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Chairman: Mr. Omar Abdel Hamid ADEEL (Sudan).

AGENDA ITEM 28

The Korean question (continued):

(a) *Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and rehabilitation of Korea (A/5213 and Add.1, A/C.1/877, A/C.1/882, A/C.1/883, A/C.1/L.322);*

(b) *The withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea (A/5140, A/C.1/869, A/C.1/877, A/C.1/882, A/C.1/883, A/C.1/884 and Corr.1, A/C.1/L.322, A/C.1/L.323)*

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. DUGERSUREN (Mongolia) said that the withdrawal of foreign troops, and above all of United States troops, from South Korea was the main requirement for a successful settlement of the Korean question and for the elimination of a dangerous source of conflict in the Far East. The transformation of South Korea into a military base and colonial possession of the United States was the main obstacle to the reunification of Korea on a peaceful and democratic basis.

2. That important problem was the internal affair of the Korean people. No progress towards a solution had been made as a result of the decisions taken by the United Nations over the last fifteen years of the work of the so-called United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), whose one-sided composition indicated its true worth. The United States and its allies sought to justify the illegal occupation of South Korea by United States troops under the United Nations flag on the ground that the refusal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to accept United Nations decisions made their presence necessary. But the decisions in question were not valid decisions of the United Nations; they had all been forced through by the United States and its allies in violation of the Charter. That was why the Democratic People's Republic could not accept them. The United States and the military fascist régime in South Korea had done nothing to further the real aims of the Organization, but instead had destroyed all democratic rights and freedoms. In an

article in the July 1962 issue of the London monthly, *Eastern World*, the President of the Korean Affairs Institute in Washington had pointed out that despite the money and lives expended by the Western Powers in South Korea there was no democracy, peace or prosperity there, but only moral degradation and tyranny. Yet the Western Powers continued to represent it as a democracy.

3. The occupation of South Korea by United States troops had had extremely adverse effects on the cultural and economic as well as the political life of the people. In economic affairs, in particular, there was a striking contrast between South Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In a very short time, the workers of the Democratic People's Republic had overcome the aftermath of colonialism and war and had turned their country into a developed industrial and agricultural economy. Until recently an importer of industrial equipment, the Democratic People's Republic was now able to satisfy its own basic needs and even to export some kinds of machinery. The output of the machine-building and metal-working industry had been 120 times greater in 1961 than in 1946, that of the mining industry sixteen times greater, that of the metallurgical industry twenty times greater and that of the chemical industry five times greater. Light industry also had developed rapidly and all mass consumption goods which had formerly been imported were now produced in the country. As a result of mechanization, electrification and irrigation programmes, rapid progress had been made in agriculture. The area of cultivated land had been more than six times greater than in 1944, and grain production had more than doubled since 1946. Great successes had been achieved in education, public health and culture. A quarter of the population was receiving education. Hundreds of thousands of engineers and technicians had been trained in various sectors of the economy; their numbers had doubled over the preceding four years. The number of hospitals and of doctors also showed a great increase.

4. The situation in South Korea was quite different. By 1961, over 80 per cent of industrial enterprises had either ceased production entirely or had been working below capacity, and a press agency report had noted that the enterprises still in operation were working at 10 to 20 per cent of capacity. The South Korean authorities had themselves recognized that the unemployment rate was 24.2 per cent of the total population; and all they could promise was that by 1966 they would have reduced it to 14.4 per cent.

5. In those circumstances, industrial output was naturally falling. In addition, the area of cultivated land had fallen by half a million hectares in 1961, and in 1960 grain production had amounted to only 60 per cent of the 1936 figure. South Korea, which in the past had exported rice, had become a land of chronic famine.

The situation was just as bad in education and public health. The number of children unable to go to school increased every year, while the number attending higher educational institutions was falling. By July 1961 twenty-one such institutions had been closed down and over the past four years the number of students had fallen by 66,410. Of those who succeeded in obtaining higher education, 80 per cent could not find employment. Because of the extremely low standard of living and the absence of medical services, the population suffered from many endemic diseases. The fact that the suicide rate was the highest in the world showed how intolerable conditions had become. Of the 76,921 Koreans repatriated from Japan to the Democratic People's Republic between December 1957 and July 1962, 95.9 per cent came from South Korean families.

6. The United States occupying forces had committed innumerable barbarous crimes against the innocent population, including murder, rape, assault and robbery. It was clearly their presence which was the reason for the economic and political sufferings of South Korea.

