



CONTENTS

	Page
Agenda item 32: Consideration of measures for the strengthening of international security: report of the Secretary-General ( <i>continued</i> ) . . . . .	1
Statement by the Chairman . . . . .	6

Chairman: Mr. Andrés AGUILAR M. (Venezuela).

**AGENDA ITEM 32**

**Consideration of measures for the strengthening of international security: report of the Secretary-General (*continued*) (A/7922 and Add.1-5, A/7926; A/C.1/1003, A/C.1/L.513 and 514)**

1. Mr. BEAULNE (Canada) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. Chairman, the Canadian delegation wishes the First Committee, under your chairmanship, success in its deliberations, and also wishes to congratulate you and the other members of the Bureau.

2. At our last meeting, on 3 October, the representative of Italy very ably and lucidly described to the Committee the provisions of the draft resolution [A/C.1/L.514] of which Canada has the honour to be a sponsor.

3. I should like now to put before you the considerations which led the Canadian delegation to take an active part in developing a draft resolution on the question of strengthening international security and to comment on some of the aspects of that draft to which Canada attaches particular importance.

4. In its submission to the Secretary-General [see A/7922] in response to resolution 2606 (XXIV), the Government of Canada stated:

“The strengthening of international security, in its broadest sense, is the basic objective of the United Nations. This means that all its purposes—peace, friendly relations, international co-operation and harmonizing the actions of nations—contribute to and are dependent on the strengthening of international security.”

Let us keep that fundamental proposition firmly in mind. It has been suggested in the United Nations from time to time, and most eloquently in this debate by the representative of Brazil [1725th meeting], that there is a danger that the Organization may become depoliticized through the gradual abdication of its responsibility in the maintenance of peace and security. Others have argued that the

same result might flow from an excessive concentration on matters primarily of economic and social importance. If there be such a danger, let us be alert to it. However, the debate in which we are now engaged, which follows that of last year, and the thoughtful responses from many governments to resolution 2606 (XXIV), are encouraging evidence of the willingness, indeed the determination, of Member States to ensure that questions of peace and security in their political aspects retain their primary importance in the United Nations. It is precisely because it shares that determination to the full that Canada was one of the first Members to submit its views on the subject to the Secretary-General and that it decided to embark on the formulation of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.514.

5. I submit, furthermore, that the strengthening of international security by United Nations action is not something that can be achieved by looking backward or by a fundamentalist reading of the Charter as is said to have been intended by its authors in 1945.

6. If I may quote again from my Government's submission to the Secretary-General:

“... the condition of international security cannot be usefully thought of as static. Peace is a process requiring continual adjustments among nations. Further economic and social development is sought by all. The full enjoyment of human rights in dignity by every human being must be envisaged as an essential aspect of international security. The principles of justice demand constant reassertion and defence. A stable and secure world order can be realized only if the international system is resilient and capable of evolution, and not rigid and resistant to change.”

7. Let there be no misunderstanding regarding the meaning of this evolution. I do not mean by this that it entails abandonment of principles or alteration of the Charter or extensive reconstruction of the machinery of the United Nations. It does, however, entail flexibility, and recognition of the value of usage, which in a responsible body means growth by the accretion of experience duly assimilated and applied with imagination.

8. Clearly, security cannot be imposed. The United Nations has functioned as an incubator of state sovereignty, so that the Organization has developed as an assemblage of sovereign States, none of which has so far been prepared to surrender the substance of its sovereignty unilaterally to an international body it cannot control.

9. The rapid growth of awareness of the great imbalance between developed and developing countries, coupled with

the dissolution of the colonial empires, has made it clear that the problems of world order and international security were vastly more complex than had been supposed. The prevention of war remains the preponderant task, but the new perspectives as they have opened up have revealed that it is not the only, nor is it always the most difficult, task ahead. Similarly, interrelationships between States have become far too subtle and differentiated to permit us to rely on the primary responsibility of the strong, with all that implies in the diminished responsibility of the weak.

