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CONTENTS

Page

Agenda items 27, 28, 29, 94 and 96:

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (continued)	} 1
Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (continued)	
Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (continued)	
Memorandum of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning urgent measures to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament (continued)	
Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States: Final Document of the Conference (continued)	

Chairman: Mr. Piero VINCI (Italy).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Galindo Pohl (El Salvador), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

AGENDA ITEMS 27, 28, 29, 94 AND 96

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (continued) (A/7189-DC/231, A/C.1/L.443, A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-5, A/C.1/L.445 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.446, A/C.1/L.448)

Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (continued) (A/7189-DC/231, A/C.1/L.447 and Add.1 and 2)

Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (continued) (A/7189-DC/231)

Memorandum of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning urgent measures to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament (continued) (A/7134, A/7223, A/C.1/974, A/C.1/L.443)

Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States: Final Document of the Conference (continued) (A/7224 and Add.1, A/7277 and Corr.1, A/7327, A/C.1/976)

1. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The General Assembly's con-

sideration of the disarmament questions on its agenda has shown that States are keenly interested in making real progress in that sphere. Today, hopes for such progress rest on the fact that agreement has been reached on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, aimed at decreasing the danger of spread of nuclear weapons over the globe, and that the Treaty has been signed by many States. The formulation and signing of the non-proliferation Treaty [resolution 2373 (XXII)] have been welcomed by most countries, as may be seen from statements of representatives at the plenary meetings of the General Assembly and in the First Committee. A great many of them have declared that they give their full support to the Treaty and favour its coming into force at an early date. A number of delegations from countries which had already signed the Treaty have stated that their Governments were taking measures for its prompt ratification. Yesterday we heard the United Kingdom representative [1623rd meeting] say that his country has ratified the Treaty. My delegation wishes to express satisfaction at these statements.

2. In discussions of disarmament questions, attention has centred on disarmament measures as such, on safeguarding the security of States, and on international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

3. My delegation expounded its position on disarmament questions in its statement of 12 November 1968 [1606th meeting], at which time it submitted the USSR Government's Memorandum on disarmament [A/7134] and offered additional explanations. The Memorandum contains a broad range of proposals, including prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, cessation of production of such weapons and the reduction and elimination of their stockpiles, restriction and reduction of vehicles for their delivery, prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests, and others. Many delegations have supported these proposals and said that they should be examined without delay by the Eighteen-Nation Committee. Many speakers expressed an interest in the possibility of bilateral USSR-United States negotiations on the restriction and subsequent reduction of vehicles for the delivery of strategic weapons. The USSR position on this question was stated at the current session by A. A. Gromyko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, who declared that the USSR Government is ready to begin a serious exchange of views on this question [1679th plenary meeting].

4. In connexion with disarmament questions, I should like to comment on the results of the session held by the Eighteen-Nation Committee in July and August 1968, immediately after the opening for signature of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The primary purpose of the session was to lay the groundwork for implementing those provisions of the Treaty which relate to further negotiations on disarmament.

5. Accordingly, the Eighteen-Nation Committee held an exchange of views on a broad range of disarmament questions, in which particular attention was given, *inter alia*, to such problems as prohibition of all nuclear weapon testing, prohibition of the use of such weapons, prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, and the exploitation of the sea-bed and ocean floor exclusively for peaceful purposes.

6. As a result of this exchange of views, the Committee agreed on the agenda for further examination of disarmament questions and decided that nuclear disarmament problems would be given priority. The agenda also provides for due attention to the question of general and complete disarmament.

7. Furthermore, the Committee adopted Poland's proposal to request the Secretary-General to arrange for a group of experts to study the effects of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. My delegation supports the draft resolution on the matter which is before the First Committee [A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-5]. At the same time, my delegation wishes once again to draw attention to the need to ensure that all States comply with the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.¹ My delegation is opposed to any revision of that instrument.

8. The Eighteen-Nation Committee held a very useful review of the disarmament proposals submitted by different States.

9. At the present time, the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee are holding consultations regarding the date of resumption of its work, and I trust that these consultations will be completed before the end of the current session of the General Assembly.

10. My delegation notes with satisfaction that in the course of our meetings here many delegations have spoken in praise of that Committee's work.

11. The problem of safeguarding the security of States, which is of concern to a great many representatives at the General Assembly, is intimately connected with disarmament questions.

12. Like many of the preceding speakers, I believe that the safeguarding of international security is a most important task of co-operation among States. The solution of other international problems is secondary to this endeavour, which has immeasurably gained in importance in this nuclear century of ours.

13. The best way to safeguard State security is to carry out disarmament measures. History teaches us that the growth of armaments endangers rather than enhances State security. Two world wars bear witness to the fact that the arms race and the achievement at some stage of temporary superiority by certain States—as was the case first with the Kaiser's Germany and then with Nazi Germany—far from enhancing international peace and security, serves as a stimulus for the launching of a world war.

14. The Soviet Union, which attaches great importance to matters of security, shares the legitimate desire of States to protect their peoples from danger and, above all, from nuclear attack or threat of nuclear attack. The importance of this problem must not be minimized, just as attempts to obstruct and frustrate the solution of this problem cannot be recognized as right or justified. The need to ensure security should not be juxtaposed to, or made to oppose, a solution of disarmament problems. There can be no doubt that security and disarmament are so closely interconnected that they form an indivisible whole. Any progress in the sphere of disarmament enhances security. Rejection of this approach to disarmament questions does nothing to strengthen that security.

15. This is the criterion that should be applied in evaluating the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This Treaty, as it stands, enhances the security of all States. Serving as it does to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world and preclude the appearance of additional States possessing nuclear weapons, the non-proliferation Treaty safeguards the security of States.

16. Let us ask ourselves: how would the security of States be affected by the appearance of five or ten more nuclear Powers?

