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Chairman: Mr. Otto R. BORCH (Denmark).

**AGENDA ITEMS 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 AND 38
(continued)**

**Economic and social consequences of the armaments race
and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and
security**

**World Disarmament Conference: report of the Special
Committee on the World Disarmament Conference
(A/8990 and Add.1, A/9033, A/9041, A/9228)**

**General and complete disarmament: report of the Con-
ference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/9039,
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**Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report
of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
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**Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear
tests (A/9081, A/9084, A/9086, A/9093, A/9107,**

**A/9109, A/9110, A/9117, A/9166, A/C.1/1031, 1036,
1039):
(a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on
Disarmament (A/9141);
(b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/9208)**

**Implementation of General Assembly resolution
2935 (XXVII) concerning the signature and ratification
of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Pro-
hibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of
Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General (A/9137,
A/9209)**

**Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace: report
of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean (A/9029)**

1. Sir Laurence McINTYRE (Australia): Mr. Chairman, let me take this first opportunity to salute you as the presiding officer of this Committee and, incidentally, to congratulate you on the reputation you seem to have established for getting this Committee to begin its meetings with a commendable measure of punctuality.

2. In this intervention I propose to concentrate on what my delegation believes is widely accepted as the top priority task of disarmament negotiations—that is, the control of that most terrible category of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear armaments. We shall reserve our right to intervene later in the debate to speak about other subjects falling under the broad heading of disarmament.

3. Looking first of all for progress, we can welcome the efforts that the United States and the Soviet Union are making to enlarge the first-stage agreement, reached last year, in their talks on the limitation of strategic armaments. We can also welcome the agreement this year between those two Powers on the prevention of nuclear war.

4. Another area where progress has occurred, on a regional level but no less valuable for that, is related to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.¹ The acceptance this year by China and France of Additional Protocol II of that Treaty, whereby those States have joined the United States and the United Kingdom in formally signifying their respect for an initiative by Latin American States to keep their region free from nuclear weapons, will be the more welcome if it should prove to be notice of a willingness to join more broadly in multilateral efforts towards disarmament.

5. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex] gained some additional support in 1973, but not as much as we might

¹ Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634, No. 9068, p. 283).

have wished. Australia was one of those States that ratified the Treaty during the year. This step, taken last January, and one of the first acts of the Australian Government which was elected in December 1972, was a clear reflection of the new Government's strong and unequivocal support for efforts to check the spread of nuclear weapons.

6. My delegation joins earlier speakers in appealing for the widest possible degree of support for this important Treaty from all categories of States—nuclear, near-nuclear and not at all nuclear. The path to a fully effective non-proliferation Treaty lies through the maximum enlargement of support for it and through the impartial application of a system of verification such that parties may have confidence in the Treaty.

7. I have chosen today to look first at the credit side of the ledger, because my delegation believes that an approach founded on optimism for the future is preferable to one based on pessimism. For an accurate appreciation of the situation in which we find ourselves, however, we must now look at the debit side, and when we do so I fear that we might be excused for believing that our debits for the year of 1973 outweigh our credits. I refer of course to the subject of nuclear weapons testing, which continues to take place both in the atmosphere and underground—although, happily, we recognize that States that could well afford and are able to do so have not chosen to add themselves to the list of those possessing and testing nuclear weapons.

8. At the outset, let me state unequivocally the Australian Government's firm opposition to all forms of nuclear-weapon testing, whether in the atmosphere or underground.

9. The nuclear-weapon problem can be considered both as a composite whole and on different levels. One level is that of underground testing which, although opposed by the bulk of world opinion, is not the subject of an international treaty. That it has not yet been possible to negotiate such a treaty is particularly regrettable.

10. A number of speakers before me have recalled the signature, just over 10 years ago in Moscow, and in such high hopes for a better world, of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water.² The preamble to that Treaty set forth as the objective of the three nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time". It must be acknowledged that the partial test-ban Treaty has fulfilled its objectives in part; but let us spare a moment now, in 1973, 10 years later, to express our common sense of regret that it has not yet been possible to live up to the aspirations of mankind as expressed in that preamble.

11. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has, of course, been pursuing diligently the objective of a prohibition of all forms of nuclear weapons testing. In response to resolution 2934 B (XXVII), that Conference submitted a special report [A/91.11] to the General Assembly this year on its endeavours. Section III of the report is perhaps useful in the sense that it provides a statement, in summary form, of material that is available in

the Committee's records. Beyond that editorial exercise, however, it would seem once again that agreement on a comprehensive test-ban that would have the support of the five nuclear Powers is still some distance in the future.

12. On this note, I turn now to the second and, to my delegation, more serious level of nuclear testing, that in the atmosphere. This category of testing stands clearly and universally condemned by world public opinion as embodied in the partial test-ban Treaty and in the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly.

13. The actions of two permanent members of the Security Council in testing nuclear weapons in the atmosphere in and around the Pacific Ocean region this year have caused deep concern to the Government and people of Australia. Again, it is my duty to report to the First Committee that popular feeling in Australia against the tests has been at a high and sustained level this year. Once more Australians from many walks of life—many of whom are quite unaccustomed to the habit of public protest—have joined in expressing dismay at this threat to the environment in which they live. The Australian Government has joined its voice to theirs in protesting officially to both the States concerned.

14. Australians have not been alone in their protests against the tests. Their voices have been echoed and magnified throughout the length and breadth of the Pacific Ocean, to such an extent that it might fairly be claimed that the peoples of the area are united in their opposition. If anyone doubts this let him read the expressions of apprehension and concern that have now become commonplace at all levels—individual, governmental and regional.

15. After seeking a settlement of our dispute with one nuclear Power through bilateral discussions and having failed to achieve a settlement, the Australian Government this year instituted proceedings in the International Court of Justice. It was our contention in the Court that atmospheric testing is an unlawful activity, prohibited by contemporary norms of international law. Furthermore, we argued, the people of Australia are entitled to the protection of Australia's territorial sovereignty, which they regard as infringed by the deposit on our soil, without our consent, of radioactive substances from tests in the Pacific. Australia was also asserting, however, a more far-reaching principle than its own right and interest, namely, the right of every State and its people to be free from atmospheric nuclear-weapon tests by any country.

16. Last June, the Court ruled in favour of Australia's request for interim measures of protection pending its judgement on the merits of the case. It is with profound regret that I note that this order was disregarded through the conduct of further nuclear tests by the State in question. Notwithstanding this action, however disappointing it has been to us, my Government will pursue its search for protection through the use of the peaceful processes available through the International Court of Justice, which we believe is the proper remedy in this case.

17. Let me repeat, however—indeed, let me stress—that our concern goes further than the immediate protection of Australian territory. Radioactive products released over the

² United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480, No. 6964, p. 43.

oceans inevitably settle to the sea, whatever precautions are taken, and are absorbed into the water and eventually into the life chains that comprise the marine ecosystems. Species of living resources might then contaminate the diet of other species, including man, in widely distributed areas.

18. In this connexion we have heard the argument that the tests in the Pacific do not constitute a hazard to anyone. Although we do not dispute that this view is held sincerely, my delegation would like to advance the following considerations in this regard. First, natural conditions make it inevitable that radioactive debris will be deposited beyond the territory of the Power conducting the tests. Secondly, that debris will enter into the bodies of people in other countries, subjecting them to additional ionizing radiation. Thirdly, ionizing radiation is inherently harmful to human life. Fourthly, there is a serious danger that any addition of ionizing radiation, however small, is harmful. We believe that the prudent scientific approach is to assume that there is no threshold or safe limit. Fifthly, there should be no exposure to ionizing radiation from artificial sources without a compensating benefit. Sixthly, it is for each country itself to decide the levels of artificial ionizing radiation to which its people are to be subjected and to balance the risks involved against any compensating benefits.

19. To us in Australia it is difficult to discern a benefit flowing from atmospheric nuclear testing by other States that compensates for those risks. We believe, today more than ever, that the impulsion of events requires us to draw the necessary conclusions from the facts: first, that we live in one world and, secondly, that as inhabitants of that world we are becoming increasingly interdependent. In our view, responsible States, members of the international community, have a duty to preserve and protect the environment which we inhabit in common and which is our heritage in common and in trust for future generations.

