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GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (*interpretation from Spanish*): My statement today will be devoted entirely to item 93 of the agenda concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco).<sup>1</sup>

2. My statement is also intended to fulfil the very honourable duty of formally submitting the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.522, sponsored by the following 18 delegations: Barbados, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. Seventeen of these delegations are listed in the draft and the delegation of Trinidad and Tobago later joined as a sponsor.

3. The scope of this draft resolution, the contents of which, I think, are self-explanatory, and the fact that some days have already elapsed since it was first circulated—which no doubt has made it easier for members of the Committee to consider it carefully—will allow me to limit my statement merely to stressing some aspects which we believe to be essential to the examination of the subject.

4. I shall begin by recalling that there does exist at present a nuclear-free zone, subject to a régime of the total absence of such instruments of mass destruction, guaranteed by an effective international control system. That region—the first to be established that includes densely populated territories—covers an increasingly large area which is at present about 6.6 million square kilometres and whose population is approximately 117 million inhabitants.

5. The existence of this zone was made possible by the establishment of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear

<sup>1</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634 (1968), No. 9068.

Chairman: Mr. Andrés AGUILAR M. (Venezuela).

AGENDA ITEMS 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 93 AND 94

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/7958, A/7960 and Corr.1, A/7961, A/8059-DC/233, A/C.1/1001 and 1010, A/C.1/L.523 and 528)

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Implementation of the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States: report of the Secretary-General (*continued*) (A/8079 and Add.1)

Establishment, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of an international service for

Weapons in Latin America—or the Treaty of Tlatelolco—which in itself was the fruit of generous and persevering efforts of the countries of Latin America that from the outset received encouragement and support from the United Nations and from its Secretary-General.

6. The Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) was duly established in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and has been in operation since 2 September 1969 when the first sessions of its supreme organ, the General Conference, began.

7. From the very moment when the Treaty of Tlatelolco was approved, widest praise was heaped on the document by a number of outstanding personalities all over the world and the Treaty was welcomed enthusiastically at all international meetings dealing with matters of disarmament.

8. A mere four days after the Treaty was opened for signature the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on disarmament welcomed the document with enthusiasm at the beginning of its 1967 session on 21 February of that year. It was then that the privilege fell to me of formally presenting the instrument in fulfilment of the mandate from the Preparatory Commission.

9. In the debates in the First Committee during October and November of 1967—in which representatives of 46 States of the most varied geographical zones participated, States that follow different political ideologies and economic systems—the greatest praise was expressed regarding the work successfully carried out by the Latin American States.

10. At that time the Treaty was referred to as “an outstanding Latin American contribution”, “a notable feat”, “an unprecedented example”, “extremely important pioneer work in disarmament” and “of exceptional success in the field of nuclear-weapon control”. In the verbatim records of this Committee I found that it was said that the Treaty was “a historic event that stresses the fact that man is beginning to think of the survival of the human race” and that it was “a bold step at a time when man is seriously concerned over his future”. It was stated that the countries of Latin America “have given the world a glorious and outstanding example of how, once a decision exists, concrete steps towards peace can be taken”; that the Treaty implies “an achievement that, because of its importance, goes beyond the frontiers of the Latin American continent”; that it offers “an incomparable experience for all countries that see in the establishment of nuclear-free zones an effective way of strengthening international peace and security”; and, at the same time, stress was laid on the fact that “the Treaty of Tlatelolco has significance beyond the present: it is a historic milestone, since, for the first time, a nuclear-free zone is established in a highly populated region”.

11. As a happy culmination of the debates on the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the General Assembly of the United Nations, without a negative vote, approved resolution 2286 (XXII) in which, after having expressed its “special pleasure” at the signing of the Treaty, proclaimed that the Treaty: “constitutes an event of historic significance in the efforts to

prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security and which at the same time establishes the right of Latin American countries to use nuclear energy for demonstrated peaceful purposes in order to accelerate the economic and social development of their peoples”.

12. Similar praise was lavished on the Treaty at later sessions of the General Assembly and at the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and also at the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States which met in Geneva in 1968 and which, on 27 September 1968, adopted a resolution devoted to the general subject of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which deals widely with the Treaty and speaks of it in very favourable terms.<sup>2</sup>

13. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, on 12 February 1967, when the Treaty was approved, stated:

“The nations of Latin America can, with ample justification, take pride in what they have wrought by their own initiative and through their own efforts.”

He also stressed the importance that he, personally, attributed to it by being present himself at the inauguration of the General Conference of OPANAL in September last year. In the statement he made at that time he said:

“In a world that all too often seems dark and foreboding, the Treaty of Tlatelolco will shine as a beacon of light.

“ . . .

“The Treaty of Tlatelolco preceded the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by more than a year and exceeds it in the scope of its prohibitions and its control features . . . [The Treaty of Tlatelolco] will provide an example and a precedent for the establishment of nuclear-free zones in other areas of the world . . .”<sup>3</sup>

14. The Director General of the Atomic Energy Agency, Dr. Sigvard Eklund, when speaking at the same opening ceremony, stated:

“The Treaty of Tlatelolco might thus be regarded as the first multilateral treaty in the field of nuclear disarmament which provides for the application of an institutionalized and international control system and as such represents a decisive step forward in the recognition and acceptance of international safeguards. . . .”<sup>3</sup>

15. In the light of everything I have said, it would have appeared most natural and just had the Treaty received the spontaneous and immediate co-operation of all nuclear Powers that the General Assembly had called for ever since the initiation of the studies and negotiations for the preparation of the Treaty according to its resolution 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963. But unfortunately the facts have been very different.

<sup>2</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, agenda item 96, document A/7277 and Corr.1 and 2, para. 17.*

<sup>3</sup> See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232, annex C, sect. 33.*

16. Obviously, the Treaty possesses autonomous existence and full force for States parties, even if it has not received the support of some, or even of the majority, of the nuclear Powers. But, it is equally obvious that for greater effectiveness all the nuclear Powers should co-operate in the implementation of the Treaty. And, as the non-nuclear-weapon States stated in their resolution B of 27 September 1968, "for the maximum effectiveness of any Treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon States is necessary and . . . such co-operation should take the form of commitments likewise undertaken in a formal international instrument which is legally binding, such as a treaty, convention or protocol".

17. It is doubtless for that reason that the Preparatory Committee, while drafting the Treaty, at the same time drafted Additional Protocol II, with a view to obtaining from the nuclear-weapon States agreement to the following commitments: To respect, "in all its express aims and provisions", the "statute of denuclearization of Latin America in respect of warlike purposes, as defined, delimited and set forth in the Treaty"; "Not to contribute in any way to the performance of acts involving a violation of the obligations of article 1 of the Treaty in the territories to which the Treaty applies"; and "Not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties of the Treaty".

18. These commitments are far from being burdensome and obviously there is nothing in them that in any way departs from the general obligations contracted under the Charter of the United Nations, which all Members of the Organization have solemnly committed themselves to abide by in good faith in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter.

19. Thus the General Assembly, in that same resolution 2286 (XXII) in which, on 5 December 1967, it welcomed the Treaty "with special satisfaction" and invited "all Powers possessing nuclear weapons to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II of the Treaty as soon as possible"; and the following year, in resolution 2456 B (XXIII) of 20 December 1968, it reiterated the appeal addressed to the aforementioned Powers by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, fully to comply with the invitation addressed to them by the General Assembly in resolution 2286 (XXII) that I have just quoted.

20. At present Additional Protocol II is in force for one of those Powers: the United Kingdom; and there are reasonable grounds for hope that it will soon be in force for another Power: the United States, which signed it on 1 April 1968 and whose constitutional process of ratification is very far advanced.

21. To what I have just said, which must be a matter of satisfaction to the General Assembly, we must unfortunately add that the other three nuclear Powers have not as yet even signed the Protocol.

22. In view of that situation and pursuant to resolution 1 (I) of the General Conference of OPANAL,<sup>3</sup> the 18 Latin American delegations that I mentioned earlier have submitted to this Committee the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.522 to which I also referred before,

by means of which the General Assembly would reaffirm its appeals to the nuclear-weapon States in resolutions 2286 (XXII) and 2456 B (XXIII), to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II as soon as possible, would also decide to include in the agenda of its twenty-sixth session an item entitled "Status of the implementation of General Assembly resolution . . . (XXV) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)", and would then request the Secretary-General "to transmit to the Governments of the nuclear-weapon States the text of this resolution asking them to keep him informed of any measures adopted by them in order to implement it".

23. In the light of the position of the General Assembly reflected in its previous resolutions, we hope that the draft resolution we have now submitted will also be adopted by the Assembly. We believe such approval to be fully justified, both for the reasons that I have just outlined in this statement and for further reasons which I shall mention before concluding.

24. The period of approximately four years that has elapsed since the Treaty and Protocol were opened for signature on 14 February 1967 would appear to be ample for completing—with positive results, we trust—the study of those instruments which, we were told at that time, some of the nuclear Powers, Members of the United Nations, had undertaken.

25. Repeated statements made both here and in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to the effect that support should be given to any nuclear-weapon-free zone which may be established on the initiative of the States composing that zone, even if such a zone is composed of a very small number of States or even of individual countries.

