

United Nations
**GENERAL
ASSEMBLY**

TWENTY-THIRD SESSION

Official Records



**FIRST COMMITTEE, 1611th
MEETING**

Tuesday, 19 November 1968,
at 10.30 a.m.

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

Page

Agenda items 27, 28, 29, 94 and 96:

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (continued)

Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (continued)

Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (continued)

Memorandum of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning urgent measures to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament (continued)

Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States: Final Document of the Conference (continued)

} 1

Chairman: Mr. Piero VINCI (Italy).

AGENDA ITEMS 27, 28, 29, 94 AND 96

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (continued) (A/7189-DC/231, A/C.1/L.443)

Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (continued) (A/7189-DC/231)

Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (continued) (A/7189-DC/231)

Memorandum of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning urgent measures to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament (continued) (A/7134, A/7223, A/C.1/L.443)

Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States: Final Document of the Conference (continued) (A/7224 and Add.1, A/7277 and Corr.1, A/7327)

1. Mr. CASTRO (Brazil): My delegation wishes, at this stage, to offer some preliminary observations on the whole range of the so-called "disarmament items", such as they appear under items 27, 28, 29, 94 and 96 of the agenda of

the Political and Security Committee of the General Assembly. Although my delegation attaches the utmost importance to each one of the matters under review, as deserving full study and consideration, I shall not conceal our conviction that in the consideration of the Final Document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States lies the ground for the most positive and most effective creative action on the part of the twenty-third regular session of the General Assembly. I refer to document A/7277 and Corr.1. And this for a very simple reason: no considerable progress on matters of general and complete disarmament is likely to be achieved without a corresponding continued détente in the world political pattern. Disarmament will be the result of an increase in mutual confidence and, unfortunately, it will be obvious to any realistic observer that recent events, on which it would be superfluous to dwell, have introduced many new difficulties in the relations among the major Powers. I hope that patient efforts will be made on both sides in order to avoid a sudden return to the bitter days of the cold war. In such a context of acrimony, distrust and propaganda, all efforts would certainly prove of no avail.

2. As we have said before, disarmament is basically a problem of power and, historically, all problems of power have been settled by the sheer operation of power itself. The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament faces the difficult challenge of settling this problem through negotiation and by peaceful means. Disarmament is a central problem to the extent that all other world problems are, so to speak, reflected in it. It thus becomes a spectrum problem. No matter how difficult and serious, any other political problem is relatively simple to settle as compared to the problem of disarmament. A solution reached today on any problem may be changed or altered tomorrow if a Power or a group of Powers conserve the means ultimately to dictate or force a diverse solution. A false step in the field of disarmament may be irreversible, since it may strike at the very roots of power. This theory is not advanced as a justification for the serious frustrations we meet along the road to general and complete disarmament. This is said only to place our debate on considerations of pure realism, if we wish to escape both wishful thinking and day-dreaming. The proceedings of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, from March 1962 to this date, amply corroborate our assertion.

3. Brazil has given, from the very start, its most decided contribution and support to the work of that Conference. It has advanced several specific proposals and it has fully collaborated with the seven other mediating Powers in their efforts to bridge the gap and to compose the differences between the two opposing sides. It was the first nation within the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to

formally propose a partial test ban which eventually materialized in the Moscow Treaty¹ and it has been consistent in its endeavours to secure a comprehensive test-ban. Furthermore, it has collaborated to the best of its ability towards a fair and equitable régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, while at the same time insisting on the fullest and unrestricted use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We have fully collaborated in the consideration of the "collateral matters" within the scope of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, but we feel that the appalling rate of arms escalation does not permit us any longer to concentrate only on the "collateral". Somehow, our attention should again be refocused on the essence and the gist of the terms of reference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, namely, on the elaboration of a treaty for general and complete disarmament.

4. We feel bound to make this point, although we are conscious of the fact that, by now, we may sound a little over-ambitious. It is a sad reflection on the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee to verify that the only instance in which it was quite speedy and operative occurred when the main purpose was directed at disarming nations which were already disarmed. Although we have consistently supported the idea of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, we cannot fail to remark that non-proliferation is essentially a matter of non-armament, not, in the strict sense, a real matter of disarmament. When will the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament really embark upon its task of disarmament? When will this body go beyond the few tentative articles of the eventual preamble of an eventual treaty aimed at general and complete disarmament?

5. During the Geneva debates of January-March 1968 on the negotiation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*], we tried to bring the following important point to the attention of the delegations sitting at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament: in visualizing a treaty intended for a minimum initial period of twenty-five years, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has appeared to admit that for all that period and for possible successive terms, the world would still be divided into nuclear and non-nuclear nations and thus the problem of nuclear disarmament would not be settled in the foreseeable future. Does that mean—we put that question then in Geneva—that, by 1993, twenty-five years hence, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament or another body, in Geneva or in another city, would still be groping for a solution of a problem or the removal of a situation which impregnates the whole of mankind with fear and anxiety, at the sight or the prescience of further mushrooming stockpiles of death and destruction? The institution of a minimum initial period for the duration of the non-proliferation Treaty was, in a certain way, an anticipated admission of failure on the part of the Eighteen-Nation Committee and of the United Nations General Assembly.

¹ Treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

6. The following passage from the latest report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is clearly revealing as to the stalemate which now prevails on matters of general and complete disarmament. The report states as follows:

"... members of the Committee exchanged views on the question of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and emphasized the importance of resuming the consideration of this question."²

7. That is all and that is, indeed, very little, but exact, and a perfect mirror of the situation described.

8. The non-proliferation Treaty endeavoured to check horizontal proliferation. It dared not touch on the at least equally important matter of vertical non-proliferation and on the specific field of the stockpiles of armaments of the super-Powers. It is imperative that, in accordance with the pledges assumed by the super-Powers, this endeavour should be made forthwith, in the terms contemplated by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States in its resolution C [*see A/7277,7 and Corr.1, para. 17 (III)*]. In accordance with that resolution, which should be endorsed by this twenty-third session of the General Assembly, the Eighteen-Nation Committee should begin, not later than March 1969, to undertake negotiations on:

(a) the prevention of the further development and improvement of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles;

(b) the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty, as an important step in the field of nuclear disarmament, and as a matter of high priority;

(c) the reaching of agreements on the immediate cessation of the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes and the stoppage of the manufacture of nuclear weapons;

(d) the reduction and subsequent elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

9. We sincerely hope that, living up to its responsibilities under the Charter, the General Assembly will not fail to endorse the aforementioned recommendations, which do not dare to aim at general and complete disarmament but, if implemented, might pave the way for further efforts towards such an ultimate goal.

10. On the other hand, we earnestly express the hope that the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United States of America will heed the appeal of the Conference to the effect that they enter into bilateral discussions on the limitation of offensive strategic nuclear-weapons delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles. I refer to resolution D [*ibid.*], which should likewise be endorsed by the General Assembly.

