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Chairman: Mr. Piero VINCI (Italy).

AGENDA ITEMS 27, 28, 29, 94 AND 96

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (continued) (A/7189-DC/231; A/C.1/L.443, L.444 and Add.1-7, L.445 and Add.1, L.446, L.448/Rev.1, L.449)

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1. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (*translated from French*): There are two matters on which the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria would like to make some remarks in addition to those I made already in my first

statement to the Committee [1616th meeting]. These two questions are, speaking generally, the following: the possibility of opening negotiations concerning the limitation of vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons which were mentioned in some statements made by the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, and the problem of general and complete disarmament which has been on the agenda of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and of our Organization in general for a long time.

2. There is no need, and it would serve no purpose, to dwell at the present time on the question of how the question of the limitation and final elimination of vehicles for the delivery of strategic weapons arose and who was the first to propose such an initiative. What is important at the moment is that the two parties principally concerned, namely the Soviet Union and the United States of America, have found it possible to state, through their authorized representatives, that they are interested in opening discussions to find an acceptable solution to this important problem.

3. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko, in fact stated during the general debate at this session [1699th plenary meeting] that the Soviet Government wished to reach agreement on specific measures in the field of the limitation and reduction of delivery-vehicle systems for nuclear weapons. He informed the General Assembly that the Soviet Union and the United States had in fact already agreed to engage in an exchange of views on the reciprocal limitation and reduction of strategic delivery systems for nuclear weapons, offensive and defensive, including anti-missile missiles, and he stressed that the Soviet Government was ready to undertake immediately serious exchanges of views on this question.

4. What is more, it has been mentioned here by various speakers that the United States of America has been interested, apparently for a long time, in bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union on the limitation and subsequent reduction of vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons. This interest was reflected, furthermore, in the statement of the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster. He said in this Committee:

"I should like to call your attention to an undertaking which still stands before us, namely, the prospect of bilateral talks between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the limitation and reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear-weapons delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles. As you know, after some months of prior consultations, initiated by the United States, the two

sides reached agreement on 1 July to enter into such discussions in the near future.” [1611th meeting, para. 76.]

5. But immediately after that, Mr. Foster stated that subsequent events had forced a postponement of those talks. Similar explanations on the postponement of the talks were given, in many varying versions, by the delegations of certain countries friendly to the United States of America to explain the latter's attitude and in particular to excuse it for having avoided those conversations which those same delegations nevertheless regarded as extremely important—as indeed they are—for the future course of negotiations on disarmament in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and in all other disarmament discussions.
6. The long history of disarmament negotiations has shown that when a country is not ready to move towards disarmament, and more specifically towards some particular aspect thereof, it can always find the pretexts it needs. Sometimes the question of control is raised as a precondition, and then there follow interminable technical discussions by experts, sometimes events that have happened are alleged to have rendered the negotiations impossible; and sometimes what is lacking is confidence. But the fact is that the United States, if necessary with the assistance of certain of its allies and partners, is seeking excuses for having avoided discussions with the Soviet Union on the limitation and reduction of vehicles for the delivery of strategic weapons, and finds excuses in the series of events that were provoked for the purposes of preventing dangerous developments and which seem to have been instigated by the United States so that it could “come into the picture” and create the atmosphere it considered desirable for discussions of this matter with the Soviet Union.
7. If the United States raises as a precondition for conversations on such important disarmament measures, or on negotiations for general and complete disarmament, the right to act or conduct matters as it chooses and where and when it chooses, or if it allows certain developments to occur which are to its advantage, this means that the United States will not wish to undertake negotiations on disarmament unless it is enabled to order about whatever State it may select. This means also that the United States does not want at all to engage in any disarmament, for that is what the imposition of such conditions amounts to.
8. The socialist countries will in any case never allow themselves to be directed, whether by pressure, through unbridled propaganda or by any other means. The socialist States did not start the arms race. It is a well-known fact that they started to arm only to defend themselves against imperialist aggression. Nor did the socialist States begin nuclear armament; but they were constrained to take measures to organize their defence against the all too clear and well-defined threat to their security and to world peace. They have, however, always been ready to hold any discussions on disarmament and any genuine measure aiming at disarmament. They have no conditions to lay down; they impose no preconditions for the undertaking of talks on disarmament questions that are so vital for world peace and security.
9. According to reports in the press—*The New York Times* of 4 December—it would seem that the decision of the United States of America to delay talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic systems for the delivery of nuclear weapons was prompted also, during the electoral campaign that has been taking place in that country, by the advice of one of the greatest specialists on disarmament and strategic problems in the United States of America.
10. We hope that after his appointment to a very important post in the future administration of the United States and once he has assumed his functions, he will be more realistic and much more sensitive and open to the wishes of peoples for general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, in the matter of the negotiations on the limitation and reduction of systems of vehicles for the delivery of strategic nuclear weapons.
11. Certain circles, it seems, find it difficult to realize that to make general and complete disarmament dependent upon the creation of an atmosphere of confidence which they would find acceptable, means that any effort made in that direction is doomed to failure from the start. We must not forget in the first place that the lack of confidence is a result of the arms race. The more the arms race intensifies, the less confidence there will be in the world. On the other hand, any disarmament measure adopted and implemented has always had a favourable effect on international relations. This is even more true in the case of general and complete disarmament. But if we were able to adopt and implement genuine and effective disarmament measures which could pave the way to general and complete disarmament, that would probably be the best foundation for the establishment of a climate of confidence among nations.
12. The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, throughout the disarmament discussions, has always been in favour of adopting genuine disarmament measures leading directly to general and complete disarmament. We have always come out in favour of sincere and effective negotiations on disarmament and we have always sought, within the limits of our modest possibilities, to eliminate all obstacles put in the way of those negotiations, such as lack of confidence, conditions relating to control and any other pretext.
13. We consider that the question of general and complete disarmament must be at the heart of discussions of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and we therefore support the draft resolution originally submitted by the eight non-aligned countries [A/C.1/L.448/Rev.1] on general and complete disarmament. The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, if there is no objection, would like to be a sponsor of that draft resolution.
14. Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): Before commencing my prepared remarks, I must say that I have noted with interest the comments of the representative of Bulgaria on what he calls the “delay and excuses for delay” in the initiation of talks on the limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic offensive and defensive missile systems. I must comment that I believe every one of our colleagues in this Committee is aware of the reasons for that delay.

15. The past year has been one of substantial accomplishment in the field of arms control and disarmament. This should encourage us to face up to the need for making even greater progress in the future if we are to achieve the momentum required to turn back the nuclear arms race and to begin making progress in other areas of arms control and disarmament. The United States believes the non-proliferation Treaty holds the promise of facilitating further significant progress.

16. I have already shared with the Committee my Government's views on prospects for international co-operation opened up by that treaty. We have emphasized that turning these prospects into concrete achievements requires an approach which will enable the competent bodies and experts to get to work without delay.