17. There can be no doubt that, if new nuclear Powers were to appear, the security of all countries would be substantially lessened. Such a development would increase international tension. The probability of a nuclear war would be much greater. Indeed, in those circumstances there would be a risk that any armed conflict might escalate into a nuclear war. Local situations in various parts of the world would be exacerbated because of the emergence there of nuclear Powers. The danger of nuclear war breaking out accidentally, through miscalculation or technical failure, would increase with an increased number of nuclear Powers. In the Secretary-General's report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons we read:

“If a nuclear conflict were to erupt, however it started, not a single State could feel itself secure. Even if a State were not subjected to direct attack and even if it should not experience any immediate consequences of such an attack, it could nevertheless suffer as a result of later radio-active fall-out”.²

18. If the number of nuclear States should increase, the developing countries would be in the worst position as regards security, since they do not have the powerful industrial plant and the large numbers of scientists, engineers and experts necessary to manufacture nuclear weapons. Taking into account economic and other factors, it may be presumed that the overwhelming majority of these countries cannot expect to have their own nuclear weapons in the near future. In the circumstances, if our desire is to enhance State security, is there any justification for the concealed, and sometimes open, opposition on the part of certain countries to the entry into force at an early date of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons? Such opposition serves only to increase the threat of nuclear war.

19. Security Council resolution 255 (1968) of 19 June 1968 and the identical declarations made by three nuclear

¹ League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138.

² United Nations publication, Sales No.: 68.IX.1, paragraph 82.

Powers—the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom—on safeguards of the security of non-nuclear States parties to the Treaty are important factors in strengthening State security and a valuable addition to the non-proliferation Treaty. The resolution recognizes the obligation of the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon-State permanent members, to act immediately in accordance with the United Nations Charter to repel aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State, and also welcomes the intention expressed in that regard in the declaration of the three nuclear Powers. In these declarations, the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom confirm their intention, in the event of such aggression, to press for immediate action by the Security Council with a view to ensuring support, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the non-proliferation Treaty. The declarations also reaffirm the right of United Nations Members to individual and collective self-defence, as provided in Article 51 of the Charter.

20. The Security Council Resolution and the declarations of the nuclear Powers considerably strengthen the security safeguard constituted by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

21. In speaking of security safeguards, it must be emphasized that very important in that regard are the provisions of article 6 of the non-proliferation Treaty regarding the commitment by the parties to it to pursue negotiations in good faith on further effective measures relating to disarmament, provisions which really make the Treaty a starting point for carrying out other measures to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament.

22. By ensuring further progress in the matter of disarmament, these treaty provisions furnish a solid foundation for the further development and strengthening of State security, inasmuch as any agreement on disarmament measures is bound to be a further safeguard of such security.

23. Can there be any doubt, for example, that if agreement is reached on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the security of all States would be enhanced? The General Assembly should draw attention to the urgent need to conclude a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and call for such action to be taken without delay. That would be yet another guarantee of State security.

24. Bearing in mind the provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty concerning negotiations for further disarmament measures, the nature and meaning of the security of non-nuclear and nuclear States should not be regarded as static or frozen. Because of these provisions, international security will be in the process of constant development. Progress towards disarmament will mean greater State security.

25. In view of the opportunities afforded by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the strengthening of international security, all efforts should be concentrated not on creating difficulties, obstacles and

delays to prevent its entry into force but rather on seeing to it that the Treaty should as soon as possible become a valid rule of international law and a starting point for further disarmament measures. It should be clearly understood, of course, that the non-proliferation Treaty is only a partial measure in the sphere of disarmament, aimed at reducing the threat of nuclear war. It cannot, and is not intended to, constitute full and absolute protection for the non-nuclear and nuclear States parties to it from any attack or any threat of nuclear war. No treaty on partial disarmament measures can offer any such guarantee, until nuclear weapons, and weapons in general, have been destroyed. It is unreasonable to expect the Treaty to offer broad, direct and complete guarantees of security to non-nuclear countries. In actual fact, such demands are being used to undermine the Treaty, and to postpone indefinitely its entry into force—a development which would adversely affect the prospects of other partial disarmament measures. The same aim is pursued by certain States when they call for a conference on disarmament questions, the only consequence of which would be to postpone the entry into force of the non-proliferation Treaty. Such demands only hurt the cause of State security and of lasting international peace.

26. As A. A. Gromyko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, said in his statement at this session of the General Assembly, “If things move in the direction in which the acknowledged and unacknowledged opponents of the non-proliferation Treaty try to push them, then many months and perhaps years could elapse with the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons still unsolved” [*1679th plenary meeting, paragraph 109*].

27. In any event, no one can deny that if the opponents of the non-proliferation Treaty should succeed in preventing that important international instrument from coming into force, the security of all States—nuclear and non-nuclear, great and small—would suffer considerably, and the prospects of solving the problem would be less promising.

28. I would now turn to another question which is connected with the conclusion of the non-proliferation Treaty and which many representatives have had much to say about—the development of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

29. Many countries, and particularly developing countries, are greatly interested in the effect of the non-proliferation Treaty on the development of international co-operation in reaping those enormous benefits which the great discoveries of our times in the field of nuclear physics and technology can confer upon mankind. It is being asked whether the Treaty will promote higher national levels of living owing to the wide use of nuclear energy and, in particular, facilitate the execution of projects for building nuclear reactors and nuclear energy plants; using isotopes in industry, agriculture and medicine, the construction of large scale public works using nuclear explosive devices, etc.

30. The Soviet Union attaches great importance to co-operation among States in that sphere. Even the earliest drafts of the non-proliferation Treaty called for broad assistance for non-nuclear countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In its present form, the Treaty recognizes

the inalienable right of States to participate in international co-operation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without discrimination. The Treaty will be of special importance for developing countries which lack the resources and potential for carrying out major programmes to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and which need assistance from developed States.