10. We have learned by now that the disproportion between the great Powers and the smaller States is such that a surrender of responsibility by the small tends inexorably to lead towards a relative accretion of power to the great. We have also learned that the collective judgement of smaller States can make a constructive contribution to the strengthening of international security. What must, therefore, be sought is a reasonably equitable reconciliation between the broadly understood interests of each nation—not only the political but the economic, social, cultural, environmental, and technological also—and the interest in peace and security which all of us have in common.

11. My delegation is convinced that every organ of the United Nations and every provision of the Charter must be brought into play and used to its maximum capacity to this end. We cannot accept the enlargement of the powers of any one United Nations organ at the expense of another. For this reason we find that the repeated emphasis on the powers of the Security Council and the neglect of those of other principal organs in the draft declaration sponsored by Bulgaria and other delegations in document A/C.1/L.513 is an unbalanced approach.

12. Nor can we accept any approach which might lead to alteration or reinterpretation of the Charter by means other than those which the Charter itself provided. That is why the document of which the Canadian delegation is a co-sponsor is cast in the form of a resolution rather than a declaration, which is the form of the text in document A/C.1/L.513. Although a solemn declaration has, in our view, no greater legal significance than a resolution of the General Assembly, we are aware that in the view of some delegations the status of a United Nations declaration is unclear. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.514 avoids this ambiguity. The sponsors have taken particular care to adhere to all the principles and purposes of the Charter without omitting any, and without introducing new ones which have no Charter foundation. We have relied on Charter language. For the well-being of the United Nations itself we should beware of trying by indirection to legitimize partial or particular readings of the Charter. Any declaration or any resolution purporting to interpret the Charter gives rise to serious reservations if it is in any way one-sided. It is perhaps surprising that a group of delegations that are usually averse to the idea of a Charter revision should now introduce a text like document A/C.1/L.513, which, by its selectivity and lack of balance, could only weaken the Charter.

13. There are a number of specific aspects of draft resolution A/C.1/L.514 to which my delegation attaches particular importance and to which we should like to direct special attention.

14. Operative paragraph 2 deals with regional organizations and their security role. In the light of the observations of a number of delegations in the debate on this subject last year, this paragraph is so phrased as to emphasize that regional organizations must act in a manner consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter. The risk we wish to avoid is one of which all small States are aware: that of appearing to acquiesce in the dominance of any given region by the strongest State or group of States in it. We consider the juxtaposition of operative paragraphs 2 and 3 important in this connexion.

15. We would also have reservations about any formulation like that in document A/C.1/L.513, which states that it is necessary for all States in each region to participate in regional arrangements and implies, at the same time, that some purely geographical consideration should override community of interests or cultural, historical, social or economic affinities, so that States could be excluded from groupings in which their vital interests may be directly involved.

16. It is our contention that States must be free to choose whether or not, and if so, to what degree, they will participate in regional arrangements. Moreover, we consider it of fundamental importance to state, unequivocally, as did the Government of Mexico in its submission to the Secretary-General [*ibid*] that:

“the United Nations is the supreme authority in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, that such arrangements or agencies must be consistent with the purposes and principles of the world Organization, that enforcement action applied under or by such arrangements or agencies shall be subject to the provisions of Article 53, that their measures for the pacific settlement of local disputes shall be subject to the provisions of Article 52, paragraph 4, and lastly, that in the event of a conflict of obligations of the kind dealt with in Article 103, the obligations of Members under the Charter shall prevail as is stipulated in that Article.”

17. The provisions of draft resolution A/C.1/L.514, in our judgement, cover these considerations.

18. The continuation and intensification of efforts by the United Nations for the progressive development, codification and implementation of international law are an essential aspect of the strengthening of international security. The institutions engaged in this task should be capable of providing assurance to each member of the world community that peace, justice and development can be attained without recourse to methods which might jeopardize the security with which these goals are inextricably linked. Operative paragraphs 5 and 21 of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.514 deal with this fundamental matter, whereas it is totally neglected in document A/C.1/L.513.

19. There is also, as I have indicated, unused capacity in the political machinery of the United Nations which must be brought into play in the interests of genuine international security. The General Assembly and the Secretary-General have played in the past, and undoubtedly will have to play in the future, vital roles. The representative of

Brazil has already suggested means by which the efficacy of the Security Council in the pacific settlement of disputes could be enhanced. His method deserves serious consideration. Operative paragraphs 6 and 14 of document A/C.1/L.514 envisage such measures.

