 2, at art. 6 (c).

²⁴ *Yearbook ... 1950*, vol. II, p. 377 at para. 119.

²⁵ *Yearbook ... 1954*, vol. II, p. 150 at para. 49 (art. 2 (11)).

²⁶ *Statute of the ICTY*, *supra* note 19, at art. 5.

²⁷ Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), document S/25704, p. 13 at para. 48.

²⁸ *Statute of the ICTR*, *supra* note 22, Annex, art. 3.

motive language.²⁹ Crimes against humanity have also been defined in the jurisdiction of hybrid criminal courts or tribunals.³⁰

(7) Article 5, paragraph 1 (b), of the Rome Statute includes crimes against humanity within the jurisdiction of the ICC.³¹ Article 7, paragraph 1, defines “crime against humanity” as any of a series of acts “when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”³² Article 7, paragraph 2, contains a series of definitions which, *inter alia*, clarify that an attack directed against any civilian population “means a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack.”³³ Article 7, paragraph 3, provides that “it is understood that the term ‘gender’ refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The term ‘gender’ does not indicate any meaning different from the above.”³⁴ Article 7 does not retain the nexus to an armed conflict that characterized the ICTY Statute, nor (except with respect to acts of persecution)³⁵ the discriminatory motive requirement that characterized the ICTR Statute.

(8) The Rome Statute Article 7 definition of “crime against humanity” has been accepted by the more than 120 States Parties to the Rome Statute and is now being used by many of those States when adopting or amending their national laws. Given the desire to promote the harmonization of the national laws of all States, and to support the principle of complementarity, the Commission viewed Rome Statute Article 7 as an appropriate basis for defining such crimes in paragraphs 1 to 3 of draft article 3. Indeed, the text of Article 7 is used verbatim except for three non-substantive changes, which are necessary given the different context in which the definition is being used. First, the opening phrase of paragraph 1 reads “For the purpose of the present draft articles” rather than “For the purpose of this Statute.” Second, the same change has been made in the opening phrase of paragraph 3. Third, Rome Statute Article 7, paragraph 1 (h), criminalizes acts of persecution when undertaken “in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.” Again, to adapt to the different context, this phrase reads in draft article 3 as “in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or in connection with the crime of genocide or war crimes.” In due course, the ICC may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, in which case this language may be revisited by the Commission.

Paragraphs 1 to 3

(9) The definition of “crimes against humanity” set forth in paragraphs 1 to 3 of draft article 3 contains three overall requirements that merit some discussion. These requirements, all of which appear in paragraph 1, have been illuminated through the case law of the ICC and other international or hybrid courts and tribunals. The definition also lists the underlying prohibited acts for crimes against humanity and

²⁹ *Yearbook ... 1996*, vol. II (Part Two), p. 47 at art. 18.

³⁰ See, e.g., Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone (with Statute), done at Freetown on 16 January 2002, United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 2178, p. 137 at p. 145; “The Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea,” art. 5, 27 October 2004, at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legal-documents/KR_Law_as_amended_27_Oct_2004_Eng.pdf (last visited 22 June 2015).

³¹ Rome Statute, *supra* note 1.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ See *ibid.*, art. 7, para. 1 (h).

defines several of the terms used within the definition (thus providing definitions within the definition). No doubt the evolving jurisprudence of the ICC and other international or hybrid courts and tribunals will continue to help inform national authorities, including courts, as to the meaning of this definition, and thereby will promote harmonized approaches at the national level. The Commission notes that relevant case law continues to develop over time, such that the following discussion is meant simply to indicate some of the parameters of these terms as of 2015.

“Widespread or systematic”

(10) The first overall requirement is that the acts must be committed as part of a “widespread or systematic” attack. This requirement first appeared in the ICTR Statute,³⁶ though some ICTY decisions maintained that the requirement was implicit even in the ICTY Statute, given the inclusion of such language in the Secretary-General’s report proposing that statute.³⁷ Jurisprudence of both the ICTY and the ICTR maintained that the conditions of “widespread” and “systematic” were disjunctive rather than conjunctive requirements; either condition could be met to establish the existence of the crime.³⁸ This reading of the widespread/systematic requirement is also reflected in the Commission’s commentary to the 1996 Draft Code, where it stated that “an act could constitute a crime against humanity if either of these conditions [of scale or systematicity] is met.”³⁹

(11) When this standard was considered for the Rome Statute, some States expressed the view that the conditions of “widespread” and “systematic” should be conjunctive requirements — that they both should be present to establish the existence of the crime — because otherwise the standard would be over-inclusive.⁴⁰ Indeed, if

³⁶ Unlike the English version, the French version of Article 3 of the ICTR Statute used a conjunctive formulation (“généralisée et systématique”). In the *Akayesu* case, the Trial Chamber indicated: “In the original French version of the Statute, these requirements were worded cumulatively ... , thereby significantly increasing the threshold for application of this provision. Since Customary International Law requires only that the attack be either widespread or systematic, there are sufficient reasons to assume that the French version suffers from an error in translation.” *Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Trial Chamber, Judgment*, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998, para. 579, n. 144 (hereinafter *Akayesu 1998*).

³⁷ *Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Chamber, Judgment*, Case No. IT-95-14-T, 3 March 2000, para. 202 (hereinafter *Blaškić 2000*); *Prosecutor v. Tadić, Trial Chamber, Opinion and Judgment*, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997, para. 648 (hereinafter *Tadić 1997*).

³⁸ See, e.g., *Prosecutor v. Mrkšić, Trial Chamber, Judgment*, Case No. IT-95-13/1-T, 27 September 2007, para. 437 (hereinafter *Mrkšić 2007*) (“[T]he attack must be widespread or systematic, the requirement being disjunctive rather than cumulative.”); *Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Trial Chamber, Judgment*, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, 21 May 1999, para. 123 (hereinafter *Kayishema 1999*) (“The attack must contain one of the alternative conditions of being widespread or systematic.”); *Akayesu 1998, supra* note 36, at para. 579; *Tadić 1997, supra* note 37, at para. 648 (“[E]ither a finding of widespreadness ... or systematicity ... fulfills this requirement.”).

³⁹ *Yearbook ... 1996*, vol. II (Part Two), p. 47. See also *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fiftieth Session, Supplement No. 22 (A/50/22)*, para. 78 (Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent International Criminal Court) (“[E]lements that should be reflected in the definition of crimes against humanity included ... [that] the crimes usually involved a widespread or systematic attack”) (emphasis added); *Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1995*, vol. II (Part Two), p. 25 at para. 90 (“the concepts of ‘systematic’ and ‘massive’ violations were complementary elements of the crimes concerned”); *Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1994*, vol. II (Part Two), p. 40 (“the definition of crimes against humanity encompasses inhumane acts of a very serious character involving widespread or systematic violations”); *Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1991*, vol. II (Part Two), p. 103 (“Either one of these aspects — systematic or mass scale — in any of the acts enumerated ... is enough for the offence to have taken place.”).

⁴⁰ See United Nations, Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, document A/CONF/183/13 (Vol. II), p. 148 (India); *ibid.*, p. 150 (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France); *ibid.*, p. 151 (Thailand, Egypt);

“widespread” commission of acts alone were sufficient, these States maintained that spontaneous waves of widespread, but unrelated, crimes would constitute crimes against humanity. Due to that concern, a compromise was developed that involved leaving these conditions in the disjunctive,⁴¹ but adding to Rome Statute Article 7, paragraph 2 (a), a definition of “attack” which, as discussed below, contains a policy element.

(12) According to the ICTY Trial Chamber in *Kunarac*, “[t]he adjective ‘widespread’ connotes the large-scale nature of the attack and the number of its victims.”⁴² As such, this requirement refers to a “multiplicity of victims”⁴³ and excludes isolated acts of violence,⁴⁴ such as murder directed against individual victims by persons acting of their own volition rather than as part of a broader initiative. At the same time, a single act committed by an individual perpetrator can constitute a crime against humanity if it occurs within the context of a broader campaign.⁴⁵ There is no specific numerical threshold of victims that must be met for an attack to be “widespread.”

(13) “Widespread” can also have a geographical dimension, with the attack occurring in different locations.⁴⁶ Thus, in the *Bemba* case, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber found that there was sufficient evidence to establish that an attack was “widespread” based on reports of attacks in various locations over a large geographical area, including evidence of thousands of rapes, mass grave sites, and a large number of victims.⁴⁷ Yet

ibid., p. 152 (Islamic Republic of Iran); *ibid.*, p. 154 (Turkey); *ibid.*, p. 155 (Russian Federation); *ibid.*, p. 156 (Japan).

⁴¹ Case law of the ICC has affirmed that the conditions of “widespread” and “systematic” in Rome Statute Article 7 are disjunctive. See *Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya*, ICC-01/09, 31 March 2010, para. 94 (hereinafter *Kenya Authorization Decision 2010*); see also *Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges*, ICC-01/05-01/08, 15 June 2009, para. 82 (hereinafter *Bemba 2009*).

⁴² *Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Trial Chamber, Judgment*, Case No. IT-96-23-T, 22 February 2001, at para. 428 (hereinafter *Kunarac 2001*); see *Prosecutor v. Katanga, Trial Chamber, Judgment*, ICC-01/04-01/07, 7 March 2014, para. 1123 (hereinafter *Katanga 2014*); *Prosecutor v. Katanga, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges*, ICC-01/04-01/07, 26 September 2008, para. 394 (hereinafter *Katanga 2008*); *Prosecutor v. Blagojević & Jokić, Trial Chamber, Judgment*, Case No. IT-02-60-T, 17 January 2005, paras. 545-46; *Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, Appeals Chamber, Judgment*, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, 17 December 2004, para. 94 (hereinafter *Kordić 2004*).

⁴³ *Bemba 2009*, *supra* note 41, at para. 83; *Kayishema 1999*, *supra* note 38, at para. 123; *Akayesu 1998*, *supra* note 36, at para. 580; *Yearbook ... 1996*, vol. II (Part Two), p. 47 at art. 18 (using the phrase “on a large scale” instead of widespread); see also *Mrkšić 2007*, *supra* note 38, at para. 437 (“[W]idespread’ refers to the large scale nature of the attack and the number of victims.”). In *Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco Ntaganda*, ICC-01/04-02/06, 9 June 2014, para. 24 (hereinafter *Ntaganda 2014*), the Chamber found that the attack against the civilian population was widespread “as it resulted in a large number of civilian victims.”