26. The fact is that the adoption of the draft resolution we propose would seem particularly appropriate during this anniversary of the United Nations and especially if we bear in mind the fact that the General Assembly itself, in resolution 2499 A (XXIV) of 31 October 1969, entitled "Celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations", agreed to make an appeal "to all Member States to give urgent consideration to the ratification of, or accession to, a number of multilateral instruments which have been adopted, endorsed or supported by the United Nations," and appear in the list that the Secretary-General transmitted to Member States by his note of 15 October 1969, which included Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

27. Basically, the resolution which the General Assembly may approve now will only be a reiterated appeal to the nuclear Powers, which seems indispensable in view of the delay on the part of many of them in complying with previous resolutions of the General Assembly and also in acting in accordance with their own declarations. It is also a renewed appeal for those resolutions and promises to be made a reality which Latin America has patiently awaited for almost four years, and which can be done by signing and ratifying Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

28. Mr. SEN (India): Mr. Chairman, my delegation has already paid its tribute to you as Chairman and to the other officers of the Committee. But may I be permitted a personal word of appreciation? When a friend does well, and is honoured, we are naturally pleased. But when such a man has all the qualities necessary for his high office, we consider ourselves doubly fortunate.

29. The present phase of the problem of disarmament is characterized by two seriously disquieting features: first, an ever-spiralling arms race and, secondly, growing disappointment in regard to any genuine progress in disarmament.

30. The Secretary-General has proposed that a comprehensive international expert study be made of the economic and social consequences of the arms race and massive military expenditures. We strongly support that proposal. To have maximum value from a study of that kind we must ensure that it adheres to the supremely important question of the nuclear arms race and is not diffused by considerations that may not be so vital.

31. The momentum of the arms race has continued unabated, and the nuclear-weapon Powers have built up arsenals that can destroy all life on this planet, and perhaps on other planets, many times over, yet not a single agreement has been reached on disarmament in its correct and only sense—that is, the reduction and elimination of arms.

32. The few agreements so far concluded have all been partial measures of non-armament. They have had little or no impact on the existing and fast-increasing armoury of death and destruction of the nuclear-weapon Powers. Only an illusion of progress has been created.

33. The advent of nuclear weapons and the development of other weapons of mass annihilation have left us no choice other than general and complete disarmament. A lasting peace can only be achieved through such disarmament and economic and social development, not through policies based on a balance of terror or other such concepts, which derive from the military and political doctrines of the major Powers.

34. By its resolution 1378 (XIV), adopted at its fourteenth session, the General Assembly established the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament was set up in 1962 with the main task of conducting negotiations for the achievement of that objective. Those negotiations were interrupted in 1964, and the Conference has since then been discussing only partial measures, again mainly of a non-armament nature. A tendency to avoid any movement towards disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, is noticeable.

35. In order to inspire belief in our efforts towards disarmament, and to ensure their success, agreements must be reached on those measures that would stop the arms race and lead to real disarmament. The highest priority should be given to measures aimed at curbing the nuclear race and bringing about nuclear disarmament. Such measures include a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes; a stoppage in the production of nuclear

weapons; a comprehensive nuclear test ban; and, finally, reduction and destruction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

36. With a view to facilitating progress in disarmament negotiations, the delegation of India suggested in 1968 that, in the light of various suggestions that had been put forward and developments that had taken place, the Soviet Union and the United States might consider submitting revised versions of their draft treaties on general and complete disarmament, which they had first presented to the Committee on Disarmament in 1962.<sup>4</sup> My delegation is gratified that that suggestion has received general and increasing support. At the last session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament we made a further proposal. We considered that the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations<sup>5</sup> drawn up by the Soviet Union and the United States on 20 September 1961, and commended by the General Assembly, should now be the main focus of attention and the basis for concrete work in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The joint statement lays down guidelines for a programme that would seem appropriate for our efforts during the Disarmament Decade. It could be elaborated into a full and fruitful programme of disarmament, which should, naturally, take into account the suggestions and proposals made by various delegations.

37. India has welcomed the declaration of the 1970s as the Disarmament Decade and has offered complete co-operation to ensure its success. The Decade will acquire practical meaning only if agreements are concluded for reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons. Serious consideration must be given to concrete steps that could be taken to secure the participation of France and the People's Republic of China in all efforts towards disarmament.

38. India has welcomed the bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the Soviet Union and the United States. However, very little information has been made available in regard to the progress of those talks. We consider it most desirable that at all suitable stages the United Nations should be kept informed so that our partnership in the common solution of all these important problems is maintained and strengthened.

39. I should like to deal briefly with the question of the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, since it is a matter of the highest importance to the developing countries. We have repeatedly emphasized that the development and benefits of the technology of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should be available to all States without any discrimination. The Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at Lusaka in September 1970 upheld that view. The relevant Declaration adopted by that Conference states:

“The Conference is aware of the tremendous contribution which the technology of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including peaceful nuclear explosions, can make to the economy of the developing world. It is of the

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962, document DC/203, annex 1, sects. C and F.

<sup>5</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

opinion that the benefits of this technology should be available to all States without any discrimination.”

tions [A/8136], and the other by the United Kingdom [A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 2].

40. India is convinced that a correct and equitable solution of the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes can only be found in the context of a comprehensive nuclear test ban and that meanwhile the discipline of the partial test ban Treaty<sup>6</sup> should be observed by all States. An international régime for peaceful nuclear explosions should be established and the benefits of technology made available to all States on a basis of equality. We agree with the proposal that, while the technical aspects of the question of peaceful nuclear explosions, including the establishment of an international service, should continue to be dealt with by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the principles governing the creation of an international régime should be discussed at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

45. The group of twelve members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament have, in a joint memorandum [*ibid.*, sect. 39], outlined the basic approach to this problem. We think that the time has come when the General Assembly could, instead of taking a merely procedural type of action, adopt a resolution which would call upon the Committee on Disarmament to continue with a sense of urgency its work on the elimination of all chemical and bacteriological weapons. In this they should no doubt take into account the basic approach outlined in the joint memorandum of the group of twelve, and at the same time avoid taking any steps that might enfeeble in any way the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

41. Both in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in the United Nations considerable attention has recently been focused on the problem of the elimination of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. Mankind has become increasingly concerned by the continued development, production and stockpiling of these weapons. This problem obviously has these aspects: the prohibition of the use of all such weapons, the prevention of their development, production and stockpiling and, finally, effective elimination.

46. Now I turn to the question of the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed. This subject has been under consideration for about two years in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament as well as in the General Assembly.

47. We welcome the presentation by the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States of the third revised version of their joint draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [*ibid.*, annex A]. We note that the two authors have taken into account the discussions and the resulting suggestions. However, we consider that the draft treaty would have been more comprehensive and effective if some important ideas expressed during the discussions had been accepted.

42. The problem of the prohibition of the use of the weapons we are now considering was settled 45 years ago. The Geneva Protocol of 1925<sup>7</sup> prohibits the use in war of all chemical and bacteriological weapons without any exceptions whatsoever. By its resolution 2603 A (XXIV) the General Assembly affirmed that that prohibition was comprehensive and covered “the use in international armed conflicts of all biological and chemical methods of warfare, regardless of any technical developments”. The Assembly has also stressed the need to maintain intact the Geneva Protocol of 1925 in its entirety and to ensure its universal application. In response to the requests of the General Assembly, several States have become parties to the Protocol. We welcome that development.

48. The draft treaty is based on the limited concept of the prohibition on the sea-bed of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The discussions that have taken place in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament as well as in the General Assembly have clearly shown that most countries would support the concept of the present draft treaty on the basis that the exploitation of the sea-bed would be reserved for strictly peaceful purposes. We commend the initiative taken by Poland on 18 June [see CCD/PV.471], and agree with the suggestion made by Sweden on 4 November [1750th meeting], that an item entitled “The reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed” be retained on the agenda of disarmament negotiations.

43. On the second problem, chemical and bacteriological weapons, it will be essential to build on the principle and foundation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. We consider it fundamental to avoid any course of action that might either weaken the basis on which that Protocol rests or cast doubts on its continuing validity.

49. Three issues have received special attention in the course of discussions on the question of a sea-bed treaty: verification, law-of-the-sea questions, and rights and concerns of the coastal States.

44. For almost two years now, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has been trying, without success, to solve the problem of the elimination of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. The basic difference is reflected in the two rival draft conventions that have been proposed: the one submitted by nine socialist delega-

50. In the new version of the draft treaty, the right to verify, which would be available to all States parties to the treaty, has been made more significant. States adhering to the proposed treaty would have the possibility of undertaking verification through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. This is of importance to the developing countries which do not possess the technological capability and necessary resources for this purpose.

<sup>6</sup> Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

<sup>7</sup> Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).