11. It has been said that disarmament will only be possible when world conditions indicate the prospects of a per-

² See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, para. 31.

manent peace. But it might likewise be said that peace is very precarious and uncertain when it rests upon the existence of rival and competitive nuclear stockpiles. Somehow, this vicious circle will have to be broken or circumvented. It will be incumbent upon the eight mediating Powers in Geneva to propose new and imaginative steps to facilitate the negotiations between the major Powers. A continued failure in the field of general and complete disarmament will not be the sole responsibility of the super-Powers. It will be the common responsibility of all the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, as a collective body. Brazil, for its part, will not evade its responsibilities.

12. Mutual confidence, it has been said, is the prerequisite for disarmament. In this connexion we should like to stress the high significance of resolution A of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [*ibid.*, *para. 17 (I)*]. It reaffirms the principle, indivisible in its application, of the non-use of force and the prohibition of the threat of force employing nuclear or non-nuclear weapons in relations between States and the belief that all States without exception have an equal and inalienable right to enjoy the protection afforded by this principle, recognized in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter. Furthermore, it reaffirms the right of every State to equality, sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-intervention in world affairs and self-determination. If all nations would abide by those principles, if confidence developed that those principles would be observed and respected, then the way would be paved for peace and for disarmament.

13. Resolution A was all the more necessary since recent events had demonstrated that force was insistently maintaining its right as the *ultima ratio regum*. Other circumstances made it timely to reassert also, as does resolution A, that the inherent right of self-defence, individual or collective, apart from measures taken or authorized by the Security Council, is the only legitimate exception to the overriding principle of the non-use of force in relations between States. It is the firm opinion of the Brazilian Government that efforts towards disarmament cannot be unaccompanied by efforts towards improving and perfecting the international behaviour of States and nations. Arms will be disposed of easily at the moment when nobody admits the possibility of the use of force for the attainment of political objectives and at the moment when all States feel secure within their respective boundaries. The moment the United Nations Charter is respected and implemented, disarmament may come by itself. That is why we believe that the reaffirmation of those basic United Nations principles by the Geneva Conference has a particular bearing on all our efforts towards disarmament.

14. On recent occasions my country has been moved, before the Security Council and the General Assembly, to draw the attention of the Organization to the arms escalation in the Middle East, which, if left unchecked, may lead to a new round of fighting. It was and still is our suggestion that the major Powers should endeavour to reach a basic agreement or understanding on the necessity for restricting or balancing the supply of weapons and war implements to the contending parties. We do not think that this question of arms escalation in the Middle East can be ignored indefinitely by the United Nations Security

Council. Armaments are the offspring of fear and distrust: disarmament is the offspring of security.

15. The First Committee is called upon to examine, consider and ponder the conclusions and recommendations of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States embodied in a Declaration and fourteen resolutions. In resolution N [*ibid.*, *para. 17 (V)*] the Conference invites the General Assembly to consider the best ways and means for the implementation of the decisions taken by the Conference and the continuity of the work undertaken and, at a subsequent session, to consider the question of the convening of a second conference of non-nuclear-weapon States. This of course raises the question of determining what machinery should be established by the General Assembly to follow the implementation of the conclusions of the Conference by the various agencies and organs to which the Conference has addressed specific requests and appeals.

16. It is also obvious that further study and consideration should be given to the necessity for furthering co-operation among all States, without discrimination, in the field of nuclear energy, and to the all-important and vital question of security assurances against nuclear-weapon attacks. This is of the utmost relevance to the entire future and concept of non-proliferation. Again we wish to stress that security is the prerequisite for disarmament and that it is entirely unrealistic to believe that the question of security assurances has been settled by the recent Security Council resolution 255 (1968), on which Brazil abstained. The problem stands in its full cogency and should be dealt with forthwith.

17. My delegation is under the specific instructions of the Brazilian Government to seek full and unrestricted endorsement by the General Assembly of the terms of the provisions of resolution J [*ibid.*, *para. 17 (IV)*] on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This resolution, to a certain extent and in many ways, is the hard core of the decisions reached at Geneva, and the recommendations contained therein should be speedily implemented and complied with.

18. In resolution J, section I, paragraph 1, the General Assembly is invited to consider the establishment, within the United Nations Development Programme of a nuclear technology research and development programme to be executed as a matter of priority with the assistance of the International Atomic Energy Agency for the benefit of the developing countries. Resolution J, section I, paragraph 2, requests the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to consider, at the next meeting of its Board of Governors, the establishment for the benefit of the developing countries of a programme for the use of nuclear energy in economic development projects which would be a matter of priority and under which financing would be granted on the most favourable terms as regards interest and repayment. Nuclear-weapon States are thereby invited to assume the main responsibility for financing the contemplated programme. Furthermore, in section II of that same resolution the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency is requested to consider the establishment of a fund of special fissionable materials for the benefit of non-nuclear-weapon States and in particular of developing countries. The Conference similarly

recommends in section III the nuclear-weapon States to channel into the contemplated fund and programme a substantial share of such financial resources and special fissionable materials as may be released in the future as a result of the adoption of nuclear disarmament measures.

19. Those are the main claims of the non-nuclear-weapon States in the field of security and economic development. As we have said on other occasions, we are prepared to renounce nuclear weapons—and we have indeed done so by adhering to the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco³—but we are not prepared to renounce the benefits of science, progress and technology. The General Assembly is now confronted with a very clear choice: the choice between privilege and discrimination on the one side and constructive leadership in the field of peace, security and development on the other.

20. For all these reasons and because of the necessity to better co-ordinate our efforts my delegation would favour the establishment by the General Assembly of a standing body on which both nuclear and non-nuclear States would be adequately represented. The Brazilian delegation holds very strong views in this regard and cannot see why this constructive course of action should or how it could reasonably be converted into a matter of controversy or reservations. We appeal earnestly to the nuclear Powers to extend their fullest co-operation in this regard. We feel that such a body should keep under review the whole field of international co-operation in matters of nuclear energy, and this of necessity comprehends the questions both of peaceful uses and of security, without discrimination.

21. Those are the suggestions and preliminary observations my delegation wished to advance at this early stage of our proceedings. We reserve our right to intervene later, in the light of specific draft resolutions, proposals and motions to be introduced on the five disarmament items under consideration. For the sake of expediting the proceedings and in keeping with your recommendation, Mr. Chairman, we deemed it proper not to protract our remarks further. We are prepared to listen to other views and other suggestions; we shall keep our minds open; and we are animated by a constructive spirit of compromise and negotiation.

22. It is none the less our earnest conviction that the General Assembly cannot evade this important issue of the interests of the non-nuclear-weapon States—and the time for action is now.

23. Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): The last time this Committee met to consider disarmament and arms control we and the world took a historic step towards peace. I refer, of course, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*].

24. We can all be proud and gratified at the more than eighty signatures this document has received. I believe we also can feel encouraged that more signatures and ratifications can be expected soon.

