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GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. OGBU (Nigeria): Ten years ago, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was created with the aim of arresting the ever-growing armament race among the world's major Powers. Seeing that not much progress was made in the period of the life of the Committee on Disarmament the General Assembly in resolution 2602 E (XXIV) proclaimed the 1970s the Disarmament Decade, hoping that there would be a greater willingness on the part of nations to turn their attention away from the wasteful expenditure on armaments to more productive channels. Today we still continue to witness the ever-increasing production and stockpiling of more sophisticated weapons of mass destruction, and no end to the balance of terror is in sight.

2. Indeed, the arms race continues virtually unabated, heavily taxing the economies of countries and putting a dangerous brake on economic and social progress. This continuing development of sophisticated and more and more perfected man-killers no doubt poses dangerous threats to international peace and security, seriously disturbing any conceivable equilibrium in international relations. The situation is most unfortunate, besides being rather depressing.

3. Be that as it may, hope must not be abandoned. We should only feel disappointed but not despondent. Nigeria therefore joins all men of goodwill in calling upon all Governments to renew their determination to make concrete progress towards the elimination of the arms race and the achievement of the final goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

4. Gloomy as the situation may be, we should draw solace and encouragement from a number of favourable developments in world trends in recent times since such developments should not only brighten our hopes but should also reinforce our confidence and stimulate our efforts in seriously and earnestly seeking possibilities of attaining further marked results in the field of disarmament and world peace.

5. Efforts of the recent past in disarmament negotiations have not been totally unrewarding. They have been fairly

rewarded by the emergence of a number of important international agreements on collateral measures of non-armament. Most significant among such agreements include the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water,¹ the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*] of 1968 and the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof [*resolution 2660 (XXV) annex*]. It is the hope of my delegation that during the current session the General Assembly will accord its blessing to the first true disarmament measures. I am referring to the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction [*A/8457, annex A*] recently negotiated by the Committee of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

6. These are small but, nevertheless, significant beginnings whose importance lies in our hope that they will spur mankind in general, and disarmament negotiations in particular, into greater and more serious efforts in their earnest and ceaseless endeavour to build a peaceful world without arms.

7. Disarmament talks in the past have been restricted in scope in terms of the number of active participants. France has so far not found itself able to take its rightful place at the disarmament negotiating table in Geneva. Regrettably, its vacant seat still remains unoccupied. Similarly, the Government of the People's Republic of China has long remained conspicuously excluded from the scene of disarmament negotiations. It is for this reason, among others, that Nigeria whole-heartedly welcomes the presence of the People's Republic of China in the world assembly for the first time at this session. My delegation hopes that the People's Republic of China will assume the important role that it is expected to play within the world community in all spheres of the Organization's activities, particularly in the field of disarmament and international peace and security.

8. The bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the Soviet Union and the United States have remained virtually secret and exclusive. Nevertheless, the reported results recently achieved between the two super-Powers in their negotiations are not only encouraging but also promise better prospects for further progress. We earnestly urge the two super-Powers to continue their joint efforts and seek wider areas of agreement and to urgently come to terms between themselves for the survival of mankind. In the same strain, my delegation strongly appeals to them to refrain from keeping the anxious world community in the dark about the actual content and progress of their negotiations.

9. We still witness, horror-stricken, the existence of tension spots the world over. Such spots no doubt continue to threaten international peace and security seriously. In this connexion, however, the Nigerian delegation is happy to note the current progress that is being made in the normalization of relations in Europe. Sincere efforts along

this line must continue. We also take full note of the important disarmament proposals recently advanced by the Soviet Union. In principle, we welcome the formulation of such proposals and we look forward, in good faith, to similar proposals from appropriate quarters other than that of the Soviet Union, so that all may work together to achieve our common goal of peace, perfect peace, in our world.

10. I now turn my attention to some comments on the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament as contained in document A/8457.

11. No doubt the most astounding achievement of the Conference during its 1970 session has been the serious negotiation in the spirit of give and take, and the final submission to the General Assembly of a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction.

12. In a general sense, the Conference deserves the commendation of this Committee and, indeed, of the General Assembly for the emergence of this vital document, partial though the measures involved may be. On the other hand, I am certain that a good number of the members of the world community will feel somewhat disappointed by the fact that it has not been possible for the Conference to come up with a convention simultaneously banning both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons from the arsenals of States as earlier envisaged.

13. It will be recalled that Nigeria, as one of the sponsors of the joint memorandum of 25 August 1970 by the group of 12 non-aligned countries on the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare,² supported the position that negotiation on the two methods of warfare should proceed simultaneously since the two types of weapons constitute a whole and have been recognized as such. This basic approach of the non-aligned countries to which the Nigerian delegation strongly subscribed was actually commended by the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session [*resolution 2662 (XXV)*] before finally requesting the Committee on Disarmament to continue its consideration of the problem with a view to urgently prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of both weapons and their elimination from the arsenals of all States.

14. This was the course that was religiously pursued by the Nigerian delegation in concert with other non-aligned members of the Committee on Disarmament at the disarmament conference table in Geneva. In the face of the impasse caused by the irreconcilable positions of the socialist, the NATO and the non-aligned countries, members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, it became evident that genuine hope of achieving any substantial progress in the negotiations that have been going on for more than two years on the banning of these two deadly weapons would end up as a dream, the realization of which would have to be pushed forward indefinitely. However, on 30 March 1971, in an abrupt shift of position, the Soviet

¹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964.

² *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1970*, document DC/233, annex C, sect. 39.

Union, on behalf of the socialist members of the Committee, presented a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins and on their destruction [A/8457, annex C, sect. 8] to open the way again for further negotiations. This was a major turning point.

15. The Nigerian delegation in Geneva has already placed on record the motivating factors of the Nigerian Government's reluctant acquiescence in this new trend and I would not wish at this moment to take much of the Committee's time to reiterate those details. Suffice it to say that my Government, like many others, was forced by circumstances to dispense with an "all-or-nothing" attitude and to shift from the ideal to the pragmatic in the full realization of the fact that "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush". After more than two years of nearly fruitless negotiations, the Nigerian Government became rather wary of seeing the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament coming to this twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly virtually empty-handed.

16. In addition to these considerations, circumstances that prevailed in Geneva following the submission of the Soviet draft were such that prospects of a successful negotiation in the spirit of give and take were held out. Indeed, such bright prospects encouraged participation on the part of the non-aligned members of the Committee resulting in a working paper [*ibid.*, sect. 23] containing suggestions on desirable changes in the revised draft convention. The non-aligned group's working paper stressed, among other things, the absolute need to link up both chemical and biological weapons. It also laid considerable emphasis on the fact that an agreement on the elimination of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons represents a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures for complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the determination to continue negotiations to that end.