51. The disclaimer clause in article IV of the draft treaty should ensure that the position of any State party on questions related to the law of the sea need not be affected in any way. We consider it important that nothing should be done through a sea-bed treaty relating to disarmament that would either prejudice or prejudice unsettled questions of the law of the sea and of international practice.
52. A greater clarity has been brought about in the new draft treaty in regard to the pre-eminence and special concerns of coastal States parties. We have consistently taken the view that a sea-bed treaty dealing with disarmament should not in any way adversely affect the rights of coastal States on their continental shelves. Our position is that India, as a coastal State, has and always has had full and exclusive sovereign rights over the continental shelf adjoining its territory and beyond its territorial waters, and the subsoil thereof. We, therefore, interpret the provisions contained in paragraph 6 of article III of the draft treaty in the sense that verification activities written into the treaty shall be conducted with due and full regard for the rights of coastal States in all matters concerning the exploration and exploitation of their continental shelves.
53. I would recall that the Canadian proposal on the possibility of using the good offices of the Secretary-General had been favoured by an overwhelming majority of coastal States, many of which, being developing States, as I said before, do not possess the technology and resources to carry out verification by their own means. In order that a sea-bed treaty may be widely acceptable, we consider it essential that this serious and genuine concern of the vast majority of coastal States in regard to their security should be satisfied. We would repeat our conviction that, so far as continental shelves are concerned, other countries cannot use them for military purposes.
54. The delegation of India would vote for the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.523, which would have the General Assembly commend the sea-bed treaty and request the depositary Governments to open the treaty for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date.
55. Year after year, delegation after delegation makes comprehensive statements on this important subject. This is as it should be. But in the outside world men must wonder why so little progress is being made, and that, too, so slowly. We put forward our views and records, we relay our opinions between New York and Geneva, and we all rather tend to feel that we alone know the right lines. Yet a stubborn adherence to our own views is not always the best way of achieving results. I hope that the delegation of India has always shown, and will continue to show, the widest spirit of accommodation and understanding, so that we can, with equal co-operation from the others, make the Disarmament Decade a reality and begin to rid the world of the scourge of armaments and armaments races of all kinds, especially of nuclear and other weapons of total annihilation.
56. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): I appreciate very much the kind words that the representative of India has addressed to the Committee's officers and to myself.
57. Before calling on the next speaker on my list, I would request members of the Committee to take note of the fact that, as observed by the representative of Mexico in his statement, the delegation of Trinidad and Tobago wishes to be added to the list of sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.529.
58. Mr. GURINOVICH (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): Questions relating to disarmament are always among the main items on the agenda of the sessions of the United Nations General Assembly. The delegations of the socialist States and many other States consistently devote a great deal of attention to this problem, to the search for ways to solve it and to reaching agreement on both partial measures and general and complete disarmament. The fact that so much attention is devoted to one of the cardinal problems of our time reflects the deep interest of all mankind in disarmament as the best guarantee of peace, international security, the acceleration of economic development and the enhancement of the material well-being of peoples.
59. Guided by the peaceful principles of Leninist foreign policy, our socialist State consistently supports the cause of peace and peaceful coexistence and is striving to find a solution to the problem of disarmament.
60. It was the Soviet Union that first raised the question of disarmament in the United Nations, and there has not been a single session out of the 25 held by the United Nations General Assembly so far at which the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries have failed to propose specific measures to be taken with respect to disarmament. These proposals have been aimed at the discontinuance of all nuclear weapon tests, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the complete prohibition and elimination of such weapons and the prohibition of the production of chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare and elimination of those already existing—in other words, all means of mass destruction. Proposals have been made for the reduction of armaments and armed forces, the limitation and cessation of the arms race, the demilitarization of outer space, the sea-bed and the ocean floor, the prohibition of war propaganda, and other measures for the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of international peace and security. The proposal of the Soviet Union concerning general and complete disarmament opened a new era in the struggle to achieve disarmament and save mankind from the sufferings and horrors of war.
61. The proposals of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have played a decisive role in the achievement of important agreements in the field of disarmament and in the prevention of a new world war. In recent years definite progress has been made in the matter of disarmament through the application of partial measures.
62. For more than seven years the cause of peace has been served by the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964.

63. Part of the programme of general and complete disarmament is the international Antarctic Treaty,<sup>9</sup> which was concluded in 1959. In accordance with that Treaty, Antarctica—an area covering 14 million square kilometres—is under a régime of complete disarmament. That continent, where any measures of a military nature are prohibited, is used for peaceful purposes only.

64. An important step towards the peaceful use of outer space and its exclusion from the arms race was the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies [*resolution 2222 (XXI), annex*]. As we are all aware, the Treaty prohibits the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction in outer space and ensures that celestial bodies will not be used for military purposes.

65. The entry into force in March 1970 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*] caused deep satisfaction in broad sectors of the world community: this is certainly a significant step towards saving mankind from the horrors of nuclear war.

66. All these international agreements are convincing evidence that, if there is goodwill on the part of all interested States, agreements can be worked out even on the most acute problems of our time.

67. At present, along with joint efforts to bring universal participation in and the general application of the above-mentioned international agreements, work must be pursued with a view to approving agreements which have already been worked out and drawing up new agreements in the field of disarmament, paving the way and creating favourable conditions for the achievement of agreement on general and complete disarmament.

68. In elaborating and implementing partial measures in the field of disarmament, we must overcome the opposition of the militant imperialist circles and the military-industrial complex, the main opponents of general and complete disarmament, who are obliging the socialist and other peace-loving States to spend a large proportion of their resources for the defence of their freedom and independence and have drawn the whole world into the arms race. It is time the initiators of the arms race realized that there is no force capable of arresting the process of mankind's advancement on the path of peace, democracy and socialism. The interests of peace and of economic and social progress for all peoples make it essential to achieve agreement as quickly as possible on general and complete disarmament on the basis of the proposals made by the Soviet Union.

69. The current session of the General Assembly should adopt decisions which would constitute a significant step towards general and complete disarmament. In the opinion of the delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic we have the possibility of doing this.

70. The General Assembly has before it a draft resolution submitted by a large group of States, including the

Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic [*A/C.1/L.523*], commending the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof [*A/8059-DC/233, annex A*]. This Treaty would serve the interests of the maintenance of peace throughout the world, would reduce international tension, would strengthen friendly relations among States and would be a step towards excluding the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof from the sphere of the arms race. It would bring us closer to attaining the goal of general and complete disarmament. For these reasons, we, together with the other sponsors of the draft resolution, suggest that this carefully prepared document should be approved without further changes and that the depositary Governments should be requested to open it for signature and ratification as soon as possible.

71. As to the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests, the delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic reaffirms its position that agreement on this question can and must be achieved on the basis of the use of national means of detection to verify compliance with such a prohibition. Modern science and technology make it possible, by using sensitive seismological equipment and without any international on-site inspection, to effect reliable verification of compliance with a ban on underground nuclear tests by national means. This view is confirmed by the studies of eminent scientists and supported by the majority of States Members of the United Nations. We regret that, taking advantage of the proposal made last year by Canada for the collection of data on seismic stations, which did not move the question of a ban on underground nuclear tests off dead centre, the opponents of such a ban have come up with another pretext for avoiding the adoption of a political decision on the question. This is also shown by the statement of one of the sponsors of the Canadian proposal, the representative of Australia, who has continued to insist on the need for on-site inspection to make the ban on underground nuclear tests effective.

72. Agreement on the cessation of underground nuclear tests with national means of verification would pave the way for the widest and freest possible exchanges in the field of seismology, of which many delegations have spoken here.

73. The active discussion in recent years of the question of the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons has not been fortuitous. The constant growth of certain countries' stockpiles of chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare and the appearance of more and more destructive types of such weapons are causing legitimate concern throughout the world. According to information published in the West German magazine *Neue Revue*, the United States of America, for example, possesses a large enough quantity of the war gas "GW" to destroy the whole of mankind 30 times over. According to Seymour M. Hersh, author of the book *Chemical and Biological Warfare: America's Hidden Arsenal*,<sup>10</sup> the cost simply of the bases and arsenals where Americans produce these weapons and where work is done on the development of new types of

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. 402 (1961), No. 5778.

<sup>10</sup> The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis, 1968.

weapons is almost \$1,000 million. It is well known that some of these barbarous types of weapon have been used in the past and are being used now. During the First World War, 100,000 persons died and more than one million suffered as a result of the use of these weapons.

74. An example of the application of chemical weapons in our time is South Viet-Nam, where since 1961 defoliants and herbicides have been widely used over huge areas to exterminate people, to destroy vegetation, crops, domestic animals, poultry and sources of food and to poison water supplies. The use of poisonous substances has killed or undermined the health of many people. Whole areas that were once fertile have been turned into barren wastes.

75. It is difficult to imagine now what will be the long-term destructive effects of chemical warfare in Indo-China. The use of chemical substances has led to the destruction of large areas of fruit trees, forests and rubber plantations in Cambodia, causing agricultural production to drop significantly. According to United States scientists who have studied the matter, the consequences of the use of chemical weapons will be felt in Cambodia for 20 years. This was discussed in detail in *The New York Times* on 14 January of this year.

76. Nine socialist States, including the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, have submitted for consideration at the current session of the General Assembly a revised draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons [A/8136]. The draft convention provides that each State Party shall undertake not to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, or equipment or vectors specially designed for the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons as means of warfare. It also provides for the establishment of specific time-limits for the destruction of these weapons and stipulates other measures for the complete removal of chemical and bacteriological weapons from the military arsenals of States.

77. The revised draft convention of the socialist States takes account of the comments and proposals made by many countries at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly and at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament during its spring and summer sessions this year. In particular, it takes account of proposals relating to the control system and the participation of the Security Council in the consideration of complaints concerning breaches of the obligations specified in the Convention and certain other provisions which have already been introduced and explained by sponsors of the draft Convention who have spoken earlier.

78. Taking account of the views of the majority of States, our draft convention provides for the simultaneous and complete prohibition of both chemical and bacteriological weapons. These methods of warfare, as weapons of mass destruction, have always been considered together; this is confirmed by the provisions of the Geneva Protocol of 1925<sup>11</sup> and by authoritative international studies on the

problem, for example, the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations,<sup>12</sup> the conclusions of the group of World Health Organization consultants, the research done by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the documents and resolutions of the General Assembly.

79. It is recognized that the production of chemical weapons and that of bacteriological weapons are closely interrelated. At the present level of scientific development there is such a variety of chemical and bacteriological agents that it is difficult in many cases to determine to which of the two categories a given agent belongs. For this reason, the simultaneous prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons provided for in the draft convention of the nine socialist countries is fully justified from both the political and the technological points of view.

