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**Chairman: Mr. Ismail FAHMY**  
(United Arab Republic).

**AGENDA ITEMS 29, 30 AND 31**

Question of general and complete disarmament (*continued*):

(a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (A/6951-DC/229; A/C.1/L.411/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.412);

(b) Report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons (A/6858 and Corr.1, A/C.1/L.413 and Add.1 and 2)

Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/6951-DC/229; A/C.1/L.414 and Add.1)

Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/6951-DC/229)

1. Mr. HOPE (United Kingdom): During this debate several delegations have expressed their disappointment that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has found little time since the last session of the Assembly to discuss the three items which are now before us. But it is clearly right that attention in Geneva should have been concentrated, in the recent period, more on the negotiation of a non-proliferation treaty as an

essential preliminary to progress in other fields of disarmament.

2. The representative of Sweden has also chided us for the optimism expressed during the last session about the prospects of an early conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty. It is true that the hopes which were then expressed have not been fulfilled during the last twelve months. But we believe that the records of the Eighteen-Nation Committee demonstrate the significant advances which have been achieved, in which all nations represented at Geneva have played their part. We have good reason to hope that the Disarmament Committee will soon be able to report that the text of a draft treaty has been agreed. We hope that at the conclusion of our debate this week their efforts will be endorsed and that the Eighteen-Nation Committee will be given a new stimulus to complete the draft treaty with dispatch, and then, without delay, proceed with the many other important and pressing measures of disarmament which have been remitted to it for study by the General Assembly.

3. I should now like to deal briefly with each of the items before us. I say "briefly", not because of any lack of recognition of their significance, but because the position of my Government, and the importance which we attach to progress in the field of disarmament have been stated many times before in this Committee.

4. Firstly, I should like to welcome warmly the valuable and, indeed, impressive report by the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of those weapons.

5. I think most of us here were already familiar with the literature dealing with the appalling effects of the use of nuclear weapons. But, even so, the stark and explicit portrayal in this report of the death, destruction and suffering which the use of those weapons would inevitably bring about should lend added emphasis—if any were needed—to the importance and urgency of the work of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. We hope that the report will be pondered by all whose work involves them in the consideration of these problems.

6. Another feature of the report, which we believe of particular value, is the section dealing with the security and economic implications of the acquisition of nuclear weapons. These implications are at least as important as the physical effects, but have hitherto received comparatively little attention. They underline the heavy economic cost of developing and producing nuclear weapons and—what is often overlooked—the appalling cost of continuously improving and updating the complicated delivery systems

involved, which is essential if the nuclear force is to remain a credible deterrent to potential enemies.

7. My Government believes that the conclusions of this thorough and impartial study should receive the widest possible attention. The main lesson perhaps to be drawn from the report is that, whatever the path to national and international security in the future, it is most certainly not the further spread of nuclear weapons.

8. My delegation supports fully the conclusions in the report, and draft resolution A/C.1/L.413 and Add.1-2, and congratulates the Secretary-General, his staff, and the panel of experts on their work.

9. I will, if I may, now turn to draft resolution A/C.1/L.411/Rev.1, about the use of chemical and biological weapons, which has been placed before us by the representative of Malta. We welcome the Maltese initiative in raising this subject. There is growing concern in the international community about the dangerous potentialities of these particularly horrible and repulsive weapons. We share that concern and, of course, we are a party to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which forbids the use of bacteriological and chemical weapons in war. My delegation supported resolution 2162 (XXI), adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session, calling for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol.

10. As was made clear in the comprehensive and, indeed, compelling statement by the representative of Malta, from the point of view of controlling these weapons in the context of disarmament, the ease and cheapness with which they can be made—and, more important, perhaps, the ease with which they can be concealed—raises particularly difficult practical problems. Secrecy and obscurity surround this whole subject, and it is clear that, although essential, adequate verification of any arms control agreement in this field presents a major difficulty.

11. However this does not mean that this is a problem which we can allow to be side-tracked just because of the difficulties involved in tackling it; on the contrary. We therefore welcome and support the Maltese resolution as a hopeful way to proceed. However, I would hesitate to agree, in spite of the arguments used by the representative of Malta, that there have been recent developments in the bacteriological and chemical weapons field which are of such magnitude as to make it necessary for the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to give absolute priority to this item. Nevertheless we naturally hope that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee will soon have completed its work on the non-proliferation treaty and will then be able to devote itself to these other important matters.

12. I listened this morning with respect and close attention to the speech by the representative of Hungary. But, nevertheless, I feel I must say that I regret that the Hungarian delegation should have used the opportunity afforded by the helpful and constructive Maltese proposal to table a resolution which is clearly aimed more at gaining a propaganda advantage than in finding a solution to the problem.

13. It is the view of my delegation that the Hungarian resolution [A/C.1/L.412] adds nothing to the serious and

forward-looking proposals tabled by Malta, particularly since the tabling of the amended version of the Maltese resolution [A/C.1/L.411/Rev.1] which is now before us. I recall that the Hungarian delegation put forward a similar proposal at the start of last year's debate on disarmament. The Committee will remember that it had to be substantially amended before the majority of the States represented here were willing to adopt it. Looking again at the present text submitted by the Hungarian delegation, I for my part do not believe that there is something called "contemporary international law" which is distinct from international law in the normal understanding of this expression. I do not accept that the use of one particular category of weapons rather than any other category for the purposes described is a crime against humanity. This term "a crime against humanity" has a technical and legal significance and as we all know the Third Committee has been working on aspects of this problem in recent weeks and months. In the view of my delegation it is not right to attempt in another Committee and in another connexion to adopt "on the nod" a view on the question of what is and what is not correctly described as a crime against humanity. I hope therefore that the Committee will agree with me that the proposals put forward by the representative of Malta deal with this matter in a serious and objective manner and that our attention should be directed to his draft resolution rather than the text introduced by the Hungarian delegation. Nevertheless, we note that the representative of Hungary has today suggested further consultations on this matter.

14. I should now like to speak briefly on the urgent need for the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. We profoundly hope that, when the non-proliferation treaty is signed, the resulting improvement in the political atmosphere will allow a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and other measures, to be negotiated as soon as possible. We agree with the distinguished and expert representative of Sweden, and other delegations too, that this is one of the most urgent and important of the disarmament measures which are currently under consideration. My Government continues to support fully all efforts to reach a treaty which, when agreed, we would sign with the greatest satisfaction. This continues to be a major aim of our policy. We also hope that all countries will find it possible to become signatories to such a treaty. I need hardly add, after what has been said in this, and earlier debates, that for such a treaty to be enduring and to be a significant step on the way towards nuclear disarmament it is essential that each party to it can be satisfied that the provisions of the treaty are being strictly observed by all the other signatories.

15. I should like to emphasize again the importance which my Government attaches to the need to capitalize on the decrease in mutual suspicion which we confidently expect to result from the signing of a non-proliferation treaty in order to follow up this success with progress on other disarmament issues, and particularly a comprehensive test-ban treaty to which I have referred. We believe that the General Assembly should urge the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to continue to work for this treaty and to ensure that it contains provision for adequate and effective verification.

16. I cannot conclude without referring to some of the more extreme statements which have been made in this

Committee in the course of this debate on the question of the elimination of foreign military bases. We have heard these tired arguments many times before, and I fear that we shall hear them again too. But this does not mean that we should not refute them each time that they are made. It is not my purpose here to repeat all the familiar counter-arguments about the rights of sovereign States to defend themselves or to enter into collective agreements for their security. The United Nations Charter is explicit on this point. I will, however, recall one point which my Government has made many times: namely that we do not believe it is either possible or desirable to keep military bases in a territory against the wishes of the inhabitants.

17. The General Assembly agreed at its last session, by resolution 2165 (XX), to transmit this question to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee for further consultation and report. If the original sponsors of this draft resolution have nothing further to contribute I suggest that, instead of wasting the extremely limited time of this Committee in further discussion of the item, we invite the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to carry out this examination as soon as practicable.

18. You, Sir, have advised us that our debate this week need not be strictly confined to the three items before us, and perhaps, Sir, with your permission, I might end by referring to two recent initiatives which my Government has taken in the field of disarmament.

19. On 4 December, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Mulley, announced in the House of Commons that in order to assist the negotiations at present taking place in Geneva to secure a non-proliferation treaty, Her Majesty's Government had decided that, at such time as international safeguards are put into effect in the non-nuclear-weapon States in implementation of the provisions of a treaty, it will be prepared for its part to offer an opportunity for the application of similar safeguards in the United Kingdom, subject only to exclusions for national security reasons. He also welcomed the parallel announcement of President Johnson on behalf of the United States.

20. Secondly, during the debate last month on item 91, "The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America", my delegation announced that Her Majesty's Government would shortly arrange to sign both additional Protocols of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. I am pleased to be able to confirm that these Protocols will be signed in Mexico City in the very near future.

21. Mr. GARCÍA ROBLES (Mexico) (*translated from Spanish*): Following the example of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, I shall try to make this statement as succinct as the interim report the Committee submitted to us in document A/6951-DC/229. I shall therefore confine myself to some general comments on three of the questions covered in that report: the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; the suspension of nuclear tests; and the report on the effects of nuclear weapons.

22. With regard to the first point, I should like to stress the need to keep well in mind everything we approved on this matter last year in resolutions 2149 (XXI) and 2153 A (XXI), especially the fact that, unless an inter-

national treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons is concluded very soon, the situation resulting from the absence of an agreement on this crucially important question could lead, in the words of paragraph 4 of the preamble to the above-mentioned resolution 2153, to "aggravation of tensions between States and the risk of a nuclear war". Thus we feel it is indispensable that all States, and particularly those jointly presiding over the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, take all necessary action to facilitate, and abstain from any activity which might hinder, the conclusion of an agreement that will place the General Assembly in a position to consider a complete draft treaty within no more than three or four months from the present date. That is the time-limit contemplated in the draft resolution jointly sponsored by sixteen nations—including Mexico—and distributed as document A/C.1/L.416.

23. With regard to the item on the agenda of the General Assembly entitled "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests", the substance of what my delegation would wish to say is summed up in the draft resolution sponsored by the eight non-aligned States—including Mexico—of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and submitted to the First Committee as document A/C.1/L.414. Allow me to stress, in particular, our "growing concern" at the fact that some States have still not acceded to the Moscow Treaty and that tests of nuclear weapons are being continued in the atmosphere and underground, and hence the urgency we attach to the need to heed the appeals, repeated again in the draft resolution, to adopt the measures it outlines for remedying the present dangerous situation.

24. Finally, with regard to the third point I mentioned at the beginning of my statement—namely, the report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons, and the implications of the acquisition and further development of those weapons for the security and economies of States—my delegation's views are adequately summarized, as in the case of the preceding item, in the draft resolution of the nine States, including Mexico, appearing as document A/C.1/L.413. Hence I wished to read out paragraphs 1 and 2 of that report merely in order to illustrate the reasons why we are convinced that the widest possible publication and circulation of the complete text of the Secretary-General's report [A/6858] will be extremely useful for speeding up the negotiation on disarmament. We feel it would be impossible to exaggerate the importance of giving the most serious reflection to the content of these paragraphs:

"The enormity of the shadow which is cast over mankind by the possibility of nuclear war makes it essential that its effects be clearly and widely understood. It is not enough to know that nuclear weapons add a completely new dimension to man's powers of destruction. Published estimates of the effects of nuclear weapons range all the way from the concept of the total destruction of humanity to the belief that a nuclear war would differ from a conventional conflict, not in kind, but only in scale. The situation, however, is not as arbitrary as opposing generalizations such as these might suggest. There is one inescapable and basic fact. It is that the nuclear armouries which are in being already contain large megaton weapons every one of which has a

destructive power greater than that of all the conventional explosive that has ever been used in warfare since the day gunpowder was discovered. Were such weapons ever to be used in numbers, hundreds of millions of people might be killed, and civilization as we know it, as well as organized community life, would inevitably come to an end in the countries involved in the conflict. Many of those who survived the immediate destruction, as well as others in countries outside the area of conflict, would be exposed to widely-spreading radio-active contamination, and would suffer from long-term effects of irradiation and transmit, to their offspring, a genetic burden which would become manifest in the disabilities of later generations.

"These general propositions, whether set out passionately in scientific studies or directed as propaganda, have been proclaimed so often that their force has all but been lost through repetition. But their reality is none the less so stark that, unless the facts on which they are based are clearly set out, it will not be possible to realize the peril in which mankind now stands."

25. Mr. VINCI (Italy): This year the debate on disarmament has begun under very special circumstances. In the past, it was the practice of the First Committee to give the items related to disarmament priority consideration and to devote to them its undivided attention, at times for five or six weeks. That is a quite understandable practice as it concerns a most vital subject for the peace and security of the world, present and future. This year we find ourselves compelled to squeeze the entire range of problems connected with disarmament into a very short period of time. We should therefore try to make the best use of the few meetings available and to make sure that this debate has a meaningful and constructive outcome. In other words, we should endeavour to conclude on a positive note and to give a fresh momentum to the negotiations in the field of disarmament.

26. We are, of course, fully aware of the circumstances that have led to this development and we cannot underrate the magnitude of the problems involved in the negotiations that are being conducted in Geneva with a view to finding a satisfactory conclusion of the non-proliferation treaty. We do not underrate either the amount of serious and relentless effort made by all members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in order to achieve this purpose. It might nevertheless be disappointing, at least for the majority of the countries here represented which are not in a position to follow closely the deliberations of the disarmament conference in Geneva, that the report submitted by the two co-Chairmen [A/6951-DC/229] should provide so little information. If I am not wrong, that sentiment was expressed yesterday by the representative of Finland. It is true that the interim report is accompanied—I hasten to add—by the assurance that a fuller report, including all relevant documents, will be submitted as soon as possible. As far as my country is concerned, our delegation in Geneva favoured a more comprehensive report even at this late stage.

27. In this connexion, I should like to remark that we saw no reason why the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament could not have been submitted by the Conference as a whole instead of by the two co-

Chairmen, acting on behalf of the Conference. We feel, in fact, that despite the confidence that we have in the authority of the two co-Chairmen, documents of such importance should proceed from the Conference as a whole. For that reason, the Italian representative to the Committee of Eighteen had to reserve the position of his Government.

28. In spite of the lack of time for an extensive discussion a more detailed report—as was wisely pointed out by the representative of Nigeria—would have given to all Member States a better picture of the state of the negotiations and of the prospects in the near future. But *quod defertur non aufertur*: in other words a thing postponed is not taken away. So we do hope that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament will be able to produce the full report it has promised as soon as possible.

29. Now what we have before us are only two substantive reports that we can use as the basis of our deliberations this year: the report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons [A/6858 and Corr.1] and—here I take the liberty, on the basis of the statement that you made, Mr. Chairman, to mention it—the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [A/6817].

30. In these circumstances, it is the duty of each delegation that takes part in this debate to be brief as far as possible and to the point. It is certainly the duty of the members of the First Committee to take advantage of the few remaining working days and seriously to meditate what sort of guidance we want to give to the Disarmament Conference in Geneva; a guidance which must surely be aimed at clarifying its mandate and facilitating the fulfilment of its task.

31. As far as the Italian delegation is concerned, it believes that the General Assembly should request the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to renew its efforts and set in motion again the negotiations for a general and complete disarmament, both nuclear and conventional, under effective international control, as well as collateral measures and the completion of the test-ban treaty so as to cover underground nuclear weapon tests. Very little progress in this field has been made in the last year or two, with the exception, perhaps, of resolution 2222 (XXI), the Treaty prohibiting the placing in orbit of weapons of mass destruction, and the Treaty of Tlatelolco for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America. We do understand and recognize that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had to concentrate on the most urgent task: the treaty on non-proliferation. My country has welcomed the draft treaties<sup>1</sup> submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union, the more so because our delegation in Geneva had long before asked for such a move.