17. The working paper also suggested the inclusion of an additional preambular paragraph:

"Affirming the principle that a substantial portion of the savings derived from measures in the field of disarmament should be devoted to promoting economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries."

18. Finally, the group suggested the redrafting of the operative article on the link between chemical and biological weapons to state that each State party to this convention "accepts the principle of complete prohibition of chemical weapons".

19. It is gratifying to note that most of these suggestions are already accommodated in the new draft.

20. In the opinion of my delegation, the draft now submitted for the approval of the General Assembly has much to commend it. The paragraphs of the preamble, for instance, quite satisfactorily cover a number of related aspects of great importance to my delegation. Its concur-

rent references to chemical as well as biological and toxin weapons, its emphasis on the importance and urgency of eliminating both types of weapons from the arsenals of States, its recognition of the outstanding significance of the Geneva Protocol of 1925,³ the expressed reaffirmation of adherence to its principles and objectives and the call on all States to comply strictly with them, and finally, its emphasis on the determination of the parties to the convention to exclude completely the possibility of the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins as weapons—all these fulfil the desire and meet with the satisfaction of my delegation.

21. The operative paragraphs similarly contain very significant articles of tremendous satisfaction to the Nigerian delegation. Most speakers before me have already lauded the appropriateness and adequacy of these articles. To save time I shall therefore limit myself to two of the most significant aspects. First, the use of the words "never in any circumstances" contained in article I seems to me to have closed a hitherto dangerous loop-hole by making it impossible for any State party to the convention to formulate reservations besides nullifying all previous reservations to the Geneva Protocol concerning the use of bacteriological (biological) weapons. Secondly, the affirmation contained in article IX of the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and the solemn undertaking to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement in this regard represents a major commitment that underscores the importance of the most desired link between effective solutions to the question of chemical and biological weapons.

22. The Nigerian delegation is deeply gratified to see this link fixed and closely knit. We nurse the earnest hope that serious efforts on the banning of chemical weapons will follow immediately before the link becomes weak and rotten. We are firmly convinced that the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction represents only a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on a similar prohibition in the case of chemical weapons. Indeed, it is a partial measure that requires urgent follow-up action in order that the ultimate goal may be achieved. We should not allow this convention on the banning of biological weapons to suffer the fate of its predecessor in the partial measure category. I call to mind the Moscow Treaty of 1963 which to this day still woefully fails to live up to expectations. I therefore commend to this Committee draft resolution A/C.1/L.581, sponsored by the non-aligned countries, on the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and earnestly seek widespread support for its spirit and content.

23. We are faced with the awful and staggering revelations of gigantic waste contained in the invaluable and highly commended report of the Secretary-General on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race [A/8469 and Add.1]. As I said earlier in my statement, the continuing arms race seriously taxes the economies of

³ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138).

countries, putting a dangerous brake on economic and social progress. Besides, we all recognize the draft convention on biological weapons as the first disarmament measure ever taken. It is a cardinal achievement. In the opinion of my delegation, this is the most opportune moment for us to re-emphasize the link that should be made between disarmament and economic development. In the circumstances, we fully support the amendment submitted by a number of non-aligned countries to the effect that a new tenth paragraph of the preamble be inserted in the convention:

“Affirming the principle that a substantial portion of the savings derived from measures in the field of disarmament should be devoted to promoting economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries.” [A/C.1/L.582.]

It is our fervent hope that the suggested inclusion will receive the favourable consideration of other delegations.

24. My comments on the other items of our agenda will be rather brief, not because they are less important items but simply because most speakers have hit the nail on the head and I agree with them in general.

25. On the question of the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests, the Nigerian delegation feels disappointed that an agreement has so far not been reached, although considerable background work has been done. While we appreciate the urgency for a comprehensive test ban treaty, we also realize that the question of inspection constitutes the greatest obstacle to an agreement. In the circumstances, the Nigerian delegation will continue to support the proposal for establishing a worldwide seismic data exchange which will, to a certain extent, remove the necessity for intrusive on-site inspection. We also feel that, given the present development in seismic detection capability, it may be suggested that a ban on a certain category of testing under a seismic level—an idea which we are not opposed to, in principle—can now be negotiated. However, there is the danger that such a measure can only produce a limitation on the lesser category of nuclear weapons and not affect the heavier strategic arms. This will then further widen the weapons gap generally and, in particular, further underscore the nuclear “terror”.

26. It goes without saying that substantial action on this important aspect of disarmament is being unduly delayed. The Nigerian delegation fully subscribes to the joint memorandum on a comprehensive test ban treaty [A/8457, annex C, sect. 34] submitted to the Conference on Disarmament by nine non-aligned countries, members of the Committee. We urge immediate action leading to agreement in the interest of humanity. We believe that, on the technical side, sufficient material is available for immediate negotiations to be embarked upon. What is regrettably lacking is the political will to move ahead. All nuclear Powers should, and are hereby requested to, take the necessary political decision to make the way clear for an agreement. My delegation believes that where there is a will there is a way.

27. The Nigerian delegation appreciates and commends the rather constructive role of the International Atomic

Energy Agency in the peaceful application of nuclear energy for the welfare of Member States, as well as the Agency’s emphasis on technical assistance activities. We also commend the expeditious and efficient manner in which the Agency has evolved the structure and content of agreements between it and the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in accordance with article III of the Treaty. All that notwithstanding, the Nigerian delegation would like to see greater emphasis placed on the Agency’s technical assistance activities, especially in the fields of agriculture, engineering, medicine and health. To this end, the Special Fund and the technical assistance components of the United Nations Development Programme should provide more resources for the application of nuclear science and techniques in the above fields, particularly in developing countries, so as to raise standards in agriculture, engineering, medicine and so on in that category of countries.

28. General and complete disarmament under effective international control is our ultimate goal. Efforts towards this desirable goal should be sustained in various ways. In all that we do in this regard, I wish to assure the Committee of the co-operation of the Nigerian Government in all earnest endeavours to rid our world of the scourge of war and the arms race.

29. On this Thanksgiving Day we thank God for the little progress that we have made so far.

30. Mr. SEATON (United Republic of Tanzania): As this is the first time that the delegation of Tanzania is speaking in this Committee since the arrival of the authentic representatives of China in this Committee, I must express my delegation’s appreciation that the First Committee will now hear, after such a long delay, the authentic voice of the Chinese people. We are convinced that progress in disarmament will now receive a fresh stimulus as a result of the contributions of the Chinese delegation.

31. I shall limit my statement this morning to two items. First I shall speak on item 28 relating to the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and then I shall address myself briefly to item 98 relating to the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. My delegation reserves the right to speak on the other items on the agenda relating to disarmament at a later stage if circumstances so necessitate.