20. In conclusion, my delegation notes that a contrast has been drawn between current protests and the fact that similar protests were not made in the case of testing carried out years ago. Like other States, we attach importance to consistency of practice in the conduct of international relations. We do not believe, however, that the practice of States can always be unchangeable. The world cannot stand still and we should not try to make it do so. Times change; attitudes change; new facts, new scientific findings, emerge and our knowledge goes on growing. What may have been acceptable in the past—before the partial test-ban Treaty had been negotiated—may not be acceptable today. One could quote a whole range of subjects, nuclear testing among them, on which views have changed dramatically with the passage of time, and to which this argument could apply.

21. The CHAIRMAN: Before calling upon the next speaker on my list, I should like to ask the representative of Sweden to introduce the revised draft resolution regarding napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use [A/C.1/L.650/Rev.1].

22. Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): I have asked to speak today not in order to make a second statement in this debate on behalf of the Swedish delegation but in order to introduce

the revised draft resolution which you, Mr. Chairman, have just referred to, on behalf of the sponsors of that draft resolution: Bahrain, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia.

23. The sponsors have tried to take into account various suggestions that have come to them from other delegations and to meet some of the concerns that have been voiced.

24. The first change is the insertion of a new preambular paragraph after the second preambular paragraph. The new paragraph is designed to underline the importance of searching for rules, even in the context of rules regarding weapons, that might improve the protection of the civilian population.

25. The next change is in the seventh preambular paragraph of the revised draft resolution. That change is designed to stress the fact that, while the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts is indeed invited to seek agreements on rules regarding the prohibition or restriction of use of certain conventional weapons, the question of disarmament, in the stricter sense of that word—namely, non-production, non-stockpiling and non-proliferation—remains one for the organs already set up or to be set up for disarmament negotiations.

26. The change in the eighth preambular paragraph of the revised draft resolution spells out that the meeting in Geneva next February will be the first session of the Diplomatic Conference. A second session is expected in 1975. It may be desirable to stress this, as it is evident that the issue which the draft resolution invites the conference to deal with is one which undoubtedly will take more than six weeks to consider.

27. The change in the last preambular paragraph is intended to make the statement a little less categorical and, at the same time, to avoid any innuendo to the effect that rules regarding specific weapons should necessarily be inserted into the draft protocol submitted by the International Committee of the Red Cross. As I have had occasion to stress before, such rules might well be laid down in instruments separate from the protocol.

28. A new passage has been inserted in operative paragraph 1 to meet the concern of some delegations that the issue referred to the conference by the draft resolution would unduly burden the conference or complicate the work on the protocols. Some delegations have suggested that this operative paragraph might have invited the conference to establish a special commission to consider the question of napalm and other incendiary weapons, as well as other, specific, conventional weapons that may be deemed to cause unnecessary suffering or to have indiscriminate effects; and, further, to make recommendations to the conference regarding rules prohibiting or restricting the use of such weapons. It being understood that such a commission would be open to all participants in the conference and that it would function as other commissions of the conference, although it might in addition be asked, if need be, to work also between the sections of the conference.

29. In the view of the sponsors that might well be a convenient arrangement. At this early stage, however, it might be premature to suggest arrangements of such a specific character to a conference which, in any event, is master of its own proceedings. Hence, the sponsors have thought it wiser to stress that the work of the conference on the issue dealt with in this draft resolution should not encroach upon the work that the conference will have to devote to the many other important matters referred to. One way of ensuring that such encroachment would be avoided could be, as I suggested in my first statement in this Committee [1941st meeting], to set up a separate commission to deal with that issue.

30. The last two changes relate to the way in which the Secretary-General would be requested to inform the General Assembly of the work of the conference. These changes are of a procedural nature. Under the present items it would probably be appropriate only to ask him to report on the issues referred to in this draft resolution. In any draft resolution which may be introduced later this session in the Sixth Committee under the item entitled "Human rights in armed conflicts", the Secretary-General will no doubt be asked to inform the General Assembly of the work of the diplomatic conference on matters other than those dealt with in the present draft resolution.

