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Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security (A/7994)

GENERAL DEBATE

1. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): Today the First Committee of the General Assembly is beginning consideration of the questions relating to disarmament to which States and the United Nations as a whole have invariably attached great importance and devoted much attention. This is quite understandable. The solution to this problem is related to the vitally important issues of our time, the strengthening of international security, the establishment of a durable peace and the raising of the standard of living of the peoples. The importance of the problem of disarmament has increased immeasurably over the last decades, during which enormous progress has been achieved in the world in nuclear physics, chemistry, rocket construction and other areas of science and technology, and also in military production. It is quite obvious that a nuclear war would involve tremendous losses, the death of many millions of people, the annihilation of whole States and the destruction of invaluable cultural treasures.

2. The Soviet Union considers the problem of disarmament an exceedingly important task which requires an immediate solution. At all stages of its development, the Soviet State has always attached great importance to the struggle for disarmament. The USSR's approach to this task is based on the principle defined by the founder of the Soviet State, V. I. Lenin, who advanced the thesis that disarmament is the ideal of socialism. The Soviet Union sees disarmament as an effective means of ensuring a system of international security which would preclude any possibility of the use of force to solve international disputes. We are pleased to note that many delegations, speaking in the general debate at this session of the United Nations General Assembly, have devoted considerable attention to the problems of disarmament and have stressed the imperative need of a speedy solution to them.

3. As we take up the problem of disarmament in the First (political) Committee of the General Assembly, we cannot fail to note that the basic tasks in this sphere are still unsolved, the arms race continues to grow and the burden

of military expenditure has risen sharply over the last ten years. The increase in the military budgets of States is an indication of the fact that vast material wealth and resources are being used for military purposes. The continuation of the arms race, which is dictated by imperialism, is fraught with grave dangers to mankind.

4. However we can note, as a positive factor, that some progress has been achieved in recent years in the adoption of partial measures in the field of disarmament. This is apparent from the fact that a number of international agreements which represent a valuable contribution towards the limitation of the arms race have been concluded. These treaties include the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water;¹ the Treaty on principles governing the activities of states in outer space, which prohibits the placing in orbit of nuclear weapons around the earth and the installation of such weapons on the moon or other celestial bodies;² and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex]. The conclusion of these international acts is an indication of the real significance of the efforts being made by States to limit the arms race, first of all in the field of nuclear weapons.

5. The Soviet Union considers the aforementioned international treaties as only the first step towards general and complete disarmament. The task facing us consists in achieving agreement on other disarmament measures and thus broadening the scope of international agreements in this important sphere of international life.

6. One of the important problems of disarmament which we have to consider at this session of the General Assembly is the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, a draft of which has been prepared and submitted by the Conference of the Committee on disarmament [see A/8059-DC/233, annex A]. The discussion on this problem at the previous session of the General Assembly and in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has shown that throughout the world great importance is attached to excluding from the sphere of the nuclear arms race vast tracts of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof. The importance and urgency of solving this problem is necessitated by the recent discoveries in the sphere of science and technology which have made it possible to begin to utilize the sea-bed and the ocean floor in a practical way and at the same time have created the danger that that environment might be used for the arms race. It is quite obvious that the use of the sea-bed for the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction would widen the scope of the arms race and increase the danger of the outbreak of global war.

7. The military use of the sea-bed is still limited in scope, but in the very near future that situation may change. The treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed is intended to prevent that danger, or at least to reduce it considerably. It is also a

prerequisite for the development of international co-operation in the peaceful utilization of that environment. General Assembly resolution 2602 F (XXIV) states that “the prevention of a nuclear arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor serves the interests of maintaining world peace, reducing international tensions and strengthening friendly relations among States”.

8. The draft treaty submitted for consideration at this session of the General Assembly is in many respects different from the draft submitted for consideration at the twenty-fourth session.³ The changes introduced into the draft treaty concern a number of important provisions.

9. First, a new article—article V—has been included in the treaty providing that the parties thereto shall undertake to “continue negotiations in good faith concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof”. This new article is intended to put into effect further measures to demilitarize the sea-bed and reflects the concern of a wide range of States that the sea-bed should be completely excluded from the scope of the arms race.

10. Another change introduced into the draft treaty concerns those provisions relating to a precise definition of the zone of applicability of the treaty. The treaty now states very clearly that the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction shall not apply within the 12-mile zone either to the coastal State or to the sea-bed beneath its territorial waters. It also states that the outer limit of the sea-bed zone, within which the coastal State has special rights, shall be coterminous with the 12-mile outer limit of the zone referred to in the Geneva Convention of 1958 on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.⁴

11. An important change has been introduced in article III, concerning control. This article provides not only for observation of the activities of other States Parties to the treaty on the sea-bed, but also for verification procedures, including inspection, which may be carried out with the agreement of both parties in cases where serious doubts arise concerning the compliance by any parties to the treaty with the obligations assumed by them. The article on control provides for the possibility of participation by all countries concerned, including coastal States, in mutual consultations and verification measures. Verification may be undertaken by any State Party not only using its own means or with the full or partial assistance of any other State Party, but also through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. The revised article on control contains further provisions which set forth in greater detail the procedure to be followed in informing States Parties of doubts which may arise concerning compliance with the treaty and of the results of the verification procedure. Changes in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the same article define more precisely the right of States Parties, including any coastal State, to participate in consultation and co-operation as well as in other verification procedures.

¹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964.

² Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (resolution 2222 (XXI), annex).

³ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969*, document DC/232, annex A.

⁴ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 516 (1964), No. 7477.

12. On the whole, the article on control provides for a reliable and flexible system for verifying the compliance by States Parties to the treaty with the obligations they have assumed. In addition to national forms of control, the verification system includes an international procedure and provides for the possibility of States appealing to the Security Council to consider doubts concerning the implementation of the treaty.

13. It must be pointed out that in practice a situation might arise where a party to the treaty, because of various political circumstances connected with its relations with other countries or with the general international situation, may not be able to enter into the consultations provided for in article III of the draft treaty. In this connexion, we note that the provisions contained in article III, paragraph 2, for consultations between States Parties with a view to removing any doubts there might be concerning the observance of the treaty are not, of course, a mandatory prerequisite before that State Party may invoke the right to refer the matter to the Security Council, as provided in article III, paragraph 4, should there be serious grounds for so doing. Consequently, any State Party to the treaty may appeal directly to the Security Council, even without holding consultations.

14. An important change introduced into the draft treaty concerns the problem of the relationship between the obligations assumed under this treaty and the position of States under other existing international conventions, and also the problem of the rights and claims relating to coastal waters and the continental shelf. A separate article, article IV, defines the relationship between this treaty and other treaties and obligations to which States which have signed this treaty may or may not be party. Article IV states that nothing in the treaty shall be interpreted as supporting or prejudicing the position of any State Party with respect to . . . rights or claims which such State Party may assert, or with respect to recognition or non-recognition of rights or claims asserted by any other State, related to waters off its coasts, or to the sea-bed and the ocean floor”.