32. This year, as has happened for several years past, the General Assembly is participating in its annual ceremonial ritual on disarmament. The first part of this ritual is performed in Geneva, where representatives of 25 nations—including some but not all of the technologically most advanced and therefore militarily most potent—gather at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to receive and digest the latest contribution of the world’s two most powerful nations towards the achievement of universal and complete disarmament.

33. I have said that they receive and digest, but the process of digestion must necessarily be hurried, because usually they are not presented with anything substantial until almost the last moment. This year it was on 5 August, little more than a month before the session of the General

Assembly was to begin, that this year's contribution was submitted: a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction, identical texts of which were submitted, on the one hand, by the USSR, joined by the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and Romania [*ibid.*, sect. 19] and, on the other hand, by the United States [*ibid.*, sect. 20].

34. Lacking the collective will or the means to challenge the two super-Powers, to which they defer as Co-Chairmen, some of the representatives of the remaining 23 nations protest mildly at the most unfair or arbitrary features of the offerings presented to them, but nevertheless accept them as "the best available under the circumstances", "the only reasonable and practical possibility", and so forth. The General Assembly is usually well started before it is given precise details of the Geneva events. This year, for example, the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/8457] was not issued until 6 October. Non-participants in the Conference, of course, have no adequate opportunity to receive appropriate instructions from their Governments before the report is discussed in the General Assembly.

35. At the twenty-fifth session, when the annual report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was discussed, the non-members overwhelmingly commended the basic approach contained in the joint memorandum on the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare submitted by 12 of the members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 25 August 1970.⁴ In that memorandum, the urgency and importance of reaching agreement on the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare was stressed, as was the necessity that both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons should continue to be dealt with together in taking steps towards the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and their effective elimination from the arsenals of all States. As to the important issue of verification, it was urged that this should be based on a combination of appropriate national and international measures which would complement and supplement each other, thereby providing an acceptable system that would ensure the effective implementation on the prohibition. At the time, this basic approach also had the support of the great majority of the members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and it was accordingly embodied in resolution 2662 (XXV). That resolution was adopted by the General Assembly by 113 votes to none, with 2 abstentions, and was duly transmitted to the Conference.

36. We now have before us the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on its work during 1971. From a study of the report, it is clear that the Conference has not heeded the recommendations of the General Assembly given in resolution 2662 (XXV) and has not reached agreement on the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare; it has not dealt with both chemical and bacteriological (biological)

weapons together; and it has not taken the required steps towards the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling, and their effective elimination from the arsenals of all States. Instead, the Conference has agreed to recommend a draft convention providing for a ban on germ weapons only, without waiting for an agreement also on chemical weapons. This is an acceptance of the approach originally proposed by the United Kingdom, with the support of the United States.

37. It is necessary to ask ourselves two pertinent questions: first, why did the Conference, in disregard of the recommendations of the General Assembly so overwhelmingly expressed, accept the proposal for a separate ban on bacteriological (biological) weapons; and secondly, does the proposed draft convention, as recommended by the Conference, make any significant contribution to the goal of general and complete disarmament?

38. Bacteriological and chemical weapons are weapons of mass destruction no less than nuclear weapons, and mankind has always expressed horror at their use as methods of warfare. It is relevant in this connexion to note that the use of biological weapons, as well as poisonous and other gases, was banned as long ago as 1925, under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.⁵ However, as a disarmament measure, this was not markedly successful, because under the Geneva Protocol the production of the banned weapons was not forbidden. Also, many countries, in adhering to the Protocol, expressed reservations the effect of which was to maintain their right to use those weapons in retaliation.

39. Fellow representatives will all recall the long struggle in this Organization to increase the effectiveness of the ban on bacteriological and chemical weapons, particularly after complaints about the alleged use—which was denied—of bacteriological warfare by the so-called United Nations Forces in Korea in 1952 and 1953. None of the many proposals submitted to the Security Council and to the General Assembly during the ensuing years resulted in the adoption of any concrete measures to achieve the desired end. However, with the increasing resentment aroused in many countries by the use of chemical weapons in Viet-Nam, a greater stimulus was given to efforts to prohibit both bacteriological and chemical weapons. Hence, at its twenty-first session in 1966, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2162 B (XXI), which, in its operative paragraphs, called for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol and condemned all actions contrary to those objectives and invited all States to accede to that Protocol. My delegation was honoured to be among the sponsors of that resolution.

40. As is well known, one of the major causes of the ineffectiveness of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 is to be found in the varying interpretations of its scope. A few of the signatories of the Protocol maintain that it does not apply to all gases and does not prohibit, for example, the use of tear-gas or of herbicides. Such interpretations of the Geneva Protocol are used as a cover for the extensive use of napalm and defoliants in Viet-Nam by the so-called allied

⁴ Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1970, document DC/233, annex C, sect. 39.

⁵ League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No.2138.

forces and in the territories in Africa illegally occupied by the Portuguese. Emboldened by the failure of the international community to take effective measures to outlaw the notorious use of such weapons, the Portuguese are reportedly planning to intensify their use. According to Mr. Amílcar Cabral, Secretary-General of the African Party for the Independence of the Cape Verde Islands and Guinea (Bissau), (PAIGC), in a statement to the *Algeria Presse* on 11 November 1971, Portugal is preparing to use poisonous and toxic products against the farmlands and forests of Guinea (Bissau), in an effort to reduce the PAIGC revolutionary forces to famine.

41. Now, as to the question of why the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament accepted the proposal for a separate ban on germ weapons, there are various answers given.

42. The representative of the Soviet Union, speaking in this Committee on 11 November 1971, stated as follows:

“However, certain Western States—including the United States and the United Kingdom—have declared their readiness to agree only to the prohibition of bacteriological methods of warfare, justifying their obstructive approach to the banning of chemical weapons by alleged difficulties in ensuring implementation of the agreement.

“As a result, talks on the simultaneous prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons reached a deadlock, and the achievement of an agreement on the full scope of the problem appeared impossible. The deadlock in attempts to achieve an agreement on the prohibition of those types of weapons seriously impeded constructive consideration and settlement of other disarmament problems, gave rise to a mood of pessimism and, in fact, undermined efforts directed towards achieving positive results in disarmament talks.

“In an attempt to remove the deadlock in the solution of this problem, the socialist countries, as a first step towards settling it, declared their readiness to come to an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin methods of warfare alone.” [1827th meeting, paras. 48-50.]

43. The representative of Ethiopia, on 18 November 1971, told this Committee that in the Disarmament Committee:

“there was neither the mood nor the will to learn . . . from the hard facts of experience and to tackle the more complex problem by way of negotiating an agreement on the prohibition and destruction of both bacteriological and chemical weapons.” [1831st meeting, para. 49.]

44. It is therefore apparent that lack of political will or desire on the part of certain Western Powers was the major cause of the Disarmament Committee's failure to follow the approach overwhelmingly endorsed by the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly.