31. Mr. DUGERSUREN (Mongolia): I should like to begin my statement by endorsing the prevailing view that in the intervening year since the last session of the General Assembly international détente has gained further ground. The crux of the new development lies in the strengthening of the principles of peaceful coexistence among States with differing social systems and in the enhancement of that policy by increasing co-operation among nations in political, economic, technical and other fields.

32. Leaders of non-aligned countries declared at the Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries at Algiers in September 1973:

"Examining the contemporary international developments, the Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries consider that there have emerged profound changes in the general balance of forces in the world, as a result of the growing forces of peace, independence and progress." [See A/9330.]

It is these changes that have brought about a new stage in international relations.

33. We can say now that the war that erupted recently in the Middle East because of the Israeli aggressive and expansionist acts has not reversed the basic trend, although it has caused certain serious complications. However, there is no ground for complacency.

34. First of all, we take full cognizance of the fact that forces which attempt to inject and encourage instability in the international climate are at work.

35. On the other hand, the spiralling arms race has not been checked. The means of mass destruction are being increasingly stockpiled and perfected. Military expenditures are swallowing up each year hundreds of billions of dollars.

An increasing number of States are getting involved in the armament race, many of them against their will. Even those countries which badly need resources for their economic and social development are compelled to spend a considerable share of their income for military purposes.

36. Thus the problem of disarmament has become a concern of each and every nation. The purpose of disarmament, as we see it, lies in strengthening, through collective measures, the security of every State—big, medium-sized and small alike.

37. The year 1973 has witnessed certain tangible headway in the arms control and disarmament negotiations, both bilateral and multilateral. First of all, in Vienna new ground has been broken in multilateral negotiations. My delegation welcomes the talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe as a very important beginning which, we hope, will materially contribute to détente in that continent. The successful outcome of the talks will not only diminish the risk of armed confrontation in the region, where the main bulk of armed forces of the two military-political groupings is concentrated. It may also provide a lead to other regional reductions of armed forces and armaments so indispensable both for strengthening universal peace and security and for enhancing the economic and social advancement of all countries, especially the developing ones.

38. The other day the Soviet Union expressed its earnest desire to see 1975 as the year of implementation of practical measures in this vital field; and this is fully endorsed by other socialist countries. My delegation would like to express its hope that the Western participants in the talks will be guided by the same serious and constructive approach.

39. In the bilateral field, the Soviet-American Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War [see A/9293] constitutes a real landmark in the effort for staving off a nuclear missile holocaust which would endanger the very survival of the human race. Anyone who really cares for security and the well-being of mankind cannot question the significance of this Agreement. My delegation believes that, among other things, the meaning and implications of this Agreement could best be judged in the light of General Assembly resolution 2936 (XXVII), whereby the General Assembly:

"Solemnly declares, on behalf of the States Members of the Organization, their renunciation of the use or threat of force in all its forms and manifestations in international relations, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons;"

40. In the view of my delegation, the parties to the Agreement have taken an important lead towards the implementation of that historical declaration. My delegation would very much like to express the hope that the other nuclear Powers will find it possible to endorse the Agreement in any way suitable to each of them. To judge from the statements of the representatives of these nuclear Powers which I have in mind, each of them seems to favour the prevention of nuclear war. What is more important is that all nuclear Powers have a special responsibility before

mankind in terms of promoting universal peace and security. My delegation further submits that the Agreement has also provided the Security Council with some useful clues for evolving ways and means of fulfilling the General Assembly mandate which requested the Council to take “as soon as possible, appropriate measures for the full implementation” of the above-mentioned declaration.

41. Of no less importance is the Soviet-American agreement on the Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms [*ibid.*]. We are encouraged by assurances from both sides on the seriousness of their intention to reach agreement by 1974 on measures for making permanent the limitation on strategic offensive weapons and bringing about a gradual reduction in that field.