⁴⁴ See *Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application under Article 58*, ICC-01/04-02/06, 13 July 2012, para. 19 (hereinafter *Ntaganda 2012*); *Prosecutor v. Harun, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Prosecution Application under Article 58(7) of the Statute*, ICC-02/05-01/07, 27 April 2007, para. 62 (hereinafter *Harun 2007*); see also *Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Trial Chamber, Judgment*, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, 6 December 1999, paras. 67-69; *Kayishema 1999*, *supra* note 38, at paras. 122-23; *Yearbook ... 1996*, vol. II (Part Two), p. 47; *Yearbook ... 1991*, vol. II (Part Two), p. 103.

⁴⁵ *Kupreškić 2000*, *supra* note 14, at para. 550; *Tadić 1997*, *supra* note 37, at para. 649.

⁴⁶ See, e.g., *Ntaganda 2012*, *supra* note 44, at para. 30; *Prosecutor v. Ruto, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute*, ICC-01/09-01/11, 23 January 2012, para. 177 (hereinafter *Ruto 2012*).

⁴⁷ *Bemba 2009*, *supra* note 41, at paras. 117-24.

a large geographic area is not required; the ICTY has found that the attack can be in a small geographic area against a large number of civilians.⁴⁸

(14) In its *Kenya Authorization Decision 2010*, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber indicated that “[t]he assessment is neither exclusively quantitative nor geographical, but must be carried out on the basis of the individual facts.”⁴⁹ An attack may be widespread due to the cumulative effect of multiple inhumane acts or the result of a single inhumane act of great magnitude.⁵⁰

(15) Like “widespread,” the term “systematic” excludes isolated or unconnected acts of violence,⁵¹ and jurisprudence from the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC reflects a similar understanding of what is meant by the term. The ICTY defined “systematic” as “the organised nature of the acts of violence and the improbability of their random occurrence”⁵² and found that evidence of a pattern or methodical plan establishes that an attack was systematic.⁵³ Thus, the Appeals Chamber in *Kunarac* confirmed that “‘patterns of crimes — that is the non-accidental repetition of similar criminal conduct on a regular basis — are a common expression of such systematic occurrence.’”⁵⁴ The ICTR has taken a similar approach.⁵⁵

(16) Consistent with ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence, an ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in *Harun* found that “‘systematic’ refers to ‘the organised nature of the acts of violence and improbability of their random occurrence.’”⁵⁶ An ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in *Katanga* found that the term “has been understood as either an organized plan in furtherance of a common policy, which follows a regular pattern and results in a continuous commission of acts, or as ‘patterns of crimes’ such that the crimes constitute a ‘non-accidental repetition of similar criminal conduct on a regular basis.’”⁵⁷ In applying the standard, an ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in *Ntaganda* found an attack to be systematic since “the perpetrators employed similar means and methods to attack the different locations: they approached the targets simultaneously, in large numbers, and from different directions, they attacked villages with heavy weapons, and systematically chased the population by similar methods, hunting house by house and into the bushes, burning all properties and looting.”⁵⁸ Additionally, in the *Ntaganda* confirmation of charges decision, a Pre-Trial Chamber held that the attack was systematic as it followed a “regular pattern” with a “recurrent *modus operandi*, including the erection of roadblocks, the laying of land mines, and coordinated the commission of the unlawful acts ... in order to attack the non-Hema civilian population.”⁵⁹ In *Gbagbo*, an ICC Pre-Trial Chamber found an attack to be systematic

⁴⁸ *Kordić 2004*, *supra* note 42, at para. 94; *Blaškić 2000*, *supra* note 37, at para. 206.

⁴⁹ *Kenya Authorization Decision 2010*, *supra* note 41, at paras. 95–96.

⁵⁰ *Yearbook ... 1996*, vol. II (Part Two), p. 47; see also *Bemba 2009*, *supra* note 41, at para. 83 (finding that widespread “entails an attack carried out over a large geographical area or an attack in a small geographical area directed against a large number of civilians”).

⁵¹ See *Yearbook ... 1996*, vol. II (Part Two), p. 47; *Yearbook ... 1991*, vol. II (Part Two), p. 103.

⁵² *Mrkšić 2007*, *supra* note 38, at para. 437; *Kunarac 2001*, *supra* note 42, at para. 429.

⁵³ See, e.g., *Tadić 1997*, *supra* note 37, at para. 648.

⁵⁴ *Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Appeals Chamber, Judgment*, Case No. IT-96-23/1-A, 12 June 2002, para. 94 (hereinafter *Kunarac 2002*).

⁵⁵ *Kayishema 1999*, *supra* note 38, at para. 123; *Akayesu 1998*, *supra* note 36, at para. 580.

⁵⁶ *Harun 2007*, *supra* note 44, at para. 62 (citing to *Kordić 2004*, *supra* note 44, at para. 94, which in turn cites to *Kunarac 2001*, *supra* note 42, at para. 429); see also *Ruto 2012*, *supra* note 46, at para. 179; *Kenya Authorization Decision 2010*, *supra* note 41, at para. 96; *Katanga 2008*, *supra* note 42, at para. 394.

⁵⁷ *Katanga 2008*, *supra* note 42, at para. 397.

⁵⁸ *Ntaganda 2012*, *supra* note 44, at para. 31; see also *Ruto 2012*, *supra* note 46, at para. 179.

⁵⁹ *Ntaganda 2014*, *supra* note 43, para. 24.

when “preparations for the attack were undertaken in advance” and the attack was planned and coordinated with acts of violence revealing a “clear pattern.”⁶⁰

“Directed against any civilian population”

(17) The second overall requirement is that the act must be committed as part of an attack “directed against any civilian population.” Draft article 3, paragraph 2(a), defines “attack directed against any civilian population” for the purpose of paragraph 1 as “a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack.”⁶¹ As discussed below, jurisprudence from the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC has construed the meaning of each of these terms: “directed against,” “any,” “civilian,” “population,” “a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts,” and “State or organizational policy.”

(18) The ICTY has found that the phrase “directed against” requires that civilians be the intended primary target of the attack, rather than incidental victims.⁶² The ICC Pre-Trial Chambers subsequently adopted this interpretation in the *Bemba* case and the *Kenya Authorization Decision 2010*.⁶³ An ICC Trial Chamber adopted the same interpretation in the *Katanga* trial judgment.⁶⁴ In the *Bemba* case, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber found that there was sufficient evidence showing the attack was “directed against” civilians of the Central African Republic.⁶⁵ The Chamber concluded that Movement for the Liberation of Congo (hereinafter “MLC”) soldiers were aware that their victims were civilians, based on direct evidence of civilians being attacked inside their houses or in their courtyards.⁶⁶ The Chamber further found that MLC soldiers targeted *primarily* civilians, demonstrated by an attack at one locality where the MLC soldiers did not find any rebel troops that they claimed to be chasing.⁶⁷ The term “directed” places its emphasis on the intention of the attack rather than the physical result of the attack.⁶⁸ It is the attack, not the acts of the individual perpetrator, which must be “directed against” the target population.⁶⁹

(19) The word “any” indicates that “civilian population” is to have a wide definition and should be interpreted broadly.⁷⁰ An attack can be committed against any civilians, “regardless of their nationality, ethnicity, or any other distinguishing feature,”⁷¹ and can be committed against either nationals or foreigners.⁷² Those targeted may “include

⁶⁰ *Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges against Laurent Gbagbo*, ICC-02/11-01/11, 12 June 2014, para. 225 (hereinafter *Gbagbo 2014*).

⁶¹ Rome Statute, *supra* note 1; see also International Criminal Court, *Elements of Crimes*, document PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2, p. 5 (hereinafter ICC, *Elements of Crimes*).

⁶² See, e.g., *Kunarac 2001*, *supra* note 42, at para. 421 (“The expression ‘directed against’ specifies that in the context of a crime against humanity the civilian population is the primary object of the attack.”).

⁶³ *Kenya Authorization Decision 2010*, *supra* note 41, at para. 82; *Bemba 2009*, *supra* note 41, at para. 76.

⁶⁴ *Katanga 2014*, *supra* note 42, para. 1104.

⁶⁵ *Bemba 2009*, *supra* note 41, at para. 94; see also *Ntaganda 2012*, *supra* note 44, at paras. 20–21.

⁶⁶ *Bemba 2009*, *supra* note 41, at para. 94.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, paras. 95–98.

⁶⁸ See, e.g., *Blaškić 2000*, *supra* note 37, at para. 208, n. 401.

⁶⁹ *Kunarac 2002*, *supra* note 54, at para. 103.

⁷⁰ See, e.g., *Mrkšić 2007*, *supra* note 38, at para. 442; *Kupreškić 2000*, *supra* note 14, at para. 547 (“[A] wide definition of ‘civilian’ and ‘population’ is intended. This is warranted first of all by the object and purpose of the general principles and rules of humanitarian law, in particular by the rules prohibiting crimes against humanity.”); *Kayishema 1999*, *supra* note 38, at para. 127; *Tadić 1997*, *supra* note 37, at para. 643.

⁷¹ *Katanga 2008*, *supra* note 42, at para. 399 (quoting *Tadić 1997*, *supra* note 37, at para. 635); see also *Katanga 2014*, *supra* note 42, at para. 1103.