45. We also note the explanation advanced by the representative of the United Kingdom, among others, that issues of substance, and particularly differences of views regarding possible verification measures, made agreement on a chemi-

cal weapons ban considerably more difficult than on a biological weapons ban treaty.

46. However, it would have been more convincing if the United States and those other Western Powers which supported its position in this matter had indicated their readiness to accept the reasonable proposal submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 24 August 1971 and introduced in this Committee by the Mexican delegation in document A/C.1/L.578 as a proposed amendment to the draft convention.

47. I turn now to the second pertinent question, namely: does the draft convention proposed by the Disarmament Conference obviate or reduce the ambiguities and loopholes of the 1925 Geneva Protocol? It has been pointed out by many speakers in this Committee how far it fails to do so: the draft convention does not tackle the problem of methods of warfare currently producing the most horror and resentment—that is to say, chemical weapons—but rather concentrates on those methods which have not yet been used in warfare, namely, bacteriological (biological) weapons. Thus it is analogous to the Antarctic Treaty,⁶ the outer space Treaty,⁷ and last year's sea-bed Treaty.⁸ They also relate to methods of warfare which the military establishments of countries have never counted upon. Proponents of these measures of disarmament defend them on the ground that, because they are the easiest to accomplish, they should be agreed upon as first steps which would build confidence and thus lead to further measures of greater difficulty of achievement.

48. However, there is the danger here of lulling ourselves into a complacency which is unjustified by the significance of these easily achieved agreements.

49. As the representative of France commented on 18 November 1971 during his speech in the General Assembly on item 97, relating to a world disarmament conference:

“The path which the international community has thus taken does not lead to disarmament. One must not be deceived by these agreements nor by the gratuitous declarations and promises without guarantees which are too often presented to set the minds of the world at rest.” [1989th plenary meeting, para. 19.]

50. Regarding the prohibitions in the draft convention against bacteriological (biological) weapons, my delegation shares the fears that have been expressed about the omission of any specific ban on the use of bacteriological weapons. An express prohibition to this effect would have seemed to be necessary in view of the limited number of ratifications to the Geneva Protocol, which is the only international convention forbidding such use.

51. I have already referred to General Assembly resolution 2162 B (XXI), the effect of which, in the view of my

⁶ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 402 (1961), No. 5778.

⁷ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (resolution 2222 (XXI), annex).

⁸ Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (resolution 2660 (XXV), annex).

delegation, is quasi-legislative. Nor does the proviso in article VIII of the draft convention go anywhere towards removing the crippling effect of the reservations to the Geneva Protocol which have caused it to become known as only a first-use ban.

52. My delegation has noted with satisfaction the action of the United States Government in converting the research and development facilities at Fort Detrick, Maryland, from the production of biological weapons into cancer research and in expressing its intention to destroy its stockpiles of such weapons. We also appreciate the expression of similar intention by the Soviet Union.

53. Nothing that I have said so far should be construed as in any way doubting the genuineness of the concern for world peace and disarmament of those who have joined as sponsors of the draft resolution recommending the draft convention presented to us in the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. However, for the reasons I have already explained, my delegation has decided to join in sponsoring the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.581. We believe that that draft resolution is more consistent with the position which the international community has taken since it began to deal with the problem of biological and chemical methods of warfare.

54. I shall now turn to item 98, which refers to the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. The Government of Tanzania was honoured to support the request made by the delegation of Ceylon for the inscription of this item on the agenda of the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly [A/8492 and Add.1]. In doing so we recalled that the concept of zones of peace had long ago been proposed as a means of saving selected areas of certain regions from the tragedy of nuclear war. Then the proposal was more particularly concerned with the threat of an outbreak of war in the continent of Europe; later the idea was extended to other regions of the world. The Organization of African Unity, at its Conference of Heads of State and Government in 1963, adopted a resolution affirming and declaring respect for the principle that Africa should be declared a denuclearized zone, and the General Assembly at its twentieth session ratified this concept by adopting resolution 2033 (XX) endorsing the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, including the whole of the continent of Africa. The Conference of Non-Aligned Countries held at Cairo in 1965 condemned the establishment of military bases in the Indian Ocean. Subsequently, the countries of Latin America, in the Treaty of Tlatelolco,⁹ in 1968, established a nuclear-weapon-free zone for the whole continent of Latin America. That Treaty has repeatedly been hailed by the General Assembly as an example which other regions of the world might follow.

55. The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at Lusaka, in 1970, issued a declaration which endorsed the concept that the Indian Ocean should be declared a zone of peace. The Conference urged that:

“A declaration should be adopted calling upon all States to consider and respect the Indian Ocean as a zone

⁹ Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634 (1968), No. 9068).

of peace from which great Power rivalries and competition, . . . either army, navy or air-force bases, are excluded. The area should also be free of nuclear weapons.”

That decision was reaffirmed by the Foreign Ministers of Non-aligned Countries, who met in New York in September and stated:

“The participants in the Consultative Meeting recognized that, in keeping with the Lusaka Declaration, the creation of zones of peace would contribute to international peace and security, and the stability of all States and peoples. It was agreed that concrete steps should be taken at the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly to implement the decision relating to the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, contained in paragraph 8 (6) of resolution 12 of the Lusaka Declaration. For the preservation of the peace, stability and security of South-East Asia, the non-aligned countries urged the neutralization of the area so as to ensure that the region would be free of big-Power rivalries and interference and that its peace and security as well as the independence and territorial integrity of the States in the region be fully safeguarded and guaranteed. It was recognized that there was urgent need for the implementation of this proposal.”

56. It was with the hope that the General Assembly would endorse this decision of the non-aligned States that Tanzania joined the delegation of Ceylon in its request for the inscription of this item on the agenda of the twenty-sixth session of the United Nations. Of course, during the discussion of this item in the First Committee, delegations have had an opportunity of contributing to the elaboration of the idea of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

57. Of particular interest to the major maritime nations must be the question of ensuring continued use of the Indian Ocean as an unimpeded highway for carrying goods for trade and other peaceful purposes. What would be prohibited would be the use of the ocean as an arena of international conflict.

58. No great Powers should make the area the scene of their confrontation. It was through fear of such confrontation that Sub-Committee I of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples drew attention to the declared intention of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States to proceed with the construction of military bases in the so-called “British Indian Ocean Territory”.

59. It is for these reasons that my Government hopes that the General Assembly will agree to take concrete measures during this session to implement the desire of the littoral and non-aligned States regarding the declaration of this area as a zone of peace for all time.

60. Mr. POLYANICHKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translation from Russian*): The statements by delegations during the discussion of the group of questions related to disarmament which has been allocated to the political Committee show that the continually expanding

arms race is steadily increasing the concern felt by peoples for the preservation and maintenance of peace throughout the world. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR shares this concern. The process of stockpiling and improving armaments has harmful consequences for all peoples and States without exception, no matter what their geographical position, their size, their population or their military and economic potential.