25. The non-proliferation Treaty is vitally important for all of us not only because it is the most promising means of forestalling a catastrophic security situation but also because it goes well beyond that objective and establishes a set of principles for exploiting the peaceful aspects of nuclear energy. We entirely agree that the Treaty should bear equitably upon all signatories and we believe that in fact it will do so. The Treaty will establish a balance between limiting the spread of nuclear weapons on the one hand and developing and sharing the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy on the other. On both sides of the balance we are all gainers, and we all have obligations. The maximum benefits for the world community can be realized only if all of us fulfil our obligations.

26. Having said this, we must acknowledge that anything as complex and as new as the non-proliferation Treaty, and anything that impinges so directly on the interests of all States, will inevitably at its inception raise some questions and will be the subject of some concerns. I believe that this debate will have served us all well if it helps to clarify the questions and mitigate the concerns and if it leads to a greater consensus regarding the means of giving effect to the Treaty. I shall, therefore, turn to three specific areas of particular importance and discuss each in turn: the questions of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, security, and arms control measures. All these subjects were considered extensively at the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, and we now have before us the resolutions and declarations produced by the Conference.

27. In the field of peaceful uses, we all share certain practical objectives. We all want to see how the general obligations and safeguards of the non-proliferation Treaty can facilitate co-operation in realistic programmes for reactors, kilowatts, isotopes and the energy for large-scale excavations and for tapping raw materials beneath the earth's crust.

28. The United States has, of course, long maintained an active and extensive research and development programme in all fields pertaining to the civil uses of atomic energy, and we have shared our advances with other countries. In the field of civilian reactor development alone, we have spent \$1,500 million to develop an economic source of electrical power. We have also made heavy investments in developing uses of radiation and isotopes in medicine, industry and agriculture. Today the practical use of isotopes and radiation is commonplace, and the era of competitive nuclear power plants has begun.

29. By virtue of the long experience of the United States and the substantial resources it has devoted to peaceful international atomic co-operation, I believe my Government can make a particularly significant contribution in commenting on those areas of co-operation pertaining to peaceful uses that have stimulated the greatest interest in recent weeks. Statements made in the General Assembly debate and resolutions adopted at the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States highlight four areas: exchange of information, technical assistance and training, capital assistance and, finally, the supply of fissionable material.

30. Interest in the exchange of information has centred on exerting every effort to make technological data available

³ Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America; see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes*, agenda item 91, document A/C.1/946.

which might promote peaceful economic and scientific development.

31. The exchange of information is also an important responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Agency carries out many mutually reinforcing activities to make information as widely available as possible. I should like to mention some of them.

32. Each year the Agency organizes a dozen or more conferences with two hundred to four hundred participants each. It also organizes about thirty smaller gatherings of experts. Today, for example, three hundred experts from thirty countries are gathered in Madrid for an IAEA symposium on how multipurpose nuclear power centres might provide arid parts of the earth with more fresh water by economic desalination of sea water.

33. In the field of publication the programme of the International Atomic Energy Agency is substantial. Each year the International Atomic Energy Agency publishes, and thus makes available to scientists throughout the world, some 30,000 pages of valuable technical data.

34. But, IAEA is also now working to anticipate the needs of the future. It has begun to work on the establishment of an International Nuclear Information Service. Hopefully, in time, data from member States will be stored in a computerized bank and supplied on request. Thus, IAEA is preparing itself to play a valuable and indeed a vital role in helping countries deal with the "information explosion".

35. The United States has given IAEA strong support in the field of information exchange ever since the inception of the Agency in 1957. We have utilized IAEA in ensuring the widest possible dissemination of United States technological information.

36. Moreover, we have undertaken, on a bilateral basis, extensive additional co-operative programmes in this field. We have donated depository libraries, containing vast collections of technical reports concerning the peaceful uses of atomic energy, to more than eighty countries and five international organizations. We have developed mutually beneficial, and detailed technical-information exchanges with more than forty countries. With the help of local scientists and educational officials we have conducted "Atoms in Action" demonstration centres in thirty-one countries. These centres carry out seminars and experiments on items of specific local interest. Nearly seven million people have visited them.

37. A great deal, therefore, is being done and is being planned to disseminate scientific and technological information, and I have only mentioned part of the story. Other countries are taking active steps to share their results, and other international organizations, such as EURATOM, also have active programmes to foster the prompt exchange of information. However, it is evident that the sharing of technical information can have its maximum favourable impact on the programmes of developing countries only if there also exists an ability to absorb and utilize the available data.

38. Recognizing this fact, in early years our effort in helping countries get established in the peaceful nuclear

field was based extensively on providing technical assistance as well as equipment. One of our first activities after the passage of our Atomic Energy Act of 1954 was to work out agreements for co-operation which enabled the United States to provide nuclear reactors, nuclear fuel and extensive information and technical assistance to thirty-three countries and to international organizations, including IAEA.

39. To help developing countries organize effective research reactor programmes, we have several laboratory-to-laboratory relationships with United States National Laboratories, like Brookhaven, Argonne and Oak Ridge. Under these "sister-laboratory" arrangements, our facilities provide sustained advice or assistance to foreign research reactor centres.

40. In the field of training, I note that the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States requested that students and scientists be granted access to the peaceful atomic laboratories of the more advanced States. The United States has long provided foreign scientists with extensive access to its peaceful facilities.

41. We have offered, and continue to offer, numerous training opportunities to foreign scientists in our leading atomic centres. Many of the key scientists and engineers, prominent in national nuclear programmes throughout the world, have attended and participated in this programme. In addition, 4,500 individual research and training assignments have been arranged at our facilities to meet the particular needs of foreign visitors. We have also assisted IAEA by providing approximately 585 cost-free fellowships.

42. IAEA supports research in the application of isotopes in agriculture, medicine and industry, in which the primary emphasis is on helping the developing countries. For example, 90 per cent of the work of the joint FAO-IAEA Division of Atomic Energy in Food and Agriculture is aimed at problems which are important to the developing countries, such as studying the absorption of fertilizers in rice and corn, using radiation to generate more productive and disease-resistant species, eradicating harmful insects, and preserving food.

43. In the field of power reactors, IAEA's role is to provide practical service to member States in economic studies, safety, evaluation of bids, advice on problems of operation, system economy, and so forth.

44. A measure of IAEA's success is that demands for IAEA technical assistance on good, feasible projects now run at least double the Agency's resources. As Dr. Seaborg, Chairman of our Atomic Energy Commission, pointed out at the recent meeting of the IAEA General Conference, responsibility for increasing the resources available to the Agency lies with the members themselves.

45. We have supported the Agency's programmes through financial contributions to both the assessed and voluntary budgets, in the sum of \$30,500,000 to date. In addition—I repeat, in addition—we have made available experts, equipment and special nuclear materials for use in Agency projects. We urge all other countries in a position to do

so—and there are quite a few in addition to the nuclear-weapon States—to make a comparable effort.