17. Today I would like to discuss several of the arms control and disarmament questions now before the Committee and the related draft resolutions, bearing in mind the practical, step-by-step approach which has led to progress.

18. Foremost among the arms control issues which have seized our attention for more than two decades is the problem of nuclear disarmament. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament recognized the pre-eminence of this area of concern in the programme of work which was adopted at its last session. From the discussion in this Committee it is also clear that, within this broad and complex field, the question of further limitations on nuclear-weapon testing stands as a priority item.

19. Therefore I would like first to comment on the draft resolution placed before the Committee on the suspension of nuclear tests [A/C.1/L.447 and Add.1 and 2]. On numerous occasions in the past, and particularly since the conclusion of the limited test ban treaty¹ in 1963, my delegation has strongly supported the conclusion of an adequately verified comprehensive test ban. We remain convinced that if we are to reach such an agreement, we must continue to work towards a treaty providing for adequate verification.

20. As for the draft resolution before us, the United States delegation intends to support it, as in fact we supported similar resolutions during previous sessions of the General Assembly. I would, in addition, like to re-emphasize the basic point of our remarks on those previous occasions. We made clear, and I wish to repeat, with respect to operative paragraph 2 of the present draft resolution, that we understand the call for a suspension of tests in all environments to mean suspension pursuant to an adequately verified treaty.

21. I am pleased to note that the present draft resolution expresses the hope that States will contribute to an effective international exchange of seismic data. As all delegations are aware, the United States has, in connexion with possible limitations on nuclear testing, long urged increased international exchange of seismic data. We have also urged, in the same context, technical discussions relating to identification of seismic events. Therefore, it was

especially heartening to us that the meetings of the Seismic Study Group of the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research held earlier this year in Sweden, were able to accomplish much in both these areas. There can be no doubt that exchanges and discussions such as occurred at the Seismic Study Group meetings can be very useful and should continue to be encouraged.

22. In this connexion, I should like to note that there has been an unfortunate tendency in some quarters to draw unwarranted conclusions from the opinions given in the summary report of the study group's meetings.² A careful reading of this summary report will leave no one in doubt that the participants agreed that there were sizeable man-made explosions which could not be identified as such—that is, differentiated from earthquakes—using only the available long-range seismic identification criteria. These unidentifiable events are in the range of explosive yields equivalent to many tens of thousands of tons of TNT.

23. Thus, the explosions which were agreed to be unidentifiable seismically by the Seismic Study Group participants are indeed of yields which are of great military significance. The technical inability to distinguish at long distances between explosions and earthquakes in this yield range is one which cannot be dismissed, no matter how much some might value the political advantages of doing so.

24. The United States has reported from time to time on seismic research it is undertaking to improve the capability for detecting and identifying underground seismic events, and I should now like to mention briefly several recent endeavours.

25. The Montana Large Aperture Seismic Array (LASA) established in 1965 and previously described in detail here and at the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, continues to be operated as a research tool to provide data for evaluation of the detection capability of such arrays. The LASA is also used for studies of identification techniques utilizing high quality long- and short-period array data, and for development and evaluation of sophisticated on-line and off-line data processing techniques for handling the large volume of data generated by large arrays.

26. In accordance with an agreement signed in June of this year between the Governments of the United States and Norway, a second large aperture seismic array—the Norwegian Seismic Array, called NORSAR for short—will be installed as a co-operative enterprise in southern Norway. Preliminary studies began in 1967, and the NORSAR is expected to be completed by the fall of 1969. It will be operated by Norwegian agencies.

27. The NORSAR will permit evaluation of performance of large aperture arrays in geologic and geographical environments different from the Montana LASA. Among other things, the NORSAR will allow a determination of the improvement that can be made in identification of small seismic events by using multiple large arrays. The NORSAR will consist of a heptagonal pattern of twenty-two sub-arrays, each of which will contain six short-period seismographs and one three-component

¹ Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

² See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, annex I, sect. 6.

long-period seismograph, with data being transformed into digital form at the centre of each sub-array and transmitted by telephone lines to a central point for processing and analysis. The total array aperture will be about 110 kilometres.

28. When the Gasbuggy underground nuclear explosion experiment for gas stimulation was performed in New Mexico on 10 December 1967, as part of the United States Atomic Energy Commission's Plowshare Program, advantage was taken of the opportunity to record this relatively large seismic energy source—twenty-six kilotons—in order to obtain data on the crust and upper mantle of the earth in the region of the explosion. More than fifty portable seismic stations were especially deployed to record this event at distances ranging from fifty to several thousand kilometres.

29. The average seismic magnitude of the Gasbuggy explosion was 4.5. Detailed studies of the structure of the crust and upper mantle are presently in progress and will be made available when completed. It is certain that detailed studies of the Gasbuggy data will significantly add to our knowledge of the crust and upper mantle structure in North America and of the seismic characteristics of this structure.

30. Of course, data has been released for other United States underground nuclear explosions and this release has proven most useful for seismic purposes world-wide. Indeed, some explosions, such as the long shot experiment of the United States Department of Defense's Vela programme in 1965, have had pre-planned world-wide seismic coverage.

31. As demonstrated by activities such as these, the United States is continuing to devote considerable resources to seismic research so as to improve the capability to detect and identify underground seismic events. However, it is a fact that, with the existing technology, we are unable to gather all available seismic data at long distances. We are unable at such distances to detect or locate accurately all seismic events or to identify positively whether certain seismic signals come from earthquakes or man-made explosions.

32. Fortunately, there is clearly a widespread desire—fully shared by the United States—for further advancement in seismic technology and for increased international exchange of information in this field.

33. It is in keeping with this desire that I should like to present today a proposal which the United States considers could do much to advance objectives in these areas. The United States proposes that some underground nuclear explosions be conducted with the collateral objective that these serve as explosions for world-wide seismic investigation. This investigation is one in which all States with the appropriate seismic instrumentation could participate. Indeed, the success of this proposal would depend in large measure on the extent of world-wide participation in the collection and evaluation of the seismic data.

34. Such underground explosions could provide, among other things, a means of determining important seismological characteristics, both of the geological media and of

the explosions. Furthermore, implementation of the proposal would systematize, in a most valuable manner, world-wide use for seismic purposes of information released on certain underground nuclear explosions, as well as world-wide evaluation of seismic information gathered on such explosions.

35. I should like to note that the United States underground nuclear explosions contemplated in connexion with this proposal would not involve development or testing of nuclear weapons.

36. The proposal would be implemented as follows:

Sufficiently in advance of an explosion with the collateral seismic purpose, seismic stations throughout the world would be alerted so as to be fully prepared to record the explosion. Data on scheduled time, location, depth, geological medium and predicted explosive yield would also be provided in advance. Following the explosion, the actual time of explosion, yield, and other pertinent data from national seismic systems would be furnished.