32. We cannot, however, in all frankness, conceal our concern at seeing so very few bright spots in an otherwise

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/230 and Add.1, annex IV, sects. 6 and 8.

dark picture. While the negotiations on disarmament are unavoidably at a standstill, the trend in the world at large seems rather to point to wasteful and costly armament races and the technologically advanced States appear to be engaged in competitive programmes going under the ominous names of anti-missile ballistic weapons systems, or fractional orbital or suborbital bombardment systems. Every day we hear of new machines.

33. This discouraging picture emerges in all its clarity from the report of the Secretary-General [A/6858 and Corr.1]. We are most indebted to him and to the distinguished group of scientists of all nations who concurred in a rare display of unanimity in emphasizing the dangers of an armed world in which a number of nations may be preparing to pass the nuclear threshold.

34. We listened with great interest to the very informative statement of the representative of Sweden [1547th meeting] on the problem of a comprehensive test ban and we do hope that, at least in this instance, the great forward strides made by science could be applied in the field of disarmament rather than to increasing the already well provided military arsenals of the great Powers.

35. In this regard, however, I need not call the attention of the Committee to the basic principles which should govern a treaty on disarmament: principles, by the way, which have for a long time been the official doctrine of the United Nations and were incorporated in the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations issued by the Soviet Union and the United States on 20 September 1961 and further endorsed by the General Assembly at its sixteenth session, by its resolution 1660 (XVI). The fifth of these principles states:

"All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all".<sup>2</sup>

36. In other words, much as we appreciate, encourage and support collateral or specific measures of disarmament intended to reduce tensions and to restore the confidence which is still sadly lacking among the great Powers, we reaffirm that the progress towards disarmament must be pursued on the widest possible front. Namely, nuclear disarmament must be accompanied by conventional disarmament, both under effective international control; and commitments by small Powers to limit their military potential must be accompanied by similar commitments by the greater Powers to stop the armament race, to cease production of fissile material for military purposes as a first step to reducing the nuclear stock-piles already at their disposal.

37. This leads me back to the problem of non-proliferation which has been—and very rightly so—at the very centre of attention of the Disarmament Committee in Geneva. To indicate the point of view of the Italian Government on this problem, I could do no better than to refer my colleagues to the statement made on 11 October this year by the

Chairman of the Italian delegation, Minister Piccioni, before the General Assembly at its 1579th meeting. I hope I will be permitted to quote a few excerpts from that statement:

"... I should like to repeat most firmly and most emphatically that the Italian Government is resolutely opposed to the dissemination of nuclear weapons in any form.

"We are fully aware of the importance for the future of the whole international community of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In fact, we are faced with a fundamental choice between order based on law, and disorder which might degenerate into anarchy and lead eventually to the self-destruction of all mankind. In Italy, I repeat, the Government, Parliament and public opinion are well aware that we must make this choice and are determined to make the right choice. But between the loyal and voluntary acceptance of a principle, which I have no doubt in qualifying as fundamental, and the methods of implementing that principle, much still remains to be done. This is not at all surprising when we consider that we are confronted by a completely new problem for which there are no precedents.

"Before mentioning some of the points which cause us some concern with regard to the proposed methods of implementing a principle which we not only accept unreservedly, but which we will help to implement fully, I should like to emphasize one important point . . .

"... that Italy was the first to formulate at the right time, both at Geneva and at the United Nations, a specific and still valid proposal for a moratorium. That was a proposal under which the non-nuclear Powers would immediately, on a voluntary and unilateral basis, commit themselves to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

"This is an indication . . . that we wish to ensure the maintenance of the *status quo* while we discuss the question and whilst we seek a formula to meet the requirements of all the contracting parties without creating an imbalance in the commitments to be undertaken by the parties and without excluding the possibility of an adequate development in nuclear achievements for peaceful purposes.

"If our proposal for a moratorium is borne in mind, together with the fact that, although among the Powers which are technically capable of becoming nuclear Powers, Italy is certainly the furthest removed from any decision of that kind, the observations which I propose to make may be appreciated in their true light."<sup>3</sup>

38. At the end of the statement the head of our delegation stated:

"In substance . . . let it suffice if I say here that the text of certain articles of the draft treaty submitted at Geneva has still not entirely dispelled some of our doubts on the subject of the commitments to be undertaken by the nuclear Powers with regard to their own future disarmament; on the subject of the period of time to be covered by the treaty, we would like to have an indication of a specific period of time; on the subject of controls, we would like to avoid a situation in which the non-nuclear Powers belonging to EURATOM would find themselves in

<sup>2</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., Twenty-second Session, Plenary Meetings, 1579th meeting, paras. 118-123.



a disadvantageous position; and on the question of research into the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, we would like to avoid being placed in a position of permanent inferiority. In this connexion last summer at Geneva the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Fanfani, submitted a specific and important proposal under which certain quantities of fissile material processed and owned by the nuclear Powers would be reserved for the non-nuclear Powers for peaceful purposes.<sup>4</sup>

39. I should like to address myself to the concluding remarks of the statement made by the Chairman of the Italian delegation which I have just quoted. In order to give the members of the Committee an opportunity to study this specific proposal made by Mr. Fanfani at the Geneva Conference on 1 August, I have requested the Secretary-General to circulate the text of the statement made by my Foreign Minister as a General Assembly document.<sup>5</sup>

40. From this document, as well as from the records of our debates here, in Geneva, and elsewhere, the position of my country appears, I believe, quite clear. May I resume it in a few words. Our basic concept is prompted by the conviction that, in the present world, there is no alternative to peace, there is no alternative to disarmament. They are both a must. Disarmament is necessary in order to release the increasing means we need for the future peaceful battles: to defeat hunger, to defeat diseases. Without these means we will be unable to meet the rising expectations of the peoples throughout the world which demand better conditions of living, better education and social justice.

41. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva is still actively considering the draft treaty on non-proliferation submitted by the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. A number of proposals and amendments have been submitted for the attention of the Conference. Other views and other suggestions are emerging from the present debate which has given and will give Member States not represented in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament an opportunity to participate, although indirectly, in the common effort made in Geneva.

42. We believe that it is the duty of the General Assembly, at this stage, to request the Eighteen-Nation Conference on Disarmament to continue to give urgent consideration to the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons with a view to reaching a satisfactory conclusion. We believe we ought to reaffirm a principle, already stressed in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965, that the treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations on the part of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers and that it should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament. We believe also that the negotiating Powers in Geneva should, in their further work, take into full account the amendments and proposals submitted by various delegations, as well as the views and suggestions expressed at the twenty-first session of the General Assembly.

43. As we have already indicated, we hope that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee will be able to bring the negotiations on the treaty to a speedy conclusion.

44. In this connexion, I should like to recall the specific reference to the non-proliferation treaty made in the messages exchanged by satellite between the President of the United States of America and the President of the Italian Republic two weeks ago, on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the first nuclear chain reaction produced by Enrico Fermi, the greatest Italian scientist. In those messages, President Johnson publicly announced the decision of the United States to submit to the safeguards of a treaty on non-proliferation all peaceful American nuclear activities. President Saragat welcomed such a step and said that, should other nuclear-weapon Powers follow the same example, as he sincerely hoped they would, it would represent a decisive contribution towards the conclusion of the treaty.

45. But at the same time we feel, having in mind all the circumstances, some of which I have just mentioned, that it would be unwise to press for undue haste, as would be the case if the General Assembly—for instance—set too short a term for the presentation of the report. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is of such vital importance for world peace and its implications—military, economic and all others—so far-reaching for each single country that we cannot spoil the chances of a fully satisfactory and effective working treaty which will stand the test of time, just for the sake of gaining time. A few months more—after years of negotiations and compared with the long duration of the treaty to be agreed upon—is of little or no importance if we set our minds on the objectives which should be common to all the Member States: to improve the conditions of an imperfect world.

46. We believe, finally, that the non-proliferation treaty, once concluded, should be submitted for approval to the General Assembly. It is our considered opinion that the resolution concluding our work on disarmament should reiterate some of the main guidelines approved in the past sessions and reflect some of the views expressed in our meetings, especially on matters of safeguards and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

47. I believe that the views I have just expressed imply—at least in substance—our preliminary consideration of the draft resolution which has just been circulated and which the representative of Mexico has just mentioned. Of course, my delegation would like to reserve its position on this draft resolution [A/C.1/L.416], until we have studied the text very carefully and thoroughly.

48. Before concluding, I should like to make a few remarks on the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [A/6817] which is the result of a most serious and constructive effort made last summer by the eleven-nation committee under the chairmanship of the Permanent Representative of Kenya, Ambassador Nabwera.

49. Let me say, in the first place, that despite initial misgivings as to the purpose of resolution 2153 B (XXI) and especially as to the possibility of reconciling the

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 124.

<sup>5</sup> Subsequently distributed as document A/C.1/955.

proposed Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States with the existing machinery for negotiating a treaty on non-proliferation, we have never underestimated the concern of those delegations, mostly from Afro-Asian countries, which sponsored and supported the draft resolution; we knew that they meant to explore new ways and new methods to reach the same goals that the Powers represented at Geneva are pursuing.

50. Indeed, the three questions which, so to speak, represent the terms of reference of the proposed Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon Powers—namely, how can the security of non-nuclear States best be assured; how may non-nuclear Powers co-operate among themselves in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons; how can nuclear devices be used exclusively for peaceful purposes—all these terms are very present in our minds and maintain their validity today, thirteen months after the day on which resolution 2153 B (XXI) was adopted.

51. We feel, moreover, that the terms of reference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and the objectives set forth in resolution 2153 B (XXI) are not contradictory.

52. It may well be—and indeed we hope so—that two of the three questions proposed to the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States—those of the security and the co-operation of non-nuclear States—will be satisfactorily solved in Geneva in the context of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and then submitted for the approval of the General Assembly, but we would see no harm in having the non-nuclear-weapon Powers voice their views. On the contrary, those views could contribute to a great extent in improving the draft of a treaty which is meant to shape the connotations of a world of peace and security for all.

53. There is, finally, the third question, namely, how to reconcile the provisions of a treaty prohibiting the manufacture of nuclear weapons with the need to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes. This is a question which may not be fully covered by the treaty.

54. We have in mind the recent debate on the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. The approach to the problem which is valid in a specific area of the world—an approach, incidentally, which has been challenged by certain Powers—may or may not be applicable or useful in other areas of the world.

55. We feel that over and above what may be decided in Geneva, the problem of the peaceful use of nuclear energy and, in particular, of nuclear explosion should be further considered among non-nuclear Powers, especially the developing countries, as the impact on their destinies and on the economic progress of their populations could be of paramount importance, if not fundamental.

56. A workable solution, which I believe has already been suggested, could consist of a commitment from the nuclear-weapon Powers to supply—of course, through an appropriate international agency and agreed procedures—the services and facilities required for such peaceful explosions.

57. I have mentioned only one of the matters concerning non-nuclear-weapon Powers, and especially the developing countries. But there are many others. To save time I will not deal with them at this stage. That is why we feel that the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon Powers may serve a very useful purpose even when—and we all hope it will be soon—a treaty on non-proliferation comes closer to its conclusion.

58. We do not propose at this time to suggest a formula which could accommodate the different views emerging in this Committee and still make sure that the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States takes place in time—I mean on a date which can be of some use, in the first place for the developing countries. Many factors, beginning from the duration of the present session of the General Assembly, are unknown. According to the usual practice, we believe that this can best be done through private consultations among members of the Committee.

59. The Italian delegation will be ready to offer its contribution to a formula that takes into account the remarks I have just made.

60. Mr. RAKOTOMALALA (Madagascar) (*translated from French*): My delegation shares the view that it is regrettable that the documentation which should have served as a basis for our present discussion is not available. But our disappointment is somewhat alleviated by the indications in the interim report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to the effect that great progress has been made with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The report also states that the debate on the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests proved useful.

61. Without wishing to be unduly optimistic, we feel that the discussions in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament are starting out on the right foot. Furthermore, the Committee should remain in session to continue and speed up its work.

62. My delegation had occasion last year to state its views on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons [*1444th meeting*] and the elimination of military bases in African, Asian and Latin American countries [*1467th meeting*]. It is our deliberate intention, therefore, not to take up those two subjects during the current session. We should first like to be informed of the results of their examination by the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

63. At the present stage, my delegation will therefore confine itself to referring briefly to general and complete disarmament and to the need for the prompt suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests.

64. With regard to disarmament, let me state at once that the arms race is an utter absurdity. In support of this statement, I should like to illustrate the futility of armaments.

65. Until recently the possession of powerful stocks of weapons undoubtedly gave certain advantages to a State, for example, in seeing that it received its just deserts or in safeguarding its national security. It must be recognized

today, however, not only that the concept of resort to arms to ensure justice which prevailed twenty years or so ago has become obsolete and is tending to disappear both from international practice and from international terminology, but also, indeed above all, that no military defence system, however perfect, at any rate as the state of knowledge stands today, would preserve the country possessing it from the devastation an adversary could inflict on it. There is only deterrence and reprisal; thus since the belligerent is not entirely and effectively protected, the situation can only be called one of mutual destruction. The absurdity of the arms race and the futility of armaments is manifest. We are convinced that man has crossed the threshold of the era predicted by Louis Pasteur when he said, over a hundred years ago, that the progress of science would one day make war impossible.

66. We hope that all nations appreciate the dilemma in which man's discoveries have placed them. The dilemma was very well described by the late lamented Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, as coexistence or co-destruction.

67. The difficulties standing in the way of general and complete disarmament would appear *a priori* to originate in the different concepts and methods advocated by the two sides. This is true in part, but an honest analysis of the facts confirms that there is an essential outstanding factor which appeared after the Second World War and continues to hamper all progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective control.

68. As I indicated in this Committee during the debate on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons [1536th meeting], while all of us are motivated by the same desire to achieve general and complete disarmament, the state of mind which prevailed during the initial post-war period has not completely disappeared as yet.

69. My delegation is convinced that efforts must be directed towards this aspect of the subject also, so as to replace suspicion by trust and mutual understanding; for we have reason to believe that if the present fever remains at the level it has reached lately, the inevitable climax will be the end of the world—a nuclear war which would destroy the human race and all civilization.

70. We are well aware that the situation in which we now find ourselves is not calculated to help us to achieve our aims because, even if we are conscious of the danger inherent in modern armaments and even if we were anxious to get rid of them, mutual trust is as yet non-existent in inter-State relations. In the absence of this motive force, this stimulus, we are constrained to turn towards methods which will furnish us with the means of verifying each other's good faith and sincerity from time to time. This could only be done in the present circumstances piecemeal, by partial steps which would enable each of us to assess the behaviour of any nation in respect of a stage agreed on in advance. Further stages would be envisaged in the light of the extent to which States respected or failed to respect the agreements reached. Caution would suggest, of course, that in the event of violation by a State or group of States, the other States should not be exposed to dangerous situations at each successive stage.

71. This procedure might seem desperately slow, but at least we should move forward resolutely towards our common goal.

72. Thus my delegation has always welcomed and continues to welcome and view with keen interest all piecemeal partial measures calculated initially to reduce armaments prior to their prohibition one day.

73. I should now like to explain briefly why my delegation intends to co-sponsor the draft resolution submitted by the Hungarian delegation [A/C.1/L.412]. My country's attitude is dictated by the fact that in response to the appeal by the General Assembly it acceded to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. I need not explain our attitude, which is based on human feelings which I am sure all delegations here share. My country regards war in any form as frightful; we must avoid anything that can make it more so.