46. IAEA has a relationship as sub-contractor to United Nations organs carrying out United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Special Fund projects, particularly in the area of water-resource research and development. In 1967 this account totalled almost one million dollars. The Agency will be the executing agency for a more than \$3 million Special Fund project in India on nuclear research in agriculture. The contribution of UNDP will be \$1.4 million.

47. We all recognize that the full exploitation of atomic energy for peaceful purposes demands capital. In the early days of United States international co-operation, when the focus was on research, we provided for financial and material assistance to other countries with a programme of contributing up to \$350,000 or half the cost of research reactors. Twenty-six countries received such grants, and this seed capital had an important effect in stimulating peaceful nuclear research in a number of developing countries. The reactor centres which resulted have served as an important catalyst for fostering growth of science and technology in these countries.

48. At the same time, we began a series of equipment grants, making available items ranging in size from small electronic devices to complete laboratories and sub-critical assemblies. To date, eighty such grants have been made to thirty-six countries.

49. Now, of course, atomic energy is increasingly a commercial proposition. Accordingly, we have provided important credit facilities, through the United States Export-Import Bank, to foreign purchasers interested in acquiring reactor components, as well as reactor fuels, in the United States. The Bank has agreed to loan approximately \$300 million to other countries for nuclear-power projects.

50. Although IAEA does not build or finance commercial power reactors, it does help countries in their efforts to obtain capital assistance by carrying out studies to establish the economic feasibility of nuclear-power projects. However, proposed atomic projects have to compete for development capital with other projects in developing countries.

51. Capital financing for suitable nuclear projects was a main issue underlying some of the resolutions adopted by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. My Government believes that this question and the related Conference resolutions do deserve serious consideration by Governments and the appropriate international bodies to which they have been addressed.

52. Finally, I would like to comment on the concern which has been expressed recently about the supply of fissionable materials for peaceful purposes. At the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, for example, resolutions called for IAEA to study means for ensuring access to such material on a commercial basis and for nuclear-weapon States to facilitate the availability of such material. Similarly, another resolution asked that consideration be given to establishment of a fund for special fissionable

materials for developing countries and that nuclear-weapon States supply such materials to this fund at reasonable prices.

53. In looking at these suggestions, we believe it important to note that the United States has committed itself very significantly on several occasions to supply sizable quantities of enriched uranium, a vital reactor fuel, to foreign countries under the most stable and attractive conditions.

54. As of today, the United States has made arrangements for other countries to obtain up to 527,000 kg of such material. This includes the estimated long-term requirements of approximately thirty nuclear-power reactors in India, Japan, Norway, the Philippines, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, as well as the requirements for approximately 13,500 megawatts of power in the EURATOM countries. Our current enrichment facilities should be capable of handling all foreseeable demands at reasonable prices through the late 1970s. Moreover, when additional enrichment capacity is needed, we are confident that United States industry or the United States Government will have it installed on the desired time scale.

55. In its resolution G [*see A/7277 and Corr.1, para. 17 (IV)*], the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States pointed out that nuclear energy has

“opened up new perspectives for the progress of mankind, and especially for the economic and scientific advancement of developing countries.”

We fully share this objective. Accordingly, we would support a General Assembly resolution requesting that the Secretary-General appoint a group of experts to prepare a report on possible contributions of nuclear technology to the economic and scientific advancement of the developing countries. So that the report will be most likely to make a practical contribution, we would propose that the experts be asked specifically to take full advantage of the experience and the competence of the IAEA in preparing the report.

56. Before trying to draw a few conclusions about future work regarding peaceful uses of atomic energy, I would like to touch on two other related issues: the composition of the IAEA Board of Governors and peaceful nuclear explosions.

57. No one doubts that the advent of the non-proliferation Treaty means that IAEA will be taking on added responsibilities. We support the decision of the recent IAEA General Conference which asked that the Board of Governors examine its composition. We will consider this question with an open mind.

58. The General Conference also asked the Director-General of IAEA to look into the question of the Agency's role with respect to peaceful nuclear explosion services, as they become practicable. The United States believes that the IAEA is the right agency for carrying out the responsibilities of the international body contemplated in article V of the non-proliferation Treaty, and we welcome this first step.

59. For our own part we intend to continue an active research and development programme on nuclear explosive

devices suited for peaceful uses and on the technology for various peaceful applications for nuclear explosions. At the same time, we will provide available information, data and technical advice to those non-nuclear States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty which request it.

60. Our objective is to make peaceful nuclear explosion services available for practicable applications, both domestically and internationally. Proposed legislation which would facilitate implementation of that objective is already being considered by the United States Congress.

61. I think two points are clear from this examination of what is going on in international co-operation on peaceful uses of the atom: first, the problems we face are practical ones. They involve money, materials and equipment. They concern choices among various concrete possibilities. They require expert knowledge to arrive at workable solutions.

62. Second, good work is already being done in this field, and the practical problems of future co-operation are best handled by existing bodies with the experience to do the job.

63. We note, and we think that this is most significant, that the non-nuclear Conference resolutions themselves call for study and action by several existing bodies and by individual States. The non-nuclear Conference resolutions specifically ask that such bodies as IAEA, the World Bank and the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament study various proposals and take action. We strongly support this approach.

64. The United States Government does not believe it is either necessary or desirable to create a new body, such as a United Nations committee, for these purposes. I listened with great attention yesterday to the various arguments in favour of a new committee advanced [1609th meeting] by the distinguished representative of Italy. I was impressed by his seriousness and conviction, but I must differ with his line of argument. The creation of such a new body would serve only to duplicate, complicate, and therefore impede, the work of existing bodies, which must be given an adequate chance to make progress. No new body can produce one more reactor or one more dollar of aid or piece of equipment that would not otherwise be available. And it could lead to a deterioration in the atmosphere of good will needed for effective international co-operation. In fact, it is the existing organizations which indisputably have the backlog of experience, the essential technical expertise and the continuity of effort which makes it most likely that they will be able to utilize fully, where appropriate, ideas put forward in the non-nuclear Conference and elsewhere to take concrete steps forward. We cannot conceive of such a committee functioning without directly duplicating and complicating efforts under way in existing, competent bodies. Therefore, for all these reasons, the United States is strongly opposed to the creation of any new committee for these purposes.

65. The United States Government would like to see a resolution emerge from our deliberations which would ask the existing bodies to work on the problems which the non-nuclear Conference resolutions ask them to work on—which would request the relevant bodies, after this

work has progressed, to submit reports to a subsequent General Assembly on the progress they have made, and which would provide for a subsequent General Assembly to determine whether progress was adequate and what steps should be taken in the future. As I stated before, we also support the inclusion in a resolution of a proposal that the Secretary-General appoint a group of experts to prepare a report on all possible contributions of nuclear technology to the economic and scientific advancement of the developing countries.

66. My Government understands and sympathizes with the desire of many States for measures which would provide a greater degree of security. Indeed, the search for security on the part of individual States, groups of States and the international community as a whole has been one of the principal themes of international relations since the end of the Second World War. It played a major role in the establishment of the United Nations. Unfortunately, for reasons that are well known, the early hopes that the United Nations might provide the answer have not so far been adequately realized.