61. The arms race has many negative aspects, but its ruinous effect on the economy of both developed and developing States, and on general security and the international political situation, is particularly dangerous.

62. The socialist States have taken a firm and consistent stand in favour of implementing a broad programme of measures to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament, and of putting into practice a plan for general and complete disarmament. A concrete example of this policy was the peace programme adopted by the Twenty-fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which contains a whole range of far-reaching measures to curb the arms race. Among other measures, this programme provides for the conclusion of treaties prohibiting nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons, the universal cessation of all nuclear weapon testing, including underground tests, the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, a reduction in military expenditure, especially by the major Powers, and a number of other measures.

63. The nuclear arms race presents the gravest danger to all mankind. The threat of a nuclear-missile war can be removed only if all States possessing such weapons of mass destruction take concerted action to achieve their prohibition and elimination.

64. Many years of experience in disarmament negotiations have shown that now, at a time when there are serious differences between States, disarmament negotiations should be intensified and the search for various ways of stopping the arms race and solving the problem of disarmament should continue. The search for such ways has already led to the conclusion of agreements on a number of well-known partial disarmament measures which have met with broad international support. These have been convincingly discussed by the representatives of many delegations. We agree with the considerations which have been advanced in this connexion.

65. However, at the same time, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR cannot but express its regret that certain delegations have attempted rather to belittle the importance of the treaties limiting the arms race which have been agreed and which have entered into force. It is of course in no way our intention to exaggerate unduly the role of the existing agreements in this field or to assert that they have solved the basic problems facing the peoples of the world in the area of disarmament. To do so would be unrealistic and wrong. At the same time, it seems to us that we must assess the state of progress on disarmament problems objectively, and in this connexion we should like to say that the agreements already in existence today play a clear and important political role in reducing the threat of nuclear war.

66. Some years ago the great significance to mankind of the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water,¹⁰ to which about 120 States have acceded, was acclaimed by the world community and by leading scientists in various countries. The number of nuclear weapon tests in these three environments has been greatly reduced, thus leading to a substantial reduction in radio-active fall-out products in the atmosphere and on the surface of the earth. This has made a significant contribution to protecting the health of millions of people of both the present and future generations. The political significance of this international instrument lies in the fact that it was the first treaty aimed at checking the arms race.

67. The Treaty banning the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction in outer space and on celestial bodies¹¹ is very important in the context of the principles governing the activities of States in outer space, and of warding off the danger of a nuclear-missile war.

68. The conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*], which entered into force last year, was a major international event. The Treaty limits the arms race and reduces the danger of nuclear war being unleashed. Those States which, having signed the Treaty, have undertaken to renounce the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons, have saved considerable amounts both of money and of materials, which can be put to peaceful uses. The main political consequence of this agreement, which enjoys wide support, is that by limiting the circle of States possessing nuclear weapons it has considerably simplified the solution of nuclear disarmament problems.

69. One of the most recent in this series of agreed international instruments is the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof [*resolution 2660 (XXV), annex*], which will soon enter into force. With the current rapid development of military technology and of methods of working under water, States would be in a position to install on the sea-bed and the ocean floor a large number of murderous weapons of all types. The Treaty does away with this danger by prohibiting the emplacement on the sea-bed, and in the subsoil thereof, of structures, launching installations or any other facilities specially designed for storing, testing or using weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and bacteriological weapons as well.

70. In referring to international treaties concerning the limitation of arms and military preparations, we cannot fail to mention the important part which the Committee on Disarmament has played in the drafting of almost all of these instruments. While giving the Committee and its members their due for the work they have carried out, and bearing in mind the importance of the task entrusted to them, we must do everything in our power to ensure that this negotiating body works more actively and more effectively in the future.

¹⁰ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964.

¹¹ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (*resolution 2222 (XXI), annex*).

71. Particular stress should be placed on the fact that the Committee's work has proceeded on the basis of recommendations by the General Assembly and proposals by individual States. It was on this basis that the Committee prepared the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and that prohibiting the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed, as well as the convention prohibiting bacteriological weapons. Dozens of amendments submitted by various countries were incorporated into their texts, and they can be regarded as the product of a common, collective effort.
72. In our view, one important task of disarmament talks must be to ensure the consistent implementation of existing treaties limiting the arms race. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR considers that an effort should be made to ensure that the largest possible number of States accedes to these international instruments. The whole world will benefit if the agreements already concluded on partial disarmament measures can be made universal.
73. However, there is an even more important task. The existing international instruments must be supplemented with further agreements aimed at expanding the scope of prohibitions limiting the arms race. This will mean prohibiting underground nuclear tests, completely demilitarizing the sea-bed and the ocean floor, eliminating from military arsenals and destroying all stockpiles of chemical weapons and taking effective measures for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. This difficult but entirely attainable goal can be achieved if all States show a readiness to reach agreement on these questions. As you all know, the socialist countries have more than once declared their readiness to resolve all the above problems, and have made concrete proposals.
74. In referring to specific disarmament measures, we do not in any way suggest that talks on the question of general and complete disarmament should be pushed into the background. Our delegation maintains the view that discussion of particular disarmament measures should go hand in hand with consideration of the problem of general and complete disarmament, the talks on which, as many of those speaking here in this Committee have rightly stressed, should be intensified.
75. The General Assembly at its present session has before it for approval a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction [A/8457, annex A]. This is the first agreed instrument in the history of disarmament negotiations to provide for the complete elimination of one of the types of weapons which are classed as weapons of mass destruction.
76. Our position on this question is based on the need for the complete prohibition and elimination of chemical as well as bacteriological weapons. The Ukrainian SSR has not only proclaimed this approach to the question of prohibiting chemical and bacteriological weapons but, together with the other socialist countries, has twice submitted for consideration by the General Assembly draft conventions providing for the simultaneous prohibition of these weapons.
77. The negative attitude of certain Western countries which have insisted on prohibiting only bacteriological weapons has prevented the simultaneous prohibition of bacteriological and chemical means of destruction. In the situation as it developed, when there was a real danger that talks on the subject would be broken off, the socialist countries yet again adopted a constructive approach and demonstrated their real desire to seek solutions to the political problems.
78. The draft convention on bacteriological weapons agreed in the Committee on Disarmament and submitted for approval by the General Assembly not only provides for prohibiting the production and eliminating the stockpiles of these weapons of mass destruction, but also contains a system of safeguards which is intended to make the agreement viable and effective.
79. An important element in solving the problem of complete prohibition of bacteriological, and in future also chemical, means of warfare is the consolidation of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925.¹² Article VIII of the proposed draft convention provides for an increased role and place in international life for the Geneva Protocol.
80. It should be noted, incidentally, that the General Assembly has more than once appealed to all States to accede to the Geneva Protocol and to comply strictly with it. In the past two years the Protocol has been ratified by more than 10 States, including Japan, Brazil, Morocco and others. Unfortunately, not all of the militarily important States have yet become parties to the Geneva Protocol.
81. In the view of the Ukrainian delegation an important feature of the draft convention we are discussing is that it provides not only for the prohibition and elimination of bacteriological means of warfare but also for an undertaking by States to continue negotiations in good faith on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction.
82. The draft convention on bacteriological weapons submitted for consideration by the political Committee is a carefully balanced document in which the proposals and views of many States have been incorporated. Considerable time and effort was required to draft it. It is quite obvious that no international multilateral instrument can be ideal, or express fully everything which States wish it to. In the process of negotiating and agreeing on the text of international instruments, States must naturally accept certain compromises and make mutual concessions; only from such an approach to solving international problems can positive results be expected.
83. The Committee has before it draft resolution A/C.1/L.579 which approves the draft convention on bacteriological weapons, requests the depositary Governments to open the convention for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date and expresses the hope for the widest possible adherence to the convention. The delegation of the

