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**Economic and social consequences of the armaments race  
and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and  
security**

**World Disarmament Conference: report of the Special  
Committee on the World Disarmament Conference  
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**General and complete disarmament: report of the Confer-  
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**Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of  
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**Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report  
of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament  
(A/9141)**

**Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear  
tests (A/9081, A/9084, A/9086, A/9093, A/9107,**

1. Mr. GRINBERG (Bulgaria): On 25 October, at the 1938th meeting, the Bulgarian delegation expressed its views regarding some of the most important aspects of the problem of disarmament and, more specifically, on the urgent necessity of speeding up the preparatory work for convening a World Disarmament Conference. Now we would like to put forward a few considerations regarding some of the other items on the agenda.

2. In our previous statement we gave expression to our conviction that the positive trends in international relations which we have been witnessing of late are particularly propitious for an intensification of the efforts of all peace-loving countries in the area of disarmament. The discussion so far has revealed quite a wide consensus in this regard.

3. The unfolding prospects of accelerated progress in this vital area make even greater the responsibility of the United Nations and its Members to do all they can for the speedy solution of all disarmament problems which are ripe for solution. To work in favour of disarmament is one of our most important obligations under the Charter. People around the world are anxious to enjoy the fruits of détente in a more tangible way and without delay. Measures of disarmament would certainly enhance and deepen détente, thereby bringing us closer to the desired goal of making irreversible the present process of easing international tensions and bringing lasting peace to the world. As a socialist country, the People's Republic of Bulgaria is entirely committed to that noble cause.

4. My delegation has already spoken in favour of adopting a flexible approach in matters of disarmament. To spur the negotiations in this area, we need forums and procedures suited to the task to be fulfilled. In our view, however, no less flexibility is needed when we have to deal with the substance of the different disarmament problems.

5. The People's Republic of Bulgaria is in favour of general and complete disarmament. At the same time we are also in favour of the gradual approach, of the solution of separate partial measures which help in the achievement of the final goal of general and complete disarmament. In the present complex situation in world affairs, it would be wrong to proceed from the premise, "Everything or nothing". More often than not, maximalism is but a device for concealing negativism.

6. We believe that the recent new Soviet initiative on reducing the military budgets of the five permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries has, apart from the fact that it seeks to link disarmament to development, the added advantage of representing a relatively simple and realistic measure which may later on generate conditions propitious for undertaking measures of greater complexity and importance. The Soviet proposal could also offer an alternative to those Western countries which have recently displayed a trend towards increasing their military expenditures. An intensified arms race, with all the dangers inherent in it, could in no way serve the cause of peace and relaxation of tensions. That is why it is to be hoped that the General Assembly will approve the proposal, thereby making a real contribution towards both disarmament and development.

7. Foremost among the problems the solution of which should be delayed no longer are the prohibition of chemical weapons and the comprehensive nuclear test ban. The problem of the elimination of chemical weapons has taken most of the time and attention of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament during the last few years. As is known, as early as March 1972 the socialist countries, including the People's Republic of Bulgaria, jointly proposed a draft convention on the prohibition, development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction.<sup>1</sup> This year, the same countries have made an additional important contribution by submitting a working paper [A/9141, annex II, sect. 11] on the question of verification and control over the implementation of the convention. A number of papers on different technical aspects of the problems involved have been presented by various countries; special meetings were held in 1972 and were attended by prominent scientists and experts. Thus the problem has been exhaustively examined by now and yet, as we see it at present, the Committee has regretfully failed to fulfil its tasks.

8. As has been pointed out by previous speakers, the main obstacles to an agreement continue to be related to the question of the scope of the prohibition and the problem of verification and control. We believe that the prohibition should be comprehensive and should encompass the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. We support the purpose criterion for the determination of the scope of the prohibition because it meets the objective of achieving a total prohibition of that type of weapon of mass destruction and at the same time it would mean adopting the simplest and clearest formula which does not lend itself to contradictory interpretations. As far as the

other basic problem is concerned, namely, the question of control over the observance by States of the obligations assumed by them for the prohibition of chemical weapons, the socialist countries have offered a realistic and effective system of verification based on a reasonable combination of national and international measures.

9. We far from underestimate the complexity of the problems related to the prohibition of chemical weapons. It is understandable that at this stage there should still be some substantial differences of opinion regarding the approach to be taken for the solution of the two basic problems in question. But those differences cannot account for the lack of progress in the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in this area. The real handicap, in our view, is the failure of some Western countries to engage in constructive negotiations by offering their own suggestions on concrete formulations of an agreement.

10. The draft convention submitted by the socialist countries is for the time being the only comprehensive document and, as such, it could form the basis of negotiations. Naturally, in the course of those negotiations full account will be taken of the views and concrete proposals advanced by other countries. A number of interesting suggestions of a general nature have already been made in the 10-Power working paper presented on 26 April 1973 by Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Sweden and Yugoslavia [*ibid.*, sect. 8]. In more than one respect the provisions of this paper coincide with or are similar to the positions taken by the socialist countries. Of great interest, likewise, is the working paper submitted by Japan [*ibid.*, sect. 21] at the very end of the session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in August last. Without dealing with the substance of that paper, we consider positive the very fact that additional countries have given proof of their readiness to participate in a constructive dialogue with the aim of working out an agreed text of a draft convention. There can be no doubt that if all members of the Disarmament Committee take the same positive approach next year's session of the Committee may turn out to be of decisive importance for the implementation of the task entrusted to it.

11. The Bulgarian delegation considers that this year the General Assembly should again invite the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to accord high priority to the negotiations on the elaboration of a draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons in the shortest possible time.

12. As is known, the question of chemical weapons is closely connected with the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.<sup>2</sup> The General Assembly has on many occasions condemned actions in violation of the principles and aims of that document. The question of the universal acceptance and observance of the Geneva Protocol is still very topical. We believe the Assembly should once again repeat its call on those countries which have not yet done so to ratify the Protocol or adhere to it.

<sup>1</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1972, document DC/235, annex B, sect. 5.

<sup>2</sup> League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, No. 2138, p. 65.

13. Another important issue the solution of which is long overdue is the banning of all nuclear-weapon tests. Ten years have passed since the opening for signature of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water,<sup>3</sup> which took place in Moscow on 5 August 1963. The People's Republic of Bulgaria was among the first countries to sign and ratify that instrument. Although partial, the Moscow Treaty will remain in history as one of the first important arms-control measures which, by general admission, has played an important role as a limiting factor against the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons and a step which prepared the ground for the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*]. The partial test ban Treaty of 1963 was instrumental in starting the cleaning process in both the physical and political atmospheres of our globe.
14. Due to the circumstances prevailing in the early 1960s, a total ban could not be achieved, and the underground tests remained outside the realm of the Treaty. As is known, some countries did not adhere to it, and nuclear tests continued to be conducted in the atmosphere. In view of that, it is essential that the efforts at insuring the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests everywhere and by everyone, including underground tests, should continue and grow stronger.
15. In our view, the various aspects of the problem have already been exhaustively studied in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The main obstacle still standing in the way of reaching an agreement on underground testing is the insistence of some countries, and especially the United States, on the setting up of a system of control which would envisage some on-site inspection to supplement national means of verification. It is our considered view that national means of detection and identification would be sufficient to properly guarantee the observance by States of the obligations assumed by them for the cessation of underground nuclear tests. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries have also agreed to participate in an international exchange of seismological information. A verification system based on a combination of national means of control and international exchange of seismological data provides all the necessary elements for ensuring effective detection of eventual violations. Thus the obstacle to an agreement is of a political nature, and a political decision is needed to overcome it.
16. We also share the view that suggestions regarding the banning of underground tests by partial steps or unilateral actions on the part of nuclear Powers could not help in solving the problem under the present circumstances, when disarmament measures should be based on the principle of equal security for the parties concerned.
17. The new atmosphere of détente in the world should make the efforts to find a comprehensive solution of the problem before us more promising. Success in this area would hold back the nuclear arms race significantly, improve the prospects for talks in other fields of disarmament, and have a salutary effect on the entire international situation.
18. The People's Republic of Bulgaria attaches great importance to all measures that would bring us closer to the goal of nuclear disarmament.
19. My delegation has already had an opportunity of expressing its high appreciation of the important agreements concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States in 1972 and 1973, particularly the historic Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War [*see A/9293*], signed in Washington during the summit meeting between the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, and President Richard Nixon. That Agreement marked an important step on the way towards the total elimination of the threat of a nuclear holocaust and to the creation of a system of real guarantees of international security.
20. We share the view expressed by many delegations that in the period ahead all efforts should be made to ensure the world-wide acceptance of the non-proliferation Treaty. We noted with satisfaction the news that the International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) had concluded an agreement on guarantees as required by the non-proliferation Treaty, thereby opening the way for the adherence of seven new European non-nuclear States to that Treaty. While welcoming this very positive development, we cannot help mentioning, however, that there are still quite a few States, and, most important, some so-called near-nuclear States, that have not yet ratified the Treaty or adhered to it. The General Assembly should once more urge these countries to become parties to the non-proliferation Treaty so that the effectiveness of that important instrument will be enhanced and better conditions created for making progress in all areas of nuclear disarmament.
21. The People's Republic of Bulgaria attaches particular importance to the declaration of the General Assembly on the non-use of force in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons [*resolution 2936 (XXVII)*]. The principles of that document, which are of great political and moral value, should now acquire mandatory character through a decision of the Security Council. Such action would undoubtedly be in the best interests of international peace and security and the promotion of further measures of disarmament. We hope that the Security Council will proceed without delay to take action aimed at giving effect to the recommendation of the General Assembly.
22. Last year we had before us a report of the Secretary-General which brought to the attention of the General Assembly the necessity of working out measures for the prohibition of the use, production, development and stockpiling of napalm and other incendiary weapons.<sup>4</sup> The Assembly has to decide now on its future course in this area.
23. My delegation believes that the question of napalm and other incendiary weapons is very complex and requires detailed and time-consuming study. Taking into consideration that, essentially, we have to deal here with a problem

<sup>3</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480, No. 6964, p. 43.

<sup>4</sup> *Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.1.3).

of disarmament closely associated with the question of chemical weapons, we feel that the most qualified organ to consider measures in this respect is the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

24. The 15-Power draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.1 seeks to accord priority to the consideration of measures aimed at merely prohibiting or restricting the use of napalm and other weapons which may be deemed to cause unnecessary suffering, and to entrust this task to the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts. My delegation has certain doubts regarding this course of action. The Conference in question has a very difficult and important job to do, and it would not seem proper and practical to burden its agenda with yet another complex problem.

25. Having made those preliminary remarks, my delegation reserves its right to speak on this point again during the consideration of the draft resolution.

26. It is the sincere hope of the Bulgarian delegation that the action which this Assembly is going to take upon the conclusion of the current debate will give a new impetus to the negotiations on disarmament and will contribute towards strengthening the positive trends in international affairs for the benefit of the cause of peace and security in the world.

27. Mr. MOTT (Australia): My delegation spoke at the 1947th meeting about questions concerning the control of nuclear weapons. This intervention, which is complementary to that statement, gives our views on other aspects of arms control and disarmament.

28. A number of speakers have commented, so far approvingly, about the co-operation that now characterizes aspects of relations between the super-Powers, in particular, and other States as well. The work of the United Nations on measures of arms control and disarmament has helped to some extent to bring about this improvement in the international climate. We, as member States of the international community, are now confronted, however, with the further responsibility of helping to consolidate and enlarge the existing areas of accord to the further benefit of the peoples whom we represent here.

29. Improved relations between States, of course, do not just happen. The initial impulse for them springs from the hearts and minds of people and is translated first into action and then into results by Governments, working on three levels: bilaterally, regionally, and multilaterally or globally. There are few short-cuts along the path towards greater harmony between States. For the most part, the prime requirement is hard, patient work, because old suspicions do not yield easily to new ideas and new ideas themselves do not convert easily into international agreements.

30. Although, as I have said, the work of the United Nations has assisted towards the betterment of relations in recent years, this objective has been sought to a large and increasing extent through bilateral and regional means. The multilateral process tends more and more to be put aside

until the latter stages of a given exercise, when it might be utilized to complete or sanction agreements substantially negotiated elsewhere.

31. Without in any way intending adverse comment on the other mechanisms, my delegation would be sorry if the global machinery available for work on disarmament were to fall into disuse. In the General Assembly each year we debate matters of arms control and disarmament on a general level. This is the formal, and essential, stage of comment, review and direction, during which the opinions of Member States are made known and evaluated. My delegation values the opportunity to take part in the annual discussion of disarmament problems but recognizes that the Assembly is not the appropriate forum for the detailed and exacting work of negotiation.

32. The existing multilateral forum for negotiation is the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which reports each year to the Assembly on its work. The Conference has a number of useful achievements to its credit, but regrettably it is now some time since it has sent forward a report which contains evidence of tangible progress.

33. Again this year the Committee's report [A/9141] shows few signs of movement on its two priority items—a comprehensive nuclear test ban, and effective controls over chemical means of warfare. In this situation it is scarcely surprising that Member States of the United Nations are beginning to look for other ways of controlling armaments.

34. My delegation, although not a member of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, has always supported its work and welcomed its successes. The fact is, however, that the Conference is not now carrying out the main function for which it was set up—the work of negotiation, as distinct from the debate on specific subjects and the identification and discussion of problems, both of which are essential preliminary stages but which do not of themselves give birth to worthwhile agreements unless supplemented by a further stage of negotiation. My delegation, therefore, calls on the Conference to carry forward its unfinished work into the area of negotiation and to present us next year with signs of tangible progress on both nuclear testing and chemical weapons.