31. There is, however, a definite obstacle in the way of a broad exchange of information in the field of nuclear technology, and that is a tendency to secrecy, which stems from the fear that such information and also deliveries of nuclear materials and equipment to other countries might be used by those countries for military purposes. The non-proliferation Treaty in large measure abates such apprehensions, as it provides for the establishment of a definite system of control or supervision by the International Atomic Energy Agency with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Treaty thus helps to remove the existing obstacles to a broad exchange of scientific technical information and the development of international co-operation in the nuclear sphere. In that respect, it offers the shortest, most rational and economically profitable road to the storehouse of those benefits which the peaceful uses of nuclear energy have brought and which they will bring in increasing measure.

32. In this connexion, I would note that the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States at Geneva adopted some recommendations on questions relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including a recommendation that the International Atomic Energy Agency should continue

“...its utmost efforts for compilation and dissemination of public information concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including those related to the peaceful application of nuclear explosions” [A/7277, *para. 17, resolution II*].

33. My delegation feels that these recommendations might be referred to the International Atomic Energy Agency and the specialized agencies for consideration and subsequent report to the General Assembly.

34. I cannot but feel that the approach of some States to the problem of peaceful uses of nuclear energy is not such as to ensure successful solution of the problems involved. For example, the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States adopted a recommendation proposing the establishment, within the United Nations Development Programme, of a nuclear technology research and development programme and also of a programme for the use of nuclear energy in economic development projects and providing that the nuclear-weapon States (it says in the recommendation) should assume the main responsibility for financing those two programmes.

35. To this I would say, first, that these important decisions, which incidentally entail considerable expenditure, were formulated and adopted without the participation on an equal footing of those very countries which, according to the authors of the recommendation, should assume the main responsibility for financing the programmes and projects in question.

36. Secondly, no distinction is drawn in these recommendations between States parties and States not parties to

the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Yet these two groups of States cannot be placed in a position of equality in enjoying such benefits under the Treaty, inasmuch as the parties to the Treaty undertake to submit to certain control procedures to verify peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as provided in article III of the Treaty, whereas non-parties to the Treaty assume no such obligations. In these circumstances to extend to them—and particularly to some of them—certain kinds of assistance for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy entails some risk that such assistance may be used for other than peaceful purposes.

37. In accordance with its provisions, those States which sign the non-proliferation Treaty will of course be in a more favourable position to enjoy the benefits of international co-operation in the field of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes than States which for one reason or another decide not to accede to the Treaty.

38. Thirdly, establishment of the programmes I have mentioned would require careful preliminary study and consultations with the interested parties, covering the economic, financial, legal and all other practical aspects of the matter.

39. In the same document from which I have quoted, the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States requests the “. . . establishment of a fund of special fissionable materials for the benefit of non-nuclear-weapon States and in particular of developing countries”, and invites the nuclear Powers “. . . to give a firm undertaking regarding the supply of such material to that fund . . .” [*ibid.*, *resolution J*].

40. This proposal ignores the well-known fact that a fund of special fissionable materials already exists. It has been set up in the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and it contains a sufficient quantity of special fissionable materials to meet the requests of States. To establish another such fund would be senseless and would merely result in unnecessary expenditure of funds and efforts.

41. These are my comments with regard to international co-operation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

42. I should now like to comment on the remarks of some representatives concerning organizational matters.

43. The representatives of Brazil, Italy and several other countries spoke in favour of setting up a committee on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which would continue the work begun by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. In their view, such a committee should have broad functions; namely, it should see that the Conference's recommendations are carried out, co-ordinate the activities of different organs with regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, formulate policy in that sphere, etc.

44. The Soviet Union vigorously opposes the establishment of such a committee, which would only duplicate the work of existing United Nations organs and specialized agencies competent to deal with matters of disarmament, security, and international co-operation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Indeed, a special organization—the

International Atomic Energy Agency—has been created for purposes of such co-operation. The IAEA is doing important work in this field. It has recruited a highly qualified staff and collected considerable financial resources, materials, equipment, technical documentation, etc. It also decides political questions which have a direct bearing on its sphere of activities. On the whole, it is fully competent to promote co-operation among States in the peaceful uses of the atom.

45. Some aspects of the IAEA's work need amelioration. What has to be done is to expand and improve its activities, especially as regards the functions it will discharge under the non-proliferation Treaty, including control of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. As is generally known, the necessary measures to that effect are already being taken.

46. On the other hand, the establishment of a new special committee would not only mean duplication of the work of existing United Nations organs and organizations, but would complicate future negotiations on disarmament and hinder co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

47. I should now like to say a few words regarding attempts by some States to arrange for the periodic convening of conferences of non-nuclear-weapon States and the establishment of a special organ for them. Attempts to bring about the institutional organization of a group or bloc of non-nuclear States as opposed to the nuclear Powers are clearly fraught with peril. Their success would weaken the United Nations and have an adverse effect on international relations and on the solution of questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, disarmament, promotion of economic and social progress, and co-ordination of the activities of States for the achievement of the common goals proclaimed in the United Nations Charter. Is it not contrary to the principles of the Charter to attempt to prevent the permanent members of the Security Council, which also happen to be nuclear Powers, from taking part in the solution of such political problems as State security or disarmament? Any intention to consider and decide such questions without the States on which the United Nations Charter explicitly places the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security is in effect an attempt to revise the Charter.

48. Preventing the permanent members of the Security Council, which have shouldered the main burden of defeating the Axis and maintaining the peace thereafter, from examining and working out proposals on matters of security and disarmament is a violation of the principles which became the basis of the United Nations Charter when it was formulated at the San Francisco Conference in 1945. This line of action is in fact aimed at undermining the United Nations and at breaking down the system of international co-operation in settling questions relating to peace and security which it has evolved.