¹² Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138).

Ukrainian SSR, which is one of the sponsors of the draft resolution, hopes that it will be supported and adopted by the General Assembly, and that the convention will be opened for signature as soon as possible. A solution to the problem of halting production and completely eliminating all stockpiles of bacteriological weapons will offer further proof that, with goodwill and a desire to seek compromise, positive solutions to the important political problems of the day can be achieved.

84. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR has also sponsored another draft resolution [A/C.1/L.580], the point of which is that we should not rest on our laurels but continue talks with a view to achieving early agreement on effective measures to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and eliminate them from the arsenals of all States.

85. In our view a set of favourable circumstances already exists for the successful conduct of talks and the very rapid achievement of an agreement completely prohibiting chemical weapons. In the first place, there is complete unanimity on the need to solve the problem of prohibiting chemical weapons; this is shown by the relevant resolutions of the last three sessions of the General Assembly, the joint memorandum of 12 non-aligned States of 28 September 1971 [A/8457, annex C, sect. 33] and the statements by delegations during this discussion and in the Committee on Disarmament. In the second place, the discussion of this problem which has taken place so far, both in the General Assembly and, in particular, in the Committee on Disarmament, has to a large extent clarified the views of the various Governments, thus facilitating further work. The draft convention on bacteriological weapons which we have been discussing is the first effective step towards prohibiting and eliminating chemical means of warfare. Of course, these favourable circumstances will only have a positive effect on the progress of talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and on talks concerning any other disarmament questions, if all participants in them show themselves ready to seek possibilities of mutual accommodation, to work together and to endeavour to arrive at agreed decisions.

86. Bearing in mind the great danger which chemical weapons present as a means for the mass destruction of human beings, we should take all necessary measures to facilitate the conclusion, at the earliest possible date, of a convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and providing for their removal from the arsenals of all States. We hope that in discussing this question further and in agreeing on the text of a convention, States will refrain from any action which might make it more difficult to reach agreement on the problem of prohibiting chemical means of warfare.

87. In concluding our statement, we should like to observe that in the recent past the world has witnessed certain signs that events are evolving towards an easing of international tension. These circumstances make the continuation of the arms race especially unjustifiable. Further progress in the reduction of international tension will depend to a great extent on the success achieved in solving the disarmament problem.

88. Mr. FAREMO (Norway): Any curbing of arms races or substantial agreed reductions of armaments are not likely to

take place unless we are able to remove the incentives and reasons for the possession of arms and for engaging in arms races. However, while all our efforts towards that long-term goal must continue unabated, it would be wrong if our search for agreements on control of existing military instruments with regard to their kind, size, deployment and uses were weakened by frustration due to slow progress towards the ultimate goal. But in order to have any success, arms control must base itself on a realistic appraisal of the situation and thus be able to demonstrate to the parties involved that arms control measures will not reduce, but rather add to, everybody's security.

89. Furthermore, while recognizing that all aspects of the world armaments situation are interdependent, it still does not seem possible to come to grips with the problems and make progress unless—for practical purposes—we continue to address ourselves to separate categories of weapons, areas of deployment and military practices.

90. My Government therefore welcomes the new draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction [*ibid.*, annex A]. Consequently we have associated ourselves with a draft resolution [A/C.1/L.579] commending the convention and requesting the depositary Governments to open the convention for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date.

91. The draft convention before us might help to prevent the future development and use—in all circumstances—of more effective and hence also more dangerous bacteriological weapons. However, one cannot help feeling that since many other weapons are more likely to be used than bacteriological weapons, it is the principle aspects of the draft convention which are the most important. One would hope that the principle that a weapon is banned and destroyed because this is to everybody's advantage will be seen in fact to apply to an increasing number of weapons. However, considered as a practical arms control instrument, it would be difficult to claim that the community of nations can learn very much from this convention. It is indeed regrettable that the convention does not admit the principle, which we believe should be included in all global multilateral arms control agreements, that there should be an immediate possibility for a party claiming to be the victim of a breach of the agreement in question to have its case investigated by an established international machinery. It is at least a step in this direction when the draft convention establishes, in its article V, that consultation and co-operation "... in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of ... this Convention ... may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter".

92. The importance of the bacteriological weapons convention will naturally be measured against the fact that it has not been possible to draft a convention which effectively prohibits the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. We hope indeed that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will succeed in its further work in this vital area and will reach early agreement not only on a comprehensive prohibition of

chemical weapons, but also on their total elimination from the arsenals of all States.

93. We realize, however, that any arms control or disarmament measure with regard to the whole spectrum of chemical weapons presents control problems of a most serious nature. My Government also is of the opinion that a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons should establish beyond question that the use in warfare of tear-gases and herbicides is strictly prohibited. This would establish a clear demarcation line in warfare between the use and non-use of gas, thus reducing the risk of escalation from non lethal chemical weapons to lethal ones.

94. During our intervention in the General Assembly [1992nd plenary meeting] we stressed the urgency of halting nuclear weapon tests by all States in all environments.

95. To a very large extent our views on the test ban problem coincide with points already made by other representatives in this Committee. My Government is also inclined to feel that the test ban problem now lends itself to a political rather than a technical approach. Impressive advances have been made in the area of detection seismology, and identification methods have been improved. The verification problem thus appears manageable and it should consequently be possible before long to expect the necessary political decisions to be taken in order to clear the way towards a speedy conclusion of an international agreement for the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests.

96. However, the Powers concerned do not seem to be inclined to stop the testing, nor are they able to agree on whether and how to make use of available ways and means to verify an agreement to halt nuclear weapon tests. There are many ways the nuclear Powers could demonstrate that they are genuinely interested in reaching such an agreement. They could, for instance, start serious discussions with a view to reaching agreement on the verification issue, and they could stop at least those detonations which no one can mistake for an earthquake.