42. Now let me turn to some other nuclear disarmament issues which have been matters of special concern to the world community. Among them I would single out two: the question of a comprehensive nuclear weapon test ban and that of implementing the existing international instruments. My Government unreservedly subscribes to prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests by all States in all environments. The longest-sought, and still unattained, objective is the banning of underground nuclear tests. The lack of a political decision on the part of certain Western Powers, especially the United States, has been an obstruction to the negotiations. The United States continues to insist upon on-the-spot inspection as the main requirement for solving this problem. With rapid technological advancement, however, every passing year has been bringing forth new vindication of those who consider national means of detection adequate for the verification of the observance of an underground test ban agreement. The socialist countries have always displayed readiness to negotiate on such a basis. No agreement, unfortunately, has been reached so far. Besides the aforementioned basic reason for lack of progress, one might add that non-observance by certain nuclear Powers of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water has objectively contributed to making negotiations on banning underground nuclear tests more difficult and complex. The regrettable fact is that this important instrument, adhered to by more than 100 States, has failed so far to command co-operation and observance on the part of China and France.

43. This brings me to reiterating the policy of my Government, which attaches special importance to the strengthening of all major agreements concluded thus far in the field of limiting the arms race and of disarmament. It has always held the view that the widest possible adherence to and observance of the existing instruments of arms limitation and disarmament constitute factors indispensable for encouraging further measures in this vital field. In addition to the partial test-ban Treaty, my delegation wishes to make special reference to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This instrument, like the first one, has played a very important part in checking the spread of nuclear weapons. It is more than obvious that in the present circumstances the non-proliferation Treaty needs further strengthening. My delegation renews its appeal to all States, especially the nuclear and so-called near-nuclear ones, which have not yet acceded to

or ratified the Treaty, to do so, having in view the forthcoming review conference in March 1975. My delegation submits that this important issue deserves a special appeal which could be launched by the present session of the General Assembly.

44. Now allow me to turn to the question of the banning of another weapon of mass destruction—the chemical means of warfare. The key aspects of this problem—especially the issues of scope of prohibition and verification—have been extensively discussed in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for the past two years or so. Technically speaking, one may say that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has accumulated sufficient knowledge and adequate groundwork to elaborate a mutually acceptable agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons as such. Since March 1972 the Committee has had before it a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction presented by the socialist countries³ and recognized by the majority of the Committee members as a suitable basis for an agreement. The draft has been supplemented by a working paper on national control measures submitted by the same countries to the Committee on 28 June 1973 [A/9141, annex II, sect. 11]. As is well known, the draft convention advocates a comprehensive ban on the basis of the purpose criterion. It also recognizes a rational combination of national means of control and certain international measures as an acceptable solution to the key issue of verification.

45. The working paper submitted by 10 non-aligned States on 26 April 1973 [*ibid.*, sect. 8] has made a substantial contribution to the effort for elaborating a comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. On the main issues of determining the scope of prohibition and the system of verification, the working paper of the non-aligned countries and the draft convention follow basically the same line. This bears out the fact that the majority in the Committee on Disarmament is in favour of a comprehensive ban on chemical means of warfare. It should be added that, both in the draft convention and in the working paper of the 10 non-aligned countries, account has been taken of the complexity of the problem, stemming from the deep involvement of chemistry in peaceful endeavours as well as from the dual-purpose use of a great variety of chemical agents.

46. Just on the eve of the recess of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament the delegation of Japan presented a working paper [*ibid.*, sect. 21]. A first reading of this paper, which has been deservedly welcomed as a substantial contribution to the examination of the question, gives the impression that an earnest attempt has been made to produce a document which would reconcile the views and approaches that have been expressed on the matter in the Committee on Disarmament. My delegation hopes that it will have the chance to comment on the paper in greater detail later on. However, even now we can safely say that the working paper essentially advocates a partial

³ Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1972, document DC/235, annex C, sect. 5.

approach, both in terms of the agents to be covered and of activities to be prohibited.

47. Thus, notwithstanding quite a lively discussion in the Committee on Disarmament, there has not been progress towards achieving agreement. All indications are that certain Western Powers—the United States in the first place—are not yet prepared to agree to the prohibition of chemical weapons or, to be more exact, to accept a comprehensive solution to this problem which is vital for all.