80. The statements of the representatives of the United States of America and the United Kingdom in favour of separate approaches to chemical and bacteriological weapons, and the United Kingdom draft convention for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare alone [A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 2], are actually aimed at undermining the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which prohibits the use in war of all types of chemical and bacteriological weapons. In essence, the effect would be to legalize chemical weapons, facilitate the further accumulation of such weapons by States and increase the danger of the use of such weapons of mass destruction in international conflicts.

81. This being the case, the General Assembly would be acting correctly if it came out in favour of the simultaneous and complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all types of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the elimination of these methods of warfare from the arsenals of States either through their destruction or through their diversion to peaceful uses, as suggested in the draft resolution submitted by Hungary, Mongolia and Poland [A/C.1/L.527].

82. Advocating the complete prohibition and elimination of chemical and bacteriological weapons, we at the same time appeal to all States to become parties to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. This Protocol has served and continues to serve as a deterrent to the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons for military purposes. We note with satisfaction that in recent years still more States have acceded to this agreement, by whose provisions our Republic too is bound. It should be noted, however, that to this day there are States, including some countries which are very important militarily, that have not become Parties to this Protocol. It has taken the United States of America almost 45 years to decide to announce, at the most recent session of the General Assembly, its intention to ratify the Geneva Protocol. A further nine months elapsed before the Protocol was formally submitted to the Senate for consideration. At the same time, President Nixon stated that the prohibition laid down in the Protocol would not apply to tear gas and defoliants, which are used to destroy vegeta-

<sup>11</sup> Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).

<sup>12</sup> *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.I.24).



tion, although in December of last year the United Nations General Assembly emphasized in particular in its resolution 2603 A (XXIV) that the Geneva Protocol embodied the generally recognized rules of international law prohibiting the use in international armed conflicts of all biological and chemical methods of warfare, regardless of any technical developments.

83. In view of the attempts of certain Western countries to interpret the provisions of the Geneva Protocol in a restrictive manner and the generally known facts of its gross violation, we must once again appeal to all States strictly to comply with the purposes and principles of the Geneva Protocol and suggest that all States which have not yet done so should become parties to it.

84. In the discussion of questions of disarmament, just as in the discussion of certain other matters at sessions of the General Assembly, individual delegations often refer to the role of the two "super-Powers", meaning the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. In doing so, they make no distinction between their positions. These two Powers are blamed equally for the lack of agreement on a number of important problems relating to disarmament. In this connexion, it must be observed that there are no grounds or justifications for such an appraisal of the position of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It is impossible to ignore certain generally known facts which prove that the position of one of those Powers is blocking the way to an agreement, while the Soviet Union constantly, consistently and resolutely strives for the adoption of agreed decisions on the most pressing problems of our time, as can be clearly seen from the whole history of the discussion of disarmament questions in the United Nations. To ignore these facts is, in essence, to eschew the search for ways of reaching agreement and to limit consideration of the matter to general statements at a time when such practical steps as the following are required: a factual appraisal of the positions of the Powers on the most important questions, support for international instruments such as the treaties on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the demilitarization of the sea-bed, new efforts to reach agreement on the simultaneous and complete prohibition and elimination of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the elaboration and implementation of other measures leading to general and complete disarmament.

85. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR intends to state its views on the substance of the proposal known as the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament in the course of further discussion in the Committee. However, we must comment now on the attempt of the representative of the Philippines who has spoken here to take advantage of that proposal and set up an artificially complicated and costly working mechanism for the United Nations in the field of disarmament which might undermine the activities of both the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the General Assembly itself.

86. We consider it totally inappropriate to establish a so-called committee of the General Assembly for the Disarmament Decade, whose activities would be either patently useless, at variance with the Charter or an encroachment on the prerogatives of bodies which are

already functioning actively, including the Security Council.

87. Together with the other socialist countries the Byelorussian SSR will continue actively to promote the peaceful coexistence of States with different social systems, will strive to safeguard peace and strengthen international security, will support measures for the limitation of the arms race and for disarmament, will try to ensure that nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction are forever excluded from the life of the human community and will work towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament.

88. Mr. PARDO (Malta) (*interpretation from French*): Not having been able to speak in the plenary of the General Assembly, I wish now to offer the French delegation our most sincere condolences on the death of General de Gaulle, one of the last great statesmen whose thoughts and policies have shaped the present-day world.

89. French above all, General de Gaulle today belongs not only to France but to history. His valour and his moral grandeur stand as an example to all of us and will never be forgotten.

*[The speaker continued in English.]*

90. It is indeed difficult for my delegation to add anything useful to what has already been said, often brilliantly, by the speakers who have preceded me. Nevertheless, I hope that a short statement, notable perhaps only for its frankness, from a delegation representing a country with no power, with no international ambitions and with virtually no arms of any kind, may make a modest contribution to this debate.

91. I wish, first of all, to thank the Secretariat for its always useful work during the current year and for having issued a revised, updated edition of the publication entitled *The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945-1970*.<sup>13</sup> That publication is of great value to my delegation.

92. We have taken note of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*] and we welcome, in this connexion, the declaration submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by the delegation of Yugoslavia [*A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 7*].

93. We should like to express our great appreciation of the useful and patient work of all members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and we note with interest the increased number of working papers and suggestions on various aspects of disarmament which have been submitted to that body. That doubtless reflects the increasing sense of urgency with which progress in the field of disarmament is now being sought. We would in particular wish to congratulate members of the Conference on their agreement on a revised text, more acceptable than that submitted last year to the General Assembly, of the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the

<sup>13</sup> United Nations publication, Sales No.: 70.IX.1.

sea-bed and ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [*ibid.*, annex A].

94. We believe, however, that several of the observations on the draft treaty which we made last year remain valid and are now substantiated by the comments on this subject contained in the *SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament, 1969-1970*,<sup>14</sup> published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), to the effect that the draft treaty is of marginal arms control value and is highly unlikely to contain the spread into the deep ocean of ballistic missile submarines and of their supporting equipment or of the counter-weapons that they have called into being. Nor does the draft treaty deal at all with the question of foreign, non-nuclear military installations on the continental shelves claimed by non-nuclear coastal States. Finally, we have the most serious doubts as to whether the term “weapons of mass destruction” used in the draft is sufficiently precise to be appropriate for use in a formal international instrument dealing with arms control. Our doubts are confirmed by the fact that in the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament, submitted by the delegations of Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia [*ibid.*, annex C, sect. 42], reference is made to the need to define the scope of the term “weapons of mass destruction”. Until the scope of those words have been defined, we believe that their use in a formal international agreement invites future controversy which it may be very difficult to resolve amicably.

95. I also do not propose to comment on the interesting discussion in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on the question of a treaty banning underground nuclear tests or on the problem of the elimination of chemical and biological weapons, a problem which my delegation was the first to present seriously and objectively for the consideration of the United Nations in 1967. No doubt we shall have an opportunity next year to comment on both those questions.

96. My delegation is grateful to the members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for having given detailed attention to the possibility of elaborating a comprehensive programme for the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control in implementation of General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV). We have studied carefully the various suggestions made in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in this connexion, in particular the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament. It is a useful and thoughtful document and we do, of course, support it, but we feel that the chances of implementing most of the elements of the comprehensive programme envisaged in it are slim indeed—first because the decisive influence of contemporary national and ideological conflicts on both strategic and regional arms races is not sufficiently taken into account, and secondly because the broad implications of scientific and technological progress for disarmament negotiations are totally ignored.

97. I am aware, of course, that section IV of the draft programme mentions the “close interrelationship among disarmament, international security, peaceful settlement of

disputes and a climate of confidence”, and that it states that “there should be parallel negotiations in the appropriate forums for the establishment or development of United Nations peace-making machinery and procedures”. But those bland statements, although couched in approved United Nations language, scarcely suggest in an adequate manner the fundamental changes in the policies of States that are required if a comprehensive programme of disarmament, however skilfully drafted, is to have any chance of success.

98. In its working paper on chemical and bacteriological weapons [*ibid.*, sect. 28], the delegation of Czechoslovakia made the point that the question of verification would act as a break on the proposed treaty by bringing in complicated technical problems unless the question of prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons were approached “with a certain degree of trust”. But it is precisely lack of trust, deriving from a deep suspicion of the intentions of others, that is at the root of the strategic arms race. And the strategic arms race itself is but one expression of a global struggle between bitterly hostile ideologies and interests, the nature of which was candidly outlined in the long and extremely important communiqué issued at the conclusion of the International Conference of Communist Parties in Moscow in June 1969. In the circumstances, it is not surprising that there may be considerable reluctance to exhibit on disarmament questions that degree of trust which the delegation of Czechoslovakia rightly believes necessary for the early elimination of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

99. In view of the declared hostilities and deep, pervasive suspicion that are poisoning the contemporary world, sweeping generalized initiatives such as the recent one by mainland China for the complete and immediate elimination of nuclear weapons, or a treaty for the elimination of chemical weapons based mainly on hope and trust, are scarcely likely to achieve their stated purpose, however desirable such initiatives may appear to be for the achievement of other purposes. The fact must be recognized that, as long as the present state of world affairs continues, the conclusion of disarmament and arms control agreements is possible only when the subject matter is of marginal military importance or when the agreements suggested appear balanced and their implementation in practice can be credibly verified. But we know that on-site inspection is not acceptable. Hence at the present time only such balanced arms limitation agreements are possible as can be monitored effectively by methods other than on-site inspection. This inescapable conclusion forces us to study complex technical questions if we are to make any progress at all in the field of arms control, and, on the other hand, sets a limit to our expectations from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), or from the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, unless of course present antagonisms disappear and stated policy objectives are radically changed or anti-military political movements achieve success in the United States and Western Europe.