20. It is useful, I think, to compare the passages on disarmament and arms control in the two documents before us. Document A/C.1/L.513 speaks of general and complete disarmament, but says nothing of those cumulative collateral measures which constitute some of the most encouraging practical contributions to strengthening international security in recent years; on the other hand, they are given their appropriate place in paragraph 7 of document A/C.1/L.514. Document A/C.1/L.513 refers to nuclear disarmament, but says nothing of the competition in conventional armaments which is also a dangerous source of instability. Representatives will have noted that this question is dealt with in document A/C.1/L.514. Furthermore, in keeping with its general reticence on developmental questions, document A/C.1/L.513 says nothing of the Disarmament Decade and the relationship between disarmament and arms control, on the one hand, and the use of human and material resources in the creation of conditions of stability and well-being in the world, on the other. Paragraph 8 of document A/C.1/L.514 stresses this important matter.

21. Representatives will have noted the differences in the formulations of documents A/C.1/L.513 and 514 on the subject of peace-keeping. It is the view of the Canadian delegation that the peace-keeping functions of the United Nations have developed, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter, to complement the functions of peace-keeping covered in Chapter VI for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the enforcement measures provided for in Chapter VII. Peace-keeping requires the full use of all the resources provided by the Charter, supplemented by specific agreements covering areas of activity which have proved essential but on which the Charter is silent. To declare, as does document A/C.1/L.513, that "strict compliance with the Charter" is required in connexion with operations which the framers of the Charter could not have envisaged in the form they have taken as circumstances have changed, is to suggest that we are somehow to ignore those accretions of experience by which a living political organism evolves, and that we should therefore resign ourselves to that static state against which I warned at the outset. What are required are agreed procedures which will enable the United Nations to act constructively in situations of conflict in order to foster or maintain conditions under which peaceful settlement is possible on a generally acceptable basis and which will ensure that no State, either by exploiting United Nations peace-keeping operations or by preventing them, will be able to obtain advantages for itself to the detriment of others.

22. Finally, I should like to direct the Committee's attention to operative paragraphs 17, 18 and 19 in document A/C.1/L.514, which deal with the vital areas of development and human rights. Without a full and definite commitment to these causes the great cause of peace and security for all cannot prosper. The United Nations has laid the foundations for progress in these fields in some of its

most constructive and promising endeavours. Document A/C.1/L.513 says nothing of human rights; it overlooks entirely the great enterprise of the Second United Nations Development Decade. But these are essential pillars of the foundation on which, with the will to succeed, we can hope to erect the structure of security with justice, which we are here to build.

23. In conclusion, may I once more quote from the reply of my Government to the Secretary-General:

"The effectiveness of the United Nations depends . . . on the will of all its Members to use it to capacity and to accept the concomitant obligations, some of which may be onerous or seem to run counter to national interests narrowly conceived. Without the United Nations such a will could not be translated into practice. Without such a will the United Nations is powerless."

24. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Canada for his best wishes for success in the work of the Committee and for his kind congratulations addressed to the officers.

25. Mr. KUIŁAGA (Poland) (*interpretation from French*): Twenty-five years ago, barely emerging from a long and devastating war imposed upon them by nazism and fascism, the United Nations assumed a fundamental task: the maintenance and the strengthening of international peace and security.

26. Twenty-five years of experience, the challenge of the technological evolution in the world, the increase in destructive potential—measured in kilogrammes 25 years ago, in kilotons yesterday, in megatons today—give radically new dimensions to this key problem.

27. In these 25 years the United Nations has progressed—but too little; it has learned much—but not enough. It still has much to learn and much progress to make.

28. In these 25 years the United Nations has served as the framework, inspiration and support for liberation movements of many colonial peoples. It has helped them to accede to independence and has helped them in their difficult transition from the colonial status to that of independent, sovereign members and partners in the international community with equal rights. The United Nations has sometimes served as an arena—and more often, happily, as a forum—for disarmament negotiations as well as the elaboration of important agreements on the limitation of arms, especially nuclear arms. It is in the framework of the United Nations that the codification of political, civic, economic, social and human rights was worked out as were principles of international law. The United Nations has tried to exert a positive influence to prevent the worsening and spreading of some conflicts.

