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Chairman: Mr. Piero VINCI (Italy).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Galindo Pohl (El Salvador), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

Invitation aspects of the consideration of item 25, The Korean question: consideration of all relevant proposals related to the invitation aspects, such as those contained in documents A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3, L.423 and L.424 (continued)

1. Mr. SYMINGTON (United States of America): Once again the First Committee has before it the Korean question. And once again, the first aspect of this question to which we turn our attention is the invitation to Korean representatives to participate in substantive debate.
2. There is no pretence on my part to speak as an expert on the history or current political situation in Korea. Nevertheless, as a member of the Executive Branch of the United States Government in the early 1950s and a member of the Senate for sixteen years, I have followed the developments in Korea with interest.
3. In preparation for this discussion, it was felt only prudent to review the records of the past; and I found those records replete with evidence of differences of view concerning the formula which should be used to invite representatives of Korea to participate in the Assembly's substantive debate—a debate which has centred on the nature, propriety and future of responsibilities the United Nations has undertaken to help resolve the problems of the Korean people. The draft resolutions already placed before the Committee this year make it clear these differences of view have not been reconciled. One [A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3], introduced by Bulgaria, with several co-sponsors, would "invite simultaneously and without condition" a representative of North Korea and a representative of the Republic of Korea to take part in the Committee's debate. Another [A/C.1/L.423], of which my delegation is one of twelve co-sponsors, would invite a representative of the Republic of Korea. This latter draft resolution would reaffirm the Committee's willingness to invite also a representative of North Korea under circumstances identi-

cal to those in which the Republic of Korea has appeared in the past, and would be invited again: that is, when it would accept the competence and authority of the United Nations, within the terms of the Charter, to take action on the Korean question.

4. One naturally asks, what can there be about the extension of invitations—on the surface a simple procedural act—which could generate such strong differences of view? Underlying the extension of invitations, there are three questions of far-reaching and fundamental political importance: First, does this Assembly continue to believe that the United Nations has the competence and authority to deal with the Korean problem, a problem involving a nation divided against its will, along with the international friction and tension which constitute a by-product of that division? Second, does the Assembly believe the United Nations should continue to play a role in ending the division of Korea, and in reducing international friction and tension in that area? Third, assuming the Assembly does retain those beliefs, is it not necessary to avoid any action which would lead others to conclude these beliefs have weakened?

5. To be more specific, is it not both a proper and necessary means of reaffirming those beliefs to ask that those who would join our substantive debate accept the competence and authority of the United Nations to deal with this Korean question?

6. In answering the first question, that of United Nations competence and authority, it is necessary to delve briefly into history, to recall a past which some members of this Assembly, including many co-sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3, might prefer be forgotten.

7. When the Second World War ended, the people of Korea looked forward to the end of foreign rule, and the beginning of a new era of independence, freedom and unity. But this hope was short-lived. Repeated efforts outside the United Nations to reach an agreement whereby the Korean people could choose, in peace and freedom, a Government for a reunited nation proved to be a failure. They failed because of the determination of the Soviet Union to establish a Soviet-controlled Government in North Korea. It was only after the failure of these various efforts for reunification that the question of Korea was brought before the General Assembly.

8. During that same year, 1947, the Assembly adopted a programme [resolution 112 (II)] to give the Korean people independence, national unity, and a freely chosen government, and also to provide for the withdrawal of foreign forces. It was proposed that free nation-wide elections for a

national Government should take place under the eyes of an impartial commission established by this Assembly and sent to Korea with the right to travel, observe and consult throughout Korea. The Assembly's programme envisaged that the new nation-wide Government, in consultation with the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, would arrange with the occupying Powers for the withdrawal of their forces, again under the observation of the United Nations Temporary Commission.

9. It was at this point that the United Nations first heard the North Korean and Soviet claim, a claim we have heard repeated ever since: namely, that the United Nations has no right to concern itself with the unity and independence of Korea. The United Nations Commission was denied access to any portion of Korea north of the 38th parallel; and the people of North Korea were denied the right to take part in United Nations supervised national elections.

10. In South Korea, where two thirds of the people then lived, United Nations observers were welcomed and supervised elections were carried out in accordance with the programme of the General Assembly, and out of these elections, held in 1948, came into being the Republic of Korea. This was, and is, the Korean Government which has been recognized by the General Assembly [see resolution 195 (III), operative para. 2] as the only lawful Government in Korea.

11. In 1949, again pursuant to the Assembly's wishes and under the observation of a United Nations Commission, all foreign armed forces, including those of the United States, were withdrawn from South Korea. North Korea, however, refused again to grant entry to the United Nations Commission so the latter could verify the alleged withdrawal of foreign forces from the North; and the world was to learn why they did not desire these observers.

12. On 25 June 1950, nearly one year to the day after the withdrawal of all foreign forces from South Korea, North Korea launched a massive military invasion across the 38th parallel, attested to by eyewitness reports of the United Nations Commission. Within hours after the North Korean attack, the Republic of Korea appealed to the United Nations to send military forces to repel the North Korean aggression, and the prompt response of the Security Council is one of the bright pages in the history of the United Nations. On the same day the Council passed a resolution [resolution 82 (1950)] calling for both a cease-fire and withdrawal to the 38th parallel of all North Korean troops.

