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**Chairman: Mr. Piero VINCI (Italy).**

*In the Chairman's absence Mr. Galindo Pohl (El Salvador), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

*Invitation aspects of the consideration of item 25, The Korean question: consideration of all relevant proposals related to the invitation aspects, such as those contained in documents A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3, L.423 and L.424 (continued)*

1. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): Before I call on the first speaker this morning, and since we have already established a programme of work, particularly for the item before us, may I recall that on Friday last, 22 November, the Chairman of the First Committee said [*1616th meeting*] that the item on invitations to representatives of Korea would be taken up on the morning of 25 November, would continue through the afternoon and evening and would be concluded about noon today, 26 November. He went on to say that the vote would probably be taken this afternoon, but that if that were not possible—and it will not be possible today—a vote would be taken at the latest on 27 November, in the morning or by about noon.

2. Since we have twenty-six speakers on the list for today, some having decided not to participate, it seems that in order to keep to this time-table and to take the vote and hear explanations of vote tomorrow morning, 27 November, the deadline set by the Chairman on 22 November, there will have to be meetings this afternoon and tonight. This is the only way in which it will be possible for us to vote on the item before us tomorrow morning and thus comply with the proposal made by the Chairman on 22 November and accepted by the Committee.

3. I venture, then, once again to remind representatives of the agreement reached on 22 November, and if there is no objection I trust that the Committee will confirm it.

4. Mr. CSATORDAY (Hungary): I apologize for taking the floor, but it is not quite clear to me what it is that we should agree upon now—whether it is that we should have an afternoon meeting and a night meeting, or that we

should curtail the speakers by concluding the consideration of this item abruptly at a certain fixed moment. It is not quite clear to me what we should agree upon.

5. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): If I understand correctly, since the list of speakers was closed yesterday at 5 p.m., and we have twenty-six speakers on the list, the procedure would be to hear the twenty-six speakers, in other words to conclude the debate this evening so as to be ready, without anyone having to refrain from speaking, to vote tomorrow. That is the position. I hope it is clear.

6. Mr. CSATORDAY (Hungary): It is entirely clear to me. I do not think that we shall have to take a decision on that, because the list of speakers is closed, everyone will be allowed to take the floor to make his statement, and after that we shall take into consideration the different drafts and we shall proceed to the vote. I do not think that a special decision is needed on that. At least, it is still not quite clear to me why we need such a decision. In the view of my delegation we do not need to take any decision because the list of speakers is closed, they will be free to take the floor and we shall proceed normally with our work.

7. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): On 22 November the Chairman of the Committee considered the question settled, and all I wanted to do today was to seek confirmation from the Committee of what the Chairman took to be settled on that date, since no objection had been raised to his suggestion. In other words, I wanted to be sure it was realized that we would make use of all time needed, so as to conclude the debate today.

8. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (*translated from French*): I fully agree with the Chairman's explanation of the proposal he made last Friday, a proposal flexible enough to enable us to finish the general debate and proceed to the vote, the matter to be decided tomorrow morning at the latest. I therefore feel that, after having terminated the general debate, we can take any decision that may be necessary when we proceed to discuss the draft resolutions.

9. I believe that there is no need to reconsider the Chairman's proposal, and that we should now merely take note of his explanation.

10. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): Exactly, all I wanted to do was to confirm and recall the decision taken on 22 November, since in principle we have to keep to a time-table. Obviously, it is always a flexible time-table, and the Committee has the last word.

11. Now that this clarification has been made, I think we can begin hearing the speakers on this morning's list.

12. Mr. HARBI (Algeria) (*translated from French*): The Committee's attention is once again drawn to the important question of extending an invitation to representatives of both parts of Korea to participate in the consideration of agenda item 25.

13. Although my delegation has on another occasion stated its view on the invitation of representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and those of South Korea, I believe that I should reaffirm its position.

14. This question has been viewed from a partisan angle in the past, and because of the absence of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from our earlier debates it could not be settled in the interests of the Korean people and in conformity with its legitimate wishes for peace in unity. The United Nations cannot hope to arrive at a fair settlement of the Korean question unless the parties directly concerned are allowed to state their views freely and without restriction. It is absurd to speak of the unification of Korea while ostracizing one of its parts. To act thus is to pass judgement on a situation which ought to be regarded as temporary and which is being deliberately perpetuated. The First Committee is aware of South Korea's views and, in the interests of objectivity and justice, ought to hear the views of the other party. The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.423 have set out to exclude from our debate a legitimately interested party by setting conditions that no State which truly exercises the attributes of sovereignty could possibly accept. The language of the draft implies that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is regarded as guilty and that it must first mend its ways—i.e., accept the aggression of which it was a victim and endorse the resolutions which had led to that aggression. The Committee should certainly not expect the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to accept such an invitation. A very interesting contradiction is thus revealed in the attitude of those who profess adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter. What would really be useful would be a realistic discussion of the urgent problems to which recent events have once again drawn attention. The Committee should not allow decisions on the Korean question to be taken in the absence of the principal party concerned. Such decisions could only harm the authority and prestige of the United Nations, which would also deny itself an opportunity of understanding the actual situation in Korea.

15. The Algerian delegation hopes that this year our Committee will break new ground and will proceed to discuss the Korean question in the presence of representatives of both parts of Korea.

16. Mr. CORNER (New Zealand): The question of Korea was brought to the United Nations in September 1947. Immediately the First Committee was plunged into an argument over inviting representatives from Korea to participate in the Committee's work. Now, twenty-one years later, we are still in the same argument. And it is quite right that we should be arguing about this matter of representation, for it is, as the Soviet Union made so clear back in 1947, the very heart of the matter. I propose to go back to the records to remind the Committee of the course of that first argument about representation in September and October 1947. All members will, I trust, then see how

the question of representation is an inextricable part of the substance of the Korean question. They will also see how the Korean question casts a more general light on other issues that face the United Nations.

17. On 17 September 1947 the United States brought the question of Korea to the United Nations. It did so because the Soviet Union would not, as it had previously agreed to do, join in discussions to achieve the independence of Korea, of which half was occupied by the United States and half by the Soviet Union. The dispute between the United States and the Soviet Union was tortuous, as those disputes traditionally are, but the essence of the continuing disagreement was that the Soviet Union insisted that the occupying Powers should deal only with "democratic" groups or political parties. And with its well-known capacity for defining terms to suit itself, the Soviet Union excluded from the definition of "democratic" any group that had not formally accepted the need for military occupation.