15. By comparison with the provisions in the previous draft treaty, this article has been strengthened by references to the fact that the treaty should not be interpreted as supporting or prejudicing the position of any State with respect to existing international conventions, including the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, and also with respect to rights or claims relating to the continental shelf.

16. We attach great importance to this article of the treaty and feel we must emphasize that the provisions of the treaty on the sea-bed are intended to achieve only the goal which is stated in this agreement, that is, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction to the sea-bed. The treaty is not intended to settle the many questions of maritime law, or to confirm or abrogate any commitments assumed by States under other international agreements, or to predetermine any possible decisions in this sphere which may be taken in the future.

17. An important addition to the draft treaty has been included, on the proposal of Mexico, in the new article IX of the treaty, which states that the provisions of the treaty

shall in no way affect the obligations assumed by States Parties to the treaty under international instruments establishing zones free from nuclear weapons.

18. The representative of the United Arab Republic put forward in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament a proposal that the article on zones free from nuclear weapons—article IX—should state that the treaty would also not affect the obligations assumed by States under other agreements relating to nuclear disarmament, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In this connexion we should like to point out that such a provision is already covered in article IV of the draft treaty, which I have just quoted and which states that: “Nothing in this treaty shall be interpreted as supporting or prejudicing the position of any State Party with respect to existing international conventions”.

19. In concluding this part of our statement on the draft treaty on the sea-bed, we should like to emphasize that the draft treaty on the sea-bed submitted for consideration by the General Assembly has been prepared with due regard for the positions and proposals of a wide range of States which participated in the discussion of the question at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly and in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. There is every justification for stating that this document is the result of the collective efforts of many States Members of the United Nations. The content of the treaty is based on a concern to ensure the security of all countries and peoples. Its addition to the body of international instruments and agreements will be a positive step forward reflecting the desire to reduce international tension, to improve relations between States and to create favourable conditions for the implementation of other measures to limit armaments and to achieve disarmament.

20. We are glad to see that many delegations which have spoken in the general debate at this session of the General Assembly on questions relating to disarmament have commended the draft treaty on the sea-bed and called upon the Assembly to approve this treaty so that it can be opened for signature by States without delay. The Soviet delegation expresses the hope that such an appeal will meet with a wide response among delegations to the Assembly and that the draft treaty on the sea-bed will soon become a valid international instrument in the interests of all countries and peoples. This will at the same time be a positive contribution to the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations.

21. Another very important and urgent disarmament measure which is before the General Assembly for consideration is the prohibition of the production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons. The representatives of many countries, speaking at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly and in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, pointed out that a solution to this problem would be of tremendous significance since it would save mankind from the horrors of a war in which chemical and bacteriological weapons were used and would promote further progress along the path towards total disarmament.

22. The use of chemical substances by the United States in its military actions in Viet-Nam has caused alarm and

indignation in world public opinion. The existence and use of such weapons and the continuing development and stockpiling of such weapons directly affect the development of the international situation, create distrust in relations between States and hinder and even prevent the solution of other disarmament problems.

23. The report of the group of consultants of the World Health Organization on the dangers of using such types of weapons states: "In view of the power of existing agents in conditions favourable to their use and the possibility of developing new and even more dangerous weapons, it is imperative to find ways of abolishing any presumed need for this militarily orientated research as soon as possible".⁵

24. The complete prohibition and destruction of such types of weapons is an urgent step which would be welcomed by all countries of the world. Such a prohibition would be the next logical act after the Geneva Protocol of 1925, prohibiting the use in war of chemical and bacteriological weapons.⁶

25. The twenty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to consider urgently the question of reaching agreement on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons [*resolution 2603 B (XXIV)*]. The Conference was thus given the specific task of drawing up a text for an appropriate international agreement. In connexion with that task, nine socialist countries submitted for the consideration of the General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session a draft convention on the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons.⁷

26. The United Kingdom, in its turn, put forward a proposal for the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of biological weapons only [*A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 2*] so that the question of prohibiting chemical methods of warfare could be considered later.

27. The Soviet Union has invariably advocated the need for a simultaneous prohibition of both types of weapons. In conditions where chemical weapons are already being widely used in military actions, there is a need precisely for both types of weapon to be banned simultaneously. The proposal of the Western Powers that only biological methods of warfare should be prohibited can, in existing circumstances, be interpreted only as an attempt to avoid reaching agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons and to retain such weapons for military purposes.

28. The Soviet Union is unable to agree to such an approach. Traditionally, both in theory and in practice, the prohibition of chemical and of bacteriological weapons has

always been considered as a single goal. This is precisely how the problem was tackled in the well-known report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, prepared by eminent experts and scientists from fourteen States,⁸ and in the report of the World Health Organization on this problem from which I have just quoted. All international agreements relating to this problem considered both the aforementioned types of weapons together. The implementation of a ban on the development, production and stockpiling of only one of those types of weapons, bacteriological weapons, a ban on chemical weapons, would have adverse results. Such a solution to the problem would stimulate the development of chemical weapons in those countries which favour their use.

29. We are glad to note that the 12 non-aligned States which are members of the Committee on Disarmament unanimously supported the proposal for a simultaneous solution of the question of chemical and biological methods of warfare. The memorandum which they submitted to the Committee on Disarmament draws attention to the fact that it is essential "that both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons should continue to be dealt with together in taking steps towards the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and their effective elimination from the arsenals of all States". [*Ibid., sect. 39.*]

30. An important aspect of the problem of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons is how to ensure that obligations assumed under an agreement on the prohibition of such weapons are in fact observed. In this connexion, it is important to note the special nature of chemical and bacteriological weapons, the production of which is very closely linked to the peaceful production of chemical and bacteriological substances. Verification by such means as the establishment of control posts, the sending out of inspection groups and so forth, would thus be virtually impossible from a practical point of view. If this were to be done there would have to be controllers in almost every laboratory.

31. In view of the actual state of affairs, we cannot fail to conclude that in order to ensure that obligations relating to the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare are fulfilled there would have to be a combination of special specific national and international means and procedures which would make it certain that obligations relating to the elimination of chemical and bacteriological weapons from the arsenals of States are in fact carried out.

32. The draft convention of the nine socialist countries provides for just such a combination of national and international means and procedures. Article IV of the convention provides that each State Party shall be internationally responsible for compliance with its provisions by citizens and enterprises of that country. In implementation of that provision, States Parties undertake under article V to take such legislative and administrative measures in their countries as would prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and to arrange for the destruction of such

⁵ *Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons* (World Health Organization, Geneva, 1970), section 9.

⁶ Protocol for Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).

⁷ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda items 29, 30, 31 and 104, document A/7655.