13. Two days later, on 27 June, the Council passed a further resolution [resolution 83 (1950)] calling upon Members of the United Nations to furnish to the Republic of Korea all assistance necessary to repel this armed attack. Sixteen Member countries, including my own, responded to this call and fought under the United Nations Command established pursuant to a third resolution of the Council [resolution 84 (1950)]. Many others contributed in other ways. And let us note that after three years of combat entailing heavy casualties along with massive destruction, this aggression was repelled and an armistice signed.

14. In October 1950, long before the armistice, the General Assembly acted [resolution 376 (V)] to reaffirm

the peaceful aims of the United Nations in Korea, to end the division of Korea by peaceful means, and to establish by free elections, not by force, a unified, independent, and democratic Korean Government. Over the subsequent two decades, these objectives have been reaffirmed repeatedly by this Assembly; and while North Korea may continue to frustrate them, they cannot render them invalid.

15. The record is clear that the United Nations has the competence and authority to deal with this Korean problem.

16. Let us now turn to the second question, namely, does the Assembly desire that the United Nations continue its role in helping end the division of Korea and thereby reduce international friction and tension? In this case also, the record of past decisions reveals a repeated and affirmative answer from a broad geographical spectrum of United Nations Members. More relevant to the continued United Nations role than any record, however, are the events which have transpired within Korea itself, events which continue even as we begin this discussion. These events have implications which should convince anyone of the vital necessity, in the interest of peace, for the presence of the United Nations in Korea.

17. Those concerned with peace in Asia have long been disturbed by the frequent reiteration by North Korea of a doctrine which calls for carrying "the revolutionary struggle" from the north to the south; but even more disquieting have been the recently accelerated actions of North Korea to put that doctrine into practice.

18. For the last two years, as attested by two reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, by three reports of the United Nations Command submitted during the past year, and by many accounts in the world press, North Korean violations of the 1953 Armistice Agreement have been taking place at a high and increasingly dangerous level.

19. The number of serious incidents resulting from these violations—infiltration of armed agents across the Demilitarized Zone, landings from the sea of armed North Korean bands well into the interior of the Republic of Korea, terrorist activities against ordinary civilians and the highest officials of the Republic of Korea—has totalled more than 1,000 since the fall of 1966. Four hundred and fifty incidents have occurred in the southern portion of the Demilitarized Zone between 1 January and 15 November of this year, already more than the total of such incidents for all of 1967.

20. The most outrageous and potentially explosive of all these violations occurred last January when a group of thirty-one North Korean commandos, drawn from the 124th Guerrilla Unit established in 1966, attempted to raid the Presidential Palace in Seoul in order to assassinate President Park of South Korea.

21. Less than four weeks ago, forces from the 124th Guerrilla Unit launched the largest infiltration effort ever, since the signing of the Armistice Agreement in 1953. Between 30 October and 2 November, a large number of North Korean commandos, currently estimated to be about

sixty, landed from boats on the east coast of South Korea in an area some 100 miles south of the demilitarized zone. These commandos then worked their way several miles inland over rough terrain, travelling at night and hiding in the mountains during the day. As of today, forty of these North Koreans have been found and killed by South Korean security forces. Those still at large are apparently seeking to make their way back to North Korea over land.

22. The source of these commandos, the testimony of those captured and interrogated, and the activities they engaged in after landing from the sea leave no doubt that their mission was to test the feasibility of establishing bases for future guerrilla operations against the Republic of Korea.

23. Nor has my own Government been spared the hostility of North Korea during the past year. Since the illegal and outrageous seizure of the *Pueblo* in international waters last 26 January, not only has its crew of eighty-two men been held hostage, but the leaders of North Korea have even refused to entertain requests that neutral representatives, who could not possibly be considered unfriendly to North Korea, be permitted to visit and verify the health and well-being of this detained crew. Members of the Congress, as well as all the people of the United States, are awaiting with increasing impatience the release of these men.

24. In the light of all these actions, one can only surmise whether North Korea has made a policy decision to disregard the prohibitions and restraints to which it committed itself under the terms of the 1953 Armistice Agreement.¹

25. In any case, it is not necessary to be an alarmist, nor is it necessary to conclude that North Korea has made such a decision, to recognize that there has never been a time when it was more important for this Assembly to reaffirm, and without equivocation, its conviction that the role of the United Nations in Korea should be continued.

26. Now, I would turn to the third question raised at the outset of this statement, namely, if the General Assembly believes the United Nations has the authority to deal with the Korean question, if it believes the United Nations should continue to play a role in Korea, should we not reaffirm those convictions through the formula which we now use in inviting representatives of Korea to participate in the substantive debate?