18. But this ruled out, in practice, all parties except the Communists and groups under their control. For the other parties, deprived of the independence of their country for forty years, were bursting with nationalism. They demanded immediate freedom; they denounced the rule by foreign armies, whether American or Russian. Only the Communists—with that strange masochism which marks them off from other parties—accepted occupation; only they, therefore, were "democratic". Here was trouble from the very beginning.

19. And so on 17 September 1947 the United States brought the question to the United Nations. Immediately the question of representation came up. The Soviet Union proposed that Korean representatives come for the debate. But how could you discover Koreans who were truly representative? Surely the Committee would not want to hear persons who were mere appointees of the military occupation forces. This, it appeared, was precisely what the Soviet Union had in mind. But the majority of the Committee could not stomach this. Surely, numerous representatives argued, the proper way to find representatives was to hold elections. And these elections would serve another essential purpose: for the obvious way to get the American and Soviet occupation troops out of the country was to have a Korean government; and the way to get a government was to hold nation-wide elections. All this made obvious sense to nearly all Members of the United Nations—and surely it still does. Forty-six Members of the United Nations voted in favour of this course, not one voted against, and there were only four abstentions.

20. But the six Communist countries did not take part in the vote. The Soviet Union did not like the idea of nation-wide elections on the basis of adult suffrage, by secret ballot and under United Nations supervision. They had not hurried into the Far Eastern war and into Korea a few days before that war ended, after years of fighting by the United States, just to have the people of Korea vote them out of this new addition to their empire. They had a different plan: the Korean question was to be settled not by the United Nations but by the great Powers. Or, alternatively, the United States and Soviet forces should withdraw simultaneously and let the Koreans decide their

future. The Soviet Union had of course stacked the cards by having organized strong armed forces in their zone and put them under a single-party government; whereas in the South at that time there were a great number of rival political parties which could not have agreed on who should control any armed forces even if they had had them.

21. So the Committee, by forty-six to none with four abstentions, and then the General Assembly, by forty-six to none with four abstentions, adopted resolution 112 (II). The operative part of section A of that long resolution read as follows:

*"The General Assembly*

*"1. Resolves that elected representatives of the Korean people be invited to take part in the consideration of the question;*

*"2. Further resolves that in order to facilitate and expedite such participation and to observe that the Korean representatives are in fact duly elected by the Korean people and not mere appointees by military authorities in Korea, there be forthwith established a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, to be present in Korea, with right to travel, observe and consult throughout Korea."*

22. That Temporary Commission consisted of Australia, Canada, China, El Salvador, France, India, the Philippines, Syria and the Ukraine [see *General Assembly resolution 112 B (II), operative para. 1*]. For a time the representative of India was its Chairman and then the chairmanship rotated alphabetically.

23. So there the lines were marked out. The entire membership of the United Nations of that day wanted to hear Korean representatives, but wanted representatives who truly represented the Koreans. The Soviet Union wanted only those it could hand pick. It fought against the appointment of the Temporary Commission. It seems not to have pressed the Ukraine to take the place reserved for it on the Commission; at any rate the Ukraine did not participate. And it refused to let the Temporary Commission into the zone of Korea which it controlled. The most the Temporary Commission could do was to observe the elections in the zone controlled by the United States forces. And at the next session of the General Assembly, the Soviet Union, which had kept the Commission out of the North, had the nerve to maintain that the Commission had exceeded its terms of reference because the United Nations resolution had called for elections in the whole of Korea, not just in one part. All these things members can see in the documents of the time or summarized in the Yearbooks of the United Nations for 1947-1948 and 1948-1949.<sup>1</sup>

24. In 1948 a new Commission was elected [see *General Assembly resolution 195 (II), operative para. 4*] by a vote of forty-eight in favour, six against—the Communist States—and one abstention only. The Soviet Union and its five associates voted against the resolution, this time on the ground that the United Nations had no right to take any

action with regard to Korea; it should be dealt with, they said, by the great Powers.

25. The United Nations, I recall, was in those days unsatisfactory to the Soviet Union because almost all its Members thought in terms of free elections, international supervision and other techniques which put "democratic forces" at a disadvantage. Direct negotiations between the great Powers gave "objective reality" a better chance of expressing itself. The Soviet Union said that if, despite its objection, the United Nations was going to consider the Korean question, it should invite the true representatives of Korea to the United Nations; and—does it come as a surprise?—the true representatives of Korea, the people who expressed the will of the Korean people, were the Government of the Democratic Republic of Korea which, by some means not vouchsafed to the Committee, had, so they said, been elected by the overwhelming majority of the people of both North and South. The entire membership of the United Nations, apart from these six, preferred to continue on the path of free, supervised elections.

26. The new Commission consisted of Australia, China, El Salvador, France, India, the Philippines and Syria. It was reappointed in 1949 [see *General Assembly resolution 293 (IV), operative para. 1*] with Turkey taking the place of Syria. This was the body that was on the spot when in 1950 the North launched its aggression. It was the Indian representative who was Chairman at that vital time. Mr. Nehru cast no doubt on the integrity of his representative, nor on the finding which the Commission made under the chairmanship of that representative.

27. The report of the Commission on the aggression by North Korea belongs to our next debate, on the substance of the question. At this point I confine myself to recording that the new Commission was never able to get into North Korea under Soviet occupation. The Soviet Union did not reply to the Secretary-General's letters asking for co-operation. The Commission reported on the withdrawal of United States forces from South Korea, which was completed on 29 June 1949 under the observation of the Commission. But at the end of July 1949 it had also to report that:

*"As long as the opposition of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the efforts of the United Nations Commission to achieve the objectives of the General Assembly resolution of 12 December 1948 continues, neither a relaxation of hostile propaganda nor any other measure can facilitate to a substantial degree the achievement of unification."*<sup>2</sup>

28. Thus the United Nations was unable to achieve that aim of bringing about free elections in the whole of Korea which, as has been shown, were intended to produce representatives qualified to participate in the General Assembly's discussions.

29. Free elections, supervised by the United Nations, have been held in the South. Careful reports have been presented to the General Assembly about those elections, and the representatives produced by those elections have been heard, as was proper, by this Committee. They are present

<sup>1</sup> See *Yearbook of the United Nations 1947-48* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 1949.I.13) and *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1948-49* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 1950.I.11).