48. It is our hope that the Western Powers will come to the 1974 sessions of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament with concrete proposals put into treaty language, and thus positively respond to the widely expressed desire of the majority of the Committee members.

49. In connexion with the question under discussion, my delegation would like to stress again the importance of strengthening further the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.⁴ It is the hope of my delegation that the General Assembly will again make an appeal to those States that have not yet done so to accede to or ratify the said Protocol.

50. My delegation has already lent its full support to the proposal of the Soviet Union on the reduction of military budgets of States permanent members of the United Nations Security Council by 10 per cent and the use of a part of the funds thus saved for providing assistance to developing countries. It will also have a chance to express itself in greater detail on the item when it is taken up at the plenary.

51. At this stage I wish only to state that this concrete and practical proposal must be seen first of all in the light of international détente. It is the first true indication of how real the economic and other benefits from disarmament measures could be. The Soviet proposal suitably epitomizes the two main areas of primary concern to the world community, namely, the need to check the arms race and strengthen universal security and the need to contribute effectively to the economic and social advancement of the developing countries. This new timely initiative, therefore, has met with increasing support.

52. I should now like to make a preliminary brief remark in connexion with draft resolution A/C.1/L.650/Rev.1, which has just been introduced by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal.

53. My Government has from the very beginning lent its support to all steps taken by the General Assembly which resulted in the preparation and dissemination of a report on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use.⁵ As is clear from the reply [see A/9207 and Corr.1] to the Secretary-General's note verbale of 8 January 1973, my Government stands for the prohibition

of the use, production, development and stockpiling of napalm and other incendiary weapons. We would prefer that such a course of action be taken by competent organs, in particular by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament that has proved itself a qualified and effective body for such negotiations. In other words, we would think it more appropriate to treat this problem as a disarmament matter. However, the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.650/Rev.1 have proposed that the General Assembly recommend to the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, to be held at Geneva in February and March 1974, that it adopt rules prohibiting or restricting the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons. As far as I can understand, the suggestion made is to treat the problem essentially from its humanitarian aspect.

54. My delegation will take a final position on the draft resolution after carefully studying it in the light of the basic approach of my Government to the problem.

55. The CHAIRMAN: Before I call on the next speaker I should just like to confirm that Ghana has been added to the list of sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.650/Rev.1.

56. Mr. LUSAKA (Zambia): My delegation has carefully studied the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/9141]. We have also listened with great interest to the statements made in this Committee by those members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament who have spoken before us.

57. Clearly the message from the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is the same as that of last year. That body has again failed to live up to its expectations. The appeals addressed to it by the General Assembly in its resolutions 2933 (XXVII) and 2934 (XXVII) did not, unfortunately, have any effect on the Conference. We still note the lack of progress in the Conference on the urgent questions of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty and the prohibition of chemical weapons.

58. My delegation, nevertheless, wishes to record its appreciation for the efforts of a number of members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament who advanced constructive proposals aimed at breaking the deadlock. We are being made to believe that there are intricate technicalities which have to date prevented the Conference from recording success in its endeavours. We are convinced, however, that the real problem is the lack of political will on the part of certain members of that body. It seems to us that in spite of the commendable efforts of many of its members the Conference cannot act since certain Member States continue to procrastinate and prevaricate. Only if and when there is a change of heart on the part of these States can we expect positive results on this question. The question arises, however, whether the Conference serves any other purpose apart from that of rubber stamping accords negotiated bilaterally between certain States and outside its framework.

59. My delegation believes that if the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should be maintained at all, we must urgently seek measures designed to make it an effective and truly multilateral forum for disarmament

⁴ League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, No. 2138, p. 65.

⁵ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.I.3.

negotiations. We agree with those who feel that a starting point in this direction should be an immediate change from the present system of super-Power co-chairmanship of that body. In the process of reorganizing the structure and procedures of the Conference, we must also seek ways and means of securing the inclusion in its membership of the two nuclear countries still outside it. The opportunity should also be seized to ensure adequate and effective representation of all regions in order that the Conference may have a truly international character and therefore rekindle hopes for genuine disarmament efforts.