27. The co-sponsors of the Bulgarian draft resolution [*A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3*] have tried hard, more so this year than ever before, to depict the invitation formula, which they favour, as being motivated by considerations of fair play and a desire to hear both sides of the question, along with a wish to do nothing incompatible with the dignity of either party involved. But the history of this issue reveals what their statements and speeches seek to obscure, namely, that the basic, if not the only, motivation in their approach to the question of Korea, including the invitation aspect, is identical with that of North Korea

itself. That approach could only rest upon the premise that the United Nations has no right to concern itself, in any way, with the Korean question.

28. This assertion is not made lightly, nor without full evidence. The attitude of North Korea is well enough known and fresh enough in our memories to require but brief mention. Only last July, in chapter IV of its memorandum of 25 July 1968, North Korea restated its basic position that the United Nations has “no ground or authority to meddle in the Korean question”, and that it “must not discuss the question of the unification of Korea, an internal affair to be settled by the Korean people themselves”. [*See A/C.1/970.*] Later, North Korea forwarded a government statement of 21 September to the Secretary-General. It states in part that “The Korean question is by no means a question to be discussed at the United Nations by nature”. The statement continues: “. . . it is already outrageous to discuss the Korean question at the United Nations”. It further states: “If the United Nations really wants to act in accordance with the objectives and principles of its Charter, it must not discuss the Korean question any more but withdraw without delay all measures taken by the illegal ‘resolutions’ on the ‘Korean question’ . . .” [*see A/C.1/966*].

29. Some may have forgotten, however, that the co-sponsors of the Bulgarian draft resolution share this attitude; and, therefore, it is worth while to recall certain salient facts. All but one of the co-sponsors of the draft resolution in A/C.1/L.422 have consistently voted, either in the General Committee, or in the Assembly itself, even against placing the Korean question on the agenda. Furthermore, all these co-sponsors have consistently voted for, or presented to this Committee, substantive draft resolutions such as that introduced last year stating that “there should be no further discussion of the ‘Korean question’ in the United Nations”.²

30. The opposition of the co-sponsors to placing this Korean question on our agenda, along with their support of draft resolutions which would bar the Assembly from even discussing it, have not been justified on grounds that the United Nations role in Korea should be altered or revised; rather, their premise is that the United Nations can and should play no role whatsoever in Korea.

31. One might ask whether this attitude is not analogous to the reasoning behind the doctrine enunciated in rejecting the right of the United Nations to concern itself with events in Eastern Europe this past summer—the doctrine that international relations within the “socialist commonwealth” and actions by one or more members of that commonwealth against another are not governed by the principles of the Charter and cannot be a subject of concern to this Organization.

32. Leaving aside any implications of the attitude of the co-sponsors of the Bulgarian draft resolution, none will deny that the division of Korea does exist, that this is contrary to the wishes of a large majority of the Korean

¹ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1963*, document S/3079, appendix A.

² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes*, agenda item 33, document A/6906, para. 10 (c), operative para. 2.

people, and that it is a source of continuing international friction and tension.

33. In these circumstances, I submit that an attitude which denies the United Nations the right to exercise its competence and authority over the Korean problem has no basis in law, no basis in the Charter and, what is at least as important, no basis in common sense. For, clearly, it would contribute to instability, not peace and security, in North-East Asia. I submit further that any action which would grant respectability to this attitude would not only be a great disservice to this Organization, but also would be an encouragement to those who seek to declare certain areas of the world "off-limits" to the United Nations.

34. It is evident that the Bulgarian draft resolution stems from an attitude which both denies and rejects any international responsibility for resolving the problems of Korea. Stripped to its bare meaning, that attitude carries the message: "Korea—off-limits to the world community".

35. By contrast, the invitation formula as contained in draft resolution A/C.1/L.423, sponsored by Australia, Bolivia, Central African Republic, Colombia, Costa Rica, Japan, Madagascar, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, Togo and my own country, the United States, represents a conviction that the United Nations has the right to concern itself with the grave problems of the people of Korea.

36. What we face in these two differing draft resolutions is not a difference as to how the United Nations should carry out its responsibility, but rather whether the United Nations has, or can have, any responsibility whatever with respect to Korea.

37. The strength of our support for the tenets contained in draft resolution A/C.1/L.423 bears out the strength of our conviction that the United Nations must continue to exercise its responsibility in Korea. We believe that the formula used to invite representatives of Korea to join the debate must uphold the authority and the competence of the United Nations to continue to deal with a problem which all recognize as being related to the peace and security of Asia.

38. For these reasons, we oppose the Bulgarian draft resolution A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3 and respectfully urge the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/L.423.

39. Mr. DUGERSUREN (Mongolia) (*translated from Russian*): I shall be very brief and shall refrain from commenting on the substance of agenda item 25, as my delegation will have an opportunity to do so later.

40. As a co-sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3, my delegation advocated at the very outset of the Committee's work that a favourable decision should be taken on inviting representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and of South Korea to take part in the discussion of questions relating to Korea. Like the other co-sponsors of the draft resolution, my delegation was prompted by a desire to bring about appropriate conditions for a workmanlike discussion of questions which are of vital importance to the Korean people.