35. We believe it is generally accepted that without China and France the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament or any similar body cannot be fully effective as a negotiating medium. Like other delegations, my delegation takes this opportunity to repeat that it would strongly favour the participation of both these countries in multilateral disarmament work in whatever forum and through whatever processes might command general acceptance, and would hope that means could be found for bringing about such an end.

36. Until this happens, however, it is hard to see any alternative but that the Committee should continue its work without them. Otherwise the only body now functioning on a world level for the purpose of negotiating on questions of disarmament would fade into disuse. As far as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is concerned, therefore, the preferable course of action for

the immediate future surely is for it to rediscover the art of negotiation and to pursue its objectives in a positive manner in the common interest.

37. Concern about the functioning of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the need to consolidate and expand areas of improved relations among States brings us to the proposal for a World Disarmament Conference. Last year in this Committee my delegation signified its support for the concept of a World Disarmament Conference on the understanding that it would be adequately prepared, that it would have objectives and an agenda that commanded widespread support, and that it would include the nuclear Powers and other States of military and political significance.

38. There is little to be gained now, at the twenty-eighth session of the Assembly, in going back in detail over the events of 1973. Differences of opinion with regard to the Conference and the Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference set up pursuant to resolution 2930 (XXVII) exist in large numbers; errors of omission and commission have been alleged. The result has been that the Special Committee has been unable to do more during the year than to meet informally for an exchange of views; it has not been able to discharge the mandate for which it was established by the General Assembly.

39. To understand what happened during the year delegations require primarily a facility for reading between the lines. The Secretary-General's paper on the subject [A/9228], sets out the uncontested facts. Those States which were not designated as members of the Special Committee must now look to the intervention of those which were so designated for an understanding of the position in which we now find ourselves. In this regard they look particularly to the personal report of Mr. Hoveyda of Iran who, by way of introduction to his remarks, described himself as a non-chairman of a non-committee and said that he had been entrusted, as convener of the Committee, with a "Mission Impossible". My delegation is profoundly grateful to him for the help he has given us in understanding this complex subject.

40. For our part we do not wish now to add to or subtract from the position that we took in this Committee last year with regard to the Conference. Before considering any modifications of view, we would prefer to await more general accommodations of attitude concerning, particularly, the role and participation of the nuclear Powers. With longer-term objectives in mind we would restrict ourselves to expressing the hope that the outcome of our deliberations this year will be a resolution that is generally acceptable, and acceptable to the nuclear Powers.

41. The report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament indicates that the Committee again devoted considerable attention to the problem of devising a generally acceptable convention on chemical weapons. Once more, however, it was unable to bring its work to a conclusive end.

42. Australia has supported efforts in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in the General Assembly to negotiate effective controls over chemical and

biological weapons. We have approached these questions as a party to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. We have also signed, and intend to ratify as soon as the necessary legislation has been enacted, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction [resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex], which we consider to be a valuable supplement to the Protocol.

43. My delegation has always conceived the objective of disarmament treaties to be the promotion of the security of States in real terms. To do this, such treaties must provide their parties with the highest possible degree of assurance that other parties will respect their terms.

44. In the case of chemical weapons we must consider that the eventual treaty will have to be clear as to the agents covered and that it will have to contain effective provisions for verification. Such requirements, of course, raise two problems that do not apply with such force to biological weapons as they do to chemical weapons: first, the fact that many chemical agents have both peaceful and warlike applications; and secondly that the manufacture of chemical agents is widespread throughout the community for purposes unconnected with warfare. Considerations such as these would seem to indicate that a different approach is necessary in the case of chemical agents from the one employed in the biological convention.

45. In the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament this year, many delegations contributed to the essential preliminary work of isolating and defining the problems for which solutions will have to be found before a convention can be drafted. The Conference, of course, has also taken the process further and has had before it for some time actual treaty language.

46. The conclusion would seem to be inescapable, however, that further study will be necessary of the technical problems, especially with regard to the scope of the prohibitions and verification, that are still delaying the conclusion of an acceptable and effective agreement. For these reasons we believe that the best service that the Assembly can do this year is to approve a resolution that would take note of the stage the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has reached and ask it to continue work, with an appropriate sense of urgency, in 1974.

47. Australia is a member of the 15-nation Committee set up under resolution 2992 (XXVII) with a mandate to study the implications of the proposal that the Indian Ocean should be a zone of peace. Our support for that resolution and our membership of the Committee demonstrate our sympathetic concern with questions affecting the peace and stability of the Indian Ocean and our willingness to play a constructive role in regional initiatives of this kind. We take this opportunity of reaffirming our support for the concept of the zone of peace and our determination to play an active and helpful part in giving it more concrete form.

48. The *Ad Hoc* Committee has accepted a complex task, which bears upon the security of a large and important region of the world. In a sense, as is evident from its report

to the Assembly [A/9029], it is only at the beginning of the work of debating the proposal, analysing it and considering its implications. This fact makes it desirable for the Committee to adopt a flexible approach, seeking to ensure as it moves ahead that it carries with it not only the regional States but also those other States, such as the major Powers and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, which have important interests in and responsibilities for the security of the region.

49. The essence of the *Ad Hoc* Committee's problem is to find an acceptable balance of various legitimate interests, for example, as between the interests of States of the region as well as between regional interests on the one hand and outside and global interests on the other. We should be under no illusion that the task will be easy. For example, it will be necessary at some stage that the Committee should consult the great Powers with a view to enlisting their support for proposed courses of action. This would imply that, before taking this important step, the Committee itself will need to forge common viewpoints on the subject-matter of consultations.

50. As to the role of the Assembly now, my delegation believes that the main requirement is a resolution cast in non-controversial terms that achieves the objective of sending the Committee back to work next year.

51. Australia was one of a number of States which, pursuant to resolution 2932 A (XXVII), submitted its views to the Secretary-General on the report *Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use*. We did so because we share international concern about the use of napalm and because to us the overriding consideration is to give priority to the humanitarian aspects of the subject.

52. Our reply [see A/9207 and Corr.1.] recalled that Australia is a party to international agreements to prohibit the employment in war of weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering. It reaffirmed the principles in those agreements and their application to all classes of weapons, particularly napalm. We said, too, that we agreed that international study was required to bring about effective measures to prevent the use of napalm-type weapons, especially in circumstances where civilians could be affected. As we interpreted the replies of other countries, we believe that there is a wide degree of unanimity on this last point.

53. My delegation looks to the General Assembly this year to set action in motion in respect of napalm-type weapons, having particularly in mind the humanitarian aspects of the question. Against this background we welcome the constructive initiative by the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.650/Rev.1 in taking a lead for this purpose.

54. Mr. JANKOWITSCH (Austria): On 30 October this year, the negotiations on mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe began in Vienna. As has been pointed out by a number of speakers before me, the importance of these negotiations can hardly be overestimated as they constitute the first concrete effort at attaining a reduction of conventional armaments. I may add that my Government is pleased to be

able to offer the site and secretariat services to those negotiations.

55. The talks on mutual force reduction are only one in a series of events which have led us to evoke a new climate of détente and to speak of new hopes in the field of disarmament. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, now in its second phase in Geneva, the second round of the strategic arms limitation talks as well as the simultaneous talks on the implementation of the first two agreements concluded last year must be mentioned in this connexion.

56. We are, on the other hand, all aware of a certain feeling of frustration, particularly among those associated with disarmament negotiations in the United Nations, a feeling which appears to be generated by the recent lack of tangible results in the field of disarmament proper. We are told that the negotiations on mutual force reductions can at this stage only be a promise; the strategic arms limitation talks have been criticized as providing, after the first round, only for arms control; and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the only disarmament organ reporting to the United Nations, has not been able, for the second consecutive year, to make any substantial progress on the topics it has discussed. In such a situation of unfulfilled expectations, it is not surprising that a call for institutional changes has become more frequent and forceful.

57. The most important and far-reaching proposal in this direction has been the suggestion to hold a World Disarmament Conference. One of the main arguments advanced in favour of convening such a conference, namely, that it would achieve universality, has during the past year become the focus of many preoccupations. It was said that the World Disarmament Conference would, by assembling all countries without exception, and in particular all nuclear-weapon States, overcome one of the birth defects of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, in which only three of the five nuclear Powers participate. This argument loses some of its strength if we consider for a moment that the two nuclear-weapon States absent from Geneva—China and France—are already participating in the disarmament debate of this Committee; but it goes without saying that their participation in the proposed World Disarmament Conference is indeed indispensable. We attach far greater importance to another aspect. We believe, as was expressed in the reply of the Austrian Government of 13 September 1972, contained in document A/8817, that a World Disarmament Conference could provide a forceful impetus to all disarmament negotiations, that it could stimulate new proposals and that it would provide a vantage point from which to review and evaluate all activities in the field of disarmament. Consequently, the Austrian Government is convinced of both the necessity and the usefulness of a World Disarmament Conference, and this conviction is strengthened in the face of the present lack of direction in the United Nations disarmament debate.

58. Austria will therefore support every concrete proposal which is designed to bring us closer to this goal, such as the establishment of a body, whether it be called preparatory, or study or a special committee. However, let me add a word of caution. Experience with the Special Committee

on the World Disarmament Conference provided for in last year's resolution 2930 (XXVII) shows that careful and comprehensive consultations are absolutely essential for the establishment of such an organ, if we want to avoid a recurrence of events which have moved the goal of a World Disarmament Conference perhaps a little further away rather than bringing us closer towards it. In saying this my delegation, as previous delegations have done, would in no way underestimate the diligent efforts made by so many members of that Committee and in particular Mr. Hoveyda, who convened the Special Committee, in trying to achieve some measure of agreement.

59. Because my Government views a world disarmament conference as an event which would provide a unique impetus—after all, there has been only one disarmament conference of similar scope in history, and that was held in the early 1930s—we have some doubts whether a reactivation of the United Nations Disarmament Commission would be a satisfactory substitute for the conference itself. However, the United Nations Disarmament Commission could very well serve in making preparations for such a conference at the same time as it took up, as we hope it will, substantive issues.

60. The present widespread frustration, however, seems to have its origin not so much in a lack of suitable disarmament organs as in the repetition of sterile debates in the existing bodies without even the prospect of solutions.

61. I hasten to add that the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has since its inception performed extremely useful work which can be measured not only and not always by the rate at which the Conference turns out agreements ready for signature but rather by the growing body of common knowledge and understanding reached among its members on one of the most intractable problems of international relations. It is precisely because of this valuable work, which in our view should continue, that a discussion on a possible restructuring of the Committee on Disarmament could be useful. Such a discussion, if undertaken, could centre on the following objectives.

62. First, it could centre on efforts in the direction of the participation of all nuclear-weapon States in the meetings of the Committee.

63. In connexion with this and taking into account the increase in the membership of the United Nations, a certain enlargement of the Committee might be envisaged, bearing in mind that, because of the highly complicated nature of its discussions, the membership should be kept as small as possible. Because of the growing number of States closely interested in the debates of the Committee on Disarmament, and again because of the necessity of keeping membership fairly small, efforts could be made to enable additional countries to participate in the work of the Committee on Disarmament on a different basis, for instance by rotating memberships or by allowing observers to take part in the debates.

64. The work of the Committee might focus on a number of issues which until now have received only scant attention, for example conventional armaments. In some

fields the creation of working or expert groups might relieve the Committee of the purely technical aspects of disarmament.

65. Those are just a few thoughts which my delegation puts forward in response to suggestions concerning the work of the Committee itself contained in paragraphs 125 to 142 of the Committee's report [A/9141].

66. Ten years after the conclusion of the partial test-ban Treaty in Moscow, a comprehensive test ban treaty remains as elusive as ever, despite the fact that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has discussed the subject for the past three years with the "highest priority". Why is that so? Reports submitted by the Committee on Disarmament do not give any clear-cut explanation or an assessment of the future chances of realizing the objective set forth in numerous resolutions of the General Assembly.

67. More than ever, the difficulties seem to centre on the problem of seismological identification and adequate verification of underground explosions. Annexed to the report of the Committee on Disarmament may be found a wide array of highly specialized working papers on these problems, and I should like to pay tribute to delegations which have spared no effort in preparing and submitting them. Among those papers my delegation found one submitted by the United States of particular interest [*ibid.*, annex II, sect. 12]. It deals with the possibilities of evasion by such devices as testing in low coupling media, cavity decoupling, interfering events or the simulation of seismic signatures of earthquakes by multiple explosions.

68. The amount of research that has gone into this and similar studies is enormous. However, my delegation cannot escape the impression that we have entered another vicious circle, where research into evasion techniques, paired with the constant progress of nuclear-weapon technology, always manages to keep ahead of progress in the field of seismic detection. The statement made in this debate that only nuclear-weapon States are in a position to determine with absolute certainty which low-yield tests are detectable as such and what military significance has to be attributed to undetectable tests tends to confirm this impression. Only a demonstration of political will by the major nuclear-weapon States could, in our opinion, therefore, break this circle.

69. During the past few years the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere has aroused the protests of many countries and in particular of those which, because of their geographic vicinity to the testing sites, are primarily affected. Austria is in full sympathy with the concern expressed by those countries and their efforts to forestall all further nuclear testing.