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Session, Supplement No. 9, chap. IV, para. 35 (2)*.

continuously at the United Nations as accredited observers, and they are treated with the respect that is properly extended to representatives who are known to speak for a Government that has been formed through elections conducted under international scrutiny.

30. They bear a heavy burden, those who frustrated the United Nations plan of holding free elections throughout Korea—elections designed both to produce representatives to join in the United Nations discussions and also to provide the means for the unification of the country. As the Commission said in its 1950 report, which conclusively pinned the responsibility for aggression upon North Korea:

“Had internationally-supervised elections been allowed to take place in the whole of Korea, and had a unified and independent Korea thereby come into existence, the present conflict could never have arisen.”<sup>3</sup>

31. That is the history of the past effort of the United Nations to find true spokesmen to appear on behalf of the Korean people at the discussions in the United Nations. Is it irrelevant history? In one sense it might be argued that it is; because most Members have now indicated—and it is implicit in draft resolution A/C.1/L.423—that they are prepared to receive representatives from the authorities in the North despite the fact that they have not emerged by the kind of electoral process that the United Nations had previously considered desirable. To such an extent have our standards been eroded. The only condition which the majority of the membership now insists upon is that any representative from either part of Korea “unequivocally accepts the competence and authority of the United Nations within the terms of the Charter to take action on the Korean question” [see A/C.1/L.423, *operative para. 2*].

32. Given the history of this question, given the terrible results which, as the words of the Commission which I have just quoted testify, came from the past refusal of the North to co-operate with the United Nations, is that an unreasonable condition? For some years the majority of the Members of the United Nations have thought not; and I have no doubt that they will continue to think not.

33. A few members of this Committee are complaining of injustice and are trying to rewrite history, to stand things on their head. In a few years, I have no doubt, we shall be given, in similar tones of injured innocence, a similar topsy-turvy version of the history of this summer's events in Eastern Europe. The representative of Hungary said yesterday that countries which value their sovereignty cannot accept such conditions—this from the representative of a Government which shows the value that it places upon its sovereignty by its apparently passive acceptance of the new doctrine of limited sovereignty. The representative of Hungary also asserts that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea maintains a policy of peace, when the evidence produced in this Committee makes it clear that it is behaving just as it did twenty years ago—but that subject, the menacing acts of infiltration, murder and terrorism by North Korea, is for the next part of our debate. He complains that the United Nations has been made into one of the parties to the Korean conflict. Of course it has—when the United Nations moved to resist the aggres-

sion of North Korea it naturally became a party; that is what collective security is all about. But he and a few of his colleagues maintain the United Nations should never have taken collective action against North Korea because it was the South which was the aggressor.

34. Well, there we are back to history, and we have to keep coming back to the facts; for example, to the report of the United Nations own Commission at the time sent to the General Assembly by its Chairman, Anup Singh of India. It said:

*“Responsibility for the aggression*

“The invasion of the territory of the Republic of Korea by the armed forces of the North Korean authorities, which began on 25 June 1950, was an act of aggression initiated without warning and without provocation, in execution of a carefully prepared plan.

“This plan of aggression, it is now clear, was an essential part of the policy of the North Korean authorities, the object of which was to secure control over the whole of Korea. If control could not be gained by peaceful means, it would be achieved by overthrowing the Republic of Korea, either by undermining it from within or, should that prove ineffective, by resorting to direct aggression. As the methods used for undermining the Republic from within proved unsuccessful, the North Korean authorities launched an invasion of the territory of the Republic of Korea.”<sup>4</sup>

The report also reads:

“On the morning of Monday, 26 June 1950, the Commission was informed of the adoption by the Security Council, at its 473rd meeting on 25 June 1950, of the resolution which termed the armed invasion of the Republic of Korea a breach of the peace, and called upon the authorities in North Korea to cease hostilities forthwith and to withdraw their armed forces to the 38th parallel. Sitting in almost continuous session throughout the day, the Commission received from its observers frequent reports of the progress of hostilities. The Commission also considered evidence that had been gathered by its field observers during a tour of the 38th parallel which had recently been concluded. The observers reported that they had been impressed during their tour by the fact that the South Korean Army was organized entirely for defence. They had noted that in all sectors it was disposed in depth; that armour, air support and heavy artillery were absent; that there were visible no military or other supplies necessary for a large-scale attack, and that they had encountered no concentrations of transport. The observers had returned to Seoul less than thirty-six hours before the attack from the North began.”<sup>5</sup>

35. It really is not possible to reverse judgements as conclusive as that. The facts are, of course, inconvenient. We can understand that a few countries would like to rewrite this piece of history, to change the picture. If only the picture was one of those mosaics that exist in some countries, so that the pebbles can be readjusted, faces changed and new ones inserted as reputations rise and fall and rise again. But the records of the United Nations, unlike national history books, cannot be rewritten.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 16, para. 206.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 202 and 203.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 8.

36. We can understand also the worry of the representative of Cuba that to participate in the debates North Korea would have to admit that it was the aggressor. Perhaps a little honesty would do some good; and, after all, confession and repentance is a notable element of one of the great literary traditions. But we are not asking for such miracles. All we ask—and in view of the history of this question we think it a modest request—is that the authorities in North Korea should at last try the path of co-operating with the United Nations. Their other path led to enormous bloodshed and a dead end.

37. For our part, our aim is not to exclude but to include them within the framework within which we all must work if we are to have peace, namely, respect for the Charter and for the simple obligations which we should all have assumed by virtue of our membership of the United Nations.

38. It is in that spirit that we commend the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.423, which we have co-sponsored, and it is in the same spirit that we shall vote against the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3.

39. Mr. HUOT SAMBATH (Cambodia) (*translated from French*): For over twenty years, under pressure from United States imperialism, the so-called Korean question has been included in the agenda and examined by the United Nations. The purpose of this United States manoeuvre has been simply to perpetuate the division of Korea and to set the seal of United Nations approval on the imperialistic policy of the United States Government and on the maintenance of its aggressive bases in Asia, that being accomplished through the so-called United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

40. During the general debate, I reminded the General Assembly that Korea was divided by the great Powers not as a vanquished country punished for its participation in the Second World War along with the dictatorships, but as a victim of the Yalta spirit [*1701st plenary meeting, para. 78*]. My delegation accordingly asked the General Assembly “to recognize that the artificial perpetuation—with the agreement of the United Nations—of the division of the Korean nation is an injustice” [*ibid., para. 79*].