74. With regard to the question of the "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests", my delegation reiterates here that it welcomed with a sense of relief the measures which henceforward will govern the activities of States in outer space, under water and, just recently, in outer space; but it will be recalled that in resolution 2163 (XXI) the General Assembly requested the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament *inter alia* to elaborate a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests. It is disappointing to find that the reaction of the nuclear Powers to that request was not as had been hoped.

75. Perhaps it would be well to analyse briefly the obstacles raised thus far. Emphasis has always been placed on the absence of effective control. But the control argument does not stand up to the analysis made by others of scientific progress today. It is therefore legitimate to question the real reasons why the nuclear Powers cannot agree to ban underground tests. Is this not a pretence of disagreement which enables the States concerned, already bound by the Moscow Treaty, to continue their tests in environments not covered by the Treaty? We hope we are mistaken in asserting that there can be no other significant reason.

76. The fact is that for one reason or another, States are still not prepared to abandon the notion of the arms race, which we have already shown to be futile and absurd.

77. We exhort the nuclear Powers to reconsider their individual attitude and to give further thought to the conclusions reached by scientists and experts from all parts of the world on the effects of nuclear tests. It is pointless to argue that the effects of the tests carried out since 1964 are relatively slight. Who among us can state that the present level of radio-activity in the atmosphere since nuclear explosions began presents no danger for posterity? As everyone knows, radiation affects heredity most of all.

78. Moreover, the fourth report of the United Nations Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation<sup>6</sup> made it

<sup>6</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/6314).



quite clear that nuclear tests are the main source of radio-active contamination on a world scale.

79. On the other hand, my country declares itself in favour of any experiments designed to put nuclear power at the disposal of all nations, large and small, for peaceful purposes.

80. Madagascar, like many other countries, unfortunately, does not possess large conventional power resources. Nuclear energy is our great hope for more prosperous days in the future and for use as one of the means of developing our industry, our agriculture and our whole economy. In the interests of the less-favoured nations, we must see to it that restrictions on the use of the atom for military purposes do not in any way curb the research and experiments needed to harness the atom for the betterment of mankind, not for his destruction—for life, not for death.

81. In conclusion I should like to express the hope that the nuclear Powers will continue their efforts to eliminate tests anywhere and to bring about general and complete disarmament, which is the essential condition for a lasting peace.

82. Mr. EL-BOURI (Libya) (*translated from French*): The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament informs us in its interim report of 7 December 1967 that in accordance with the recommendations contained in General Assembly resolution 2153 A (XXI), it has undertaken a thorough study of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and that good progress has already been made, even though it has not been able to produce a final draft. Since it concentrated mainly on the preparation of a non-proliferation treaty, the Eighteen-Nation Committee was unable to devote sufficient time to the other items on its agenda.

83. My delegation is alive to the importance of drawing up a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and we are happy to have this opportunity to congratulate the Eighteen-Nation Committee on the genuine efforts it is making to find a compromise likely to lead to agreement and at the same time meet the demands of the non-nuclear countries.

84. However, we cannot hide our disappointment at noting once more that a year has gone by without any progress being made in the direction of general and complete disarmament.

85. The absence of a report will not prevent my delegation from offering a few brief comments in the hope of making its weak voice heard. It is the voice of all the small, weak nations of the world which had been confident that the United Nations, in accordance with one of its basic objectives, would be capable through general disarmament of effectively establishing the kind of peace indispensable for their stability and their social and economic prosperity.

86. Ever since the United Nations was founded, general and complete disarmament has been the focus of man's concern. The maintenance of international peace and security is closely linked to disarmament. If in this atomic age the United Nations failed in its duty and disappointed

the hopes placed in it, that would spell the end not only of the United Nations itself but perhaps of the whole world.

87. Without in any way underestimating the danger which conventional weapons involve, for twenty years nuclear weapons have been the main focus of the efforts of the United Nations to find common ground among the differing views of the great Powers on nuclear disarmament. With the exception of the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963, the Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space [*resolution 2222 (XXI), annex*] and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America [*A/C.1/946*], no significant progress has been made in this field in spite of all the efforts made by the Eighteen-Nation Committee over the last six years. On the contrary, nuclear-weapon tests have continued under ground, and nuclear weapons have progressed in quality and quantity alike. In practice, the Treaty which gave rise to such great hopes in 1963 has been able neither to stop nor to slow down the arms race.

88. In 1963 the two super-Powers regarded themselves as the only ones that possessed nuclear weapons and thought they had the exclusive responsibility for supervising and maintaining peace in the world by holding the balance of fear; today the situation is very different. Other Powers have joined the nuclear club and continue to develop and perfect their nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. At the same time, other States have acquired and developed for peaceful purposes atomic reactors which could in case of necessity be transformed into producers of atom bombs. Experts on the subject speak of six or seven States which within two or three years will probably have their own atom bombs. The number might increase, while it is distinctly possible that the countries which have made progress in nuclear technology for peaceful purposes will also embark on the construction of nuclear weapons for the sake of their national security and to acquire status and power in a world racked by fear and terror.

89. Thus, mankind lives aghast in the apprehension of a nuclear conflict that could be unleashed by one of those foolish accidents of which history has an all-too gloomy tradition.

90. We are most grateful to the Secretary-General and the groups of experts who have submitted to us, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2162 A (XXI), their report of 10 October 1967 [*A/6858*] on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons.

91. At a time when the peace and security of the world are threatened in various places over the globe, and when the concept of force as a means of settling international conflicts or of realizing political or territorial ambitions is beginning to gain ground, the solemn warnings by the Secretary-General and the experts who wrote the report deserve our full attention and reflexion and indeed our utmost gratitude.

92. The experts who worked on this significant report represent all the continents concerned, all the political and

economic systems of our many sided world, and they are unanimously agreed as to the disastrous consequences a nuclear conflagration would have on our planet. In the introduction to the report, they state as follows:

"There is one inescapable and basic fact. It is that the nuclear armouries which are in being already contain large megaton weapons every one of which has a destructive power greater than that of all the conventional explosive that has ever been used in warfare since the day gunpowder was discovered. Were such weapons ever to be used in numbers, hundreds of millions of people might be killed, and civilization as we know it, as well as organized community life, would inevitably come to an end in the countries involved in the conflict. Many of those who survived the immediate destruction, as well as others in countries outside the area of conflict, would be exposed to widely-spreading radio-active contamination, and would suffer from long-term effects of irradiation and transmit, to their offspring, a genetic burden which would become manifest in the disabilities of later generations."

93. The representative of Sweden made a penetrating analysis of the report and aptly illustrated its contents [1547th meeting].

94. This gloomy prospect of self-destruction of everything that the genius of man has achieved on the earth in the course of thousands of years impels small nations like my own to take part in this debate in order to assert their need for peace—a need felt by all the peoples of the world, for in spite of all their differences and contradictions they are united in one common desire: to live in peace, without fear or terror.

95. The report has helped to enlighten public opinion regarding the various aspects of the acquisition, possession and proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as their economic implications. It has enabled us to understand and gauge more accurately the danger to which the world is exposed.

96. The balance of fear, or the deterrent force, which has thus far ensured a certain stability between the two super-Powers, is dealt with at some length in the report; it analyses the advantages and drawbacks of that policy and arrives at the following conclusion, to be found in paragraph 41 of the report:

"But the fact that a state of mutual nuclear deterrence prevails between the Super Powers does not, as we know all too well, prevent the outbreak of wars with conventional weapons, involving both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon nations; the risk of nuclear war remains as long as there are nuclear weapons."

97. A mere glance over the world today shows that local wars have broken out in various parts of the globe in the course of the past twenty years. Hatred, resentment, the desire to be top dog and to dominate by force and violence, and new wars of expansion still dominate the international scene and further aggravate the already precarious state of world peace. It is unthinkable that a non-nuclear-weapon nation living in a state of hostility with a neighbouring country and possessing atomic weapons should not alarm that neighbour and spur it on to acquire the same kind of

weapons so as to safeguard its own national security. There is no doubt that the danger and the perpetration of local wars could drag the whole world into a nuclear war, with all its tragic consequences.

98. My delegation has co-sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/L.413, because it is convinced that until all peoples are fully aware of the inherent danger of nuclear weapons, we cannot expect any appreciable progress along the thorny path to nuclear disarmament.

99. In the light of the urgent need to make real progress towards nuclear disarmament, my delegation ventures to hope that the obstacles that have prevented the Eighteen-Nation Committee from concluding its negotiations on the preparation of a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by the end of the twenty-second session can be overcome and that the spirit of conciliation which has marked the negotiations between the two super-Powers can be maintained, in the interests not only of those Powers themselves but of all mankind.

100. There is no doubt that an international agreement banning the proliferation of nuclear weapons, accompanied or followed immediately by an agreement on the total prohibition of nuclear tests, would constitute an important step forward on the long and difficult road to general and complete disarmament. According to indications in the General Assembly itself, those two questions seem to be the most urgent and the most likely to secure the agreement of the nuclear Powers.

101. My delegation shares the view of the Swedish delegation on the need for the Eighteen-Nation Committee to examine, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2163 (XXI), the question of an agreement prohibiting underground tests at the same time as the proliferation of nuclear weapons. For this reason my delegation will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/L.414.

102. Finally, the cessation of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the total prohibition of nuclear tests, the destruction of existing stockpiles, and the complete liquidation of nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them are in keeping with the common desire of all mankind to be delivered from that terrifying weapon and its disastrous effects. Such salutary measures would in addition enable the vast resources now devoted to the production of those deadly weapons to be used for the social and economic progress of the underdeveloped nations and to bridge the gap between the wealthy and the wretched on this earth.

103. Statistics speak of \$130,000 million swallowed up each year by armaments, at a time when nearly two thirds of the world lacks bread, medical supplies and education. If part of that amount were devoted to supporting efforts to improve the living conditions of the poorer peoples, many of the causes of international tension and war would be eliminated.

104. The CHAIRMAN: Before calling on the next speaker, I should like to inform the Committee that Denmark has become a co-sponsor of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.416.

105. Mr. DHAR (India): It is a matter of regret that, in the last week of this session of the General Assembly, the

Committee has been obliged to start consideration of the disarmament questions, which have a great bearing on the future of mankind. We would have wished that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had submitted its report in good time to enable us to examine in depth all disarmament items before us.

106. We are disappointed at the lack of progress in the field of disarmament, but we are considerably more concerned and apprehensive that the arms race is spiralling upwards, taking an ever-increasing share of the world's wealth and causing a sense of helplessness and gloom everywhere. The continuing sophistication and stockpiling of nuclear and other weapons, while consuming the scarce resources of the world, is increasing fear and tension and is also bringing us nearer to the danger of nuclear war. This arms race has not ensured the security of States. On the contrary, it threatens humanity with the grave and unprecedented danger of total destruction.

107. There are disquieting reports regarding development of the fractional orbital bombing system capable of sudden attack from relatively low altitude and the further development of anti-ballistic missile systems. Today we have seen reports in the newspapers regarding the latest addition to the list of deadly and formidable weapons—the "space bus"—a further sophistication of MIR vehicles, that is multiple, independently targeted, re-entry vehicles. We are told that a "space bus" fired by a single missile, could carry many individual re-entry vehicles with thermonuclear warheads. Each warhead could be delivered to a different city, or if desired, all can be delivered within one city, that is, what has been explained as "multi-city bombardment by a single missile". We are deeply concerned by the fact that the Powers concerned have not been able to come to an understanding to initiate steps to contain this unfortunate and totally undesirable increase in the level of "terror weapons" which is acting as a spur for further increase and perfection of such weapons, and thus considerably increasing the danger of a nuclear holocaust, by accident or design. This, in our view, is a suicidal course to adopt for the super-Powers. Nevertheless, we feel sure that the collective wisdom of the international community should enable us to work out measures which would call on the States particularly involved in this continuing arms race to put an end to it.

108. In this context, my delegation would like to refer to the admirable report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of those weapons. My delegation joins others in congratulating the consultants for their valuable contribution to this study.

109. The report has brought out in a telling manner that the effort to maintain a state of nuclear deterrence has demanded the expenditure of vast resources and, paradoxically, far from increasing the sense of security, has at times engendered a sense of insecurity. It has been stated in the report that:

"Short of mutual agreement, it is a race which has no end, and one which leads not to a uniform state of security but, as has been said, to phases of major insecurity which alternate with periods in which relative security seems assured." [A/6858 and Corr.1, para. 80.]

The message is quite clear. The sense of insecurity and fear will increase and not abate unless serious steps are taken to change the present drift towards the arms race.

110. The report has thus indicated to us, with clarity and precision, that the so-called balance of nuclear deterrence is unstable and does not give any sense of real security. The report has stated that:

"Security for all countries of the world must be sought through the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons." [Ibid., para. 91.]

We firmly believe that the only sane course open to us is to seek security which is lasting and real and which is not dependent on the concept of deterrence.

111. The report makes out most logically and unmistakably the case for putting an immediate halt to the nuclear arms race which, because of the prevailing mistrust among nations and the action-reaction phenomenon, seems to be completely getting out of hand. The catastrophic effects of the use of such lethal weapons are more and more widely realized. The report has made a signal contribution by highlighting the grim consequences of the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons, including the somatic and genetic effects. The report refers to the horrifying experience of the first ever use of nuclear weapons in war in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and makes projections on the basis of available knowledge of the possible use of nuclear weapons in future wars.

112. Without any effort at exaggerating the peril in which mankind now stands in the face of a possible outbreak of nuclear war, the report brings out the most basic elements in the situation. It states:

"There is one inescapable and basic fact. It is that the nuclear armouries which are in being already contain large megaton weapons every one of which has a destructive power greater than that of all the conventional explosive that has ever been used in warfare since the day gunpowder was discovered. Were such weapons ever to be used in numbers, hundreds of millions of people might be killed, and civilization as we know it, as well as organized community life, would inevitably come to an end in the countries involved in the conflict." [Ibid., para. 1.]

113. The report goes on to say that the survivors either in countries affected by the conflict or outside the area of conflict would suffer from long-term effects of irradiation and transmit to their offspring a genetic burden which would become manifest in the disabilities of later generations. The report notes that there is no real defence against nuclear weapons.

114. It is ironic that economic and material resources which could be used for relieving the evils of poverty and distress all over the world are now being harnessed to the further development of deadly nuclear arsenals. The report has convincingly underlined what the developing countries have all along been urging, that:

"... the immense resources devoted to their production could instead be used, according to the expressed aim of the United Nations, 'to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom'." [Ibid., para. 43.]

115. The report also most eloquently points out how, in the nuclear arms race, the fear of obsolescence alone is leading rival countries to spend increasingly large sums of money, costing mankind vast resources which it can ill afford to waste.

116. I would now like to make a brief mention of the question of general and complete disarmament. The consistent position which India has taken on the question of disarmament over the last twenty years would make it clear that India firmly believes that agreement on general and complete disarmament, under effective international control, should be concluded as expeditiously as possible. In our view, disarmament must extend to the prohibition of the manufacture, storage and use of nuclear, thermonuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and must also bring about the progressive elimination of conventional weapons. India has always attached great importance to the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles and made a proposal to this effect as early as 1957, as, in our view, it was simpler to deal with carriers than with nuclear weapons, and also because, if delivery vehicles were eliminated, the nuclear weapon's capacity for harm would be greatly reduced. It is, however, obvious that complete disarmament cannot be achieved at one stroke. It can be realized only in regulated and balanced stages so as to ensure that during the progress of disarmament neither side gains military advantage over the other.