⁸ *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.I.24).

weapons. The fulfilment of these obligations would be one form of guaranteeing observance of the agreement on the complete prohibition and destruction of the aforementioned types of weapons. Thus, in accordance with the provisions of the convention, the Government of every State Party would guarantee that not a single industrial enterprise and not a single citizen of that country would develop or produce chemical or bacteriological weapons and that there would be no stockpiling of such weapons in the military arsenals of those countries.

33. The draft convention proposed by the socialist countries also provides for the application of international procedures in order to ensure that obligations regarding the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare are fulfilled. Thus, article VI provides that States Parties shall undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in the application of the provisions of the convention. The holding of such consultations would make it possible for States to resolve any doubts which might arise in connexion with the fulfilment of obligations under the convention.

34. The nine socialist countries recently submitted to the General Assembly a revised draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons [A/8136]. This draft convention contains a number of additional provisions including a new article VII concerning the use of international procedures in order to ensure that the provisions of the convention are implemented. In our statement today we do not intend to dwell on this matter or to explain the additions to the draft convention made by its sponsors since this will be done at a later stage.

35. An important task which is directly related to the solution of the problem of prohibiting chemical and bacteriological weapons is the strengthening of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting the use of these types of weapons. In this case, we should first of all try to ensure that all States accede to this important international agreement prohibiting the use of such weapons which already exists. We are glad to note the decision adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session, which called for strict observance by all States Parties of the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, condemned all actions contrary to those objectives and invited all States which had not yet done so to accede to that Protocol [resolution 2162 B (XXI)]. We also agree fully with the interpretation of the Geneva Protocol which was given at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly, namely, that the prohibition in the Protocol is comprehensive and includes the use in international armed conflicts of all bacteriological and chemical methods of warfare, regardless of any technical developments.

36. As a result of the widely held view that the Geneva Protocol is extremely important, a growing interest in it has been evident recently on the part of many States. We are glad to note that Japan, Brazil and Morocco have acceded to the Protocol this year and we were also interested to note the statement made in November 1969 by the President of the United States that this international instrument had been referred to the United States Senate for ratification. Unfortunately we cannot fail to note that,

despite that statement, the United States has still not completed the process of ratification of the Geneva Protocol.

37. Participants at this anniversary session of the General Assembly must make every effort to promote a solution to the problem of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons. In order to do this, it is essential to have a constructive approach and to be willing to reach agreement on the elimination from the military arsenals of States one of the most dangerous types of weapons of mass destruction, that is to say: chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare. The revised draft international convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the destruction of such weapons, proposed by the nine socialist countries, provides a suitable basis for agreement on this important matter.

38. Among the disarmament problems put forward for consideration at this session of the General Assembly, the most important is still general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Union attaches great importance to this problem and as far back as 1962 put forward a comprehensive and specific programme for general and complete disarmament.⁹ We are glad to note that the idea embodied in that programme has received world-wide recognition.

39. Since the Soviet disarmament programme was introduced, considerable progress has been achieved in the sphere of military technology. New types of weapons of mass destruction with enormous destructive power have been devised. This has made even more urgent the need for general and complete disarmament which would prevent the achievements of science and technology being used to harm people.

40. In spite of the considerable efforts made by the Soviet Union and some other countries to solve the basic problems of disarmament, constructive progress has still not been achieved in this sphere. The problem of general and complete disarmament is still at the same point as it was ten years ago when the USSR first proposed this item for consideration by the United Nations General Assembly. However, it can be said that some individual problems relating to disarmament have been solved in recent years, and that a number of international agreements limiting the nuclear arms race have been concluded. We have already mentioned such international instruments as the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the three environments, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in Outer Space, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and others. The reaching of agreement on these questions was convincing proof that it was possible and necessary to solve disarmament problems through negotiation. The fact that some progress has been achieved in this connexion is encouraging and is a stimulus to further efforts to reach agreement on a broader range of disarmament problems.

41. In view of the importance of general and complete disarmament and its consideration by the General Assembly, we are glad to note the great interest in this problem

⁹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 90, document A/C.1/867.

shown by many States. Disarmament is not a self-determining or isolated problem; it is very closely linked to the task of strengthening international security. A deterioration of the international climate encourages the arms race, and that race in its turn strains relations between States, creates an atmosphere of distrust and leads the world to the brink of military catastrophe. The existence of such an interrelationship explains why efforts to strengthen international security and to achieve disarmament have unfailingly claimed the attention of all peoples.

42. Many complex problems arise in approaching a solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament. They include the question of the priority of disarmament measures. In conditions where the danger of a nuclear war is a very serious threat to all mankind, the task of nuclear disarmament naturally takes priority. In the proposals made by the Soviet Union questions relating to this kind of disarmament have always taken first place. In this connexion, we fully realize that the fundamental problems of nuclear and complete disarmament can and must be solved with the participation of all States which possess nuclear weapons. Commitments on questions relating to disarmament should be undertaken by the largest possible number of States.

43. It is our aim to continue our efforts to find a solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament, but we should also like to emphasize that this should not prejudice the achievement of agreement on partial disarmament measures. A positive decision on partial disarmament measures will create favourable conditions for a constructive solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament. Evidence of the firm intention of the Soviet Union to achieve agreement on individual questions relating to disarmament is to be found in its position on the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons, in the treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and in its willingness to continue bilateral talks with the United States on the limitation of the strategic arms race, with a view to finding mutually acceptable solutions to this important problem. These talks, as you know, were renewed today in Helsinki.

44. It is a well-known fact that many countries are in favour of drawing up a ten-year disarmament programme. We would like to point out, in this connexion, that the USSR has no objection in principle to the drawing up of a disarmament programme, since that would serve the purpose of putting an end to the arms race and ensuring agreement on urgent disarmament measures. We realize that this task is an extremely complex one and requires tremendous efforts, a realistic approach and goodwill. The Soviet Union is prepared to give very careful consideration to all proposals from other States on this question and to make its own contribution to this work. At the same time we feel we must emphasize that the programme should be drawn up in such a way as to avoid postponing or delaying the search for a solution that would make it possible to implement specific measures in the field of disarmament.

45. We all realize that, in order to achieve agreement on questions relating to disarmament, tremendous efforts and goodwill are required on the part of States. It is also important and crucial always to bear in mind those treaties

and agreements which have already been concluded in this field and to make sure they are being consistently implemented. We were very pleased to note the entry into force, on 5 March 1970, of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This Treaty should remain the focus of attention for those participating in the General Assembly. It is essential that the broadest possible range of States should accede to it and that all its provisions and obligations should be strictly observed and consistently implemented.

46. In our statement today we have touched on only a few of the most important aspects of disarmament which we are discussing today. There are many other aspects to this problem on which we intend to comment in the course of the discussion. A broad exchange of views at this session of the General Assembly will, we hope, open up new possibilities for further progress towards a solution of this problem, which is of such vital importance to all peoples.