7. Another urgent reason for the immediate withdrawal of United States troops was that, in violation of the Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953^{1/} they had transformed South Korea into a military base which threatened security in the Far East and throughout the world. There were over 50,000 United States troops in the country, and the South Korean army was 600,000 strong. Large quantities of weapons and ammunition, including nuclear weapons and rockets, had been sent to South Korea, which in the financial year 1960-1961 had received military aid amounting to \$250 million, or more than any other ally of the United States. The South Korean military authorities, encouraged by the United States, had repeatedly made provocative statements about reuniting the country by force, i.e., by destroying communism; a statement to that effect by General Park Chung Hee was quoted on page 24 of the memorandum of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of 24 November 1962, circulated under cover of document A/C.1/884 and Corr.1. Thus it was evident that their talk of peaceful unification was merely camouflage. The United States had recently been making an attempt to establish a new military and political bloc linking South Korea with Japan and Taiwan. There had been exchanges of visits by military leaders of the countries concerned and joint manoeuvres by their armed forces. Such developments could not but arouse concern.

8. The United States alleged that its troops had remained in South Korea in order to protect that country against the Communist menace from the North. That was nonsense; the Democratic People's Republic had no aggressive intentions, but had frequently made reasonable proposals for a peaceful solution of the Korean problem. Its latest proposals, which were contained in the memorandum of 24 November 1962, set forth a detailed plan for unification and would serve as an excellent basis for a solution. Unfortunately, the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.322) ignored them, demanding in effect that the Korean people should accept the rule of the military fascist régime in South Korea as a condition for unification. Since the North Koreans could not accept

that, the draft resolution was really intended to maintain the partition of Korea and the United States military occupation. His delegation would therefore vote against it. It also took exception to the report of UNCURK (A/5213 and Add.1), which was designed to justify the aggressive policy of the United States.

9. If the United States was allowed to continue its criminal activities under cover of the United Nations flag, great harm would be done to the Organization. The Korean people must be left to solve their internal problems without any foreign interference. The first condition for Korea's peaceful unification, therefore, was the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea. The South Korean people themselves were showing increasing understanding of the proposals put forward by the Democratic People's Republic. It was most regrettable that representatives of the Democratic People's Republic had not been invited to participate in the First Committee's discussion, since they represented the true interests of the people of Korea. The decision not to invite them had been imposed on the Committee by the United States, out of fear. It was to be hoped that at its current session the General Assembly would take action to further the interests of the Korean people and remedy its previous mistakes in that respect. His delegation would support the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.323), which was fully in accordance with the position of his Government.

10. Mr. ZEA (Colombia) said that his country had been one of the sixteen which had answered the Security Council's appeal of 27 June 1950 for assistance to the Republic of Korea in repelling North Korean armed aggression. That United Nations military action had been taken to defend the principles of the Charter, principles which were also reflected in the fifteen-Power draft resolution, of which his delegation was a sponsor.

11. The present Government of the Republic of Korea, as could be seen from the report of UNCURK (A/5213, para 22), was making sincere efforts to bring about the peaceful unification of Korea as an independent democratic State. It had also undertaken to establish a new constitution, with a system of representative government based on respect for the human rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. In contrast, the unification sought by the North Korean régime amounted in fact to the subjugation of the entire peninsula to Communist tyranny.

12. In the contest between the two opposing systems for acceptance by the peoples of the world, the Communist Governments frequently spoke out loudly for the right of peoples to self-determination, but they seldom applied it in practice, as could be seen from the enslavement of the people of East Germany. In a world in which part of humanity still had to be kept by armed force from choosing its own system of government, there was little hope of progress toward disarmament or the elimination of war.

13. In considering the question of the withdrawal of United Nations forces from Korea, the Committee should examine carefully the validity of the charges brought against the United Nations troops by the Government of Communist Korea, charges which had been repeated by the representatives of the Soviet Union and Mongolia. It was clear from the statements made by the representatives of the United States, Greece and other countries, as also from the statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Re-

^{1/} Official Records of the Security Council, Eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1953, document S/3079, appendix A.

public of Korea and above all, from the report of UNCURK, that the United Nations forces in Korea had served the purposes of law and order, not those of unrest, and that they embodied the determination of the United Nations to defend a people against any attempt to suppress its rights and freedoms. His delegation was convinced that any improper actions by individual members of the United Nations forces had been and would be appropriately punished. The United Nations was in Korea to guarantee the defence of the Korean people, and its forces must remain in the country until that goal was achieved; they would do so not as occupation forces but as guardians freely accepted by the people and the Government of the Republic of Korea in the exercise of their full sovereignty. There was no evidence, aside from the statements of certain speakers belonging to the Soviet bloc and the assertions of the North Korean authorities, to support the allegation that the presence of United Nations forces in Korea was preventing the unification of the country. The United Nations forces in Korea were not keeping a particular Government in power against the wishes of the people or preventing the holding of free elections; nor did any of the General Assembly's resolutions relating to the situation in Korea contain any expression which would justify such a charge.