⁷² See, e.g., *Kunarac 2001*, *supra* note 42, at para. 423.

a group defined by its (perceived) political affiliation.”⁷³ In order to qualify as a “civilian population” during a time of armed conflict, those targeted must be “predominantly” civilian in nature; the presence of certain combatants within the population does not change its character.⁷⁴ This approach is in accordance with other rules arising under international humanitarian law. For example, Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions states: “The presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian character.”⁷⁵ The ICTR Trial Chamber in *Kayishema* found that during a time of peace, “civilian” shall include all persons except those individuals who have a duty to maintain public order and have legitimate means to exercise force to that end at the time they are being attacked.⁷⁶ The status of any given victim must be assessed at the time the offence is committed;⁷⁷ a person should be considered a civilian if there is any doubt as to his or her status.⁷⁸

(20) “Population” does not mean that the entire population of a given geographical location must be subject to the attack;⁷⁹ rather, the term implies the collective nature of the crime as an attack upon multiple victims.⁸⁰ As the ICTY Trial Chamber noted in *Gotovina*, the concept means that the attack is upon more than just “a limited and randomly selected number of individuals.”⁸¹ ICC decisions in the *Bemba case* and the *Kenya Authorization Decision 2010* have adopted a similar approach, declaring that the Prosecutor must establish that the attack was directed against more than just a limited group of individuals.⁸²

⁷³ *Ruto 2012*, *supra* note 46, at para. 164.

⁷⁴ See, e.g., *Katanga 2014*, *supra* note 42, at para. 1105 (holding that the population targeted “must be primarily composed of civilians” and that the “presence of non-civilians in its midst has therefore no effect on its status of civilian population”); *Mrkšić 2007*, *supra* note 38, at para. 442; *Kunarac 2001*, *supra* note 42, at para. 425 (“the presence of certain non-civilians in its midst does not change the character of the population”); *Kordić 2001*, *supra* note 21, at para. 180; *Blaškić 2000*, *supra* note 37, at para. 214 (“the presence of soldiers within an intentionally targeted civilian population does not alter the civilian nature of that population”); *Kupreškić 2000*, *supra* note 14, at para. 549 (“the presence of those actively involved in the conflict should not prevent the characterization of a population as civilian”); *Kayishema 1999*, *supra* note 38, at para. 128; *Akayesu 1998*, *supra* note 36, at para. 582 (“Where there are certain individuals within the civilian population who do not come within the definition of civilians, this does not deprive the population of its civilian character.”); *Tadić 1997*, *supra* note 37, at para. 638.

⁷⁵ Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 50(3), done at Geneva on 8 June 1977, United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 1125, p. 3.

⁷⁶ *Kayishema 1999*, *supra* note 38, at para. 127 (referring to “all persons *except* those who have the duty to maintain public order and have the legitimate means to exercise force. Non-civilians would include, for example, members of the FAR, the RPF, the police and the Gendarmerie Nationale”).

⁷⁷ *Blaškić 2000*, *supra* note 37, at para. 214 (“[T]he specific situation of the victim at the moment the crimes were committed, rather than his status, must be taken into account in determining his standing as a civilian.”); see also *Kordić 2001*, *supra* note 21, at para. 180 (“[I]ndividuals who at one time performed acts of resistance may in certain circumstances be victims of a crime against humanity.”); *Akayesu 1998*, *supra* note 36, at para. 582 (finding that civilian population includes “members of the armed forces who laid down their arms and those persons placed *hors de combat*”).

⁷⁸ *Kunarac 2001*, *supra* note 42, at para. 426.

⁷⁹ See *Kenya Authorization Decision 2010*, *supra* note 41, at para. 82; *Bemba 2009*, *supra* note 41, at para. 77; *Kunarac 2001*, *supra* note 42, at para. 424; *Tadić 1997*, *supra* note 37, at para. 644; see also *Yearbook ... 1994*, vol. II (Part Two), p. 40 (defining crimes against humanity as “inhumane acts of a very serious character involving widespread or systematic violations aimed at the civilian population *in whole or in part*”) (emphasis added).

⁸⁰ See *Tadić 1997*, *supra* note 37, at para. 644.

⁸¹ *Prosecutor v. Gotovina*, *Trial Chamber, Judgment*, Case No. IT-06-90-T, 15 April 2011, para. 1704.

⁸² *Kenya Authorization Decision 2010*, *supra* note 41, at para. 81; *Bemba 2009*, *supra* note 41, at para. 77.

(21) The first part of draft article 3, paragraph 2 (a), refers to “a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population.” Although no such language was contained in the statutory definition of crimes against humanity for the ICTY and ICTR, this language reflects jurisprudence from both these tribunals,⁸³ and was expressly stated in Rome Statute Article 7, paragraph 2 (a). The ICC’s Elements of Crimes provides that the “acts” referred to in Article 7, paragraph 2 (a) “need not constitute a military attack.”⁸⁴ The Trial Chamber in *Katanga* stated that “the attack need not necessarily be military in nature and it may involve any form of violence against a civilian population.”⁸⁵

(22) The second part of draft article 3, paragraph 2 (a), states that the attack must be “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such an attack.” The requirement of a “policy” element did not appear as part of the definition of crimes against humanity in the statutes of international courts and tribunals until the adoption of the Rome Statute.⁸⁶ While the ICTY and ICTR Statutes contained no policy requirement in their definition of crimes against humanity,⁸⁷ some early jurisprudence required it.⁸⁸ Indeed, the *Tadić* Trial Chamber provided an important discussion of the policy element early in the tenure of the ICTY, one that would later influence the drafting of the Rome Statute. The Trial Chamber found that

“the reason that crimes against humanity so shock the conscience of mankind and warrant intervention by the international community is because they are not isolated, random acts of individuals but rather result from a deliberate attempt to target a civilian population. Traditionally this requirement was understood to mean that there must be some form of policy to commit these acts Importantly, however, such a policy need not be formalized and can be deduced from the way in which the acts occur.”⁸⁹

The Trial Chamber further noted that, because of the policy element, such crimes “cannot be the work of isolated individuals alone.”⁹⁰ Later ICTY jurisprudence,

⁸³ See, e.g., *Kunarac 2001*, *supra* note 42, at para. 415 (defining attack as “a course of conduct involving the commission of acts of violence”); *Kayishema 1999*, *supra* note 38, at para. 122 (defining attack as the “event in which the enumerated crimes must form part”); *Akayesu 1998*, *supra* note 36, at para. 581 (“The concept of attack may be defined as a unlawful act of the kind enumerated [in the Statute]. An attack may also be non violent in nature, like imposing a system of apartheid ... or exerting pressure on the population to act in a particular manner ...”).

⁸⁴ See ICC, *Elements of Crimes*, *supra* note 61, at p. 5.

⁸⁵ *Katanga 2014*, *supra* note 42, at para. 1101.

⁸⁶ Article 6 (c) of the Nürnberg Charter contains no explicit reference to a plan or policy. The Nürnberg Judgment, however, did use a “policy” descriptor when discussing article 6 (c) in the context of the concept of the “attack” as a whole. See *Judgment of 30 September 1946*, *supra* note 3, at p. 493 (“The policy of terror was certainly carried out on a vast scale, and in many cases was organized and systematic. The policy of persecution, repression and murder of civilians in Germany before the war of 1939, who were likely to be hostile to the Government, was most ruthlessly carried out.”) Article II (1) (c) of Control Council Law No. 10 also contains no reference to a plan or policy in its definition of crimes against humanity.

⁸⁷ The ICTY Appeals Chamber determined that there was no policy element on crimes against humanity in customary international law, see *Kunarac 2002*, *supra* note 54, at para. 98 (“There was nothing in the Statute or in customary international law at the time of the alleged acts which required proof of the existence of a plan or policy to commit these crimes.”), although that position has been criticized in writings.

⁸⁸ *Tadić 1997*, *supra* note 37, at paras. 644, 653–655 and 626.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 653.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 655 (citing to *Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Chamber, Review of the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence*, Case No. IT-94-2-R61, 20 October 1995, para. 26).

however, downplayed the policy element, regarding it as sufficient simply to prove the existence of a widespread or systematic attack.⁹¹

(23) Prior to the Rome Statute, the work of the ILC in its draft codes tended to require a policy element. The Commission's 1954 Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind defined crimes against humanity as: "Inhuman acts such as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or persecutions, committed against any civilian population on social, political, racial or cultural grounds *by the authorities of a State or by private individuals acting at the instigation or with the toleration of such authorities.*"⁹² The Commission decided to include the State instigation or tolerance requirement in order to exclude inhumane acts committed by private persons on their own without any State involvement.⁹³ At the same time, the definition of crimes against humanity included in the 1954 Draft Code did not include any requirement of scale ("widespread") or systematicity.

(24) The Commission's 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind also recognized a policy requirement, defining crimes against humanity as "any of the following acts, when committed in a systematic manner or on a large scale and *instigated or directed by a Government or by an organization or group.*"⁹⁴ The Commission included this requirement to exclude inhumane acts committed by an individual "acting on his own initiative pursuant to his own criminal plan in the absence of any encouragement or direction from either a Government or a group or organization."⁹⁵ In other words, the policy element sought to exclude "ordinary" crimes of individuals acting on their own initiative and without any connection to a State or organization.

(25) Draft article 3, paragraph 2 (a), contains the same policy element as set forth in Rome Statute Article 7, paragraph 2 (a). The ICC's Elements of Crimes provides that a "policy to commit such attack" requires that "the State or organization actively promote or encourage such an attack against a civilian population,"⁹⁶ and that "a policy may, in exceptional circumstances, be implemented by a deliberate failure to take action, which is consciously aimed at encouraging such attack."⁹⁷

(26) This "policy" element has been addressed in several cases at the ICC.⁹⁸ In *Katanga 2014*, the ICC Trial Chamber stressed that the policy requirement is not synonymous with "systematic," since that would contradict the disjunctive requirement in Article 7 of a "widespread" or "systematic" attack.⁹⁹ Rather, while

⁹¹ See, e.g., *Kunarac 2002*, *supra* note 54, at para. 98; *Kordić 2001*, *supra* note 21, at para. 182 (finding that "the existence of a plan or policy should better be regarded as indicative of the systematic character of offences charged as crimes against humanity"); *Kayishema 1999*, *supra* note 38, at para. 124 ("For an act of mass victimisation to be a crime against humanity, it must include a policy element. Either of the requirements of widespread or systematic are enough to exclude acts not committed as part of a broader policy or plan."); *Akayesu 1998*, *supra* note 36, at para. 580.

⁹² *Yearbook ... 1954*, vol. II, p. 150 (emphasis added).

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ *Yearbook ... 1996*, vol. II (Part Two), p. 47 (emphasis added).