41. The Korean question, as presented by the United States, is completely outside the competence of the United Nations. There is no article in the Charter that authorizes the international Organization to intervene in the internal affairs of an independent and sovereign State, even if the State in question is not a Member of the United Nations.

42. To justify their initiative, the representatives who requested the inclusion of the so-called Korean question in the agenda referred to the illegal resolutions adopted year after year by the built-in majority in the Assembly. They know perfectly well that the resolutions in question flagrantly violate the very principles of the Charter, for the United Nations has no political competence whatever as regards the unification of Korea—an internal matter solely within the competence of the Korean people. The only questions within the province of the United Nations are

simply the dissolution of the illegal commission set up on the initiative of the United States to justify the presence of its troops and bases in South Korea, and the withdrawal of these occupation troops and dismantlement of these bases. These two questions, the inclusion of which has been requested by a number of Member States [*A/7182 and Add.1-4 and A/7184 and Add.1 and 2*], are now on this session's agenda.

43. However, another question relating to Korea is also on the agenda.

44. At our meeting of 18 October last [*1585th meeting*], when the organization of our work was being discussed, I introduced a draft resolution submitted by seventeen Powers, including Cambodia and other non-aligned Asian and African Powers; it has been circulated as document A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3. I emphasized at that time that no question could be discussed equitably and effectively without the participation of the interested parties. As questions relating to Korea are on our agenda, the Committee must recognize that it cannot examine them seriously and usefully without the participation of the interested parties, i.e., in the absence of representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea. Logic and common sense both require that the interested parties should be invited to state their views before our Committee.

45. Seeking to sabotage the consideration of these questions, the United States delegation has submitted draft resolution A/C.1/L.423, demanding that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which is an independent and sovereign State and not a Member of the United Nations, should first accept the action taken by the United Nations—or, more precisely, by the built-in majority in the United Nations—on a question which is solely within the competence of the Korean people and of the independent and sovereign State in question. This condition is outrageous and cannot be accepted by any self-respecting sovereign State.

46. The United States draft resolution also requires of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that it “first unequivocally accepts the competence and authority of the United Nations within the terms of the Charter”.

47. Last year some speakers in this Committee even said that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea must also first show respect for the dignity of the United Nations. These are fine phrases which are meaningless today, for as the Secretary-General of the United Nations says in the Introduction to his Annual Report on the Work of the Organization<sup>6</sup> the world is faced with an obvious lowering of international morality.

48. If it wishes to be respected, our Organization must set a good example, and begin by respecting the purposes and principles set out in its own Charter. Member States must themselves respect the authority and competence of the United Nations before asking non-member States to respect them.

49. A few days ago, Cambodia and a large number of other non-aligned African and Asian countries attempted to

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 1 A.



restore the dignity of the United Nations and to give it some prestige and authority by asking for the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and the recognition of representatives of the Government of that great country with 800 million inhabitants as the only legitimate representatives of China in the United Nations and in all related organizations.

50. At the behest of the United States Government, the built-in majority in the United Nations continues to pretend against all reason that the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek—who, incidentally, have not set foot on the Chinese mainland for nearly twenty years, since their headlong flight, and who are sheltering in the province of Taiwan under the protection of the United States army—represent China in the United Nations. Even the former permanent representative of the United States, Mr. George Ball, found this position of his Government unworthy and unrealistic, in that it perpetuates what the whole world knows to be an outworn fiction.

51. The United States, a highly industrialized super-Power, is waging a genocidal war in Viet-Nam against the people of a small underdeveloped country whose only crime is that it refuses to be enslaved by the United States.

52. Is it worthy of the United Nations to allow this super-Power to violate the principles of the Charter with impunity all over the world, and to flout international conventions and the very principles of international law?

53. I could cite many other examples to show that certain other Member States, which have undertaken to respect the Charter, daily violate the purposes and principles of that Charter and the resolutions adopted by the United Nations.

54. I would invite those who claim that the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea does not respect the Charter to read the statement of that country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs contained in document A/C.1/966 of 10 October 1968, in which it is said very clearly: "The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has always respected and respects the Charter and objectives of the United Nations".

55. For all the reasons I have given, my delegation urges the delegations of all truly independent countries which believe in peace and justice to support the draft resolution which asks that the two parties interested in the Korean question should be invited simultaneously and unconditionally. That draft resolution has been submitted by the non-aligned countries of Africa and Asia and circulated in document A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3. Similarly, my delegation urges outright rejection of the United States draft resolution, A/C.1/L.423, which contains conditions unacceptable to any independent and sovereign State.

56. I would emphasize that my statement dealt only with the procedural question of the invitation of the two interested Korean parties. My delegation will make another statement when the Committee examines the substance of the various questions on its agenda relating to Korea.

57. Mr. GURINOVICH (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): The Byelorussian

delegation notes with satisfaction that for the first time this year the First Committee has so organized its work that draft resolution A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3, whereby the General Assembly decides

"... to invite simultaneously and without condition a representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and a representative of the Republic of Korea, as interested parties, to take part, without the right to vote, in the discussion of questions relating to Korea"

is being examined separately from the Korean question as such, and well in advance of it.

58. This to us is the first indication that there is a growing desire among Member States to turn their backs on the old and fallacious practice of discussing the question of invitation in circumstances arranged by countries which are not interested in a just solution of this question and which, without any good reason, oppose the participation of both interested parties in the debate.

59. My delegation is firmly convinced that problems relating to the future of the Korean people must be discussed in the presence and with the participation of those who are shaping that future—representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

60. In the course of the debate and again today many delegations have said that fallacious practice of discussing questions relating to Korea in the United Nations without the participation of such representatives is not to be tolerated. Like many other delegations, my delegation believes that this discriminatory policy with regard to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea prevents rather than promotes a reasonable solution of the Korean question.