41. We are also mindful of the need to allow as much time as possible to the representatives of the parties concerned to prepare for participation in the work of the United Nations. This consideration, of course, applies primarily to representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, for I am convinced that the representatives of South Korea have been here for a long time and have been making ready to take part in the debate. There can be no doubt that Washington has already made the necessary arrangements.

42. No one who respects the spirit of the United Nations Charter and is guided by impartiality and desire for justice can deny that the proposal contained in draft resolution A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3 is timely and reasonable.

43. The fact is that those who claim that this proposal is not purely procedural have been unable to summon up arguments of any value to support their view.

44. Both the parties concerned must be given an equal opportunity to take part in the discussion of a question which concerns them directly. That is an elementary requirement for the proper consideration of any case.

45. Consequently, the twelve-Power draft resolution [A/C.1/L.423] which would make the invitation of the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea subject to an entirely unreasonable condition is lacking in both common sense and a sense of reality. Its sponsors are trying to induce the Committee to repeat an old and grievous mistake in order to please those who continue to use the United Nations flag as a cover for their aggressive acts against the vital interests of the Korean people, and against the cause of international peace and security in Asia and the Far East.

46. Adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/L.423 would amount to denying to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea the right to take part in the discussion of a question which vitally affects it, for the sole reason that it has dared to say that the United Nations must not intervene in the internal affairs of the Korean people.

47. The sponsors of this draft resolution try to give the impression that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is defying the United Nations. But in its statement of 21 September 1968 [A/C.1/966], the Government of that country made it clear once again that it was opposing not the authority of the United Nations, but any discussion by the United Nations of the Korean question on the basis—and this is important—of the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, and any discrimination with regard to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the matter of participation by representatives of the parties concerned. In the above-mentioned statement, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea emphasizes that it respects and has always respected the United Nations Charter and its purposes.

48. My delegation is convinced that no one can successfully challenge the correctness of that Government's position. The fact that for many years the United Nations has discussed the Korean question on the basis of reports of

the so-called United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea has been one of the principal obstacles in the way of the reunification of Korea on a peaceful and democratic basis. These reports, like the Commission in all its activities, have always pursued the sole purpose of justifying the occupation of South Korea by United States forces and thereby perpetuating the division of the country.

49. The question of the reunification of Korea must be decided by the Korean people themselves, without any outside interference. The immediate withdrawal of United States troops from South Korea and the dissolution of the so-called United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, as proposed by the socialist, African and Asian countries, can alone create favourable conditions for such a decision.

50. For our Committee to allow draft resolution A/C.1/L.423 to be adopted would be tantamount to the United Nations taking over United States policy and methods—the “big stick” policy and police methods—with regard to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, i.e., the country which truly represents the interests of the Korean people.

51. With all due respect to the First Committee and the United Nations, I must take the liberty of pointing out that this grievous mistake has been perpetuated for nearly twenty years. No verbal tricks or distortion of facts can justify in the eyes of history those who have been consistently inciting the United Nations to act in flagrant contradiction with the spirit and principles of its Charter.

52. The utterly unjustified activities of the United States and its followers are doing the greatest harm to the authority and prestige of the United Nations. An end should have been put long ago to this intolerable situation.

53. My delegation therefore appeals to members of the Committee to take a realistic and impartial attitude and to vote to invite representatives of both the parties concerned, without any condition, for the purpose of taking part without the right of vote in the discussion of questions which have a bearing on the fate of the Korean people.

54. Mr. JIMENEZ (Philippines): Fifteen years have now passed since the guns fell silent in the cold and barren wastes of Korea. Fifteen years must seem very long especially if we consider the slow and laborious process of negotiation over Korea which has been dragging on in seemingly hopeless frustration. But the time is really short when viewed in the context of the 4,000 years of Korea’s history as a civilized nation, and in the light of the cardinal importance of achieving the United Nations declared objectives in that country.

55. While it is true that the Korean question has been repeatedly discussed in this Committee, and quite possibly nothing that we may say now has not been already said before, this should not deter us from dealing with the problem once again. The fact that this question has repeatedly appeared on the agenda serves to underline its far-reaching importance.

56. It cannot be denied that Korea remains the special responsibility of the United Nations. It was at Cairo and

Potsdam that the Allied Powers pledged that Korea in due course should become free and independent. It was the General Assembly which in 1947 resolved to re-establish the national independence of Korea and unify it through the process of free elections. After elections were held under United Nations auspices in South Korea, with efforts to hold them in North Korea having been frustrated by an illegally established communist régime, it was the General Assembly which in 1948 gave the seal of legitimacy to the Republic of Korea and declared it to be the only lawful Government in Korea. When the North Korean armed forces launched their unprovoked invasion against the Republic of Korea in 1950, it was again the United Nations which rushed to the defence of the beleaguered land and saved it from being overwhelmed in defeat. Korea is, therefore, a special child of the United Nations, and our Organization cannot but take a fatherly interest in its affairs.

57. The First Committee is again confronted with the question of whether invitations should be extended to the representatives of the Republic of Korea and the so-called Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to participate in the discussion of the Korean question.