⁹⁵ *Ibid.* In explaining its inclusion of the policy requirement, the Commission noted: "It would be extremely difficult for a single individual acting alone to commit the inhumane acts as envisaged in article 18."

⁹⁶ ICC, *Elements of Crimes*, *supra* note 61, at p. 5.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.* Other precedents also emphasize that deliberate failure to act can satisfy the policy element. See *Kupreškić 2000*, *supra* note 14, at paras. 554-55 ("approved," "condoned," "explicit or implicit approval"); *Yearbook ... 1954*, vol. II, p. 150 (art. 2(11)) ("toleration"); Security Council, Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), document S/1994/674, para. 85.

⁹⁸ See, e.g., *Ntaganda 2012*, *supra* note 44, at para. 24; *Bemba 2009*, *supra* note 41, at para. 81; *Katanga 2008*, *supra* note 42, at para. 396.

⁹⁹ *Katanga 2014*, *supra* note 42, at para. 1112; see also *ibid.*, para. 1101; *Gbagbo 2014*, *supra* note 60,

“systematic” requires high levels of organization and patterns of conduct or recurrence of violence,¹⁰⁰ to “establish a ‘policy’, it need be demonstrated only that the State or organization meant to commit an attack against a civilian population. An analysis of the systematic nature of the attack therefore goes beyond the existence of any policy seeking to eliminate, persecute or undermine a community.”¹⁰¹ Further, the “policy” requirement does not require formal designs or pre-established plans, can be implemented by action or inaction, and can be inferred from the circumstances.¹⁰² The Trial Chamber found that the policy need not be formally established or promulgated in advance of the attack and can be deduced from the repetition of acts, from preparatory activities, or from a collective mobilization.¹⁰³ Moreover, the policy need not be concrete or precise, and it may evolve over time as circumstances unfold.¹⁰⁴

(27) Similarly, in its decision confirming the indictment of Laurent Gbagbo, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber held that “policy” should not be conflated with “systematic.”¹⁰⁵ Specifically, the Trial Chamber stated that “evidence of planning, organisation or direction by a State or organisation may be relevant to prove both the policy and the systematic nature of the attack, although the two concepts should not be conflated as they serve different purposes and imply different thresholds under article 7 (1) and (2) (a) of the Statute.”¹⁰⁶ The policy element requires that the acts be “linked” to a State or organization,¹⁰⁷ and it excludes “spontaneous or isolated acts of violence,” but a policy need not be formally adopted¹⁰⁸ and proof of a particular rationale or motive is not required.¹⁰⁹ In the *Bemba* case the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber found that the attack was pursuant to an organizational policy based on evidence establishing that the MLC troops “carried out attacks following the same pattern.”¹¹⁰

(28) The second part of draft article 3, paragraph 2(a), refers to either a “State” or “organizational” policy to commit such an attack, as does Article 7, paragraph 2(a), of the Rome Statute. In its *Kenya Authorization Decision 2010*, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber suggested that the meaning of “State” in Article 7 (a) (2) is “self-explanatory.”¹¹¹ The Chamber went on to note that a policy adopted by regional or local organs of the State could satisfy the requirement of State policy.¹¹²

(29) Jurisprudence from the ICC suggests that “organizational” includes any organization or group with the capacity and resources to plan and carry out a widespread or systematic attack. For example, the Pre-Trial Chamber in *Katanga* stated: “Such a policy may be made either by groups of persons who govern a specific territory or by any organisation with the capability to commit a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.”¹¹³ An ICC Trial Chamber in *Katanga* held that the organization must have “sufficient resources, means and capacity to bring about the course of conduct or the operation involving the multiple commission of acts ... a set of structures or mechanisms, whatever those may be, that are sufficiently

at para. 208.

¹⁰⁰ *Katanga 2014*, *supra* note 42, at paras. 1111–13.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, para. 1113.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, paras. 1108–1109 and 1113.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, para. 1109; see also *Gbagbo 2014*, *supra* note 60, at paras. 211–212, and 215.

¹⁰⁴ *Katanga 2014*, *supra* note 42, at para. 1110.

¹⁰⁵ *Gbagbo 2014*, *supra* note 60, at paras. 208 and 216.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 216.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 217.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 215.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 214 (footnotes omitted).

¹¹⁰ *Bemba 2009*, *supra* note 41, at para. 115.

¹¹¹ *Kenya Authorization Decision 2010*, *supra* note 41, at para. 89.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ *Katanga 2008*, *supra* note 42, at para. 396 (citing to ICTY and ICTR case law, as well as the Commission’s 1991 Draft Code); see also *Bemba 2009*, *supra* note 41, at para. 81.

efficient to ensure the coordination necessary to carry out an attack directed against a civilian population.”¹¹⁴

(30) In its *Kenya Authorization Decision 2010*, a majority of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber rejected the idea that “only State-like organizations may qualify” as organizations for the purpose of Article 7(2)(a), and further stated that “the formal nature of a group and the level of its organization should not be the defining criterion. Instead ... a distinction should be drawn on whether a group has the capability to perform acts which infringe on basic human values.”¹¹⁵ In 2012, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in *Ruto* stated that, when determining whether a particular group qualifies as an “organization” under Rome Statute Article 7:

the Chamber may take into account a number of factors, *inter alia*: (i) whether the group is under a responsible command, or has an established hierarchy; (ii) whether the group possesses, in fact, the means to carry out a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population; (iii) whether the group exercises control over part of the territory of a State; (iv) whether the group has criminal activities against the civilian population as a primary purpose; (v) whether the group articulates, explicitly or implicitly, an intention to attack a civilian population; (vi) whether the group is part of a larger group, which fulfils some or all of the abovementioned criteria.¹¹⁶

(31) As a consequence of the “policy” potentially emanating from a non-State organization, the definition set forth in paragraphs 1 to 3 of draft article 3 does not require that the offender be a State official or agent. This approach is consistent with the development of crimes against humanity under international law. The Commission, commenting in 1991 on the draft provision on crimes against humanity for what would become the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes, stated “that the draft article does not confine possible perpetrators of the crimes to public officials or representatives alone” and that it “does not rule out the possibility that private individuals with *de facto* power or organized in criminal gangs or groups might also commit the kind of systematic or mass violations of human rights covered by the article; in that case, their acts would come under the draft Code.”¹¹⁷ As discussed previously, the 1996 Draft Code added the requirement that, to be crimes against humanity, the inhumane acts must be “instigated or directed by a Government *or by any organization or group*.”¹¹⁸ In its commentary to this requirement, the Commission noted: “The instigation or direction of a Government or any organization or group, which may or may not be affiliated with a Government, gives the act its great dimension and makes it a crime against humanity imputable to private persons or agents of a State.”¹¹⁹

¹¹⁴ *Katanga 2014*, *supra* note 42, at para. 1119.

¹¹⁵ *Kenya Authorization Decision 2010*, *supra* note 41, at para. 90. This understanding was similarly adopted by the Trial Chamber in *Katanga*, which stated: “That the attack must further be characterised as widespread or systematic does not, however, mean that the organisation that promotes or encourages it must be structured so as to assume the characteristics of a State.” *Katanga 2014*, *supra* note 42, at para. 1120. The Trial Chamber also found that “the ‘general practice accepted as law’ ... adverts to crimes against humanity committed by States and organisations that are not specifically defined as requiring quasi-State characteristics.” *Ibid.*, para. 1121.

¹¹⁶ *Ruto 2012*, *supra* note 46, at para. 185; see also *Kenya Authorization Decision 2010*, *supra* note 41, at para. 93; Corrigendum to *Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire*, ICC-02/11-14-Corr., 15 November 2011, paras. 45–46.

¹¹⁷ *Yearbook ... 1991*, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 103–104.

¹¹⁸ *Yearbook ... 1996*, vol. II (Part Two), p. 47 (article 18) (emphasis added).

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

(32) ICTY jurisprudence accepted the possibility of non-State actors being prosecuted for crimes against humanity. For example, the ICTY Trial Chamber in the *Tadić* case stated that, “the law in relation to crimes against humanity has developed to take into account forces which, although not those of the legitimate government, have de facto control over, or are able to move freely within, defined territory.”¹²⁰ That finding was echoed in the *Limaj* case, where the Trial Chamber viewed the defendant members of the Kosovo Liberation Army as prosecutable for crimes against humanity.¹²¹

(33) In the *Ntaganda* case at the ICC, charges were confirmed against a defendant associated with two paramilitary groups, the *Union des Patriotes Congolais* and the *Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo* in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.¹²² Similarly, in the *Callixte Mbarushimana* case, the prosecutor pursued charges against a defendant associated with the *Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda*, described, according to its statute, as an “armed group seeking to ‘reconquérir et défendre la souveraineté nationale’ of Rwanda.”¹²³ In the case against Joseph Kony relating to the situation in Uganda, the defendant is allegedly associated with the Lord’s Resistance Army, “an armed group carrying out an insurgency against the Government of Uganda and the Ugandan Army”¹²⁴ which “is organised in a military-type hierarchy and operates as an army.”¹²⁵ With respect to the situation in Kenya, the Trial Chamber confirmed charges of crimes against humanity against defendants due to their association in a “network” of perpetrators “comprised of eminent [Orange Democratic Movement Party (ODM)] political representatives, representatives of the media, former members of the Kenyan police and army, Kalenjin elders and local leaders.”¹²⁶ Likewise, charges were confirmed with respect to other defendants associated with “coordinated attacks that were perpetrated by the Mungiki and pro-Party of National Unity (‘PNU’) youth in different parts of Nakuru and Naivasha” that “were targeted at perceived [ODM] supporters using a variety of means of identification such as lists, physical attributes, roadblocks and language.”¹²⁷

“*With knowledge of the attack*”

(34) The third overall requirement is that the perpetrator must commit the act “with knowledge of the attack.” Jurisprudence from the ICTY and ICTR concluded that the perpetrator must have knowledge that there is an attack on the civilian population and, further, that his or her act is a part of that attack.¹²⁸ This two-part approach is reflected in the ICC’s Elements of Crimes, which for each of the proscribed acts requires as that act’s last element: “The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.” Even so,

“the last element should not be interpreted as requiring proof that the perpetrator had knowledge of all characteristics of the attack or the precise

¹²⁰ *Tadić 1997*, *supra* note 37, at para. 654. For further discussion of non-State perpetrators, see *ibid.*, para. 655.