61. Compelling our Committee to listen to one side only—the representatives of the South Korean authorities—is but the latest attempt to perpetuate the existing abnormal situation. Someone, apparently, finds it to his advantage to create circumstances making it impossible for members of the First Committee to hear a true statement of the position of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The purpose of such attempts is to distort and misrepresent the peace-loving nature of that country's foreign policy. The statement made this morning by the New Zealand representative is a case in point. He decided to give us a history lesson. We all, of course, have respect for history; but history is written by the peoples and not by the New Zealand representative, particularly as all his arguments rested on one premise, namely: the six communist countries voted "against", while all the rest, including New Zealand, vote "for" something. Consequently, what New Zealand voted for is good, and since the Communists voted against, so much the better for New Zealand. Presumably, the reverse holds true. If the six countries—and today, incidentally, as everyone who knows history must be aware, there are many more countries engaged in building a communist society—say "yes", New Zealand will automatically say "no". That is a historical fact. But I could cite an example to the contrary, also taken from the history of the United Nations.

62. There was a time, long ago, when the six socialist countries introduced and voted—all alone—for resolutions

calling for the elimination of colonialism. New Zealand voted against the resolutions, and gathered enough other votes to reject our proposals. Times have changed. There are now three or four delegations, including the delegation of New Zealand, which vote against practical measures to eliminate the vestiges of colonialism, while all the rest, strange as the New Zealand representative may find it, vote together with the Communists. I imagine that arguments such as advanced by the New Zealand representative would be out of place even in New Zealand, to say nothing of the United Nations. It would seem that the word "communism" no longer frightens anyone. My delegation firmly repudiates all his slanderous allegations with regard to the position and policy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the position and policy of the socialist countries, and the position and policy of other States which share our desire for a constructive decision on the participation of both sides in a discussion which is of particular interest to them. All such attempts to create a situation in which the voice of truth cannot be heard in the Committee are aimed at justifying the continuing occupation of the Korean peninsula by United States troops and legitimizing the practice of military provocations in the Far East and in the whole of Asia; they are aimed at maintaining Korea as a base for aggression and for spreading tension throughout the Far East. This is a serious threat to the cause of peace.

63. The representatives of Western countries advanced truly laughable arguments in defense of their position. Thus, they tell us that the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea objects to examination by the United Nations of the report of the so-called United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea and to the adoption of unlawful resolutions on it. What kind of argument is that? Everyone knows that many States Members of the United Nations have been insisting that the Commission should be disbanded and that this year, when the agenda of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly was adopted, forty-eight States failed to support the Western countries' proposal to place this notorious Commission's report on the agenda.

64. If we were to pursue the reasoning of the Western countries, and the reasoning of the New Zealand representative, to its logical conclusion, we should deprive all those who do not support the United States proposals of the right to discuss the questions relating to Korea.

65. Those who oppose the participation of the two interested parties in the discussion of Korean problems in the United Nations go so far as to set conditions to the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea which the United States itself does not set—I repeat, does not set—when it wants to negotiate with that Government. For example, I have not heard it said that prior to the negotiations the United States is now conducting with that Government, it had demanded that the latter should—I now cite from the resolution—"unequivocally accept the competence and authority"—I shall now add something of my own: unequivocally accept the competence and authority, say, of the United States to carry on subversive and aggressive activities against the Korean people, or unequivocally accept the competence and authority of United States ships to invade the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In this case, such

absurd requirements are not made. Why, then, should they be included in the United States draft resolution on the question of invitation to discuss matters affecting the interests of the Korean people?

66. I also note that those who oppose a just decision on the invitation of the two interested parties deliberately pass over in silence the statement of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, of which everyone is aware, that this Government "has always respected and respects the Charter and objectives of the United Nations" [A/C.1/966].

67. Again, the New Zealand representative concluded his statement by saying that actually all he asks is that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should co-operate with the United Nations and respect its Charter. But there is his answer. If he were really consistent, I could see him argue as follows: Let us not permit representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to participate in the discussion of the item "Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea", because that country objects to a discussion of this question. Let us invite it to be represented at the debate on the other questions relating to Korea. In that regard, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea remarks in its statement [A/C.1/966]:

"With the United Nations General Assembly forthcoming, a number of socialist countries and national independent countries in Asia and Africa have proposals to include the 'question of the withdrawal of the United States Army and all other foreign troops occupying South Korea under the United Nations flag' and the 'question of the dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea', an instrument of the United States imperialist aggression against Korea in the agenda of the twenty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly".

The statement continues:

"The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea regards these proposals as just proposals, which reflect the unanimous will of the peace-loving people of the world, and it fully supports them".

68. Very well then, let us invite them to the discussion of these two questions. But that is not the point. The point is that the representatives of Western countries, who have co-sponsored the relevant draft resolution, for reasons of political discrimination simply do not want to invite the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in any circumstances.

69. My delegation urges all other delegations to support the seventeen-Power draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3 (which it has co-sponsored) inviting representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and of South Korea to take part on an equal footing in the discussion of the Korean question, and to reject the unreasonable draft resolution submitted by the United States with other countries.

70. Mr. DOBLES SANCHEZ (Costa Rica) (*translated from Spanish*): We are once again confronted with item 25 of the Assembly's agenda: the Korean question; and we are about to deal with the matter of inviting the representatives of

Korea to participate, without the right to vote, in the deliberations of the First Committee.

71. In keeping with the position adopted by Costa Rica since the Korean question first came before the United Nations, my delegation is a co-sponsor with Australia, Bolivia, the Central African Republic, Colombia, Japan, Madagascar, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Togo and the United States of America, of draft resolution A/C.1/L.423. The resolution recalls a view repeated frequently here, namely, that the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea can both participate in the discussion of this question provided that they first of all unequivocally accept the competence and authority of the United Nations, in accordance with the terms of the Charter, to adopt measures in relation to the Korean question. This is the basis of any solution of the problem, since without this condition, *sine qua non*, a really effective and equitable debate on the matter is unthinkable. Otherwise it would mean that any resolution which the General Assembly might adopt, in the full exercise of its powers and with all the facts before it, could later be dubbed "illegal" if it was not to the liking of North Korea or those supporting North Korea. Nothing would be achieved, and any effort made would be a waste of time.