67. Nevertheless, we believe that the United Nations remains the best hope for achieving security on a universal basis, for any attempt to erect separate universal security guarantees alongside the United Nations framework would be subject to the same factors which have inhibited the further development of the United Nations security system itself. Furthermore, if such a universal security structure were created, even partly outside and in apparent competition with the United Nations, it would lack the legal framework provided by the United Nations Charter—a legal framework which protects the sovereign equality and general interests of all Member States. If that approach were pursued, it could only weaken the United Nations, and the world would in the end be less, rather than more, secure.

68. Achievement of a degree of security beyond that which is provided by the United Nations and the supplementary regional bodies today, including the existing assurances of the three nuclear Powers, must be a mutual effort of all concerned. Given the inescapable responsibilities already borne by the permanent members of the Security Council, it would be impractical to assume that a few major Powers can, or should, take upon themselves alone and outside the United Nations context the security of the remainder of the world.

69. It was for those reasons that the United States Government anchored solidly in the United Nations the security assurances it offered in the Security Council, together with the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in connexion with the non-proliferation Treaty. These assurances have been criticized by a number of delegations as being inadequate.

70. Our position on this issue was stated in the General Assembly and in the Security Council and will be found in the records of those bodies. However, we do stress that the declaration by the United States was a seriously considered political act which indicates how we intend to respond in the circumstances described.

71. No Government could realistically be expected to do more. No responsible Government could obligate itself to take military action automatically in a wide and unspecified variety of contingencies. To do so would hardly be credible. Indeed, such an attempt could lead to less, rather than more, stability in the world.

72. This should not be taken as reflecting a lack of interest in the various security problems which have been raised here, at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and at the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States; but these are the same problems with which we have been struggling for many years. We were able in the course of negotiating Security Council resolution 255 (1968) to deal with some aspects of those problems in a way which, we are convinced, will enhance the security of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty.

73. The solution to other aspects proved impossible. We are not aware of any change in the situation that would permit of greater progress now. Indeed, present circumstances would hardly appear propitious for a renewed effort.

74. The effort to strengthen world security must be pursued unceasingly in existing bodies in the United Nations, where all Members bear a responsibility. Let us therefore resolve to do so, bearing in mind the views expressed and suggestions made at the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. We will do our part in that effort.

75. The costly arms race, with its tremendous drain on human and material resources, must not continue unchecked. We all have a high obligation, to the living and to the yet unborn generations, to increase the prospects for world peace and well-being by stopping the arms race. General and complete disarmament is the ultimate goal which humanity must pursue with vigour if it is to survive. In the meantime, as steps which can help lead us to this over-all goal, we favour making progress when it can be made on arms control measures short of general and complete disarmament. This is an obligation recognized in article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty.

76. I would like to call your attention to an undertaking which still stands before us, namely, the prospect of bilateral talks between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the limitation and reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear-weapons delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles. As you know, after some months of prior consultations, initiated by the United States, the two sides reached agreement on 1 July to enter into such discussions in the near future. You also are aware that events intervened which forced a postponement of those talks.

77. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, at its most recent session, adopted a provisional agenda⁴ which will guide its future deliberations. This provisional agenda accords first priority in its work to further effective

measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. My Government strongly supported this provisional agenda. As has been the policy in the past, the United States will participate actively in the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and will assume a leading role in the exploration of those arms control measures which may become ripe for agreement.

78. During the discussions on the sea-beds in this Committee we made clear our willingness to explore the feasibility of a viable and effective agreement to prevent the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the ocean floor. We sincerely hope the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament will take up this important question at its resumed session.

79. We supported the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament's request⁵ that the Secretary-General arrange for the preparation of a technical report on the effects of the possible use of chemical and biological means of warfare. We are encouraged by the Secretary-General's reaction to this request and hope that the General Assembly will pass a resolution calling upon the Secretary-General to prepare such a report.

80. In the course of this debate the United States delegation will have more to say about some of the specific items on our agenda.

81. The CHAIRMAN: Before calling upon the next speaker on my list I wish to inform the Committee that a draft resolution, sponsored by ten delegations, has been circulated in document A/C.1/L.444.

82. Mr. TOMOROWICZ (Poland): In the relatively short period of time since the conclusion of the twenty-second session of the General Assembly new steps have been taken and new efforts have been made of considerable significance for disarmament negotiations. The non-proliferation Treaty has been opened for signature and the Security Council has adopted a resolution [*resolution 255 (1968)*] on security guarantees for the non-nuclear-weapon States. All of that has, of course, had a significant impact on the scope and possibilities of negotiation in other fields of disarmament. It will be recalled that an announcement was made last July that an agreement had been reached by the Soviet Union and the United States concerning early bilateral talks on the limitation of strategic offensive nuclear-weapon delivery systems and anti-ballistic systems. Disarmament negotiations have also been extended to include a totally new area, that of the sea-bed, with a view to preventing its use for military purposes. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, in its report to the General Assembly, has outlined a broad programme of future disarmament negotiations, relating particularly to nuclear disarmament.

83. The events which I have just mentioned have created premises conducive to further progress in disarmament negotiations and have offered us new and valuable experiences of international co-operation in this difficult area. Relating directly or indirectly to different aspects of

⁴ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, para. 17.

⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 26.

nuclear armaments those events have confirmed once again that the key issue facing us today is to achieve a degree of understanding as to the most effective methods of nuclear disarmament. The unceasing perfection and stockpiling of nuclear weapons accounts for the continued escalation of military and political dangers resulting from the arms race. I need hardly add that such a trend is particularly dangerous at a time when we are constantly faced with grave local conflicts and when there are many hotbeds that may well turn into catalysts of a general conflict.

84. Under such circumstances an agreement on effective steps in the field of nuclear disarmament, acceptable to all concerned, becomes the overriding and most urgent order of the day. Indeed, the solution of this problem is the key to and a necessary condition of other disarmament measures, of general and complete disarmament. A failure today to take advantage of the existing possibilities may render difficult tomorrow the settlement of problems that are ripe for an early solution.

85. The complexity, both political and military, of the problem of nuclear disarmament which, as we know, affects the security and vital interests of States, calls for diversified approaches and action. We believe that in this field the top priority must be accorded to such steps as the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the reduction and elimination of their stockpiles and a gradual reduction of the strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems. Equally urgent is the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, and a number of other partial or regional disarmament measures.

86. The cessation of underground nuclear tests would also be of primary importance for the slowing down of the nuclear race. Poland has always favoured an early settlement of that question. This is probably why we do not consider that making a decision in this regard dependent on a prior agreement on an international control system is necessarily helpful in solving the matter. In fact, in the view of the rapid development of seismic technology enabling the detection and identification of underground events through national means, setting up such an international machinery of control could hardly be regarded as necessary and we should not permit any unnecessary action to postpone unduly progress in that field.