100. Similar bitter hostilities and fears are at the root of regional arms races, whether in Korea, the Middle East or elsewhere. These reinforce the mutual suspicions of the major Powers, and at the same time they are nourished by a

<sup>14</sup> Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiksell, 1970.

pernicious, but lucrative, traffic in arms on the part of Governments of some technologically advanced countries.

101. The situation I have briefly outlined is no secret, and everybody knows, or should know, that in the present state of the world any progress in the field of disarmament is essentially dependent upon the solution of difficult technical questions. It is therefore rather puzzling that the authors of the otherwise excellent draft comprehensive programme of disarmament paid no attention to the impact of explosive scientific and technological advance on disarmament negotiations.

102. The United Nations is not, never has been, and never can be, an international institute of technology, but total disregard of the broad implications of scientific and technological advance condemns United Nations action to futility, not only because, as Leonid Brezhnev stated, "The scientific and technological revolution has become one of the main sectors of the historic competition between capitalism and socialism", but also because this revolution has a profound impact on the nature and form of the strategic arms race, and hence delimits the field where arms control agreements can usefully be sought under present world conditions.

103. I commented on this subject last year in my statement at the 1706th meeting of the Committee. I shall not repeat my analysis, nevertheless it may be worthwhile mentioning some of the conclusions which I reached.

104. The first of these is that:

"Modern science and modern technology are increasingly ambivalent, in the sense that both scientific and technological advance usually have equally important peaceful and military applications. Indeed in an increasing number of cases the same techniques may be used for peaceful or for military ends. It is only the end-product and sometimes only the use to which the end-product is put, which enables us to distinguish between the two. This is true in the nuclear field, in chemistry, bacteriology or microbiology, in the field of laser technology and in many others." [See 1706th meeting, para. 85.]

In short, virtually all contemporary scientific and technological advance has military applications.

105. Secondly, scientific and technological advance is increasingly threatening the viability of the meagre arms control results achieved to date. Thus, for instance, the long-term viability of the non-proliferation Treaty is threatened not only by well known political factors, including lack of implementation by the signatory nuclear-weapon States of their obligations under the Treaty, but also indirectly by serious technological factors.

106. For example, the closely guarded secret of the technology of uranium enrichment has been pierced. It has been announced that South African scientists have developed a unique new process of uranium enrichment and that the Government of the Republic of South Africa—I quote from an official communiqué—"is prepared to collaborate in the exploitation of this process with any non-communist country desiring to do so". This implies readiness to

disseminate the technology acquired. The development of the ultra-centrifuge process which is being developed co-operatively by the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom is a further potential threat to the Treaty.

107. Both techniques, if they are indeed different, have been developed primarily for peaceful purposes and to take advantage of the growing market for enriched uranium, which may reach \$1,000 million by the end of this decade; nevertheless they have serious implications. My delegation brought this matter to the attention of the General Assembly last year, but there was no response. In February 1970, the Secretary-General suggested to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament that an investigation be initiated on the possible military implications of the gas centrifuge method of uranium enrichment [see CCD/PV.450]; again there was no positive response.

108. Thirdly, technological advance may make it more difficult, in some respects, to conclude further meaningful arms control agreements. I have suggested that effective verification is an essential ingredient of arms control agreements under present world conditions: if verification becomes impossible, meaningful arms control agreements cannot be achieved. Satellites are an important technique of observation and verification; until recently they were invulnerable, but it appears that means may have been found to intercept and destroy them. Should this be the case, the development would have grave implications for future arms control negotiations. Incidentally, it would appear that, until the limits of outer space are defined, destruction by a State of foreign satellites overflying its territory is not contrary to international law.

109. Finally, scientific and technological advance is making possible the emergence of new concepts of weapons such as the pure fusion bomb, which may be near to development, the spectrum or X-ray bomb, which is expected to be an essential element in new ballistic missile defence systems, the neutron bomb and the laser bomb, and also of new classes of weapons that are not easily comprised in the traditional categories of nuclear weapons and conventional weapons.

110. The interesting statement by Dr. Joshua Lederberg [A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 41] discusses some scientific advances in the field of molecular biology and their relevance to the development of new types of biological weapons. My delegation could mention important advances in other scientific fields with highly significant military application, but today I would wish to confine myself to a few remarks on lasers, a subject on which my delegation sponsored a resolution at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly [resolution 2602 D (XXIV)]. We are grateful to the delegation of the Netherlands for having expertly examined the question in a working paper submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 21]; nevertheless we are somewhat disappointed that the conclusion reached was that, although it would be appropriate to follow attentively further developments in this field, the highly speculative character of the conceivable military applications of laser technology does not seem to substantiate the need for arms control consideration at this time.

111. That conclusion appears a little conservative to my delegation, since the supporting data in the working paper do not seem to cover the most recent technological developments. Perhaps I will be permitted briefly to comment on this point without taking up the document in all its details.

112. With regard to communications, for instance, the working paper states that “it is theoretically possible that a great number of messages can be transmitted simultaneously by means of one single laser beam”. That is today more than a theoretical possibility: it is a fact. It has been officially announced that scientists have developed an inexpensive, pocket-sized, reliable and versatile infra-red laser that can produce a light beam capable of carrying hundreds of thousands of telephone calls, or other communication messages. Other scientists have developed a laser that produces a beam capable of carrying more than 70 television channels at the same time; it has been stated that with telescopes the laser beam could transmit almost instantly to a satellite thousands of miles away in space. The first operational application of lasers in telephone communications, a 24-channel 15-mile link-up, was introduced this year in the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic and far more extensive and sophisticated communications systems will be operational in a few years’ time. The working paper further states that the laser designator for air bombardment “has already been tested and used in prototype form”. In fact, it is being used extensively under combat conditions and it is said to have increased bombing accuracy at least tenfold.

113. There are several inaccuracies and omissions with regard to the direct use of lasers as weapons. For instance, lasers have been used to pierce holes in armour not “at several yards” as stated in the document under reference but at several hundred yards. Nor is it stated in the document that, experimentally, lasers have been used to shoot down drone aircraft. With regard to the last sentence in the same paragraph: “A number of difficult technological problems are yet to be solved”, the document omits to state that many of the problems to which reference is made are well on the way to solution. “An even more remote possibility”, it is stated in the next paragraph of the working paper, “might be the use of laser weapons for ballistic missile defence”, and a number of reasons are given why such a development is unlikely to be practical. My delegation does not think that this paragraph of the Netherlands working paper takes adequate account of recent breakthroughs in the development of thermal lasers, which have reached the engineering stage.

114. Finally, while agreeing that “the use of laser technology to set off nuclear weapons” is still in the experimental stage, my delegation would bring to the attention of the Netherlands delegation the conclusions of the Double Kay colloquium last year. These are as follows:

“(a) that substantial developments and breakthroughs in the field of controlled nuclear fusion are in the offing, particularly with regard to the application of intense electron beams and argon-pumped dye lasers;

“(b) that substantial progress on the road towards a mobile, non-fission-induced thermonuclear explosive can

be expected to accompany or evolve inevitably from these peaceful development efforts; and

“(c) that full and immediate exposure and consideration of these developments is indicated if efforts to check the dangers of nuclear weapons and their further spread are to be genuine and effective.”

Since the colloquium, further developments have taken place. I repeat, however, that I agree that by no means all technical problems in this particular field have been solved and that the development of practical laser-triggered thermonuclear weapons should not be expected in the immediate future. Were such weapons to be developed, the Netherlands delegation is, of course, correct to state that articles I and II of the non-proliferation Treaty would continue to apply. However, the safeguard system that is being elaborated by the International Atomic Energy Agency under article III would become largely irrelevant, as well as the obligations undertaken by States parties to the Treaty under article III, paragraph 2.

115. Lasers are one of many examples of the ambivalence of modern technology. There is no doubt that lasers, virtually unknown 10 years ago, are revolutionizing the scientific and industrial world in fields as far apart as communications, holography, construction and art. They are also having a deep and possibly equally revolutionary impact in the military field.

116. Nevertheless, we shall not press our views on this matter at this session of the General Assembly, since it might be indelicate not to follow the traditional practice in disarmament matters whereby the stable door is kept open until the horse has a fair chance to escape before alerting the posse.

117. The history of disarmament plans and negotiations is a history of disappointment; one might even say that the greater the rhetoric expended on this subject at the United Nations and by the Powers directly concerned, the smaller have been the results. The brilliant and far-sighted Baruch plan, which envisaged the creation of an international system for the control of nuclear energy followed by the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, was still-born. It was followed by the Gromyko draft convention, subsequently modified in 1947; by the 1954 Anglo-French plan for comprehensive disarmament, effectively drowned by a flood of other proposals; and by the Khrushchev plan. By 1960 there was general agreement that the objective of negotiations should be general and complete disarmament under effective international control. In 1961 the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States issued a joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations, rapidly followed by an ambitious United States declaration and programme and an equally ambitious Soviet memorandum. The world was given to understand that those plans for paradise would be implemented within 10 years! Subsequent events are known to all. The results of the clamorous propaganda battle of the past 20 years are also known. They are briefly the following.

118. First, there is the 1959 Antarctic Treaty;<sup>15</sup> but who wants to militarize Antarctica?

<sup>15</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 402 (1961), No. 5778.

119. Secondly, there is the 1963 partial test ban Treaty;<sup>16</sup> but what country wants its population to be unnecessarily poisoned by the effect of its own weapons, particularly since nuclear weapon development can proceed equally satisfactorily by way of underground tests?