47. Mr. YOST (United States): At the outset of this decade of the 1970s, which the General Assembly has proclaimed the Disarmament Decade, it behoves all nations to match the solemnity of their declarations on this subject with the energy and effectiveness of their actions. We all know how fatefully important it is for humanity that we should move as rapidly as we can to control and reduce the burden of armaments. We know, too, that such progress requires of all of us an enlightened view of our vital common interests and a readiness to transcend our political differences and co-operate in measures which none of us can accomplish alone.

48. In that conviction, we of the United States attach the highest priority to our efforts to co-operate with our negotiating partners in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, here in the First Committee of the General Assembly and in the all-important Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). We are conscious of the need to tackle the complexities of these talks in a mood not only of passionate commitment but also of pragmatic, businesslike determination.

49. This year the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has made progress on several fronts. It has negotiated a satisfactory draft treaty to prevent the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor. It has worked extensively on the problems of chemical and biological weapons.

50. The draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, annexed to the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/8059-DC/233] is the product of almost two years of negotiations. As all members will recall, an earlier draft¹⁰ was discussed in this Committee last year. During that discussion, a number of suggestions and comments were made with the purpose of improving the treaty and helping to fashion an instrument that could command broad support. In fact, the debates of last year were of vital importance in developing the present draft treaty.

¹⁰ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969*, document DC/232, annex A.

51. I do not think it is necessary to describe again in detail the provisions of the treaty. My Soviet colleague has already commented on some of them. However, I would on this occasion like to take special note of a few of the important contributions made both as a result of our debates here last year and as a result of the intensive work that took place at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament this year.

52. The present draft treaty incorporates verification procedures largely proposed by our colleagues from Canada. The verification article was further improved in the course of the meetings of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva this summer, as a result of suggestions by Argentina, Brazil, Yugoslavia and others. The verification article now provides a balanced and practical procedure permitting appropriate participation by any party that is concerned about assuring itself that in some particular situation the treaty is being observed.

53. The draft treaty now contains clearer provisions for defining the geographic scope and application of the treaty's obligations. The Committee will recall that last year in this Committee the delegation of Argentina proposed revision of articles I, II and IV of the draft treaty. That proposal has been closely followed in the present draft. Article IV contains a disclaimer clause which states that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as supporting or prejudicing the position of any State Party on questions concerning the law of the sea.

54. The draft treaty now contains an operative article, article V, in which the Parties undertake to continue negotiations in good faith concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed. The delegation of Sweden, as we all know, has long been associated with the suggestion that the Treaty should contain an article on further negotiations.

55. The present draft treaty is also responsive to proposals presented by a group of non-aligned delegations to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva this summer. First, as I have already mentioned, it contains an undertaking for further disarmament negotiations. Second, the treaty's verification provisions now contain a clause stating that verification may be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. Finally, there are provisions for giving notice to other parties regarding verification and calling for an appropriate report thereafter. This last idea was contributed by the delegation of Yugoslavia.

56. I cite these facts about the history of the draft treaty because they demonstrate that it is a draft to which many countries have contributed. This history, which is by no means a complete statement of the contributions of other countries or of the major elements of compromise reflected in the treaty, is a source of considerable satisfaction to us. The negotiation of this treaty seems to us an outstanding example of how an important multilateral instrument can be developed with the participation and the significant help of many countries. It constitutes an example that we hope will serve as a guide in the negotiation of other multilateral treaties of disarmament and arms limitation.

57. The present draft treaty enjoys, we believe, a wide measure of approval. We are hopeful, therefore, that it can receive broad support from this Committee. Broad acceptance of this treaty will constitute a step forward in our efforts to halt the arms race; it is a limited step, but one we believe to be valuable and which we are capable of taking now. It would keep the sea-bed, which is now a subject of increasing attention by the world community from becoming an object of the arms race. We therefore regard this treaty as another building-block in the arms control structure which the world community has been seeking to erect during the past decade. In particular, it forms a significant part of our effort to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction to areas which man is just beginning to explore.

58. When the General Assembly had before it the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons—which we are pleased is now in force—it passed a resolution [2373 (XXII)] commending the Treaty, the text of which was annexed thereto. We hope that this year the Assembly will similarly embrace the treaty on arms control on the sea-bed and request that it be opened for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date. This will facilitate the success of the Treaty.

59. The report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament devotes a major section to the question of chemical and biological weapons [A/8059-DC/233, paras. 27-38]. It is apparent that this question occupied much of the time of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. There are several draft treaties before the Conference, and a number of suggestions and working papers have been submitted to it. These suggestions and papers cover an extremely broad spectrum of issues and problems. They include such widely varying matters as the definition of chemicals that might be covered in an agreement, possible means of verifying treaty obligations, questions about the economic and industrial structures relevant to certain undertakings, and so forth. All of this work is unquestionably leading to a better understanding of the issues that are involved in coming to grips with the control of chemical weapons. It is evident that much work remains to be done—work which must be done if we are to establish a firm foundation for effective and reliable measures.

60. The United States continues to believe that it would be possible now, and desirable, to reach early agreement on a separate convention prohibiting biological weapons. The declared intentions of many of the countries capable of making and using such weapons are such that agreement to prohibit the production and stockpiling of these weapons should now be within our reach. We urge such a ban because we are convinced that such a step would be a significant achievement in the interests of all. Surely all of us will agree that the elimination of disease as a method of warfare would be an achievement making this planet of ours a safer and saner place in which to live? At the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva this year we announced our readiness to add to the draft convention for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare proposed by the United Kingdom¹¹ a prohibition on the production and stockpiling of toxins [*ibid.*, annex C,

¹¹ *Ibid.*, annex C, sect. 20.

sect. 19] some of the most lethal substances that could be used for warfare. In proposing the inclusion of toxins in the ban of biological weapons our position reflects our assessment of what substances can be prohibited now with only the most simple and easily negotiated means of verification. We expect, and indeed we welcome, a debate in this Committee regarding chemical and biological weapons in which members will set forth their views about the various possible paths of progress. We shall listen most attentively to this debate and we are convinced that it can make an important contribution to our future work.

61. As I indicated earlier, however, we recognize that the divergence of views on this subject remains very wide and that a great deal of work yet remains to be done. This year in Geneva we witnessed the most intensive discussions that have taken place to date regarding prohibitions in the field of chemical and biological weapons. We need to carry forward that work. In the light of these considerations, it is our belief that this body should refer back to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament all of the proposals and suggestions that have been made, as well as the record of the debates in this Committee, with the request that the subject be given high priority next year at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. In this connexion I am gratified to recall that the United States Administration has sent the Geneva Protocol¹² to the Senate for its advice and consent.

62. Another important question on which work progressed in Geneva was that of a comprehensive test ban. The United States continues to favour a ban with adequate verification, which in our judgement must include on-site inspection. Meanwhile, we are co-operating in international efforts to improve seismic detection and identification capabilities, whose role in verifying an underground test ban will certainly be a vital one. In this connexion, we note with appreciation the considerable number of affirmative and useful responses [*see A/7967/Rev.1*] to the questionnaire of the Secretary-General regarding the possibility of exchange of seismic data from stations in various countries. Work in this area should continue and we hope that our distinguished Canadian colleagues will continue to take the lead in providing us with suggestions for action that may be considered by this Committee.