70. We are also of the opinion that a thorough examination by the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation of all available data on the effects of such tests, as proposed by France in the Special Political Committee, would well serve in providing an objective basis for our discussion, in so far as it concerns these aspects. There is more, however. Austria has always advocated the cessation of all tests in all environments as one step towards general nuclear disarmament. If under-

ground tests, because of the lack of atmospheric fall-out, encounter today less vociferous protest, their continuation by the major nuclear-weapon States appears to be intimately connected to the continuation of atmospheric tests carried out by other nuclear States. We believe that it is the responsibility of all nuclear-weapon States to make efforts in this direction and at least to begin a discussion of these problems.

71. If the nuclear test ban and a concomitant halt in the vertical proliferation has eluded us so far, we can at least say that our efforts at preventing horizontal proliferation of atomic weapons by the instrument of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have been successful. My Government was among those that signed that Treaty on the very first day. Austria ratified it before it entered into force on 5 March 1970 and subsequently concluded a safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. My Government is therefore gratified to note that the number of countries which have signed or ratified the Treaty or concluded safeguard agreements again increased during the past year.

72. We hope that this trend will continue, thus strengthening the effectiveness of the Treaty, and that, in particular, the so-called "near-nuclear countries" will find that their accession to the Treaty would, on balance, be highly beneficial to them.

73. Because of the importance we attach to the non-proliferation Treaty, we believe that the review conference to be held by the parties in accordance with its article VIII in March 1975 in Geneva should be carefully prepared in order to ensure its success.

74. The unimaginable destruction in a possible nuclear war has been and still is the overriding rationale for disarmament negotiations to concentrate on these most dangerous weapons. Let us not overlook the fact, however, that all the conflicts since the Second World War, among them a number of major wars, have been fought with conventional weapons. Moreover, the term "conventional weapons" as opposed to "nuclear weapons" begins to be somewhat misleading when we think of the sophistication that has transformed these weapons from cannons and rifles into electronically guided missiles, laser bombs and supersonic aircraft.

75. The most recent conflict in the Middle East reminds us once again of the fact that a conventional arms race is continuing both qualitatively and technologically. One of the byproducts of the increasingly rapid technological obsolescence of every new generation of conventional weapons has been an unprecedented increase in the arms trade.

76. In view of this, we would see considerable merit in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament or—in case of its reactivation—the United Nations Disarmament Commission taking up soon the question of how to curtail the arms race in the field of conventional weapons.

77. There are two methods through which a control or reduction of conventional armaments could possibly be achieved. One is an item by item negotiated reduction, as

will apparently be attempted in the mutual force reduction negotiations in Vienna, and the other is to deal with defence budgets. We are therefore particularly interested in a related item, to be discussed in plenary, on a reduction in military budgets.

78. If we assume that conventional weapons constitute the lion's share of the approximately \$220,000 million spent annually for military purposes on a world-wide basis, then the question of conventional disarmament would also be of primary importance in seeking to establish a link between disarmament and development, as proposed in the recent report of a group of experts on the economic and social consequences of disarmament,<sup>5</sup> presided over by a member of this Committee, Mrs. Myrdal of Sweden. We are particularly struck by the argument, contained in the report, that to spend increasingly vast sums on sophisticated military equipment at a time when we are discovering the limits of our planet's resources, and when so many countries are still struggling for the fulfilment of the basic needs of their populations, must seem outrageous to public opinion at large.

79. Consequently, we attach great importance to item 29 of the agenda and are prepared to support constructive proposals in this direction.

80. But let me add here another word on the relationship between disarmament and public opinion. We have felt for some time that one of the reasons for the present disarray and for the lesser sense of urgency in the disarmament debate is what I would call a serious information gap. This is due not only to growing secrecy surrounding disarmament negotiations but, even more, to the increasingly complicated nature of the questions involved. We are therefore convinced that special efforts are needed to bridge this gap. In this connexion I should like to pay special tribute to the way in which a number of non-governmental organizations—and foremost among them the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute—have for a number of years endeavoured to publicize disarmament information.

81. I should like now to make a few remarks about the second issue discussed extensively by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, that is, a possible ban on the use, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. In examining the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, one finds that a whole range of questions was debated. If no tangible result has yet been obtained, it appears that at least the understanding of the difficulties involved was considerably advanced and that the position of the different delegations became more clearly defined. My delegation does not wish, at this stage, to offer any definite opinions on such questions as the scope of a possible ban, the criteria to be used for the definition of substances to be banned, the possible inclusion of binary weapons, and the particularly thorny problem of verification.

82. Suffice it to say that Austria, which has ratified the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 and signed the bacterio-

<sup>5</sup> *Disarmament and Development* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.IX.1).



logical weapons Convention last year, will support any measure designed to reduce the possibility of resorting to the use of chemical weapons which, in their destructiveness, are second only to nuclear weapons.

83. Another category of special weapons was, for the first time, brought to the attention of this Committee during the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly. I am referring to "weapons that may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects", as they are called in a report on the work of a group of experts who met this year under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva. In this category, napalm and other incendiary weapons have been the subject of a report by the Secretary-General, on which comments by Governments were invited.

84. The two reports just cited, as well as numerous other papers available on the same subject and the use of these weapons in a number of recent conflicts constitute, in the opinion of my delegation, a forceful argument for dealing urgently with the subject.

85. Last year, Austria, inspired by its humanitarian traditions, voted for a draft resolution on this subject. This year, we are confronted with a choice of two different ways of dealing further with this question. To my delegation, both possibilities appear equally viable. While the diplomatic conference to be convened in Geneva next year seems well qualified to take up the question of a possible legal instrument banning certain uses of these particularly cruel weapons—even if such a task cannot be expected to be completed shortly—the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament might concurrently address itself to disarmament measures concerning incendiary weapons, possibly along the lines on which chemical weapons have been discussed there.

86. I have now dealt briefly with most of the different items on the agenda of this year's disarmament debate. Still, paraphrasing an Austrian philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, I would have to admit that I have not even touched the essence of disarmament yet—and I ask for the Committee's indulgence if I shall now, briefly and in conclusion, transgress the frame set by our agenda.

87. Repeatedly, we had to take note of criticism to the effect that, so far, only measures of arms control or arms limitation have been achieved, but not real disarmament. Justified as these comments may be, they have to be supplemented by a wider perspective. The Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Rudolf Kirchsclaeger, stated before the General Assembly that

"... advances in the field of disarmament and even in the limitation of the arms race have been extremely modest.

"This is frightening for a world whose natural resources are beginning to be recognized as limited and whose inhabitants strive, as we all know, for quality of life rather than quality of weapons. Terrifying as this escalation of armaments may be, it is understandable in view of the fact that even today, and even among Members of the United Nations, it is not the removal of the causes of

conflict or mutual faith in the peaceful settlement of disputes which guarantee peaceful coexistence, but the balance of military potential." [2142nd plenary meeting, paras. 4 and 5.]

88. This appears to be the crux of the matter. Disarmament is not only a military-technical discipline for highly trained experts but also a political issue and as such must never be separated from the general political context of any given situation. Disarmament is not an end in itself but emerges as only one step on the road to peace. Seen this way, arms control and arms limitation would constitute earlier steps on the same road.

89. As long as the causes of conflict and therefore the possibility of war persist, we should modestly acknowledge that it might be due to certain arms control measures that another world conflagration could be avoided. Only if we succeed in making a pledge of renunciation of force and the threat of force credible, and in creating mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of conflicts, can we reasonably hope to make progress towards a durable peace. Disarmament will then be a most natural complement. This is why Austria has, during the preparatory phase of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, advocated a stronger link between the Conference and negotiations on mutual force reduction. In the last analysis permanent security cannot be built on a balance in the levels of armaments, whether they are high or low—because such a balance is too easily upset—but on relations of confidence between States based on mutual interest and co-operation.

90. Mr. SOUMARE (Mauritania) (*interpretation from French*): Disarmament and understanding among all peoples and nations have always been major objectives of the United Nations. Each year this Committee and the United Nations give pride of place in their work to the problem of disarmament. Surely this attests to the concern shown by people all over the world regarding this problem. This matter is of concern to all of us because our survival depends upon it. In fact, in the insensate race that some nations have been running since the end of the Second World War in order to establish their hegemony and impose their dictates on other nations, arsenals of apocalyptically destructive power have been set up, whose very existence threatens the existence of mankind as a whole.

91. The arms race swallows up yearly colossal amounts of resources which, instead of serving to invent and perfect weapons of mass destruction, might have been used to put an end to the hunger, sickness and want of hundreds of millions of human beings and thus contribute to making a little more justice prevail on earth.

92. Today, all mankind is aware of the fact that the end of the arms race and the achievement of genuine disarmament are the only way that we can survive. Almost all nations represented here have been calling for this for a long time.

93. Some years ago, certain Powers that have the dubious privilege of possessing terrifying means of destruction seemed to feel that they alone had the right to discuss disarmament. Today, however, with the awakening of former colonial peoples and their accession to independence, the situation has been reversed. Daily it becomes

more obvious that the fate of each nation, however great it may be, depends on the fate of others. For this reason the discussion of disarmament questions can no longer be the monopoly of a very restricted group. All States—great and small, powerful and weak—must participate. It is true that the responsibility of the nuclear Powers on this issue, and particularly that of the two super-Powers, is immense, because it is they that must be blamed for the arms race. If they set their feet on the road to true disarmament, then everything will clear up.

94. My country believes that the best framework in which to discuss disarmament questions is the world disarmament conference, whose convening is desired by almost all nations, as they have stated for a number of years. The holding of such a conference with the participation of all States would encourage the creation of an atmosphere of peace and détente for which we yearn so deeply. Let those who are sceptical about the possibilities of success of such a conference grant at least that the undertaking is worthwhile, since surely that is one of the noblest tasks to which the international community can turn its hands. The recent Soviet-United States agreement on the prevention of nuclear war [see A/9293], the discussions taking place at present on the reduction of military forces in Europe and the talks on mutual security and co-operation in Europe lead us to hope that the world is at last starting on the road to détente. But for that détente to be real, it cannot be limited to the European continent alone. Theatres of war exist in various parts of the world: in Indochina, in the Middle East, in Africa; the maintenance of the Portuguese colonial yoke on the necks of a number of African peoples that aspire to independence and freedom, the existence of the racist régimes in southern Africa and Rhodesia and the intervention of neo-colonialism in the Indochina peninsula are all obstacles to the achievement of a true era of peace and the spreading of détente, on which the European peoples are beginning to pin firm hopes.

95. The roar of cannons has only just been silenced in the Middle East, but there is nothing to stop the Arab and Palestinian peoples from taking up arms again, if their territories are not evacuated by the Zionist occupiers and if the right of others to a homeland is not recognized. Today Zionist imperialism, together with the colonialism that certain decadent régimes insist on maintaining in Africa, constitutes the gravest threat to peace in the world and represents the greatest obstacle to genuine disarmament. The events of the past weeks remind us of this sad truth.

96. These are some of the basic conditions that my delegation feels might, if met, encourage the holding of the world disarmament conference.

97. To sum up, I would say that the success of that conference requires, first, the participation of all States, and first and foremost that of the nuclear Powers; second, the total eradication of colonialism in all its forms—imperialism, Zionism, *apartheid* and so on—and the exercise of the right of self-determination by all peoples that aspire to freedom and national sovereignty.

98. Finally, one last point does, I think, warrant our attention, namely the preparation for the conference. This preparation must be undertaken without haste, and

thoroughly. My delegation deplors the lack of goodwill and the lack of a spirit of co-operation of which some members of the Special Committee entrusted with making preparations for the conference are guilty. The failure of that Committee cannot be imputed to its Chairman, whose praiseworthy efforts were not recompensed with positive results. The Government of Mauritania is in favour of enlarging the membership of that Special Committee in order to allow equitable representation of all regional groups among its membership, a measure for which some countries have constantly called, if such a measure would lead to effective work. However, my delegation will not object to the creation of any other body to prepare for the conference, if that is the will of the majority of States. My Government feels that what is most important in this field is good faith and a sincere desire to achieve the ultimate objectives. Within the framework of the preparations for this conference, the Mauritanian Government considers that we should reiterate the need, in relations among nations, to respect certain basic principles, namely the equality of all States, mutual respect for the sovereignty and integrity of each country, non-interference in the domestic affairs of other States, and the non-use of force in the settlement of international disputes. It is by following these tenets that my Government has been able to settle the disputes that, at one time, set us against some of our neighbours.

99. At present I should like to indicate the objectives of the world disarmament conference. As my delegation sees it, that conference should first lead to the best means of prohibiting the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons. To achieve that end, existing stockpiles would obviously have to be destroyed. Secondly, the conference should agree on the limitation and ending of the arms race in conventional weapons. Thirdly, the conference should prohibit the manufacture and utilization of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Fourthly, it should lead to the elimination of all military bases that some Powers have built on the soil of other nations. Finally, it should lead to a reduction in the military budgets and armed forces of all countries.

100. The proposal made by the delegation of the Soviet Union calling for a 10 per cent reduction in the military budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council will be carefully studied by my delegation. If that step were to be carried out it might well be a first stage in the reduction of the armed forces of those countries, and the application of the resources released by the reduction in the military budgets of the great Powers to assist the developing nations could only be of benefit to all. We hope that that proposal will be given a thorough examination by all parties concerned. That might be a chance to take positive steps and make us forget the sterility of beautiful words.

101. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): Mr. Chairman, it is my pleasure to associate my delegation with expressions of gratification and congratulation on your election as Chairman of this Committee. Our congratulations are extended equally to the two Vice-Chairmen, Mr. Mehdi of Pakistan and Mr. Rabetafika of Madagascar, on their election, and to Mr. de Soto of Peru as Rapporteur.