117. I should now like to turn to an important item on our agenda, namely, the question of the "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests". We are unhappy to note that in spite of the fact that last year's resolution 2163 (XXI) asked the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to elaborate without further delay a treaty banning underground tests, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee has not been able to give this question the consideration it deserves. Since the signing of the Moscow test-ban Treaty in 1963 it had been the fervent hope of India that the Treaty would be adhered to by all States, but, unfortunately, this has not materialized. It is a matter of concern that nuclear tests are being conducted in the atmosphere by two non-signatories to the Treaty. It seems to have been forgotten that the partial test-ban Treaty is an extremely fragile arrangement and cannot endure for long if it is not universally adhered to and if its five-year-old commitment for disarmament and for prohibiting underground weapon tests remains only a platitude.

118. India has always attached the greatest importance to the banning of nuclear tests in all environments. Apart from the nuclear tests being conducted in the atmosphere by two non-signatories to the Treaty, underground tests are continuing at a greater tempo in spite of the historic resolution 1762 (XVII) which condemned all nuclear weapon tests. As the Secretary-General has stated in the introduction to his annual report:

"The Soviet Union and the United States seem to have accelerated the rate of underground testing." [A/6701/Add.1, para. 17.]

Such underground tests are obviously conducted in order to seek new and improved offensive and defensive missiles, thus adding momentum to the nuclear arms race.

119. While India has maintained that a comprehensive test-ban treaty should be concluded as a matter of urgency, it is also of the view that, pending the conclusion of such a treaty, nuclear Powers should agree to discontinue nuclear weapon tests. It had, therefore, supported suggestions for a formal treaty banning underground tests above an agreed seismic level. It was contemplated that the threshold would subsequently be lowered as progress was made in techniques of detection and identification. We have also supported the Swedish proposal for verification by challenge, as well as the proposal regarding improvement of detection techniques through international co-operation in seismic detection.

120. We are happy to note that in the report of the Secretary-General, to which I have referred frequently, it is stated that:

"A comprehensive test ban treaty, prohibiting the underground testing of nuclear devices, would also contribute to the objectives of non-proliferation and would clearly help to slow down the nuclear arms race." [A/6858 and Corr.1, para. 92.]

121. Resolution 2032 (XX) also points out the crucial importance of a comprehensive test ban to the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This view has been consistently advocated by us. To focus attention on this urgent and important matter, my delegation has co-sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/L.414 and Add.1. We hope that it will get the unanimous support of the membership of the Committee.

122. Before concluding, I should like to refer again to the Secretary-General's report and to stress that it has underlined the dangers posed by the nuclear arms race, without making any artificial distinction, as is done by some Powers, between the existing and further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The report has neither minimized the dangers from one aspect of the nuclear arms race nor has it exaggerated those flowing from the other aspect. It has dealt with the problem of the nuclear arms race as a single whole. It has talked of both the aspects of this arms race together—that is, vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is stated in the report that:

"The solution of the problem of ensuring security cannot be found in an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons or, indeed, in the retention of nuclear weapons by the Powers currently possessing them. An agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons as recommended by the United Nations, freely negotiated and genuinely observed, would therefore be a powerful step in the right direction, as would also an agreement on the reduction of existing nuclear arsenals." [Ibid., para. 91.]

123. It is the firm view of the Indian delegation that a treaty on non-proliferation should reflect these views and, more particularly, it should be in conformity with the principles laid down in resolution 2028 (XX), which was reaffirmed in resolution 2153 A (XXI), so that the treaty is acceptable to all concerned and satisfactory to the international community.

124. The position of the Indian delegation on this question has been stated in this Committee on a number of

occasions: for example, at the 1436th and 1443rd meetings. Therefore, we do not propose to put forward our views and suggestions in this regard at any length at this juncture, particularly as the full report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, including all relevant documents, has not yet come before the Committee. Nevertheless, we should like to emphasize again that an acceptable and satisfactory treaty on non-proliferation should prevent three aspects of proliferation: first, an increase in nuclear arsenals; second, a spread of nuclear weapons over the world, and, third, an increase in the number of nuclear weapon Powers. An acceptable and effective treaty, therefore, is one which prohibits existing proliferation among nuclear-weapon Powers, the dissemination of nuclear weapons and weapon technology from one country to another, and further or possible proliferation among hitherto non-nuclear-weapon Powers.

125. The Indian delegation has often referred to the principles mentioned in resolution 2028 (XX) and indicated how they should be given practical shape in an international instrument. Even at the risk of repetition, I should like to recapitulate the main features of resolution 2028 (XX).

126. The first principle has stipulated, *inter alia*, that the treaty should not permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate. The second principle has stated explicitly that the treaty should have within its body a balance of mutual responsibility and obligations on the part of both the nuclear and the non-nuclear-weapon Powers. The third principle requires that the treaty should be a step towards disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament. The fourth principle asks us to ensure that the provisions in the treaty based on these principles and incorporating them should be effective and not remain merely an expression of intent or goodwill. In parentheses, I should like to mention that the non-aligned delegations have placed special emphasis on the principle of balance and on the principle that the treaty should be a step towards nuclear disarmament. The fifth principle lays down that all measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain a military advantage, and security is ensured for all.

127. It is our firm conviction that any measure which gives tacit license to a small group of States to develop and augment its nuclear weapons is in fundamental contradiction with these principles and purposes.

128. We have stated previously that a treaty on non-proliferation should not deny development of technology to non-nuclear-weapon States in the field of nuclear explosions for peaceful objectives. The benefits of science and technology should be available to the developing countries, and any proposal for the establishment of a super-commercial monopoly by nuclear weapon Powers in this field would be unacceptable. In this connexion we have read with attention and interest the news of the world's first commercial thermonuclear explosion—called "Project Gasbuggy"—a mile underground in New Mexico. Thus a beginning has been made and we should expect progressive improvement in the techniques used and results obtained by such experiments. It is our view that non-nuclear-weapon States should not be denied the legitimate right to conduct such explosions, exclusively for peaceful purposes.

129. Finally, I should like to conclude by making again a reference to the Secretary-General's report. In our view, the report has made a most serious contribution to the efforts now being made to bring the nuclear arms race to heel and deserves to be studied not only by Governments and experts, but by people all over the world. With this in view, we have co-sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/L.413 and Add.1-2, which we hope will meet with the whole-hearted approval of the Committee.

130. The CHAIRMAN: Before proceeding, I should like to consult the Committee about the progress which we have achieved until now. The names of ten more speakers are inscribed on the list. If we continue until eight o'clock, we may be able to hear all those speakers, in which case the night meeting could be cancelled. Therefore, if representatives are prepared to remain until eight o'clock, the necessary arrangements can be made.

131. Since I hear no objection, I take it that the Committee agrees to continue this meeting until eight o'clock.

132. Secondly, the representative of Hungary has asked for the floor to make a statement for clarification purposes.

133. Since I hear no objection, I shall call on the representative of Hungary, before giving the floor to the next speaker in the general debate.

134. Mr. CSATORDAY (Hungary): I wish to make only a short statement on a procedural matter.

135. During this morning's meeting, I made a statement in which some of my words were misunderstood by the representative of Malta, and he made reference to them this morning. I regret very much that he is not paying attention, because I wanted to clarify the situation for him, but perhaps it will be useful for other members of the Committee to know the basis of the misunderstanding.

136. The representative of Malta submitted the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.411/Rev.1 this morning. In my statement I mentioned that the draft resolution had an author, and some silent co-sponsors. This is a revised draft text which was submitted after amendments had been proposed by the representative of the Netherlands in document A/C.1/L.415, and those amendments have been incorporated in the revised draft resolution. Despite that fact, the representative of Malta felt offended and he riposted in a completely unwarranted and uncalled for way by saying that it might have been "a slip of the tongue" [1550th meeting, para. 131].

137. Usually, when a revised text is submitted, it is the text of the sponsor or the sponsors submitting it. If amendments are included in a certain text, then usually the sponsor of the amendment becomes a co-sponsor of the newly amended text. In this case, I had in mind the hidden or silent co-sponsor of the delegation of the Netherlands. I do not know whether Malta has someone else in mind. I only thought of the delegation of the Netherlands, and that was the only reason why I mentioned the author or silent co-sponsor, because the Netherlands delegation was not mentioned in the revised draft resolution.



138. I felt it necessary to explain that point because I am of the opinion that we need co-operation in this Committee and I cherish very much the co-operative spirit which exists between the representative of Malta and myself. I do not want to introduce any element of irritation into our co-operation, and my expression was used without any hostile intent. I hope that we shall be able to eliminate that misunderstanding and co-operate in the future as well.

139. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The question of military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America is becoming daily more acute and must be solved without further delay. This is made plain by numerous facts and events.

140. Thus, according to the latest reports in the United States press, the United States now has more troops in Viet-Nam than it had in Korea during the Korean War.

141. If we take into account the fact that, over and above the troops stationed in the territory of Viet-Nam itself, the United States maintains other sizable contingents on its many bases in other countries of South-East Asia, and if we then add the United States Fleet cruising in that region, we shall find that the United States is waging war against the Viet-Nameese people on an even larger scale than would at first appear.

142. The United States armed forces are engaging in open aggression in fighting their cruel and barbarous war in Viet-Nam. This aggression against the Viet-Nameese people is being supported from United States military bases in Thailand, Okinawa and other areas of South-East Asia, the Pacific Ocean and the Far East. These are facts obvious and familiar to all. They alone suffice to justify the demand of the peace-loving peoples of the world that military bases in foreign territory should be dismantled. They also reveal the reason why military bases should have been established and maintained in the territory of other States in the first place.

143. The chain of United States military bases overseas is by no means confined to South-East Asia. The United States has over 2,000 military outposts in the territories of other States, including some colossal installations. The bases situated in the vicinity of Viet-Nam and in Viet-Nam itself are being made use of in the bloody war against the Viet-Nameese people. The bases in those parts of the world where the guns, for the time being, are silent, nevertheless are also a sinister presence. All these bases are links in the same chain and serve the same purpose.

144. The position of the Soviet Union as regards the elimination of foreign military bases rests on principle and is entirely consistent. Together with all other peace-loving States, we urge that these bases, set up by certain members of Western military blocs, should be dismantled with the least delay.

145. The Soviet Union has repeatedly made proposals in the General Assembly, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and other bodies, calling for the elimination of military bases in the territory of other States anywhere in the world. As a first step towards a solution of the entire problem of foreign military bases, the USSR Government

has proposed the dismantlement of foreign military bases in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The Soviet Union is thus engaged in a struggle for the elimination of such bases. Why? Primarily because military bases in foreign territory are a source of international tension and a threat of war.

146. To put it in another way, each such base is a focus of potential war, the kind of war now sweeping over South-East Asia. Who, after all, sets up military bases in the territories of other States, and to what end? Those who believe in settling international problems in their own favour by main force, those who are convinced that they can compel other peoples to obey them—those who regard armed force as the highest argument, overriding the arguments of reason.

147. It is clear the foreign military bases are set up in order to make other peoples bow to one's will. I am not speaking only of the people in whose territory the base is installed and whose policies it directly influences. The peoples of the neighbouring countries as well must sometimes take the presence of the base into account.

148. This situation creates a serious threat to the maintenance of international peace and security, as it does to the national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of States.

149. The existence of military bases in foreign territory is therefore incompatible with normal relations among States or with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Such bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America are, in addition, a powerful tool in the hands of colonialist and neo-colonialist forces. Many of them are a legacy of colonial empires, and the part they play today differs little from the part they played when colonialism was at its height. They are the outposts and bastions of those who would impose their will on liberated peoples and compel them to follow a policy not of their own choosing.

150. It suffices to recall, in this connexion, the endless acts of provocation and the sinister role of the military bases in the history of the struggle against the national liberation movement of the African peoples and the attempts to prevent them from attaining their independence. It suffices to recall the fight for independence of the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the peoples of the Portuguese colonies, to name no other.

151. Together with all other peace-loving States, the Soviet Union has repeatedly and forcefully supported Cuba's demand that the United States military base at Guantanamo should be dismantled at once. What purpose does that base serve, other than presenting a constant threat to the Cuban people? Does it not exist in order to hinder the Cuban people from exercising its sovereign rights as laid down in the United Nations Charter? Does not its maintenance provide a weapon for constant interference in Cuba's internal affairs?

152. The Soviet Union's proposals concerning the elimination of foreign military bases in countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America are prompted by an earnest desire to strengthen international peace and national independence and to secure the liberation of peoples still fighting for their

freedom. No State that is truly concerned with maintaining a lasting peace and promoting international co-operation can remain indifferent to the attainment of these goals.

153. Moreover, leaving these lofty goals aside, the peoples of the world are interested in the dismantlement of foreign military bases for reasons of their own security. Recent events have amply demonstrated that hostilities, as a rule, break out in places where there are foreign military bases. Moreover, any conflict, even a purely local one to begin with, can easily be transformed into a war that will affect and afflict many peoples, including some that are thousands of miles away from the spot where hostilities first break out.

154. The Soviet Union and the socialist countries regard the elimination of military bases in foreign territory and the withdrawal of foreign troops from such territory as a major international problem. This was stressed in the Declaration adopted at the Bucharest Conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the countries members of the Warsaw Pact in July 1966. It was also emphasized by the European Communist parties which attended the Karlovy Vary Conference in April 1967. In their declaration, "For Peace and Security in Europe", they urged the elimination of foreign military bases as an important step towards the normalization of the international situation and the maintenance of European and world peace.

155. As everyone knows, the Warsaw Pact countries are also in favour of the simultaneous dissolution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and of the Warsaw Pact, which was set up as a counterbalance. If the Western Powers are not prepared to take such a step, it would be useful, as a beginning, to reach agreement on disbanding the military organizations of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This matter has been raised repeatedly, but the Western Powers have thus far shown no inclination to take it up.

156. The position of the socialist States, the position of the peace-loving countries on the elimination of military bases in foreign territory is shared by the overwhelming majority of States. Thus, the heads of State and Government of African and non-aligned countries have lent support to the countries which want to see foreign bases removed from their territory forthwith. The General Assembly, taking the same position, in its resolution 2105 (XX) requested "the colonial Powers to dismantle the military bases installed in colonial Territories and to refrain from establishing new ones".

157. The reason why my delegation draws attention to the question of bases is that, although the problem is clear and calls for an urgent solution, nothing is being done about it, primarily because of the resistance of the United States and other Western Powers. Those who are interested in maintaining military bases in foreign territory are apparently playing a waiting game, counting on the pressure of world opinion to ease up. This we must prevent, in the interests of the world's peoples, and achieve, at long last, the adoption of resolutions on the dismantlement of foreign military bases, beginning with those in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The Soviet Union appeals to all States Members of the United Nations to bend every effort to that end.

158. In its statement today, my delegation would also dwell on another question that is now under discussion, namely, the ban on all nuclear weapons testing, including underground tests.

159. Such a ban would seriously hamper the further development of nuclear weapons and would prevent States from including in their armaments new types of mass destruction weapons.

160. The position taken by the Soviet Union on this important question is known to all, having been not only put forward in the General Assembly, but restated and advocated repeatedly in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva. We should like to reaffirm once again that this position remains unaltered in any particular.

161. The Soviet Union has been consistently advocating the complete prohibition of all testing of nuclear weapons, including underground nuclear explosions. We are ready at any time to negotiate the extension of the 1963 Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water to underground tests, thereby making the Treaty all-embracing.

162. Here again the Soviet Union takes the view that national means of detection available to States are adequate to control the ban on underground nuclear tests. This position is based on present-day knowledge in the field of seismology and the identification of seismic phenomena.