63. The United States regards it as an important development that the question of conventional armaments received increasing attention at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament this summer. We are convinced of the need to halt and reverse the steady rise in the already enormous expenditures of resources of the development and maintenance of these armaments throughout the world. Moreover, as I pointed out last year, all the wars now being fought are being fought with conventional arms.

64. The United States and several other delegations called attention in Geneva to the need to try to come to grips with this very complex subject. Other delegations commented on our remarks and, in some cases, disagreed with some of the things we said. We are nevertheless pleased that

¹² Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).

an exchange of views has begun. We think it should continue, and we hope it can continue, in the same spirit in which it was conducted in Geneva this summer.

65. We all recognize that any discussion of possible limitation of conventional armaments touches on the most delicate and sensitive security interests of States and particularly of those with regional security concerns or specific concerns about their neighbours. To be constructive, therefore, such a discussion requires an absence of polemics and a sincere effort to appreciate the genuine security interests of all concerned.

66. Before concluding this review of some, though not all, of the issues before us, I would like to touch briefly on one of the principal concerns which have been expressed during the general debate in the General Assembly this year. It has often been said that our pace in achieving disarmament agreements is not fast enough. Disappointment is felt that more substantial achievements in the field of disarmament are not more frequently realized.

67. The Government of the United States is sympathetic to this viewpoint. My Government would also like to see a great deal more progress in reaching important arms limitation agreement. We are committed to the pursuit of measures to halt the nuclear arms race under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*] and we mean to pursue that commitment with all the energy, determination and imagination at our command.

68. But I think we all know that significant disarmament and arms limitation measures are inherently difficult to achieve. This is a fact of life that I need not labour and that we all know cannot be changed by merely wishing that international life were different from what it is.

69. Moreover, despite the difficulties that confront each arms control proposal, I think we must also recognize that a great deal of important business in the disarmament field is under way and much has been accomplished. In addition to the subjects which I have mentioned in the context of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are now in progress between the United States and the Soviet Union. Let me assure my colleagues here that my Government is keenly conscious of the great importance of those talks for the entire world and of the sentiments that many nations in this very Committee have expressed concerning them. As President Nixon stated in his address before the General Assembly on 23 October of this year:

“... There is no greater contribution which the United States and the Soviet Union together could make than to limit the world's capacity for self-destruction.

“This would reduce the danger of war and it would enable us to devote more of our resources—abroad as well as at home—to assisting in the constructive works of economic development and peaceful progress...”.
[1882nd plenary meeting, paras. 58 and 59.]

70. These vital and historic talks have been started in a businesslike way and we are prepared, together with our

Soviet colleagues, to pursue them with the utmost seriousness of purpose. As you know, the talks are now being resumed in Helsinki. We hope for positive results.

71. In the meantime, let us do here as much as we can to contribute to progress in all disarmament fields. Let us commend the draft treaty to prevent the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed. Let us explore here in our debates the many important arms control subjects which concern us. Let us ask the disarmament negotiating body, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, to get on with its work, being assisted by the important debates which will take place here.

72. Mr. JAROSZEK (Poland): The problem of disarmament is becoming ever more imperative and urgent. The accelerating arms race spreads to ever newer fields and consumes ever greater resources, while not strengthening the security of States. On the contrary, the spiralling arms race increases the risks of a nuclear conflagration in the world.

73. In the face of this mad momentum, the international community is increasingly beginning to seek disarmament and to replace the precarious and ominous balance of fear with a balance of security. In the second quarter of a century of the United Nations, progress in the field of disarmament will become one of the most important factors on which international security will depend.

74. It is in this light that we assess the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/8059-DC/233] submitted to the current session of the General Assembly. We welcome with particular satisfaction the fact that, apart from the wealth of information about the useful exchange of views and the submission of various proposals and documents, the Conference was able, for the first time since the spring of 1968, to include in its report an agreed text of a new draft disarmament treaty—the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. We feel that this fact entitles us to state, first, that the conference is successfully discharging the basic task entrusted to it by the General Assembly and, secondly, that it has appreciably accelerated the pace of its negotiations. Thus, while the pool of experience of States increases as a result of the implementation of successive disarmament measures, the elaboration of further steps in the field of disarmament is markedly facilitated. We are fully aware, of course, that here we are dealing with a process the final results of which depend not only on the efforts of the Committee itself but on other factors as well, primarily on the development of the international situation. Bearing in mind the Conference's achievements thus far, the important part it plays in elaborating successive disarmament agreements and its tested procedural arrangements, we are confident that other problems on its agenda will also be successfully resolved. As in the past, Poland is ready to contribute actively to the work of the Conference, which we consider to be one of the most useful platforms for a wide-ranging international discussion aimed at strengthening world peace and security.

75. One of the co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has already extensively and

lucidly commented on the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. I should like to add just a few remarks of my own. The Polish delegation approves and supports the draft treaty, which is annexed to the report of the Geneva Conference. The draft treaty is an important achievement in the efforts of the international community to ensure exclusively peaceful exploitation of the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. These efforts are fully justified by the economic significance of the sea-bed environment, as well as by the threat that the arms race in this area would bring to its peaceful exploration and exploitation. On both counts the necessity of full demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor is well established.

76. Admittedly, the draft treaty submitted for the approval of the General Assembly meets this postulate only in part. In accordance with the general direction of the negotiations in this respect so far, it was agreed that prohibition under article I of the draft treaty shall apply to the implanting or emplacing on the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and in the subsoil thereof, of any nuclear weapons or any other types of weapon of mass destruction, as well as launching installations or any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using such weapons. In accordance with international practice and law, particularly part II of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,¹³ signed at Geneva on 29 April 1958, the treaty prohibitions shall apply to areas beyond the twelve-mile coastal zone.

77. Article III of the draft contains provisions relating to verification. The right to verify, through observation, the activities of States on the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond the twelve-mile coastal zone constitutes, in our view, a fully adequate form of control. These provisions take sufficient account of the rights of coastal States. They specifically provide for the possibility of seeking clarification concerning activities that might give rise to reasonable doubt as to their compatibility with the treaty provisions. They also envisage the possibility of referring serious problems to the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

78. We consider as particularly significant the provisions stipulating that the Treaty shall in no way affect the obligations assumed by signatory States under international instruments establishing nuclear-free zones. The incorporation of this provision in the draft treaty reflects the generally accepted principle, stemming from the very nature of disarmament agreements, that no new obligation assumed by States in the field of disarmament should infringe on their commitments assumed under earlier agreements.