¹²¹ *Prosecutor v. Limaj et al.*, *Judgment, Trial Chamber*, Case No. IT-03-66-T, 30 November 2005, paras. 212–213.

¹²² *Ntaganda 2012*, *supra* note 44, at para. 22.

¹²³ *Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana*, *Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges*, ICC-01/04-01/10, 16 December 2011, para. 2.

¹²⁴ *Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony Issued on 8 July 2005 as Amended on 27 September 2005*, ICC-02/04-01/05, 27 September 2005, para. 5.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 7.

¹²⁶ *Ruto 2012*, *supra* note 46, at para. 182.

¹²⁷ *Prosecutor v. Muthaura et al.*, *Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute*, ICC-01/09-02/11, 23 January 2012, para. 102.

¹²⁸ See, e.g., *Kunarac 2001*, *supra* note 42, at para. 418; *Kayishema 1999*, *supra* note 38, at para. 133.

details of the plan or policy of the State or organization. In the case of an emerging widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, the intent clause of the last element indicates that this mental element is satisfied if the perpetrator intended to further such an attack.”¹²⁹

(35) In its decision confirming the charges against Laurent Gbagbo, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber found that “it is only necessary to establish that the person had knowledge of the attack in general terms.”¹³⁰ Indeed, it need not be proven that the perpetrator knew the specific details of the attack;¹³¹ rather, the perpetrator’s knowledge may be inferred from circumstantial evidence.¹³² Thus, when finding in the *Bemba* case that the MLC troops acted with knowledge of the attack, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber stated that the troops’ knowledge could be “inferred from the methods of the attack they followed,” which reflected a clear pattern.¹³³ In the *Katanga* case, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber found that:

knowledge of the attack and the perpetrator’s awareness that his conduct was part of such attack may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, such as: the accused’s position in the military hierarchy; his assuming an important role in the broader criminal campaign; his presence at the scene of the crimes; his references to the superiority of his group over the enemy group; and the general historical and political environment in which the acts occurred.¹³⁴

(36) Further, the personal motive of the perpetrator for taking part in the attack is irrelevant; the perpetrator does not need to share the purpose or goal of the broader attack.¹³⁵ According to the ICTY Appeals Chamber in *Kunarac*, evidence that the perpetrator committed the prohibited acts for personal reasons could at most “be indicative of a rebuttable assumption that he was not aware that his acts were part of that attack.”¹³⁶ It is the perpetrator’s knowledge or intent that his or her act is part of the attack that is relevant to satisfying this requirement. Additionally, this element will be satisfied where it can be proven that the underlying offence was committed by directly taking advantage of the broader attack, or where the commission of the underlying offence had the effect of perpetuating the broader attack.¹³⁷ For example, in the *Kunarac* case, the perpetrators were accused of various forms of sexual violence, acts of torture, and enslavement in regards to Muslim women and girls. The ICTY Trial Chamber found that the accused had the requisite knowledge because they not only knew of the attack against the Muslim civilian population, but also perpetuated the attack “by directly taking advantage of the situation created” and “fully embraced the ethnicity-based aggression.”¹³⁸ Likewise, an ICC Trial Chamber has held that the perpetrator must know that the act is part of the widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population, but the perpetrator’s motive is irrelevant for the act to be characterized as a crime against humanity. It is not necessary for the perpetrator to

¹²⁹ ICC, *Elements of Crimes*, *supra* note 61, at p. 5.

¹³⁰ *Gbagbo 2014*, *supra* note 60, at para. 214.

¹³¹ *Kunarac 2001*, *supra* note 42, at para. 434 (finding that the knowledge requirement “does not entail knowledge of the details of the attack”).

¹³² See *Blaškić 2000*, *supra* note 37, at para. 259 (finding that knowledge of the broader context of the attack may be surmised from a number of facts, including “the nature of the crimes committed and the degree to which they are common knowledge”); *Tadić 1997*, *supra* note 37, at para. 657 (“While knowledge is thus required, it is examined on an objective level and factually can be implied from the circumstances.”); see also *Kayishema 1999*, *supra* note 38, at para. 134 (finding that “actual or constructive knowledge of the broader context of the attack” is sufficient).

¹³³ *Bemba 2009*, *supra* note 41, at para. 126.

¹³⁴ *Katanga 2008*, *supra* note 42, at para. 402.

¹³⁵ See, e.g., *Kunarac 2002*, *supra* note 54, at para. 103; *Kupreškić 2000*, *supra* note 14, at para. 558.

¹³⁶ *Kunarac 2002*, *supra* note 54, at para. 103.

¹³⁷ See, e.g., *Kunarac 2001*, *supra* note 42, at para. 592.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

have knowledge of all the characteristics or details of the attack, nor is it required for the perpetrator to subscribe to the “State or the organisation’s criminal design.”¹³⁹

Underlying prohibited acts

(37) Like Rome Statute Article 7, draft article 3, paragraph 1, at subparagraphs (a)–(k), lists the underlying prohibited acts for crimes against humanity. These prohibited acts also appear as part of the definition of crimes against humanity contained in Article 18 of the Commission’s 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, although the language differs slightly. An individual who commits one of these acts can commit a crime against humanity; the individual need not have committed multiple acts, but the individual’s act must be “part of” a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population.¹⁴⁰ The underlying offence does not need to be committed in the heat of the attack against the civilian population to satisfy this requirement; the underlying offence can be part of the attack if it can be sufficiently connected to the attack.¹⁴¹

Definitions within the definition

(38) As noted above, draft article 3, paragraph 2(a), defines “attack directed against any civilian population” for the purpose of draft article 3, paragraph 1. The remaining sub-paragraphs (b)–(i) of draft article 3, paragraph 2, define further terms that appear in paragraph 1, specifically: “extermination”; “enslavement”; “deportation or forcible transfer of population”; “torture”; “forced pregnancy”; “persecution”; “the crime of apartheid”; and “enforced disappearance of persons.” Further, article 3, paragraph 3, provides a definition for the term “gender” as it may appear anywhere within these draft articles. These definitions also appear in Rome Statute Article 7 and were viewed by the Commission as relevant for retention in draft article 3.

Paragraph 4

(39) Paragraph 4 of draft article 3 provides: “This draft article is without prejudice to any broader definition provided for in any international instrument or national law.” This provision is similar to Article 1(2) of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which provides: “This article is without prejudice to any international instrument or national legislation which does or may contain provisions of wider application.”¹⁴² Rome Statute Article 10 (appearing in Part II on “Jurisdiction, admissibility, and applicable law”) also contains a “without prejudice clause,” which reads: “Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international law for purposes other than this Statute.”

(40) Paragraph 4 is meant to ensure that the definition of “crimes against humanity” set forth in draft article 3 does not call into question any broader definitions that may exist in other international instruments or national legislation. For example, the definition of “enforced disappearance of persons” as contained in draft article 3 follows Rome Statute Article 7, but differs from the definition contained in the 1992 Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,¹⁴³ in the

¹³⁹ *Katanga 2014*, *supra* note 42, at para. 1125.

¹⁴⁰ See, e.g., *Kunarac 2002*, *supra* note 54, at para. 100; *Tadić 1997*, *supra* note 37, at para. 649.

¹⁴¹ See, e.g., *Prosecutor v. Mrkšić et al., Appeals Chamber, Judgment*, Case No. IT-95-13/1-A, 5 May 2009, para. 41; *Prosecutor v. Naletilić, Trial Chamber, Judgment*, Case No. IT-98-34-T, 31 March 2003, para. 234; *Mrkšić 2007*, *supra* note 38, at para. 438; *Tadić 1999*, *supra* note 21, at para. 249.

¹⁴² Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, done at New York on 10 December 1984, United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 1465, p. 85 (hereinafter “Convention Against Torture”).

¹⁴³ *Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance*, G.A. Res. 47/133 (18 December 1992).

Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons,¹⁴⁴ and in the International Convention for the Protection of all Persons against Enforced Disappearance.¹⁴⁵ Those differences principally are that the latter instruments do not include the element “with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law,” do not include the words “for a prolonged period of time,” and do not refer to organizations as potential perpetrators of the crime when they act without State participation.

(41) In light of such differences, the Commission thought it prudent to include draft article 3, paragraph 4. In essence, while the first three paragraphs of draft article 3 define crimes against humanity for the purpose of the draft articles, this is without prejudice to broader definitions in international instruments or national laws. Thus, if a State wishes to adopt a broader definition in its national law, the present draft articles do not preclude it from doing so. At the same time, inclusion of paragraph 4 is not intended as an invitation for States to develop broader definitions of crimes against humanity in their national laws. Indeed, an important objective of the draft articles is the harmonization of national laws, so that comparable national laws may serve as the basis for robust inter-State cooperation. Moreover, any additional elements adopted in a national law would not fall within the scope of the present draft articles, and therefore would not benefit from the provisions set forth within them, including on extradition and mutual legal assistance.

Article 4 **Obligation of Prevention**

1. Each State undertakes to prevent crimes against humanity, in conformity with international law, including through:

(a) effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other preventive measures in any territory under its jurisdiction or control; and

(b) cooperation with other States, relevant intergovernmental organizations, and, as appropriate, other organizations.

2. No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, such as armed conflict, internal political instability or other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of crimes against humanity.

Commentary

(1) Draft article 4 sets forth an obligation of prevention with respect to crimes against humanity. In considering such an obligation, the Commission viewed it as pertinent to survey existing treaty practice concerning the prevention of crimes and other acts. In many instances, those treaties address acts that, when committed under certain circumstances, can constitute crimes against humanity (for example, genocide, torture, apartheid, or enforced disappearance). As such, the obligation of prevention set forth in those treaties extends as well to prevention of the acts in question when they also qualify as crimes against humanity.

(2) The 1948 Genocide Convention provides in Article I: “The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.”¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁴ Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, done at Belém do Pará on 9 June 1994, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.P/AG/Doc 3114/94.

¹⁴⁵ International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, done at New York on 20 December 2006, United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 2716, p. 3 (hereinafter Enforced Disappearance Convention).