102. I should like first to refer to the very important and vital question of the comprehensive test-ban Treaty. It is

really what I would call a burning question. This is the tenth anniversary of the signing of the partial test-ban Treaty by the original parties. It is a landmark both of achievement and of failure: achievement in the sense of being a very much needed and vital health measure for saving the atmospheric environment from further contamination, but definitely a failure from the point of view of disarmament, because instead of diminishing nuclear testing it has very appreciably advanced it.

103. It was an achievement also in the sense of being a recognition that unrestricted test explosions generally should be curbed, and in its action to counter the threat of continuing atmospheric tests.

104. In the sense of restricting test explosions, the Treaty incorporated in its preamble an undertaking for the continuance of relevant negotiations with the aim of achieving "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time." The partial test-ban Treaty was thus only a part of the contemplated whole to be completed soon through a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The difficulties at the time obviously were not considered insuperable because otherwise these words would not have been put in the Treaty. In accordance with that Treaty and with world-wide expectations, the General Assembly in 1963—from the very first year—called upon the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to prepare, as a high priority, a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Lack of results, however, necessitated a repetition of that call by the General Assembly the following year, and the same appeal went forth in all subsequent sessions of the General Assembly without effect, until at the last session the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was requested to complete it by the tenth anniversary, which is the present year. The outcome again has been negative.

105. During all this time the positions of both sides on this problem of the underground tests were immutable, and a stumbling block was the question of verification and inspection *in situ*. Yet, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in its 1971 report asserts "that recent advances in the science of seismology have virtually removed the major technical obstacle to the negotiation of such a treaty. Verification without on-site inspection should no longer be considered a serious problem." Of course it is a problem, but it is not a serious one. There is a general feeling that the obstacles to a complete ban are political rather than technical. The partial test-ban Treaty thus remains uncompleted to this day, an unfinished symphony in dissonance with its own intrinsic spirit for a comprehensive ban. In consequence, nuclear underground tests have proceeded at an accelerated pace and more massively than before the ban, while their continuance has furnished the excuse and encouragement for tests in the atmosphere by nuclear Powers, non-signatories to the partial test-ban Treaty.

106. We consider the suspension of all nuclear testing is of basic and vital importance to the whole problem of the arms race and to the grave dangers involved, for a number of reasons, among which are the following: first, the pursuance through nuclear test explosions of qualitative improvements in the instruments of global destruction leads to the creation of new kinds of nuclear weapons more

difficult to control. We are now thus faced with the possibility, or indeed the likelihood, of a new generation of "mini-nukes"—low-yield nuclear weapons designed for use on the battlefield—which will in practice blur the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons. They would thus provide a ladder for perilous escalation to a major nuclear exchange without it being realized. Generally, the search through test explosions for more and more sophisticated and more globally destructive nuclear weapons, if not halted in time, could probably reach the point of no return through utter uncontrollability.

107. The second reason is that the continuance of nuclear testing may have an adverse impact on the will of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to maintain their adherence to it in view of the continuance of the underground testing despite the undertaking contained in the non-proliferation Treaty, thus putting that Treaty in jeopardy when it comes up for review in 1975.

108. It may be recalled that in the preamble to the non-proliferation Treaty the participation of a number of States in the Treaty was made contingent upon inclusion in the agreement of a pledge that it was the intention of the signatories to achieve "at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament." So long as the arms race continues undiminished, that pledge is not satisfied.

109. While we fully appreciate and appropriately commend the intensive efforts genuinely made by the two major Powers towards substantive agreements through the strategic arms limitation talks and we fully recognize the importance of these negotiations, we cannot fail to remark that the ceiling set for the production of strategic arms is appreciably higher than the level of the presently existing armaments, thus allowing full scope for the continuation of the arms race instead of halting it.

110. We might, of course, hope that there will be reductions in nuclear stockpiles as a result of the negotiations, but we can find as yet little basis for optimism that the arms race towards qualitative improvement of nuclear armaments will not be continued, resulting in additional and highly destabilizing generations of weapons, over which control will be increasingly difficult to exercise. I refer particularly to the advent of the "MIRV generation", the hydra-headed missiles carrying a bonus package of uncontrollable destruction: not just death for one nation, or two or three, but death for whole civilizations and with the addition of a built-in capacity to extinguish practically all human life, if directed to that end.

111. No disarmament measures can have the importance and the urgency of the cessation of the qualitative nuclear arms race. The dangers involved are grave, multiple and imminently threatening. Every effort must be made, through the collective and determined will of the international community, to bring the nuclear arms race to a halt. It is a matter of equal concern for all nations and countries, whether big or small, and even for individual citizens of all nations, who are in the last analysis a part of mankind threatened in its very survival on this environmentally fragile planet.

112. This Assembly has at the present junction no other alternative but to renew and repeat in more emphatic terms, and with a sense of urgency, its appeals that the comprehensive test-ban treaty be finally consummated and that the further testing and deployment of new nuclear-weapon systems be suspended, while the negotiations to limit them and, hopefully, to reduce them continue. The response to these appeals by those concerned would be basic to a spirit of détente.

113. However, we believe there is need for basically more effective action, and to this aspect the General Assembly will have to turn its attention. Now, turning to the prohibition of chemical weapons, there has again been no progress in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Only in the last moments of the session were some hopes raised by the constructive suggestions of a formula by the representative of Japan, which might establish the principle of a complete prohibition of chemical weapons and at the same time make possible within that framework the early prohibition and destruction of the most dangerous and toxic of those substances.

114. In this connexion, we would recall the extreme lethal character of the nerve gas weapons now stored in vast quantities. These weapons have proved to be a hazard to the local inhabitants where they are now stored, and their use in war would be an indescribable horror.

115. In this connexion, we would recall a generous and far-sighted act by the United States, which opened the way for the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. I refer to its unilateral renunciation of biological weapons, which contributed importantly to the creation of an atmosphere conducive to the completion of an agreement on the prohibition of biological weapons. A similar statement by either of the two major Powers holding nerve gas weapons at least would be most beneficial and would redound greatly to its credit in the eyes of world public opinion.

116. I should like briefly to comment on the question of arms expenditure. The heavy expenditure on armaments is like a continuing drain on the body of mankind, a haemorrhage that can no longer be admissible in our present-day world. The substance wherewith humanity could be nourished is instead being applied to the agents of its own destruction.

117. We welcome suggestions for a general cut in arms budgets and we particularly welcome the recommendations of the Soviet Union for a 10 per cent reduction in arms expenditure. This recommendation, furthermore, has the important feature of an immediate transfer of resources so saved to those areas of the world most desperately in need. The General Assembly has long recognized the desirability of the transfer of savings from arms expenditures to the task of raising the living standards of humanity generally to a level which makes the very concept of living not only bearable, but also desirable and productive.

118. This is a challenge which should meet with a favourable response from all. But even without it, the initiative taken to implement this proposal unilaterally

would accelerate progress towards an agreement in which others would participate.

119. In connexion with napalm, which is an extraordinarily cruel and inhuman weapon that must be prohibited, I should like to mention that my delegation is a sponsor of the relevant draft resolution A/C.1/L.650/Rev.1, already introduced by the representative of Sweden. We are also working on a draft resolution on chemical weapons which will be introduced shortly.

120. I should like to return to the important question of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and its present position. Regrettably, for the second consecutive year now, the Conference has not been productive, notwithstanding the assiduous work and dedication of its members. It is a sad reality that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which has done so useful and constructive work in the past and has made such important contributions to the disarmament effort, finds itself now blocked and unable to produce the results expected of it. We have seen that on the problem of the comprehensive test-ban treaty and other important subjects, and the reasons have been explained by members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. As the representative of Sweden said the other day, the Conference clearly suffers from near paralysis. That is partly due to the need for new modalities and new membership, particularly having regard to the non-participation in the Conference now of two nuclear Powers. But it is also greatly due to the traditional lack of political will.

121. In that context I now turn to the subject of a world disarmament conference. There is an obvious need for some new forum to deal with the question of disarmament more effectively. We are therefore basically in favour of such a conference for a number of cogent reasons—provided, of course, the five nuclear Powers would be among the participants. A world disarmament conference is needed not so much to itself negotiate new disarmament measures as to generate a new political will through activating world public opinion and also through establishing the mechanics for effective negotiations.

122. There is no doubt that a new world-wide impetus to disarmament is both necessary and generally desired. A world disarmament conference of the kind envisaged could clearly be the instrumentality for imparting that impetus; for taking an integrated and comprehensive inventory of the degree of progress on disarmament so far achieved, if any; for designing an appropriate agenda for future work; and for setting up such subsidiary bodies as would be appropriate to the task of intensive and effective negotiations. With the admission to the United Nations this autumn of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, and in view of the non-participation in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by both France and the People's Republic of China, it is obvious that new arrangements for effective negotiations to halt the arms race must soon be made. The best way to that end is clearly through a world disarmament conference. In our view, such a conference should in furtherance of its purposes and tasks also meet periodically to review the progress achieved, or the lack of it. The cursory survey annually made in the General Assembly cannot focus

sufficient attention on the subject or carry the weight and effectiveness of a world disarmament conference specifically dealing with the subject of disarmament. Therefore, we envisage a continuing role for such a conference, one to be convened every three or four years, for instance, to give disarmament the intense and prolonged attention the subject so clearly requires.

123. It is disappointing that nothing has been achieved so far in the establishment of a preparatory committee. However, we express the hope that the difficulties will be overcome through the negotiations now afoot. If, however, there is no possibility at present of convening a world disarmament conference, the only alternative is to convene the United Nations Disarmament Commission, which can deal with the relevant matters as a body representative of the whole membership and can eventually pave the way for a world disarmament conference.

124. Now, whatever the mechanics may be, even if there is a world disarmament conference, if the political will for disarmament is lacking and continues lacking in spite of world trends towards a catastrophic end, then nothing can be done. But how can we influence political will? It seems to me that nobody is responsible for this result, which comes from the whole structure of States as they are now—remnants of the past in an era which is completely different from the past. The scientific and technological progress made in this present generation is far greater than the progress achieved over the millennia. And that has brought a changed world, changed in the sense that the concept of force has already been abolished by the very realities of the situation. Yet humanity clings to the momentum of the past: the concept of force has in reality been abolished, yet it still influences the policies of the nations, like the travelling light of an already extinct star. In this way acting contrary to the realities of the day, we come upon a clash with realism—not with idealism, though idealism is involved in it—and that clash will perhaps bring the end of humanity.

125. Now, it is obvious that no war can reach a successful conclusion or any conclusion. We have seen that in practice. If the small nations are involved in a war, the bigger Powers will intervene and stop that war, as we saw the other day. If the big Powers are themselves involved in a war, their own inhibition at the brink of catastrophe—catastrophe total for all, including themselves—will make them stop. Therefore, although in the past there was sense and meaning in armaments and force, there is none today. The excuse that it is used to prevent the other side from dominating and the balance-of-power excuse are again children of the concept of force, which has no place today. You cannot have disarmament together with a balance of power. It is impossible, no matter how long you try. It has been tried for the last 40 years, and it has never succeeded because they are two different concepts. One is positive, the other is negative. One is based upon disarmament and co-operation, the other is based upon antagonism. And the balance-of-power concept is really the pretence of trying to keep the balance; actually, each side is trying to get an edge on the other side and be dominant, because the concept of a balance of power is again in the spirit of domination, whatever it is called. In this context I feel it is very difficult

to achieve either the cessation of the arms race—we may diminish it, but not stop it—or any kind of disarmament.

126. But how can we change those concepts? Only the threat of destruction can make man change in so short a time, because those changes have occurred in so short a time that there has been no possibility of adjustment. So let us hope that man will in time adjust, and let us expect that by providing the facilities and mechanics for a better understanding and better negotiation we might reach the stage of having effective disarmament. In this respect, I think the easiest way to deal with the matter—if this is agreed by all sides—would be to begin reducing expenditures on armaments. And that is a hopeful sign for a short-cut in the reduction of armaments.

127. Mr. WANG Ming-hsiu (China) (*translation from Chinese*): In his speech during the general debate at the 1937th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, the Chairman of the Chinese delegation has already expounded China's position on the question of disarmament. Now I would like to elaborate on our views on the question of the world disarmament conference.

128. First, China's position on the question of disarmament has been clear and consistent. We have always been in favour of disarmament and, at the same time, we have always been opposed to the various deceptive tricks on the question of disarmament played by the super-Powers, particularly the Soviet Union. At present, the super-Powers are armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons, placing the peoples of the whole world under their nuclear threat. In order to contend for world hegemony, they are engaged in frenzied arms expansion and war preparations in a drive to seek nuclear supremacy. In these circumstances, will it be possible to stop the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race? Is not the so-called reduction of military budgets by 10 per cent a sheer hypocrisy and an open deception? In the present world situation, the key to the question of disarmament obviously lies in the nuclear disarmament of the two super-Powers. If the World Disarmament Conference is to be held, there must be clear aims and the necessary preconditions, so as to break the nuclear threat of the super-Powers and ensure that the Conference will be conducive to the realization of nuclear disarmament. Failing this, if any form of disarmament conference or its preparatory meeting is to be held purposelessly, without creating the necessary preconditions and without setting the clear aims of disarmament, what practical significance will it have other than suiting the super-Powers' needs of deceiving the peoples of the world by their empty talk about disarmament?

