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CONTENTS

	Page
Agenda items 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38 (continued):	
Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security	
World Disarmament Conference: report of the Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference	
General and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament	
Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use: report of the Secretary-General	
Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament	
Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests:	
(a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament;	
(b) Report of the Secretary-General	
Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2935 (XXVII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General	
Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace: report of the <i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on the Indian Ocean	153

Chairman: Mr. Otto R. BORCH (Denmark).

AGENDA ITEMS 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 AND 38
(continued)*

Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security
World Disarmament Conference: report of the Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference (A/8990 and Add.1, A/9033, A/9041, A/9228)
General and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/9039, A/9141, A/9293)
Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use: report of the Secretary-General (A/9207 and Corr.1)
Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/9141)

* Resumed from the 1935th meeting.

Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests (A/9081, A/9084, A/9086, A/9093, A/9107, A/9109, A/9110, A/9117, A/9166, A/C.1/1031, 1036):
(a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/9141);
(b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/9208)

Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2935 (XXVII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General (A/9137, A/9209)

Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace: report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean (A/9029)

1. Mr. HOLLAI (Hungary): Mr. Chairman, under rule 112 of the rules of procedure, I shall dispense with extending my congratulations, but I cannot hide the satisfaction of my Hungarian delegation with the Committee's selection of its officers. I should like to offer you, as well as the other officers of the Committee, our best wishes and to assure you of our readiness to co-operate.

2. The special importance of the question of convening a world disarmament conference has prompted my delegation to take up this issue separately, while at a later stage we shall express our views on other questions of disarmament.

3. Hungary, as a peace-loving socialist country in the heart of Europe, is very interested in the strengthening of international peace and security, friendship and co-operation among nations. I must add that my country, as one of the members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, attaches great importance to any proposal aimed at achieving progress in the field of disarmament. Consequently, Hungary whole-heartedly welcomed the proposal made by the Soviet Union at the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly for the convening of a world disarmament conference.

4. We did so because we considered and continue to consider that the convening of a world disarmament conference could give a new impetus to disarmament talks held in various forums on the bilateral, regional or multilateral level. The timeliness of the proposal is demonstrated by the fact that the overwhelming majority of Member States voted in favour of the relevant resolutions in 1971 and 1972.

5. The proposal for the convening of a world disarmament conference continues to receive wide international support from States Members of the United Nations and from world

public opinion too. In this connexion I should like to recall the Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at Algiers in September 1973 and the many statements made during the general debate. All of them favour the early convening of a world disarmament conference with the participation of all countries. We hold the view that disarmament is of vital importance for all countries of the world since they would all benefit from the results. Last but not least, the world situation, which is characterized by international détente, calls for the holding of the conference.

6. It is in this spirit that we joined the Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference established under the terms of resolution 2930 (XXVII). In our opinion, the President of the General Assembly, at its twenty-seventh session, acted correctly and wisely when he appointed the members of the Special Committee after consultations with the various regional groups.

7. The note of the Secretary-General contained in document A/9228 and the statement at the 1934th meeting by Mr. Hoveyda, the representative of Iran, under whose able guidance the Special Committee has worked on an informal basis, have clearly demonstrated the difficult situation of the Special Committee and the problems we are facing with respect to the preparation and convening of a world disarmament conference. The reasons for this state of affairs are well known, but despite all its difficulties the Committee held eight meetings. During those meetings members of the Committee made proposals which deserve careful consideration when we continue our efforts aimed at the preparation and convening of the world disarmament conference. That is our task now, as we understand it.

8. Before turning to some specific question I should like to join those delegations which expressed their appreciation of Mr. Hoveyda's guidance of the Special Committee's work. We agree with him when he states that: "... the unofficial exchanges of views among the designated members was deemed useful, since it had pinpointed questions and defined the areas of agreement and disagreement;" [1934th meeting, para. 113.]

9. I wish now to outline the position of the Hungarian delegation regarding some aspects of the world disarmament conference and some suggestions made in various forums.

10. My delegation fully shares the view expressed by many delegations during the general debate that every effort should be made to promote the preparation and convening of the world disarmament conference. Consequently we are of the opinion that the Special Committee should continue working under its mandate. The fact that some nuclear Powers are not yet ready to take their seats on the Committee should not prevent it from discharging its task. I take this opportunity to express the hope that these Powers will find it possible, the sooner the better, to participate in the work of the Special Committee. That is why we cannot support the idea that the four reserved seats should be assigned to delegations which have expressed the desire to participate in the Committee's work.

11. At the same time the Hungarian delegation is open-minded and flexible concerning the desire expressed by

some delegations as to a possible enlargement of the Special Committee's membership. If an enlargement of the Committee provides a new impetus for its work, we shall not fail to give it our support, provided that the workable size and the limited composition of this body are still based on equitable geographical and political representation. If and when the enlargement of the Committee takes place, the Hungarian delegation will be strongly in favour of the participation in it of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany which are both militarily important States.

12. The continued absence of four nuclear Powers from the work of the Special Committee has given rise to the idea of limiting its membership to non-nuclear-weapon States in order to overcome the existing difficulties. We think that this is an entirely inappropriate idea, because it would keep a nuclear Power that is ready to do so from participating in the work of the Special Committee. It would be a retrograde step, and consequently my delegation cannot give its support to this idea.

13. In conclusion, I should like to reaffirm my delegation's full support for the cause of convening the world disarmament conference, and to restate that we are prepared to work towards that goal, in the Special Committee. I wish to express the hope that the General Assembly, at its current session, will adopt a resolution facilitating the preparation and convening of the World Disarmament Conference. My delegation will do its best to achieve that goal.

14. Mr. ROSCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): At the 1934th meeting, our delegation spoke here on the question of the convening of a world disarmament conference. Today our delegation would wish to speak and state its views on other questions related to disarmament which are on the agenda of the First Committee.

15. Among the most important problems of modern international life with which people are concerned from day to day are those relating to disarmament. A large number of States have been continuing to attach the utmost importance to disarmament. The problem can be solved only through the active participation of all States Members of the United Nations, whose Charter provides that the General Assembly is entitled to consider general principles of international co-operation in the solution of this major task. The Soviet Union attaches considerable significance to the problem of disarmament since its solution will ensure the achievement of international security, the establishment of durable peace and will promote the welfare of peoples. Consideration of disarmament items at the present session of the General Assembly is taking place in a qualitatively new set of circumstances which in spite of the existence of hotbeds of tension and conflict, is characterized on the whole by favourable transformations towards relaxation of international tensions. The policy of peaceful coexistence of States belonging to different social structures is giving positive results. It is highly important for political détente in the world to be accompanied by military détente and for all States and peoples to enjoy the benefits of the emerging process of improvement in the international climate.

16. We note with satisfaction that in the field of disarmament, through the common efforts of many States, it has become possible to conclude a number of important multilateral agreements which play a significant role in international life. A prominent place among them is occupied by treaties of the following kind: the prohibition of the testing of nuclear weapons in three environments, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the prohibition of biological weapons, and others. Of great significance in the improvement of the international climate are bilateral Soviet-American agreements, in particular on the limitation of strategic weapons and the prevention of nuclear war. These treaties and agreements mark a considerable contribution to the solution of the problems of disarmament in the nuclear age. Historically they will be remembered by having been brought about by the efforts of Governments to decrease and halt the nuclear arms race. One of the most important tasks of the present lies in the proposition that it is necessary to strengthen constantly the agreements achieved on questions of limitation of armaments and disarmament and to secure participation in them of the widest possible number of States. The solution of these problems, to a large extent, will govern the prospects for the attainment of agreement on the implementation of other measures in the field of disarmament and in the strengthening of international peace.