60. We have often wondered whether it is not more fear of one another than any genuine desire for disarmament that compels the super-Powers even to discuss this question. Clearly, certain accords that have been concluded to date either are discriminatory in nature or seek to create an illusion of world peace and security based on an equilibrium of big-Power preponderance.

61. We must seize the bull by the horns. Let us not confuse issues. Priority attention must be on genuine nuclear disarmament. Half-hearted measures at disarmament are not the answer. In March 1975 a review conference of one of the treaties on disarmament, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, will take place. I would like to take this opportunity to point out that the attitude of my delegation towards the general import of that Treaty remains unchanged. My delegation still contends that the Treaty is grossly discriminatory in that it allows for the perpetuation of a dangerous monopoly in nuclear might, and this is contrary to the consistent policy of my Government to work towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament.

62. My delegation has always been happy to give its support to General Assembly resolutions urging all nuclear Powers to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. We are happy to note at this session that since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2935 (XXVII), two nuclear Powers—China and France—have responded positively. We would like to express the hope that the only remaining nuclear Power will soon respond to the wishes of the people of Latin America.

63. This brings me to a related question, namely, the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. Both in the non-aligned group and indeed in the United Nations, Zambia has consistently been an ardent supporter of the highly commendable initiative of the Government of Sri Lanka. The adoption of resolution 2832 (XXVII) by the General Assembly was not an end in itself, but rather an important first step, since we have yet to translate the concept itself into a practical reality. My delegation is happy to be a member of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean established by the General Assembly last year for that purpose. We are convinced that the co-operation of the great Powers and other interested countries is vital if the *Ad Hoc* Committee is to succeed in its work. The concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace is undoubtedly a constructive contribution towards *the strengthening of international security*.

64. We in Zambia believe that urgent international action is required to prohibit the use, production, development

and stockpiling of napalm and other incendiary weapons. We have noted the comments made by a number of Governments in connexion with the report of the Secretary-General. At the 1941st meeting, the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Alva Myrdal, very eloquently introduced a seven-Power draft resolution inviting the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts to consider this question and to take measures prohibiting the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons. It is our hope that that Conference will respond quickly and decisively.

65. It would be superfluous for me to repeat here Zambia's commitment to the idea of a world disarmament conference. Our efforts at the last session of the General Assembly, along with those of other non-aligned countries, speak for themselves. Again, we joined with others at the Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at Algiers in calling for a world disarmament conference to be convened as soon as possible. Furthermore, our position was clearly spelt out by my Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. E. H. K. Mudenda, in his address to the General Assembly at the 2130th plenary meeting on 27 September 1973. In fact, a part of his statement has been quoted by at least one delegation in this general debate. I wish to make it clear that we are in favour of a world disarmament conference not merely for its own sake but also because we would like to see genuine disarmament. In other words, we are calling for a conference which we hope will produce positive results in the field of disarmament. It is also our belief that for the success of the conference it will be necessary to undertake thorough preparations. More important, the participation of all nuclear-weapon States in such a conference must be assured. The questions of thorough preparation for the conference and participation of all nuclear-weapon States are important and directly linked to its outcome. They can be solved only by a serious and constructive approach by all of us.

66. As was pointed out by my Minister for Foreign Affairs, my delegation seriously regrets the unhappy events which made it impossible for a special committee on the world disarmament conference to be constituted as envisaged under General Assembly resolution 2930 (XXVII). We thought that we had begun to make progress by the adoption of that resolution. Unfortunately, we now find ourselves back to square one. The representative of Iran, Mr. Hoveyda, has already very eloquently informed this Committee of what happened during the year [1934th meeting]. In this connexion, I take this opportunity to express to him the admiration of my delegation for the exemplary manner in which he executed his difficult task of directing the informal exchanges. The report which he gave to this Committee bears testimony to his abilities and skilful diplomacy. My delegation hopes that if anything positive emerges from our current consideration of the question of a world disarmament conference, great care will be taken to ensure that what happened after the adoption of resolution 2930 (XXVII) will be avoided.