129. Back in 1971 during the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly, the Chinese delegation maintained that a clear aim must be set for the World Disarmament Conference, that is, to discuss the question of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and, as the first step, to reach an agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons by all the nuclear countries. In order to ensure that all countries of the world, big or small, can attend the conference on an equal footing and free from any threat, all the nuclear countries, especially the Soviet Union and the United States, must declare that they undertake the following obligations: first, not to be the

first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, particularly not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-weapon-free zones; and secondly, to dismantle all military bases, including nuclear bases, set up on the territories of other countries and to withdraw all their armed forces, including nuclear forces, from abroad.

130. However, in the past two years, the two super-Powers have refused to accept these reasonable proposals. The Soviet Union, in particular, has so far not dared to come forward with a direct reply, and the only thing it has done is wilfully to distort and slander the above-mentioned just propositions of the Chinese delegation. While evading the essence of the matter, the Soviet Union has tried by every possible means to impose on various countries of the world a world disarmament conference that can solve no problems. This can only further expose its ugly features of sham disarmament and genuine arms expansion. The Soviet Union has spared no efforts to push through its fraud on the disarmament conference. The Soviet Union has violated the resolution adopted at the last session of the General Assembly by arbitrary and truculent means in an attempt to turn the Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference into an organ controlled by the Soviet Union. As this malicious practice of the Soviet Union has met with the opposition of numerous States Members, the so-called "Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference" was not legally constituted at all. However, in disregard of the boycott and opposition of many countries, the Soviet Union insisted on asking a non-existent special committee to elect its chairman, convene its formal meetings, keep official records, enlarge its membership and submit a so-called official report to the current session of the General Assembly. As is acknowledged by all, this non-existent special committee has never held any formal meeting, and it goes without saying that no decision has ever been, or can possibly be, adopted. Yet, the Soviet Union had the effrontery to spread the lie that the so-called special committee "confirmed" that the World Disarmament Conference enjoyed "extremely wide support", in an attempt arbitrarily to turn a non-existent special committee into a preparatory meeting of the World Disarmament Conference. Is this not big-Power hegemony? Why is the Soviet Union in such a hurry to convene a world disarmament conference? Is it really motivated by a sincere desire for peace and an eagerness for disarmament? This offers food for deep thought.

131. Secondly, in our view, the Soviet proposal for convening a world disarmament conference is a fraud. Throughout the past decade, and more, the Soviet Union has been peddling general and complete disarmament and has repeatedly put forward proposals for convening a world disarmament conference, masquerading as the angel of peace and the standard-bearer of disarmament. But what has the Soviet Union done over the past years? While energetically developing conventional weapons, it is expanding its nuclear arsenal on an unprecedented scale and at an unparalleled tempo and is feverishly expanding its ocean-going naval force. In the past decade, its inter-continental ballistic missiles have reportedly increased more than 10 times and its submarine-launched ballistic missiles, as well as the size of its "strategic rocket forces", have also increased manyfold. It has also developed anti-ballistic

missile systems and multiple individually-targetable re-entry vehicles. The total tonnage of warships of various types has doubled. Its fleets sail almost every ocean of the world. At the same time, the Soviet Union has been steadily expanding and strengthening its forces and bases on foreign soil. Over the past decade, and more, the Soviet Union has been talking about disarmament day in and day out while actually engaging in ceaseless arms expansion. On the question of disarmament, the Soviet Union has been saying one thing and doing another, and it is a downright double-dealer. The above-mentioned facts fully show that the Soviet proposal for a world disarmament conference is aimed at spreading a peace smoke-screen to lull the peoples of the world and at covering up its ugly social-imperialist features of aggression and expansion with the mask of détente.

132. It is not a new invention to use the so-called détente and disarmament conferences to cover up aggression and expansion. The old-line imperialists did exactly the same thing. One may recall that in 1868, 1899 and 1907 the old tsars proposed and actively took part in so-called world peace conferences of various descriptions and signed a number of international agreements on the so-called limitation of armaments. Yet at the same time they were frantically carrying out aggression and expansion. What a striking similarity between what the Soviet Union is doing now and what the old tsars did in the past.

133. Thirdly, the Soviet Union has lauded to the skies its proposal for convening a world disarmament conference. According to its assertion, once the conference is convened, peace and happiness would automatically come to the people of various countries. It asserts that the convocation of the World Disarmament Conference will in itself limit the arms race and strengthen international security. This is sheer deceptive talk. The past decade and more has seen the convocation of innumerable disarmament conferences in various forms and the conclusion of disarmament agreements and treaties of various descriptions. However, the more the talk about disarmament, the larger the armaments of the super-Powers and the more unbridled their aggression and expansion. How is it possible to speak of the relaxation of world tension? The gravest menace to international security emanated and still emanates from the super-Power policies of aggression, expansion and hegemony. No one with common sense will believe that through another disarmament conference which is tantamount to an "empty talk club", the Soviet Union and the other super-Power will abandon such policies and bring peace and security to the world. Such a thing has never happened in the past and will never happen in the future. The Soviet Union further asserts that the convocation of a world disarmament conference will contribute towards supporting the national liberation movement. This is ridiculous indeed. Countless facts have shown that it is the two super-Powers which are undermining and suppressing the national liberation movement. The present situation in the Middle East is a vivid case in point. Who could believe that the convocation of a world disarmament conference would make them reduce their armaments, abandon their policies of aggression and expansion, give up their evil ways and turn over a new leaf? The Soviet Union tries to use the disarmament conference to spread illusions for peace and paralyse the fighting will of the people. National liberation depends mainly on the

people's struggle, and the disarmament conference is of no help to the national liberation movement. The Soviet Union also asserts that the convocation of the world disarmament conference will contribute to the social and economic progress of the developing countries. This is utterly groundless. It is deceitful to assert that the conference could compel the super-Powers, imperialism and colonialism to stop their plunder and exploitation of the developing countries and provide aid to these countries with the money saved from disarmament. It is all the more a design with ulterior aims to ask the developing countries to disarm themselves and engage in peaceful construction with smug complacency. The developing countries already have a grave shortage of defensive weapons. If one asks them to further reduce their armament is one not intentionally asking them to disarm themselves in the face of foreign aggression? In the absence of any guarantee for political independence and State sovereignty, how can there be any talk about economic development?

134. Although the Soviet Union describes its proposed world disarmament conference as a panacea capable of curing all diseases, yet a fraud is after all a fraud, and anyone with a discerning eye can tell at one glance that it is a sham.

135. At present the Soviet Union is again saying volubly that the time has come to begin preparations for convening a world disarmament conference. We must be vigilant against this, and we must resolutely oppose and expose the multifarious deceptive tricks of the Soviet Union in proposing the preparation for and convening of a world conference, so as not to allow it to succeed in its scheme of covering up its armament race and aggressive expansion and lulling and deceiving the world's people by its empty talk about disarmament. Some say that it is preferable to have the conference started first, and then various proposals can be discussed at the conference. Such an idea may be motivated by a good desire, but it will lead precisely into the trap set by the Soviet Union. In our opinion, since the super-Powers have refused to set clear aims for the conference and refused to undertake the aforesaid two obligations set forth by us, the current session of the General Assembly should not take a concrete decision on the convening of a world disarmament conference, nor is it advisable to proceed with the preparatory work by setting up any form of preparatory organ, including the convening of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

136. Mr. TEMPLETON (New Zealand): The representative of Sweden began her speech in this debate with a well-justified warning against facile optimism. She had hoped, she said, to see some measure of disarmament in her time, but this was not to be; the truth was that there was no sign of a real will to take political decisions to proceed in the direction of disarmament.

137. There has been little in this debate to cause us to revise Mrs. Myrdal's sombre conclusion. The great Powers, which are responsible for the development and accumulation of by far the major and most deadly part of the world's armaments, have spoken here of détente, of control, of limitation, of verification, of conferences, and even of their possession of nuclear weapons as a factor for peace; little has been heard from them of concrete measures of disarmament.

138. I must pay tribute, nevertheless, to a number of constructive contributions to our discussions, notably, among others, from the representatives of Sweden, Canada, Iran, Japan and Mexico, all of whom have made distinguished personal contributions to the cause of disarmament, backed by Governments whose positive and active approach to the problem is fully shared by my own.

139. The fact is that we cannot afford the luxury of indulging in either unfounded optimism or passive pessimism about disarmament. Such optimism and pessimism are merely a means of escape from the need to pursue the goal of disarmament with unflagging determination, whatever the obstacles. Even if there were no other incentive, the pressure of events and of world opinion compel us to redouble our efforts.

140. During recent weeks it has been vividly brought home to us that the atmosphere of détente in which some were tempted to bask in the opening days of this session of the Assembly is subject to abrupt climatic change. For a few mind-chilling hours on 25 October, the world faced the possibility of an armed confrontation of the super-Powers in the Middle East, with incalculable consequences. It seemed conceivable that a local war, fuelled already by vast quantities of arms supplied mainly by the super-Powers, could explode into direct conflict between those super-Powers and even into a nuclear exchange from the effects of which no part of the world would be immune. We faced a situation in which the peace-making machinery of this Organization appeared to play no decisive part, and in which the fate of humanity seemed to depend on the judgement and coolness of a handful of people, perhaps of one man. This does not seem to us a tolerable state of affairs. We do not believe that the rest of humanity can continue to accept the resolution of the periodic crises in the world power game by a kind of nuclear poker. The super-Powers may be super-Powers, but the men who lead them are not supermen; they are distinctly human.

141. My Government therefore makes no apology for putting nuclear disarmament first in its list of priorities, or for believing that concrete measures in this field are the key which could unlock the whole problem. Conversely, we do not see how other measures, however admirable and valuable in themselves, can in fact relax tension and add to the sense of security of non-nuclear Powers, while the capacity of the nuclear Powers to retain and further develop the means of blowing humanity out of existence remains effectively unfettered.

142. Like other speakers I should now like to make a few remarks about general disarmament, with particular reference to the question of the forums in which future negotiations are to be conducted, and then say something about items with which my Government is especially concerned, and on two of which we, with others, have sponsored, or will sponsor, draft resolutions.

143. This year the question of disarmament forums has again attracted particular attention. There are a number of possibilities: to continue with the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament; to reform it; to create a new body; to revive the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and to convene a World Disarmament Conference.

My delegation would have been greatly encouraged to have heard all five nuclear-weapon States express their willingness to meet in one forum with the firm intention of making progress. It is regrettable, to say the least, that the nuclear-weapon States cannot agree even to the extent of deciding where to talk about disarmament. So modest have our expectations become that an agreement even on this would be widely acclaimed.

144. As it is, it is important for the non-nuclear nations to keep up the pressure and to be particularly active and vigorous in their search for ways to break the deadlock. As we see it, the absence of two of the five nuclear Powers from the Committee on Disarmament has been one of the principal reasons why it has been able to make so little progress during the past year. We doubt that we shall get very far on any aspect of disarmament until we have a forum in which all the nuclear Powers are prepared to participate actively, and for that reason we are inclined to believe that to leave things as they are is the least satisfactory alternative.

145. At the same time as we seek a forum in which all the nuclear Powers will be present, we also seek a forum in which the smaller Powers will have an effective voice. I believe that I speak for other small countries than my own, when I say that we are losing patience with the apparently endless capacity of the nuclear Powers to adopt positions which they know in advance will be unacceptable to each other, and when they make acceptance of these positions the condition of their willingness to engage in substantive discussions.

146. We therefore continue to support the convening of a world disarmament conference as soon as there is evidence that the nuclear Powers are ready to participate. In this connexion, a decision by China to participate in the disarmament negotiations would be widely acclaimed and would contribute markedly to the climate and prospects for genuine progress. We welcome, too, the desire expressed by France in the course of this debate for a genuine disarmament policy. We earnestly hope that they will join in the international community's efforts to construct one.

147. There is also on the horizon the 1975 review conference on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty. We have noted with interest the approach to this conference suggested by Mrs. Myrdal of Sweden. The Swedish suggestions that the United Nations should be involved in organizing the conference, and that non-parties to the Treaty might also be invited, deserve serious consideration.

148. I now turn to one of the specific questions that are of deep concern to my Government: the question of barbarous and indiscriminate weapons. New Zealand is a sponsor of the draft resolution on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use [A/C.1/L.650/Rev.1].

149. The early part of this century saw the development of a norm of international law which prohibited the use of weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering. However, that principle has been seriously eroded by developments in technology and recent military practice, which

appears to have placed the pursuit of military advantage ahead of the dictates of humanity.

150. The New Zealand Government finds these developments gravely disturbing. An urgent need now exists to update and strengthen the present norm of international law by new and specific prohibitions, including rules relating to incendiary weapons. In this endeavour, while the paramount requirement is to protect civilians from the cruel effects of such weapons, the unnecessary suffering caused by incendiaries is not restricted to civilians. In any case, there are likely to be substantial difficulties in the implementation of prohibitions on the use of incendiaries in particular circumstances or against particular targets. In the view of the New Zealand Government there is a strong case for a total prohibition of such weapons.

151. We consider that the present draft resolution opens the way towards restoring the original efficacy of an accepted principle of international law and will help put a brake on the development of even more horrifying practices.

152. My Government has only recently received the report of the International Committee of the Red Cross entitled *Weapons That May Cause Unnecessary Suffering or Have Indiscriminate Effects*, and is giving it careful study.