87. In the considered view of the Polish delegation, prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would constitute a logical sequel to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. As it will be recalled, the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics submitted to the twenty-second session of the General Assembly a draft convention⁶ which was based on the main principles of General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI) adopted on the initiative of Ethiopia. The draft convention had been transmitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and, as indicated in the Committee's report,⁷ the matter has been included in the agenda of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament as one of the high priority items.

⁶ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes*, agenda item 96, document A/6834.

⁷ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, para. 17.

88. There are many arguments which support the wisdom, indeed necessity, of banning the use of nuclear weapons. Once established, such a prohibition not only would strengthen the security of all States, it would reinforce the efficacy of international arrangements relating to peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. Reducing the possibility of pursuing a policy "from the position of strength" the convention would represent an important instrument of international law and order. Moreover, it would be instrumental in increasing the effectiveness of such fundamental international principles as the right of States to existence, self-defence, the right to neutrality at times of armed conflicts and many others.

89. The memorandum of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of 1 July 1968 (see A/7134) concerning urgent measures to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament, which has been submitted to the current session, is a development which facilitates initiating concrete negotiations on the key issues of nuclear disarmament. We are deeply convinced that this document could and should become a basis for fruitful negotiations.

90. First, the memorandum suggests a broad action programme with reference to topical questions of nuclear disarmament which constitute a pressing business of the day as a result of the present international situation as well as in view of the progress in technology and science.

91. Secondly, the memorandum corresponds to the desires and suggestions made by other States and that is why the particular items of the document coincide with the agenda agreed upon by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and included in the Committee's report.⁸

92. Thirdly, the Soviet Union has expressed its readiness to open early negotiations with the States concerned, especially the nuclear Powers, on the particular issues referred to in the memorandum. The document can thus be read as proof of the determination to stand by the commitments in the field of nuclear disarmament contained in the preamble and article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty.

93. Having all these considerations in mind, the Polish delegation fully supports the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.443 concerning the memorandum submitted by the Soviet delegation. We are confident that other nuclear Powers will consider the Soviet offer with a full sense of responsibility and that they, too, will declare a readiness to open negotiations.

94. With your kind permission, Mr. Chairman, I should like to comment briefly on the non-proliferation Treaty, whose overriding significance, I trust, will escape nobody in this room, particularly when the Treaty is viewed in the light of the top priority which we all are agreed must be accorded to effective measures in nuclear disarmament. The significance of the Treaty consists in the fact that it closes down all roads to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, thus barring one of the main possible forms of the nuclear arms race. The Treaty comprises a balance of rights and obligations of all its signatories, both nuclear Powers and

⁸ *Ibid.*

non-nuclear-weapon States. The ban on the further proliferation of nuclear weapons has created the possibility for further disarmament negotiations and provisions for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. All this considered, we view the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as an important instrument of international co-operation, an instrument which opens up broad possibilities especially in the field of further measures of nuclear disarmament.

95. However, in order that the international community can fully benefit from the possibilities provided for by the very terms of the Treaty, that instrument must enter into force at the earliest time and it has to be adhered to and ratified by the largest possible number of States.

96. In view of the emerging possibilities of progress in disarmament negotiations, any delay, especially on the part of the States of developed technological capability, which postpones that accession to the Treaty, constitutes today probably the most real threat to the balance of rights and obligations established in the Treaty. Such an attitude can be regarded as being tantamount to active opposition against disarmament negotiations, and it certainly gives comfort and encouragement to those who are opposed to the Treaty itself, who have not yet laid down their arms and who try to devise organizational forms so as to help their activities. Unwilling for obvious reasons to assault the Treaty in a frontal attack, they continue toiling to invent various conditions which they want to be met as a price for their signature. Such an approach cannot be regarded as being compatible with the principle of good faith which is generally recognized in disarmament negotiations and which is referred to in resolution 2373 (XXII), adopted at the twenty-second session of the General Assembly.

97. It is because of our geographical location and the ghastly sacrifice we suffered during the Second World War that my country is vitally interested in the earliest signature and ratification of the Treaty by all European States. In Europe, as well as in other areas where there are substantial stockpiles of nuclear weapons, where there is a suitable and extensive industrial and technological basis for nuclear industries, and where, moreover, political and military claims to nuclear weapons are openly made, the non-proliferation Treaty must urgently come into force if it is to be fully effective.

98. Our assessment of the situation prevailing in Europe for years led Poland to support in 1957 a plan for a nuclear-free zone in central Europe, and again in 1963 a plan for a nuclear-arms freeze in the same area. Again in 1964 Poland came out with a proposal for an all-European conference on security and co-operation. All those proposals are fully valid today. We interpret article VII of the non-proliferation Treaty as a confirmation of our diplomatic efforts made so far. Article VII recognizes the right of States on a basis of equality to pursue regional measures in the field of nuclear disarmament. The principle of the implementation of such measures has been subordinated, within the scope of the Treaty, to the over-all principles of disarmament. Article VII is quite explicit in asserting that priority of nuclear disarmament applies also to disarmament efforts pursued on a regional scale. That, too, explains the need to seek measures of regional disarmament as a first priority in the areas where large stockpiles of nuclear weapons represent a particular danger of nuclear conflict.

99. Viewing the non-proliferation Treaty as an instrument for fostering further disarmament negotiations, the Polish delegation cannot but consider that the attitude of States towards the Treaty determines the sincerity of the intentions of States with regard to the very problem of disarmament, including regional disarmament. In this connexion, we do not and cannot recognize as acts of good faith the attitude of certain States, first of all that of the Federal Republic of Germany which, while evading accession to the Treaty, try to find an alibi for their non-constructive attitude by professing their alleged readiness to consider some other disarmament measures, all of them of a strictly regional character.

100. The successful negotiations on and the subsequent preparation for signature of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons constitute an important chapter in disarmament talks. Having completed that task, we find ourselves confronted by new tasks, which have to be approached as a whole, in all their complexity. As we know, each move in disarmament negotiations counts. Each move, directly or indirectly, paves the way to the next move, thus accumulating a capital of mutual trust and experience. The agenda for future disarmament negotiations suggested in the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, as well as the programme outlined in the Memorandum of the Soviet Government, indicate that the disarmament negotiations will tend to embrace a number of new questions arising from the current international situation and dictated by the present-day level of the unfortunate arms race.

101. One of those new questions is the problem of bacteriological and chemical weapons. Their use as weapons of mass destruction represents a threat to all mankind. Therefore, the most urgent and immediate task facing States today in that field is to see to it that the provisions of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on the prohibition of the use of bacteriological and chemical weapons⁹ are universally observed.

102. As will be recalled, the Polish delegation proposed in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on disarmament that the Secretary-General appoint a group of experts to assist him in the preparation of a report on the effects of the possible use of bacteriological and chemical weapons. That proposal has been accepted and incorporated in the Committee's report¹⁰ as a recommendation to be considered by the General Assembly. The recommendation has been acknowledged with approval in the introduction to the annual report of the Secretary-General.¹¹ In introducing its proposal, Poland sought to continue the action inaugurated with the Secretary-General's report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons.¹² In our view, the

⁹ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, of 17 June 1925 (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138).