72. The situation in which we now find ourselves is likewise not a new one. It is the reiteration by the authorities of North Korea in their statement of 21 September 1968 [A/C.1/966] that the United Nations must not discuss the "Korean question" any more but withdraw without delay all measures taken by means of resolutions which those authorities call "illegal" in spite of the fact that they were adopted within the framework of the norms and principles of the Charter as well as of those established by the General Assembly itself in resolution 112 (II) of 14 November 1947. That resolution was adopted, as is well known, though it needs to be recalled, when all efforts to establish a united, democratic and independent Korea had failed. The General Assembly, bearing in mind the events of that time, decided that it was imperative to hold free elections in all Korea to bring about unification. But what happened? Elections were held in South Korea only. It is no secret to anyone that the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was not allowed to enter North Korea.

73. On 12 December 1948 the General Assembly adopted resolution 195 (III) which declared as the only lawful Government in Korea the Government of the Republic of Korea.

74. For all these reasons my delegation considers that the United Nations has a very definite responsibility to examine this issue involving important questions of principle. We must not forget that the United Nations was set up precisely to deal with matters of this nature, which are the source and breeding-ground of tension, and that the Korean question has been before the General Assembly since 1947 precisely for that reason, and came before the Security Council in 1950 when the forces of North Korea carried out an armed attack against South Korea and crossed the dividing line of the 38th parallel. We cannot overlook the fact that the United Nations has offered a reasonable and practical formula for the unification of Korea, the one that

long-suffering people wishes and the one calculated to solve the problem, namely, unification by means of genuinely free elections held throughout the entire territory.

75. If this is to materialize, such elections would have to be held under the supervision of the United Nations. But the mere mention of "free elections" is regarded by the communist régime of North Korea as an affront. We see no reason why it should be regarded as "intervention" by the United Nations for such a procedure to be established, when in other parts of the world we have seen plebiscites and referendum operations successfully carried out under the supervision of the United Nations pursuant to decisions of the General Assembly that have never been impugned.

76. Thus complete integrity in the procedure of the elections has been guaranteed, and in many cases this procedure has led to the accession of peoples to independence. To cite a very recent case, that of Equatorial Guinea, a new State now a welcome Member of the Organization, it can be amply attested here that, when there is an honest intent to proceed legally, participation by the United Nations to strengthen the guarantee that everything has been done in accordance with democratic principles and the wishes of the majority of the population, which is thus exercising its self-determination, is not regarded with suspicion but is welcomed, as again in the case of Spain.

77. There is a popular saying in my country that a man who pays his bills does not fear foreclosure.

78. If the régime in North Korea were allowed to recognize the competence of the United Nations to seek a satisfactory solution to this problem we are confident that a positive solution would be reached. But we realize at the same time that this is not very likely. For we must not deceive ourselves regarding those who have no wish to see such a solution and the disappearance of a trouble-spot in a region that is of unquestionable strategic importance. And who are they who do not want this? We know perfectly well how and by whom the communist régime was set up. It is no expression of the popular will, but an *ad hoc* set-up designed to serve specific objectives and in defiance of the resolutions of the United Nations.

79. This is palpably evident. All we have to do is to read through the Memorandum of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea [A/C.1/970] which is self-explanatory. Having read the Memorandum, my delegation sees no need for any further argument in support of the draft resolution we are co-sponsoring with the other delegations mentioned. The resolution decides, in the light of obvious facts, to invite a representative of the Republic of Korea to participate in the debate on the Korean question, without the right to vote, and reaffirms that the First Committee is ready to invite a representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to participate likewise in the discussion of this question, without the right to vote, so long as it first accepts unequivocally the competence and authority of the United Nations, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, to adopt measures in connexion with the Korean question.

80. If the Powers that call themselves peace-loving are desirous of finding a just and satisfactory solution to this



problem, they would not overlook so important a detail as that of "persuading" the North Korean régime to agree to these conditions, which, incidentally, are the bare minimum. This would allow a start to be made with a dialogue which is both necessary and calculated to lead to a true and effective solution of the problem, and would provide an opportunity for the whole Korean population, of both the South and the North, to make up their minds about an issue which, when all is said and done, it is their right to decide, always provided that right and its exercise are properly protected and guaranteed. And who can guarantee that right? My delegation believes that only the United Nations can.

81. For the above reasons, my delegation will be unable to support draft resolution A/C.1/L.424, while appreciating the constructive intentions of the delegation of Saudi Arabia. Although it underlines certain points which are undoubtedly important, it tries to solve the problem by not imposing prior conditions on the attendance of the representatives of either of the parties to the conflict. This is precisely the neutral point from which and towards which any principle governing negotiations for solving the problem must proceed, on a basis of equity and, above all, of recognition of the competence and authority of the United Nations to examine the question and to offer practical and reasonable solutions, taking account first and foremost of the fundamental interests of the Korean people as a whole and their right to make a free choice.

82. Consequently, my delegation will likewise not be able to support draft resolution A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3 submitted by Bulgaria and sixteen other nations.

83. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (*translated from French*): Our Committee is once again beginning a debate on Korea, a debate in which the procedure is the substance, since we are seeking to organize our work as regards consideration of the Korean question.

84. The Committee has before it draft resolution A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3, which is co-sponsored by my country. This text deals with the organization of our work, since it proposes the manner in which we should examine the Korean question and, more particularly, preparatory steps to be taken by sending in good time the customary invitations to representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea. This would be a time-saving and useful measure, since it is the only way to ensure participation in the debates by qualified representatives of the two parties concerned.

85. It goes without saying that if we really want to have a serious discussion, we are obliged to invite both parties in order to hear their views on the question before us.

86. A serious problem has been referred to us: the unification and rehabilitation of a country. It is only natural that we should want to know the views of that country's representatives, especially as the question at issue is of the most vital importance for the Korean people—it is the question of its very future.

87. It is only right that we should ask ourselves: Is it possible to discuss the unification of a people and a country

in the absence of that people's representatives? The presence of both interested parties at a debate on a problem of direct concern to them is required not only by established usage and many years of international and United Nations practice, but by a rule of international law recognized in all epochs. To disregard this rule is tantamount to admitting our inability and lack of true desire to deal objectively with the problem.

88. If we should refuse to hear both of the parties, we should deliberately and knowingly deprive ourselves of the possibility of fully examining the matter; it would mean that we had no intention of holding a serious debate. Responsibility for such action would lie with those who have taken it upon themselves to submit the draft resolution inspired by the United States.

89. For seventeen years and more, we have been considering and attempting to settle this question, with a view, according to the headings of our documents, to the unification and rehabilitation of Korea. But what has been the result? South Korea continues to be occupied by foreign forces and is steadily being transformed into a military outpost.