Seismic data would then be exchanged world-wide. To compare known results with derived results, interested States would in turn calculate, using the seismic data, the explosion's geographic co-ordinates, time of origin, and explosive yield. The States would also calculate the explosion's measured seismic magnitude. Also, they would analyze the data, using various available identification criteria, such as the surface-wave/body-wave magnitude criterion, which the Stockholm Seismic Study Group considered to be of significant value.

The results of the seismic analysis would be published and distributed and could then be discussed in the relevant forums.

37. As I have already said, the success of that proposal would depend greatly on the extent of world-wide participation in collecting and evaluating the seismic data, and I am sure that a great many States would want to participate to the fullest extent possible and thus assure the success of this endeavour.

38. Of course, it will be obvious to this audience that the carrying out of the seismic investigation proposal, useful as it would be, would not be in any way a panacea for the problems regarding negotiation of a comprehensive test ban. A situation whereby the world's seismic stations are in a very high state of readiness awaiting an explosion of known and substantial yield in a specified location and medium, and for which no attempt at evasion would be made, simply cannot be considered as being directly relevant and applicable to a comprehensive test ban situation. However, a proposal need not be a cure-all to be of value. The United States is convinced that its proposal for seismic investigation using underground nuclear explosions is of significant value and has much to commend it. In our view, it is a proposal in which many States represented here can, and, we hope will participate directly and fruitfully.

39. This proposal is the kind of practical effort required to make serious progress in the field of arms control and disarmament.

40. My Government is gratified that a practical approach also has been suggested in tackling the question of chemical and biological warfare.

41. The draft resolution on this subject before the Committee [*A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-7*] properly reflects the serious concern which has been expressed over the potential threat to mankind posed by the development and possible use of lethal chemical and biological weapons. We believe this proposal constitutes a realistic, first step to further consideration of an issue that has only too often been approached with divisive political motives by some who have sought to exploit it mainly for propaganda purposes.

42. I would now like to discuss the draft resolution before us. The United States is pleased to associate itself again with the request in operative paragraph 1 that the Secretary-General prepare a concise report on the effects of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare, in accordance with both the proposal in Part II, paragraph 32, of his introduction to the annual report for 1967-1968³ and with the recommendation contained in paragraph 26 of the recent report by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.⁴

43. My Government, however, would like to suggest that such a study should deal equally and individually with the effects of chemical and biological weapons. In our view, the scientific and technological differences between the two systems, as well as differences which obtain in their operational applications, warrant such a particular approach to each category of weapons.

44. While the language in the recommendation by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament specifically refers to chemical and bacteriological means of warfare, it is our understanding that the latter would embrace those types of weapons also referred to as biological, as is made clear in the Secretary-General's introduction to his report to the twenty-third session of the General Assembly. I might add that this form of warfare is also at times referred to as microbial warfare, bacterial warfare, microbiological warfare, or germ warfare. We should all understand that it means disease-causing living micro-organisms, be they bacteria, viruses or whatever, used as deliberate weapons of war.

45. The United States earnestly hopes that a study undertaken along these lines will provide the requisite scientific and technical perspective for further consideration by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and this Committee of ways of dealing with these weapons and, as requested in operative paragraph 3, we are prepared to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General, as well as with the experts appointed by him.

46. My Government agrees with the request in operative paragraph 4 that the report be furnished to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the Security Council,

³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 1A.*

⁴ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231.

and the General Assembly at an early date. At the same time we believe the experts should be given sufficient time to develop a complete and technically sound appraisal of the effects of such weapons.

47. Also, the United States welcomes the reaffirmation in the first preambular paragraph of General Assembly resolution 2162 B (XXI), of 5 December 1966, which *inter alia* called for the strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,⁵ done at Geneva in 1925, and condemned all actions contrary to those objectives. However, in noting that operative paragraph 6 of the draft resolution now before us reiterates, in effect, both operative paragraphs of resolution 2162 B (XXI), I should like to recall that the United States co-sponsored and supported the first operative paragraph which I have just cited. At that time my Government set forth its position with regard to that Protocol and our consistent support of its principles and objectives, together with our reasons for not having ratified that instrument.

48. I would like to reiterate that the United States takes the view that whether, or by what procedure, States that have not yet done so should adhere to the Geneva Protocol is for each of them to decide in the light of constitutional and other considerations that may determine their adherence to any international instrument. Accordingly, we regard the substance of operative paragraph 6 as not intended to prejudge for political purposes the results of the study to be undertaken.

49. I should now like to comment briefly on the draft resolution which would request the Secretary-General to ascertain the position of Member Governments on establishing a system for the registration and publication of information on the international transfer of conventional arms, ammunition and implements of war [*A/C.1/L.446*]. My delegation believes that such a resolution would provide an opportunity for Governments to give serious thought to, and make their views known on a subject where progress is needed, the subject of conventional arms transfers. This is an important, as well as a complex and difficult subject.

50. I would also like to say a few words on the problems of general and complete disarmament. It is one of mankind's oldest hopes and it continues to be an urgent task.

51. No one who is familiar with the complex negotiations which led to the limited test ban treaty,⁶ the outer space Treaty,⁷ The Antarctic Treaty⁸ and the non-proliferation Treaty⁹ can have any illusion that the road to general and complete disarmament is an easy one. But, however difficult that road may be, my Government remains determined that general and complete disarmament must be our final goal.

⁵ League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138.

⁶ See foot-note 1.

⁷ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI), annex).

⁸ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 402 (1961), No. 5778.

⁹ Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII) annexes).

52. My Government supports the draft resolution requesting the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to pursue renewed efforts towards achieving substantial progress on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as well as on important partial measures of disarmament [A/C.I/L.448/Rev.1].

53. We also have before us a draft resolution submitted by the representative of Cyprus [A/C.I/L.449]. While appreciating the concerns which underlie this suggestion, I frankly believe it would be most inadvisable to place before the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations, as this draft resolution proposes, most of the major problems that confront the United Nations. In particular the United States would oppose a change in the established mandate of the Disarmament Commission in order to include matters not now within its competence. Grafting additional responsibilities onto a body charged with arms control and disarmament would so overload it as to render it ineffective. Moreover, a broadened and diffused mandate could lead to overlap and interference in the work of other institutions.

54. Finally, I would like to comment on the draft resolution on the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States submitted by the delegations of Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Japan and the Netherlands [A/C.I/L.450]. As everyone is aware, my Government was not a voting participant in that Conference. For this reason, and quite apart from some of the views it expresses, we do not believe the United States should be asked to endorse the declaration of the Conference.