120. Thirdly, we have the 1967 outer space Treaty;<sup>17</sup> but who is capable now of militarizing Mars or the moon? In any case, outer space has not been defined and it has been tacitly agreed that the fractional orbital bombardment system in which there is some interest does not violate the Treaty because it does not complete a full orbit in space.

121. Fourthly, comes the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco<sup>18</sup> and related Protocols; but the Treaty will remain a dead letter in substance until all the States in the region, including the extraterritorial Powers, have fully acceded to it, and that will not happen in the foreseeable future.

122. Fifthly, there is the ingenious 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*], designed to prevent the emergence of new States—particularly the Federal Republic of Germany—as nuclear-weapon Powers, but which places no limitations whatsoever on existing nuclear-weapon States. Because of this imbalance, the Treaty is fragile. It will only survive if, among many other things, the nuclear-weapon States visibly fulfil their obligations under the Treaty. In any case the significance of the Treaty is being progressively undermined by emerging technologies.

123. All these agreements have been welcomed with pomp and innumerable speeches, but their real significance as measures of arms control is trivial. The United Nations has reacted to proved ineffectiveness in promoting disarmament by actions such as increasing membership in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, proclaiming a Disarmament Decade and a multiplication of resolutions. More rhetoric, more States participating in disarmament negotiations or the creation of new bodies dealing with disarmament problems are not likely to improve the prospects of disarmament. What is required is a new approach.

124. Our traditional approach to disarmament problems is still valid only in the context of conventional weapons. At the strategic level of the major Powers, traditional approaches, even fortified by comprehensive technical knowledge, can yield only marginal arms control agreements: the problem of disarmament at the strategic level is insoluble in the present context, since it is linked inextricably with the wider question of the control of technology for human benefit. But this requires a radically changed approach, not only technical but political, on the part of the Powers directly concerned and indeed on the part of all States, to world questions. The political struggle must be muted; trust must be built and the political basis of trust is fair dealing and the reasonable consideration of the rights of others,

<sup>16</sup> Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

<sup>17</sup> Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (resolution 2222 (XXI), annex).

<sup>18</sup> Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634 (1968), No. 9068).

even when this entails some apparent sacrifice of the national interest. We must identify our goal. This is not merely the prevention of a new world war; as formulated by Dr. Lederberg in his remarks to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the basic question is as follows:

“Can we establish a world order that will, in effect, protect ‘you’, as representatives of the global community, from the subversion of the scientific advances to which my own peers and myself have dedicated their careers?”

125. In this context and perspective, policies such as that of peaceful coexistence are bankrupt, since they maintain and nourish the antagonisms and suspicions which are at the foundation of the arms race and which are accelerating the technology race. The slogan of peaceful coexistence must be replaced by the slogan of peaceful co-operation and a new international law of co-operation must be created to replace destructive competition and freedom of action. In this truly gigantic but most urgent and truly vital task of creating a new world order, the major Powers must lead the way in their own interests as well as ours; otherwise, if we do not perish with a heroic bang, we shall certainly depart from the scene with a whimper, slowly strangled by our own technology.

126. Mr. CHRISTOV (Bulgaria) (*interpretation from French*): The importance of the disarmament problems has been highlighted in the course of this debate and I shall merely recall the words of the Secretary-General, U Thant, who we feel summarized everything and expressed the feelings that are widely shared by all in the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization. After having recalled that the signing of the Charter took place a few days before the explosion of the first atomic bomb, U Thant declared that, since then, “disarmament has been recognized as an essential condition for the survival and well-being of mankind.”<sup>19</sup>

127. A great expert and winner of the Nobel Prize pointed out that in the course of history an enormous number of massacres have occurred and that, if man has still not succeeded in destroying himself, it was because the instruments he used for that end were not sufficiently effective, and it was only that that gave him some chance of surviving the most violent of conflicts. But modern science and technology have changed this entire situation. The second Yearbook published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) tells us, among other things, that there is today a total nuclear stockpile of different categories assessed at approximately 50 thousand megatons, namely, 15 tons of TNT per inhabitant of the world.

128. Thus, 25 years of United Nations existence, 25 years of negotiations that have continued almost unceasingly in the course of that period to stop the nuclear danger, have only led to an accumulation of this terrible capacity of destroying life on the planet.

129. Obviously the picture shown us by reality is frightening. Military budgets gnaw away at the economies of the

<sup>19</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 1A*, para. 17.

majority of countries; astronomical amounts are devoted to the manufacture of increasingly sophisticated weapons and at an insane rate; institutes and specialized laboratories announce that experiments on new and more perfected weapons are being carried out, while millions of human beings are condemned to a slow death, through the inability to satisfy their natural needs.

130. In a number of the general debates in the plenaries of the General Assembly as well as in the debates held here, much has been made of the arms race being one of the main causes of this ill. The Bulgarian delegation agrees with what was said in denouncing this phenomenon and in condemning the nefarious role that it plays in the national life of peoples and in international relations.

131. All that has been said on this matter is perfectly true and, very probably, is far less than the facts warrant because, in the light of the scope of the arms race in our day and its repercussions on all sectors of the political and economic life of peoples, it seems difficult in a few sentences or with a few figures to give a complete picture of the situation.

132. My delegation believes that such a picture cannot be complete, and might give us a distorted idea of reality, unless we remembered that the arms race is not a spontaneous phenomenon, a mysterious disease afflicting all countries. At the root of the matter is a political choice, a political decision, and the arms race is not simply an accumulation of all types of weapon. It is, above all, an instrument at the disposal of the imperialist countries for the achievement of the objectives of their policies.

133. It is true that by a sinister play of domestic mechanisms the control centres of these arms races do exert pressure on the centres where political decisions are taken, but this pressure is exercised in order to ensure the hardening of the political line that is the source of the arms race.

134. The aggressive policy of imperialism is not another slogan of some other time. We might limit ourselves to speaking of the arms race, but we cannot forget that the arms race itself has other names. Today it is also called the war in Viet-Nam and in South-East Asia; provocations on the frontiers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; Israeli aggression in the Middle East; support for the reactionary forces of southern Africa; military bases in foreign territories; NATO plans for the installation of atomic mines along certain frontiers, and so on.

135. But to return to the more specific problems we are discussing here, this policy is also called obstructive to the very idea of disarmament, for disarmament, rather than the stemming of the arms race alone, must be a political choice—namely, not only to put an end to the stockpiling of instruments in support of aggression but also to forgo the desire to impose the imperialist policy characterized by the will to, and desire for, world power.

136. It is precisely along those lines, and in order to reverse the policies of the arms race, that 10 years ago the Soviet Union took the historic initiative of proposing to the world of the atomic era the political choice of general and

complete disarmament under effective and strict international controls.

137. Obviously, the achievement of general and complete disarmament must be surrounded by different technical measures of control and the like, but basically the substantive problem remains that of the political will to embark on a course other than that of the arms race. Today it is obvious that that choice has not been made by one of the parties on whom the solution of the problem of disarmament depends—hence the slowness and relative sterility of the negotiations that have taken place at different levels.

138. Instead of that indispensable decision, two trends have become apparent: first the tendency to place in the forefront of the debate technical problems, even to the point of substituting them for the political problems, and next the tendency to do nothing that might truly lead to the halting or slowing-down of the arms race.

139. On the strength of what I have just said, I should like to comment on two of the items on our agenda today, in particular the question entitled “Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests” and also the question of “Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons”.

140. Those two problems have for a number of years been studied in great detail in all their aspects. The results show to many of the delegations in the United Nations and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, as also to the highest representatives of science, that the two problems are now ripe for a positive solution and should no longer present insurmountable technical difficulties.

141. From the point of view of disarmament, those two problems do have certain characteristics that force us to take a great interest in them. Today, underground tests constitute one of the most acute and dangerous forms of the arms race, namely the perfection of nuclear weapons. It is obvious that the objectives sought in the field of other weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological weapons, are the same. We believe that the solution of both problems can today demonstrate and test the goodwill of all concerning the ending of the arms race. As a measure of disarmament, a decision on this point would clear the way to new progress. But we know what happened: the discussions in Geneva on the prohibition of underground tests have constantly come up against the immutable obstacle of control. Despite scientific progress in the detection and identification of seismic phenomena, and despite the oft-repeated opinions of specialists on the matter, that national means of detection are sufficient to guarantee that any treaty, if concluded, can be respected, the position of the United States delegation has remained unchanged for many years. That is characteristic of the technical approach to a problem which, when political will and decision are lacking, is allowed to hamper efforts made in one of the most important spheres of activity, namely the bringing of the arms race to a halt. On that point I should like to recall the opinion of a group of experts voiced at the recent Pugwash conference,<sup>20</sup> which has

<sup>20</sup> Twentieth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, held at Fontana, Wisconsin, in September 1970.

already been cited here. There was consensus in the group on the fundamental idea that the problems of the application of the Moscow Treaty<sup>21</sup> to underground tests are mainly political and that the technical problems and those of verification are not the main obstacle.

142. I should now like to speak of another very important problem: chemical and bacteriological weapons. Certain Western Powers try to delay the solution of this problem, if not make it impossible, by setting up the same impediment of technical difficulties. Furthermore, the problem of verification in this case is adduced so that chemical weapons will be treated separately from biological ones.

143. Last year, nine socialist countries including Bulgaria submitted a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons.<sup>22</sup> To supplement that draft, the delegations of Hungary, Mongolia and Poland on 4 April 1970 submitted a new working paper containing an amendment to the draft convention of the socialist countries [A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 14].