97. My Government has consequently associated itself with a draft resolution stressing the urgency of halting all nuclear weapon testing in all environments by all States and, furthermore, calls upon the Governments of the same countries immediately to undertake unilateral or negotiated measures of restraint that would suspend nuclear weapon testing or limit or reduce the size and number of nuclear weapon tests, pending the early entry into force of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

98. We still hope that SALT will, as it should, substantially reduce the need felt for continuing nuclear weapon tests. However, we have never accepted the principle that there should necessarily be any link between SALT and the question of a complete test ban.

99. Over the years the Norwegian Government has consistently supported the efforts to establish the necessary technical basis for a complete test ban treaty. My Government has also co-operated with the United States in building in Norway one of the world's two largest seismic

stations. This seismic array installation—designated NORSAR for short—has now been completed. We hope this array will in large measure increase our knowledge in the area of detection seismology and thus constitute a significant contribution to the general aim of achieving agreement on a complete test ban treaty. As on previous occasions, we should like to stress our hope that NORSAR will attract seismologists from other countries for short or long periods of study, and we are looking forward to co-operating with all interested nations in using this facility for joint international research projects in detection seismology.

100. When a complete test ban treaty enters into force—before long, we hope—NORSAR will function as a monitoring or control station for a large part of the world and thus constitute a most significant part of a world monitoring system designed to deter or discover would-be violators of a treaty.

101. Finally, I should like to extend my Government's best wishes for the future work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, in particular with regard to the Conference's continuing and important work aimed at curbing chemical means of warfare and at achieving a complete test ban treaty soon.

102. Mr. FARHANG (Afghanistan): May I first welcome, on behalf of the Afghan delegation, our colleague from the People's Republic of China to the deliberations of the First Committee of the General Assembly.

103. Our satisfaction in this respect is related not only to the sincere friendship existing between our two neighbouring nations, but also to our firm belief that more meaningful discussions and practical measures in the field of disarmament could be evolved and implemented with the participation of the true representatives of that great nation. Now that this deficiency has been removed, we have every reason to hope that our common efforts in this field will be pursued with greater realism and will consequently have a better chance of success.

104. Afghanistan has a deep-rooted and long-standing interest in all measures conducive, directly or indirectly, to general and complete disarmament. In conferences of the non-aligned countries held in Belgrade, Cairo and Lusaka, Afghanistan, together with other non-aligned countries, has repeatedly stressed the vital importance of disarmament not only with regard to world security but also with regard to economic and social development.

105. We have studied with great interest the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/8457]. Although the report falls somewhat short of our expectations, we appreciate, nevertheless, the efforts being made by all concerned in the solution of these complex problems—the most pressing of our time. We welcome particularly the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. We are well aware of the limited scope of this draft convention and of its small impact on the arms race now in progress among the great Powers. Nevertheless, we appreciate this document as the first measure of real disarmament evolved since the establishment of the United Nations.

106. It is true that during the last decade a number of international measures have been adopted under the general terms of reference of disarmament by the United Nations, such as the Antarctic Treaty,¹³ the partial test ban Treaty,¹⁴ the Treaty on the use of outer space,¹⁵ the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,¹⁶ the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*] and the sea-bed Treaty.¹⁷ Without trying to minimize in any way the importance of these international instruments in regard to peace and security, we have to submit to the fact that none of these measures could be considered as measures of disarmament *per se*. They represent, at most, provisions, beneficial each in its own domain, for the control or limitation of armaments and for the prevention of their being extended to new spheres in terms of time, space or human activities.

107. The draft convention on bacteriological weapons, on the contrary, is not confined to limitations or prevention, but contains concrete measures—and this is the heart of the matter—for the destruction of the existing stockpiles of a certain category of lethal arms. This is why our delegation has decided to associate itself with some other countries in sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/L.579 recommending the adoption of this convention, and we hope that it will be unanimously confirmed.

108. We are also sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/L.580 on the abolition of chemical weapons. However, our association with this draft does not preclude our support for any other proposal which, while pursuing the same objective, may elaborate on the means for its implementation. We believe that the joint memorandum submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by 12 member countries [*A/8457, annex C, sect. 33*] also has great merit and deserves to be considered most attentively by other members of the Committee.

109. My country attaches great importance to the report of the Secretary-General on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race [*A/8469 and Add.1*]. We strongly support the view expressed in this Committee by the representatives of a number of developing countries stressing the special role of economic security as the basis of political security. We all know that economic security can be achieved only in an atmosphere of economic growth and increasing well-being for an increasing number of populations. In other words, economic security, in the last analysis, is dependent on a more equitable distribution of the resources and the flow of material and financial facilities towards the under-developed regions of the world. This may take the form of a fair deal in trade, of appropriate financial assistance, of the transfer of necessary

¹³ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 402 (1961), No. 5778.

¹⁴ Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (*ibid.*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

¹⁵ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (resolution 2222 (XXI), annex).

¹⁶ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634 (1968), No. 9068.

¹⁷ Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (resolution 2660 (XXV), annex).

technology, or more preferably, a combination of all of them put together. But in any case the essence of such an effort will be the release of necessary funds for productive investment in under-developed regions, as defined in the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade [*resolution 2626 (XXV)*].

110. This was, in our view, the main purpose of General Assembly resolution 2667 (XXV) in paragraph 3 of which the Secretary-General was requested to prepare a report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures.

111. Now, after one year, the report prepared with the collaboration of eminent experts informs us of the actual situation. It indicates beyond a shadow of doubt that things are moving exactly in the opposite direction of what we have been striving for. It informs us that during the last decade, military expenditures have increased by 33 per cent from \$150,000 million to more than \$200,000 million and may in the near future reach the \$300,000 million mark. They are now running at 30 times more than the total of all official economic aid granted by developed to developing countries. What the report does not indicate, but we know from our own experience, is the fact that, at the same time, net assistance to developing countries was running in the opposite direction. A case in point is my own country where during the same period gross financial foreign aid, including loans, has decreased from \$75 million per year to \$42 million, while debt servicing has jumped from \$4 million to \$27 million, or one third of our total annual foreign exchange earnings.

112. It is not our intention to confuse the issues or to bring into the discussion of this Committee what, as it may seem, does not belong to it. But I wish to illustrate by concrete example that the developing nations have a real vested interest in disarmament and I propose that any measure to be taken in this field or any savings to be made on that account should be connected, in some appropriate way, with the common goal of fighting poverty and under-development, wherever they may be located. We are firmly convinced that should the goal be defined in such graphic terms, world public opinion would be aroused and mobilized in favour of disarmament and would help us to remove the most formidable barriers now blocking our way, namely, fear, suspicion and, above all, ignorance of the real issues involved.