79. It was, therefore, with satisfaction that the Polish delegation welcomed the interpretation offered by the two co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament reaffirming that the treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor

¹³ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 516 (1964), No. 7477.

would in no way affect the obligations of States under such measures as the Moscow Treaty of 1963 on the partial test ban¹⁴ or the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*]. We believe that such an interpretation of the stipulations of the draft treaty reinforces indirectly the effectiveness of the partial disarmament measures which entered into force earlier.

80. The treaty, moreover, opens up realistic prospects for the continuation of negotiations relating to further disarmament measures on the sea-bed and the ocean floor. Article V contains specific obligations in this respect. This opens up real possibilities of extending the scope of the treaty's prohibitions to make it a comprehensive instrument that would bar the possible development of an arms race in other forms on the sea-bed and the ocean floor. Such an extension of the scope of the already agreed measures would enhance their significance as one of the instruments which, with respect to the sea-bed and the ocean floor—an environment of ever greater importance to the international community—would lead to general and complete disarmament.

81. In accordance with my Government's position of principle and in view of the formulation of article V of the draft treaty, the Polish delegation wishes to reaffirm the proposal, first submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva on 18 June 1970, that the question of full prevention of the arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor remain on the agenda of the Committee [*see CCD/PV.471*].

82. On the basis of the above assessment of the draft treaty, and bearing in mind the fact that the text submitted for our approval reflects a compromise in seeking to accommodate the positions of various States set out in the numerous amendments submitted both in the General Assembly last year and in the course of the Conference, the Polish delegation holds the view that the General Assembly should commend this treaty and request that the depositary Governments open it for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date. It should also urge the widest adherence of States to this treaty.

83. The main objective of the Government of the Polish People's Republic in the field of disarmament has been the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. Our dedication to this cause is reflected in our initiatives concerning the preparation by the Secretary-General of the successive reports on the nature and the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons, as well as chemical and bacteriological weapons. I might add that we have also contributed to the elaboration of the draft resolutions concerning chemical and bacteriological weapons at the twenty-third and twenty-fourth sessions of the General Assembly. Together with other socialist States, Poland has submitted concrete proposals on banning the development, production and stockpiling, and on the destruction, of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. I refer to the draft convention submitted by nine socialist States to the

General Assembly last year,¹⁵ as well as to the supplementary provisions jointly tabled by Poland, Hungary and Mongolia in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in April of this year [*A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 14*]. The debate in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva has fully borne out the timeliness and correctness of those proposals.

84. Our assessment of that debate has led us to the following conclusions.

85. First, an overwhelming majority of States participating in the work of the Conference declare their total support for the underlying principle of the draft convention that the chemical and bacteriological weapons should be dealt with jointly, and that urgent efforts should be made to establish comprehensive prohibition of those weapons as well as their effective elimination. A measure of consensus in this matter was reflected in the joint memorandum of the twelve non-aligned States of 25 August 1970 [*ibid., sect. 39*] which, in paragraph 6, quoted this morning by the Ambassador of the Soviet Union, Mr. Roshchin, stated as follows:

“It is essential that both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons should continue to be dealt with together in taking steps towards the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and their effective elimination from the arsenals of all States. It is the conviction of the Group of Twelve that an effective solution of the problem should be sought on this basis.”

86. Secondly, the attempts of certain States, in particular the United Kingdom and the United States, to belittle the significance and urgency of the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons and to leave them out of the scope of the practical measures being considered, failed to gain wider support. On the contrary, that support has gone to the argument in favour of the necessity of urgent measures towards the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons, including tear-gas and herbicides, which should not follow but go along with appropriate measures concerning bacteriological weapons.

87. Thirdly, there is an increasingly strong body of opinion that the problem of the prohibition and effective elimination of chemical and bacteriological weapons can be solved as a direct result of a political decision of States, and not—as asserted by certain Western Powers—through painstaking technical considerations relating particularly to verification, which are irrelevant for the practical purposes at hand. An attempt to shift the emphasis to the technical difficulties involved is, in the opinion of my delegation, to look for a handy excuse for a further delay in making a political decision in this matter.

88. Fourthly, there is substantial support for the concept of verification of compliance with the prohibitions in the field of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons on the basis of national means and in accordance with a procedure envisaging the possibility of lodging complaints with the United Nations Security Council.

¹⁴ Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

¹⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda items 29, 30 31 and 104, document A/7655.

89. Taking into consideration the views expressed in the course of the debate so far, and acting in a spirit of co-operation with a view to achieving the urgent elimination of chemical and bacteriological weapons at the earliest possible date, the socialist States, sponsors of last year's draft convention, submit to the General Assembly at its present session a supplemented and expanded text [see A/8136] of the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons. I should like to present to this Committee some comments on the draft, especially on its new provisions.

90. Of course, the revised draft convention proceeds from the premise of joint treatment of chemical and bacteriological weapons, an approach supported both by sound logic and by valid arguments. First, chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons constitute an integrated weapons system. Secondly, all relevant juridical instruments, including various resolutions of the General Assembly, deal with those two types of weapons jointly. Thirdly, the effects of these weapons, as is rightly stressed in the report of the Secretary-General on this subject,¹⁶ are similar, and qualify both of them as weapons of mass destruction.

91. The revised draft convention contains the following new provisions.

92. First, in articles I and II, a new formula has been added to cover also the means of delivery of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. In addition, in conformity with various suggestions, it is explicitly stated that the prohibition applies to such means of delivery as are "specially designed for the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons as means of warfare".

93. Secondly, the new draft convention includes in article VII the amendment which Poland, Hungary and Mongolia jointly submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva on 14 April 1970 [A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 14]. The amendment provides for a procedure whereby each State party to the convention may lodge a complaint with the United Nations Security Council in case any other State party acts in violation of the prohibitions under articles I and II of the Convention.

94. Thirdly, the new article VIII specifies that the principles of international co-operation should be adhered to in the use of chemical and bacteriological means for peaceful purposes. It also stresses that the convention shall be implemented in such a way as not to create obstacles to the economic and technological progress of States parties or to international co-operation in peaceful chemical and bacteriological activities.

95. Fourthly, two additional new articles—IX and X—have been incorporated in the draft convention, one dealing with the amendment procedure, the other providing for a conference to be held five years after the entry into force of the convention, in order to review its operation, with a

view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the convention are being fulfilled.

96. I am sure that the other sponsors of the draft convention will dwell in more detail on its various provisions. I should like to limit myself at this stage of our discussion to some remarks on verification and control.

97. The supplemented text of the draft convention provides for various methods of ensuring strict compliance with its provisions. Apart from the national means of control, referred to in article V, offering States parties wide possibilities of ensuring, through various legislative and administrative measures, strict implementation of the provisions of the convention, article VI of the draft envisages international co-operation in solving any problems which may arise in the application of the provisions of the convention.