17. In assessing the situation concerning the solution of the problems of disarmament on the whole, we are bound, unfortunately, to observe that the arms race has not been stopped; that military expenditures continue to consume a large share of the incomes of States. The continuing growth in armaments is having an unfavourable effect upon the solution of tasks related to international security. The situation with respect to finding a solution to the problem of disarmament is of great concern to numerous States.

18. The Soviet Union shares this concern. In order to contribute to the limitation of the arms race and to arrest it, the Soviet Union has presented, and is defending in various international forums, a wide disarmament programme. At the present session of the General Assembly, the USSR has come forward with a proposal on the reduction of the military budgets of States that are permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent, and the utilization of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries. This proposal was presented in the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. Gromyko, on 25 September at the 2126th plenary meeting. A further detailed explanation and the provision of grounds for this proposal was made by the delegation of the USSR at the 2154th plenary meeting of 15 October of this year.

19. The proposal concerning limitation of the military budgets of States and the utilization of the funds thus saved for purposes of economic development is a concrete manifestation of the great efforts put forward in an attempt to achieve a positive solution to the problems of disarmament. Proposals of this kind have been made by the Soviet Union in the past in the 1950s and in the 1960s. However, in view of the existence at that time of the cold war, of hostility and distrust between States, that proposal could not be realized. It was necessary then to secure a substantial change in détente in international relations to achieve an

end to the cold war. At the present time it is possible to note that such a change has taken place and that the necessary conditions now exist for a positive solution of the problem of the reduction of military expenditures of States and, in the first instance, those of the permanent members of the Security Council. A reduction in the military budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council would be an important move towards the solution of the cessation of the arms race. The Soviet delegation is confident that a proposal on this question will be favourably received by the majority of States, and that the General Assembly will adopt a recommendation to implement this proposal.

20. An important contribution to the solution of the problems of disarmament for the purpose of enlisting an extensive number of countries to participate in this, including all nuclear-weapon States possessing significant armament, was the initiative of the USSR for the convening of a world disarmament conference. As has already been pointed out in the statement of our delegation in the First Committee at the 1934th meeting, the holding of such a conference, once it has been properly prepared, will contribute to a solution of the problems of disarmament. The time is also ripe for such solutions. It would help to bring about a weakening of the arms race and, at the same time, it would also contribute to a further normalization in the international situation. As a result of the work of the present session of the General Assembly, we hope that the practical preparation of such a conference will be accelerated and that this international action will at last be translated into practical reality.

21. Of great significance in the weakening and elimination of the threat of nuclear war would be the early implementation of the solemn statement made at the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly on behalf of States Members of the United Nations concerning the rejection of the use of force in international relations or the threat of the use of force and the prohibition for all time of the use of nuclear weapons [*resolution 2936 (XXVII)*]. In this connexion, the Assembly recommended that the Security Council should adopt also, as early as possible, corresponding measures for the total implementation of this statement. The task at the present time is for the Security Council to adopt positive solutions to this question.

22. For its part, the Soviet Union has officially stated that it is ready to agree with all nuclear Powers and to conclude the necessary agreements concerning the non-use of force, including nuclear weapons. The statement of the USSR on this question is a concrete step with the purpose of eliminating from the lives of peoples the threat of nuclear war and of war in general. The readiness of the Soviet Government to agree on this question with other nuclear Powers opens broad possibilities for the solution of the international problem of the security of all States. There is no need to emphasize that this strict compliance by States with the solemn statement of the General Assembly on this question would substantially contribute to the strengthening of the cause of peace.

23. Among the specific questions of disarmament actively considered over the past few years at sessions of the General Assembly and in the Committee on Disarmament is the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons. Many

international forums are devoting considerable attention to this question. In the Political Declaration of the Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, *inter alia*, in this connexion it is pointed out, and I quote: “The Conference also declares itself in favour of the banning of all existing chemical and bacteriological weapons.” [See A/9330.] The great interest in this problem by a large number of States and world public opinion is an indication of the urgency for its speedy solution.

24. The USSR and the other socialist countries are making significant efforts in order to come to agreement on the total prohibition of chemical weapons, prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling, as well as the destruction of all existing stocks of such weapons. With this in view, the socialist countries, last year in the Disarmament Committee, made a proposal concerning our corresponding draft convention.¹ That draft in essence is the only concrete proposal that is under consideration in international forums on the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

25. During the past two years, in the Disarmament Committee, numerous aspects of this problem have been considered. In this connexion, attention was centred on the scope of the prohibition of such weapons and control over it. The socialist countries are proceeding from the proposition that all forms of chemical weapons must be prohibited under controls carried out under national auspices, with the use also of international procedures.

26. Considering the great interest demonstrated in the Disarmament Committee concerning question of control over the prohibition of chemical weapons, the socialist countries presented a working document containing explanations and clarifications regarding the provisions of their draft convention concerning ways and means of national control [A/9141, annex II, sect. 11]. A draft convention prepared by the socialist countries and their working document have produced numerous remarks and comments on the part of many participants in the Committee.

27. The Committee noted the introduction of a whole series of other working documents on the problem of chemical weapons, among them a document of the 10 non-aligned countries which concerns the total prohibition of such weapons under guarantees for compliance, based on a combination of national and international measures which would supplement each other [*ibid.*, sect. 8]. This document aroused great interest and was commented upon at length by members of the Committee. Considerable interest in the Committee was also evinced by the working document of Japan which was based on the principle of phased or progressive prohibition of chemical weapons [*ibid.*, sect. 21].

28. As yet, a practical move in the Disarmament Committee towards agreement on a draft agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons has, unfortunately, not yet properly been arrived at. A cause of this is the unreadiness of the Western Powers to enter into construc-

tive talks on the problem. Statements and comments on the draft convention of the socialist countries made by representatives of Western States have not provided a basis for any move forward in talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons. In order that constructive talks on this problem might take place, it is necessary for the participants in the talks to present concrete proposals that have been duly formulated. In practice, however, it turned out that only the socialist position was formulated and defined. The Western Powers, for their part, limited themselves merely to comments in relation to that position and criticism of it, without presenting constructive proposals of their own. Talks on such a complex problem as the prohibition of chemical weapons cannot be conducted merely on the basis of comments by one side; they can be conducted on the basis of concrete proposals concerning possible agreement on this problem.

29. We hope that at the current session of the General Assembly it will be possible to make headway in the solution of the question of the total prohibition of chemical weapons, and that it may be possible to enter into practical talks on the question at last which would bring consideration of the problem in international organs out of its state of stagnation.

30. In direct relation to the solution of the problem of the total prohibition of chemical weapons, their development, production and stockpiling, is the question of the widest subscription of States to the existing international agreement, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 concerning the prohibition of the use of such weapons.² In this connexion, we wish to stress the hope that steps will be taken to accelerate the ratification of that Protocol by the United States. This, in our opinion, would constitute a step forward in talks concerning the conclusion of a draft convention on the prohibition of the chemical means of waging war.

31. A positive factor in international life is the signing by more than 100 States of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction [resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex]. Attainment of agreement on this question is an important step forward in eliminating the danger of unleashing a war of bacteriological weapons. The task in this case lies in including this Convention in the list of effective international acts already in force. It is important for States—first of all, States depositaries which have signed this Convention but which have not yet ratified it—to accelerate the process of ratification. For its part, the delegation of the USSR wishes to state—in fact, states—that the ratification of that Convention by the Soviet Union will not hold up the entering into force of the Convention.

32. The General Assembly has devoted considerable attention to the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the elimination of the threat of nuclear war. This attention expressed the concern of States over the unceasing development of nuclear weapons and the danger of radio-active contamination of the atmosphere.

¹ Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1972, document DC/235, annex B, sect. 5.

² Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, No. 2138, p. 65).

33. The development of nuclear weapons makes the task of ensuring international security in the prevention of radio-active contamination of the human environment even more urgent. The most radical solution of these questions would be the total prohibition of nuclear weapons. Proposals concerning this prohibition have been made on numerous occasions by the Soviet Union. Events have demonstrated, however, that it is necessary to proceed in sequence in relation to those problems on which agreement is possible at a given stage and to resolve those problems.

34. One of the first international acts towards the solution of problems that have arisen on the development of nuclear weapons was the Moscow Treaty, signed in August 1963, concerning the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.³ A significant aspect of this Treaty is that it has substantially averted the contamination and pollution of the atmosphere, of outer space and of the water resources of our planet by radio-active substances, and thereby prevented the serious threat which has been looming over the health of present and succeeding generations. Another important aspect of the Moscow Treaty is the fact that it hampers the nuclear arms race, thereby decreasing the threat of nuclear war. This Treaty has paved the way towards the conclusion of other international agreements relating to the limitation of weapons of mass destruction. Adherence by the largest possible number of States to the Moscow Treaty would be an important step towards the elimination of the threat brought about by the development of nuclear weapons.

35. An effective move in averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the world was the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*], that has assumed a noteworthy place in the list of existing operative agreements in the field of disarmament and which has been widely recognized internationally. It is satisfying to note that in over three years since the signing of this Treaty there has not been a single violation recorded. An important aspect of this Treaty is the obligation of its parties to hold talks on measures to halt the nuclear arms race and to promote nuclear disarmament as well as general and complete disarmament. There are still many difficulties on the road towards the realization of the goals set out in the Treaty. First of all there is the problem of achieving the widest possible participation in this Treaty, especially from the so-called "near-nuclear" countries. We note with satisfaction that as the result of the conclusion of an agreement between non-nuclear States Members of EURATOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency the way has been paved for the ratification by these countries of a treaty on non-proliferation. But with respect to talks on the conclusion of an agreement with IAEA concerning control, not all States have adhered. We hope that States which still have not taken the necessary steps to adhere to the Treaty on non-proliferation will do so in the near future or as early as possible.

36. Of great significance to the solution of the halting of the nuclear arms race is the American-Soviet agreement on the limitation of strategic weapons concluded in May 1972. This series of treaties contributes to lessening the threat, of

nuclear war, halting the arms race and opening prospects for moving forward towards general and complete disarmament. The continuing talks on this problem are designed to find ways of converting the temporary United States-Soviet agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms into a permanent one and of moving towards the gradual decrease in such armaments and the establishment of limits to their level of development. The Soviet-American agreements on the limitation of strategic weapons are at the same time a positive contribution to the implementation of obligations flowing from the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to the halting of the arms race and the elimination of the threat of nuclear war and war in general.

37. An important event in international affairs, which has contributed to the elimination of the threat of nuclear warfare, was the conclusion on 22 June 1973 of the United States-Soviet accord on the prevention of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons [*A/9293*]. It is stated in the Treaty that each side "will act in such a manner as to prevent the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations, as to avoid military confrontations, and as to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war between them and between either of the Parties and any other countries." This agreement is fully in accord with the spirit and letter of the United Nations Charter. It provides that each party will refrain from the threat or use of force against the other, against allies of the other party, and against other countries in circumstances which might threaten international peace and security.

38. The accord on the prevention of nuclear war is an important step towards the further positive improvement in the international atmosphere and the affirmation of the principles contained in the United Nations Charter relating to the obligation of States to maintain peace, to refrain from the threat or use of force. It is a step towards the elimination of the threat of the outbreak of a nuclear war and the establishment of a system of real guarantees for international security. The Soviet Union is convinced that the readiness of other States to adhere to the principles jointly expressed by the Soviet Union and the United States against recourse to the threat or use of force and the adoption of firm measures to eliminate the outbreak of nuclear war would be of considerable significance in bringing about international peace and security.

39. The problem that is directly connected with the elimination of the threat of nuclear war is that of the cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons. The position of the Soviet Union on this question is well known. It has been stated frequently in international forums. The Soviet Union stands for the cessation everywhere and by everyone of the testing of nuclear weapons, including underground testing. The Soviet Union expresses its readiness to participate in agreements on this problem, having in mind that control over compliance and the obligations such a prohibition entails would be carried out by national means of detection and identification. For the purpose of establishing more secure guarantees against violations of the agreement on the cessation of underground nuclear tests, the Soviet Union is ready to co-operate internationally in the exchange of seismological data within the framework of an agreement on the cessation of underground nuclear tests.

³ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480, No. 6964, p. 43.

In complying with definite conditions for such exchanges, national means of detection and control, in combination with international co-operation by States in the exchange of seismological data, provide a reliable guarantee of the fact that any possible violations by any given State of the treaty on the cessation of underground tests would be detected with all the consequences flowing therefrom.

40. The cessation of nuclear-arms tests is hampered by a lack of readiness on the part of certain States to adopt a political decision on this matter. Nor do the considerations presented in the Committee on Disarmament, which were based on a partial solution, contribute to solving this problem—the declaration of a moratorium on nuclear weapons, the prohibition of underground nuclear tests beyond a certain level, and so on. Such partial measures, as well as unilateral actions in this field on the part of individual nuclear-weapon States, would lead to the establishment of unilateral advantages which would benefit certain States to the detriment of others, and would result in destroying the principle of equal security for all.

41. In striving towards the total prohibition of dangerous experiments with nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union supported a resolution at the last session of the General Assembly which called for all States possessing nuclear weapons not to use this type of weapon in any environment.

42. Thus a solution to the question of the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests calls at the present time for political solutions which would demonstrate the readiness of States to accept the prohibition of such types of tests.

43. There are numerous other problems in the field of disarmament which call for careful study. Among these it is necessary to point to such problems as the liquidation of military bases on foreign territories, the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, and many others. The basic task of all such actions is the cessation and reversal of the arms race. For the solution of problems of disarmament it is necessary to study all existing possibilities in these matters. One of the multilateral forums within the framework of which these problems are being considered is the Committee on Disarmament, in Geneva, which has become a universally recognized organ for the harmonizing of actions of States in matters of disarmament. Although it is necessary to note with regret that during the past two years the Committee has not been able to achieve any practical results in its work—which might have been in the form of draft agreements—nevertheless its activities should be considered to be essential and useful. Within its framework a number of international agreements have been concluded, and these were of great significance. They related to limitation of the development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, over the past few years its activities have served some purpose since they made it possible to define the state of affairs in regard to the talks on problems of disarmament and to define the nature of the difficulties and obstacles preventing their solution.

44. We note with satisfaction the intense activity in other international forums in regard to disarmament and security. Thus in Geneva the Soviet-American talks on the limitation

of strategic arms are proceeding; new solutions are being provided for problems connected with the security of the European continent, which was the theatre of two world wars. In Vienna, on 30 October, talks will begin on the limitation of armed forces in Europe; the European Conference on Security and Co-operation is continuing in Geneva. The activities of these forums are an important factor of modern times contributing to the elimination of the vestiges of the Second World War, to the normalization of the international situation and to the strengthening of peace and security. Progress in their work will have a positive effect upon progress in the solution of disarmament problems as a whole.

45. The Soviet Union is taking an active part in all of these efforts and is demonstrating total readiness to take part in talks on implementing measures whose purpose would be to stop the arms race and to achieve disarmament. The task of the present twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly is to contribute to the solution of those problems being considered at the present session which are most susceptible of solution. We hope that through the joint efforts of the States Members of the United Nations this task will be resolved in the interests of all the countries and peoples of the world.