49. Our task is not to set up new organs or convene conferences of non-nuclear-weapon States, but rather to strengthen the United Nations and ensure effective and fruitful co-operation among its Members in solving the problems of peace and security within its existing organs and membership.

50. Consideration of questions affecting the security of States, including non-nuclear-weapon States, and also of questions of disarmament is within the competence, as it is the prerogative, of the Security Council and the General Assembly. Consequently, these questions must be examined in the Security Council, and also in General Assembly and in its First Committee. For preliminary consideration of specific proposals on questions of disarmament and State security and for preliminary elaboration of agreed recommendations on such proposals we have the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. As we know from past experience, that Committee has proved to be a useful and effective international organ for examining disarmament proposals submitted by Governments or referred to it by the General Assembly. It has succeeded in achieving a consensus of disarmament questions, including the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. What I have said shows that the important thing is to strengthen and improve the work of the existing organs concerned with disarmament and security problems, rather than to establish new organs which would merely duplicate the work of the old and would actually hinder the solution of the vitally important international problems I have mentioned.

51. Solutions to the problems of State security and co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy must be sought in the conclusion of international agreements, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The importance of the Treaty is that it offers a real basis for strengthening international security and developing international co-operation in nuclear matters. The aim of all States, great and small, nuclear and non-nuclear, developing and developed, should be to make effective use of the opportunities offered by the Treaty, for that is the key to the solution of many of the acute international problems of our day.

52. In conclusion, I would emphasize once again that the Soviet Union is ready to negotiate on a wide range of disarmament questions with a view to achieving agreement. That is the purpose of the USSR Memorandum on disarmament submitted to the present session. Every one of the disarmament measures proposed in the Memorandum has a direct bearing on the strengthening of international security. The proposals contained in it reflect the firm desire of the Soviet Union to achieve real progress in the matter of disarmament and of evolving sound guarantees of international security.

53. Mr. HUSAIN (India): On our agenda relating to disarmament we have, in the main, before us two documents, the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament³ and the final document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [*A/7277 and Corr.1*]. I shall deal first with the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

54. At its last session, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had before it items 27, 28, 29 and 94 of the agenda of the current session of the General Assembly, concerning the question of general and complete disarma-

³ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231.

ment, the urgent need for the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests, the elimination of foreign military bases, and the memorandum of the Government of the USSR concerning urgent measures to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament. It had also before it resolution 2289 (XXII) concerning the "Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons", and resolution 2373 (XXII) asking the "Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the nuclear-weapon States urgently to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date...". The Eighteen-Nation Committee had a brief session and towards the end of the session an agenda⁴ was adopted for subsequent discussion. It agreed that first priority in its work should be given to further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,⁵ but due to the comparative shortness of the session it was not able to discuss substantively any of the matters before it.

55. While appreciating that the adoption of the agenda is a step forward in establishing guidelines for future work, I cannot help observing that it was unfortunate that despite the insistence of several delegations, for purposes of discussion and negotiation the Eighteen-Nation Committee did not assign priorities for the specific measures of nuclear disarmament or priority *inter se* among the items listed under the other three categories. Unless such priorities are indicated, the future discussions in that Committee will remain discursive and it will be difficult to achieve required progress on specific issues. If progress is to be made in the task now set for that Committee, it is of the utmost importance that, in the light of the views expressed in the current session of the General Assembly, at the next session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee priorities should be assigned to the various items of the agenda, so that purposeful negotiations can be undertaken without further delay and some progress reported at the next session of the General Assembly.

56. As to the principal task before the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, let it be recalled that when the General Assembly in its resolution 1722 II (XVI) endorsed the establishment of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, it called upon the Committee, as a matter of utmost urgency, to initiate negotiations, on the basis of the joint statement of agreed principles,⁶ on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control—a goal established by the international community under the historical General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV).

57. The work which that Committee began in 1962 on the drafting of a treaty on general and complete disarmament could not proceed beyond the stage of agreement on the preamble and the first four articles, and even that agreement was subject to certain crippling reservations from both the Soviet Union and the United States. An attempt to resolve differences on certain basic problems of disarmament also did not succeed and the discussion on the question of the reduction and elimination of nuclear

weapons delivery vehicles remained inconclusive. The Assembly is only too well aware of the fact that since 1964 no negotiations have been undertaken in the Committee with a view to drafting a treaty on general and complete disarmament. If the world community is not to be disillusioned about the goal that it has set for itself, to live on a disarmed planet, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament must not lose sight of the main task assigned to it, or relegate general and complete disarmament to a dim and distant future. The Committee must pick up the threads from where it left off in 1964. Perhaps this task could be facilitated if the United States and the Soviet Union submitted revised versions of their draft treaties, which were presented in 1962.

58. For those reasons my delegation, along with the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic, has proposed the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.448, which I should like formally to place before this Committee for its consideration. I hope this draft resolution will receive the overwhelming support of this Committee.

59. The General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV), I have just referred to, also laid down that, until the goal of total disarmament was achieved and without prejudicing progress in regard to that goal, the Committee should endeavour to reach agreements on collateral measures of disarmament, particularly in the field of nuclear disarmament. In this connexion it is a welcome development that the United States and the Soviet Union have reached an agreement in principle to hold bilateral talks on the limitation and reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles. Even as early as 1957, India had been of the view that it was simpler to deal with carriers than with nuclear weapons, and that if delivery vehicles were eliminated, the nuclear weapon capacity for harm would be greatly reduced. As we all know, despite the growing concern of the world, the nuclear arms race has shown no signs of abatement. Indeed, with the further sophistication of offensive missile systems equipped with the multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle system (MIRVS), decoys and penetration aids, and the development of the anti-ballistic missile systems, the nuclear arms race is entering a new and more dangerous phase resulting in growing anxiety and uneasiness for the entire world community. The lack of restraint in the development of the anti-ballistic missiles, and of offensive missiles equipped with MIRVS, and the fear that the Moscow test ban Treaty⁷ may have to be broken in order to test a larger system of the anti-ballistic missile, is likely to render a step-by-step disarmament—nay even the conclusion of non-armament agreements like a comprehensive test ban treaty—extremely difficult. It is hoped, therefore, that the proposed bilateral discussions would take place soon and would be fruitful.