153. Although an agreement on general and complete disarmament remains our objective, realism compels us to recognize the obstacles in the way of its early achievement. In the interim, it is natural that small countries should be considering carefully the possibilities of partial disarmament or demilitarization on a regional basis, wherever circumstances and geography make this appropriate. Fourteen years ago the Antarctic Treaty<sup>6</sup> demilitarized the Antarctic continent and forbade the testing of weapons there. One of the first acts of the New Zealand Government after its election last year was to change New Zealand's vote at this Assembly in order to express its sympathy with the concept of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. We are studying with interest the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee established by last year's Assembly to consider this question [A/9029]. At the recent meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government, New Zealand joined in a unanimous endorsement of the action of the Foreign Ministers of the Association of South-East Asian Nations in adopting a declaration to make South-East Asia a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality. In the words of the Commonwealth communiqué, we regard this initiative as a positive contribution towards peace and stability in that region.

154. New Zealand looks with favour also on the establishment by treaty of nuclear-free zones, such as that created by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,<sup>7</sup> and it is our intention to consult with our Pacific neighbours about the feasibility of establishing a similar kind of nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific.

155. These examples show a widespread desire on the part of small nations for regional neutralization or demilitari-

<sup>6</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 402, No. 5778, p. 72.

<sup>7</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634, No. 9068, p. 283.



zation. It would be useful, we believe, for the small countries to seek from the Assembly, at an appropriate time, an expression of solidarity and support for these aspirations.

156. I shall now discuss item 36 of our agenda, concerning the urgent need for the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests.

157. I believe that the Committee will expect my delegation to explain the reasons for New Zealand's strong and consistent opposition to the testing of nuclear weapons, that has been more extensively publicized than ever before in the course of this year. The publicity generated by the efforts of my country, among others, to focus attention on this issue has heightened world consciousness of the dangers of continued testing and has perhaps helped to sensitize consciences that previously showed little disposition to take world opinion into account. Certainly we have this year detected sensitivity where sensitivity was not especially evident before. It is world public opinion, in the end, which will force Governments to modify policies: and we shall not relax efforts to bring about change by all appropriate diplomatic and legal means, as well as by generating publicity for our attitude.

158. The first point I should make about the rationale of my Government's approach to this problem is that we do not regard the ending of nuclear-weapon testing as simply an end in itself. We accept that it is only one step on the road to nuclear disarmament and we agree that the elimination of all nuclear weapons must be the goal. Nevertheless, a cessation of testing would have immediate benefits, first, in removing what we believe to be unjustifiable risks to the environment and to the health of peoples subjected without their consent to radiation fall-out; secondly, in removing the apprehensions which those people naturally feel about the consequences of being subjected to such hazards, and thirdly, in improving relations between States and thus contributing to a general relaxation of tension.

159. New Zealand has been brought especially close to this issue by the fact that atmospheric testing has continued year after year in the region in which we live, the South Pacific, and there are no signs of an end to it. Island nations and territories of the South Pacific, some with no voice of their own in this Assembly, are much closer to the site of these tests than is New Zealand. It has been suggested that in concentrating our principal attention on testing in the South Pacific we are somehow discriminating against one of the nuclear Powers, given the fact that tests continue to be held by other Powers in other places. In fact we oppose all nuclear tests, and we protest against all tests. But surely it is reasonable that we should feel an especial concern and responsibility in regard to tests conducted in our own region. These tests are being conducted in the face of the strongly expressed wishes of the peoples of the area expressed in their own regional forums, in resolutions that have been circulated as official documents of this Assembly. It is easy, perhaps, to shrug aside the views of small countries. But we believe that no nation has the right to pursue a self-proclaimed national interest in a manner that harms the interests and welfare of others and causes them apprehension, anxiety and concern. We also believe

that small countries have the right to be heard, the right to draw attention to their regional concerns, in this of all forums, and more particularly when that regional concern has serious implications for the international community.

160. Not only do these tests strike a blow against progress towards disarmament measures; there are also other serious objections. These tests expose the people of New Zealand, the Cook Islands, Niue and the Tokelau Islands, territories for which we have special responsibility, to artificial radioactive contamination which is beyond our control. We are satisfied, on the basis of responsible scientific opinion, that the radioactive nuclear fall-out that reaches our area as a result of atmospheric testing is inherently harmful, and we know of no compensating benefit to justify our exposure to such harm. We must emphatically reject the view that there is conclusive proof that the risks from fall-out are negligible. No such sweeping generalization has been made by the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, which, on the contrary, has made it clear that mankind would benefit from the cessation of atmospheric testing. Certainly testing is not the only source of radiation to which our peoples are subjected; but, even if testing is a lesser source than natural or other sources of radiation, that is not the point. We are not offered a choice. Radiation from fall-out is added to the other radiation to which we are subjected, without our consent. This situation is not made acceptable by the fact that rigorous safety precautions are taken in the conduct of those tests; nor can such precautions avoid all risks. During the recently concluded series of tests, the phenomenon known as "blowback" occurred twice, causing increased fall-out in the islands to the west of the testing area.

161. The peoples of the South Pacific are deeply concerned about the damaging effect of these tests on their environment, which is as yet relatively free from the pollution seriously affecting many other parts of the world. The preservation of the South Pacific environment is of obvious importance to those who live in the region. For many Pacific territories the sea and its resources are a vital element in their subsistence and economy.

162. Naturally, New Zealand is directly affected when such tests are conducted in the South Pacific, but those who assume that New Zealand's opposition to nuclear testing being carried out in the South Pacific is based solely on the danger posed to our own citizens are missing the point. New Zealand has made it clear that our approach rests on a much broader basis of international concern. It proceeds in part from a belief that world peace and security depend on whether nuclear weapons can be limited, and eventually eliminated, and that the continued development and proliferation of these weapons increase tension and the risk of nuclear war. In part, also, it proceeds from a concern that the irreversible pollution created by nuclear fall-out presents a risk to the health of mankind, and particularly of future generations.

163. For these reasons, New Zealand opposes all nuclear-weapon testing in all environments. We have protested not only to the Powers that are conducting nuclear tests in the atmosphere; we have also made our views known to the Powers that are continuing underground testing.

164. We are concerned that in the decade since the signing of the partial test-ban Treaty no tangible progress has been made towards the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty. The number of nuclear tests carried out has not been reduced in the past decade. On the contrary, they have continued at an unabated pace. Almost one half of the total of 940 announced and presumed nuclear explosions conducted since 1945 have been carried out since the signing of the 1963 Treaty. It is true that the carrying out of underground nuclear testing is not prohibited by that Treaty. We nevertheless consider it a regrettable trend on the part of the major nuclear Powers, which have accepted the obligation to work for the elimination of all tests, that they are carrying on with underground testing as a matter of routine and apparently with no end in sight. It is a trend we wish to see reversed.

165. We have been encouraged by the fact that the goal of a comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear-weapon tests is earnestly sought by many other countries. At their recent meeting in Ottawa the 33 members of the Commonwealth took the unprecedented action of issuing a statement on nuclear weapon tests separate from the final communiqué. This unanimously supported statement, which was issued on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the signing of the partial test-ban Treaty, provides convincing evidence that there is widespread international concern to see an end to atmospheric nuclear testing. It is also important in that it appeals to all Powers, and in particular the nuclear Powers, to take up as an urgent task the negotiation of a new agreement to bring about the total cessation of nuclear-weapon tests in all environments.

166. It is distressing that, despite the widely supported and urgent appeals of the last session of the General Assembly, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has again delivered a nil return on the question of the comprehensive test ban. This is not the answer the international community expected from the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in 1973. It is not an answer we can accept.

167. New Zealand applauds the progress that has been made in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in past years, resulting in certain concrete, though partial, measures. We recognize that it has required enormous patience, goodwill and negotiating skill. We recognize that a good deal more effort will be required to achieve a comprehensive test ban and we expect that effort to be made. No longer can we pull up the blanket of the partial test-ban Treaty and attempt to nestle beneath it. It simply does not provide sufficient shelter or comfort. We see a comprehensive test ban as the next achievable step in the disarmament field. We know that there remains a certain gap to be bridged and we are aware that certain difficulties remain. Nevertheless, we consider that this gap can be bridged and that the difficulties can and should be overcome. What is needed now is the political will to bridge the gap and to achieve the breakthrough to a comprehensive test ban. We are now in the Disarmament Decade, we have just marked the tenth anniversary of the partial test-ban Treaty, and a spirit of détente, we hope, is emerging. The present moment offers certain opportunities. We appeal to those primarily concerned to take full advantage of them.

168. A representative from one of the nuclear Powers, speaking in this debate, expressed the hope that a single draft resolution on nuclear testing would be submitted this year which would attract the broadest possible support, including that of the nuclear-weapon States, whose support, he said, is essential if the resolution is to be effective.

169. At first sight this is a logical and attractive proposition, with which it would seem difficult to disagree. Certainly we would like to see a single, comprehensive draft resolution. Certainly we would like it to receive the broadest possible support. Certainly it would be highly desirable to have the affirmative votes of all the nuclear Powers.

170. But is this enough? Should the sponsors tailor the draft resolution, as the speaker seemed to imply, of materials and in a fashion that the nuclear Powers are willing to wear?

171. Before trying to answer these questions, I think we must take some account of past experience, and in particular of what took place as a result of last year's Assembly debate on this issue, especially as regards events during the current year.

172. At the end of last year's debate a resolution was adopted by an enormous majority which called upon all nuclear-weapon States to suspend nuclear weapon tests in all environments [*resolution 2934 (XXVII)*]. Two nuclear weapon States voted against that resolution, and three voted for it. But what has happened since that resolution was adopted? The regrettable fact is that four of the five nuclear weapon States have tested nuclear weapons in the course of the current year—not only the two who voted against the resolution, but two of the three who voted for the resolution. It is a further regrettable fact that although the same resolution called upon the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to give urgent consideration to the question of a treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests, no perceptible progress in that direction has been recorded. Indeed, to quote Mr. Hoveyda, the representative of Iran, whose work for disarmament has drawn merited praise from the nuclear Powers themselves, "both sides have displayed an incredible lack of enthusiasm over getting around the difficulties." [*1934th meeting, para. 79.*]

173. In these circumstances, and drawing the lessons we are obliged to draw from this distressing state of affairs, I believe that if the sponsors of the draft resolution were to adapt their text to make it acceptable to the nuclear Powers, as suggested, it would be necessary to have assurances on three points: first, that all five nuclear Powers would vote for the draft resolution, and not just three of them; secondly, that they would not merely vote for it, but undertake to implement it, and thirdly, that measurable progress towards achieving the objectives of the draft resolution would be made during 1974.

174. Such assurances would be most welcome but if they were forthcoming—and, regrettably, I detect no signs so far that they will be—a draft resolution would hardly be necessary. My delegation cannot subscribe to the view that Assembly resolutions are only useful and effective when they are accepted in advance by the Governments to which

they are addressed. Resolutions of the General Assembly are not adopted by the overwhelming majority of Members, as was resolution 2934 (XXVII) last year, unless they also reflect the overwhelming weight of world opinion. Even nuclear Powers cannot, we believe, ignore for ever the moral pressure of Assembly resolutions are only useful and effective when they are accepted in advance by the Governments to which they are addressed. Resolutions of the General Assembly are not adopted by the overwhelming majority of Members, as was resolution 2934 (XXVII) last year, unless they also reflect the overwhelming weight of world opinion. Even nuclear Powers cannot, we believe, ignore for ever the moral pressure of Assembly resolutions to which more than a hundred Member States have subscribed. Such resolutions may not be effective immediately, but they will be effective in the end.

175. Mr. IPOTO Eyebu Bankand'Asi (Zaire) (*interpretation from French*): We continue to speak of disarmament here while elsewhere armaments are being manufactured and improved in order to make them even more murderous. Last year, during the debate in this Committee, the delegation of Zaire ventured to illustrate its support for the convening of a world disarmament conference by mentioning the notable, although still incipient, progress achieved by Zaire in the field of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. More specifically, we mentioned the setting up of a new atomic reactor that is the work of Zaire scientists, in order to respond to the varied and complex needs arising from economic and social development in the modern world.

176. The General Assembly, by an overwhelming majority, adopted resolution 2930 (XXVII) on the question of convening a world disarmament conference. This was more than a simple vote; it represented, in the eyes of several delegations, a new and important step in the continuing search for solutions to the question of disarmament. This resolution established a Special Committee whose mandate was "to examine all the views and suggestions expressed by Governments on the convening of a world disarmament conference and related problems and to submit, on the basis of consensus, a report to the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session".

177. As might perhaps have been expected, that Committee was unable to function in a regular fashion. My colleague, Mr. Hoveyda, has very eloquently reported to the Committee [*1934th meeting*], and I wish to associate myself with those who have paid tribute to him for his capability, his conscientiousness and his high sense of duty. I was somewhat shocked to hear that the mandate of the Committee had not been adequately carried out. But since then, I have had occasion to read his statement and, despite what seems to have been a lack of concrete results, many good things have been done. Indeed, the contacts which took place have made it possible to clear the way towards the fulfilment of the mandate of the Committee, which we would wish to see renewed by the General Assembly.

178. Our anxiety to see general and complete disarmament take place as early as possible is based *inter alia* on the reflex of fear brought about necessarily by a special category of weapons. I speak of the atomic weapon which, from the moment of its appearance in the world, towards

the end of the Second World War, produced at one stroke more casualties than had been inflicted in any other war in history. The atomic bomb which caused so many deaths at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was manufactured—as no doubt the Committee is aware—from raw materials which came from my country. Now that we know this weapon, public opinion has found it difficult to establish a line of demarcation between nuclear energy and the atomic bomb, or between twentieth century physics and the devastating power of atomic energy.