46. Mr. NISHIBORI (Japan): The purpose of my statement today is to explain some aspects of my delegation's views on recent disarmament negotiations as a whole and to express our ideas on the several disarmament items.

47. As representatives are well aware, disarmament questions are inseparable from the security of States and, therefore, it is hard to deny that progress in disarmament inevitably tends to be greatly affected by changes in international relations that alter their security. Important measures for arms control or disarmament are, in fact, symbols of changing international situations at the time. It could also be said that the easing of international tensions had been making progress until recently and was the background for agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the basic principles of negotiations on the further limitation of strategic offensive arms, and also for the conclusion of their agreement on the prevention of nuclear war.

48. On the other hand, a disarmament agreement should not be merely a mirror which passively reflects changes in the international situation, but should also contain elements which will positively motivate and accelerate the promotion of world peace. It is this positive role of disarmament that I wish to emphasize here.

49. When we look back at the history of the world over the past quarter of a century—that is, from the end of the Second World War to the present—it is undeniable that world peace and security have been maintained by the unstable balance of power, the balance of huge armaments. The genuine role of disarmament should be the pursuit of a stable peace through the control and reduction of the armaments of opposing Powers, instead of depending upon an unstable balance of power. The critical or pessimistic opinions expressed about recent disarmament negotiations seem, in part, to have resulted from the recognition that this positive role of disarmament is not being fully explored.

50. The question, then, is how to revive the positive role of disarmament negotiations. First of all, it is justifiable to point out that the responsibility of the major military Powers, especially that of the nuclear-weapon Powers, is great. In saying that, I have no intention of pitting nuclear-weapon States against non-nuclear-weapon States. The object of the major disarmament items on the Committee's agenda is the control and reduction of the huge armaments of major military powers, especially those of the nuclear-weapon Powers, which are opposed to one another and, in this way, maintain an unstable balance. So I can only say that sincere and constant efforts and a firm determination—accompanied by deeds, in the case of nuclear-weapon States—are the key to the realization of concrete disarmament measures, including nuclear disarmament.

51. In the light of what I have said, it is necessary for us to find ways and means of encouraging such a determination by nuclear-weapon States and, taking these ways and means as a basis for action, to do our best to obtain a positive contribution from nuclear-weapon States.

52. Our efforts, however, should be strictly realistic and within the limits of what is practicable. I feel keenly that in recent disarmament negotiations there have been instances where highly specialized technical knowledge was required in order to give adequate consideration to an item, whether it was the question of a comprehensive test ban or that of banning chemical weapons. But we cannot avoid facing the discussion of the technical questions when we seek to achieve justifiable disarmament measures. While we have to admit that such technical discussions create difficulties for the early realization of concrete disarmament measures, we must study the technical questions fully and then promote negotiations steadily—and from a realistic point of view. I am convinced that this attitude, which I mentioned previously, encourages the efforts and determination of nuclear-weapon States and thus leads us by the shortest route to progress in disarmament.

53. From the basic position I have just explained, I now turn to my delegation's views on the question of a comprehensive test ban and that of banning chemical weapons—both of which are among the most important items on the agenda of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament—with a view to obtaining the understanding and co-operation of the members of the First Committee.

54. Last year, when submitting to the First Committee a draft resolution on the question of a comprehensive test ban, my delegation pointed out the need to hold informal meetings, with the participation of experts, to study technical questions, including verification problems, in order to revitalize the stagnant test-ban negotiations and encourage positive contributions from nuclear-weapon States [1891st meeting]. As representatives are aware, General Assembly resolution 2934 B (XXVII), which was adopted as a result, included a line in paragraph 5 requesting the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to take "full account of views of experts" in negotiating a comprehensive test ban. In compliance with the resolution, which requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament "to give first priority to its deliberations on a

treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests", my delegation proposed, on 10 April of this year, at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, the holding of informal meetings with the participation of experts. These informal meetings, which began on 10 July, achieved remarkable results.

55. They confirmed the great concern of the countries involved and active discussions proceeded for four days, with the participation of an unprecedented number of experts, although, unfortunately, none from the Eastern-bloc countries were available. The meetings confirmed yet again that seismological means play the main role in the detecting and identifying of underground nuclear explosions. As regards seismological means of verification, the discussions produced further clarification of such technical questions as an assessment of their existing verification capability and the attainable future goal.

56. As for our future tasks, therefore, we should further promote international co-operation in such matters as strengthening existing monitoring capabilities and facilities for processing seismological data, in order to improve seismological verification capabilities. At the same time, on the basis of the results I have reported from the informal meetings, the countries conducting nuclear-weapon tests should urgently study what concrete measures they should adopt, from a realistic point of view, in order to achieve an underground test ban at the earliest possible date.

57. For example, there is a choice between a partial ban and a comprehensive ban. If a partial ban is to be adopted, there is the question of what size of explosion should be the lowest threshold. Studies should also be made as to whether any intermediate measures, such as a test moratorium, a reduction in the size of explosions or a gradual reduction in the number of tests, should be sought. Such studies should naturally be accompanied by parallel studies on how to deal with small-size nuclear explosions, which are said to be of great military significance, the masking of nuclear tests, and suspected events, as long as seismological methods of detection are not 100 per cent effective in verifying underground nuclear explosions.

58. While my delegation has been doing its best to further the early realization of a comprehensive test ban, which is an urgent issue at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, I am increasingly inclined to think that most of the questions regarding this issue have already been discussed and that our future efforts should be concentrated on how to put into effect the various proposals made so far. I would point out that now is the time for the countries conducting nuclear-weapon tests to give some concrete answer to the sincere efforts we have been making for years.

59. Next, I move on to express my delegation's views on another main item before the Committee on Disarmament: the question of banning chemical weapons. Though last year's General Assembly resolution 2933 (XXVII), in paragraph 2, requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament "to continue negotiations, as a matter of priority" on this subject, I am sorry to say that there has been no remarkable progress this year in the Committee. Compared with the banning of biological weapons, there

are more difficulties as regards the chemical weapon agents to be prohibited and the measures to verify a violation of the treaty, in view of the fact that the number of chemical agents to be prohibited is enormous and that many of them serve peaceful purposes. It is understandable, therefore, that the negotiations have not provided quick results.

60. Concerned about the stagnant deliberations on this question, my country submitted to the Committee, on 21 August 1973, a working paper [A/9141, annex II, sect. 21] on the main points of an international agreement, which contained our concrete suggestions on the substance as well as the format of banning chemical weapons.

61. This working paper incorporates, as much as possible, the views of the delegations represented on the Committee and, while its ultimate aim is a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, it is designed to exclude temporarily, through the establishment of a supplementary document which is inseparable from the treaty, those agents and activities the prohibition of which is deemed not proper, or difficult to carry out under present circumstances. As to verification, the working paper envisages a verification system which organically combines national and international verification measures.

62. The Committee on Disarmament expects from now on to continue its deliberations on the details of a possible concrete draft treaty, also taking into consideration the draft convention submitted by the socialist countries and the working paper submitted by the non-aligned countries.

63. The Japanese working paper does not specify the actual chemical agents which should be temporarily excluded from the initial ban. My delegation suggested banning first super-toxic chemical agents, since agreement on their definition could be reached comparatively easily, and then expanding the scope of prohibition. On the other hand, we have not the slightest doubt about the correctness of the statement in paragraph 8 of the working paper submitted by the non-aligned countries, which says:

“Since adequate protection against any kind of chemical weapons is not available to the greater part of the world population, even less toxic agents can create as great a danger as highly toxic ones and therefore should be prohibited.”

It is necessary, then, to continue our study, taking into consideration the views of the experts as to which agents should be prohibited and which should be excluded from the initial ban, and on the basis of what objective criteria.