60. Among collateral measures in the field of nuclear disarmament, the most important, as the Indian delegation has repeatedly stressed in the past, is a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. This would be the most significant step towards a complete

⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 17.

⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 21.

⁶ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

⁷ Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

stoppage of the production of nuclear weapons. There could be no justification whatsoever for any addition to the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons, which, as has been repeatedly stressed by many delegations in this Committee, have long since reached the capacity of annihilating the world several times over. The difficulty of verification of a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes could no longer be cited as a reason for not reaching an agreement on this measure, since an agreement on control, as elaborated in the non-proliferation Treaty,⁸ already exists and the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States in respect of inspections by IAEA could be made the same as those of the States not having nuclear weapons. An agreement on a cut-off in the further production of fissionable material for weapons purposes should, therefore, be related to a total cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

61. Among other measures in the field of nuclear disarmament, the Government of India has always attached the highest importance to a comprehensive test ban treaty. Both the need for and urgency of achieving “the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time” is underlined in the undertaking given in the third preambulatory paragraph of the Moscow test ban treaty by the three nuclear-weapon Powers. No progress has, however, been made in this direction during the last five years, which have, on the other hand, been marked by an increasing frequency of nuclear explosions. The General Assembly has accorded a special priority to this item for a number of years. It may be added that most speakers at the resumed twenty-second session of the General Assembly and at the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States stressed that underground tests should stop at the earliest possible moment. The eight non-aligned countries, members of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, have in their joint memorandum of 26 August 1968,⁹ viewed with deep concern that it had not so far been possible to reach agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty and have urged that renewed and urgent efforts be made to conclude such a treaty.

62. India was the first country to press for a suspension of all nuclear weapons tests and has consistently been of the view that, whatever might be the differences on the question of verification, all nuclear weapon tests should immediately be discontinued. Negotiations could then be undertaken to resolve the outstanding differences with a view to making the present partial treaty a comprehensive one. At the same time, it should be ensured that the success achieved by the international community in regard to a ban on tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water is further consolidated by securing adherence of those States which have not signed the partial test ban treaty so far. As to the problem of verification of a comprehensive test ban, India, along with other non-aligned countries, has, over the years, made various proposals which have not so far been accepted by the nuclear-weapon States. These proposals, along with others which have recently been submitted, should be studied without further delay by the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. Developments in

regard to seismic detection and identification, evidenced by the fruitful exchange of views which took place in Stockholm last summer at the initiative of the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research, with which India co-operated fully, have made it increasingly difficult to plead inadequacies in this field as a reason for holding up agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty. For these reasons, my delegation, along with seven other delegations, has submitted a draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.447 and Add.1 and 2, already placed before this Committee by the representative of Ethiopia, which we hope will be unanimously adopted by this Committee.

63. In this context it is to be observed that since the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty in 1963 the nuclear Powers have not agreed to any significant step—let me add, the non-proliferation Treaty as a non-armament rather than a disarmament measure is not such a step—in the field of nuclear disarmament, thereby reserving to themselves complete freedom of action to continue the nuclear arms race, to produce and to deploy nuclear weapons systems and to develop new ones. And now here in this Committee during the current debate the view has been expressed that no significant progress can be made in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee or elsewhere on matters relating to nuclear disarmament until the non-proliferation Treaty is brought into force; and that therefore, this must remain the first priority task, and that the international sense of urgency created earlier in the year to seek endorsement of the non-proliferation Treaty needs to be recreated. It is for the promoters of the non-proliferation Treaty to consider the nature of the difficulties inherent, and others which have arisen, in the way of bringing this non-proliferation Treaty into force—the views of the Government of India in regard to the Treaty are too well known to need repetition here—and how those difficulties can be overcome. But one thing is clear to my delegation, and that is that the delay in the non-proliferation Treaty—a non-armament measure—being brought into force should not be used as a pretext for not proceeding with collateral measures of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament.

64. Pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament we need to consider the proposal for the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The Government of India has consistently opposed the use of nuclear weapons and advocated their total prohibition. Although it is realized that this question has come to be tied up in the minds of the great Powers with their vital security interests, it is felt that, like other declaratory prohibitions in the past, such a convention could have a considerable moral and psychological value. A ban on the use of nuclear weapons along with other similar measures would lead to a building up of confidence among nations. The Government of India is therefore of the view that it would be of definite advantage if the nuclear-weapon Powers were to accept the principles embodied in resolution 1653 (XVI), which declared the use of nuclear weapons as being contrary to the United Nations Charter and a crime against humanity. At the twenty-first and twenty-second sessions of the General Assembly, India supported resolutions 2164 (XXI) and 2289 (XXII) urging the convening of a conference for that purpose. In India's view, if the proposed convention is to be effective it requires the active support of all States and particularly of

⁸ Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex).

⁹ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, annex I, sect. 10.

States which possess nuclear weapons. In the course of discussions held in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, in the General Assembly and elsewhere, some States have expressed the view that the proposed convention, in the absence of means of control or measures of disarmament, would undermine their security. It has been the view of the Government of India that all such matters could be considered when the drafting of the proposed convention is taken up.