179. Concern is displayed—perhaps appropriately—if one is to believe Citizen Mahu, Professor at the National University of Zaire, a Governor of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in his study on the impact of atomic energy on society, from which I quote:

"The terrifying nature of modern atomic weapons, combined with the deep division of the world and the continual tensions on the international scene, are unquestionably the cause of the apprehension which troubles the dreams of the intelligent citizen. And yet a quick estimate of the peaceful uses of atomic energy reveals that it is a highly positive acquisition for mankind."

180. Virtually every year it is revealed to the world that nuclear tests for military purposes have taken place. It is well known that these tests consume large sums of money and inevitably hinder the dissemination of ideas and the exchange of scientific and technical information.

181. This is what caused President Mobutu to say on 4 October 1973, in the general debate at this twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly:

"Without any doubt, it is a matter of prestige to possess the atomic bomb or even better the thermonuclear bomb; but to make it operational, and particularly to miniaturize it, you obviously have to carry out tests, and that is not always convenient. We condemn all nuclear tests wherever they take place and we do not condemn any one country more than another. In this particular area, we do not agree with the atomic countries, which are asking all others to ratify the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. For our part, we have ratified it with enthusiasm; yet we do not manufacture bombs or even bullets. But the countries concerned are telling us every day about the invention of ever-more sophisticated weapons. Now what is responsible about that?" [*2140th meeting, para. 181.*]

182. The Organization's Charter recognizes the equality of all Member States and their sacred collective duty to watch over international peace and security. The right of veto recognized to a handful of Member States cannot, nor must it, constitute a sufficient reason for them to use the fulfilment of this collective duty of States for their own benefit. Moreover, the fact that they have military arsenals that could destroy the world, consciously or through error, neither can nor must dictate to certain States a behaviour that would arouse all kinds of suspicion.

183. We watch—not without misgivings—the emergence of relations between two super-Powers which were formerly fiercely opposed and which are attempting, outside the

organic framework of the United Nations, to find solutions favouring their interests in various questions with which the Organization regularly deals, so as to have their solutions endorsed by the Organization.

184. It is high time to denounce this behaviour collectively before it is too late, because the failure of the other Member States to react will involve a risk whose dimensions are unknown but foreseeable; in other words, favouring the hegemony of the two super-Powers with all its consequences. Zaire, for its part, believes that it has seen the silhouette of the Devil and has sounded the alarm as the occasion warrants. It is not in vain to remind ourselves all the time that détente throughout the world was obtained thanks to the over-all structures established by all the Member States and that it was not the work of two or a handful of States.

185. Appropriately, the representative of Yugoslavia, in the course of his statement at the 1941st meeting, informed the Committee of negotiations which are taking place between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries for the reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe. I agree with him that these negotiations are of vital interest to the international community as a whole, especially when one remembers the beginning of the Second World War. On the other hand, he reminded us that the United Nations was the only forum capable of assuming this function. The delegation of Zaire is prepared to study his proposal, which was "to reaffirm existing principles and adopt new ones that should govern the negotiations on disarmament in any international forum, for this would result in establishing the necessary links between those forums and the United Nations and also in guaranteeing the interests of all States." [1941st meeting, para. 66.]

186. The delegation of Zaire will, in due course, express its view on the other points submitted for the Committee's consideration.

187. In conclusion, therefore, I should like to make a brief comment.

188. Resolution 2930 (XXVII), which established the Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, set at 35 the number of Member States to be appointed by the President of the General Assembly "after consultation with all the regional groups and taking due consideration of the necessity to ensure adequate political and geographical representation".

189. Africa, more than any other geographic region, has been relatively unfavourably treated in its representation on that Committee. I can do no less than my African brothers who have spoken in this Committee asking formally that additional seats be granted to Africa so as to reflect the spirit of the aforementioned resolution.

190. For Zaire, there can be no doubt about those who must be disarmed. They know themselves and they know each other—which makes it unnecessary for me to name them. It is for them to establish the necessary conditions for disarmament called for by our Charter; it is for them to establish reciprocal confidence; it is for them, lastly, to wish to disarm. As for the group of States to which my

country belongs, it is already disarmed—and was so even before disarmament was brought up. But that group of States knows that it has its word to say, so long as others obstruct disarmament. This is an obligation; it is indeed a duty.

191. Mr. BAZAN DAVILA (Chile) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I should like to speak on some of the main questions with which this Committee is at present dealing. They could, however, be summed up under a single head: disarmament.

192. The problems of disarmament are linked with the entire gamut of international affairs and life among nations. To speak of disarmament is to speak of peace, of security and, as has been proved, of development.

193. We are not sceptical. It is true that 27 years ago, in its first resolution, the General Assembly decided to deal with the problems of disarmament; and it is equally true that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the bodies that preceded it have worked on this same subject for 21 years, and that the culmination of their work is the report that has been submitted to us [A/9141].

194. After such prolonged efforts it is painful to have to note a situation which was described more eloquently than I could describe it by one of the most capable experts on the subject, the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Alva Myrdal, when she dealt with this subject. Mrs. Myrdal said:

"There has been no manifestation of a real will to take political decisions to proceed in the direction of disarmament." [1941st meeting, para. 90.]

195. But in the midst of these discouraging aspects, there are at times some reasons for hope, and among these I must stress the very positive approach adopted by China and France regarding Additional Protocol II of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, an instrument to which my Government attaches the greatest importance. And thus we still contend that without flagging we must not give up our efforts to progress towards disarmament.

196. We cannot dissociate the problem of disarmament from the problem of security, as the representative of Brazil, Mr. Frazão, correctly reminded us. And the security in which we live today is precarious at best. This has been shown by the effects on the world that the war in the Middle East could have had at any moment. A balance of armaments, the so-called "balance of terror" is not a solution, nor can a solution be found in "détente", particularly if, besides being insufficient, that détente is partial and inadequate. Thus first and foremost it is the political roots of international tension that must be destroyed if we wish to achieve true disarmament.

197. Furthermore, disarmament is indissolubly linked to development, as the representative of Uganda reminded us a short time ago. This was solemnly declared by the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session when, in resolution 2627 (XXV), it linked the Second Development Decade to the Disarmament Decade. In turn, the Economic and Social Council, when assessing the results of the first two years of

that Decade, analysed the relationship between disarmament and development on the basis of a very clear-sighted study by the Secretary-General and very thorough work done by the group of experts presided over by Mrs. Myrdal. That analysis demonstrated something that we all know but that can never be repeated too often, namely that the world squanders \$200,000 million a year on weapons, and that amount may rise to \$300,000 million by the end of the Disarmament Decade; that that amount is approximately 6.5 per cent of the gross national product of the world, and, what is even more impressive, is 25 times the total amount spent in so-called "aid" to development, that is to say, the contribution made by the developed nations to the progress of the developing countries.

198. In the light of the ineffectiveness of the methods applied thus far, how are we to grapple with the problem of disarmament? For over 10 years in this same Assembly, Chile has contended that a world disarmament conference should be convened. We maintain that view today, while at the same time emphasizing that that is not solely our idea, nor solely that of any other State. It is not the heritage of any single ideology, and it is only through the co-operation of all nations, given with nobility of mind and seriously, that we can succeed in convening such a conference.

199. It is with that in mind that I should like to comment on the efforts being made to promote the holding of a world disarmament conference. My delegation is imbued with the heartfelt hope that our efforts will lead us to positive results and that those efforts will not be dissipated through erroneous steps, and therefore I trust that because of that good intention I shall be forgiven for expressing my opinions with the strictest frankness.

200. The 100 States that last year voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 2930 (XXVII) agreed to create a Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference. That was an organ entrusted not with preparing the conference but rather with weighing the opinions and suggestions of Governments on the subject and reporting back to the General Assembly.

201. According to this resolution, the Special Committee was to be composed of 35 Member States which the President of the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly would appoint "after consultation with all the regional groups and taking due consideration of the necessity to ensure adequate political and geographical representation".

202. So far as my delegation is concerned, first of all there can be no doubt that the idea of ensuring "adequate political and geographical representation" in the composition of the Special Committee constituted what I would term the original sin, of which it has not as yet been shriven.

203. The requirement of adequate political representation was added here, unduly and unnecessarily, to the basic requirement of adequate geographical representation. Thus a new and disturbing element was introduced into the above-mentioned resolution, a political element which does not appear in the Charter and was never, in similar cases,

contemplated in the long-established practice of the General Assembly.

204. Furthermore, it was unnecessary in this case to go beyond the letter of the Charter and abandon a very respected practice, because political régimes are not in the atmosphere, they are on the soil, and therefore it is sufficient to ensure equitable geographical representation for all political régimes to be adequately represented also.

205. This superfluous criterion of adequate political representation in the Special Committee jeopardized its constitution, on the one hand, and condemned it to paralysis, on the other.

206. The President of the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly admitted on 19 December that he had not as yet concluded the indispensable consultations, that is to say, those prior consultations to be held with all regional groups as ordered in resolution 2930 (XXVII); when on that day he adjourned the General Assembly, he left in the minds of all the impression that he would not be able to set up that Special Committee until one or two weeks later. Yet the next morning he announced that the Special Committee had been constituted. It is obvious that in proceeding so abruptly he carried out the consultations only half way and did not conclude those prior consultations which the General Assembly had set as the precise condition for the appointment of the members of the Special Committee. Thus he went beyond the terms of his mandate.

207. And with regard to the consultations he managed to hold with some regional groups, the President ignored the views that were expressed to him. He left the Philippines out, despite the recommendation of the group of Asian States; he ignored Burundi and Tunisia, the candidates of the group of African States; and he omitted Peru and Venezuela, which had been sponsored by the group of Latin American States. In curtailing in that way the regional groups, that is to say, geographical representation, the President of the last session of the General Assembly brought about a disproportionate political representation of socialist Europe; all of the countries of socialist Europe, with the sole exception of the German Democratic Republic, which was not at that time eligible, were included in the Special Committee.

208. Thus, it appears that the President of the twenty-seventh regular session of the General Assembly went beyond his mandate when he failed to conclude the consultations that were the *sine qua non* condition for the appointment of the Special Committee; that thereupon he sacrificed geographical representation in order to ensure political representation; and that, finally, when deciding on the political representation, he did not act objectively, since he gave preference to European socialism, to which he ensured 100 per cent representation by including all its members, ignoring all the other political régimes existing in the world, to which he gave only a very slight representation in the Special Committee.

209. The representative of China, in a letter dated 9 January 1973 [A/9033], addressed to the Secretary-General, denied that the Special Committee had any legal

force since he felt it had been imposed in a form which he termed “crude and arbitrary”, and he observed, furthermore, that the procedure employed had been “catering to the needs of a certain super-Power”. He went on to say that an instrument has been created to serve “that super-Power for its political manoeuvres”. At the same time China announced its decision not to participate in the work of the Special Committee.

210. For its part, the group of Latin American States objected also to the procedure employed in the constitution of the Special Committee. In a letter dated 2 February 1973 [A/9041], that group informed the Secretary-General that, in the unanimous view of its members, it considered that the representation assigned to Latin America was insufficient numerically, and added that with the reservation of one country—a reservation which I am happy to state today no longer exists—the group felt that the situation produced was of such a nature that: “for the present, the initiation of the Committee’s work, far from contributing to the attainment of the objectives sought, would make that attainment more difficult and might indeed severely jeopardize it” and that: “elementary prudence would dictate that no action should be taken in the immediate future”.

211. The constitution of the Special Committee was furthermore anomalous because sufficient clarification was never given regarding participation in it by the nuclear Powers, and because the criterion applied to this question by the President of the last session of the General Assembly was from the very beginning objected to by China.

212. From the purely formal standpoint, the President did not place the five nuclear Powers on an equal footing. My delegation believes that the presence of all of them is indispensable for any serious discussions on disarmament, since nothing can be achieved without their full accord. Therefore, no difference should be drawn between them. Yet, the President of the last session included the Soviet Union by name in the Special Committee, thus meeting that nation’s desires, and left four empty seats for China, the United States, Great Britain and France, laying a certain challenge before them that they either take the seats or leave them. China proudly rejected the seat, nor have the United States, Great Britain or France accepted theirs.

213. Thus, vitiated *ab initio* because of an obvious legal contravention, incomplete as far as geographical representation is concerned, unbalanced as far as political representation is concerned, and cold-shouldered by four of the five nuclear Powers, disqualified by one of the latter and rejected by a number of regional groups, the Special Committee could do nothing and has done nothing.

214. It is a useless task to try to find something positive in the last months of the Special Committee’s existence. It held an inaugural meeting and eight unofficial meetings; it did not manage to elect its Bureau; it arrived at no consensus and dealt only with non-substantive questions. It dealt with its own composition, on the appropriateness of expanding it, on the need to be able to count on the presence of all nuclear Powers, and on its obligation to report.

215. But since this was impossible, Mr. Hoveyda, who had presided over the unofficial meetings, was asked to sum up those meetings for the General Assembly. This was a trust that he carried out by saying that to a certain extent he had been “the non-chairman of a non-committee entrusted with submitting a non-report on what perhaps did not happen”. His kindly final report on the work done is most distressing. He tells us that the participants in the Committee defined the zones of agreement and disagreement. Generally speaking, they were in favour of convening the world disarmament conference, and they agreed that the Committee should be enlarged and that it would be appropriate for all nuclear Powers to participate in it.

216. But the truth of the matter is that the Special Committee did not gather the background material that it was intended to examine. It could therefore neither comment or report upon it, and in a word, it in no way carried out the tasks entrusted to it.