64. As for activities which should be prohibited, our working paper envisages an initial ban on the development, production and transfer of chemical weapons, from the realistic viewpoint of achieving the early conclusion of a treaty. My delegation considers that stockpiling might better be excluded from the initial ban, with a view to ensuring deterrent capabilities against violations of treaty obligations. As the question of stockpiling is highly relevant to the structure of the verification system, we should strive to achieve a ban on stockpiling as early as possible while at the same time trying to establish an efficient verification system.

65. As to the verification system which my delegation is suggesting, and which incorporates national and international verification, we intend to continue our study on how concretely to organize and operate the verification system, and we should be happy to receive suggestions from countries concerned. On 23 October in this Committee, the representative of Iran, Mr. Hoveyda, made the well-justified comment that “. . . it would be regrettable if insistence on a specific method of verification that was unacceptable to one State were made the pretext to maintain the impasse.” [1934th meeting, para. 82.] I would say that our suggestions on the verification system have been made in the same spirit which inspired Mr. Hoveyda's remarks.

66. My delegation hopes that its working paper will become a basis for the deliberations on banning chemical weapons and sincerely desires constructive comments from other delegations.

67. Although I have explained the views of my delegation on concrete disarmament measures, I wish to emphasize that only nuclear-weapon States, which are concurrently major military Powers, can make definitive decisions on them. I wish to emphasize, therefore, the gravity of the responsibilities of nuclear-weapon States in disarmament negotiations as a whole and to cite some concrete problems.

68. First is the question of banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, which has recently attracted keen attention. As representatives are aware, two of the nuclear-weapon States recently conducted atmospheric nuclear-weapon tests, one after the other, despite the vigorous protests of world public opinion. Japan expressed its strongest objection to these tests, in accordance with its basic position of opposing any nuclear-weapon tests by any country. In the Japanese Diet, a resolution was adopted last July opposing all nuclear-weapon tests, and that was an unmistakable expression of the desires of the Japanese Government and people. I reiterate here my request that these two nuclear-weapon States discontinue their nuclear-weapon tests immediately and accede to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, to which almost all the countries of the world are parties.

69. Secondly, there is the regrettable fact that the nuclear-weapon States which recently conducted tests in the atmosphere have adamantly refused to participate in substantive disarmament negotiations. While I have already emphasized that the sincere efforts and resolute determination of the nuclear-weapon States were the key to expediting future disarmament negotiations, the fact that not all nuclear-weapon States are even represented at the Committee on Disarmament—which is one of the most important multilateral organs for negotiating concrete disarmament measures—is simply not a normal state of affairs and constitutes a great impediment to progress in disarmament negotiations. The same can be said about the World Disarmament Conference. A Special Committee was established last year by resolution 2930 (XXVII) on the question of the World Disarmament Conference, but its substantive discussions are stalled since the Special Committee is not able to ensure the participation of all nuclear-weapon States. That being so, I urgently request the two nuclear-weapon States, to which I have referred, to partici-

pate as early as possible in substantive discussions on disarmament, fully realizing the special international responsibility which rests on them.

70. Thirdly, there is the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, which is an important example of a regional arms control agreement. As a country which has supported the conclusion of this regional agreement, Japan welcomes the recent signature, by both France and the People's Republic of China, of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty. We welcome their signatures all the more warmly as indications of their willingness and determination to face disarmament questions seriously.

71. The last question I wish to mention is the signing in June 1973 of the Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War [see A/9293]. We welcome these actions as an expression of the determination of both the United States and the Soviet Union to undertake future disarmament negotiations in a positive spirit. I believe that the demonstration of sincere efforts on the part of nuclear-weapon States will prove an important step toward realizing genuine disarmament measures.

72. I have emphasized the grave responsibility of nuclear-weapon States to contribute to disarmament in response to the sincere efforts of non-nuclear-weapon States as a basic condition for expediting future disarmament agreements.

73. In conclusion, I earnestly hope that meaningful discussions will take place in this Committee and that clear and specific guidelines about what we should do in the future will be given to us.

74. Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): As on earlier occasions, I shall begin my statement by rapidly reviewing the general aspects of the items on our agenda devoted to disarmament. Also as on other occasions, I am bound to begin my statement by sounding a negative note by way of a prologue because, strictly speaking, in the year that has elapsed since the last time we considered these questions here no concrete progress has been achieved in respect of disarmament proper.

75. Quite the contrary, if anything is to be noted it is the uninterrupted continuation of the arms race with its growing signs of danger. Once again our exhortations have been in vain, and the resolutions that have emerged from this Committee have remained a dead letter.

76. This repetitive situation, we regret to have to say, is no longer a surprise to anyone. Indeed, we are becoming so accustomed to its happening that the truly surprising thing would be the reverse, that is, that we should have cause to rejoice at some true disarmament measure.

77. This time, however, we have more reason for concern than usual. It is paradoxical to note, in fact, that the competition between the great Powers for the possession of the largest quantity of weapons and of the most lethal weapons continues unchecked even at a time when relations between those Powers appear to offer the most encouraging prospects in recent years.

78. It is legitimate to wonder whether the understandings arrived at in many areas reflect a true willingness to co-operate or whether they are still based on the precarious and uneasy "balance of terror" which has been the hallmark of the past decade.

79. It is important to clear up this point. Because if the spiral of armaments continues, despite the climate of détente, there can be little hope should those good relations suffer a crisis—a most undesirable but certainly not impossible development. For the political rapprochement not to be accompanied by effective disarmament would be illogical and, moreover, most alarming. It is therefore essential that the super-Powers translate their proclaimed intentions into deeds. The situation brooks no delay. We believe, therefore, that the negotiations aiming at the limitation of certain strategic weapons are not sufficient. Undoubtedly they represent a laudable first step. But what the international community expects of those Powers—and awaits impatiently—is that they continue their efforts and arrive at nuclear disarmament, the absolute priority of which no one dares to question.

80. The new climate of relative confidence that prevails at present is propitious for the initiation of such an undertaking. It might perhaps not be idle to recall in this connexion that we are well into the decade devoted by the General Assembly to disarmament without a single one of the expectations aroused among world public opinion by that event having been met.

81. Neither do I think it superfluous to mention also that the fundamental aim of our work continues to be general and complete disarmament under effective international control. And I bring this matter up here because the nuclear Powers appear to have completely relegated it to oblivion. So much so, that despite the repeated requests addressed to them, the United States and the Soviet Union have not yet proceeded to update their respective draft treaties dating back to 1962.

82. I am convinced that any action in that direction will be most favourably received and will demonstrate, much more than an abundant flow of words, the determination to give real content to the Disarmament Decade.

83. It has become an almost unalterable practice in our debates to refer to the immense expenditures entailed by the acquisition of weapons. I have not the slightest intention of quoting the astronomic figures quite beyond anyone's imagination invested annually in so-called defence budgets.

84. First of all, because such arguments are likely to be adduced in plenary when we consider the very interesting proposal put forward by the Soviet Union on the reduction of military expenditures and the channelling of funds thus saved to assist the developing countries.

85. But especially, because any reference to such facts would necessarily be incomplete and could never replace the detailed studies carried out by responsible agencies on this question.

86. I should like here to express our sincere appreciation of the excellent work carried out so patiently and consistently by the Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute. Year after year it provides us with invaluable material of unquestionable objectivity and high quality, one of the most valuable contributions to the analysis of such problems.

87. A cursory reading of the publications of the Institute and its comparative tables is enough for us to understand how burdensome is the arms race—which is already calculated in terms of trillions of dollars—and its negative influence on the economy of States.