55. However, aside from this reservation, I find that overall this draft resolution does embody an approach to the problem of dealing with the results of the non-nuclear Conference that the United States can support. It meets our concern that existing bodies have an opportunity to work on the constructive suggestions adopted at the non-nuclear Conference and that subsequently the General Assembly have an opportunity to look at the results of these efforts to see whether further steps might be required—including in that context, the possibility of convening a session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. To consider calling for further steps before the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly would, in our view, be premature and detrimental to the efforts under way in existing bodies. Notwithstanding our reservation concerning the declaration, we hope that this draft resolution will find wide support in this Committee and in the plenary of the General Assembly.

56. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (*translated from Spanish*): As in previous years, the agenda of the First Committee is rich in items relating to disarmament. It is not my intention to examine each of these five items separately; at the present stage in the debate, that would obviously be overdoing things. I shall confine myself to some general comments on the contents of the two documents on which these five items are based: the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,¹⁰ and

the Final Document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [A/7277]. In connexion with the latter, I should like also to make a brief analysis of two of the questions it deals with: nuclear-weapon-free zones, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with special reference to nuclear explosions.

57. The report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament submitted to us is certainly rather meagre, and indeed it could not be otherwise, since it covers only the short period of six weeks, from 16 July to 28 August 1968, during which the Committee met following the resumed twenty-second session of the General Assembly.

58. Nevertheless, we should bear in mind that even if no progress was made on substantive issues, the Committee did at least adopt a substantial programme of work, including both the enumeration of a series of measures of the kind described as “further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament”, “non-nuclear measures” and “other collateral” measures, emphasis being placed also on the importance of resuming consideration of the question of general and complete disarmament.

59. With regard to the effective measures just mentioned, my delegation feels that the schedule of the most urgent of them as set forth in resolution C of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [*ibid.*, *para.* 17] is more to the point and more appropriate than the proposal by the co-Chairmen of the Committee in the draft programme they submitted to it. In fact, we feel it should be made very clear that at the forthcoming sessions the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should, as stated in the resolution, undertake negotiations for:

“(a) The prevention of the further development and improvement of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles;

“(b) The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, as an important step in the field of nuclear disarmament, and as a matter of high priority;

“(c) Reaching agreement on the immediate cessation of the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes and the stoppage of the manufacture of nuclear weapons;

“(d) The reduction and subsequent elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems”.

60. We would also have preferred that the Committee on Disarmament did not limit itself to noting the agreement reached between the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union in July of this year to enter in the nearest future into bilateral negotiations on the limitation of both nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles, but acted like the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and urged those Governments to undertake the negotiations in question as soon as possible. Similarly we would have preferred the Committee to note in that connexion the need to be kept informed as far as possible of the progress being made by the two super-Powers in those negotiations, since as the representative of Canada rightly pointed out at Geneva, there is a close link between that matter and the other items with which the Committee will have to continue to deal.

¹⁰ *Official Records, Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968 (DC/231)*.

61. With regard to the procedure which it seems essential for the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to adopt, we entirely agree with what was said at its meeting of 16 July by Mr. Mulley, the representative of the United Kingdom, in urging his colleagues to dismiss from their minds any idea that the Committee could “proceed at a leisurely tempo with one topic under consideration and allow another five years to pass before reaching agreement on a further major measure as happened between the partial test-ban treaty . . . and the non-proliferation treaty.”¹¹

62. To counteract as far as possible the relative neglect of various extremely important aspects of disarmament during the past five years, we believe it is necessary, as the Secretary-General suggests in the introduction to his annual report for 1968, that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the General Assembly should “review the situation and take up, with firmness of purpose, those questions which are more urgent and more amenable to early agreement”.¹² In our opinion those are the questions that were pinpointed by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, taking as a basis the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament I have just recalled. We feel sure that what the peoples of the world are now anxiously awaiting from the United Nations are concrete measures of genuine nuclear disarmament applied in the regions inhabited by man.

63. The priority which negotiations on these pressing disarmament measures no doubt warrant should not of course work to the detriment of other measures likewise included in the agenda of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, such as the adoption of a régime of demilitarization and reservation for exclusively peaceful purposes of the international submarine zone and the problem of chemical, bacteriological and other biological means of warfare. All that is needed to achieve this, in our opinion, is for the Committee to make the appropriate changes and adjustments in its methods of work. For example, it could increase the number of its weekly meetings from two to three or four. It could keep permanently on its agenda all the matters which have been given priority, so as to try to make parallel progress on as many of them as possible, and to ensure that when the representatives of the two States that are co-Chairmen of the Committee need to engage in active bilateral negotiations on one of the items, the Committee does not have to suspend its work for long periods—as happened several times in connexion with the non-proliferation Treaty—but can carry on with the discussion of another item. In addition to the official meetings, there could also be unofficial ones, such as that held on 8 August 1968, whenever it seems useful. Finally, after a general debate in plenary on such matters as the peaceful utilization of the international submarine zone and the prohibition of the use of chemical and microbiological means of warfare, the study of these subjects could be continued in appropriate sub-committees or working groups.

64. I should like before I end this first part of my statement to refer, if only by the way, to the various

¹¹ ENDC/PV.38, para. 2 (mimeographed).

¹² *General Assembly, Official Records: Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 1A*, para. 21.

criticisms, some of them sound, addressed to the Eighteen-Nation Committee during the debate. I would merely point out that in the opinion of my delegation such criticisms cannot fairly be applied to the eight States usually termed the group of non-aligned States. We are convinced that all of these have at all times given proof of broad-mindedness, a constructive spirit and constant and renewed vigour in participating in the work of the Committee. Both the reason for the meagre results achieved so far and the remedy for the lack of productiveness were, I think, very ably defined by the representative of Sweden when she said in this Committee a few days ago:

“The reason why the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament—and the same refers to the whole of the United Nations—is not making much progress towards disarmament is, of course, that since the Moscow Treaty in 1963 the nuclear-weapon Powers have not wanted to agree to any real infringement on their freedom of action to continue the arms race, to produce and deploy nuclear weapons systems and to develop new ones . . . So the overriding, most imminent task must be for these Powers to make a concrete contribution towards disarmament. It is their turn to act.

“During the preparation of the non-proliferation Treaty, we, the non-nuclear-weapon Powers, were demanding ‘tangible steps’ to accompany or follow it. But no steps have so far been taken to accompany the readiness on the part of the majority of us to accept non-nuclearization of our military forces. No steps have been taken to ‘follow’ ” [*1609th meeting, paras. 74, 82 and 83.*]

65. The Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, which as we know met at Geneva from 29 August to 28 September 1968, was without any question one of the most important events that have taken place in the last few years in the field of disarmament.