58. My delegation does not find it difficult to agree to the general proposition that it would be desirable to have a dialogue between the parties directly involved in a dispute. But it would also be desirable to determine first whether that dialogue would be fruitful and meaningful and would redound to the best interest of the said parties, and to the interests of peace and security in the area.

59. In order to have such a fruitful and meaningful dialogue, the parties concerned should be motivated by the best of intentions and they should demonstrate a sincere effort to find a solution to their problem. It is a well-settled principle that those who seek justice and equity must come with clean hands.

60. We do not dispute the argument that equity requires the participation of interested parties. But equity likewise requires that one party should not have an advantage over the other in subscribing to a condition which is made applicable to both. The imposition of the same condition to both parties is not a discriminatory act. But it would certainly be inequitable and impractical for one party to accept the condition and for the other not to do so. What we then expect from the parties involved in the question before this Committee is a recognition by both of the competence and authority of the United Nations.

61. In my intervention during the meetings of this Committee in previous years, I have said that the Republic of Korea and the so-called Democratic People’s Republic of Korea could not be bracketed in the same category because of the following considerations.

62. Firstly, while the Republic of Korea has consistently recognized the competence and authority of the United Nations, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has persistently refused to accept, and has even challenged, that competence and authority.

63. Secondly, since its establishment, the Republic of Korea has religiously and whole-heartedly co-operated with

the United Nations in order to attain the Organization's objectives—the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea—while the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has persistently obstructed the efforts of the United Nations, has maintained its militant posture in relation to the Republic of Korea, and has continued to adopt a policy of defiance and contempt towards our Organization.

64. Thirdly, the Republic of Korea is the only legitimate Government of Korea recognized by the United Nations under General Assembly resolution 195 (III) of 12 December 1948.

65. The same reasons continue to be as valid now as they were before.

66. The national leaders of the Republic of Korea have on numerous occasions reaffirmed their support for the solution of the Korean question through the United Nations. On 1 August 1968, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea reiterated that the Republic of Korea would continue to accept the competence and authority of the United Nations to deal with the Korean question and to co-operate with the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea in its efforts to attain the objectives of the United Nations. On 1 February 1968, the President of the Republic of Korea expressed the wish to accomplish Korean territorial unification as early as possible through free elections to be held in both South and North Korea.

67. On the other hand, what is the attitude of the national leaders of North Korea? They have reaffirmed their rejection of any role or responsibility by the United Nations in finding a solution to the Korean problem. In chapter IV of a memorandum issued on 25 July 1968 and reproduced in *The People's Korea* on 31 July, it was stated that the United Nations had “no ground or authority to meddle in the Korean question”; that it “must not discuss the question of the unification of Korea, an internal affair to be settled by the Korean people themselves”; and that it “must put an end to the illegal discussion of the ‘Korean question’” [see A/C.1/970]. In a memorandum of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea dated 18 July 1968 and circulated upon the request of the representative of the Soviet Union, it was stated that the United Nations “. . . has no ground or right whatsoever to be concerned in the Korean question. The United Nations has been reduced to a belligerent in the Korean war. . . .” [See A/C.1/971.]

68. On 21 September 1968 the North Korean régime stated that:

“If the United Nations really wants to act in accordance with the objectives and principles of its Charter, it must not discuss the ‘Korean question’ any more but withdraw without delay all measures taken by the illegal ‘resolutions’ on the ‘Korean question’ . . .” [see A/C.1/966].

69. Can the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea be equated, when their attitudes toward the Organization are worlds apart? Can we be assured that a fruitful and meaningful dialogue would take place in the First Committee when the Democratic People's

Republic of Korea has been challenging all along the authority and competence of the United Nations and has been demanding the revocation of resolutions which it describes as “illegal”?

70. If the answers to these questions are in the negative—and indeed it must be—then there is no basis for the claim that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea must be invited on grounds of equity and justice.

71. My delegation holds the view that unless and until the North Korean régime purges itself of its continued defiance and intransigent attitude toward the United Nations, we have no option but to refuse its participation in our deliberations.

72. Last year, the First Committee offered an opportunity to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by expressing the Committee's willingness to invite its representatives provided it first accepted the competence and authority of the United Nations, which the Republic of Korea has already done; but the North Korean régime has squandered that chance.

73. While the Republic of Korea has given, and continues to give, all-out co-operation to all the efforts of the United Nations to unify Korea in accordance with the principles reaffirmed in numerous resolutions of the General Assembly, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has persistently obstructed these efforts. The North Korean régime has opposed the United Nations formula for peaceful unification based on free elections.