98. This mechanism has now been further expanded by the addition of two new elements. The first one, contained in article VII of the draft, provides for the right of States parties to lodge complaints with the United Nations Security Council in case any other State party acts in violation of the obligations assumed under articles I and II of the convention. In accordance with this procedure, the Security Council shall investigate such complaints, together with all possible supporting evidence, and inform the States parties of the results of its investigation. Each State party shall assume the obligation to co-operate in any investigations which may be initiated by the Security Council on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. Bearing in mind the role played by the Security Council, the suggested procedure would be tantamount to a system of verification and safeguarding of strict compliance with the respective prohibitions.

99. The second element is contained in article VIII of the new draft, relating to proposed international co-operation in the field of the use of chemical and bacteriological means for peaceful purposes. As we see it, this co-operation can indirectly help to determine the ways and means of such peaceful uses of chemical and bacteriological agents, a function that is clearly and directly related to the fulfilment of the basic goals of the convention, as defined in articles I, II and III.

100. While submitting our proposal for a solution of the problem of prohibition and elimination of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, we wish to reaffirm that we continue to attach great importance to the strict observance of the 1925 Geneva Protocol¹⁷ and to ensuring its universality. We have noted with satisfaction the accession to or ratification of the Protocol by additional States, as well as the fact that yet other States have announced their intention to accede to or ratify it. At the same time, bearing in mind that—as noted in the introduction to the report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization¹⁸—more than a third of the States

¹⁷ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).

¹⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 1A.*

¹⁶ *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.I.24).

Members of the United Nations have not yet signed or ratified the Protocol, we deem it particularly important to urge all States concerned to adhere to this instrument and to ratify it as soon as possible.

101. Let me turn now to the question of general and complete disarmament, which is the ultimate objective of all disarmament efforts. We are all aware that the attainment of this goal is a complex and difficult task. The global character of the arms race today, involving ever new fields of economy, science and technology, and striving for a continuous increase in the destructive power of weaponry stockpiled in the arsenals of States, is a measure of the range of difficulties facing the disarmament efforts. Moreover, experience of the process of international negotiations in the field of disarmament indicates that the prevailing international situation bears heavily upon the prospects of disarmament. Any major tension in international relations adversely affects the climate and the prospects of disarmament negotiations. Conversely, any progress in the construction of the political conditions of collective security helps to create premises favourable to such negotiations.

102. Against this background, it is clearly indispensable to ensure universal adherence to and validity of the disarmament measures. The important point is to make sure that the greatest possible number of militarily developed States, including all the nuclear-weapon Powers, are actively associated with and involved in the negotiations and implementation of each successive step towards the goal of general and complete disarmament. Only thus will the necessary effectiveness of the successive disarmament measures be ensured.

103. In the view of the Polish delegation, the priorities in the negotiation of disarmament measures that are to lead ultimately to general and complete disarmament should correspond to the requirements arising from the actual state of the arms race as well as the international situation. Under the present-day conditions of unstable peace, constantly disturbed by local conflicts and smouldering hotbeds of war threatening to explode into a new global conflagration, with the use of the most sophisticated means of warfare, it is absolutely indispensable to concentrate our efforts on the reduction and elimination of the threats inherent in the existence of the most dangerous weapons—the weapons of mass destruction.

104. We believe, therefore, that the present approach of concentrating in the disarmament negotiations on various partial measures of disarmament aimed at slowing down and reversing the arms race in the field of weapons and mass destruction, should be preserved and continued. We should strive for the creation of a definite pattern of negotiations wherein each successive disarmament measure resolving a concrete problem would serve to reinforce the effectiveness of the preceding agreed measure, while at the same time laying down the groundwork that would favour and facilitate still further disarmament agreements.

105. We submit that such a pattern fully meets the requirements of the present international situation since, in the conditions of the spiralling qualitative and quantitative arms race, it is imperative to protect and consolidate the progress already made and the agreements concluded with

measures that would either limit or totally eliminate the possibility of any further perfection of weapons.

106. Apart from the full demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor referred to earlier, one such measure, in our view, would be the halting and prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests. This is one of the urgent tasks that can be successfully resolved on the basis of existing national means of control. All that is required to settle this long-outstanding problem is a political decision.

107. It goes without saying, however, that short of general and complete disarmament, radical steps towards the reduction and eventual full elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction would be of decisive importance in the field of disarmament. In this respect we attach particular significance to the bilateral Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which, as we all know, are being resumed today at Helsinki. Any progress scored in these talks would have a far-reaching and positive bearing on the chances of improvement of the international situation. It would certainly be instrumental in enhancing the prospects of progress in other fields of disarmament negotiations, thereby bringing closer the goal of general and complete disarmament.

108. The recognition of the need to take urgent steps in the field of disarmament has been the primary motive of States in submitting the various proposals and concepts reflecting their positions and views as to the methods to be followed in pursuing disarmament negotiations or implementing the agreements already concluded. One such concept has been the idea of the Disarmament Decade. The Polish delegation supports such proposals to the extent to which they can contribute to the achievement of tangible progress in the field of disarmament.

109. The dangers inherent in the arms race increase as the arms race itself continues. The consequences of this arms race, initiated during the cold war by the imperialist Powers, transcend the framework of purely military problems, making inroads into political, economic and technological fields. The successive reports of the Secretary-General on the economic and social consequences of disarmament, including the most recent one¹⁹ with the annexed replies of Governments, offer an eloquent illustration of this state of affairs. The Polish Government set forth its views in this regard in its reply of 4 June 1970.

110. It is becoming an ever more widespread conviction that the arms race has reached a level where any further increase of the military capabilities is, so to say, counter-productive. It cannot ensure any greater degree of security to States; on the contrary, it generates an ever greater threat to peace. It tends to increase the risk of a nuclear conflict, including war by accident, seriously curtails the role of political control in making decisions on the vital problems of war and peace and, finally, it encourages the proliferation of armaments and the ambitions of States in this field.

111. Apart from the existing armed conflicts in the Middle East and in Indo-China, as well as the dangerous situations

¹⁹ Documents E/4811 and Add.1-4.

arising from the colonialist and racist policies, the armaments race constitutes the main obstacle in the process of peaceful stabilization and co-operation among States.

112. This destructive role of the arms race in international relations is today more than ever evident and it calls for urgent and tangible remedial steps. As in the past, Poland is ready to contribute to this task. As a socialist country, we are vitally interested in providing the best conditions for peaceful construction and development not only at home but in the region we live in and in the world at large. We have given proof of our dedication and concern in this regard by submitting over the past years a number of proposals relating to partial measures of regional disarmament in Europe. Poland was among the first States to have ratified all the disarmament agreements concluded thus far, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex]. We attach major importance to an early and universal implementation of this Treaty. Poland's position in this respect was restated on 16 October by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Stefan Jedrychowski, when he said in his address to the General Assembly:

"In view of the special conditions of security in central Europe, the full implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons depends above all on its early ratification by the Federal Republic of Germany and the other Euratom Member States signatories to that Treaty, wide adherence to which should avert the danger of a proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the world." [1869th plenary meeting, para. 85.]