66. A summary of the results of the Conference is to be found in the Final Document [*A/7277*] included as item 96 in the agenda of the twenty-third session of the Assembly and already examined and commented on at length by many speakers in the First Committee, especially the representative of Pakistan, who devoted his important and penetrating statement entirely to it on 18 November [*1610th meeting*]. I will therefore confine myself for the moment to a very rapid examination of two of the four questions constituting the agenda of the Conference: the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and the item entitled “Programmes for co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy”, with special reference, as far as this latter is concerned, to the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

67. In connexion with the first of these two items the Mexican delegation submitted a working document to the Conference,¹³ and subsequently a draft resolution which was co-sponsored by fifteen other Latin American delegations and found favour in the plenary meeting of the Conference, being adopted without a single negative vote, and becoming resolution B [*A/7277, para. 17*].

68. By that resolution the Conference took the position that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the

¹³ A/CONF.35/Doc.16.

initiative of States situated within each zone concerned—I quote the resolution: “. . . is one of the measures which can contribute most effectively to halting the proliferation of those instruments of mass destruction and to promoting progress towards nuclear disarmament”, as well as being “of benefit to the security and economic development of the States within the zone, since it frees their territories from the danger of nuclear attacks and avoids the squandering of their resources on the production of nuclear armaments”.

69. In that same resolution the Conference expressed its conviction that “for the maximum effectiveness of any treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon States is necessary and that such co-operation should take the form of commitments likewise undertaken in a formal international instrument which is legally binding, such as a treaty, convention or protocol”.

70. On the basis of the above premises, and recalling a number of pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly on the matter, the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States made recommendations of a general nature, and at the same time, with special reference to the one nuclear-weapon-free zone existing in a region densely populated by man, namely, that established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America or the Treaty of Tlatelolco, it expressed regret at the fact that not all the nuclear-weapon States have yet signed Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco;¹⁴ and it urged the nuclear-weapon Powers to comply fully with paragraph 4 of resolution 2286 (XXII), adopted by the General Assembly on 5 December 1967, i.e. precisely one year ago today, in which, as we all recall, the Assembly invited Powers possessing nuclear weapons to sign and ratify the protocol concerned “as soon [as] possible”.

71. The justification of the expression of regret by the Conference at the fact that three of the nuclear Powers—two of them Members of the United Nations—have so far failed to sign Additional Protocol II, and the appropriateness of the urgent appeal to them to do so and to all the nuclear Powers to ratify it, are evident if we consider first of all that the Treaty and its protocols have been open for signature since 14 February 1967, and secondly that the General Assembly in resolution 2286 (XXII) declared that the Treaty of Tlatelolco “constitutes an event of historic significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security”.

72. Since I have just mentioned the Treaty of Tlatelolco, this is perhaps an opportune moment for me to report, as the representative of the Depositary Government for the Treaty, on the signature and ratification status of that instrument and its protocols.

73. To date the Treaty has been signed by the twenty-one States comprising the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America, and also by Barbados. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands have already signed Additional Protocol I to the Treaty, which is open

for signature to States internationally responsible for territories which lie in the zone covered by the Treaty, and the United Kingdom and the United States have signed Additional Protocol II, which is open for signature by nuclear Powers.

74. Neither of the Protocols has been ratified as yet, but the Treaty has been ratified by nine of the signatory States, in the following chronological order: Mexico, Brazil, El Salvador, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Honduras, Barbados, Nicaragua and Peru. It is fully in force for six of these countries: Mexico, El Salvador, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Honduras and Nicaragua, which in addition to the relevant instrument of ratification have deposited individual declarations waiving the requirements laid down in article 28, paragraph 2 of the Treaty. The same will apply very shortly to a seventh country, Barbados, which has announced that it intends to deposit such a declaration in the near future.

75. Since the process of ratification is well under way in most of the other signatory States, there is every reason to hope that in the very near future the number of ratifications accompanied by waivers will rise to eleven, thus authorizing the immediate establishment of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America in accordance with article 28, paragraph 3, and the entry into operation of the principal organs of the Agency—the General Conference, the Council and the Secretariat.

76. Mexico, the first country to ratify the Treaty, as I informed the Committee last year, was also the first to enter into an agreement on safeguards as envisaged in article 13. On 6 September 1968 I had the signal privilege of signing such an agreement at Vienna on behalf of my Government, at a ceremony in which the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, who signed it on behalf of the Agency, declared that the agreement represented an outstanding event in the history of the Agency's safeguards, since it was the first time that a Government had asked the Agency to apply safeguards to all its nuclear activities.

77. With regard to the peaceful uses of the atom, the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States has to its credit the adoption of various resolutions stating unequivocally the pressing need for increasing multilateral assistance and co-operation for the promotion, development and encouragement of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, particularly in the developing countries, and stressing the duty of the nuclear States to make an effective contribution to that extremely urgent task. The Conference also placed special emphasis on the pressing need to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency and revise and adapt its structure, especially the composition of the Board of Governors, its functions and its procedures, which today are unsatisfactory and even in certain respects outdated in the light of the needs created by the events that have occurred over the past ten years.

78. The Mexican delegation to the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, convinced that the use of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes is bound to take on vast importance, especially for the developing countries, submitted a working document to the Conference em-

¹⁴ *General Assembly, Official Records, Twenty-second Session, Annexes, agenda item 91.*

bodily the fruits of a conscientious study of this question. Since the Conference documents are no longer available in sufficient quantities, and since we feel that the working document can be useful for the discussions on this topic, at future sessions of the First Committee we took the liberty of requesting the Secretary-General to have it reissued as a Committee document, and this has now appeared under the symbol A/C.1/976. Since this document can now easily be consulted by all delegations, I shall merely recapitulate some of the immediate background factors that I believe to be of major relevance.

79. As will be recalled, at the 1569th meeting of the First Committee, on 16 May 1968, the Mexican delegation submitted an amendment to article V of the draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, concerning nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

80. The two main basic purposes of the Mexican proposal, which was supported by many Latin American delegations previously consulted, were first that work on preparing the special international agreement which would embody the statute of the "appropriate international organ" for which provision was made in the article should begin as soon as possible, and should be approved in due course by a body representing the world community; and second that the procedure of multilateral assistance through the appropriate international organ in question should be given pride of place, the resort to bilateral procedures being relegated to a secondary position.

81. The main essentials of the proposal were incorporated into the revised text which was to become the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as annexed to General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII) adopted on 12 June 1968. In addition, so as to leave no room for doubt regarding the meaning of the provisions of article V of the treaty, the representatives of the co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament—the United States and the Soviet Union—who had played so important a role in preparing that instrument, explaining the scope of the revised text of the draft treaty at the 1577th meeting of the Committee on 31 May, made interpretative statements pointing out that the preparatory work on the special international agreement concerning the appropriate international body envisaged in article V should begin at an early date, with the widest possible participation of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

82. On that occasion, the representative of the Soviet Union, who spoke first, pointed out among other things that the revised text of the treaty specifies that negotiations with regard to States obtaining potential benefits from the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body, should commence as soon as possible after the entry into force of this treaty [1577th meeting, para. 15].