74. It is most unfortunate that the North Korean régime has maintained its militant posture toward the Republic of Korea. It has even launched a new series of dangerous and provocative actions in South Korea, and has intensified its campaign of infiltration and subversion against the Republic of Korea, thereby creating the most dangerous situation to the peace of the area since the Armistice of 1953. In a letter dated 18 November 1968 addressed to the Secretary-General and circulated in document A/C.1/975, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea charged that for the period from 21 October to 4 November 1968, the North Korean régime had committed fifty-one major violations of the Armistice Agreement by sending armed raiders deep into the south and by raiding guard posts south of the demilitarized zone. An Associated Press dispatch dated 23 November reported that two captured members of a sixty-man North Korean guerrilla team that landed along South Korea's eastern shore three weeks ago said that their primary mission was to set up bases for a revolutionary struggle against the Republic of Korea. They were assigned to the North Korean Army's 124th Unit engaged in training many thousands of special combat cadres for espionage, subversion and terrorism in South Korea. They were misguided, they said, about the South Koreans because they were told that the South Korean villagers would give them full support for their revolutionary struggle. They were, therefore, surprised when they faced resistance. They had miscalculated the patriotic spirit of the South Koreans. South Korean leaders believed that the landing, which was the largest single penetration of South Korea since the Armistice of 1953, was a stage setter for more such infiltration by sea in an attempt to start Viet-Cong-style

guerrilla warfare in the south. These outrageous provocations and aggressive designs, which constitute a threat to the peace and security of the region, should be condemned by all peace-loving nations of the world. They are contrary to what a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman said on 27 February 1968 that his Government:

“has consistently made every sincere effort to turn the armistice in Korea into a solid peace and realize the unification of Korea independently by the Korean people themselves and by peaceful means based on principles of democracy”.

75. The claim of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that it is the only legitimate power in Korea is not only absurd but also without any legal basis. The Republic of Korea is the only lawful Government in Korea recognized by the United Nations and based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate. The Republic of Korea has diplomatic and/or consular relations with 89 States of which 85 are Members of the United Nations. A total of 328 treaties and agreements have been entered into by the Republic of Korea. It is a member of all but one of the specialized agencies of the United Nations. On the other hand, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea came into being without the benefit of the elections provided for in General Assembly resolution 112 (II) of 14 November 1947. The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was barred from entering North Korea.

76. It has been claimed that it is not proper for a United Nations body to impose conditions on a sovereign State before it participates in the deliberations of that body. It is further claimed that it is only in the case of the admission of new Members that conditions may be imposed on sovereign States. This is, however, contrary to the truth. Article 32 of the Charter provides:

“The Security Council shall lay down such conditions as it deems just for the participation of a state which is not a Member of the United Nations.”

77. The Charter does not prohibit the General Assembly from imposing conditions, and it is therefore proper for the First Committee to do so. In the light of these considerations and in view of the continued militant and defiant attitude of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, this Committee should reject the participation of that régime in our discussion. It is precisely because of these considerations that my delegation has co-sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/L.423, which we commend to this Committee for the widest support. We also ask this Committee to reject once again draft resolution A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3.

78. Mr. HSUEH (China) (*translated from Chinese*): The debate on the question whether the First Committee should invite a representative of the Korean communists to take part in the discussion of the Korean question is an exercise in futility. Year after year, the First Committee unfortunately wastes its time on this procedural question.

79. The issues involved here are only too clear to be debated. In the first place, there is General Assembly resolution 195 (III), by which the United Nations recognizes the Government of the Republic of Korea as the only

lawful Government in Korea. In the eyes of the United Nations, it is the Government of the Republic of Korea and that Government alone which speaks for the Korean people in international affairs. I know of no act on the part of the General Assembly which revokes that resolution.

80. Certainly, it is not for the First Committee to contravene the decision of the General Assembly. By inviting at the same time a representative of the communist régime in the northern provinces of Korea to come to the First Committee also to speak for the Korean people, even for a fraction of them, the First Committee would obviously step beyond its boundaries of propriety. I do not have to point out here that the communist régime has never submitted itself to the free will of even the people under its control and that it is not representative of any part of the Korean people. I will leave that point to a later stage when the substance of the Korean question is discussed.

81. Secondly, even if it should be the intention of the First Committee to invite the Korean communists to take part in the debate as individuals because they occupy a part of the Korean territory by force, then it must first consider what purpose would be served by their presence. Would they come here to make a positive contribution to a peaceful settlement of the Korean question which has remained on our agenda for more than twenty years? It has been argued that, for this long-drawn-out debate to achieve a result, both sides should be heard. But the communist side has already told the First Committee, just to quote from its statement of 21 September 1968, that “the Korean question is by no means a question to be discussed at the United Nations by nature”. [*See A/C.1/966.*] It is clear that, if invited, the Korean communists would come here only with the intention of removing the Korean question from our agenda. They are not interested even in a discussion of the Korean question, not to speak of a solution. It is indeed a high form of mockery to call the Korean communists an interested party, as they are so called in the substantive paragraph of the draft resolution A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3. In fact, they are an uninterested party. They deny the competence and authority vested in the United Nations by the Charter to seek a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. The fact is that they do not want a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Their presence here will not help the First Committee to achieve any positive result in its consideration of the Korean question but, on the contrary, will produce a negative effect on its discussion.

82. Therefore, it is obvious that the proposed invitation to be extended, with or without conditions, to the Korean communists is legally unsound and politically unwise. My delegation is opposed to any such proposals.