163. In order to accelerate the solution of the problem of underground nuclear testing, the Soviet Union is willing to compromise. We declare that we find acceptable the proposal of the United Arab Republic on the prohibition of underground testing of nuclear weapons above a certain power, with a moratorium on all other testing pending agreement on a general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

164. The Soviet Union has also stated that in its opinion, Sweden's proposal concerning a "detection club" deserves attention, if it can promote the conclusion of a treaty banning underground nuclear tests without any inspection whatever. We stressed at that time that the provision of seismological data could be voluntary, while the evaluation of the data compiled should be carried out not by an international body, but by each State for its own benefit.

165. Unfortunately, agreement on the underground testing ban is being unjustifiably delayed. Four and a half years have elapsed since the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, and that last category of nuclear tests—tests under ground—has still not been outlawed.

166. What is the reason for this situation? Who prevents agreement on this most important question? The only obstacle in the way to an agreement on banning underground nuclear tests is the position taken by the United States of America and its supporters among the Western Powers, which, without any justification, insist on a system of international control over any such agreement, including the dispatch of foreign inspectors to the territory of sovereign States.

167. In this connexion, I would remind the Assembly that for a very long time negotiations on the banning of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water remained fruitless precisely because of the position of the Western Powers, which insisted on that same famous international control system. A truly statesmanlike approach had been needed for the Moscow Treaty to come into being. And now, four and a half years later, no one can be in any doubt whatever as to the effectiveness of the national means of control over the observance of that Treaty.

168. We are now faced with a similar situation in the matter of banning underground nuclear tests. It is common knowledge that countries today—including the United States—have at their disposal reliable scientific and technical means of detecting nuclear explosions, enabling them to control the observance of an underground test ban without having recourse to international inspection. This is a fact attested to by scientists from many different countries. It is also attested to by the statements of many delegations during the debate on the prohibition of underground testing in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

169. Let me quote, by way of an example, from the statement made by Mrs. Myrdal, the representative of Sweden, at the Committee's 309th meeting, on 29 June 1967. In commenting on the observance of an agreement banning underground nuclear tests, Mrs. Myrdal said:

"From the material available to my delegation I have drawn the conclusion, tentative in form but firm in conviction, that the scientific and technical difficulties that have prevented a generally acceptable verification procedure to monitor an underground test-ban treaty have been steadily diminished and that they should now be quite small."

170. Then, speaking of specific identification methods, Mrs. Myrdal remarked:

"These identification methods are indeed so effective that it now seems to have become meaningful to discuss verification without on-site inspection. In this second case the full guarantee against mistakes in the final evaluation of suspicious events, which in the first case was provided by inspection, would not exist; it is replaced by a procedure providing an extremely low statistical probability of mistaking an earthquake for an explosion. It can be shown that also in this non-inspection case the identification methods referred to earlier would provide sufficient deterrence: earthquakes would be mistaken for explosions only once in fifteen or more years."

171. There is thus every indication that the true reason why no progress is being made in banning underground tests is not that adequate means of control are lacking, but simply that the United States and the Western Powers which support it are unwilling to extend the Moscow Treaty to underground testing. That the United States continues to cling to this position shows that it has no desire to stop underground testing, but rather intends to continue it with a view to further developing nuclear weapons.

<sup>7</sup> See document ENDC/PV.309.

172. I should like, in this connexion, to draw to the Committee's attention some recent reports in the United States press. According to these reports, since 1963—the year in which the Moscow Treaty was concluded—the United States has carried out 117 underground nuclear tests, at an ever-increasing rate. Thus, whereas in 1963 twelve underground nuclear explosions were made, in 1966 there were forty. In the two years to come, the United States Atomic Energy Commission is planning an even more intensive programme of underground testing. The United States press does not conceal the purpose of such testing, either. Quite recently it printed reports to the effect that by carrying out an extensive series of underground tests in Nevada the United States had made progress in developing "radically new atomic weapons".

173. These reports are highly significant. They clearly indicate why the United States argues against an underground test ban and how it seeks to camouflage its true intentions by advancing utterly unfounded and contrived considerations.

174. This position of the United States is contrary to the interests of peace and disarmament. It is in contradiction with the view repeatedly expressed in the General Assembly that testing of nuclear weapons underground is dangerous and should be stopped forthwith.

175. A political, statesmanlike approach is needed to solve the question of banning underground nuclear tests, the same approach that made possible the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty four and a half years ago. That is the realistic approach that the United States should take, instead of sticking to its unreasonable demand for international inspection and control. The problem could then be solved quickly and well.

176. The Soviet Union, for its part, regards an early conclusion of a comprehensive treaty banning nuclear weapon tests as entirely possible and as a matter of urgent necessity. We intend to vote in favour of the relevant draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.414.

177. My delegation has had an opportunity to state its position on the draft resolutions before the First Committee dealing with chemical and bacteriological weapons.

178. We strongly support the Hungarian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.412], which is of considerable importance in seeking to prevent chemical and bacteriological warfare. Hungary's position, which is fully shared by the Soviet Union and, I feel sure, by the majority of States Members of the United Nations, was thoroughly explained by our friend and colleague, Mr. Csatorday.

*Mr. Tchernouchtchenko (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

179. At the same time, we deem it necessary to emphasize once again that the Maltese draft resolution would do not good but harm. We repeat that we shall resolutely oppose any review of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, or any weakening of the generally recognized rules of law relating to the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons. We believe it our duty once again to appeal to all States to

adhere to the Geneva Protocol and urge the United States, which continues to use barbarous chemical weapons in Viet-Nam, to stop that savage madness at once.

180. We appeal to Mr. Pardo, the Maltese representative, to show his goodwill by associating himself with the efforts to adopt a resolution which would in fact help to spare mankind the horrors of chemical and bacteriological warfare.

181. I should also like to state our position on the draft resolution dealing with the Secretary-General's report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons [A/6858]. This report is an important and significant document, deserving of very serious attention. My delegation is in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/L.413 concerning this report, and will vote for it.

182. Mr. REYES (Chile) (*translated from Spanish*): The approach adopted to the various aspects of disarmament referred to in items 28, 29, 30 and 31 enables the delegation of Chile to express only a general policy opinion on these matters.

183. To achieve progressive and controlled general disarmament and atomic development for exclusively peaceful purposes in the interests of all mankind is the great task and challenge that face us. The achievement of that aim alone would justify the existence of the United Nations.

184. However, while waiting for a report from the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament that was to have given us a draft treaty on non-proliferation, we have reached the last few days of the twenty-second regular session of the General Assembly without touching upon what has traditionally been the First Committee's basic problem, namely, the question of disarmament. Unfortunately, the Eighteen-Nation Committee's work on a possible treaty is still some way from its goal. The identical drafts submitted by the United Nations and the Soviet Union still lack an article 3, and various important amendments submitted by other members of the Committee are still pending. In the interim report [A/6951-DC/229], the Eighteen-Nation Committee informs us that it intends to submit a full report, with all relevant documentation, as soon as possible. It also tells us that the work on the treaty has had priority and that the Eighteen-Nation Committee was therefore unable to discuss the items on general and complete disarmament and on the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Finally, it informs us that, with regard to the item "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests", the Committee has held a fruitful discussion.

185. We shall not now examine the draft treaty on non-proliferation or the amendments submitted at Geneva, since we trust that in the near future we shall have an appropriate forum for a full discussion of the provisions of the final text produced at Geneva. For the present, we shall confine ourselves to reiterating the need to uphold the principles in resolution 2028 (XX) as guidelines for the future treaty. In this regard, we may aptly recall the words of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile during the general debate at the present session of the General Assembly:

"... it is imperative that real progress should be made in the conversations of the great nuclear Powers on the practical means for their own disarmament, since the renunciation by the small States of any attempt to develop their own nuclear weapons will be of no avail unless it is accompanied by the nuclear disarmament of all States without exception."<sup>8</sup>

186. Together with progress in this field, we are also concerned with the provision of adequate security guarantees for States renouncing the nuclear option, of granting those States full access to the benefits of nuclear technology for useful purposes.

187. Chile was one of the countries which voted in favour of resolution 2153 (XXI) referring to the convening of a conference of non-nuclear-weapon States. Chile was a member of the Preparatory Committee for that conference set up by the above-mentioned resolution, and in that capacity it collaborated actively in the preparation of the report [A/6817]. We have endeavoured at all times to ensure that the agenda, rules of procedure and other aspects of the scheduled meeting should be objective and impartial. Thus we tried to ensure that there could be no objections to them on the grounds that they prejudged certain problems or were inspired by political aims different from those which have motivated previous resolutions by the General Assembly on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, particularly the above-mentioned resolution 2028 (XX). We trust that we have achieved this goal, and that the proposed agenda reflects a broad basis for the work of the conference affording guarantees to all States. By the same token, we believe that the support given to this idea at the preceding session of the General Assembly can be broadened at the present session.

188. The fact that the Geneva Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has been unable to produce a text of a treaty on non-proliferation for consideration at the twenty-second regular session of the General Assembly is certainly regrettable, since it involves a further delay on this vitally important question. However, that should not prevent the General Assembly from examining and approving the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. Moreover, holding the conference, as suggested in this document, may help to smooth out the difficulties which have arisen in the course of the efforts to conclude a treaty on non-proliferation. This might clarify and bring together the viewpoints of the non-nuclear-weapon States on the varied and complex questions connected with non-proliferation and lead to the initiation of a more specific and meaningful dialogue with the nuclear Powers which would be invited to attend the conference without the right to vote.

189. With regard to general and complete disarmament, the Chilean delegation, in speaking of item 96 on the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons [1536th meeting] expressed the view that this was certainly the most appropriate framework for solving the problem. The same consideration applies also to the problem of eliminating foreign military bases. We again

<sup>8</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Plenary Sessions, 1567th meeting, para. 28.

wish to point out that all progress in general and complete disarmament pending before the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva has been totally paralysed for several years, thereby frustrating the desire of all peoples for an agreement on this problem of such crucial importance to mankind.

190. Hence, we have sought to make progress through isolated or collateral measures which, without producing a final solution, may themselves be significant in easing tensions and facilitating the creation of a climate favourable to disarmament. Although everything concerning nuclear weapons plays a dominant role among these subjects, that does not blind us to the importance of conventional disarmament measures which are so closely related to the release of resources for economic development. Conventional weapons have been the ones used in the Middle East and Viet-Nam conflicts and, in general, continue to be the ones potentially available for use in any regional type of confrontation.

191. In analysing this situation, the interest of weapon suppliers in increasing their trade and expanding their influence through the commercialization of war becomes obvious. These conflicts, in turn, usually seem like large-scale testing grounds or fields for manoeuvres where tactics and improvements for dealing with possible new clashes are developed.

192. Perhaps it might also be useful to point out that waiting for proposals on general and complete disarmament should not prevent, paralyse or postpone any negotiation which could further other agreements more limited in scope or geographic coverage. In this regard, allow me to recall the agreement on limitation of military expenditures adopted by the meeting of American Heads of State held in April 1967 at Punta del Este. We also wish to stress particularly the Latin American effort to achieve the military denuclearization of our region, embodied in the Treaty of Tlatelolco which the General Assembly has received with special satisfaction [*resolution 2286 (XXII)*]. Both these actions attest to the will for peace of the Latin American peoples.

193. Chile maintains a policy of peace based on non-intervention and on the legal solution of international disputes. Therefore, it does not need arms that might affect the security of other countries in our region. Even less does it need to purchase weapons or equipment for warlike uses which could impede the harmonious economic and over-all development of the area. Thus, President Frei recently declared that:

"It is inconceivable that, on the one hand, we should uphold as a main objective the integration of our nations and, on the other hand, initiate a policy of the unlimited purchase of weapons. Such a situation is even more inexplicable if we consider that the weapons we might purchase would have no object but to defend ourselves against possible conflict between the very countries seeking such integration since, however large the expenditure on weapons, they would not be of the most technologically up-to-date type nor, in any case, sufficient in the event of a world conflagration which today would have absolutely uncontrollable characteristics for these countries.

"Moreover, an armaments race itself implies an economic and social decision, since it is absolutely incompatible for these countries simultaneously to sustain an accelerated economic and social development effort to overcome poverty, provide a high level of education, build housing, improve health standards, develop their agriculture and industry and create employment, together with expenditure on an unlimited arms race."

194. One of the most important collateral measures referred to previously is the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. The success achieved by the signature of the Moscow Treaty, the importance of which cannot be disregarded, is gradually being undermined because France and the People's Republic of China have not acceded to this Treaty, and both of them continue to carry out tests with these weapons in areas prohibited by it. The fact that it has been impossible to reach an agreement to extend the Moscow Treaty to underground explosions is also very serious; the number of these explosions has been increasing, and it has become common knowledge that they are being used to accelerate the armaments race between the nuclear super-Powers, particularly to perfect the nuclear warheads to be used in anti-missile systems. These systems are a further addition to the arsenals of the super-Powers and represent an escalation in the balance of terror and in the exorbitant expenditures devoted to the war industry, to the obvious detriment of urgent economic and social needs.

*Mr. Fahmy (United Arab Republic) resumed the Chair.*

195. On the other hand, the Chilean delegation welcomes the carrying out of explosions for peaceful purposes, like the recent so-called "Gasbuggy" project, which seems to anticipate a perhaps not-too-distant future when great deeds may be accomplished with the aid of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes.

196. The lack of progress in reaching an agreement to extend the Moscow Treaty to underground tests leads us to repeat the conclusions we referred to in the First Committee during the twenty-first regular session of the General Assembly, namely:

"... the need for urgent action in this field to attain some extremely important objectives in the de-escalation of nuclear armaments, as well as to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons, leads us to advocate the immediate suspension of underground tests above the threshold that can at present be verified by seismological detection methods from outside national frontiers. We also support initiatives like that taken at the International Seminar on Nuclear Weapons, recently held in Canada, which adopted a proposal for a moratorium under a system of verification by invitation which, during a trial period, might open the door to a treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear tests ...".<sup>9</sup>

197. Our delegation has listened with great interest to the important statement made on this matter by the representative of Sweden at the 1547th meeting and regards it as a constructive contribution in moving ahead towards an agreement.

<sup>9</sup> This statement was made at the 1462nd meeting, the official record of which was published in summary form.



198. The disastrous results of the possible use of nuclear weapons have been put before this Assembly with remarkable clarity in the Secretary-General's report [A/6858/ published in pursuance of resolution 2162 A (XXI)]. As we said earlier, this report will be of great significance because of the authority of the internationally renowned experts who prepared it and to the impact of the implications of the facts it analyses. These implications speak more eloquently than any speech in favour of the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the destruction of stockpiles. The report demonstrates that these weapons threaten the survival of civilization, and that the security, for the attainment of which countries manufacture them, is only illusory and unstable.

199. This report is also a powerful argument in favour of non-proliferation of those weapons, in that it shows the heavy sacrifice which the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the acquisition of effective means for their use represents for a medium-sized or small Power.

200. The basic conclusion of the report is that: "Security for all countries of the world must be sought through the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the banning of their use, by way of general and complete disarmament." [Ibid., para. 91.] This conclusion is both the goal of the disarmament effort and the philosophy with which we must visualize the other measures whose importance is also emphasized by the report: the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; the reduction of existing arsenals of these weapons; the extension of the Moscow Treaty to underground tests; and the creation of denuclearized zones.

201. The delegation of Chile shares the satisfaction expressed by other delegations at the constructive effort made by the Secretary-General and his group of experts and hopes that the report will be given the widest possible dissemination. Thus, the peoples of the world will become more clearly aware of the dangers in which they live and will be able to exert pressure on those in responsible positions of power to ensure that they do not betray the destinies of their peoples.