144. The problem was discussed very thoroughly and a number of working papers on the subject were submitted to the Committee. The 12 non-aligned members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament presented a joint memorandum [*ibid.*, sect. 39] on 25 August 1970.

145. The discussion showed that the majority of the members of the Committee felt that the problems of chemical and bacteriological weapons should be treated simultaneously, contrary to the proposals of the United Kingdom and the United States. We believe those proposals tend to set chemical weapons apart and it is clear that they seriously endanger the validity of the Geneva Protocol.<sup>23</sup>

146. Thus a clear-cut desire has been expressed for speedy action to solve the urgent problem in order to complement the existing prohibitions set forth in the Geneva Protocol by also prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

147. Bearing in mind the views expressed by a number of delegations, the socialist countries prepared a revised draft, on the basis of last year's draft and bearing the same title, and submitted it to members of the Committee in document A/8136. This new draft has been commented on here, particularly by the representatives of Hungary [1754th meeting], Mongolia [1753rd meeting], and Poland and the Soviet Union [1748th meeting].

148. I should like very briefly to make some comments regarding the problem of verification. As in the case of

underground tests, the Western Powers are trying to make this problem the stumbling-block on the road to the liquidation of the threat inherent in chemical and bacteriological weapons. It is clear, however, that the solution cannot be made subject to certain difficulties, real or imaginary. It must be found by political decisions at the governmental level. If such decisions and the will to carry them out exist, we can quite confidently depend on the imagination and spirit of invention of specialists to find ways of organizing national and international systems of verification adapted to all circumstances—not only for the manufacture of chemical and biological products but also to the means of delivery of chemical and biological weapons and methods of carrying out chemical and biological warfare.

149. But certain working papers submitted in Geneva by the delegations of the United Kingdom and the United States have left the impression that their aim is not to propose or facilitate the solution of the problems even in the more restrictive framework in which they try to place them, namely the pure technical one, but, on the contrary, to prove how difficult, if not impossible, verification can be.

150. There can be no denying the urgent necessity of prohibiting the development, manufacture and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons, and of their destruction. These are measures that are called for as much for removing and doing away with one of the worst dangers looming over the world, as for encouraging true measures of disarmament and setting in motion the process of stemming the arms race and the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction.

151. I wish now to say a few words concerning the draft treaty prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor [A/8059-DC/233, annex A]. The Bulgarian delegation approves and supports that draft. We are gratified indeed by the good work done by the Committee on Disarmament in this matter and we are satisfied to note the co-operation that enabled the negotiations successfully to proceed, and the spirit of compromise that prevailed so that a draft was produced that places the entire question within the framework and the perspectives of disarmament. I am thinking specifically of the express obligations contained in article V of the draft treaty, under the terms of which the parties commit themselves to continue negotiations in good faith on new measures of disarmament in order to prevent the arms race from being extended to the sea-bed.

152. The Bulgarian delegation hopes that this draft will commend itself both to our Committee and to the General Assembly at this twenty-fifth session, so that it may be open for signature at the earliest possible moment. Approval of this draft treaty by the General Assembly, as the Foreign Minister of Bulgaria stated on 21 October during the commemorative session [1876th plenary meeting], would constitute an important step towards ensuring the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in an environment that covers two thirds of the surface of the globe.

153. When in 1959 on the initiative of the Soviet Union the General Assembly adopted resolution 1378 (XIV)

<sup>21</sup> Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

<sup>22</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda items 29, 30, 31 and 104, document A/7655.

<sup>23</sup> Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).

concerning general and complete disarmament, this problem was declared to be one of the most important of our day. Developments since that time have proved the truth of that statement. This problem has remained, and, for obvious reasons, we can say that it is at the present time more than ever the key problem in international relations and for world peace and security.

154. It is, in our view, comforting to note that the idea of general and complete disarmament is enjoying today a renewed timeliness, both here in the General Assembly and in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and that throughout the world there flows an ever-stronger current of public opinion in its favour. The Bulgarian delegation follows this development with the greatest attention and stands ready to give its support to all initiatives for exploring all possible ways of reaching that goal. It is in that spirit that we view the various drafts and proposals that have been offered, such as the documents submitted by Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia [A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 42], or the proposals submitted by the Socialist Republic of Romania concerning a study of the economic and social consequences of the arms race [A/7994].

155. What has thus far been achieved in the field of disarmament is, without doubt, far from all that remains to be done. Furthermore, the present international situation is not such as to encourage facile optimism. Still, despite the existing difficulties and the complexity of the international situation, the questions involved in disarmament appear in such a way in the world of today that, in our view, they may count on the assistance of a series of very encouraging circumstances.

156. The first of these circumstances is found in the talks being held in Helsinki between the Soviet Union and the United States on the limitation of strategic arms, both offensive and defensive. My delegation endorses the hopes expressed here that that dialogue will lead to the results that the entire world is awaiting. The significance of a possible positive outcome needs no emphasizing. It would open up new perspectives toward wider negotiations on nuclear disarmament, with the participation of all nuclear Powers, it being obvious that questions in this field, as in all areas of disarmament, can be resolved only within the framework of such negotiation and with the participation of all nuclear Powers.

157. Another reason for hope is that general and complete disarmament more than ever offers us perhaps the only way out of the stalemate in which imperialist policy of the arms race has kept the world's peoples. The basic argument of those who approve and enforce that policy has always been that its purpose was to strengthen their defence and guarantee their security. But everyone knows the result: it has produced a feeling of generalized insecurity. And without wishing to play with words, it can be stated that that feeling grows as the stockpiles of increasingly destructive weapons grow.

158. This phenomenon, as I just said, has created a current of opinion in favour of disarmament as the only possible way of ensuring any genuine security.

159. It is the duty of our Committee to do all it can to swell that current of opinion by affording to the Committee on Disarmament the necessary instruments for speeding up its work. We believe that the Committee can do this by adopting resolutions on the strength of which the Committee in Geneva can succeed in resolving certain problems that are ripe for solution, such as, for example, the total and complete prohibition of chemical and biological weapons.

160. The pending problems of disarmament are of the utmost importance, the urgency for their solution is most pressing, and what is at stake is the future of the world. We prefer to believe that the United Nations will find a way to devote greater efforts to them than it has in the past.

161. Mr. HARMON (Liberia): Before proceeding with my statement, permit me, on behalf of the Liberian delegation, to join our many colleagues in expressing great pleasure at your unanimous election to the chairmanship of this important Committee. Your past record in the United Nations and your activities on behalf of your great Government and people are too well known for me to attempt to recount some of them; but be assured of our continuing and fullest co-operation during your tenure to make this session an historic and successful one.

162. I also wish to express congratulations to our brother and fellow African, Mr. Farah of Somalia, our Vice-Chairman, and to our personal and esteemed friend, Mr. Černík of Czechoslovakia, our Rapporteur. To the entire Secretariat and the translators go our grateful thanks for their devotion and untiring efforts in facilitating the work of this Committee.

163. Since today is the day on which a great soldier-hero, world statesman and lover of men and of freedom is being interred, former President Charles de Gaulle of France, the Liberian delegation wishes to take note of this and to express its deep and personal sorrow at his sudden passing. His demise has left the world, torn apart as it is in strife, with its rich memory of him as the last of those stalwart surviving heroes of the Second World War, one who fought even up to the moment of his death for freedom and the equality of men. Succeeding generations will remember throughout history these legendary and great men. Even though they die and physically are no more, their memory will go on for ever.

164. Having given very serious thought to the whole question under debate before us, and the great importance which my Government attaches to such questions as disarmament, I should like to explain our slight deviation from the practice of going into detail and making a statement of position on each of the items by endeavouring to speak to the Committee in a positive way and on a note of great optimism, reminding us all of the real issues which face us. I once more call upon the smaller nations to try to come to grips with a very complex situation from a realistic and sympathetic point of view, bearing in mind the inherently difficult problems of sovereignty that are involved. Let us pursue our discussion with seriousness of purpose. Let us do nothing here that would delay or jeopardize the negotiations and the important debates which are now taking place. The world is in imminent danger, and all of us must devote ourselves to trying to



convey a sense of justice and concern to the super-Powers and developed nations of the world, not by castigating them, but by appealing to their sense of world brotherhood to improve man's condition so that international life, internal security and peace among most nations may eventually be achieved.

165. We have listened with great interest to the carefully thought out and developed statements by preceding speakers on the question of disarmament and its consequences. Some speakers have expressed the views of my delegation, but what has given us great encouragement is the fact that, significantly, in launching the Disarmament Decade we have also celebrated the first quarter of a century of the founding of the United Nations. Consequently and significantly, never before in history were so many Heads of State and Government assembled in any one country, at any one time, as was the case during the observance of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations. I must therefore pause and extend heartfelt congratulations to the Secretary-General and all those who gave birth to the idea and made that possible. The presence and statements of those world leaders will have added greatly to the renewal of our faith in the United Nations and urge us to genuinely accept our responsibilities, which we owe not only to the future of this Organization, but to the entire world. The commitments which were made by those respective world leaders cannot but give us what we so vitally needed at the beginning of this second milestone.

166. Over the past years, we have spent considerable time reading and following up technical data and other reports that have been compiled and written. There have been long sessions and discussions by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Most of them have been rather encouraging and have expressed the genuine concern and desires of many Governments in encouraging continued debate and negotiation on complete disarmament and the control or elimination of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. It is hoped that we may eventually be able to reach the point of concluding a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons.