83. I do not have to comment on the proposed invitation to be extended to the Government of the Republic of Korea. It appears to have received the unanimous approval of the First Committee. This is no surprise because, as I have already pointed out, the Government of the Republic of Korea is recognized by the United Nations as the only lawful government in Korea and because, while that Government is still unjustifiably barred from the membership of the United Nations, it has always co-operated wholeheartedly with this Organization in a constructive

effort to achieve the United Nations objectives in Korea. My delegation will vote on the draft resolutions or any part thereof accordingly.

84. Mr. BELOKOLOS (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): My delegation wishes to express its satisfaction at the fact the First Committee has found the time to revert to its consideration of the question of inviting representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to take part in our discussion. I would merely like to point out that this question is becoming extremely urgent, since only a very few weeks remain until the end of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly, while the Korean question is quite complicated and any impartial consideration of it will require a good deal of time.

85. At our very first meetings, when we discussed the organization of the First Committee's work, a number of delegations took an impartial and fair position and advocated that an invitation should be issued to representatives of both parts of Korea without any conditions whatever.

86. The current discussion shows that the representatives of many countries, including countries which are situated at a very considerable distance from the Korean peninsula and which can hardly be accused of preconceived notions or lack of impartiality, agree that the time has come to take the first constructive step in the whole long history of this question in the United Nations, namely, invite, without any conditions or qualifications, the representatives of both parts of Korea—the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and South Korea—to participate in the discussion of this question.

87. My delegation deems this to be a constructive and eminently proper course of action. Consequently, as a co-sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3, it vigorously endorses the views of those delegations which favour an unconditional invitation being extended to both parts of Korea to participate in our debate.

88. The Korean question has been on the agenda of the United Nations for decades, and the debate on it ends every year with the adoption of a resolution which, far from promoting the unification of Korea, hinders it and still further exacerbates the situation in an area which so eagerly desires peace and tranquillity. The root of the evil lies in an unjust approach to this question which contravenes the United Nations Charter. Why should the United Nations have decided, time and again, to discuss the Korean question in the absence of representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea? Surely no one can really think that the Korean problem can be solved without the participation of one of the parties concerned. If the First Committee wishes to be fully impartial and if it respects the Charter of the United Nations, it must certainly adopt without delay a resolution inviting representatives of both parts of Korea to its discussions.

89. Inviting the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to come here would be the first constructive step towards a solution of the Korean question throughout its twenty-year-long history taken by the United Nations. It is also a step dictated by the present composition of the First Committee.

90. Twenty years ago, when the so-called Korean question first appeared on the agenda, only fifty-five States were Members of the United Nations, so that the seventy States which have joined the United Nations since that time have had nothing to do with the emergence of the Korean question and with the way it has been dealt with in the United Nations.

91. Why should we not today support the legitimate request of many delegations and hear directly from representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea a statement concerning their Government's policy and its views about the so-called Korean question as a whole, its proposals for ways out of the existing situation and its plans for the solution of this old and familiar problem? Not to heed these rational appeals, not to accept or meet them halfway would mean to act contrary to reason and to the United Nations Charter; it would mean to allow ourselves to be led, even as twenty years ago, by the United States and some of its partisans, which have found it useful and profitable to keep the flames of the so-called Korean question smouldering for decades.

92. Does such behaviour, do such tactics in dealing with the question enhance the prestige and authority of the United Nations? I am deeply convinced that the numerous representatives who have answered this question in the negative are right.

93. That is why the Ukrainian delegation urges all other delegations to support the proposal in draft resolution A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3 submitted by Bulgaria, Hungary, Guinea, Cambodia, the Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Mauritania, Mali, Mongolia, Syria and other States. Their proposal to invite simultaneously and without condition the two Korean interested parties to take part, without the right to vote, in the discussion of questions relating to Korea is the only possible way to a constructive solution of the Korean question.

94. On the other hand, to support the draft resolution submitted by a group of countries headed by the United States [A/C.1/L.423] and to embrace the course which for many years they have been stubbornly imposing on the United Nations means to doom to failure any attempt to solve the Korean question and to continue along the old, much-travelled and hopeless path which can only lead to an impasse.

95. The attitude of the sponsors of the draft resolution, and in particular of the United States of America, Australia, and others, is in line with their old obstructionist tactics—to prevent at any cost and by any means a normal, objective and efficient consideration of questions relating to Korea.

96. This time too, in his statement [1618th meeting], the Australian representative made a determined and rather crude effort to misrepresent entirely the question of inviting Korean representatives and to convince the delegations here present that there is some justification for the approach advocated by the United States of America, Australia, and their supporters.

97. To begin with, it ought to be explained to the Australian representative that the subject under discussion

today is the invitation of representatives, and not the substance of the problem. We shall have something to say on the substance later.