29. But if we measure the effectiveness of the United Nations compared to its vocation—in other words, the maintenance of international peace and security—we can only draw one conclusion, namely, that the United Nations did not progress sufficiently, especially because of the policy of imperialist States after the Second World War, a policy which was obstinately opposed to the peaceful

settlement of the major problems of the post-war era—some of which are only now beginning to be solved in a realistic and just manner. It is that policy which gave rise to many conflicts threatening the peace of the world, slowing the peaceful development and depriving the international community of the right to live with a feeling of actual and lasting security. It is that policy which now claims to reverse the course of history, to question the decolonization process by trying to replace the former forms of colonialism with new and just as dangerous forms of political and economic enslavement. It is that policy which deprives the Declaration of Human Rights, as developed and codified in the United Nations, of any content. It is that policy which has engendered the long and devastating wars in Indo-China and the Near East, wars which, with their proved potentiality of sudden escalation, are the main factor for instability in international relations.

30. To try to justify these actions, to reduce this responsibility and to impose upon the international community the notion of war as an instrument of policy, various theories are being put forward. Among them the theory of local wars has pride of place.

31. We condemn them. We fully share the view of Secretary-General U Thant on this subject, expressed in the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization for 1969-1970. The Secretary-General writes:

“Limited wars fought with conventional weapons during the past 25 years not only have caused terrible death and destruction, but also contain the seeds of the threat of nuclear war.”<sup>1</sup>

32. The political, military, economic and social consequences of local wars go far beyond the borders of the States where they are waged. They affect the interests of all peoples in the immediate present and long-term. They give rise to the creation of military and political groups which harm the cause of security and international co-operation. They give rise to the acceleration of the arms race at the regional and world levels.

33. The consequences of local wars in the economic field are just as devastating. To human loss of life and material destruction one must add the disorganization of international economic co-operation which falls victim to the needs of a war economy. Local wars give rise to social scourges such as the misery and pauperization of whole peoples, demoralization and the tragedy of the refugees. The effects of the armed intervention of the United States in Indo-China gives us a striking example of social pathology—the degeneracy of many social layers, increasing criminality, proliferation of drugs and the destruction of the necessary means for the solution of social and economic problems. But, especially, we cannot forget for even one minute the suffering and the tragedy of populations directly falling victims to aggression—the Viet-Nameese people and the Arab peoples.

34. Peace, like war, is indivisible at the present time. Every armed conflict, even the most localized, contains a real and

permanent danger of unleashing an explosion of means of destruction accumulated in various arsenals. Such a situation places States in the position of having to make an extremely difficult choice—either to persist in this extremely dangerous instability, or rapidly to take fundamental and necessary political decisions to put out the existing hotbeds of war, to stop the arms race and to create the indispensable conditions for the security of the world.

35. In this field we deem it essential, first of all, to put an end to hostilities and to ensure the peaceful settlement of the conflicts in Indo-China and the Near East. In both cases these are wars of aggression imposed upon the people of Viet-Nam and the Arab peoples. In both cases an explosive situation exists which could degenerate into a wider conflagration. In both cases, however, there is a real basis for a peaceful solution.

36. For Viet-Nam we have the eight-point programme presented by the representatives of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam in Paris on 17 September 1970.

37. This new Viet-Nameese initiative asks for the immediate cessation of military operations and the withdrawal of American and other troops from South Viet-Nam, as well as the liquidation of all United States military bases in that country.

38. The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam declares its intention to cease all military operations against the American units if the Government of the United States proclaims its decision to withdraw its units from Viet-Nam by 30 June 1971. The Provisional Government would then be ready to undertake negotiations designed at guaranteeing the security of units leaving Viet-Nam and the liberation of war prisoners.

39. Conditions would thus be created for a settlement of the various South Viet-Nameese problems—the formation of a new Government which would come out for peace, independence, neutrality and democratic freedoms in South Viet-Nam.