167. Going through the report of the Conference on the Committee on Disarmament [A/8059-DC/233] one is greatly encouraged by the tremendous effort made by this Committee and the co-operation it received from Member countries. The Liberian delegation would like to give wholehearted support to the importance of full implementation of the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex] and, in particular, article VI, concerning further negotiations on effective measures relating to the cessation, by nuclear Powers, of the nuclear arms race, and to disarmament.

168. The various amendments to the United Kingdom revised draft convention for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare [A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 2] and the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, and on the destruction of such weapons submitted by the nine socialist coun-

tries<sup>24</sup> and the recommendation put forward by Japan, among others, that a group of experts study technical aspects of verification for the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, and that of the United States on the relationship between the production of chemical agents for war and the production of chemicals for peaceful purposes by the chemical industry [*ibid.*, sect. 12], should all be fully explored, bearing in mind also that the USSR delegation emphasized the necessity of an urgent prohibition of both bacteriological (biological) and chemical weapons.

169. Echoing the words of the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [*ibid.*, annex A], let me say that all nations, regardless of size, have a common interest in the survival of mankind. A treaty on general and complete disarmament, under strict and effective control, will not only renew our faith in the dignity of man, but very definitely reduce the tension and growing fear under which many nations and people live today. As the United Nations embarks on its second quarter of a century with the Second United Nations Development Decade, let us pay tribute to that Decade by building up a feeling of good faith and confidence among men everywhere. Let not generations still unborn charge that we have committed a breach of faith and deprived them of a life which, but for our folly, could have been made glorious and peaceful for them.

170. We were all very pleased when the USSR, realizing the consequences involved, took the initiative and introduced at the twenty-fourth session an appeal calling for the strengthening of international peace and security.<sup>25</sup> That initiative on the part of the USSR is most welcome and, we hope, will be unanimously endorsed by the General Assembly at the beginning of this decade as a historic step in endeavouring to build up the type of confidence to which I previously referred.

171. In further support of that great initiative, we all welcome the historic statement of President Nixon, when he spoke during the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations and emphasized that:

“The fate of more than three and a half billion people today rests on the realism and candour with which we approach the great issues of war and peace, of security and progress, in this world that together we call home.”  
[1882nd plenary meeting, para. 43.]

He went on further to say:

“I invite the leaders of the Soviet Union to join us in taking that new road—to join in a peaceful competition, not in the accumulation of arms, but in the dissemination of progress; not in the building of missiles, but in waging a winning war against hunger and disease and human misery in our own countries and around the globe. Let us

<sup>24</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda items 29, 30, 31 and 104, document A/7655.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, agenda item 103, document A/7903, para. 7.

compete in elevating the human spirit, in fostering respect for law among nations and in promoting the works of peace. In this kind of competition, no one loses and everyone gains." [*Ibid.*, para. 61.]

172. With the initiative of the USSR in introducing the appeal for the strengthening of international peace and security, and with President Nixon, speaking for the United States Government, challenging the USSR to be realistic and to join in effective measures of co-operation, we are more hopeful than a year ago that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) going on at present in Helsinki—and which Mr. Smith, the Head of the United States delegation, in a press interview reported last Tuesday described as "serious, meaningful and effective" saying that he was satisfied as to their progress—are worth more than almost all our efforts to attempt to force an earlier solution of this delicate and most intricate question. We pray that positive results will emerge so as to reverse the strategic arms race and thereby open up new areas for other measures of nuclear disarmament that are now on dead centre. Once this situation is clear, as I pointed out in my last year's statement [*1696th meeting*], in which I addressed myself to the two super-Powers in the form of an appeal, we can then all move towards collateral measures actually to ensure general and complete disarmament and some form of international control; but that will have to be done in stages and the process must allow the nuclear Powers to be constantly reminded by world opinion of their sacred duty to man, without trying to force their hand.

173. In my long experience in Government, and at international and other levels, I have never tried to be a pessimist. My whole outlook is always realistic and optimistic, yet cautious; and in looking at the situation from an analytical point of view, man's survival, his life and property are our first and prime responsibility; like man himself nations are controlled by men. The security factor is one which most nations seek to preserve under their own sovereignty and I would, therefore, say to all of my colleagues and friends here in the First Committee that what we seek first and foremost is a united, sober effort to bring nations, large and small, together on the basic and fundamental principle of the Fatherhood of God and brotherhood of man. While there will always be ideological differences, yet the basic theme should be that of man's kinship to man.

174. If we digress a little it is, in particular, to reply to the conclusion reached by some delegations that we have not made much progress. That may be true to some degree, but I would differ strongly and say that we must not fail to register our commendation and sincere recognition of the efforts of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, since I believe that the joint submission by the USSR and the United States of America on 1 September 1970 of a draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed—a great achievement indeed, in the opinion of my delegation—resulted from the efforts, debates and discussions that ensued in that Committee. We would therefore strongly urge all of us working together to give it our fullest support and we hope that it will be adopted as further clear evidence of concern for the human race. The implementa-

tion of such a treaty would be a first step in enabling us to ensure the reservation of the sea-bed for peaceful purposes.

175. Let me once again emphasize that our highest priority should be continuing negotiations year after year in this First Committee, by all members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament as well as on all other strategic arms limitation talks now proceeding along serious lines in a quest for permanent world peace.

176. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament did make marked progress in several directions and it should be encouraged to continue its work. To mention only a few important achievements, it succeeded in negotiating a satisfactory draft treaty to prevent the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and I join other delegations in calling for almost unanimous support and endorsement of the draft treaty by this Committee; a great deal of extensive work was also done on the problems of chemical and biological weapons. I wish to thank all the member countries which made substantial contributions to the work of the Conference and especially the Mexican, Swedish and Yugoslav delegations for their valuable contribution, which in the opinion of our delegation is constructive and merits our consideration. I also thank those who have contributed working papers that have given some of us a broad insight into problems which, I admit, are inherently difficult to solve until the super-Powers have worked out a *modus operandi* and agree to coexist.

177. The draft treaty now before us makes provision for verification procedures, a matter of concern to many nations.

178. The entry into force of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty is already beginning to have a decided influence on the international scene and will assuredly assist further in eventually imposing certain limitations on, and containing the nuclear threat. We call upon all countries with technological capability to produce nuclear weapons to permit their responsibility to mankind to influence man's great desire for a better world of understanding and universality. That approach would also enable those nations to undertake more constructive projects in peaceful advancement.

179. Let us therefore start this Disarmament Decade on a note of confidence and great optimism and be willing to unite our efforts for the good of the world.

180. Last year my delegation joined in sponsoring the Canadian draft resolution and, happily, we, together with 29 other countries at this point, are sponsoring a new draft [*A/C.1/L.529*] this year. We again congratulate Canada on its initiative and recommend the adoption of the draft resolution.

181. The suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests while the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are continuing is recommended by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament as an interim measure. If it proves effective, this again will come as a great relief to most humanitarian and peace-loving countries like my own.

182. The voice of world public opinion is strongly admonishing us to heed the warnings that the human race is being threatened and that genuine and sincere efforts should continue to be made to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the renewal of our duty to ourselves to seek to inspire world confidence through those who hold the balance of power in their hands.

183. Today, as we look upon the past, we are compelled to conclude that the climate for the promotion of lasting international peace and security among nations and peoples is at hand. In this Disarmament Decade we should once and for all commit ourselves to the basic human problem of eradicating human misery, disease and ignorance; in this advanced technological age we should join in helping the Decade to merit its name and have history so record it.

184. Disarmament and all of its ramifications will always remain our highest priority and concern. Small and developing nations will continue to remain at the mercy of the strong and powerful. Our voices must continue to be raised, but in moderation, for equal justice and human dignity. Our civilization and the environment in which we live, regardless of geographical separation, have all come together with the founding of the United Nations. We enjoy sovereignty, but in order to be able to press for that full recognition, growth and economic power, we must plan and live together. Economic and social consequences must be established within the framework of the international community, and when this has been done, the fear that separates and divides us will disappear gradually.

185. The implementation of treaties, whether involving military issues, commerce and trade or any other subject, will be less difficult. International protocols and other safeguards by which problems of disarmament and their effect on world peace can best be guaranteed are, in my delegation's opinion, the surest means of achieving and maintaining complete disarmament.

186. That is the kind of atmosphere we need before we can expect more meaningful progress in disarmament and other arms controls. We must therefore insist that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament either be

broadened or given greater latitude to continue its work. Our goal in this Disarmament Decade is to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons among countries which do not now possess them. The initiative of the Latin American countries in declaring their area a nuclear-free zone is to be highly commended and, hopefully, my continent, Africa, will follow that lead.

187. Let us all give wholehearted support to our Secretary-General, who is one of the greatest champions of arms control and the concluding of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. We all hope that he will heed the clarion call and accept another term of office. He enjoys the fullest respect and confidence of the international community and it is he who can carry us a long way towards our goal.

188. In our opinion, spending more than \$200,000 million yearly in the frantic arms race neither ensures the complete security of nations engaged in that race nor gives comfort to a world crying out for peace and security.

189. Finally, as we conclude the debate here in the First Committee on disarmament and related subjects, let me remind my colleagues that there is an ever-increasing awareness among all peoples of the world of the great danger of a nuclear war. My Government has, throughout its history, adhered strictly to the principles of international law and has advocated respect for the sovereignty of States. We renew here our abiding faith in those principles and pledge our fullest support for their promotion, and we will vote for the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.523.

190. With justice, peace and progress in mind, let us face the future with greater awareness and respect for the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter.

191. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Liberia, on behalf of the officers of the Committee, Ambassadors Farah and Černík, and on my own behalf, for his words of congratulations.

*The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.*