90. The representative of Costa Rica, who spoke before me, stressed that Korea was a strategic area and that a presence there was important. In the final analysis, if Korea remains divided, it is because someone is present there to divide it: United States troops.

91. That situation is continuing, despite the sterile annual reports of the so-called Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea and despite our annual consideration of the problem; and our discussions lead to nothing. We should ask ourselves why this is so. The reason is not hard to find if we take a look at past history. Certain countries, especially the United States, do not want this problem to be solved. The unification of Korea is not in their interests, and they are consequently opposed to it. They will use any pretext that comes to hand to prevent a final solution and they endeavour every year to eliminate from the discussion one of the parties concerned, to prevent at all cost the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from attending the debates and stating their case. This discriminatory practice creates a troubled and uncertain atmosphere which allows the United States and some of its allies to frustrate the solution of the problem and prevent the Korean people from settling the matter for itself.

92. I should have rested my case at this point if, during yesterday's discussion on the invitation aspects, the opponents of a fair and reasonable procedure for considering the question before us had not raised a number of issues. They endeavoured to represent the formula in the United States-inspired draft resolution—which they are co-sponsoring—as the only formula that could be adopted. This formula—which was again reiterated this morning by various representatives as the sole possible solution—runs as follows: invite a representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to take part in the discussion of the Korean question without the right of vote, but only provided that this country first unequivocally accepts the competence and authority of the United Nations to take action on the Korean question.

93. However, all the action taken by the United Nations thus far, at the instigation of the United States, has been to prevent the unification and rehabilitation of Korea; it has made it impossible for Korea to have a unified national existence.

94. It would be beneath the dignity of any people or Government jealous of its national sovereignty to accept such conditions. This formula is also unworthy of the United Nations, for it is contrary not only to the fundamental principles of the Charter, but to some of its explicit provisions. The arguments advanced in an effort to persuade members of the Committee to adopt this procedure are that it has been followed by the United Nations in the past and that it has been accepted by the authorities of South Korea. This last argument—i.e., that this procedure, which offends the dignity of any self-respecting Government, has been accepted by South Korea—is worth its weight in gold! What else was to be expected? The South Korean authorities know very well that they would not remain in power for a second without the presence of United States troops in their territory and without the support of the United States Government. They are compelled to pay for this support in humiliation, the humiliation they suffer by accepting United States intervention in their country under the United Nations flag.

95. As to the other argument—that this procedure has been followed hitherto and should therefore be followed in the future—we would respectfully point out to those who advance it that thus far this procedure has helped only to perpetuate United States intervention and aggression under the cover of the United Nations. There is no reason to expect any better results from it in the future. Hence it cannot help us to solve the Korean problem and lead to the unification and rehabilitation of Korea.

96. Moreover, the acceptance of conditions being set to a free country, such as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, would not be merely a humiliation inflicted on a free country and people; such acceptance, as the Cuban representative has emphasized, has a much more definite meaning. An attempt is being made to force the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to recognize its culpability even before the Korean question is examined in the United Nations, thereby sanctioning all the violence and abuses to which Korea has been subjected. In particular, this would mean that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would accept the occupation of the southern half of its country by the troops of the United States and its allies, and thereby acquiesce to a crime committed in the name of the United Nations. It would thus be acquiescing to all United States aggression and interference in Korea, including the recent provocations and those still in the planning. In short, such acceptance would be tantamount to sanctioning all past and future violence and declaring that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was responsible for it, even before the Korean question was examined.

97. Why should the Democratic People's Republic of Korea accept such conditions? In order to be allowed to send its representatives here to explain why the United Nations should not deal with the Korean question? To accept such conditions would be contrary not only to the

national sovereignty of any State and the dignity of any self-respecting Government, but also to all the rules of international law. Surely these are singular and iniquitous conditions whereby the victim of aggression has to admit that it was the guilty party, in order that the question of where the guilt really lies could then be examined. Such a procedure can be conceived and advocated only by those who have a guilty conscience themselves and can see no other way out.

98. The two parties concerned are also being subjected to unequal treatment. The South Korean authorities enjoy all the privileges the United Nations has to offer, because their representatives feel at home on the soil of those whom they have accepted as masters and whom they humbly serve.

99. Readiness to accept such conditions is certainly natural for a puppet Government in the pay of another, but it would be unworthy of the Government of a free, independent and sovereign country, such as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In these circumstances, one of the parties—the one showing servility towards the United States—is enabled to take part in United Nations work because it is a country occupied by United States troops, whereas the other party—the Democratic People's Republic of Korea—because it resisted United States occupation, is prevented from sending its representatives to clarify the situation, explain its views, and inform the members of the Committee of the true state affairs in Korea.

100. In the circumstances, we are entitled to ask why there should be such discrimination, and why such an attitude should be taken towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Beyond the shadow of a doubt, the answer is that, as I have explained, the United States does not want the truth to be known about the situation in that country, and it certainly does not want that truth to be revealed by the victim of its policy in that part of the world.

101. How can participation in the discussion be denied to the very party which proposes genuine measures for unification? In the light of the United States policy of intervention, the proceeding is understandable enough, but only from the United States point of view. That country does not want representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to explain in detail their constructive proposals for the unification of Korea, although, according to all our documents, that is the principal purpose of the debate. It does not want those representatives to explain to members of this Committee the proposals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for a series of measures aimed at achieving a gradual rapprochement and the final unification of the two parts of Korea by solving first the most urgent problems of that divided nation and setting up a confederation of North and South Korea as an intermediate measure. Lastly, the United States does not want a development of political, economic, cultural and social ties and of co-operation between the North and South of the country, their present political systems being maintained for the time being. Certainly this last measure could do much to bring the two parties closer together.

102. Similarly, the United States does not want the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of

Korea to be able to explain here that the puppet authorities of Seoul will not even agree to establish postal exchanges between the two parts of the country because they are afraid to do so, being fully aware that they do not have a solid backing in their own country.

103. The question thus arises whether a debate on the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea is worth holding. Repeating the same statements year after year while rejecting *a priori* the constructive proposals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea without even hearing those who make them is a truly fruitless and meaningless exercise.

104. It is high time to give up this fallacious practice, which is being urged upon us once again at this session, and to buckle down to serious work. We should be able to issue an invitation to both parties. That is why, on behalf of the Bulgarian delegation, I appeal to all other delegations to accept our proposal to invite simultaneously the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea to take part in the examination of the items on our agenda.