¹⁴⁶ Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, done at Paris on 9

Further, Article V provides: “The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III.” Article VIII provides: “Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III.” As such, the Genocide Convention contains within it several elements relating to prevention: a general obligation to prevent genocide; an obligation to enact national measures to give effect to the provisions of the Convention; and a provision on cooperation of States Parties with United Nations for the prevention of genocide.

(3) Such an obligation of prevention is a feature of most multilateral treaties addressing transnational crimes since the 1960s. Examples include: Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation;¹⁴⁷ Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents;¹⁴⁸ Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid;¹⁴⁹ Convention against the Taking of Hostages;¹⁵⁰ Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;¹⁵¹ Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture;¹⁵² Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons;¹⁵³ Convention on the Safety of

December 1948, United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 78, p. 277.

¹⁴⁷ Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on 23 September 1971, United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 974, p. 178. Article 10 (1) provides: “Contracting States shall, in accordance with international and national law, endeavour to take all practicable measures for the purpose of preventing the offences mentioned in Article 1.”

¹⁴⁸ Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, done at New York on 14 December 1973, United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 1035, p. 167. Article 4 (1) provides: “States Parties shall cooperate in the prevention of the crimes set forth in article 2, particularly by: (a) taking all practicable measures to prevent preparations in their respective territories for the commission of those crimes within or outside their territories”

¹⁴⁹ International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, done at New York on 30 November 1973, United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 1015, p. 243. Article IV (a) provides: “The States Parties to the present Convention undertake ... [t]o adopt any legislative or other measures necessary to suppress as well as to prevent any encouragement of the crime of apartheid and similar segregationist policies or their manifestations and to punish persons guilty of that crime”

¹⁵⁰ International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, done at New York on 17 December 1979, United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 1316, p. 205. Article 4 (1) provides: “States Parties shall cooperate in the prevention of the offences set forth in article 1, particularly by: taking all practicable measures to prevent preparations in their respective territories for the commission of ... offences ... including measures to prohibit in their territories illegal activities of persons, groups and organizations that encourage, instigate, organize or engage in the perpetration of acts of taking of hostages.”

¹⁵¹ Convention Against Torture, *supra* note 142. Article 2(1) provides: “Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.”

¹⁵² Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, done at Cartagena de Indias on 9 December 1985, Organization of American States, *Treaty Series*, No. 67. Article 1 provides: “The State Parties undertake to prevent and punish torture in accordance with the terms of this Convention.” Article 6 provides: “The States Parties likewise shall take effective measures to prevent and punish other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment within their jurisdiction.”

¹⁵³ Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, *supra* note 144. Article 1 (c)–(d) provides: “The States Parties to this Convention undertake ... [t]o cooperate with one another in helping to prevent, punish, and eliminate the forced disappearance of persons; [t]o take legislative, administrative, judicial, and any other measures necessary to comply with the commitments

United Nations and Associated Personnel;¹⁵⁴ International Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings;¹⁵⁵ Convention against Transnational Organized Crime;¹⁵⁶ Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children to the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime;¹⁵⁷ Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;¹⁵⁸ and International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.¹⁵⁹

undertaken in this Convention.”

¹⁵⁴ Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, done at New York on 9 December 1994, United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 2051, p. 363. Article 11 provides: “States Parties shall cooperate in the prevention of the crimes set out in article 9, particularly by: (a) Taking all practicable measures to prevent preparations in their respective territories for the commission of those crimes within or outside their territories; and (b) Exchanging information in accordance with their national law and coordinating the taking of administrative and other measures as appropriate to prevent the commission of those crimes.”

¹⁵⁵ International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, done at New York on 15 December 1997, United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 2149, p. 256. Article 15(a) provides: “States Parties shall cooperate in the prevention of the offences set forth in article 2 ...”

¹⁵⁶ United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, done at New York on 15 November 2000, United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 2225, p. 209. Article 9 (1) provides: “In addition to the measures set forth in article 8 of this Convention, each State Party shall, to the extent appropriate and consistent with its legal system, adopt legislative, administrative or other effective measures to promote integrity and to prevent, detect and punish the corruption of public officials.” Article 9 (2) provides: “Each State Party shall take measures to ensure effective action by its authorities in the prevention, detection and punishment of the corruption of public officials, including providing such authorities with adequate independence to deter the exertion of inappropriate influence on their actions.” Article 29 (1): “Each State Party shall, to the extent necessary, initiate, develop or improve specific training programmes for its law enforcement personnel, including prosecutors, investigating magistrates and customs personnel, and other personnel charged with the prevention, detection and control of the offences covered by this Convention.” Article 31 (1) provides: “States Parties shall endeavour to develop and evaluate national projects and to establish and promote best practices and policies aimed at the prevention of transnational organized crime.”

¹⁵⁷ Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, done at New York on 15 November 2000, United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 2237, p. 319. Article 9 (1) provides: “States Parties shall establish comprehensive policies, programmes and other measures: (a) To prevent and combat trafficking in persons; and (b) To protect victims of trafficking in persons, especially women and children, from revictimization.”

¹⁵⁸ Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, done at New York on 18 December 2002, United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 2375, p. 237. The preamble provides: “Recalling that the effective prevention of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment requires education and a combination of various legislative, administrative, judicial and other measures.” Article 3 provides: “Each State party shall set up, designate or maintain at the domestic level one or several visiting bodies for the prevention of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”

¹⁵⁹ Enforced Disappearance Convention, *supra* note 145. The preamble provides: “Determined to prevent enforced disappearances and to combat impunity for the crime of enforced disappearance.” Article 23 provides: “1. Each State Party shall ensure that the training of law enforcement personnel, civil or military, medical personnel, public officials and other persons who may be involved in the custody or treatment of any person deprived of liberty includes the necessary education and information regarding the relevant provisions of this Convention, in order to: (a) Prevent the involvement of such officials in enforced disappearances; (b) Emphasize the importance of prevention and investigations in relation to enforced disappearances; (c) Ensure that the urgent need to resolve cases of enforced disappearance is recognized. 2. Each State Party shall ensure that orders or instructions prescribing, authorizing or encouraging enforced disappearance are prohibited. Each State Party shall guarantee that a person who refuses to obey such an order will not be punished. 3. Each State Party shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the persons referred to in paragraph 1 of this article who have reason to believe that an enforced disappearance

(4) Some multilateral human rights treaties, even though not focused on the prevention and punishment of crimes as such, contain obligations to prevent and suppress serious human rights violations. Examples include: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;¹⁶⁰ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women;¹⁶¹ and Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence.¹⁶² Some treaties do not refer expressly to “prevention” or “elimination” of the act but, rather, focus on an obligation to take appropriate legislative, administrative, and other measures to “give effect” to or to “implement” the treaty, which may be seen as encompassing necessary or appropriate measures to prevent the act. Examples include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights¹⁶³ and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.¹⁶⁴

(5) International courts and tribunals have addressed these obligations of prevention. The International Court of Justice in the case concerning *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro)* noted that the duty to punish in the context of that convention is connected to but distinct from the duty to prevent. While “one of the most effective ways of preventing criminal acts, in general, is to provide penalties for persons committing such acts, and to impose those penalties effectively on those who commit the acts one is trying to prevent,”¹⁶⁵ the Court found that “the duty to prevent genocide and the duty to punish its perpetrators ... are ... two distinct yet

has occurred or is planned report the matter to their superiors and, where necessary, to the appropriate authorities or bodies vested with powers of review or remedy.”

¹⁶⁰ International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, done at New York on 7 March 1966, United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 660, p. 195. Article 3 provides: “States Parties particularly condemn racial segregation and apartheid and undertake to prevent, prohibit and eradicate all practices of this nature in territories under their jurisdiction.”

¹⁶¹ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, done at New York on 18 December 1979, United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 1249, p. 13. Article 2 provides: “States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women.” Article 3 provides: “States Parties shall take in all fields, in particular in the political, social, economic and cultural fields, all appropriate measures, including legislation, to ensure the full development and advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with men.”

¹⁶² Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence, done at Istanbul on 5 November 2011, Council of Europe, *Treaty Series*, No. 210. Article 4 (2) provides: “Parties condemn all forms of discrimination against women and take, without delay, the necessary legislative and other measures to prevent it, in particular by: embodying in their national constitutions or other appropriate legislation the principle of equality between women and men and ensuring the practical realisation of this principle; prohibiting discrimination against women, including through the use of sanctions, where appropriate; abolishing laws and practices which discriminate against women.”

¹⁶³ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, done at New York on 16 December 1966, United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 999, p. 171. Article 2 (2): “Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.”

¹⁶⁴ Convention on the Rights of the Child, done at New York on 20 November 1989, United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 1577, p. 3. Article 4 provides: “States Parties shall undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative, and other measures for the implementation of the rights recognized in the present Convention.”

¹⁶⁵ *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro)*, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 219 at para. 426 (hereinafter *Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro*).

connected obligations.”¹⁶⁶ Indeed, the “obligation on each contracting State to prevent genocide is both normative and compelling. It is not merged in the duty to punish, nor can it be regarded as simply a component of that duty.”¹⁶⁷

(6) Such treaty practice, jurisprudence, and the well-settled acceptance by States that crimes against humanity are crimes under international law that should be punished whether or not committed in time of armed conflict, and whether or not criminalized under national law, imply that States have undertaken an obligation to prevent crimes against humanity. Paragraph 1 of draft article 4, therefore, formulates an obligation of prevention in a manner similar to that set forth in Article I of the Genocide Convention, by beginning: “Each State undertakes to prevent crimes against humanity”

(7) In the case concerning *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro)*, the International Court analyzed the meaning of “undertake to prevent” as contained in Article I of the 1948 Genocide Convention. At the provisional measures phase, the Court determined that such an undertaking imposes “a clear obligation” on the parties “to do all in their power to prevent the commission of any such acts in the future.”¹⁶⁸ At the merits phase, the Court described the ordinary meaning of the word “undertake” in that context as

“to give a formal promise, to bind or engage oneself, to give a pledge or promise, to agree, to accept an obligation. It is a word regularly used in treaties setting out the obligations of the Contracting Parties It is not merely hortatory or purposive. The undertaking is unqualified ... ; and it is not to be read merely as an introduction to later express references to legislation, prosecution and extradition. Those features support the conclusion that Article I, in particular its undertaking to prevent, creates obligations distinct from those which appear in the subsequent Articles.”¹⁶⁹

The undertaking to prevent crimes against humanity, as formulated in paragraph 1 of draft article 4, is intended to express the same kind of legally binding effect upon States; it, too, is not merely hortatory or purposive, and is not merely an introduction to later draft articles.