40. The proposals of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam—the complete text of which I have here at the disposal of my colleagues—is the most just basis and is fully in keeping with the urgent need to put an end to this war, a need so often stressed during this session. Let us not forget that what for the United States may be a local war is, for Viet-Nam, a total war.

41. We have also, in Security Council resolution 242 (1967), adopted unanimously on 22 November 1967, the necessary basis for liquidating the conflict in the Near East. Any assistance must now be denied the aggressor and we must implement that resolution as a whole, especially its main element, the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from all Arab territories occupied as the result of the aggression.

42. The strengthening of international security, which is a complex and difficult task, requires, in our opinion, first of all respect for the principles governing relations between States, especially fundamental provisions of the Charter,

<sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 1A, para. 20.*

respect for the decisions taken by the main organs of the United Nations on the basis of those provisions, as well as development and codification of those principles. I said respect for the principles, not their revision, because what we want is the application of those principles, including the strengthening of the implementation of Charter provisions.

43. Article 2 of the Charter contains these fundamental principles. The renunciation of the threat or use of force in international relations is fundamental for international security. That concept necessarily includes the prohibition of any act of aggression or any form of legalizing the effects of aggression. Therefrom flows the absolute need to liquidate the occupation of all territories occupied as a consequence of such acts as well as the inadmissibility of military operations whose object is to maintain or restore colonial régimes.

44. Prohibition of the use of force also includes the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Chapter VI of the Charter furnishes all the necessary possibilities of action in this field. We must not so much create new instruments as prove our will to implement provisions of that Chapter and to take the necessary political decisions. The problem of the definition of aggression is therefore extremely important as is the prohibition of any form of propaganda designed to disturb peaceful relations among States.

45. We attach great importance to the codification of the principles of international law relating to friendly relations and co-operation among States. We therefore welcome the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,<sup>2</sup> recently adopted by the Sixth Committee, of which Poland was one of the sponsors. Such codification is an important contribution to the building up of a legal basis for the peaceful coexistence of States and the strengthening of international security.

46. However, legal and diplomatic instruments, perfect though they may be, cannot in themselves guarantee peaceful coexistence.

47. The profound economic, scientific and technical changes that characterize our era create the widest possible prospects for development, provided a development strategy is worked out, based on the principle of truly global international co-operation. Hence co-operation in the interest of all without any discrimination, co-operation among all the regions of the world and all countries, irrespective of their economic and social systems, is quite correctly proposed to us by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his report on the activities of the Organization.

48. Economic, scientific and technical co-operation can, then, play a positive and active role in the development of political relations within the framework of collective security, which is our objective on the international and regional levels.

49. That is why Poland and other socialist countries attach the greatest importance to the normalization of economic

relations, especially trade relations, between countries having different systems, as also the development of those relations on the basis of equality and mutual advantage. In the name of those principles, the socialist countries, in their proposals concerning the European conference on security and co-operation, tied the idea of normalizing political relations and collective security to the idea of European co-operation in the economic, scientific and technical fields.

50. Disarmament is another material condition for international security, as is already stressed in the United Nations Charter. The further development of the situation and the experience of the cold war have further stressed that truth, which led to acceptance of the principle of general and complete disarmament. In the past decade, negotiations to that end have given rise to various important partial solutions of which we are all aware. These solutions made it possible to halt the arms race in some fields, particularly the field of nuclear weapons, by contributing to the easing of tension and the strengthening of confidence and the feeling of security in relations among States.

51. Starting from those results, we think that further negotiations on disarmament could be based upon the following principles.

52. First there should be priority for agreements aiming at stopping the arms race in the field of weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical and bacteriological—the final objective remaining the destruction of those weapons. Any progress in this field would contribute to stopping the dangerous process made possible by technology. In other words, on the one hand, weapons of mass destruction should be made conventional, and, on the other, so-called conventional weapons should be made non-conventional.

53. Secondly, partial or regional solutions should be utilized as a method of reaching the final goal, general and complete disarmament, in conformity with principles laid down in 1961 determining the responsibility and tasks of the disarmament conference in Geneva.

54. Thirdly, all States having an important military potential, and especially all nuclear States, should participate in the disarmament process.