105. The United States representative asked three questions in his statement yesterday. It would hardly be worth my while to comment on all three. His first question, however, was:

"First, does this Assembly continue to believe the United Nations has the competence and authority to deal with the Korean problem, a problem involving a nation divided against its will, along with the international friction and tension which constitute a by-product of that division?" [1619th meeting, para. 4.]

106. He represented the history of the problem and the decisions taken under pressure from the United States in such a way as to make it appear that the United Nations had the right and the duty to concern itself with the question of unification and rehabilitation of Korea.

107. In attempting to prove his thesis, he—just like the New Zealand representative today—rewrote history. In other words, he represented the crimes committed against Korea as factors authorizing the United Nations to continue its policy and maintain the division of Korea. Invoking flimsy arguments, the United States representative sought to persuade the Committee to accept the United States draft resolution—a text which is discriminatory and unworthy of the United Nations. He also repeatedly—and, to be sure, unsuccessfully—advanced arguments against the draft resolution he called the Bulgarian draft. My country is, in fact, a co-sponsor with sixteen other countries of a non-discriminatory draft resolution and we are proud of having submitted this draft, which alone is worthy of the United Nations. That is why we urge all delegations to support this draft resolution, which calls for a hearing, without any discrimination, of representatives of both parts of Korea—those of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and those of the South Korean authorities—so that the matter may be discussed seriously and settled once and for all and so that the Korean people may be allowed to decide its own destiny without outside interference.

108. Mr. KOUYATE (Guinea) (*translated from French*): On behalf of the people and Government of the Republic

of Guinea, my delegation expresses the hope that the United Nations, which has had the Korean question on its agenda for twenty years, will now address itself to it in a more objective manner and reach a fair and just solution in the interests of peace and security.

109. The debate on this country, half of which has been illegally occupied by a great military Power member of the Security Council, should result in allowing the Korean people to reunite its country by its own efforts, without interference of any kind. The international community should no longer tolerate the foreign policy which uses South Korea as a weapon pointed at certain Asian countries—more particularly China and Viet-Nam. Accordingly, my delegation invites the First Committee to reject out of hand the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.423, whose only purpose is to prolong the presence of foreign troops on Korean soil. Incidentally, I would draw the Committee's attention to the fact that five of the twelve countries sponsoring this draft resolution have troops fighting in the aggressive war against the Viet-Namense people. To require the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to act in accordance with the terms of that draft resolution would not be in the interest either of the Korean people or of the United Nations. In my delegation's view, extending a conditional invitation to that country is nothing but a manoeuvre designed to prevent the Korean people from ever unifying its country by its own efforts. More particularly, as regards the question of inviting the two Korean parties to take part in our work, it goes without saying that the United Nations could not be consistent or faithful to the purposes and principles set out in its Charter unless it acted impartially and allowed the Koreans themselves to settle the disputes dividing them.

110. As a co-sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3, my delegation believes that there can be no viable or lasting solution of the matter as long as the United States maintains its policy of occupying South Korea, and, moreover, occupying it under the United Nations flag. The Korean people would hold the United Nations responsible if such a draft were adopted, especially at a time when the so-called United Nations forces are engaging in aggression and espionage not only in Asia in general, but more particularly in the territory of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The *Pueblo* affair alone should make the United Nations understand that it must unconditionally invite both parties to take part in our debate. There is all the more reason for such action as it would enable the United Nations to see for itself why the presence of foreign troops can only aggravate the Korean dispute by taking away any desire for reconciliation and reunification. It is no secret that these troops are being maintained at Seoul against the will of the South Korean population. Strikes, demonstrations, boycotts and violent reprisals are all there to justify practical action by the United Nations and to refute the slanderous and tendentious claims of the occupying forces.

111. I am confident that, in the light of these considerations, the First Committee will be virtually unanimous in approving draft resolution A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3 calling for the unconditional invitation of the two parties most directly concerned.

112. Mr. JOUEJATI (Syria) (*translated from French*): The prior question of inviting representatives of the Democratic

People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea to state their respective views here might introduce a positive element into the United Nations debate and cure it of its by now traditional sterility. Eighteen years will soon have elapsed since the violent conflict in Korea, which endangered international peace and security, and the solution of the Korean problem in the form of the withdrawal of foreign troops, unification and self-determination without foreign interference, is not yet in sight.

113. Delegations can hardly be expected to accept year after year that the debate in the United Nations should merely mark time and bring nothing new to the situation, thus dooming Korea to perpetual division and the southern part of its territory to occupation by foreign troops.

114. The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3, my country among them, concentrated this aspect of the problem with a view to taking us out of this impasse. By inviting simultaneously representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea, the sponsors have sincerely endeavoured to inject a positive and logical element into this debate.

115. How can the problem be solved unless the parties directly concerned are both heard? For that to happen, the invitation must be unconditional. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a sovereign country; problems relating to the integrity of the Korean territory are of vital concern to it. It has every reason to insist that the problems in question should be regarded as being within the sole jurisdiction of the Korean people.

116. This is not an abstract or fanciful approach, but one based on the very principles of our Charter. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea should not be put

on trial here, and in its absence at that. Logic and fairness both require that its representatives should themselves state their views before the Assembly.

117. In the last analysis, it is only to prevent representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from coming here that ingenuity is expended on such texts as draft resolution A/C.1/L.423, which in fact is an ultimatum. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is being asked either to reverse its basic attitude or to give up its right to state its views before an organ dealing with its affairs.

118. It is no secret that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is not going to accept this ultimatum. The greatness of its revolution, the solidity of its foundations, the vigour of its resistance to imperialistic manoeuvres to perpetuate occupation, consecrate division, and transform the Korean people from an independent into a client nation, and the soundness of its institutions are such that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea need not pay the slightest attention to this *diktat*.

119. The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.423 probably know what they are doing. If they are certain in advance that their text, if adopted, will yield no positive results, should we not conclude that their only concern is to prevent any real progress towards an impartial solution of the problem? If, on the contrary, their intentions are good, they ought to recognize that draft resolution A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3 offers a better opportunity for progressing beyond our sterile debate and proceeding to resolve this dispute on the basis on the inalienable right of a people to unity and territorial integrity.

*The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.*