83. He went on to say that—and this is what calls for special emphasis—"Of course, the appropriate preparatory work can be begun before the treaty actually comes into force", and that the determination of general principles and the working out of procedures for inclusion in the appropriate international agreement "should take place

with the broadest possible participation of non-nuclear States" [ibid.].

84. The representative of the United States, who spoke next, was as explicit as his Soviet colleague, if not more so, stating categorically in regard to article V:

"It will be noted that the revised text makes it clear that States may obtain the benefits from peaceful application of nuclear explosions: '... pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States'.

"This language contemplates a basic agreement defining the functions of the appropriate international body and holds open the possibilities of a series of separate international agreements dealing with particular projects.

"It is important that the primary agreement—defining the function of the international body—be negotiated promptly. For this reason we have added the sentence that: 'Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force'.

"We trust that this language will remove any doubts about the intention of the nuclear-weapon States which are in a position to do so to provide such services under appropriate international observation and at the earliest practical moment.

"Let me add, lest there be any doubt on this score, that the provision concerning negotiations is not intended in any way to preclude preparatory consideration of this matter before the treaty enters into force. We assume that all interested States will wish to begin studies and consultations promptly. Many States, including the United States, will promptly begin or continue studies and consultations already under way. I should also note that this subject is on the agenda of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States" [1577th meeting, paras. 185-187].

85. Now that I have explained the background of the Mexican working document [A/C.1/976], I would like to add that it is a digest of the fundamental ideas on which the wording of the preliminary draft articles annexed to the document is based. I shall therefore merely recall here that the structure envisaged for the executive organ we suggest—the Governing Council—meets the need to try to make the organ broadly representative in membership and appointments to it such that non-nuclear developing States are given the utmost assurance that their requests for aid in carrying out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes will always receive prompt, adequate, objective and even—as is greatly to be desired—generous consideration.

86. The financial provisions of the preliminary draft are designed to ensure not only that the provisions of article V of the non-proliferation Treaty concerning the charges made for nuclear explosive devices will be respected, but also that the remaining charges incurred in each case will be shared equitably through the application of criteria fully taking into account the vast difference in resources between the nuclear Powers and other highly industrialized States on the one hand, and on the other the developing countries, which as everyone knows constitute the overwhelming majority of the countries of the world. To sum up, what has been sought has been to ensure that the developing

countries should have access on the most favourable terms to this new application of nuclear energy which will be able to contribute so much towards closing the gap between the countries usually described figuratively as the “peoples of the north” and the “peoples of the south”. It is for this same purpose that it is suggested that a special fund should be set up to assist States which may have cogent reasons for requesting that nuclear explosions should be carried out in their territories, but because of their economic situation cannot afford the necessary outlay.

87. The need to proceed in this way is obvious and axiomatic. Suffice it to recall in this connexion that the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency said last month when presenting the latest report of the Agency¹⁵ to the General Assembly:

“The results of this inadequacy of resources and of the growing interest of developing countries in nuclear energy are shown by the fact that in 1958 the Agency was able to meet nearly 90 per cent of the requests it received for experts and equipment, while in 1968 the figure has dropped to less than 30 per cent. There is no lack of technically sound projects, but the means to implement them are actually decreasing.” [1720th plenary meeting, para. 54.]

88. My delegation is well aware that it would be impossible at the current session of the General Assembly, when we are a mere two weeks from the closing date, to attempt a study in depth of the special international agreement envisaged in article V of the non-proliferation Treaty. But we certainly would like to see the fulfilment of the solemn declarations made in this Committee by the co-Chairmen of the Committee on Disarmament and cited a few moments ago, and as a consequence, the first steps taken towards the essential preparatory work which, as was expressly stated at the time, should be begun as soon as possible, before the treaty actually comes into force and with the broadest possible participation of non-nuclear-weapon States. In our opinion, the most appropriate way of achieving that might be to ask the Secretary-General to prepare a report, in consultation with Member States and in co-operation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and any other international organs or bodies at the Secretary-General's discretion. This report could be used as a basis for the Assembly's discussions on the subject at the next session.

89. In his statement during the general debate in plenary on 4 October, the Mexican Foreign Secretary, referring to the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, stated as follows:

“... the Geneva meeting which has just ended made it clear that a kind of impatient solidarity in developing among the non-nuclear States which—again regardless of ideological lines—may eventually divide the world into two heterogeneous blocs, one of States having nothing in common but the sad privilege of possessing nuclear weapons and the other of States having nothing in common but the mistrust which stems from the fear of having to accept whatever formulae may be agreed upon

between the super-Powers, whether reasonable or not.” [1681st plenary meeting, para. 9.]

90. Those words, in our view, point to an unquestionably grave danger, and there is no doubt that the prime responsibility for coping with it lies with the nuclear Powers. It is their duty, more than that of any other States, scrupulously to honour the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force in their international relations and to promote the “establishment and maintenance of international peace and security . . . with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources” as stated in the final paragraph of the preamble to the non-proliferation Treaty, which incidentally was added to the original text as a result of a Mexican proposal.

91. It is also the duty of the nuclear Powers, first and foremost, to translate into action the provisions of article IV, designed to achieve “the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world”, and those of article V, to the effect that “potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States . . . on a non-discriminatory basis”, and under the favourable conditions described in that article, by means of an appropriate international body with structure, functions and procedures to be defined in a special international agreement.

92. It is the duty of the nuclear Powers—and in this case the responsibility is exclusively theirs—to implement at an early date the commitment undertaken in article VI “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”.

93. Approximately eighteen non-nuclear-weapon States, including Mexico, have already signed the non-proliferation Treaty. The gesture of goodwill thus shown by those States calls immediately for tangible proof of a similar spirit on the part of the nuclear Powers. It must be realized that to make an obsession of the Treaty is not the best way of ensuring its early entry into force. The success of the Treaty, as we said when its text was discussed here in May—though it cannot be repeated too often, in our opinion—will in the final analysis depend on whether the nuclear Powers demonstrate by their conduct in the immediate future that they really do regard it as a first step both towards the adoption of concrete disarmament measures, beginning with nuclear disarmament, and towards an effective contribution to the development of the investigation, production and peaceful uses of nuclear energy on the territory of non-nuclear-weapon States, and particularly the territories of those nations that need it most in order to raise the standard of living of their peoples—those usually described as “developing nations”.

94. Mr. FARACE (Italy): The Italian delegation is today taking the floor for the second time in the First Committee on item 96 of our agenda. As we had the opportunity to indicate in our previous statement [1609th meeting], the

¹⁵ *Annual Report of the Board of Governors to the General Conference, 1 July 1967-30 June 1968* (Vienna, July 1968), and Supplementary Report.