98. The Australian representative also traced in great detail the past history of the Korean problem, with numerous references to past discrimination with regard to the participation of representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in an attempt to justify further injustice and illegality in dealing with this question. It is to be regretted that, in giving a detailed presentation of the background of the Korean question, the Australian representative should have used up the entire arsenal of methods and tactics which are so dear to the hearts of those who wish to preserve the spirit and traditions of the cold war with regard to this question.

99. It is indeed surprising to what extent the Australian representative still appears to be imbued with ideas dating back twenty years—but one should remember that history does not stand still—when, as he said, he represented his country on the notorious Korean Commission. He went so far as to assert that the refusal of the socialist countries, and in particular of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, to be represented in the United Nations Commission for Korea was, if you please, one of the reasons for Korea's continuing division.

100. Thus, an attempt is being made once again to justify the continuing intervention of the imperialist Powers in the affairs of the Korean people through the United Nations Commission for Korea, which the Korean people repudiate as a tool for brazen interference in their affairs.

101. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic takes the same position with regard to the existing United Nations Commission for Korea as it did with regard to the Commission which was set up to please a certain group of States in 1947. It supports the just and legitimate demand of the Korean people as stated in the proposal of a large group of African, Asian and socialist countries to the effect that the United Nations Commission for Korea should be dissolved at once, so that this unlawful organ of the United Nations could no longer be used for intervention in the affairs of the Korean people.

102. The question of the unification of Korea is an internal matter for the Korean people itself to settle, as it wishes, by peaceful democratic means and without any outside interference.

103. The reasons for the continuing division of Korea and the dangerously tense situation in that country are known to all. I believe that the Australian representative, too, is well aware of them. For it is Australia, along with the United States and some other countries which took part in the aggression against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and which are still continuing their lawless and flagrant intervention in the Korean people's affairs, that is entirely responsible for Korea's being divided, for Korea's present position, and for the hardship and suffering that have fallen to the lot of the Korean people.

104. However, my delegation reserves the right to speak to the substance of the question at a more convenient time.

105. Mr. ČERNÍK (Czechoslovakia): The Czechoslovak delegation would like to express its position concerning the question of the invitation of the representatives of the two parts of Korea to participate in the debate which affects them directly. In this connexion, we wish to proceed from the discussion which took place at the beginning of our Committee's activities when we considered questions pertaining to the organization of our work. We noted with satisfaction that during that debate a great number of delegations had already expressed themselves in favour of the unconditional invitation to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. We fully support the position that the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should participate in the discussion of affairs which directly affect the Government and the people of that country. The representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have so far not been able to explain in the United Nations forum their position on the fundamental questions which so vitally concern all the Korean people.

106. That untenable situation has been caused by the procedural manoeuvres of certain States which are aimed at preventing the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from being present in the debate. Those States which have used discriminatory measures have also attempted this year to proceed in the same manner. I have in mind draft resolution A/C.1/L.423, submitted by the United States and ten other States. Under that draft resolution, the participation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would subject to unacceptable conditions its participation in the discussion of problems that are of direct concern to it. Such a procedure is contrary to the principles of the Charter and, consequently, the Czechoslovak delegation will vote against it.

107. The Czechoslovak delegation wishes to express its belief that the majority of Member States will recognize the justification of the demand of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as expressed in the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3, of which Czechoslovakia is a co-sponsor. We hope also that the decision relating to this question will be made without delay so that the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea can come to New York in time in order to participate in our deliberations on the substance of the problem.

108. Mr. KA (Senegal) (*translated from French*): Mr. Chairman, I wish to associate my delegation with the congratulations addressed to you by earlier speakers. I am particularly happy to do so as my country, receptive to all the life-giving winds of civilization, maintains good relations with the countries of three different continents represented by our officers. My delegation will lend you its support and understanding in your arduous task.

109. My delegation would like to speak briefly on the Korean problem, which has been discussed by the First Committee ever since it arose. In particular, it wishes to explain its position on the draft resolutions inviting the two Koreas to take part in our debates.

110. Faithful to the enriching practice of the dialogue and of peaceful and constructive confrontation of ideas, Senegal feels that a thorough examination of the question of the

two Koreas cannot be fruitful without the participation at our debates of the representatives of these two Koreas, who alone can tell us what they think of the problem before us. I am convinced that representatives of the two Koreas could bring us useful information and that the Committee would then be able to take due account of all the elements of both cases.

111. My delegation has noted with satisfaction the letter dated 14 October 1968 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea addressed to the Secretary General [A/C.1/968 and Corr. 2], reaffirming that his country accepts the competence and authority of the United Nations.

112. My Government, being faithful to the principle of self-determination, is prepared to support any draft resolution inviting both Koreas to our debate, provided that the

two countries unequivocally accept the competence and authority of the United Nations within the terms of the Charter.

113. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Senegal for his congratulations addressed to the Chair.

114. The statement by the representative of Senegal concludes the list of speakers scheduled for today's meeting. I have therefore to inform the Committee that tonight's meeting has been cancelled. However, there are twenty-eight speakers on my list for tomorrow, so that it may be difficult to avoid having a night meeting tomorrow. Everything will depend, as today, on the length of the speeches made.

The meeting rose at 5 p.m.