¹⁰ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, para. 26.

¹¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 1A*, para. 32.

¹² United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.68.IX.1.

safeguarding of the full efficacy of the Geneva Protocol is a pre-condition of any debate on bacteriological and chemical weapons within the scope of disarmament talks.

103. Poland, together with delegations of other countries, has submitted a draft resolution, contained in document A/C.1/L.444, relating to bacteriological and chemical weapons and proposing that the Secretary-General appoint a group of experts to assist him in the preparation of a report concerning the effects of the possible use of bacteriological and chemical weapons. We trust that the draft resolution will find additional co-sponsors and that it will be approved unanimously by the General Assembly. We are confident that a report concerning bacteriological and chemical weapons, like the previous report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons, will greatly assist in our further efforts seeking to establish a total ban on and elimination of weapons of mass extermination.

104. In concluding my statement, I should like to assure you, Mr. Chairman, of the readiness of my delegation to co-operate with all delegations with a view to reaching, during this session of the General Assembly, decisions which could serve as a new stimulus to disarmament negotiations and which would reinforce efforts towards the ultimate goal, which continues to be general and complete disarmament.

105. Mr. AL-MUDHAF (Kuwait): Disarmament is the major international question which concerns all countries, big or small. It is a matter on which depend the survival of mankind and its prosperity. It, however, has special meaning to the small countries because the production of arms, whether conventional or otherwise, is still the exclusive preserve of the advanced countries. It is therefore a field of activity in which the small countries find themselves to a large extent at the mercy of the advanced countries who hold in their hands the key to international peace.

106. In representing a small country, my delegation has consistently shown great interest in this item. Our views are generally well known as we have proclaimed on every occasion our dedication to the cause of general and complete disarmament.

107. My country has from the start been associated with the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States which was convened to discuss the most effective means for assuring the security of the non-nuclear States. My delegation agrees with the findings of the Conference that the non-nuclear-weapon States will only find lasting security through general and complete disarmament.

108. My Government attaches special importance to resolution C [see A/7277 and Corr.1, para. 17 (III)] adopted by the Conference, which provides that the achievement of the goal of nuclear non-proliferation requires the adoption of measures to prevent both horizontal and vertical proliferation. I should like to lay special emphasis on the provisions which underline the need to prevent the further development and improvement of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, the immediate cessation of the production of fissile materials for weapon purposes, and the reduction and subsequent elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

109. My country was among the first to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex) which is indeed a positive step towards disarmament. We sincerely hope that countries who have been reluctant to sign it will soon reconsider their position.

110. My country is also a party to the Treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.¹³ It believes that the Treaty should be extended to include a ban on underground tests of nuclear weapons.

111. My delegation also supports the recommendation of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament¹⁴ that the Secretary-General appoint a group of experts to study the effects of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological means of war.

112. My delegation has already supported the proposal of the Soviet Union in the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the sea-bed and the ocean floor¹⁵ that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should consider, as an urgent measure, the question of prohibiting the use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond the limits of the territorial waters of coastal States.

113. The economic and social consequences of disarmament are also of vital importance. No sound structure for international relations can be established while the gap between the rich and poor countries steadily widens. My country has paid special care to this problem which is one of the main causes of the anxiety and bitterness which prevail in the world today. The developing countries are naturally angry because the advanced countries do not wish to help them. Paul Hoffman has recently pointed out that all men will soon regard the opportunity to build a decent life as a fundamental right. He added that if the achievement of these rights is too long deferred, men will eventually strive to seize them by whatever means they have, including violent means. Let us heed that warning which should open the eyes of all to the dangers implicit in the present situation. My Government believes that the success of disarmament measures will release vital resources which can be properly utilized to accelerate the economic and social development of the poor countries. Nuclear energy, which should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, should be utilized to stimulate the process of development in the poor countries.

114. This is the time to move from words to deeds. The programme of action is clear to all of us. The demands of the developing countries have been embodied in the Charter of Algiers.¹⁶ The aspirations of the non-nuclear Governments are clearly defined in the Final Document of their Conference [A/7277 and Corr.1]. Let us lose no more time

¹³ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964.

¹⁴ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, para. 26.

¹⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session*, document A/7230, annex III.

¹⁶ See *Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Second Session*, vol. I and Add.1 and Corr.1, *Report and Annexes* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.68.H.D.14), annex IX.

in translating the contents of these two major documents into deeds.

115. The CHAIRMAN: Before I give the floor to the next speaker on my list I wish to inform the Committee that Pakistan has become a co-sponsor of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.444, bringing the number of co-sponsors of that resolution to eleven.

116. Mr. NABWERA (Kenya): One can quite justifiably summarize the dangers of uncontrolled armament by pointing out that it distorts the sense of values of those who pursue it. To illustrate what I mean, I shall mention a few examples.

117. To begin with, the present competition in arms production deflects economic resources from vital civilian uses where they can do the most good to mankind. We all know that, in spite of the military might of the super-Powers, pockets of poverty and now moral decay still exist in their societies. Why then cannot some of the resources now being wasted in military competition be used at least to better the lives of the people in these countries?

118. Secondly, we have also heard it said again and again, here in the United Nations and elsewhere, that the development problems of the developing countries are the responsibility of the whole world. Indeed, it is in the light of this that the developing countries have pressed and are continuing to press the developed countries to be a little more generous with economic assistance and trade. In the view of my delegation, it goes without saying that a reduction of the present level of armament would enable the developed countries to render more economic assistance to the developing world.

119. Thirdly, the developing countries are actually being called upon to bear a disproportionately greater weight of the present armament. Apart from being unable to receive sufficient aid from the developed countries, because these countries give priority to military activities, there is considerable outside interference in the development of the resources of the developing countries. This happens in two harmful ways. In one instance, the developed countries scramble for the control of the economic resources of the developing countries. The disadvantages which the latter group of countries suffers as a result of this are too obvious to mention.

120. In the second instance, some of the developed countries which have already acquired control over the economic resources of the developing countries have seen fit to follow "dog in the manger" policies; there have been cases where mineral resources discovered in the developing countries have been left untapped because the industrialized countries which have been granted exploitation rights over these resources have decided to treat them as reserves. While this enables the developed countries concerned to manipulate the world prices of such resources, the developing countries affected are being forced to forgo vital economic development. This terrible situation results from uncontrolled armament.

121. Fourthly, the psychological effects of the present level of armament are a source of concern. The present

arms build-up creates in certain circles of the world the impression of constant insecurity. As before, the people in the developing world suffer most in this respect. They know only too well that, as an African adage puts it, when two elephants fight it is the grass that suffers; thus, like the grass under the military giants, they are apt to suffer when hostilities break out. In the developed world itself, where this uncontrolled armament is taking place, the major psychological effect has been the spiritual decay of society. It is the contention of my delegation that the student revolt which is threatening academic and even social peace in the developed countries is but symptomatic of this spiritual decay. The reason for this decay is simply that the arming nations have neglected the spiritual development of their societies; instead, they are preoccupied with attempts to maintain military might, sometimes known as nuclear parity or nuclear superiority, as the case may be.