67. Finally, I wish to point out that the events in the Middle East have demonstrated the close link that exists between disarmament and international security. We hope that both these subjects can be tackled seriously, in order

that our dream for a just and peaceful world may come true. The events in the Middle East have also shown that a limited détente is nothing more than an illusion.

68. Mr. ALEMAN (Ecuador) (*interpretation from Spanish*): When we speak of the item or disarmament it is imperative to admit that we cannot hide the marked scepticism that yearly has accompanied the debates on the subject. The truth of the matter is that despite the repeated talks held on the question, and despite the many resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, no true progress has been achieved on this vital question except for certain partial and limited agreements or understandings obtained through bilateral negotiations outside the framework of the United Nations. Now, that negative note is the one that has prevailed in most of the statements we have heard in this Committee while dealing with the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. It would be most lamentable for that same feeling to be retained or for it to be the only feeling reflected in the documents of the Organization.

69. Our only hope is that that opinion, which has become generalized and reflects the anxious appeals of the peoples of the world, will be heard by the great Powers directly concerned in the unbridled arms race through which mankind is living, and that they may thus be led to assume a more constructive attitude in the negotiations on disarmament. That spirit of co-operation should be made manifest, particularly by the nuclear super-Powers which play a preponderant role in the production, stockpiling and possible use of weapons of mass destruction.

70. In this statement I shall very briefly touch upon agenda items 34, 36 and 37, because the delegation of Ecuador is, or will be, sponsoring draft resolutions on those items.

71. One of the first measures to avoid the dangers of nuclear terror would call for an end to be put to nuclear and thermonuclear tests because of the dangerous consequences that flow from them since they also speed up the arms race and because of their inherent danger to the health of mankind if not its very survival. Yet, despite resolutions of the General Assembly and despite the clamour of world public opinion, some Powers have continued to carry out nuclear tests of all sorts. Continuation of such tests undermines the authority of the United Nations, gnaws away at the fragile achievements in the prohibition of nuclear weapons and affects the interests of States and populations which, sooner or later, can be affected by environmental contamination caused by such experiments.

72. Thus too we should remember that one of the reports of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, in dealing with the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty, states that that international instrument not only considered the urgency of stemming the arms race but also took into

account the need to avoid the increasing poisoning of the atmosphere caused by radioactive isotopes released by nuclear tests. That danger should not be ignored by those who stubbornly continue to carry out that type of test, which has been vehemently and widely condemned.

73. If we truly and honestly wish to stop the arms race, then we must prohibit all types of tests including those conducted underground. The use of weapons that cause unnecessary suffering or of methods of war that have indiscriminate effects is repugnant to the conscience of mankind, and if we cannot stop war—which in itself constitutes a triumph of irrational forces over man's reason—we should at least try to avoid the use in wars of increasingly cruel and inhuman agents and means.

74. Mortality caused by napalm and other incendiary weapons is greater than that caused by any other existing explosive means, and its victims are exposed to unimaginable suffering. Furthermore, those weapons have been or are being used in countries and regions that are somewhat backward, where medical resources and means of preventing their highly destructive effects are very scarce.

75. The sophistication of weapons and methods of war which cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects on civilians should surely galvanize Governments and force them to make determined efforts to restrict and prohibit the use of such weapons and methods. The diplomatic conference to be held next year in Switzerland would appear to us to be the most propitious forum for achieving progress towards that end.

76. For those reasons my delegation has added its name to the list of sponsors of the draft resolution on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, which was formally submitted to the Committee a few days ago by the Swedish representative, Mrs. Myrdal, backed by the authority of the admirable tradition of her country in humanitarian questions and her own unselfish devotion to the cause of universal peace.

77. In conclusion, my delegation would like to express its gratification that Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which today constitutes the only healthy example of a treaty on a nuclear-free zone, has in the course of this year been subscribed to by France and the People's Republic of China.

78. The prompt ratification of that Protocol by those nuclear Powers will be a valuable contribution towards achievement of the ultimate goal of the Treaty of Tlatelolco: keeping Latin America free from atomic weaponry as one of our contributions to general and complete disarmament.

The meeting rose at 4.20 p.m.