88. Thanks to an initiative of the Romanian delegation, we still have before us for consideration agenda item 29 which, in some respects, covers a few of these aspects. We believe that this Committee must continue to give its special attention to that item in order accurately to determine the economic and social consequences of the arms race. I have advisably used the expression “accurately” because, in our view, correct or balanced conclusions have not always been arrived at when handling certain global statistical data or when applying such data in a comparative manner against other items in national budgets.

89. Thus, for instance, although it has been recognized that four-fifths of the military expenditures in the whole world are accounted for by only six countries, indirectly attempts have been made to shift the responsibility for disarmament to the large majority of other States which do no more than meet their most elementary defence needs.

90. To continue our consideration of this important item it will be necessary essentially to bear in mind that the main threat to international peace and security lies in the production, development and multiplication of highly destructive weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, by the more highly industrially developed countries. In other words, in order to achieve positive results in this area disarmament priorities must not be reversed.

91. In taking stock of the progress achieved in 1973—if “progress” is the right word—we must inevitably refer to the negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

92. On several occasions we have stated that this delicate subject is of interest to all States and is not the exclusive privilege of the great Powers because of the characteristics of this type of weapon that makes it accessible to a large number of countries. The defence problems raised by these weapons, affect all countries and not just a few.

93. In this context, Argentina, together with nine other non-aligned countries in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, submitted a working paper [A/9141/annex II, sect. 8] which we regard as a concrete contribution to the success of those negotiations.

94. The position of Argentina is reflected in that document, whose content we hope will be respected when we draft the instrument by which chemical weapons will be eradicated from military arsenals at long last.

95. Although we attach importance to all parts of that document, we should like in particular to emphasize two of its elements. First, the one that lays down, in paragraph 4, the necessity for undertakings to facilitate, and a right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of chemical agents, equipment material and scientific and technological information for the use of such chemical agents for peaceful purposes.

96. Secondly, the paragraph relating to verification. In this connexion, paragraph 9 textually reads, and I quote:

“It is essential that the prohibition of chemical weapons should be coupled with adequate verification. The question of verification has both technical and political aspects which should be reconciled and therefore it is connected with the scope of the prohibition. Solutions to the problems of scope and verification should not be discriminatory and should maintain an acceptable balance of obligations and responsibilities for all States. A partial solution with respect to the scope of the activities to be prohibited, which would only ban the development and production of chemical weapons, will be particularly discriminatory and will not be acceptable to many countries, specially to those which have abstained from procuring such weapons”.

97. We are convinced that on the basis of the document of the non-aligned countries, as well as on that of other constructive contributions made by several delegations, the Committee in Geneva is in a position to proceed without further delay to the elaboration of the definitive draft treaty to be submitted to the General Assembly.

98. One of the most controversial items on our agenda is the one relating to the world disarmament conference. Controversial, we hasten to explain, not in terms of the actual holding of the conference, the convening of which has been supported with greater or lesser enthusiasm by a large majority of the States represented here, but rather in terms of the prior stages that must be completed before we convene the conference.

99. The Argentine delegation welcomed with satisfaction and from the very outset supported this initiative because we felt it might be helpful to assess all that has been done in the field of disarmament, redress errors, and establish guidelines for future negotiations on the basis of criteria which receive general approval.

100. However, also from the outset, we said that in our view it was essential to fulfil certain requirements so as to ensure the success of the conference. Among others, we mentioned in particular the following.

101. First, careful and adequate preparation in order to determine sufficiently in advance the conference’s programme, its purposes, powers and procedures, as well as the relationship to be established between it and the other bodies that deal with disarmament, in particular the negotiating bodies.

102. Secondly, in order that it may fulfil its objectives and not become a mere propaganda forum, it is essential—I repeat essential—that all the nuclear Powers, on a footing of

absolute equality, and all the militarily significant nations must participate.

103. Thirdly, it must be open to all States without exclusion.

104. Bearing in mind the difficulties of various kinds that had been made manifest during the corresponding debates, and in order to create preliminary conditions for the holding of the conference, last year the Argentine delegation proposed the constitution of a special committee that would be entrusted with the task of examining all views and suggestions put forward by Governments concerning the convening of the conference. This in no way prejudged the favourable or adverse positions that might be upheld. In order to dispel any possible doubt, we insisted that the corresponding report be prepared on the basis of consensus.

105. Moreover, we requested that within the terms of reference of the Special Committee, there be included a consideration of, I quote, "related problems" so as not to limit discussions exclusively to the question of the conference.

106. What has happened since is well known. The Argentine initiative was taken up by the countries of the non-aligned movement, and was adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 2930 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972.

107. It becomes more difficult to speak about subsequent events. We could make many criticisms of the manner in which some of the provisions of that resolution were implemented. However, unless the developments in our deliberations call for it, we shall refrain from leveling that criticism for the present in order not to provoke a sterile discussion. Suffice it to mention that the series of erroneous procedures, which ranged from the actual composition of the Committee, to its hasty convening without the necessary prior consultations called for by the sponsors of resolution 2930 (XXVII), led to that Special Committee never meeting officially and therefore not being able to fulfil its mandate.

108. At the 1934th meeting, we had the pleasure of hearing the statement of the representative of Iran, my good friend Mr. Hoveyda, who, with his customary modesty, gave us an eloquent and objective description, in a strictly private capacity, as he emphasized on repeated occasions, the results achieved at the eight informal meetings held by members of the Special Committee.

109. I should like here to pause for a moment and publicly reiterate to Mr. Hoveyda the testimony of our recognition for the admirable manner in which he discharged the difficult and thankless task entrusted to him of conducting the informal deliberations of the members of the Committee. Had it not been for his diplomatic tact, competence and goodwill, even those contacts which he so rightly qualified as useful would not have been held.

110. We could make several observations concerning the events and facts mentioned by Mr. Hoveyda. To begin with, it is quite obvious that at those meetings a whole series of

items that went far beyond the framework of the terms of reference of the Committee were discussed. This is not surprising and is quite understandable if we bear in mind that it was no more than an exchange of ideas.

111. None the less—and this is the important point—it revealed that there was no consensus even about the membership, or composition, or the role to be played by nuclear-weapon States.

112. This leads us to believe, as several delegations have already said, that as long as those fundamental problems are not solved, the *Ad Hoc* or Special Committee will not be in a position to function normally or to achieve the purposes which justified its creation.

113. In order to tackle our search for alternative solutions and to break out of the stalemate in which we find ourselves, I believe it is desirable that we dwell on the analysis of substantive problems and not problems of form, since the latter are always easy to overcome.

114. In the view of the Argentine delegation, the substantive problem consists in persuading the five nuclear Powers, on a footing of equality and without discrimination, to take part in a negotiating disarmament body. I make this quite clear—a negotiating disarmament body and not a generalized forum. Failures of the past with regard to disarmament are due mainly to the absence from the negotiating table of two of the five nations who form the so-called atomic club, France and the People's Republic of China. We would be making an unpardonable mistake if once again we were to insist on the formation of a committee in which, as we well know, no longer two but four of the nuclear-weapon-Powers were not to participate.

115. I do not believe that I am being pessimistic when I make the prognosis that we could hardly organize a world disarmament conference unless, in one way or another, we ensure the collaboration of these Powers in the preparatory stages. Thus our concern must be directed towards the exploration of all existing channels in order to achieve that collaboration. If this is not possible within the *Ad Hoc* or Special Committee, we shall have to seek other alternatives.

116. Some have said that in order to maintain the necessary equality between those countries, we might consider the formation of a body in which none of the nuclear Governments is represented. For our part, we also suggested last year the reorganization of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in order to facilitate accession by those Powers that have not yet acceded thereto. It goes without saying that that would imply a substantial reform of the Conference procedures through a General Assembly resolution and thereby put an end to the co-chairmen system, to which we must attribute to a very large degree the absence of those two nuclear States. We might even consider the desirability of establishing a new negotiating body with similar characteristics to those of the Conference.