202. Mr. MALITZA (Romania) (*translated from French*): At the twenty-first session, the General Assembly in resolution 2162 C (XXI) expressed its firm belief that the achievement of early progress towards general and complete disarmament was imperative. It therefore requested the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament "to pursue new efforts towards achieving substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as well as on collateral measures, and in particular on an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and on the completion of the test-ban treaty so as to cover underground nuclear weapon tests".

203. The Romanian delegation supported that resolution in the firm conviction that the peace and security of the world are closely linked to the genuine solution of the problem of disarmament. We were entitled to expect that the current session would give rise to a fruitful debate on the basis of a substantial report by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on the application of the above-mentioned resolution. But we have to say that the interim report

submitted to this Committee a few days ago, far from offering us an encouraging picture, is calculated to arouse feelings of profound concern on the part of all States.

204. It might be thought that the stagnation of the negotiations on general and complete disarmament this year, and the extremely short time set aside for these fundamental questions at the present session, amount to a falling-off in the importance we attach to the reduction and elimination of the grave danger inherent in the steady increase in armaments, particularly nuclear weapons. But we do not think so; quite the contrary, the interest of countries in disarmament is constantly growing. The arms race, which continues to describe its steadily-rising curve unhindered, while this very year armed conflicts have increased and new danger spots have been added to those that already existed, again focuses the attention of Governments on the problem of disarmament.

205. The Report of the Secretary-General on the Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons [A/6858/ cites impressive figures on the unprecedented growth of the arms race over the past few years.

206. One of the salient features of the international situation is its fluidity and the possibility of new warlike outbreaks occurring at any moment in various parts of the world, with the threat of plunging the whole of mankind into the abyss of general war.

207. The Romanian delegation considers that general disarmament is a more urgent and vital problem than ever before. The existence of enormous stocks of nuclear weapons increases the danger of war and has an altogether baneful influence on international life generally, representing one of the sources of tension and mistrust among States. When a weapon is manufactured, it is invariably with possible utilization in mind. All weapons imply the possibility of resort to armed force, and inherent in the existing stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction is the potentiality of the destructive effects which would be the inevitable corollary of a modern war.

208. Hence the need to reinforce peace implies liquidation of these stocks and the achievement of general disarmament. Disarmament is a necessity today not only because of the need to strengthen international security but also because it is an essential prerequisite to the utilization of all material resources and all the potential of energy and knowledge possessed by man, exclusively in the interests of economic development.

209. The need for that development has become all the more pressing in that steering national economies in the direction of rapid progress is a major concern of most countries in their efforts to establish their political independence on solid economic foundations and to speed up improvements in the standards of living of their people.

210. Development is in fact the new dimension added to the classic arguments used through all the ages in favour of the need for disarmament, namely security and development. These two perennial goals of mankind, these two fundamental rights of all peoples, are the constant motivating forces sustaining interest in the cause of effective disarmament.

211. The fervent desires of mankind are more than ever bound up with the question of economic, social and cultural progress, and with the full utilization of the resources of the earth so that man may enjoy the fruits of his creative activities and the achievements of science and modern technology. To act in such a way as to create the necessary international conditions in which these desiderata can be realized is the main task of all States and all Governments imbued with a spirit of responsibility towards their own people.

212. The discovery of atomic energy made it possible to muster unsuspected forces in the task of gaining mastery over nature and ensuring the progress of civilization. But until such time as general disarmament is a fact, the hopes awakened by this prospect cannot be realized in full measure. It is a paradox of the age we live in that at a time when the feats of science and technology place within the grasp of man powerful means of improving his material and spiritual way of life, quite astronomical sums—according to some sources, \$150,000 million a year—are squandered on the utterly irrational manufacture of arms and most of all on weapons of mass destruction. Today certain States spend the equivalent of a pre-war military budget merely to cover the cost of stockpiling the latest nuclear weapons. This means that in a world where two-fifths of the adult population is illiterate and half the human beings are either underfed or poorly fed, thousands of millions of dollars are squandered each year on the production of new types of weapons of mass destruction.

213. The realization of the desire of all peoples for general disarmament would not only put a stop to this unprecedented waste of money; it would also free the material resources virtually needed for speeding up the development process in which many nations are involved today.

214. The reduction of military budgets would allow part of the resources thus set free to be used to back up the efforts of the developing countries to consolidate their economic independence and ensure their social progress.

215. Furthermore, disarmament would allow thousands of experts, researchers and specialists, whose activities today are devoted to fashioning means of destruction, henceforward to devote all their brain power, knowledge and creative energies to peaceful production, social progress and the improvement of the standard of living of all peoples. Now that people are convinced of the highly dangerous aspects of the arms race, and realize the waste of money, materials and energies it implies, they are now demanding more and more vehemently that it should stop. It has become crystal clear that nuclear war cannot be thought of or used as a political instrument or a means of solving international problems. The very nature of nuclear weapons and their unprecedented destructive power have made both the theory and the practice of war as understood in the past, and the way of waging it, completely obsolete today.

216. Nuclear war once unleashed becomes uncontrollable and its foreseeable consequences eliminate its very *raison d'être*. This emerges quite clearly as the main conclusion of the Secretary-General's Report on the Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Security and

Economic Implications for States of the Acquisition and Further Development of These Weapons [A/6858]:

"Security for all countries of the world must be sought through the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the banning of their use, by way of general and complete disarmament."

217. The Romanian delegation is happy to support the draft resolution to that effect proposed by Poland and seventeen other countries [A/C.1/L.413/Add.1].

218. Highly authoritative voices have been raised in demonstration of the fact that even for countries where the arms race is considered economically tolerable, it is becoming an increasingly heavy burden. We are witnessing a definite reinforcement of the efforts being made by the small and medium-sized countries of different continents to help to create a more favourable atmosphere and thus assume their responsibility in regard to world peace.

219. I am referring particularly to the trend towards removing as many geographical zones as possible from the danger of nuclear war, thus narrowing the potential danger area.

220. The foregoing demonstrates, I believe, how important it is that every effort should be made to protect the human race from a devastating war and enable men to use the vast constructive possibilities opened up by these sources of energy for peaceful purposes. It is entirely possible to achieve this most vital objective provided general and complete disarmament is attained. This is the shortest and surest way to eliminate the danger of war, and at the same time it would open up vast prospects for inter-State co-operation, which would be facilitated by the freeing of substantial material and human resources for peaceful purposes.

221. Romania, as a country that has suffered the effects of world wars twice in the space of half a century and is conscious of the disaster which a third world war would inflict on mankind, is unswerving in its efforts towards achieving general disarmament. In our view, as expressed time and time again by our Government in the United Nations, in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and elsewhere, large-scale measures must be taken, commensurate with the nuclear danger, that could culminate in the elimination of that danger, ensure peace and security for all States, and earn the confidence of the world.

222. These are the premises on which the Romanian Government envisages the problem of disarmament in the light of the ultimate goal of creating the necessary conditions for the establishment of international relations based on peaceful co-operation between independent sovereign States enjoying equal rights, and not on force. We advocate the unconditional prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the total destruction of existing stockpiles, the end of the arms race and general disarmament. The end of the arms race and the establishment of a system of international relations based on effective disarmament measures are fundamental to the security of States and a means of ensuring respect for their equal right to peace, development and security.

223. Romania also advocates partial or regional measures designed to promote the easing of tension in international relations and to bring general disarmament closer. These would include the creation of denuclearized zones in different parts of the world, the liquidation of military blocs, the dismantling of foreign military bases, the withdrawal of foreign troops stationed outside their national frontiers, and the cessation and prohibition of nuclear tests in all environments.

224. It is obvious that in a world armed to the teeth, general disarmament cannot be achieved overnight. Clearly it is a process in the course of which attention must constantly be paid to the principles which today must govern all international action, starting out with the equal right of all States, great and small, to peace and security.

225. Hence the cause of disarmament can be served only by means of measures which instead of creating or tending to perpetuate advantages or positions of superiority in favour of some and at the expense of others are on the contrary intended and implemented to strengthen the national security of all States in equal measure.

226. In circumstances where nuclear weapons can cause untold loss to life and property, since nuclear warfare is different in kind from all previous armed conflict, the elimination of this danger is likewise a problem of exceptional acuteness in relation to other disarmament measures. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that where a proposal deals with disarmament, the surest yardstick by which to measure its effectiveness and realism is the extent to which it can help to ward off, or eliminate once and for all, the danger of nuclear war.

227. We therefore feel that from this point of view also, a particularly important measure would be the liquidation of military bases on foreign territory, and the withdrawal of foreign armed forces behind their own frontiers. The Romanian delegation has stressed on many occasions and wishes to reiterate that military bases on foreign territory, far from serving the cause of international security, are most undesirable. They threaten the security not only of the States against which they are organized but of those on whose territory they are located, neighbouring States and, since peace is indivisible, the security of all States anywhere in the world.

228. Foreign military bases as such can constitute interference, they can be an instrument of future interference in the domestic affairs of the State on whose territory they are stationed. The dismantling of military bases and the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces behind their national frontiers would greatly help to improve the international political climate and would be calculated to promote confidence in inter-State relations and co-operation among States.

229. Romania is alive to the vast implications of maintaining military blocs that have imposed great hardship on many peoples, and therefore favours the elimination of a system irrelevant to modern life. The simultaneous dismantling of NATO and of the Warsaw Pact Organization would be a decisive contribution to removing the vestiges of the cold war, the barriers still standing in the way of free,

untrammelled co-operation between the different countries. The Romanian Government considers that military groupings should give way to the establishment and development of relations based on mutual confidence and esteem, non-interference in the affairs of others, complete equality of rights and co-operation between independent States.

230. I should now like to outline very briefly the attitude of Romania in regard to the need for banning nuclear tests in all environments. The Socialist Republic of Romania is a party to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, signed on 5 August 1963. In the course of drafting of the Treaty, a general consensus was established that the ban should be extended as soon as possible to the fourth environment—underground testing. Four years have elapsed since then, and today we are obliged to recognize that no progress has been achieved in this direction. We consider that further efforts should be made, with a view to the elaboration as a matter of urgency as stated in the draft resolution submitted by Sweden and seven other countries [A/C.1/414] of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests.

231. In circumstances where the arms race has not yet been stopped and we are engaged in the difficult search for ways and means of reducing the danger of war, it seems to us highly important to use every means of strengthening the international agreements reached by man at the cost of tremendous efforts. For that reason the Romanian delegation welcomed the valiant attempts by Hungary last year to make the 1925 Geneva Protocol more effective.<sup>10</sup> For the same reason we warmly support draft resolution A/C.1/L.412 submitted by the delegation of Hungary.

232. Discussion of a problem implies recognition of the need to solve it. To that end, good faith is necessary and also political will on the part of all concerned, as expressed by appropriate decisions made at the right moment. Once the decisions have been taken, their implementation is of capital importance. The history of the negotiations on disarmament which have taken place ever since the Second World War demonstrates that there has not been a lack of decisions. The United Nations has adopted many resolutions, their characteristic feature being the need, stated time and time again, to bring about disarmament and to take effective measures to that end. The study on *The United Nations and Disarmament—1945-1965*,<sup>11</sup> published recently on the welcome initiative of the Secretary-General, contains not only a concise account of the negotiations on disarmament that took place during those years, but also the most pertinent decisions adopted by the United Nations on that subject of topical interest and contemporary relevance. Unfortunately, the decisions have not as yet been crystallized in concrete disarmament measures. Hence the main conclusion is that it is imperatively necessary for such measures to be adopted, and without delay.

233. The Romanian delegation hopes that the exchange of views in the course of this debate will prove useful even in

<sup>10</sup> *Official Documents of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes*, agenda item 27 (A/6529 and Add.1, para. 5).

<sup>11</sup> *The United Nations and Disarmament* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 67.1.9).

the circumstances described at the beginning of this statement and will encourage the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to redouble its efforts to carry out the task entrusted to it by the General Assembly in regard to disarmament. Romania, which is engaged on a vast scheme of peaceful construction and is therefore vitally interested in the strengthening of security and the development of inter-State co-operation, will do all in its power, as a member of the Eighteen-Nation Committee and of the General Assembly, to make a positive contribution to the negotiations on disarmament issues.

234. Mr. CHIMIDDORJ (Mongolia) (*translated from Russian*): The elimination of foreign military bases is one of the burning problems of our day, since it has a direct bearing on the maintenance of peace and the achievement of general and complete disarmament.

235. The existence of numerous military bases in foreign territory is an obstacle in the way of the maintenance and development of normal relations among States and serves as a means of interference in the internal affairs of States and as a component in the imperialist Powers' policy of aggression, blackmail and pressure brought to bear on other countries and peoples. The military bases are a tool of colonialist and neo-colonialist policy and a source of perpetual tension in various parts of the globe. It is no accident that in its resolution 2165 (XXI) the General Assembly stated that the question of the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America "is of paramount importance and therefore necessitates serious discussion because of its implications for international peace and security".

236. The representatives of the United States and other Powers which maintain military bases in foreign territory seek to justify the situation by alleging that these bases are intended for the defence of the so-called "Free World" and of the interests and security of the United States and its allies. In reality, however, these bases are intended for aggression and attack on the socialist and other peace-loving States. The mere fact of maintenance and installation of military bases in peacetime and their proximity to the frontiers of the socialist States and to the areas in which peoples are fighting for their national liberation are ample evidence of their real purpose.

237. At present, according to press reports, the bases and other military outposts maintained by the United States outside its borders number over 2,000 and harbour about a million United States troops and one third of its military aircraft. Large United States military bases are to be found in some forty countries.

238. That the presence of United States military bases and troops in foreign territory is a danger to the cause of international peace and security is clearly demonstrated by recent events in South-East Asia, Korea, Cyprus and the Congo, the Middle East crisis, the engineering of *coups d'états* in various parts of the world, and many other facts.

239. The events in South-East Asia offer a striking illustration of the true purpose of these bases and the part they are intended to play.

240. The numerous United States bases in South-East Asia, situated in countries members of aggressive military blocs and elsewhere, are being used on a large scale in the conduct of the dirty colonial war against the Viet-Name people. United States aircraft execute barbarous raids on the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam from bases in Guam, South Viet-Nam and Thailand. The Clark Air Base in the Philippines, the base at Okinawa and United Kingdom naval bases at Singapore and Siangan are being used as midway stations for military operations in Viet-Nam. United States bases in the region have been playing a leading role in provocative acts against Laos and in the violation of the sovereignty of neutral Cambodia.

241. The 55,000-strong United States army stationed in South Korea under the United Nations flag prevents the peaceful reunification of Korea and creates tension in the Far East. Washington has transformed virtually all of South Korea into one great military base and a springboard for aggression against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and other States in Asia and the Far East.

242. The United States Seventh Fleet, which took part in the rapacious war against the Korean people, is in the Pacific Ocean near the Asian coast, and some of its aircraft are sent to bomb the towns and villages of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam in order to put down the just struggle of the South Viet-Name patriots.

243. An example of intervention in the domestic affairs of Latin American peoples and violation of their sovereignty is furnished by the events which took place in the Dominican Republic in 1965, when the United States, making use of its military bases in the Caribbean, landed marines to "defend democracy" in that country—a country whose people had in fact risen up to restore and protect a constitutional form of government. Again, in maintaining its naval base at Guantanamo, in Cuban territory, the United States is continually engaging in serious acts of provocation and conducting subversive activities against Cuba, the first socialist State in the Western Hemisphere.