65. Among non-nuclear measures, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament discussed the problem of chemical and bacteriological weapons and included it as one of the items in its agenda. India, as a country traditionally opposed to all weapons of mass destruction, fully supports the idea of the total prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons and is a signatory to the Geneva Protocol of 1925.¹⁰ At the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, India voted for resolution 2162 B (XXI), which called for strict observance by all States of the principles and objective of the Protocol and urged those States which had not acceded to it to do so. My delegation believes in the continuing importance and validity of the Protocol regardless of the passage of time or of the phraseology used or the absence of a system of international control—which, in this case, is in any event extremely difficult to provide. But in view of the important advances which continue to be made in the production and further sophistication of these weapons—and in this connexion the scientific, technical, military, legal and political issues which have been raised from time to time—my delegation agrees that the whole subject needs to be carried a step further than it is today but without detriment to the validity and the importance of the Protocol or the urgent need for securing a wider adherence to it.

66. My delegation therefore supports the proposal made by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament¹¹ that the Secretary-General appoint a group of internationally known scientific experts in each of these two fields, chemical and bacteriological weapons, and to report on the state of their present development and the effects of their possible use. It is necessary that the international community be made aware of the nature and possible effects of the use of these weapons of mass destruction, with particular reference to those States which are not in a position to establish for themselves any comprehensive methods of protection. It is to be hoped that just as the study prepared by the Secretary-General with the help of experts on the possible effects of the use of nuclear weapons¹² underlined the perils of the nuclear arms race and the need for its immediate cessation, a similar study would further strengthen the prohibition enjoined in the Geneva Protocol, and provide the background for banning the production and stockpiling of such weapons and for their complete elimination. For those reasons, my dele-

¹⁰ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, done at Geneva on 17 June 1925 (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138).

¹¹ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, para. 26.

¹² Report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of those weapons (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.1968.IX.1).

gation, along with eighteen other delegations, has proposed a draft resolution, contained in document A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-5, which we hope will receive the favourable consideration and approval of this Committee.

67. We have also before us item 29 of our agenda concerning the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Due to the short time at its disposal and its preoccupation with the framing of an agenda, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament could not discuss this substantively, but it would no doubt need to be discussed in due course under the main heading of "non-nuclear measures". So far as India is concerned, we are opposed to the establishment of foreign military bases, because they contribute to the aggravation of international tension. We are a signatory to the Cairo Declaration of the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries in Chapter VIII of which it is stated, *inter alia*:

"The Conference considers the maintenance or future establishment of foreign military bases and the stationing of foreign troops on the territories of other countries, against the expressed will of those countries, as a gross violation of the sovereignty of States, and as a threat to freedom and international peace."¹³

68. In the field of non-nuclear measures we have before us the draft resolution seeking to solicit views of Governments "on undertaking an obligation to register with the Secretary-General all imports and exports of conventional arms, ammunition and implements of war", which information should be published at regular intervals so as "to promote relaxation of tensions and foster relations of mutual trust between States". [See A/C.1/L.446.] Also, in introducing that draft resolution, the representative of Denmark said that such publication of information "would entail limitations on arms transfers, because continued secrecy about military build-up of individual countries would tend to increase the insecurity in neighbouring States and lead to unnecessary purchases of arms". [1616th meeting, para. 17.] A suggestion for arms registration¹⁴ was made at the twentieth session in 1965 in the First Committee by one of the co-sponsors of the draft resolution, and rejected by 19 votes against, 18 in favour, and 39 abstentions [1394th meeting, para. 56]. However, since the suggestion has been revived, it needs to be examined afresh in the context of the present-day world situation.

69. The concept of regional arms control or limitation with reference to particular regions was mentioned in 1966 and 1967 in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, in the General Assembly, and in the Security Council. Although what is now suggested is registration of import and export of arms and ammunition throughout the world, the purpose still appears to be to deal with local conflicts.

70. At the outset, I should like to say that as a matter of principle, the Government of India favours all proposals which promote relaxation of tension and foster relations of mutual trust between States and thus pave the way for disarmament. It is claimed in the preambular part of the

¹³ A/5763 (mimeographed).

¹⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 28, document A/C.1/L.347.

draft resolution before us that publication of information about arms transfers between States, whether by way of trade or otherwise, would promote relaxation of tension and foster relations of mutual trust between States. But it is not clear how universally it is proposed to secure an undertaking to register with the Secretary-General all imports, exports and transfer otherwise of arms and ammunition between States. Does it, for example, cover transfer of arms and ammunition between States within military alliances? Would it cover the placement of arms and ammunition in foreign territories not covered by commercial transactions? Would it include manufacture under licence of arms and ammunition in other countries? It is necessary to ask those questions so as to ensure that the attempt now being made to restrict the freedom of small Powers in the field of defence would not be a repetition of the unequal obligations of the non-proliferation Treaty under which the nuclear-weapon States continue to augment their arsenals, while those which do not possess them undertake never to think of possessing them. We need to ask, is it justifiable that while nuclear-weapon Powers and other armament-producing Powers, in the name of national security and global responsibilities, reserve to themselves secrecy and freedom of action, the smaller, non-armament-producing Powers should be subjected to a discipline which would adversely affect their security? We need to be sure that the imbalance created by the possession of nuclear weapons by a few Powers is not going to be further accentuated by creating monopolies in the field of conventional weapons also, thereby intensifying tensions and distrust among nations.

71. In support of the idea of registration a historical precedent has been invoked by recalling that for a number of years the League of Nations published a *Statistical Year-Book of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition*, containing detailed information about countries' imports and exports of arms and ammunition. Since it is suggested that this concept needs to be revived, we need to consider what in fact was done under the League of Nations, what success it achieved, and what relevance it has to our contemporary situation.