117. Any solution is possible if there is a political decision to co-operate. But we must also bear in mind that in respect of so complex a subject, where the security and sovereignty of nations are involved, it is essential that we contemplate

all the interests at stake without any exclusion or discrimination whatsoever. That is to say that, through patient and permanent consultation, proceeding without haste but untiringly, we shall have to devise formulas of understanding that will command general acceptance.

118. Then, not only the world disarmament conference, but real and effective disarmament, will become a reality. The Argentine delegation pledges all its efforts to achieve these ends.

119. Mr. GROZEV (Bulgaria) (*interpretation from Russian*): The peoples of the whole world are well within their right to hope that the present session of the General Assembly will adopt new decisions which, in the near future, will lead to substantial progress in the field of disarmament. The positive transformations on the world scene during the last few years that have produced a turn in international relations from the "cold war" towards détente make it possible to place in the forefront the task of activating the fight for the cessation of the arms race and for effective disarmament. The new circumstances require that all States of the world—in the first place, the nuclear States—make their contribution to the solution of this vitally important question to the peace of the world and the interests and security of the peoples.

120. In speaking thus, we feel that the course that is to be travelled will not be smooth or without difficulties. Some of the recent events, especially the dangerous developments in the Middle East, have demonstrated convincingly that many constructive efforts will be required on the part of all peace-loving and progressive forces of the world in order to achieve success and strengthen international relations.

121. The relaxation of tensions responds to the interests of all mankind, and the struggle for their attainment cannot be placed in dependence on the development of events in one or another country, or in any one particular region. That struggle has not ceased, even in the worst years of the "cold war", and in spite of the resistance of imperialist and reactionary circles a number of important results were attained. However miraculous it might seem to some, we are speaking of the prospects of détente, even at this moment when certain parties, in haste and without any foundation, being threatened by no one, have put on the alert all their armed forces, including their nuclear rocket units. Now, when the balance of forces in the world is definitely in favour of international understanding and peace, a favourable situation has been produced for the further development of positive trends and the attainment of further measures for disarmament. The extent to which these opportunities will be used for the benefit of all mankind depends on the efforts of people of goodwill.

122. Together with the other socialist countries, the People's Republic of Bulgaria fully and unreservedly supports the continuation of efforts for the search for new possibilities in the attainment of further definite progress in disarmament. At the gathering of the leaders of the Communist and Labour Parties of the socialist countries, which took place in the Crimea at the beginning of August 1973, one of the central questions was how to develop further the process of the relaxation of tension and how to make it irreversible. In this connexion it was agreed

unanimously that one of the most relevant tasks at this time was to fight for political détente by military détente, and to fight for the cessation of the arms race and the adoption of practical measures to limit arms.

123. Our confidence in the good prospects of efforts towards disarmament is based not only on the new situation in the world, but also on the results that have been achieved so far in this field. When one appreciates the significance of such documents as the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water—the decade of which has been solemnly marked this year—or the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it is not possible to fail to take into account the conditions which existed at the time when these treaties were concluded. Although they are the first steps towards the cessation of the arms race, these and other measures of that period have definitely contributed to clearing the way towards further efforts and results in the field of disarmament.

124. Last year, as a result of the Soviet-American strategic arms limitation talks, two extremely important documents, from the point of view of the cessation of the arms race, were signed in Moscow: the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

125. In 1972 also the first measures towards effective disarmament were adopted, namely, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on Their Destruction [*resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex*]. Of great significance also is the declaration adopted at the last session of the General Assembly concerning the non-use of force in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons [*resolution 2936 (XXVII)*].

126. This year, as the result of talks held in Washington between the Secretary-General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Brezhnev, and President Nixon of the United States, a new and extremely important success was reached through the signing of the Soviet-American accord on the prevention of the threat of nuclear war [*see A/9293*], which marks an important step towards the solution of questions involving the liberation of mankind from a nuclear catastrophe. Of great significance also is the document entitled "Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms [*ibid.*]. These principles, which are used in guiding current Soviet-United States talks being held in Geneva, paved the way for the definition of arms from the point of view of their armaments and their level of development and, ultimately, their limitation.

127. As is known, at the present time—this year—substantial changes have taken place in Europe. After the successful conclusion of the first stage of the talks on questions of security and co-operation in Europe, on 18 September in Geneva, its second stage was started in the course of which certain military measures will be discussed that were connected with the strengthening of mutual trust between the participants in the Conference. On 30 October

this year in Vienna new talks will open on the limitation of arms and armed forces in Europe. The socialist countries, including the People's Republic of Bulgaria, will exert maximum effort to achieve success in these two undertakings, which may have a singularly positive effect not only for peace and security throughout Europe but throughout the world.

128. We likewise consider it to be an important achievement that the practical discussion of measures has started which will make it possible directly to connect disarmament with the needs of economic and social development of the peoples of the world.

129. We have already welcomed and supported the new, major Soviet initiative concerning the reduction of the military budgets of permanent States members of the Security Council, by 10 per cent and the use of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to the developing countries. The proposed measure is in accord with the interests of all peoples who are well within their rights to expect that the relaxation of tensions should be concretely reflected in the life of every human being. This is of greater significance to developing countries because it is clear that disarmament will provide the greatest source for a sharp increase in funds allocated to these countries in order to close the gap which now exists between them and the developed countries. It is for this reason that the new Soviet proposal has met with such broad support and approval.

130. The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria will have an opportunity to speak in further detail on this question. At present we should like to express our confidence that this important proposal will be adopted and implemented for the benefit of all peoples and of peace throughout the world.

131. Disarmament problems are without question difficult and complex. It is equally true that to attain substantial progress in the field of disarmament the participation of all States, especially those possessing a significant military and economic potential, is required. It is not necessary to demonstrate that disarmament problems are a substantial and inalienable element in establishing a secure peace and strengthening international security.

132. At its twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh sessions the General Assembly adopted two resolutions of great significance. Resolution 2833 (XXVI) confirmed the idea of convening a world disarmament conference, and resolution 2930 (XXVII) outlined the first stage for the practical preparation of such a conference. An analysis of the extensive discussions which led to the adoption of these two resolutions and the answers of Governments to the Secretary-General's questionnaire, as well as an analysis of the resolutions themselves, shows that the Governments of the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations acknowledged the overriding need to convene as early as possible a world-wide forum in order to discuss comprehensively and thoroughly all aspects of disarmament. This analysis also shows that world public opinion is firmly in favour of giving disarmament priority and that the convening and successful holding of this conference with the participation of all States would

without doubt stimulate talks on disarmament and open up broad possibilities for achieving substantial progress towards effective disarmament.

133. All States and Governments, especially the small and medium-sized States, are interested in disarmament. Recently we saw once again confirmation of the interest in disarmament on the part of non-aligned States at the Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries at Algiers. There was a categorical declaration by these countries of their will to take further steps towards halting the arms race. Their great interest was again confirmed in the convening, as early as possible, of a world disarmament conference in which all countries would take part. At the present session of the General Assembly a large number of States confirmed their favourable attitude towards this conference.

134. As is known, at the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly, after considerable effort and extensive discussion, 59 sponsors introduced a draft resolution on the preparation of a world conference on disarmament. The General Assembly adopted a resolution which paved the way towards active work for the practical preparation of such a conference. A special organ was created for that purpose and its mandate clearly defined. In accordance with the text of the resolution of the General Assembly and the views of regional groups, the Special Committee's membership was likewise defined. Therefore, all the necessary conditions existed for the Committee to be able to proceed immediately to the fulfilment of the task entrusted to it. There were neither legal nor factual obstacles to the Committee's embarking upon an extensive and all-round exchange of views in preparation for the conference as well as a careful study of the points of view stated by all Governments in relation to any given aspect of the preparation and holding of the conference itself.