55. Fourthly, there should be rapid and complete universal implementation of all international agreements concluded up until now, in order to ensure their full effectiveness. This is especially important in cases where the adoption of additional measures is predicated on the complete implementation of existing agreements. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*] is one example. The Geneva Protocol of 1925,<sup>3</sup> relating to the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, is another. The signing and ratification of the Protocol by States that have not yet done so—and they still number one third of the Members of the United Nations—would be of great

<sup>2</sup> For the text, see resolution 2625 (XXV).

<sup>3</sup> Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).

importance to our efforts completely to eradicate chemical and bacteriological weapons.

56. Furthermore, all States should abstain from any political, legal or military measure which could complicate disarmament negotiations and delay a solution to concrete problems as well as placing obstacles in its path.

57. I have yet to mention the strengthening of United Nations machinery. The socialist States have made proposals in their draft declaration on strengthening international security [A/C.1/L.513]. They are, naturally, addressed in the first place to the Security Council, which bears primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The socialist countries therefore propose that full use be made of the provisions of the Charter relating to the competence of the Security Council. They consider it indispensable to respect and implement decisions of the Security Council that are taken with a view to putting an end to existing conflicts, especially respect for and implementation of decisions dealing with the inadmissibility of acquiring territory through the use of force.

58. The strengthening of United Nations machinery requires full respect for the principle of universality. It is impossible to settle problems of universal security without the participation of all States. That would be contrary to the principle of the sovereignty of States and to the very idea of collective security, which implies that all States have equal rights and obligations in the strengthening of peace and the development of international co-operation. The admission to our Organization of the Democratic Republic of Germany and the Federal Republic of Germany is therefore one of the most important problems, as is the restoration of the rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations.

59. The creation of regional systems of collective security and co-operation is another essential factor.

60. On the basis of its historical experiences, its geographical position and the constitutional principles of its foreign policy, Poland has a special interest in the cause of security and co-operation in Europe. That explains its active interest in the convening of a European conference on security and co-operation the idea of which it had occasion to present here in December 1964. The proposal, put forward by the socialist States in 1967, has now become one of the main themes of the political dialogue between East and West. Its importance for Europe and the world has been confirmed, among other places in the introduction to the report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Organization and in the general debate in the Assembly.

61. We are interested—and we prove it by our actions—not only in eliminating everything that is an obstacle to peaceful coexistence in Europe and undermines the feeling

of lasting security; we want a Europe that knows neither the cold war nor the balance of terror nor territorial revisionism nor any discrimination. We are above all interested in the creation of new forms of co-operation which European evolution makes possible and necessary. We wish to give that co-operation new content in a stable security system.

62. Our idea of European regional security is intimately linked to the concept of universal and complete security in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. We consider that measures for regional security in Europe are a contribution to world peace. We have always bent every effort in that direction, and we are ready to continue doing so. The tabling by socialist States, including Poland, of the draft declaration on the strengthening of international security is a new expression of that fact.

#### *Statement by the Chairman*

63. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): We have no further speakers for this morning's meeting, but before adjourning this meeting I should like to draw the attention of members of the Committee to the note of the Secretary-General of 2 October 1970 that has been distributed to all delegations. That document relates to a new procedure suggested by the Secretary-General for the announcement of additional sponsors of draft resolutions and amendments. That procedure, if adopted, would certainly be a useful measure as far as reducing documentation is concerned.

64. I do not know if all the members of the Committee have had an opportunity of reading this document, or if anyone wishes to make a comment pertaining to the suggestions it contains.

65. I should like especially to draw the attention of the members of the Committee to paragraph 3 of this note, in which it is suggested that additional sponsors will be announced in a statement by the Chairman or a representative speaking on behalf of the original sponsors. This would be reported in the record of the meeting and of course in the report of the Committee, which would indicate the names of Member States which had joined the original sponsors. This procedure for recording additional sponsors was used successfully in the Second Committee during the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly, and has also been used from time to time in other bodies.

66. Are there any comments?

67. If there are none, I shall take it that the Committee approves the suggestion of the Secretary-General.

*It was so decided.*

*The meeting rose at 12 noon.*