Italian delegation attaches special importance to this item and dares to presume; in view of the debate which has taken place during the past weeks in this Committee, that its approach is shared by many, if not by all delegations. Nobody, we think, has denied or minimized the significance of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States which took place in Geneva last September: a Conference which was held only a few weeks after the General Assembly, at its resumed twenty-second session, had commended and had opened to signature the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*]. The two events—the signing of the non-proliferation Treaty, and the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States—are, in our view, two landmarks in the history of the community of nations, in that, for the first time, they attempted in a global manner to cope with the problems of the nuclear age: disarmament, security for all nations, economic development for all, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

95. May I be allowed to concentrate my attention on the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, what we believe it meant for all those who took part in it, with or without the right of vote, the lessons that can be drawn from it and its future.

96. The results of the Conference are before us in document A/7277 and Corr.1. Despite its shortcomings, despite the limited time allotted to it, despite the magnitude of the task with which it was confronted, we firmly believe—and we heard no voice to the contrary—that it did achieve significant results; and, in particular, it confirmed and emphasized two basic principles: first, that the problems of the nuclear age are indivisible; second, that co-operation towards their solution—the co-operation of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers alike, and of the industrialized countries as well as of the developing countries—is essential.

97. The Committee is also aware that one of the early conclusions reached by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and embodied in a unanimously adopted resolution [*see A/7277 and Corr.1, para. 17 (V), resolution N*] was the necessity of ensuring the continuation of its endeavours and of the work which was begun in Geneva. That idea, I might add, inspires and runs through each of the documents approved by the Conference and has been expressed by several speakers who have taken part in this debate. But—and this is the main point to which I should like to draw the attention of the Committee—what we consider as essential is that the continuity of the Conference be ensured, not only in a piecemeal or fragmentary way, through the work of the various United Nations bodies or agencies within the United Nations family, a work which is of essential importance and which must be carried on and developed in every possible way, but also through a unitary process, capable of studying these problems and helping to move towards their solution in a single context.

98. The Italian delegation, in close co-operation with a number of countries belonging to all regional groups represented in this Committee, has in the past few weeks given its undivided attention to that issue. The specific views and suggestions of the Italian delegation, pointing to the creation of an *ad hoc* committee, are, we believe, well

known to the First Committee. They were set forth in our statement of 18 November, fully reproduced in the official records of the First Committee. [*1609th meeting.*]

99. It is not the purpose of this statement to re-emphasize our position or to answer the objections or the reservations that have been made in respect of our original proposal, although, speaking on behalf of the Italian delegation, I still maintain that our assessment was correct and our approach sound and sensible. However, our intention is to move forward. What we have in mind is co-operation, not only regarding the objectives to be pursued but also regarding the methods to be adopted. For those reasons, as I have just mentioned, we have joined our efforts with those of a group of countries which share our views and we have extended the range of our consultations to all geographical groups and sectors of the United Nations membership in order to find a common denominator for action.

100. The result of our efforts is a joint draft resolution, which has been tabled and I understand is being circulated unofficially in the Committee.¹⁶ It is sponsored by the delegations of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Pakistan and Yugoslavia, as well as by my own delegation. We feel the document does not need a lengthy introduction. Most of what it contains is already known to the members of the Committee. Part of it, I hasten to say, is drafted along lines which are parallel with those of another draft resolution which is already before the Committee—a circumstance which is evidence of the extent and depth of the consultations which we have conducted with other delegations.

101. In our exchanges of views some of the differences emerging between the draft resolutions did in effect find a compromise, in particular the timing of the convening of the Disarmament Commission, a point on which our concessions appear, at least to my delegation, to be very substantial, but agreement could not be reached on the essential problem of the terms of reference.

102. For our part we consider that the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and, as a consequence, the follow-up of the resolutions approved at that Conference, should be considered as a whole. The Conference studied and evaluated the problems of the nuclear age in a single context. It seems to us that very little purpose could be served by convening the Disarmament Commission for the sole purpose of dealing only with disarmament, leaving aside the problems of security and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

103. I should like to leave to other delegations which are sponsoring this draft resolution with us the possibility of elaborating on the separate sections of the resolution itself. For my part, I feel it consistent with the responsibility which has been entrusted to my delegation to indicate only the main lines on which we have based our work and our thinking, hoping for the kind support of the Committee.

104. Those main lines may be summed up as follows:

First, to ensure as the first and main objective the continuity of the work and decisions of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.

Second, to stress the fact that the Conference of

¹⁶ Subsequently circulated as document A/C.1/L.451.

Non-Nuclear-Weapon States was an event which deserves to receive consistent and global—and I wish to emphasize the word “global”—follow-up.

Third, to dispel some doubts, even though in our view they are unjustified, about the setting up of an *ad hoc* committee, by proposing that the Disarmament Commission be used instead, and asking, therefore, that the Commission should be convened.

Fourth, to take into due account reservations made by some countries concerning the date on which the Commission should be convened. On that point also we have followed a very flexible line by suggesting that the Secretary-General should put forward alternative possibilities to Member States.

Fifth, to spell out the objective of the follow-up of the Conference by fixing the terms of reference of the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations—terms of reference which should cover the entire set of problems connected with the nuclear field: disarmament, security and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Sixth, to draw up a draft resolution specific in its wording but clearly indicating that, far from desiring confrontation, we sincerely seek co-operation between nuclear and non-nuclear countries; that we are engaged in the task of non-proliferation; and that we do not intend to create duplicates, still less to challenge the importance and the tasks of other agencies and institutions which are working in this field.

105. Time, in our view, will prove that our assessment of the interest of all countries, nuclear and non-nuclear, in establishing a procedure capable of co-ordinating and promoting every possible endeavour in the nuclear field in this nuclear age, is the right approach to the solution of problems which are so close to us and of which every country, whatever its stage of technological development, is particularly mindful. The problems we are faced with are of great moment. Let us from now on take them into the fullest consideration and dedicate to them the attention which they require in the best interests of progress and peace.

106. The draft resolution that we have the honour to introduce is our meditated contribution to that end. We warmly commend it to the Committee's attention, and I think I can speak on behalf of all the sponsors when I say that we solicit suggestions and views of all other delegations, in order to secure for the draft resolution the widest possible acceptance and support.

107. Mr. CASTRO (Brazil): My delegation wishes to state very briefly, due to the lateness of the hour, the reasons which have prompted it to sponsor, together with the delegations of Argentina, Chile, Italy, Yugoslavia and Pakistan, the draft resolution which has just been introduced by the representative of Italy.

108. I have very little to add to what the representative of Italy has said. Brazil has given its full support to the proceedings of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States in Geneva. My country has taken a very active part in its proceedings and had the opportunity there of advancing, together with other Latin American delegations, several drafts which have been transformed into Conference

resolutions. It is thus perfectly natural that we should be interested in the necessary follow-up of those proceedings so that the valuable work undertaken in Geneva should not be lost or disregarded. The draft resolution we have co-sponsored and for which we request the sympathetic consideration of the Member States is meant to meet this objective of continuity.