217. The only positive aspect that we can gather from it is what we already knew but which has now been highlighted: that is to say, evidence of the diplomatic talent, the intellectual probity and the will to serve, of Mr. Hoveyda, and I wish to express to him the gratitude of the delegation of Chile for his efforts in trying to perform an impossible task.

218. But after giving this over-all view of what has occurred, we can state that the warnings of the group of Latin American States regarding the Special Committee have been borne out fully. The Committee has not encouraged the holding of the world disarmament conference. The Committee has not cleared the way to achieve that goal, which is what we want. On the contrary, its total inoperativeness has left us obviously frustrated. It may well be that this Committee will seriously damage the possibilities of progress towards that conference if it continues to be used as a forum for political propaganda to gain proselytes and influence. Used in this way, the Special Committee is no longer a constructive forum for serious understandings and becomes a trench, proving that those who shoot from that trench do not believe in détente, nor are they helping to create an atmosphere conducive to disarmament.

219. But to rescue the initiative of the world disarmament conference from the deadlock in which the Special Committee has placed it, or to avoid its backtracking—which may occur—it is urgent that that Committee be restructured. The delegation of Chile feels that that task should be accorded first priority, and we are ready to give all the help we can to that end.

220. With this idea in mind, and feeling that thus we shall be encouraging the possibility of a world disarmament conference being held, I should like to state the following views.

221. First, we believe it necessary to re-establish equitable geographical representation in the Special Committee. As far as Africa is concerned, the representative of Zaire just made the same comment in his very interesting statement. Thus, in order to re-establish equitable geographical representation in the Special Committee, we believe that its

membership should be expanded—but in such a way as to allow seats for the five countries proposed by the groups of Latin American, African and Asian States, which were omitted by the President of the twenty-seventh regular session—namely Peru, Venezuela, Burundi, Tunisia and the Philippines. We believe, further, that one or more countries of Western Europe should be included in the membership of the Special Committee, since that part of the world is notoriously under-represented when confronted with the massive representation of Eastern Europe.

222. The idea of enlarging the General Committee has been generally accepted. But that enlargement must be exclusively on the basis of geographical representation. If by this expansion of the membership it is intended once again to introduce the concept of political representation, we should merely be repeating on a larger scale the very error we are now trying to correct. In that case it would be better to leave matters as they stand.

223. Secondly, we believe that it is indispensable that the participation in the Special Committee of the five nuclear Powers on an equal footing should be negotiated. The absence of four of them for reasons for which they cannot be blamed—as the representative of France has pointed out in this Committee—renders completely useless the deliberations of the Special Committee. It is for this reason that those deliberations have been marginal and have not tackled the substance of the issue. That is why the statements made were recriminatory and propagandist, seriously hampering instead of facilitating any possibility of holding the conference.

224. Thirdly, and as a subsidiary solution, if the four nuclear Powers I have mentioned were still to refuse to join the Special Committee, we believe the latter should be restructured without the fifth nuclear Power. For the sake of argument, if four nuclear Powers were to refrain from joining the Committee, it would be useless for the fifth nuclear Power to remain in the same forum with all the non-nuclear-weapon States. Experience has shown that that forum could not express common views, nor could it lead to viable conclusions. It would therefore be entirely useless.

225. Last year in the General Assembly the idea was put forward that a first step towards a world disarmament conference could be taken if all the non-nuclear-weapon States were heard and submitted joint proposals to the nuclear Powers. We have much to say on questions of disarmament, and at such a time we would reaffirm, enlarge and update—with the idea of a world disarmament conference—the spirit that prevailed in the Conference of non-nuclear-weapon States. The idea I have mentioned was taken up by the representatives of Argentina and Peru, Mr. Carlos Ortiz de Rozas and Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, in their statements before the First Committee. This idea also has the warm support of the delegation of Chile.

226. Fourthly, we believe that if geographical representation in the Special Committee is enlarged, and if it is agreed that all nuclear Powers should either be in the Committee or out of it, then the very mandate given the Committee when it was created will have to be reformulated. Today, that mandate is purely academic. It must be made more practical so that the Special Committee, alone or through

dialogue with all the nuclear Powers, if they do not wish to participate in it, can come to conclusions that will effectively prepare for and lead to the holding of the world disarmament conference.

227. To sum up, this is the view that the delegation of Chile wishes to express regarding what has been done and what ought to be done so that some day we may have a world disarmament conference.

228. In conclusion—and I reserve my right to return to this question, since these comments are preliminary—I should like to refer to another matter on our agenda: I refer to nuclear explosions, which year after year are referred to in resolutions of the General Assembly.

229. Since nuclear explosions are carried out anyway, the present President of the General Assembly, Mr. Benites, in inaugurating this session, pointed out the following:

“Nevertheless, nuclear tests are continuing, not only in the atmosphere, where the danger of contamination affects many States which have rightly protested, but also underground, where, in addition to the risk of unsettling geological faults, there is the danger of the increasing power of the nuclear weapons”. [*2117th plenary meeting, para. 64.*]

230. That is the painful truth. The tests continue in the atmosphere and underground, and at an increasing rate. They continue despite the Moscow test-ban Treaty and despite the resolutions of the General Assembly. No warning has been heeded; no condemnation has been listened to.

231. My country has repeatedly condemned all nuclear tests, whether in the atmosphere or underground, because they are dangerous to man and his environment, because they endanger peace and because they threaten the very survival of mankind.

232. We have repeatedly protested against the atmospheric tests that a friendly Power is conducting in the Pacific Ocean which washes our coasts, and today we must protest again. We trust that the General Assembly will adopt a resolution once again condemning atmospheric tests in general and those conducted in the Pacific area in particular. On this point we have noted with satisfaction the draft resolution submitted by seven Powers in document A/C.1/L.651, and we are following with interest the consultations that other delegations are carrying out to propose a second draft resolution.

233. As far as underground explosions are concerned, they too continue. The last session of the General Assembly entrusted the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament with the preparation of a treaty prohibiting such tests. The report submitted by the Conference showed no progress in this matter. That is a new and monumental frustration.

234. All nuclear weapons tests must end. That is the least that we, the unarmed and non-nuclear States, can ask of the nuclear Powers that possess the weapons. The day on which all nuclear explosions cease will mark our first step—a

decisive step—on the difficult road to disarmament and, what is more important, along the road to true peace.

235. The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call upon representatives who wish to speak in exercise of their right of reply.

236. Mr. ROSCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): My delegation wishes to make a few comments with regard to the statement made by the representative of the People's Republic of China at this meeting.

237. The representative of the People's Republic of China, following the example set last year and the year before that, spoke in an extremely negative, vicious and slanderous fashion. In essence, the position of China as stated here gives every reason for coming to the conclusion that the leadership of the People's Republic of China is interested neither in disarmament nor in ensuring international security.

238. Let us consider what the People's Republic of China has done in matters of disarmament during the three years of its presence in the United Nations. We must conclude that its attitude is totally negative in relation to questions of disarmament. At the last session of the General Assembly, it did not vote on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. It does not wish to do that. It voted against all resolutions calling for the cessation of nuclear tests, and in that it was in a rather small company of States that I shall refer to in a moment. It voted against the resolution that called upon States to renounce the use of force in international relations and that declared a permanent prohibition of nuclear weapons. It was supported in this by two highly significant partners; as you will recall, it was supported last year by the Republic of South Africa and Portugal.

239. I do not wish to draw any major conclusions from this. Each one of you can come to his own. I must, however, say that, as some representatives have already pointed out, there definitely seems to be a community of souls and of ideas.

240. I would also point out that certain events that occurred a few weeks, even a few days, ago demonstrated to what extent the People's Republic of China and its leadership are lacking in any interest in securing international peace and security. A certain very tragic event occurred, namely the war in the Middle East. The Security Council unanimously adopted resolutions aimed at bringing an end to that war. The Chinese representatives were not interested in bringing about peace and security and disarmament, and they hid their hands under the table. They did not vote for a single draft resolution. They did not participate in the voting. Of course, everyone is entitled to ask why. Well, because they wished to see the flames of war spread as far and wide as possible, so that they might extend even beyond that region and into other regions and other continents, and so that, presumably, they might be able to warm their own hands over those flames. This is an illustration of the fact that the People's Republic of China has no real interest in resolving the basic questions that are considered here in the General Assembly at plenary meetings, in our Committee and in the Security Council.

241. Over the past few years the international community has succeeded in concluding a number of important agreements. Among these is included the Moscow Treaty of 1963, prohibiting nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. That Treaty has been signed and ratified by more than a hundred States. The People's Republic of China has adopted a sharply negative attitude with regard to that Treaty. Not only has it not supported it, but it strives in every way to undermine it. It is conducting tests of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. Those tests, with their radioactive fall-out, contaminate the Chinese people—we regret this most profoundly—and the neighbouring States of Mongolia, the Soviet Union and Japan. In fact, all countries of the entire world are contaminated. And they do this in spite of all appeals that an end be put to such tests because they are unlawful and have been condemned by all mankind.

242. In the course of the past few years, in 1968 to be specific, it was possible to conclude a Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which came formally into force in March 1970. The People's Republic of China remains outside that Treaty. More than that, it seeks by every possible means to slander that great and significant achievement of a large number of States, to render it null and void, to minimize it and reduce it to nothing. More than a hundred countries are represented in that Treaty. In other words, China does not wish to take into account the will, the aspirations and strivings of a very large number indeed of the countries of the world.

243. A couple of years ago an agreement was successfully concluded on the prohibition of biological and bacteriological weapons. Is China a party to that Treaty? No, it is not. Why? It is not interested in any treaties or agreements. In this fact we see the origin of the position of the People's Republic of China, so viciously stated, in relation to the World Disarmament Conference. In spite of the resolution adopted unanimously at the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly, in spite of the resolution adopted unanimously at the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly, the People's Republic of China is trying to put a spoke in the wheel so as to prevent the machinery from moving forward to the point where that Conference can actually be convened and take place.

244. Everyone will ask what is the cause of all this. The cause, I must say, is quite clear and obvious. It is that the leadership of the People's Republic of China understands that at a world conference they will be asked: Why are you not a party to any of the international agreements in which hundreds of States are represented? Why do you not wish to sign a Treaty prohibiting nuclear testing in three environments? Why do you wish to see nuclear weapons proliferate throughout the world, constituting a threat to all mankind? Why are you not a party to the Treaty prohibiting bacteriological weapons? This is what will be asked of them. In order to cover over their negative attitude, highly dangerous to mankind resulting from a policy aimed at fanning the flames of war and undermining all measures taken in the field of disarmament and co-operation among States in respect of disarmament and international security, the simplest method is, of course, to slander the entire matter, to say that these are so many tricks, so many "gimmicks"; that this is a fraud, that it is



not going to lead to anything, that mankind will achieve nothing by this but will merely be taking backward steps.

245. Well, I must say that such a policy, apart from the fact that it is sewn over with white thread, is highly dangerous to the international community. The Soviet Union, together with the other socialist countries, has insisted most emphatically that the Chinese People's Republic take part in the work of the United Nations on the premise that China would become a member of that community of nations and form part of that co-operation which is truly aimed at solving the basic task which the United Nations has set for itself, namely, the strengthening of international peace and security, the elimination of all hotbeds of war and the adoption of all measures to ensure that these hotbeds shall be quenched as soon as possible. With regard to the limitation of the arms race and its cessation we unfortunately see the most negative attitude towards all the steps which have been undertaken by States in this direction. We profoundly regret this. We hope that in the last analysis the Chinese people will understand that its leadership is now conducting a game very dangerous for the Chinese people and for the whole of the international community.

246. Mr. WANG Ming-hsiu (China) (*translation from Chinese*): Just now the Soviet representative made an unreasonable attack and accusation against the statement made by the Chinese delegation. It was totally unreasonable. It was sheer distortion and slander.

247. Of course the Soviet representative's statement is a tune which everyone is used to hearing. These are the old tricks often resorted to by the Soviet Union. Our statement was based on facts. We have only been very frank and pointed out the true state of affairs, exposing the fraud on the part of the Soviet Union. Precisely because this was so, the Soviet representative was ill at ease, and flew into a temper. But what useful purpose does that serve?

248. The Soviet representative has been resorting to tricks and shams and fraud in order to deceive other people. He

himself does not believe what he says, so how can he expect to convince others? Since everything is false it is necessary for us to expose it, to puncture the lie.

249. The Soviet representative thinks that by pinning labels on others he can seal the mouths of other speakers and allow no one to speak. How can that be? He will never be able to do that.

250. The position of China on the question of disarmament and on a disarmament conference is well known to all. It is clear and consistent. Any distortion, slander or attack by the Soviet representative is futile. It can only show that he has a guilty conscience. After all, what is false is false. No matter what kind of sophistry the Soviet representative might resort to, no matter what figments he might use, he could not conceal the fraud he is perpetrating with regard to disarmament. Much less would he be able to cover up the true social imperialist features of the Soviet Union in carrying out aggression, expansion and contention for world hegemony.

251. Since the Soviet representative has come out with this nonsense with regard to our statement we deem it necessary to reserve our right to make additional comments on certain aspects of the question. We shall make additional comments with regard to the statement made by the Soviet representative today, in order to make further exposure and refutation and to set the record straight.

252. Mr. ROSCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): I shall be most brief. I shall merely say that I have had to listen to a rather lamentable justification in connexion with the statement which I had made. We are simply bound to observe the paucity of the arguments adduced here to refute the entirely obvious facts that illustrate the proposition that China is unwilling to co-operate with regard to matters of disarmament and, over the past three years, has not come forward with a single proposal that could have been used as a basis for consideration.

*The meeting rose at 6.40 p.m.*