244. The representatives of the Western Powers assert that, if you please, their foreign bases are in every case maintained with the consent of the States concerned. The falsity of such assertions is demonstrated by the stubborn refusal of the United States to dismantle its Guantanamo base, although the people and Government of Cuba have quite justifiably been asking it to do so.

245. In recent years the United States has set up many new military outposts in Africa. The Bonn revanchists, who openly declare that the Federal Republic of Germany needs *lebensraum*, have chosen Africa as their strategic and military parade ground. In 1961, the Bonn Government signed a secret agreement with the Republic of South Africa providing for a joint struggle against the African national liberation movement. In addition, they later came to an agreement on the manufacture of rockets in South Africa. Now the *Bundeswehr* is building there a testing site for new types of weapons, a military airport, strategic highways, etc.

246. Thus, the foreign military bases in the African continent, as in other parts of the world, constitute a tool



of colonialism, a means of interference in the internal affairs of States that have recently won their political independence, and an instrument of the criminal policy of racism, *apartheid*, and the subjugation of peoples fighting for their freedom and national independence.

247. The United Kingdom's armed intervention against the Egyptian people in 1956 and its present policy with regard to the events in the Middle East and South-East Asia show that the United Kingdom military bases in foreign territory, like the United States bases, are a serious threat to the cause of international peace and security. British colonialists are doing all they can to conserve their influence in the colonies and in the newly independent States, especially in the Middle East, where, according to their own statements, they have major political, economic and strategic interests. It should be stressed that London, aware of the weakness of its position in the Middle East, is reviewing its policy as regards military bases. Like the United States, the United Kingdom has chosen numerous islands in the Indian Ocean for its strategic deployment, thereby creating a threat to all Asian and African States and to the peoples still valiantly fighting for liberation from the imperialist and colonialist yoke.

248. The presence of foreign military bases and troops in the territory of other States is contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. It is incompatible with major resolutions of the General Assembly, in particular with the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples [*resolution 1514 (XV)*] and the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty [*resolution 2131 (XX)*].

249. Demands that foreign military bases in the territory of other States should be eliminated are to be found in the resolutions of many broadly international gatherings, such as the Conference of Heads of State of Africa held at Addis Ababa in 1963, the 1964 Cairo Conference of Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries, and the 1966 Havana Conference of the Peoples of Three Continents. Those demands reflect world public opinion and the views of those many Governments which are concerned with relaxing international tension and enhancing general security. Many of the States which have foreign military bases in their territory, having become aware of the sinister potentialities of the bases, have by now either compelled the imperialists to remove their bases and troops or are endeavouring to do so, thereby strengthening their security and their sovereignty.

250. In their desire to promote peace and international security, the socialist and other peace-loving States have long been pressing for the immediate elimination of all foreign military bases. Unfortunately the Western Powers, particularly those which maintain bases in foreign territory, instead of taking practical steps to dismantle them have, on the contrary, been expanding and modernizing their old bases and creating new ones, both under bilateral military agreements and in the framework of aggressive military blocs. The fact that these bases are being increasingly prepared for the purpose of delivering nuclear weapons to their target shows the urgent need to solve this problem in

general, and with regard to the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America in particular.

251. Adoption by the United Nations of decisive measures to ensure the elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of all foreign troops would most certainly improve the international situation, contribute to the strengthening of the independence and sovereignty of States and at the same time, since the question of foreign military bases has a direct bearing on the struggle against colonialism and neo-colonialism, assist the peoples in their endeavour to extirpate the last vestiges of colonialism.

252. In the light of these considerations, my delegation is ready to support any and all United Nations resolutions aimed at the elimination of military bases in foreign territory with a view to preventing hostilities and creating more favourable conditions for the solution of such long-standing problems as general and complete disarmament and for bringing the entire international situation back to normal.

253. Mr. WALDHEIM (Austria): The First Committee is considering the various aspects of the disarmament question this year under special circumstances and under particular pressure of time. In view of both these considerations, we wish to limit our intervention at this time to a few brief comments.

254. We awaited the interim report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament which is now before the Committee [*A/6951-DC/229*] with impatience, and we cannot but express disappointment that it does not contain the results we had hoped for. While the armaments race has continued unabated over the past year, the report illustrates once again how very difficult it is to achieve even limited progress on matters of disarmament or on the limitation of armaments.

255. Yet we believe that this fact need not be a source of disillusionment. It reflects only the facts of the actual situation, and we have to face those facts. Over the years, the General Assembly has time and again stressed the importance of general and complete disarmament, and appealed to all Member States to find a speedy solution to that problem. As negotiations have proceeded over the years, we have regretfully come to realize that an agreement on general and complete disarmament, while remaining the ultimate goal of our efforts, cannot realistically be expected in the foreseeable future.

256. In the opinion of my delegation, it is therefore all the more important to concentrate on other limited measures of disarmament, or armaments limitations, in such fields where agreement appears feasible now.

257. If we accept those considerations, it is necessary for us—and particularly for the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament—to agree, in the first place, on priorities. We believe that the nations engaged in the Geneva negotiations were wise in deciding to devote their efforts over the past year primarily, or almost exclusively, to negotiations on a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was here that agreement appeared most likely to be obtained, and to give that question priority was, indeed,



also the wish of the General Assembly, as expressed in paragraph 6 of resolution 2153 (XXI).

258. As the negotiations for a non-proliferation treaty have proceeded, we have all become aware of the complexities and intricacies of this problem, and we have come to realize that the expectations expressed by many delegations in this Committee last year, that a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was within reach, were perhaps a little too optimistic.

259. Nevertheless, the interim report of the Geneva Conference states that the Committee has already made substantial progress and that it intends to continue its work. We can only once more express our hope that these negotiations will soon lead to the desired results, and that this will reflect the principles embodied in General Assembly resolutions 2028 (XX) and 2153 (XXI). In particular, we hope that the treaty will be envisaged as a concrete step, not only towards the limitation of nuclear armaments, but also as a step towards nuclear disarmament. Its objectives should not be to create a nuclear monopoly of a few Powers but rather to be a real beginning for the reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.

260. It is our expectation that, as soon as the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee reaches definite results in Geneva, the General Assembly will be given an opportunity for full and comprehensive discussion on the proposed treaty and all its implications.

261. It is on the basis of these considerations that my delegation has become a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.416, which was presented this afternoon.

262. It was a regrettable but an obvious logical consequence of the concentration at the Geneva negotiations on the non-proliferation treaty that other measures of partial disarmament or collateral measures received but little attention during the past year. We regret in particular that no further progress was possible on the suspension of nuclear weapon tests in all environments, a continual source of concern and a potential danger to all mankind.

263. Guided by those considerations we will give our support to the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.414 and Add.1 sponsored by the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia.

264. In our efforts to explore all areas where agreement on limited measures of disarmament or on limitations of armaments might be reached, we consider it useful that some delegations have called our renewed attention this year to the question of chemical and biological weapons. In spite of the enormous potential threat and destructive power of such weapons, relatively little attention has been given to this question since the end of the Second World War.

265. You will recall that Austria, in the State Treaty of 15 May 1955,<sup>12</sup> accepted the contractual obligation not to

possess, construct or experiment with asphyxiating, vesicant or poisonous materials or biological substances in quantities greater than, or of types other than, are required for legitimate civil purposes, or any apparatus designed to produce, project or spread such materials or substances for war purposes.

266. The Austrian delegation would welcome it if the problems relating to chemical and biological weapons could receive due attention in the course of the disarmament negotiations. We would also support the idea that the Secretary-General should be requested to prepare a concise and factual report on this question and its implications. We will determine our position on the proposals submitted to the Committee on this matter in the light of those considerations.

267. I should like to conclude these brief remarks by expressing our appreciation to the Secretary-General for the remarkable report he has presented to the General Assembly on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons [*A/6858 and Corr.1*]. The report is a vivid illustration indeed of what nuclear war would mean and what its consequences would be in terms of destruction and devastation of the countries involved.

268. We hope that this report will not fail to have its impact on those who have the power and the responsibility of deciding about the use or non-use of nuclear weapons, and also on those who are thinking about acquiring such weapons. It is also our hope that this grim account of destruction which nuclear weapons could bring will prove to be an additional incentive to our efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and, in the final analysis, to eliminate nuclear weapons within the framework of a general disarmament agreement.

269. Mr. ALLIMADI (Uganda): One of the most ironic facts of our civilization today is that while we yearly convene the General Assembly to discuss peace in obedience to the principles of the Charter, we witness at the same time the uncontrolled proliferation of instruments of universal annihilation. Nations and powers seem bent on increasing their capability of war rather than on utilizing their strength for the promotion of peace. The ban on atomic tests endorsed by Members of this Organization has yet to be universally observed.

270. It is with this consideration in mind that my delegation eagerly waited for the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. It is regretted that the report which we thought would come out with substantive recommendations on most of the issues in the field of complete and general disarmament contains the usual narration of frustrations in the Committee. The inadequacy of the report has limited the debate in the Committee.

271. While we do not intend to minimize the work of the Committee and the problems involved, we feel that the present rapid steps in manufacturing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction seem to outrun the steps taken to ban or prohibit their manufacture and use. Prolonged and endless discussions might achieve the opposite results.

<sup>12</sup> State Treaty for the re-establishment of an independent and democratic Austria.

272. We welcome the contents of paragraph 5 of the interim report [A/6951-DC/229] as a happy note to this Committee. We note with satisfaction that the Committee proposes to submit a full report on this vital question as soon as possible. My delegation has also noted with satisfaction the statements made this week by the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States indicating their willingness to lend utmost co-operation to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in the search for a compromise.

273. It is fitting, at this juncture, to point out that my delegation strongly believes that the ultimate solution to the armaments race lies in the achievement of world-wide general and complete disarmament. Bilateral or collateral treaties will not be the answer to this immense problem. In this connexion my delegation notes with the deepest regret the absence of the People's Republic of China. The participation of this country in the disarmament negotiations is absolutely necessary and its status as another nuclear Power has to be recognized as a matter of fact. Our endeavours in searching for peace should not be characterized by ideological or selfish motives, nor must we accept to be used as instruments for other people's interests. We must also take into account other countries besides the People's Republic of China which are not Members of this Organization and which would play an important role in the solution of the question of disarmament. Members must be realistic and objective in their approach to this problem and should aim at making all disarmament negotiations universal. Let us avoid futile approaches and self-defeating exercises.

274. Notable but limited progress was made this year by the entry into force of the outer space Treaty [resolution 2222 (XXI)]. This Treaty marks a significant step in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. We hope that this is a good omen for more practical steps in the furtherance of peace. We must not be content with mere declarations of intent on the part of the nuclear Powers. We have equal right to demand pledges from them that they will undertake to prohibit the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons, reduce existing stockpiles of such weapons and respect the inviolability of nuclear-free zones.

275. I should like to pay tribute to the Secretary-General for the elaborate and excellent report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons. It is also fitting to extend sincere thanks to the twelve experts for their impartial findings. The report needs careful reading and analysis and I venture to say that it should serve as the bible of this Organization in the consideration of this item.

276. The report confirms our fears that man's life is in more peril than it was in 1945. The report points out that:

"Were such weapons ever to be used in numbers, hundreds of millions of people might be killed, and civilization as we know it, as well as organized community life, would inevitably come to an end..." [A/6858 and Corr.1, para. 1.]

277. It would be tempting on the part of the Organization, and indeed all States which believe in the dignity and

survival of mankind, to leave this important problem in the hands of a few States. There is need for a concerted effort to bring about a healthy climate for us all to enjoy and also to save the succeeding generations from the scourge of a nuclear war.

278. The findings contained in the report paint a sombre picture of our life to come in the event of any possible use of nuclear weapons. We are told that:

"...radiation from nuclear explosions can cause genetic mutations and chromosome anomalies which may lead to serious physical and mental disabilities in future generations." [Ibid., para. 13.]

In addition, it is stated that:

"The effects of all-out nuclear war, regardless of where it started, could not be confined to the Powers engaged in that war... Given a sufficient number, no part of the world would escape exposure to biologically significant levels of radiation. To a greater or lesser degree, a legacy of genetic damage could be incurred by the world's population." [Ibid., para. 40.]

Because of this incalculable disaster, we are impatient for measures which would bring about general and complete disarmament. Nuclear destruction is nearer than ever, and there is an urgent need to prevent this.

279. The economic aspect of the arms race, particularly the manufacture, acquisition and development of nuclear weapons, is of great importance. The findings contained in the Secretary-General's report, which is now before the Committee, indicates how the limited resources of various countries are being devoted to the production of these weapons of mass destruction.

280. Man's effort, which is greatly required for the betterment of the standards of the people and the world as a whole, is being concentrated on unprofitable and dangerous exercises. There has been a great shift of scientific experts and engineers in some States from the usual industries to industries actively engaged in the manufacture of nuclear weapons and other arms. In most cases this means the diversion of the best personnel from the industries which are basically intended to improve the standard of life. There is a greater need to concentrate on the economic needs of the population.

281. Not only has such personnel been used on a futile exercise but limited economic resources have also been channelled to suit the countries' military needs. Limited raw materials, particularly uranium and plutonium, have become necessities for the manufacture of stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

282. As the report points out, expenditure on nuclear force is higher than other essential expenditures in such fields as education, health and economic development. Man's economic needs have been relegated to the supposed national prestige, valued in terms of large quantities of arms. We would have thought that the emphasis should have been on the use of nuclear energy for economic and peaceful means. If we seek to further the aims and principles of the Charter, we must initiate and execute meaningful programmes for the betterment of mankind as a

whole. Human efforts should not be wasted on weapons which potentially threaten man's annihilation.

283. I have read paragraphs 87 to 90 of the report, on the political implications, with the greatest interest and entirely endorse the relevant observations. The fact that the use of nuclear weapons would be disastrous to both sides poses in our mind their usefulness. It is argued that they serve as mutual deterrents but, to us, conventional arms serve the same purpose and achieve better results, since a large part of the population would be spared. The harbouring of nuclear weapons, according to the report, increases the insecurity of the States concerned in the event of an outbreak of nuclear war, and their best interests would be served by doing away with them.

284. The contents of paragraph 91 of the report have a great bearing on the expected role of various countries, particularly the nuclear Powers. The report stresses that:

"Security for all countries of the world must be sought through the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the banning of their use, by way of general and complete disarmament." [Ibid., *para.* 91.]

My delegation endorses this view as a declaration of a very important principle in the field of disarmament.

285. I wish to refer to the appeal made almost unanimously by the General Assembly on 5 December 1966 in resolution 2163 (XXI) to the effect that all States should adhere to the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963. It further called on all nuclear-weapon States to suspend nuclear tests. It is regrettable to note that tests have continued in defiance of this appeal and, worse still, there has been intensification of tests in violation of the Moscow Treaty. It is the view of my delegation that the question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty should be considered immediately by the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. Such a treaty should cover all nuclear and thermonuclear tests and should provide effective machinery for verification and control.

286. It is our view that, in the light of the report of the Secretary-General, the non-nuclear States have a right to demand from the nuclear States an undertaking that they will not use or threaten to use these weapons. We hope the nuclear Powers understand not only our genuine hope, but also the legitimate fears of non-nuclear States. It is with this consideration that Uganda welcomes the convening of a meeting of non-nuclear States. We hope that the meeting will serve as a forum, whereby the non-nuclear States will discuss mutual problems relating to the insecurity created by the fact of nuclear weapons. My delegation reserves its right to speak further on this item at the appropriate time.