109. Members of the First Committee will appreciate the fact that this draft is moderate in tone and moderate in purpose. It does not add up to the conclusions of Geneva; it just restates them and is motivated by the necessity of keeping them alive—no more and no less. It already incorporates many suggestions which have been advanced by several Member States and already reflects many concessions which our six delegations had to make in order to adjust our positions to the opinions and objections of other States.

110. As the members of the First Committee will recall, Brazil was in favour of the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee, with specific terms of reference for the discussion and consideration of the whole range of subjects dealt with in the Geneva Conference. We still do not think that the establishment of such an *ad hoc* committee would have resulted in duplication or in complication. On the contrary, it would have provided the basis for a better co-ordination of the activities of all the organs and international bodies concerned with the implementation of the conclusions of the Conference. We have not changed our views, but we have restricted the scope of our claims in keeping with the spirit of conciliation and compromise, as it was felt in some quarters that it would be more convenient to utilize one of the existing bodies in the machinery of the United Nations. That explains the recourse to the Disarmament Commission, which has been inactive for several years.

111. Even in this case, the six delegations have chosen a very flexible approach. Instead of setting a definite date for the convening of the Disarmament Commission, the draft resolution leaves the question open to the decision of the majority of the Member States, upon consultation with the Secretary-General. That is a democratic and unobjectionable approach, it appears to us, since normally no one should prevent the convening of a conference desired by the majority of the Member States or determine the convening of a conference contrary to the wishes of the same majority. Thus, we do not think that such provisions are really controversial.

112. On the question of the appropriate terms of reference, the six delegations have endeavoured likewise to adopt a very flexible course, to the extent that they have tried to circumvent some issues and questions which would appear to present difficulties and give rise to divergencies.

113. On the other hand, we definitely think that the General Assembly, which called for the meeting of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, should not evade its responsibilities concerning this matter. It cannot just ignore or disregard the important conclusions of such a Conference and it cannot dispel the hopes and fair aspirations of the non-nuclear world. The States represented among the non-nuclear States are to a great extent

the same States sitting in the First Committee, and, of course, they are expected to maintain in New York the same opinions they held in Geneva on the same basic issues. And this draft, we insist, contains nothing other than what was decided and recommended in Geneva. It does not aggravate opinions or positions; on the contrary, it tries to adjust, soften and reconcile such positions.

114. My delegation wishes to stress the importance it attaches to resolution J [see A/7277 and Corr.1, para. 17 (IV)], which embodies the main claims of the non-nuclear-weapon States in the field of co-operation on matters of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy among all States. We think that the programmes and measures therein contemplated are of the utmost importance, and it is only fitting for the General Assembly to be put on record as favouring their early implementation. We sincerely hope that the bodies and organs concerned will give prompt attention and full co-operation to the specific requests of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. My delegation is under instructions to insist on this point.

115. We earnestly appeal to the nuclear States to ponder the contents and provisions of this draft resolution. We feel that on all matters of such vital importance to mankind what is really necessary is a frank, open and constructive dialogue between the nuclear and the non-nuclear States. Although we think that an *ad hoc* committee would have been a preferable solution, we are confident and positive that the Disarmament Commission will provide an excellent forum for this constructive dialogue on matters of disarmament, non-proliferation, security and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

116. It has been said that nuclear and non-nuclear States may have conflicting interests and positions. That may be true, but we submit that that is not always necessarily true. Peace and security are becoming indivisible, and nuclear and non-nuclear States alike are inhabited by human beings who depend on peace for their security, for their progress and for their very lives. If we adhere to this human approach, no positions are irreconcilable. That is why the dialogue should not be further delayed. And, in keeping with the spirit of the Charter, this draft resolution is an invitation to the constructive dialogue we have mentioned. That is why Brazil has joined the other five delegations in this effort, and that is why we dare expect the widest possible support for our draft resolution, which is not dictated by the interests of any State or any group of States, but springs from an earnest wish for collaboration on the vital issues with which we are confronted.

117. We sincerely believe that the debate envisaged will dispel many of the existing doubts and difficulties, and that is why we deem it essential to secure the co-operation of the nuclear Powers in this field. We do not wish to disregard the political realities of our day. But one of those political realities is the necessity of meeting the challenge of our times in the field of economic development of all States, without discrimination, through the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. For the first time in history mankind may find in science and technology the means of settling the problems of poverty and deprivation. That goal is actually within our reach, if we turn our hearts to peace and not to

war, and if we set our minds on the really important questions, without undue attention to technicalities and to semantics. That common goal is certainly not unattainable, if we have the courage to meet the problem squarely and if we are allowed to pursue our effort in a spirit of mutual confidence and understanding. This draft resolution is an effort towards such confidence and understanding, and we hope it will be considered and evaluated in such a spirit and in that light.

118. Mr. MORTENSEN (Denmark): On behalf of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.446 my delegation had the opportunity yesterday to reply to the criticism that had been voiced against the proposal in this Committee. In the course of consultations with a number of Member States we have noted that several States sympathize with the ideas which prompted us to present the draft resolution. However, we have also had clear indications that in the present international situation, with centres of unrest in various parts of the world, the climate is not very propitious for obtaining such support of the draft resolution—in spite of its limited scope—as would be necessary for a true and meaningful realization of our proposal.

119. Consequently we have decided not to insist on the draft resolution's being put to a vote during the present session of the General Assembly. We have taken this decision on the understanding that this matter is covered by operative paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/C.1/L.448/Rev.1, referring to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament all documents and records of the meetings of the First Committee concerning all matters related to the disarmament question. Furthermore, the sponsors are confident that the Eighteen-Nation Committee will take up for active consideration and study the problems surrounding our proposal. Finally, we wish to reserve the right to revert to the matter at a future session of the General Assembly.

120. On behalf of the sponsors I wish to thank the Member States that have endorsed the draft resolution.

121. I cannot conceal our regret that the proposal did not meet with the necessary support at this session, for we believe that more exact information about arms transfers would prove to be in the true interest of all States and, in particular, that it would counteract the arms race to which we all want to put an end. A decision to make an inquiry as proposed could, in our view, have been an important step forward in that it would have engaged the entire membership in the problem.

122. The sponsors are convinced that greater openness about international arms transfers could reduce defence expenditures. Publication would entail limitations on transfers of arms, because continued secrecy about the military build-up of individual countries would tend to increase the insecurity in neighbouring States and lead to unnecessary purchases of arms.

123. In conclusion, I wish to draw attention to the fact that the International Institute for Peace and Research in Stockholm, whose positive efforts in the field of detection seismology will be well known to the members of this

Committee, has initiated a comprehensive study of the trade in arms. The sponsors are hopeful, indeed optimistic, that this study, when published, will help to create greater understanding for the ideas underlying our draft resolution

and improve the opportunities for their realization at a later session of the General Assembly.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.