(8) In the same case, the International Court further noted that, when engaging in measures of prevention, “it is clear that every State may only act within the limits permitted by international law.”¹⁷⁰ The Commission deemed it important to express that requirement explicitly in paragraph 1 of draft article 4, and therefore has included a clause indicating that any measures of prevention must be “in conformity with international law.” Thus, the measures undertaken by a State to fulfill this obligation must be consistent with the rules of international law, including rules on the use of force set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, international humanitarian law, and human rights law. At the same time, the State is only obligated to do what it legally can do under international law to prevent crimes against humanity.

(9) As set forth in paragraph 1 of draft article 4, this obligation of prevention either expressly or implicitly contains four elements. First, by this undertaking, States have an obligation not “to commit such acts through their own organs, or persons over

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 425.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 220 at para. 427.

¹⁶⁸ *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia & Montenegro))*, Order on Provisional Measures, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 22 at para. 45.

¹⁶⁹ *Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro*, *supra* note 165, p. 111 at para. 162.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 221 at para. 430.

whom they have such firm control that their conduct is attributable to the State concerned under international law.”¹⁷¹ According to the International Court, when considering the analogous obligation of prevention contained in Article I of the Convention against Genocide:¹⁷²

“Under Article I the States parties are bound to prevent such an act, which it describes as “a crime under international law”, being committed. The Article does not *expressis verbis* require States to refrain from themselves committing genocide. However, in the view of the Court, taking into account the established purpose of the Convention, the effect of Article I is to prohibit States from themselves committing genocide. Such a prohibition follows, first, from the fact that the Article categorizes genocide as “a crime under international law”: by agreeing to such a categorization, the States parties must logically be undertaking not to commit the act so described. Secondly, it follows from the expressly stated obligation to prevent the commission of acts of genocide. That obligation requires the States parties, *inter alia*, to employ the means at their disposal, in circumstances to be described more specifically later in this Judgment, to prevent persons or groups not directly under their authority from committing an act of genocide or any of the other acts mentioned in Article III. It would be paradoxical if States were thus under an obligation to prevent, so far as within their power, commission of genocide by persons over whom they have a certain influence, but were not forbidden to commit such acts through their own organs, or persons over whom they have such firm control that their conduct is attributable to the State concerned under international law. In short, the obligation to prevent genocide necessarily implies the prohibition of the commission of genocide.”¹⁷³

(10) The Court also decided that the substantive obligation reflected in Article I was not, on its face, limited by territory but, rather, applied “to a State wherever it may be acting or may be able to act in ways appropriate to meeting the obligation [] in question.”¹⁷⁴

(11) A breach of this obligation not to commit directly such acts implicates the responsibility of the State if the conduct at issue is attributable to the State pursuant to the rules on State responsibility. Indeed, in the context of disputes that may arise under the Genocide Convention, Article IX refers, *inter alia*, to disputes “relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide.” Although much of the focus of the Genocide Convention is upon prosecuting individuals for the crime of genocide, the International Court of Justice stressed that the breach of the obligation to prevent is not a *criminal* violation by the State but, rather, concerns a breach of international law that engages traditional State responsibility.¹⁷⁵ The Court’s approach is consistent with views previously expressed by the Commission,¹⁷⁶ including in commentary to the 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: “Where crimes against international law are committed by State officials, it will often be the

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 113 at para. 166.

¹⁷² It is noted that the Court cautioned that the “content of the duty to prevent varies from one instrument to another, according to the wording of the relevant provisions, and depending on the nature of the acts to be prevented,” and hence the Court’s decision did not “purport to establish a general jurisprudence applicable to all cases where a treaty instrument, or other binding legal norm, includes an obligation for States to prevent certain acts.” *Ibid.*, p. 220 at para. 429.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 113 at para. 166.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 120 at para. 183.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 114 at para. 167 (finding that international responsibility is “quite different in nature from criminal responsibility”).

¹⁷⁶ *Yearbook ... 1998*, Vol. II (Part Two), p. 65 at para. 248 (finding that the Genocide Convention “did not envisage State crime or the criminal responsibility of States in its article IX concerning State responsibility”).

case that the State itself is responsible for the acts in question or for failure to prevent or punish them.”¹⁷⁷

(12) Second, by the undertaking set forth in paragraph 1 of draft article 4, States have an obligation “to employ the means at their disposal ... to prevent persons or groups not directly under their authority from committing” such acts.¹⁷⁸ For the latter, the State Party is expected to use its best efforts (a due diligence standard) when it has a “capacity to influence effectively the action of persons likely to commit, or already committing, genocide,” which in turn depends on the State Party’s geographic, political, and other links to the persons or groups at issue.¹⁷⁹ Such a standard with respect to the obligation of prevention in the Genocide Convention was analyzed by the International Court as follows:

“[I]t is clear that the obligation in question is one of conduct and not one of result, in the sense that a State cannot be under an obligation to succeed, whatever the circumstances, in preventing the commission of genocide: the obligation of States parties is rather to employ all means reasonably available to them, so as to prevent genocide so far as possible. A State does not incur responsibility simply because the desired result is not achieved; responsibility is however incurred if the State manifestly failed to take all measures to prevent genocide which were within its power, and which might have contributed to preventing the genocide. In this area the notion of “due diligence,” which calls for an assessment *in concreto*, is of critical importance. Various parameters operate when assessing whether a State has duly discharged the obligation concerned. The first, which varies greatly from one State to another, is clearly the capacity to influence effectively the action of persons likely to commit, or already committing, genocide. This capacity itself depends, among other things, on the geographical distance of the State concerned from the scene of the events, and on the strength of the political links, as well as links of all other kinds, between the authorities of that State and the main actors in the events. The State’s capacity to influence must also be assessed by legal criteria, since it is clear that every State may only act within the limits permitted by international law; seen thus, a State’s capacity to influence may vary depending on its particular legal position vis-à-vis the situations and persons facing the danger, or the reality, of genocide. On the other hand, it is irrelevant whether the State whose responsibility is in issue claims, or even proves, that even if it had employed all means reasonably at its disposal, they would not have sufficed to prevent the commission of genocide. As well as being generally difficult to prove, this is irrelevant to the breach of the obligation of conduct in question, the more so since the possibility remains that the combined efforts of several States, each complying with its obligation to prevent, might have achieved the result — averting the commission of genocide — which the efforts of only one State were insufficient to produce.”¹⁸⁰

At the same time, the Court maintained that “a State can be held responsible for breaching the obligation to prevent genocide only if genocide was actually committed.”¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁷ *Yearbook ... 2001*, Vol. II (Part. Two), p. 142 (para. 3 of the Commentary to Article 58).

¹⁷⁸ *Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro*, *supra* note 165, p. 113 at para. 166.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 221 at para. 430.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 221 at para. 431; see *Yearbook ... 2001*, vol. II (Part Two), p. 27 (*Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts*, art. 13 (3): “The breach of an international obligation requiring a State to prevent a given event occurs when the event occurs ...”).

(13) Third, and following from the above, the undertaking set forth in paragraph 1 of draft article 4 obliges States to pursue actively and in advance measures designed to help prevent the offense from occurring, such as by taking “effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other preventive measures in any territory under their jurisdiction or control,” as indicated in subparagraph (a). This text is inspired by Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Convention against Torture, which provides: “Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.”¹⁸²

(14) The term “other preventive measures” rather than just “other measures” is used to reinforce the point that the measures at issue in this clause relate solely to prevention. The term “effective” implies that the State is expected to keep the measures that it has taken under review and, if they are deficient, to improve them through more effective measures. In commenting on the analogous provision in the Convention against Torture, the Committee against Torture has stated:

“States parties are obligated to eliminate any legal or other obstacles that impede the eradication of torture and ill-treatment; and to take positive effective measures to ensure that such conduct and any recurrences thereof are effectively prevented. States parties also have the obligation continually to keep under review and improve their national laws and performance under the Convention in accordance with the Committee's concluding observations and views adopted on individual communications. If the measures adopted by the State Party fail to accomplish the purpose of eradicating acts of torture, the Convention requires that they be revised and/or that new, more effective measures be adopted.”¹⁸³

(15) As to the specific types of measures that shall be pursued by a State, in 2015 the Human Rights Council of the United Nations adopted a resolution on the prevention of genocide¹⁸⁴ which provides some insights into the kinds of measures that are expected in fulfillment of Article I of the Genocide Convention. Among other things, the resolution: (1) reiterated “the responsibility of each individual State to protect its population from genocide, which entails the prevention of such a crime, including incitement to it, through appropriate and necessary means”;¹⁸⁵ (2) encouraged “Member States to build their capacity to prevent genocide through the development of individual expertise and the creation of appropriate offices within Governments to strengthen the work on prevention”;¹⁸⁶ and (3) encouraged “States to consider the appointment of focal points on the prevention of genocide, who could cooperate and exchange information and best practices among themselves and with the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, relevant United Nations bodies and with regional and subregional mechanisms.”¹⁸⁷

¹⁸² Convention Against Torture, *supra* note 142, at art. 2 (1).

¹⁸³ See Committee Against Torture, General Comment No. 2, para. 4 (CAT/C/GC/2/CRP.1/Rev.4) (2007). Similar reasoning exists in the area of environmental protection. See, e.g. *Serap v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, Judgment*, No. ECW/CCJ/Jud/18/12, 14 December 2012, para. 105 (Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States) (“... the adoption of the legislation, no matter how advanced it may be, or the creation of agencies inspired by the world's best models, as well as the allocation of financial resources in equitable amounts, may still fall short of compliance with international obligations in matters of environmental protection if these measures just remain on paper and are not accompanied by additional and concrete measures aimed at preventing the occurrence of damage ...”).