287. In conclusion, we call for a substantial manifestation of goodwill and generous purpose by all parties to sustain a co-operative effort in the furtherance of world peace and the survival of mankind. Each Member State should make a solemn declaration to contribute towards the peace, freedom and progress of the world. Let us compose our differences and resolve our quarrels peacefully and justly, to ensure the survival of all, and let us not underestimate the inherent value and the cumulative effect of small contributions to peace.

288. The time of decision is upon us, and we must act decisively and in concert. The imperative need of survival permits no other course.

289. Mr. LOPEZ (Philippines): It is a matter for regret that so little time is left to our Committee to discuss the items on disarmament. But this was unavoidable, for reasons known to all.

290. The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament states in its interim report [A/6951-DC/229/ that it has not been able to devote sufficient time to the consideration of the item, "Question of general and complete disarmament" and the item, "Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America". It has, however, held a valuable discussion on the item, "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests" and it has also given intensive consideration to a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Although a final draft has not emerged, the Committee feels that it has made substantial progress.

291. As one of those who voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 2153 A (XXI), adopted on 17 November 1966, my delegation welcomes the interim report. While recognizing the progress which the Committee has made, we would nevertheless express the earnest hope that a final draft of the non-proliferation treaty will soon be forthcoming. The Honourable Narciso Ramos, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, in his policy statement before the General Assembly on 25 September 1967, referring to the draft treaty to halt the spread of nuclear weapons, said:

"The gravest of perils would confront mankind if the draft treaty submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union . . . were to be unduly delayed or to fail to be adopted. We hope, therefore, that the treaty will soon take its place as another milestone on the long and difficult road to general and complete disarmament, together with the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, the nuclear test-ban Treaty of 1963, and the Treaty on outer space of 1967. . . ."13

292. As regards the various aspects and problems of disarmament, I should like briefly to summarize and reiterate our views as follows:

(1) Disarmament measures, in our view, should be implemented from beginning to end under strict and effective international controls which would provide firm assurance that all parties will honour their obligations. Strict international control of disarmament measures at every agreed stage should lead to international security and result in confidence among nations in disarmament negotiations.

(2) The creation of nuclear-free zones is a step towards the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We believe, therefore, that the creation of such zones deserves encouragement, provided it is freely agreed to among the countries in a given region and among all the nuclear Powers.

13 *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1566th meeting, para. 108.

(3) The prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons has meaning and value only in the context of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Only a verifiable agreement to halt the production of nuclear weapons and to destroy existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons can guarantee the prevention of nuclear war.

(4) The elimination or dismantling of foreign military bases should also be accomplished in the context of general and complete disarmament. It is the sovereign right of a State to demand the elimination of foreign military bases on its soil, or to agree to let them remain. Every State is the best judge of what is required to safeguard its national security.

293. We would now wish to comment briefly on the report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of those weapons [*A/6858 and Corr.1*]. First of all, we should like to express our appreciation to the Secretary-General for this report and would particularly commend Mr. Vellodi, as Chairman, and the group of consultant experts from Poland, Mexico, the USSR, Sweden, France, Canada, Japan, Nigeria, the United States, India and the United Kingdom. This report, which has been quoted many times by previous speakers, speaks for itself. It not only authoritatively describes the fearful, devastating effects of the unlimited use of nuclear weapons, but also shows the dangers arising, and which could arise, from the use of so-called tactical nuclear weapons in future wars.

294. The report also analyses, in technical and statistical terms, the economic and security implications of the acquisition and further development of nuclear weapons. Such a document can have only a sobering effect on all who read it, whether they represent nuclear or non-nuclear Powers. It draws attention to the fact that the vicious spiral of more powerful offensive nuclear weapons provoking the development of more effective defensive systems, and vice versa, can only create a sense of insecurity for which there is no cure. It analyses the theory of nuclear deterrence, but reaches the inevitable conclusion that the risk of nuclear war will remain, as long as nuclear weapons exist. The report warns non-nuclear Powers of the heavy financial cost of maintaining an arsenal of nuclear weapons, pointing out that the burden could become increasingly insupportable as the desire for greater security increases. It draws attention to the risk which such countries run as a result of unforeseen changes in their international relations or the need to establish systems of control within their borders.

295. The report of the Secretary-General and many of the scholarly discourses we have heard in this Committee constitute a most awesome testimony to the nameless havoc which nuclear weapons could wreak on man and his works and on the planet he inhabits. One could wish it were true that, even if man does not fear nuclear annihilation, he would at least be deterred by the fact that nuclear weapons are too expensive to make and to keep.

296. All these many years since the beginning of the atomic age, we have done our best to scare and frighten one

another. In speech after speech, we in this Committee and the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva have gone through the familiar ritual of describing in even more lurid and frightening detail the irreversible finality of nuclear devastation and annihilation. Since we do not seem to be moving from the brink of the abyss with more alacrity than before, we may conclude that man is tough-minded and does not scare easily. In my own view, man is either very brave or very stupid.

297. I believe we may all agree that we have exhausted the possibilities of fear as a goad, a spur to make nuclear war, whether by design or by accident, totally impossible. What we need is not fear which can become dulled with repetition, nor courage which one can pretend to have. All we need is a certain conviction that the life of man upon the earth is a plus-value in the totality of creation, and that it is a good thing to tend, to nourish and to perpetuate till the end of time. If we believe this, then we are prepared to say, in effect, that man is a sensible being and can be expected to think and act the part.

298. In accordance with these observations, we strongly endorse the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.413 and Add.1-2, which calls for the reproduction and wide distribution of the Secretary-General's report throughout the world. Our attitude towards the other draft resolutions will be governed by the views we have just expressed.

299. Mr. CORREA DO LAGO (Brazil): In keeping with one of the basic principles upon which the foreign policy of Brazil has traditionally been founded, namely the maintenance and strengthening of world peace and security, my country has consistently co-operated in all endeavours aimed at the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

300. We have always regarded general and complete disarmament as the final goal of any effort in the field of disarmament. In this connexion, we hold the view that collateral measures should not be conceived as ends in themselves, but as steps towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

301. Since the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, little or no progress has been accomplished in the field of general and complete disarmament. By mandate of the Assembly itself, through relevant resolutions adopted last year, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has devoted its efforts mainly to the task of negotiating a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

302. As we consider the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as a step on the road towards general and complete disarmament, we firmly believe that there should be a definite link between this partial measure and the final objective which lies ahead of us. We are convinced that the commitment of non-nuclear-weapon States to sign away their right to manufacture or otherwise acquire these weapons must be coupled with a specific and binding commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon Powers to take concrete steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles.

303. Our stand on the question of general and complete disarmament stems from three main considerations. First, the conviction that international security cannot in the long run be obtained through a process of accumulation and constant improvement of weapons. Quite on the contrary, we believe that true conditions of world security can only be reached through the improvement of political conditions and a gradual process of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The second important consideration is that the financial resources freed by disarmament measures should be channelled to the promotion of the social and economic advancement of the developing countries. Thirdly, the implementation of the measures that will gradually bring about the completion of the process of disarmament must not impose on the developing countries—precisely the countries which are practically unarmed—unnecessary and unjustifiable restrictions on their right to develop, by national means or in co-operation with other States, their own nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

304. Shortly after taking office, the President of Brazil defined, in a major foreign policy speech, our position on this matter. President Costa e Silva said on that occasion:

“We repudiate nuclear armament and are aware of the serious risks that the dissemination of nuclear weapons would bring upon mankind. It is imperative, however, that no actual or potential hindrances prejudice the full utilization by our countries of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Otherwise, we would be accepting a new form of dependence which is certainly inconsistent with our aspirations for development.”

305. Speaking last September before the General Assembly at the opening of the general debate, the Brazilian Minister for External Relations, Mr. Magalhães Pinto, stated:

“The adherence to the purposes of non-proliferation must not entail a renunciation by any country of the right to develop its own technology. On the contrary, Brazil, while supporting, as it always has, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, is convinced that the measures to this end should facilitate nuclearization for peaceful purposes. Such nuclearization for peaceful purposes should include the technology of nuclear explosives which might become indispensable for major engineering projects of significance for economic development.”<sup>14</sup>

306. We are all aware of the immense possibilities that the nuclear age has opened for mankind. Precisely because of the far-reaching prospects of the peaceful utilization of all forms of nuclear energy the developing nations—which constitute the large majority among non-nuclear countries—cannot without concern see any possibility that avenues of progress and economic advancement be closed to them.

307. The nuclear Powers are already exploring in practical terms new and promising fields of the peaceful application of nuclear energy. Only a few days ago the United States conducted a deep underground nuclear explosion for the purpose of liberating and putting to industrial use a deposit

of natural gas that would otherwise remain unexploited. According to press reports, the United States Atomic Energy Commission and a private enterprise shared the cost of the project, which from preliminary indications available, appears to have been successful.

308. This Committee has before it an interim report on the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament [A/6951-DC/229]. This report gives a very brief account of the status of current discussions and does not, therefore, reflect the positions of the countries participating in the negotiation of a non-proliferation treaty. It is known that the majority of these countries have submitted several important amendments, as well as comments and suggestions aimed at improving the identical drafts<sup>15</sup> presented by the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union. These amendments have not yet been fully discussed within the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. It is also known that negotiations have been delayed because the authors of the two drafts have not yet come to an agreement on the article relating to the implementation of the control system.

309. I do not intend to comment now on the Brazilian position, which is clearly reflected in the amendments which we have presented at the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, nor on the arguments which, in support of our stand, we have advanced in Geneva. At this stage, I wish only to reiterate our support for a non-proliferation treaty as a definite measure towards general and complete disarmament; and it is precisely because we believe in the objectives of such an international instrument that we want it to be universal, effective, and lasting. By its very nature, a treaty aimed at preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons is addressed mainly to the countries which do not possess such weapons; any agreement which failed to command widespread support from these nations would perforce fail to fulfil the essential requirements of universality, effectiveness and durability. It is our hope that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament will soon be able to produce a draft treaty with such characteristics and we are determined to spare no effort to contribute to the achievement of this end.

310. We should now take a formal decision to resume the twenty-second session of the General Assembly to consider a full report of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on the negotiations concerning a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons when such a report is ready for submission.

311. In this connexion we have studied with great care draft resolution A/C.1/L.416. We find ourselves in agreement with its spirit and with its main purpose of providing an early occasion for the General Assembly to hold a full debate on the results of the Geneva negotiations. On the other hand, however, we feel that the setting of a precise date would hardly be of assistance to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in finishing its task more rapidly or more efficiently. On the contrary, the fixing of a definite target date could considerably reduce the chances that adequate negotiations of the question of armed

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 1562nd meeting, para. 18.

<sup>15</sup> See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/230 and Add.1, annex IV, sects. 6 and 8.



proliferation would be properly carried out. For these reasons, we fully agree with the views expressed today in this Committee by the representative of Italy. My delegation too reserves its position regarding that particular aspect of draft resolution A/C.1/L.416.

312. We have also before us the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [A/6817]. This report was prepared in accordance with resolution 2153 B (XXI) in which the General Assembly decided that this conference should be held not later than July 1968. My delegation feels that the non-nuclear nations should have ample opportunity to discuss, with the participation of nuclear-weapon Powers, the various issues and far-reaching implications of matters of vital interest to them. In fact, such issues and implications go well beyond those raised by the non-proliferation treaty itself. For these reasons, my delegation supports the holding of the Conference in Geneva in March 1968, as recommended in the report of the Preparatory Committee.

313. I turn now to the question of the complete cessation of nuclear-weapons tests which is also under consideration in our debate today. The original parties to the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty have often reiterated, since the signing of that instrument in 1963, their intention, stated in the second paragraph of the preamble, to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and their determination to continue negotiations to this end. In the framework of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, Brazil and other countries have put forward a number of suggestions aimed at reducing the area of disagreement that up to now has prevented further progress towards a comprehensive test ban. We express the hope that progress may be achieved in this field during the forthcoming sessions of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia have tabled, in connexion with this question, a draft resolution [A/C.1/L.414 and Add.1]. We trust that the Committee will recommend its adoption by the General Assembly.

314. Our Committee has also before it the report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons [A/6858 and Corr.1]. It is a factual and able report which offers a clear presentation of the problems involved, supported by valuable data. I should add that Brazil is fully aware of the squandering of resources and of the dangers that would result from the acquisition of nuclear weapons. We have already renounced nuclear weapons. We renounced nuclear weapons when we signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco [A/C.1/946] and are convinced that all investments in the nuclear field should be designed to promote social and economic development.

315. As we discuss today the main issues connected with disarmament, we cannot ignore recent indications that the nuclear arms race is gaining new momentum as a result of the announced establishment of anti-ballistic missile systems and the prospective orbiting of nuclear warheads. Nations that have devised and perfected the most impressive arsenals ever assembled seem to be engaged in the first

stage of yet another round of sophistication of armament, bringing the arms race to even higher levels.

316. When we meditate on the state of disarmament negotiations as compared to the hard facts of international life, we cannot but feel dismayed at the thought of new and ever more powerful weapons. However, by the very nature of our position in the context of disarmament negotiations, we cannot afford to lend ourselves to unrealistic despair. Quite on the contrary, we are perfectly aware of our responsibility within the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. We shall continue to exert our best efforts and imagination to contribute in the quest for measures that may bring about substantive progress towards our final objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

317. Mr. DENORME (Belgium) (*translated from French*): The debate which this Committee traditionally devotes each year to the question of disarmament constitutes the most important item on its agenda, and is in a sense the hub of all its activities.

318. However, this time things are different. The Eighteen-Nation Committee, which has been meeting for several weeks at Geneva, has had to adjourn without being able to put the finishing touches to the work entrusted to it. Although the gap between the various views has been appreciably narrowed, there are still difficulties in the way of a draft treaty on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Eighteen-Nation Committee will resume its work on 18 January 1968; meanwhile we have only a skeleton interim report.

319. My Government does not conceal its disappointment at the slow progress made in the Geneva discussions, but it nevertheless continues to hope that the efforts to attain the objective set will be successful before too long, once the Committee resumes its work.

320. Belgium has never concealed its sympathy or stinted its whole-hearted support for the task on which the Eighteen-Nation Committee already has done such excellent work. My country sees this as an extremely important and far-reaching step in man's struggle to halt the arms race which threatens to sap his energies and perhaps in the long run to wipe out his civilization.

321. What has convinced us of the need to give our full support to such an agreement and the laudable example it sets is its decisive nature. It signifies that we are keeping our eyes fixed on the ultimate objective, which must always be general disarmament, controlled and balanced and backed by adequate international supervision.

322. In the meantime, my Government considers it important not to scorn any progress, however modest, which could be made in what might be called the fields akin to disarmament. More precisely, the conclusion of an international agreement banning underground nuclear weapon tests would be a logical and welcome adjunct to the treaty on non-proliferation.

323. These debates provide my delegation with the opportunity to sound a new alarm signal; in the face of the

terrifying development of the destructive power of nuclear weapons, we must realize that time is running out to save mankind from catastrophe. The Secretary-General's report, equally impressive for the quality of its documentation and the impartiality of its conclusions, embodies an apocalyptic vision of the aftermath of nuclear conflict. The report is unanimously endorsed by scientists and specialists of all nationalities and ideologies. We can rest assured that the warning it contains will have a genuinely universal impact and thus help to stimulate among all nations, and especially those that have been singled out for the purpose, the

unflagging search for a disarmament formula, on which the future of the world depends.

324. The CHAIRMAN: I have no more speakers on my list for today.

325. Before we adjourn, I should like to announce that Upper Volta and Uganda have become co-sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.413 and Add.1-2. Finland has become a co-sponsor of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.414 and Add.1.

*The meeting rose at 7.45 p.m.*