113. Before concluding I should like to express the appreciation in principle of my country for the initiative taken by the Government of Ceylon in requesting the inclusion of an item in the agenda of the General Assembly on the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace [*A/8492 and Add.1*]. We believe that the recognition of such zones, in different regions, will contribute to the strengthening of peace and security all over the world and thus deserves careful and sympathetic consideration on the part of all Member States.

114. Mr. JENEBY (Kenya): May I take this opportunity of associating my delegation with the words of welcome to the representatives of the People's Republic of China in this Committee addressed by our Chairman and by many delegations that have spoken before us. We have all along felt

the need for the United Nations to restore to the People's Republic of China its lawful rights and we are therefore glad that the true representatives of the Chinese people are now in our midst in this Committee. It is our fervent hope that as representatives of a great nation and a nuclear State, their contribution, which I am sure will be positive, will go a long way to assist in our deliberations of the many important issues before us.

115. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has indeed scored what one might truly call a point on disarmament. Until now the achievement of this Committee has been in areas of non-armament rather than disarmament. The question of chemical and biological weapons has been a long-standing issue well known to this august body. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2454 (XXIII), a comprehensive report¹⁸ was prepared which left no doubt in the minds of all nations of the possible disastrous effects that all living things, including man, would be exposed to if these weapons were ever used. The draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction [A/8457, annex A], which is now under discussion, must be looked upon as a feather in the cap of the world community in as far as disarmament is concerned. It is therefore the hope of my delegation that this timely achievement will underline this as the beginning of greater things in the future and will serve as an impetus in the arduous work of the Committee on Disarmament.

116. I should like at this juncture to express my delegation's disappointment at the fact that the Committee on Disarmament did not find it possible to deal with the control of both chemical and biological weapons in the same convention or simultaneously. To us, chemical weapons are as dangerous and as horrifying as biological weapons. The fact that both these weapons are cheap to manufacture and thus could be readily available to many countries, both developed and developing, should underline the necessity for their immediate control.

117. My Government has ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.¹⁹ This is why my delegation, without ignoring considerations attached to biological weapons, hopes that the factual dangers inherent in the use of these weapons as outlined in the Secretary-General's report on the subject will clearly mirror the need for the Committee on Disarmament to work expeditiously on a similar draft convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons for submission to the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly.

118. My delegation is in agreement with the views expressed by the representative of Ghana at the 1829th meeting regarding the timing of the distribution of the report of the Committee on Disarmament. The draft convention in question should have been made available to our Governments some time before the convocation of the current session so as to accord ample time for the study of

such an important instrument. This would have enabled delegations to contribute more effectively to these discussions. It is the hope of my delegation that this simple plea will be heeded in the future.

119. Since the international community was confronted with the first atomic bomb over two decades ago, mankind still remembers with horror both the immediate and long-term effects of that atomic holocaust. Yet we find that while proclaiming and making pronouncements about international peace, the world today is still in the process of arming itself with more powerful and potentially more devastating and dangerous nuclear weapons. Tests to improve the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons are still being undertaken despite the detrimental effects these weapons have on humanity. From time to time we read and learn with dismay of tests being undertaken both underground and in the atmosphere that remind us of the power struggle which still threatens our world with possible annihilation. It would appear that major nuclear Powers are still obsessed with the competitive amassing of weapons of destruction of all types and look upon military arsenals as a means of establishing and maintaining superiority in world power politics.

120. Kenya welcomed General Assembly resolution 2661 (XXV) which urged Governments of nuclear States to bring about an immediate halt in the nuclear arms race as well as in the testing and deployment of offensive and defensive nuclear weapon systems. In view of the non-compliance by certain Powers, my delegation hopes that the present session of the General Assembly will try and hammer home the great urgency of this issue, thus matching the practice of Member States with the solemn hope and aims of that resolution.

121. Kenya is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex]. Although we are not fully satisfied with the Treaty, Kenya has acceded to it because it believed, as it still does, that the Treaty was a step in the right direction, towards general and complete disarmament. We still hope that the mistrust and fear which appear to suppress the general goodwill between nations on this particular issue will in time give way to mutual trust and fair dealing, so that this Treaty can become a solid and additional pillar for peace between nations.

122. My Government has followed with keen interest the bilateral negotiations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the limitation of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapons. It is encouraging that the two Governments have agreed on a framework which would allow negotiations aimed at reaching an agreement for the limitation of the development of anti-ballistic missiles to continue. My delegation welcomes and supports these talks and hopes that both parties will apply the principle of accommodation to reach a workable agreement on this and other disarmament possibilities.

123. During the twenty-fifth session my delegation supported General Assembly resolution 2665 (XXV) on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control. It is our hope that nuclear States will

¹⁸ *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.1.24).

¹⁹ League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138.

co-operate with international atomic energy agencies in this issue so that the dangers of the explosions can be minimized if not altogether eliminated by the pooling of expertise. We know that there is a lot of information on the peaceful uses of atomic energy that can be beneficial to developing countries. We therefore appeal to the nuclear States and to the International Atomic Energy Agency to share, to an even greater extent, nuclear technology with the developing countries so as to enable them to achieve faster rates of development and industrialization.

124. My delegation is indeed pleased that the Ceylonese delegation has brought up for discussion at this current session the item on the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace [A/8492 and Add.1]. My Government has noted with concern the gradual increase of naval and military activities in the Indian Ocean. This trend, we feel, constitutes a potential threat to peace and security in the area. We strongly believe that unless this move is arrested, the possibilities of an eventual conflict of a cold war nature cannot be ruled out.

125. Kenya supports the move to declare the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace because we believe that besides the elimination of a possible cold war confrontation, such a declaration would represent a practical development towards both disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. The declaration would definitely safeguard peace and security for the non-aligned countries in the area.

126. Coming from a developing country, I think I should know how scarce financial resources and capital for

development are in those countries. Pursuant to the Secretary-General's request to examine the economic and social consequences of disarmament, the experts' report [A/8469] left no doubt that the achievement of general and complete disarmament would be an unqualified blessing to all mankind. The information in the report clearly demonstrates that both economic and social conditions of countries would improve if the resources diverted to armaments were to be injected into the development plans of the various countries. A glance at the defence estimates as provided by the 1970-1971 report of the International Institute of Strategic Studies should convince anyone that armaments are presently consuming larger portions of the gross national product of nations than ever before. It is my Government's conviction that disarmament would free such resources, both human and financial, for the improvement of the living conditions of mankind. Effective disarmament and the related lessening of tensions would also improve international relations, as well as foreign investments, and hence increase the rate of growth of real income in developed and, particularly, developing countries.

127. Having outlined my delegation's position briefly on some of the urgent issues of disarmament, I should like to remind this august body that the General Assembly has declared the 1970s a Disarmament Decade. This declaration has enhanced the hopes of all mankind for more rapid progress towards the desired goal. It is the hope of my delegation that this second year of the Decade will bring the desired end much closer, for the benefit of all mankind.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.