¹⁸⁴ Document A/HRC/28/L.25 (23 March 2015), at <<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G15/061/19/PDF/G1506119.pdf?OpenElement>> (visited 22 June 2015).

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 2.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 3.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 4.

(16) In the regional context, the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms¹⁸⁸ contains no express obligation to “prevent” violations of the Convention, but the European Court of Human Rights has construed Article 2, paragraph 1 (on the right to life) to contain such an obligation and to require that appropriate measures of prevention be taken, such as “putting in place an appropriate legal and administrative framework to deter the commission of offences against the person, backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and punishment of breaches of such provisions.”¹⁸⁹ At the same time, the Court has recognized that the State Party’s obligation in this regard is limited.¹⁹⁰ Likewise, although the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights¹⁹¹ contains no express obligation to “prevent” violations of the Convention, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, when construing the obligation of the States Parties to “ensure” the free and full exercise of the rights recognized by the Convention,¹⁹² has found that this obligation implies a “duty to prevent,” which in turn requires the State Party to pursue certain steps. The Court has said: “This duty to prevent includes all those means of a legal, political, administrative and cultural nature that promote the protection of human rights and ensure that any violations are considered and treated as illegal acts, which, as such, may lead to the punishment of those responsible and the obligation to indemnify the victims for damages. It is not possible to make a detailed list of all such measures, since they vary with the law and the conditions of each State Party.”¹⁹³ Similar reasoning has animated the Court’s approach to interpretation of Article 6 of the 1985 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture.¹⁹⁴

(17) Thus, the specific preventive measures that any given State shall pursue with respect to crimes against humanity will depend on the context and risks at issue for that State with respect to these offenses. Such an obligation usually would oblige the State at least to: (1) adopt national laws and policies as necessary to establish awareness of the criminality of the act and to promote early detection of any risk of its commission; (2) continually to keep those laws and policies under review and as necessary improve them; (3) pursue initiatives that educate governmental officials as to the State’s obligations under the draft articles; (4) implement training programmes

¹⁸⁸ European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, done at Rome on 4 November 1950, United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 213, p. 221; Council of Europe, *Treaty Series*, No. 5.

¹⁸⁹ *Makaratzis v. Greece*, Application No. 50385/99, ECHR 2004, para. 57; see *Kiliç v. Turkey*, Application No. 22492/93, ECHR 2000, para. 62 (finding that Article 2, paragraph 1, obliged a State Party not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps within its domestic legal system to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction).

¹⁹⁰ *Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey*, Application No. 22535/93, ECHR 2000, para. 86 (“Bearing in mind the difficulties in policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human conduct and the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources, the positive obligation [of Article 2, paragraph 1,] must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities.”); see also *Kerimova a.o. v. Russia*, Application Nos. 17170/04, 20792/04, 22448/04, 23360/04, 5681/05, and 5684/05, ECHR 2011, para. 246; *Osman v. United Kingdom*, Application No. 87/1997/871/1083, ECHR 1998, para. 116.

¹⁹¹ American Convention on Human Rights, done at San Jose on 22 November 1969, Organization of American States, *Treaty Series*, No. 36.

¹⁹² Article 1 (1) reads: The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination”

¹⁹³ *Velasquez Rodríguez v. Honduras*, Judgment, 4 Inter-Am. CHR (ser. C), 21 July 1989, para. 175; see also *Gómez-Paquiayauri Brothers v. Peru*, Judgment, Inter-Am. CHR (Ser. C), no. 110, 8 July 2004, para. 155; *Juan Humberto Sánchez v. Honduras*, Judgment, Inter-Am. CHR (Ser. C), no. 99, 7 June 2003, paras. 137, 142.

¹⁹⁴ *Tibi v. Ecuador*, Judgment, Inter-Am. CHR (Ser. C) No. 114, 7 September 2004, para. 159; see also *Gómez-Paquiayauri Brothers v. Peru*, *supra* note 193, at para. 155.

for police, military, militia, and other relevant personnel as necessary to help prevent the commission of crimes against humanity; and (5) once the proscribed act is committed, fulfill in good faith any other obligations to investigate and either prosecute or extradite offenders, since doing so serves, in part, to deter future acts by others.¹⁹⁵ Such measures, of course, already may be in place for most States, since the underlying wrongful acts associated with crimes against humanity (such as murder, torture, or rape) are already proscribed in most national legal systems. Here, too, international responsibility of the State arises if the State Party has failed to use its best efforts to organize the governmental and administrative apparatus, as necessary and appropriate, to minimize the likelihood of the proscribed act being committed.

(18) Draft article 4, paragraph 1 (a), refers to a State pursuing effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other preventive measures “in any territory under its jurisdiction or control.” This formula is to be understood in the same way as prior topics of the Commission addressing prevention in other contexts, such as prevention of environmental harm.¹⁹⁶ Such a formulation covers the territory of a State, but also covers activities carried out in other territory under the State’s control. As the Commission has previously explained,

“it covers situations in which a State is exercising *de facto* jurisdiction, even though it lacks jurisdiction *de jure*, such as in cases of unlawful intervention, occupation and unlawful annexation. Reference may be made, in this respect, to the advisory opinion by ICJ in the *Namibia* case. In that advisory opinion, the Court, after holding South Africa responsible for having created and maintained a situation which the Court declared illegal and finding South Africa under an obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia, nevertheless attached certain legal consequences to the *de facto* control of South Africa over Namibia.”¹⁹⁷

(19) Fourth, by the undertaking set forth in paragraph 1 of draft article 4, States have an obligation to pursue certain forms of cooperation, not just with each other but also

¹⁹⁵ For comparable measures with respect to prevention of specific types of human rights violations, see Human Rights Committee, General Comment 3, para. 2 (29 July 1981); Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 6, paras. 1–2 (A/43/38) (1988); Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 15 (A/45/38) (1990); Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 19, para. 9 (A/47/38) (1992); Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 5, para. 9 (CRC/GC/2003/5) (2003); Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 6, paras. 50–63 (CRC/GC/2005/6) (2005); Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation 31, para. 5 (CERD/C/GC/31/Rev.4) (2005); see also *Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law*, G.A. Res. 60/147 (16 December 2005), Annex, para. 3 (a) (“The obligation to respect, ensure respect for and implement international human rights law and international humanitarian law as provided for under the respective bodies of law, includes, *inter alia*, the duty to ... [t]ake appropriate legislative and administrative and other appropriate measures to prevent violations.”).

¹⁹⁶ *Yearbook ... 2001*, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 150–51 at paras. (7)–(12) (commentary to draft article 1 of the Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities).

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 151 at para. (12) (citing to *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)*, *Advisory Opinion*, *I.C.J. Reports 1971*, p. 16, p. 54 at para. 118); see also *Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2006*, vol. II (Part Two), p. 70 at para. (25) (commentary to draft principle 2 of the Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities); *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, *Advisory Opinion*, *I.C.J. Reports 1996*, p. 226, p. 242 at para. 29 (referring to the general obligation of States to ensure that activities within their “jurisdiction and control” respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond national control).

with organizations, such as the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. The duty of States to cooperate in the prevention of crimes against humanity arises, in the first instance, from Article 1, paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations,¹⁹⁸ which indicates that one of the purposes of the Charter is to “achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of ... [a] humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all” Further, in Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter, all Members of the United Nations pledge “to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of” certain purposes, including “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all” Specifically with respect to preventing crimes against humanity, the General Assembly of the United Nations recognized in its 1973 Principles of International Co-operation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity a general responsibility for inter-State cooperation and intra-State action to prevent the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Among other things, the Assembly declared that “States shall co-operate with each other on a bilateral and multilateral basis with a view to halting and preventing war crimes and crimes against humanity, and shall take the domestic and international measures necessary for that purpose.”¹⁹⁹

(20) Consequently, subparagraph (b) of draft article 4 indicates that States shall cooperate with each other to prevent crimes against humanity and cooperate with relevant intergovernmental organizations. The term “relevant” is intended to indicate that cooperation with any particular intergovernmental organization will depend, among other things, on the organization’s functions, on the relationship of the State to that organization, and on the context in which the need for cooperation arises. Further, sub-paragraph (b) provides that States shall cooperate, as appropriate, with other organizations. These organizations include non-governmental organizations that could play an important role in the prevention of crimes against humanity in specific countries. The term “as appropriate” is used to indicate that the obligation of cooperation, in addition to being contextual in nature, does not extend to these organizations to the same extent as it does to States and relevant intergovernmental organizations.

(21) Draft article 4, paragraph 2, indicates that no exceptional circumstances may be invoked as a justification for the offence. This text is inspired by Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Convention against Torture,²⁰⁰ but has been refined to fit better in the context of crimes against humanity. The expression “state of war or threat of war” has been replaced by the expression “armed conflict,” as was done in draft article 2. In addition, the words “such as” rather than “whether” are used to stress that the examples given are not meant to be exhaustive.

(22) Comparable language may be found in other treaties addressing serious crimes at the global or regional level. For example, Article 1, paragraph 2, of the 2006 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced

¹⁹⁸ Charter of the United Nations, done at San Francisco on 26 June 1945.

¹⁹⁹ *Principles of International Cooperation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity*, G.A. Res. 3074 (XXVIII) (3 December 1973), para. 3.

²⁰⁰ Convention Against Torture, *supra* note 142. Article 2 (2) provides: “No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.”

Disappearance contains similar language,²⁰¹ as does Article 5 of the 1985 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture.²⁰²

(23) One advantage of this formulation with respect to crimes against humanity is that it is drafted in a manner that can speak to the conduct of either State or non-State actors. At the same time, the paragraph is addressing this issue only in the context of the obligation of prevention and not, for example, in the context of possible defenses by an individual in a criminal proceeding or other grounds for excluding criminal responsibility, which will be addressed at a later stage.

²⁰¹ Enforced Disappearance Convention, *supra* note 145. Article 1 (2) provides: “No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification for enforced disappearance.”

²⁰² Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, *supra* note 152. Article 5 provides: “The existence of circumstances such as a state of war, threat of war, state of siege or of emergency, domestic disturbance or strife, suspension of constitutional guarantees, domestic political instability, or other public emergencies or disasters shall not be invoked or admitted as justification for the crime of torture.”