72. It is well known that, following the signature in 1925 of the Geneva Convention for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and Implements of War, the *Statistical Year-Book of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition* came to be published, and continued to be published till 1938. It should be noted—and this is important—that as a result of the recommendations of the Temporary Mixed Commission for the Reduction of Armaments, as decided by the Council of the League of Nations, that publication was a companion volume to the *Armaments Year-Book* published a year earlier, in 1924, in pursuance of article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. It may be recalled that Article 8, paragraph 6, required that:

“The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programmes and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to war-like purposes.”

73. Thus, those two publications came to be issued simultaneously as a co-ordinated system of publicity

established by the Convention, in anticipation of and in preparation for the expected disarmament conference.

74. The aim of the *Armaments Year-Book* was to improve the international political atmosphere by increasing confidence among States, calling as it did for information as to all national armaments, which went far beyond the question of mere armaments trade. The *Armaments Year-Book* was not a purely statistical publication, but also included information on the organization and composition of armed forces, and military legislation governing the system of recruitment, training and period of service, and formations organized on a military basis. Statistical data was included with regard to the numerical strength of the armed forces, expenditure for national defence, lists of warships, aircraft, submarines, and so on. The chapter entitled “Industries capable of being used for War Purposes” included data on output, imports and exports of a large variety of raw materials which could be used for the production of arms, ammunition and other implements of war.

75. It follows from this that in preparation for a disarmament conference the publication of information about arms transfers was part of the scheme to give publicity about all arms and armed forces of all States. In view of this, are the nuclear-weapon Powers and other Powers producing arms and ammunition prepared to provide the kind of information contained in the *Armaments Year-Book* of the League era? Are they prepared to make a full report about the production in their countries of all arms for use for themselves and for export? In this context it is not difficult to anticipate the attitude of the nuclear Powers and other large armament-producing Powers. It may be recalled that after the establishment of the United Nations, on the precedent of the League of Nations, the General Assembly, by its resolution 42 (I) of 14 December 1946, called on the Security Council to determine the information about armaments and armed forces which should be furnished. Three years later, on 5 December 1949, General Assembly resolution 300 (IV) noted that the permanent members of the Security Council had not agreed to the proposals formulated by the Commission for Conventional Armaments for the submission of full information on their conventional armaments and armed forces. A Soviet proposal calling upon the Assembly to declare essential the submission of such information and information on atomic weapons was rejected.¹⁵ No progress was made during the next three years and thereafter in 1952 the Commission was dissolved. And nothing has been heard since then of the inventory of armaments and armed forces of all nations of the world.

76. Then, there is the question of the success of the arrangements under the League of Nations. The prefaces of the annual issues of the *Statistical Year-Book of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition* repeatedly expressed regret over the absence of a universally accepted distinction between firearms and those intended for other purposes. The information given does not appear to have provided a sufficient basis from which the strategic significance of some of the trade could be judged.

77. A part of the effort during the inter-war period was directed against private and illicit traffic in arms and

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Fourth Session, Plenary Meetings, 268th meeting, para. 128.

ammunition, but it is well known that practically no success was achieved in this field, and another attempt is not likely to succeed. Furthermore, certain important producers of arms and ammunition refused to sign the Convention or to endorse other suggestions relating to a mere inventory of arms going from one country to another because those measures did not promote disarmament but only enabled certain countries to exercise undue influence and pressure over others. In the contemporary world a similar situation would be repeated with worse results by discrimination against non-armament-producing nations.

78. What did not succeed when half the world was under colonial or other forms of domination and when discriminatory measures could be more easily and effectively applied does not have a better chance of success when there are more than double the number of independent sovereign States. And we all know that that effort of the League could not and did not prevent local or regional conflicts before humanity was overwhelmed by the Second World War. Peace and security would not be enhanced merely by giving what would inevitably be partial figures of the international transfer of arms. As stated in this Committee [1394th meeting, para. 9] by the representative of the United States during the 1965 debate at the twentieth session, a mechanical approach to eliminating secrecy in arms transfer is no more likely to succeed now than it did in the past.

79. India considers that nuclear arms pose the most serious danger to international peace and security. At the same time we are mindful of the danger posed by conventional arms. We consider that both problems should receive balanced treatment in the context of a disarmament treaty and that the big military Powers should be the first to adopt bold and far-reaching measures for substantial reductions in their armaments. India is totally opposed to any proposal which diverts attention from the important question of disarmament and which would virtually lead to control of the smaller nations by the nuclear and other large military Powers. Since the proposal is not concerned with the question of production of conventional arms, directly or indirectly, it could only confer a unilateral military advantage on industrially advanced nations. The proposal will have no practical value unless and until effective international machinery can be created to receive and check all registered documents, which must include those relating to production and not merely those relating to imports and exports.

80. Further, there would be no guarantee of preventing clandestine international trade in conventional arms, particularly in certain sophisticated weapons, thereby further developing the black market and causing an additional drain on the limited resources of the developing countries, which would have to obtain such arms anyhow in the interest of their security. The proposal would amount to exercising totally unjustified discrimination against non-aligned countries and indirectly forcing them to join military alliances, thereby upsetting the present balance of power in the world. Also, it fails to take into account the position of countries like the People's Republic of China, which is not represented in the United Nations.

81. It would thus appear that the proposal would further add to the imbalance created by the non-proliferation

Treaty [General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex] and adversely affect the security of developing countries, particularly those which are not in a position to manufacture the conventional weapons which they badly need to ensure their security.

82. While it is true that the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.446 does not impose an obligation on Member States to furnish information about arms deliveries but merely solicits the views of Governments, the very basic concept outlined in the preamble is questionable.

83. For those reasons my delegation is opposed to that draft resolution and supports the appeal made by the representative of Saudi Arabia at our 1617th meeting that it be withdrawn.