122. Contradictory as it may sound, the present level of armament also creates a false sense of security. This false sense of security, of course, is felt mostly by the establishments in the arming countries. The more those establishments arm themselves, the more secure they feel, so they believe. That this is a mistaken belief has already been made apparent in the references that I have made to the spiritual decay of those societies and the constant state of nervousness in which all nations are put.

123. In addition to this, we all know that beyond a certain level of military preparedness the mighty tend to become impulsively aggressive. The pressure of too much military power becomes too great to contain and tends to lead to unwarranted military activities, of which the innocent are the victims. My delegation fears that the present arms build-up has practically reached this point. The present time, therefore, is the time to consider very seriously the immediate reduction of armaments.

124. If disarmament is not begun immediately the world may be plunged into a terrible catastrophe in the not too distant future. Recent events lead us to give this warning. Apart from demonstrating to the smaller nations that the present is not their world, those events have revealed a dangerous inclination on the part of the mighty. Some of the smaller nations are beginning to realise the harsh truth of the fable, that the wolf and the lamb can never be bedfellows. Thus, those of them that have sought peace under the so-called nuclear umbrella have been rudely awakened to the fact that they are not under an umbrella but under the sword of Damocles.

125. Therefore my delegation calls upon those nuclear Powers which have not yet done so to stop the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere as a step towards disarmament. This should be followed by the complete cessation of all testing of nuclear weapons anywhere, under any conditions, as well as the reduction of the present nuclear stockpiles.

126. My delegation hopes that all those responsible for the present arms race will take steps to calm the nerves of all of us by, first of all, desisting from any further arms development and production. In particular, it is necessary that vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons be stopped. We have heard it said often in some of the quarters

responsible for the wasteful arms race that the level of armament already reached is such that if a nuclear war broke out today we should all be losers and none of us would win. In these circumstances, why do those responsible still persist in producing and perfecting more and more devastating weapons? What good is the "balance of terror" if it is neither necessary to fight nor possible to survive in case war breaks out?

127. While putting an end to vertical nuclear proliferation the same Powers should desist from placing in orbit earth satellites designed for military purposes. My delegation fully appreciates the constructive uses to which earth satellites can be put for the good of mankind. Already the use of earth satellites for intercontinental television transmission has made the world appear smaller, to the advantage of us all. We should like to see such use of earth satellites intensified and extended. Naturally, the more we use our resources in developing earth satellites for peaceful purposes the fewer resources we shall have for the development of military satellites. This is such a vital point that my delegation would appeal to all States to accede and adhere to the outer space Treaty [*General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI), annex*].

128. Of late there has sprung up keen competition among the nuclear and rocket Powers in the field of anti-ballistic missile systems. If we are sincere in saying that peace is what we want, then we must agree that the extravagant expenditure on the anti-missile missile race is unnecessary, uncalled for and retrograde. We call upon all those responsible for this unhealthy state of affairs to put a stop to it.

129. My delegation is equally alarmed at the licence which some of the military-minded countries have shown lately as regards the use of bacteriological and chemical weapons. It is particularly objectionable to us that it is mostly, if not wholly, the peoples of the developing world which have fallen victim to germ and chemical warfare. We consider resorting to such warfare a grave violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which abolished it. We are aware, of course, that some of those guilty of the recent use of germ and chemical weapons have not acceded to that Protocol. That, however, is beside the point. What is important is that those responsible for germ and chemical warfare are fully aware that there is no military, political, economic or moral justification whatsoever for resorting to such crude methods of war. If they have any claim to civilization, those responsible for these inhuman acts should desist forthwith from waging bacteriological and chemical warfare. We call upon them to accede to the Geneva Protocol as well.

130. My delegation would also like to invite the United Nations to do all in its power to bring about a revision of the Geneva Protocol with a view to bringing it up to date. In this respect, my delegation is happy to support the proposal of the United Kingdom contained in its working paper on microbiological warfare presented to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and elaborated upon by the Minister of State, Mr. Mulley.

131. This statement has tended to put much emphasis on non-conventional weapons and warfare. Lest this should

create an unbalanced impression, my delegation would also like to alert this Committee to the immediate need for the reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces. We feel that arms and armed forces should be limited to the needs of national defence. The first step in this direction, we believe, is the liberalization of recruitment methods, especially those of the countries which are members of the military blocs. This is necessary because at the present time conscription is used by those countries for the building up of large armed forces. As I have already said, we believe that there is really no need for any country to be heavily armed. Therefore, there is no need for everybody to be forced to bear arms. If the level of armed forces is kept within defence limits, it will be sufficient to man them with volunteers.

132. Permit me now to make a few remarks on the recent Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. My delegation obtained much satisfaction from the Conference for two important reasons. In the first instance, the Conference enabled those States that are generally associated with the United Nations to meet those nations generally excluded from the work of the United Nations and related international conferences. I particularly wish to refer to the contributions made by the Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland. That was a step forward in collective diplomacy and should be encouraged. Secondly, we were much gratified that France was able to participate in the Conference as an observer, as the rest of the nuclear countries did with the exception of the People's Republic of China. In the light of that experience, my delegation would have been happier still if the People's Republic of China had accepted the invitation extended to it to participate in the work of the Conference.

133. My delegation fully supports the work of the Conference and in particular the resolutions that were adopted there. We would especially urge the establishment of nuclear-free zones and the expansion of the Board of IAEA, both of which were recommended by resolutions of the Conference.

134. Kenya has an open mind on the question of whether or not we should hold another such conference. We found the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States in Geneva so useful that, if at a future session the General Assembly should decide to convene another conference, we should be ready to support it. Meanwhile, we should like to call upon the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to redouble its efforts, so that the work that has been assigned to it can be completed with the necessary dispatch.

135. My delegation is rather disturbed that the authors of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty are beginning to balk at ratifying the Treaty. It will be recalled that leading nuclear nations did much rough arm-twisting in the developing world in order to obtain support for the Treaty when we last met here in June. Eventually the arm-twisting paid off handsomely, when the General Assembly commended the Treaty by 95 votes to 4, with 21 abstentions. Moreover, we understand that more than eighty countries have already signed the Treaty. In the circumstances, we do not understand why the authors of the Treaty, who were so enthusiastic at the beginning, are now reluctant to ratify it.

136. In conclusion, my delegation would like to reiterate that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should be left in no doubt by this Committee and the General Assembly that it should get down to serious discussions and negotiations. That Conference has already laid out its agenda quite clearly and in a manner which my delegation finds admirable. Therefore, we do not

expect it to drag its feet any longer; we have had enough of its annual reports of no progress. Accordingly we hope that when the Committee next reports to the General Assembly it will report progress and not the usual standstill.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.