113. The Polish delegation is deeply convinced that, despite the comparatively short time available to our Committee, it will approve the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof which is annexed to the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. We are also confident that the General Assembly at its present session will adopt decisions that will facilitate an early solution of the vital problem of the prohibition and elimination of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. We think that the draft convention submitted by nine socialist States is an important contribution to such a solution. We trust that the resolutions of the General Assembly in the field of disarmament will serve to stimulate the future work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

114. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (*interpretation from Spanish*): In view of the fact that some of the provisions of the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, which appears in annex A of the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/8059-DC/232], in the opinion of my delegation, leave much to be desired in the way of clarity and precision, I shall take the liberty in this brief preliminary statement of asking two concrete questions which I trust the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union, the co-Chairmen of the Committee on Disarmament and

co-sponsors of the draft, will be good enough to reply to in due course. My questions are the following.

115. First, according to paragraph 2 of article I, the obligations assumed in paragraph 1 of the article "shall not apply either to the coastal State or to the sea-bed beneath its territorial waters".

116. My delegation fully understands the meaning and the scope of the first of these two exceptions, the coastal State, but not the second exception. Therefore, we should be very grateful to the representatives I have just mentioned, if they would be good enough to explain to us the significance and the scope of the exception applied to the sea-bed of the territorial waters of the coastal States.

117. We believe that it would be most desirable for that explanation to be in two parts. One would cover what we might term the positive aspect of the exception; that is to say, what is to be understood as being allowed by that exception; and secondly, the negative side, namely, what the exception is not intended in any way to modify.

118. My second question deals with the scope that must be attributed to paragraph 3 of article I regarding the nuclear-free zones referred to in article IX.

119. To be more specific, and in order that my question might be better understood, may I recall that, first of all, in working paper A/C.1/995 of 1 December 1969, and later in another working paper submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 21 July 1970—which appears in the report of the Conference [*ibid.*, annex C, sect. 23]—the Mexican delegation had proposed that what is now article IX should contain a second paragraph drafted as follows:

"The States Parties to this treaty undertake not to contribute in any way to the commission in the zone referred to in article I, of acts involving a violation of such obligations."

120. At the 492nd meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, held on 1 September 1970, the representatives of the States that are joint chairmen of the Committee referred specifically to this Mexican proposal and stated what I shall now quote.

121. The representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Roshchin, as can be read in paragraph 15 of the verbatim record, stated:

"The Mexican delegation renewed the proposal it made at the twenty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly to include in the article on nuclear-free zones—article IX of the newly revised draft—an undertaking by States parties to the treaty not to contribute to the commission in the zone referred to in article I of acts involving a violation of obligations undertaken by those parties under an agreement on nuclear-free zones. In that connexion we should like to refer to paragraph 3 of article I, which embodies the obligation not to induce other States to carry out activities prohibited by the treaty. We interpret that paragraph as fully covering the Mexican proposal and as not allowing the activities mentioned in that proposal".

122. The representative of the United States, Mr. Leonard, in turn stated, as can be seen in paragraph 35 of this same verbatim record:

“With respect to the second suggestion of Mexico for article IX, it should be noted that paragraph 3 of article I of the present treaty contains an undertaking not to assist, encourage or induce any State to carry out activities falling within the prohibitions of paragraph 1 of that article. That provision, of course, would be fully applicable within any nuclear-free zone, and it would seem to achieve the same objectives with respect to the activities covered by the treaty as would the second of the two provisions suggested by the delegation of Mexico. United States support for the principle of nuclear-free zones is a matter of record; and I want to make it clear that my Government would not take any action which might prejudice the integrity of a nuclear-free zone.”

123. My question as regards the second matter is, in summary, whether we are to consider that the two declarations I have just read out represent the authorized interpretations of the Soviet Union and the United States respectively of the significance and scope of paragraph 3 of article I of the draft treaty regarding the proposal submitted by Mexico to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

124. I trust that the representatives of the Soviet Union and United States will in due course be good enough to answer my questions.

125. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): I have two speakers listed for this afternoon's meeting, one of whom has not confirmed his desire to address the Committee at that time. Therefore, in view of the very little time we have at our disposal I would appeal to all members of the Committee to place their names on the speaker list as soon as possible. I would especially draw attention to the fact that I have no speakers listed for the general debate for tomorrow, though we have only fourteen working days to consider all these items. We should therefore, I think, make the greatest possible use of the time remaining, and I would reiterate my appeal to all delegations who wish to speak in the debate to place their names on the speaker list with the Secretariat as soon as possible.

Statement by the representative of Ghana

126. Mr. CUDJOE (Ghana): I apologize for taking the floor now. I have done so to inform the Committee that owing to unforeseen circumstances it was not possible for my delegation to be present for the roll-call vote last Friday [1747th meeting] on resolutions A/C.1/L.520 and A/C.1/L.521 on the invitation aspects of the question of Korea.

127. Had my delegation been present for the vote it would have abstained on both resolutions. My delegation would

therefore be very grateful if the Committee's record could be amended accordingly.

128. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): The statement just made by the representative of Ghana will be duly noted in the record.

Tribute to the memory of Mr. Zygfryd Wolniak, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland

129. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): Before adjourning the meeting, I believe I shall be speaking for the entire Committee when I express to the delegation of Poland our sympathy on the tragic death of Mr. Zygfryd Wolniak, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland.

130. I would request the representative of Poland to be good enough to convey our condolences to his Government and the family of the deceased.

131. Mr. JAROSZEK (Poland): Mr. Chairman, I should like to express to you and to all the members of this Committee the sincere thanks of the Polish delegation for the kind words of sympathy on the tragic death of our Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Wolniak. I shall convey the sentiments of this Committee to the Polish Government and to the family of the late Mr. Wolniak.

132. With Mr. Wolniak's tragic demise the Polish Foreign Service has lost one of its most outstanding and eminent leaders. Mr. Wolniak served in the Polish diplomatic service for the last twenty-five years. Apart from his other important missions, he participated in a number of sessions of the General Assembly and took an active interest in the work of the United Nations. His tragic death brought sorrow and grief to all who knew him and co-operated with him. He will be greatly missed.

133. Mr. MIRZA (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, it is with the deepest of sorrow that we join you in expressing our condolences on the most regrettable and tragic accident that resulted in the demise of Mr. Wolniak. We have most cordial and friendly relations with the countries of Eastern Europe, and particularly Poland. We of Pakistan are deeply grieved—and I speak not only on behalf of the Government but also of all the people of Pakistan, where this tragedy occurred.

134. The Government of Pakistan will of course be conveying its condolences to the Government and people of Poland and to Mr. Wolniak's family. But I do wish here in this Committee and the greatest forum of the world community to say that the tragedy that has occurred is one that Pakistan fully shares with Poland. I should be grateful to the representative of Poland if he would convey our condolences and our deep sorrow at this very tragic accident.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.