84. I come now to item 96, which concerns the Final Document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [A/7277 and Corr.1]. Many delegations have already spoken on what transpired at that Conference. Representatives assembled here are no doubt aware that when in 1966 at the twenty-first session the proposal to convene a conference of non-nuclear-weapon States was first made India had reservations about it [1443rd and 1449th meetings], mainly because of our belief that a conference in which all the nuclear-weapon States would not take part, and in which even those of them which attended would not have the right to vote, would not be helpful in producing solutions to the acute problems facing the non-nuclear-weapon States and that it might on the other hand tend to accentuate the differences between the non-nuclear-weapon and the nuclear-weapon States and to polarize the world between the few nuclear States and the rest of the States of the world, complicating the negotiations in progress on important aspects of nuclear disarmament. However, despite those misgivings, since the majority of delegations favoured the holding of the Conference, we participated in the Conference in a spirit of constructive co-operation.

85. I should mention at the outset that the adoption without dissent of the declaration of the Conference [see A/7277 and Corr.1, para. 17(V)] giving expression to the principles which should guide international relations in the nuclear age is a signal and notable achievement of the Conference and deserves the full endorsement of the General Assembly. In addition to that there was a full and friendly discussion of the specific problems facing the non-nuclear-weapon States, which generated awareness of the complexities of those problems and the need to proceed cautiously. The fact that questions of security assurances, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy were of equal importance to all non-nuclear-weapon States, regardless of whether they were signatories of the non-proliferation Treaty or not, became evident.

86. On nuclear disarmament and allied matters the Conference passed resolutions which more or less reaffirm the existing pattern established by the General Assembly and the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

87. The Conference devoted a great deal of attention to questions relating to the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy and, after a fruitful exchange of views, adopted several resolutions. If the conclusions reached in that regard

are implemented without discrimination, the Conference will indeed have been worth while. In our discussions concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, much thought was given to the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. As is stated in resolution L [ibid., para. 17(IV)], logically and directly that question is linked to the question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and should be considered in conjunction with a comprehensive test ban and not separately. There should, therefore, in the first instance be a total prohibition of all nuclear explosions, for all States, nuclear as well as non-nuclear. Thereafter the conduct of explosions considered necessary for peaceful purposes should be dealt with as exceptions and should be under international supervision and with safeguards equally applicable to all. For that purpose an international régime would have to be established for all States.

88. The development of the technology of nuclear excavation projects must be sought not by way of modification of the Moscow test-ban Treaty¹⁶ but in the context of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and through a separately negotiated agreement, which should be made part of an international régime for peaceful nuclear explosions. Such a régime should be established within the over-all scope of the International Atomic Energy Agency and without discrimination against any category of States. Such a régime should naturally ensure the right of all States, particularly developing States, to learn and apply the technology of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Only a truly international régime, allowing for international decision-making in regard to the conduct of explosions and their international supervision, in whatever country they occur, would assure equality. It is not possible to accept as a permanent feature of the future world that some countries, because they are militarily advanced, should also have direct access to the important economic and technical benefits of new technologies while others should be either at the mercy of discriminatory treatment or able to obtain such benefits only in an indirect way.

89. Now, as to the important question of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, let it be stated frankly that the discussions in Geneva were entirely inconclusive. On this question the Conference might perhaps have been more successful if all nuclear-weapon States had participated in it or, at the very least, if those of them which participated had had the right, like the non-nuclear-weapon States, to vote.

90. The real hope of security for non-nuclear-weapon States lies in disarmament. It is obvious, however, that action in this field of genuine and lasting security would take time and would have to be sought by stages. Until such time, and so long as nuclear weapons continue to remain in the armouries of a few countries, the nuclear-weapon States have a definite obligation to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States that their security will not be jeopardized in any way.

91. The obligations put by the United Nations Charter on Member States and more particularly on the permanent members of the Security Council in the field of the maintenance of international peace and security make it necessary for them to discharge their responsibilities in this respect in strict conformity with the Charter.

92. Therefore any linking of security assurances to the signature of the non-proliferation Treaty or any other treaty would be contrary to the purposes and provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, because the Charter does not discriminate between those who might sign a particular treaty and those who might not do so. In our view, it is the clear responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States members of the Security Council to go to the assistance of any non-nuclear-weapon State which is threatened with or subjected to nuclear attack.

93. Doubts as to the adequacy of Security Council resolution 255 (1968) on security assurances have been voiced by a number of delegations, and a desire has been clearly expressed for the elaboration of more effective and meaningful guarantees on a non-discriminatory basis. The problem, therefore, continues to be a matter of concern to a large part of the world and cannot be treated as closed. The collective security system enshrined in the Charter therefore needs to be readapted to enable it to meet the challenge of the nuclear age.

94. The question now before us is what can be done to continue the work of the Conference. It is the view of my delegation that for any effective undertaking the full and active participation of the nuclear-weapon States would be required. It is necessary for us to enlist their co-operation in whatever machinery is to be set up. It is our hope that any formal proposal in this regard would be submitted only after the most thorough informal discussions and with the reasonable certainty that all shades of opinion would support it.

95. The CHAIRMAN: There are no more speakers listed for this morning. I call on the representative of Brazil in exercise of the right of reply.

96. Mr. de SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): I have asked to speak in exercise of my right of reply. I should like to say that I listened with great attention to the statement made this morning by the representative of the Soviet Union. In his statement the representative of the Soviet Union made some reference to the views put forward by my delegation concerning the follow-up and implementation of the conclusions and recommendations adopted by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States held in Geneva in September 1968. At this stage I want merely to reserve the right of my delegation to intervene again in the course of this debate. Some of the arguments put forward by the Soviet delegation are not acceptable to my delegation, and we hope to have a new opportunity to refute them.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.

¹⁶ See footnote 7.