135. Unfortunately, the normal work of the Special Committee, created by General Assembly resolution 2930 (XXVII), was frustrated. Artificial barriers, which in our opinion were completely without justification, were placed in the way of implementation of the Committee's mandate. It is not without interest to point out that none of the arguments, to which reference was made in order to justify holding up the convening of the Special Committee and ultimately hampering its normal work, were stated officially or openly but rather covertly behind the scenes. A number of preliminary conditions were set for the beginning of the work of the Committee. United Nations practice, however, demonstrates that if one proceeds in this fashion it is difficult, if not impossible, for any organ of the United Nations to meet and begin its work.

136. Thanks to the efforts and the goodwill demonstrated by the overwhelming majority of States members of the Special Committee, an appropriate way was found for the Committee to embark upon the implementation of the task entrusted to it by resolution 2930 (XXVII). Agreement was reached, that meetings should be informal in character and headed by the representative of Iran, Mr. Hoveyda. I should like, on behalf of the Bulgarian delegation, to express our sincere gratitude for the patience and impartiality with which Mr. Hoveyda has succeeded in tackling the difficult mandate conferred on him unanimously by the members of

the Special Committee. Mr. Hoveyda's characteristics of experienced diplomacy, and especially his tact, together with his sense of responsibility, contributed singularly to breaking the deadlock and to our being enabled to embark upon a useful exchange of views that was accompanied by equally useful contacts and consultations outside the meeting. On this the twenty-sixth day of October, I should also like to extend my heartiest congratulations to Mr. Hoveyda and, through him, to all of the friendly people of Iran, on the occasion of their national holiday. The exchange of views and the discussions have shown that certain differences of view concerning the mandate and membership of the Committee could very easily have been overcome in the course of the work of the Committee itself, and that it could have been possible to find appropriate working procedures to advance the preparations for the conference. The exchange of views also showed that the idea of convening a world disarmament conference—and this is very important—was abandoned, despite the fact that the great majority of States insisted not upon the postponement of the convening of the conference, but rather on a serious preparation for it. In other words, it was confirmed once again that the convening of a world-wide forum for a comprehensive discussion of disarmament questions is a vital necessity and that such a conference can indeed become the turning point in the efforts to halt the arms race and attain effective disarmament.

137. This, in our opinion, is an important and positive result of the exchange of views conducted in the Special Committee, in spite of the difficulties and despite the fact that its work was not proceeding under normal conditions. But the results could have been even more substantial, in view of the fact that the mandate assigned to that organ was extremely modest and limited. We are nevertheless convinced that even within the framework of an informal exchange of views a number of questions have been clarified and that this has provided a good basis for the present session of the General Assembly to take a serious step forward towards preparation of the Conference. Thus the question of the probable reasonable expansion of the Committee's membership should not give rise to any difficulties if the criteria set forth in resolution 2930 (XXVII) are adhered to.

138. It is also possible to find a formula that would allow participation in the preparatory work for the conference by those States which for any given reason have been unwilling so far to take their place in the Special Committee. United Nations practice shows that it is always possible to find ways and means of taking into account the points of view, opinions and recommendations of a large number of States, even if they do not necessarily take a direct part in the meetings of a given working organ. Of course, the direct collaboration of all nuclear States at the actual preparatory stages of the Conference would accelerate that preparation, and in this respect we still believe that it would be desirable to ensure the direct participation of all nuclear States in those preparatory phases. That is why we feel that at the present meeting it is necessary to reaffirm this prevailing point of view and to address an appeal to all nuclear States to take their places in the Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference. If some of them are still not ready to respond to this appeal, ways might be found to

secure their co-operation with the Committee. We hope that the present discussion in the First Committee will contribute to a clarification of the points of view of States on this important aspect of the question of preparation of a world disarmament conference. We hope, above all, that we shall be able to hear the views of those States that are unwilling to collaborate within the framework of the specially established organ for the preparation of the Conference. Indeed, in our opinion, the First Committee has every reason to express its wish to hear the views of each of the States that so far have not taken their places in the preparatory organ. It would also be desirable to obtain explanations as to the manner in which some of them would be prepared to collaborate with the Special Committee. All this would make it possible, in the course of the work in the First Committee, to find solutions that would serve as a firm foundation for preparation of the World Conference and avert the emergence of further obstacles to the preparatory work.

139. We are profoundly convinced that all the necessary requirements have now been met for orienting the preparatory work for a world disarmament conference in the right direction. The difficulties that have arisen since the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly are, of course, neither procedural nor organizational in character, and the unofficial exchange of views in the Sub-Committee has shown that despite the existence of such difficulties, they can easily be overcome—provided, of course, that goodwill and a genuine desire to prepare and convene a world-wide conference exists. To say the least, it is not logical to assert that the time has not yet come to convene such a conference because the required preparations have not been made, and at the same time to undermine such preparations and to seek other pretexts for being unwilling to collaborate in these preparations. In any event, we find it completely unacceptable and inconsistent to make the work of preparation of the conference dependent upon the solution of certain substantive problems which will be the actual subject of discussion at the conference itself. It would be difficult to adopt such an approach as a serious attitude towards disarmament problems. Obviously, at the present session it is necessary to exert every effort to see to it that the General Assembly resolutions on the world disarmament conference are implemented.

140. The results of the informal exchange of views give us grounds to believe that it is necessary to expand the mandate of the Special Committee. Some time was lost, but that loss could be compensated for if the organ for the preparation of the conference were entrusted with tasks that are extensively broader than those specified in paragraph 2 of resolution 2930 (XXVII). This would give us an opportunity at the next session to find ways of solving the concrete questions connected with the convening and successful holding of the world-wide conference. We are convinced that this is feasible, and the Bulgarian delegation is prepared to make its contribution in this respect, both in the work of the First Committee and in the work of the organ that will carry out the preparatory work of the conference.

141. The importance of the interests involved in disarmament problems and the complexity of the subject matter call for a flexible approach towards organizational methods

and the procedure for their consideration. The idea of a world conference that would be convened periodically and that would create its own machinery for disarmament talks has a number of definite advantages from the point of view of the universality of participation and the comprehensive nature of the problems to be discussed. We are also convinced of the fruitfulness of bilateral talks within the framework of the strategic arms limitation talks.

142. In matters of disarmament in Europe, a regional approach was adopted. On the special question of a percentage reduction in the military budgets of the five permanent members of the Security Council, and in particular the allocation of part of the sums thus saved to assistance to developing countries, a special committee should be created for that purpose. The People's Republic of Bulgaria supports that proposal.

143. An especially important role in the system of organs dealing with questions of disarmament is played by the Committee of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. We have heard a number of critical comments concerning the activities of that Committee over the last few years, and we have also heard a number of proposals concerning its possible restructuring. We understand the impatience with which the whole world looks forward to the emergence of

quick and concrete results from the Committee, but we do not feel that blame for any delay in any given question should be placed on that organ itself or to its methods of procedure. In our opinion, the Committee, in its activities so far, has shown itself to be a useful specialized multi-lateral body for detailed and effective consideration of questions of disarmament. At the present time, with the broadened prospects for more intensive talks on disarmament, the need for the existence of the Geneva Committee becomes even more obvious.

144. The period in which we live requires that all countries, large and small, redouble their efforts to further encourage the process of relaxation of tensions in order to achieve additional successes in the field of disarmament. The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria is ready to do everything within its power to ensure that the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly will succeed in making a general contribution to the attainment of those great goals.

145. The Bulgarian delegation reserves its right to make a few further observations concerning specific disarmament items at a later stage of our discussions.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.