14. Korea could be unified only through free elections or a plebiscite conducted by secret ballot. That procedure had been proposed by the present Government of the Republic of Korea, and by the United Nations in several resolutions. If the North Korean authorities agreed to it, if they pledged themselves in advance to abide by the results of free elections held under United Nations auspices, there would be no need to keep any United Nations forces in Korea and the unification of the country would be a foregone conclusion, to the great benefit of international peace. In reality, however, the North Korean Communist authorities recognized neither the principle of free elections nor the authority of the United Nations, and the territorial integrity of the Republic of Korea was threatened by the presence of Chinese Communist forces near its borders. Under those circumstances, the Assembly could not possibly agree to the withdrawal of United Nations troops, as proposed by the Soviet Union, without endangering world peace.

15. The fifteen-Power draft resolution reaffirmed the objectives of the United Nations in one of the most significant collective actions in the Organization's history. His delegation was confident that it would receive the full support of the Committee, and he hoped that its purposes would be achieved, so that the Korean people could fulfil their aspirations for a better life with peace and justice.

16. Mr. BUDO (Albania) said that for the past seventeen years the northern part of Korea had been a free, independent State, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, while the southern part, occupied by United States armed forces, had been a United States colony and a military base intended for aggression against North Korea, the People's Republic of China and other peace-loving Asian countries. In the fifteen years during which the Korean question had been before the United Nations, the latter, instead of contributing to its settlement, had furthered the ends of United States policy by taking unlawful measures and setting up unlawful bodies which served to prolong the partition of Korea and to keep South Korea under United States colonial domination.

17. As his delegation had pointed out at previous sessions of the General Assembly, the question of Korea's unification was one to be settled by the Korean people, and the main obstacle to its settlement was the presence of United States armed forces in South Korea. Hence, the sole task of the United Nations in the Korean question was to ensure the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from South Korea. The methods employed until now in dealing with the problem were contrary to the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter, including that of non-interference in the domestic affairs of States, and to the right of peoples to freedom, independence and self-determination. The General Assembly should abandon its past approach and, in particular, should dissolve the so-called United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, which was an instrument of United States policy. In addition, it should extend an invitation to the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which had the full support of the people of North Korea and the sympathy of the entire Korean people, to participate in the discussion of the question of withdrawing foreign troops from South Korea. The statements made before the Committee by the representatives of the South Korean puppet authorities had shown that those authorities could not speak on behalf of the people of South Korea and were interested only in defending the aggressive policy of their United States masters.

18. United States troops had landed in South Korea in September 1945 and, taking advantage of their mission of disarming the Japanese army, had proceeded to put into effect long-standing United States plans for colonial domination of Korea. Those plans were the logical corollary of United States imperialist policy in the Far East, a policy which had already made itself felt by the beginning of the second half of the nineteenth century. Unlike the Soviet army of liberation, the United States military authorities had established in their zone a rule of tyranny and terror, controlling all aspects of Korean life and committing many crimes against the people of South Korea.

19. In pursuance of its policy of domination, the United States had tried to occupy the whole of Korea, using the Syngman Rhee clique to attack the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 25 June 1950. That had been a premeditated act of armed aggression planned by the United States; evidence for that charge could be found in the war preparations known to have been carried out, as also in unchallengeable documents, statements made by responsible persons in the United States, Western publications and the statements of many witnesses. According to the testimony of Kim Il Shik, former Minister of the Interior in the Syngman Rhee Government, United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had advised Syngman Rhee in June 1950 to attack North Korea and to declare that the attack had come from the North, so that the United States could compel the United Nations to mobilize armed forces on side of South Korea. The New York Times of 22 June 1950 had quoted Mr. Dulles as saying after conferring with General MacArthur in Japan, that the United States would take "positive action" to preserve peace in the Far East; that positive action had proved to be the outbreak of the Korean war followed by large-scale United States intervention. The United States had used the United Nations as a screen for its own purposes, as planned, and had brought about the adoption of illegal Security

Council resolutions labelling the Democratic People's Republic of Korea an aggressor and authorizing an armed attack against it under cover the United Nations flag.

20. In spite of the devastation of their country and the atrocities committed by the invading United States troops, the Korean people, with the help of the Chinese People's Volunteers and with support from the socialist countries and all peace-loving peoples, had crushed the aggressors. Nevertheless, the United States Government had failed to learn the lesson of the Korean war. Nine years after its end the United States, in violation of the Armistice Agreement of 1953, was still keeping armed forces in South Korea and had brought large quantities of modern weapons, including nuclear weapons and guided missiles, into the country. The strength of the South Korean Army, under United States command, had been raised from sixteen divisions at the end of the war to thirty divisions at the end of 1956 and had been further increased since that time. On 14 June 1961, the Associated Press had quoted General Lemnitzer, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States, as stating that the strength of the United States forces in Korea had been increased by 15,000 men in 1961. The arms build-up in South Korea had also been confirmed by other Western and South Korean sources. The United States had established in South Korea a large number of military bases equipped with nuclear weapons; the territory of South Korea had been converted into a strategic military outpost for aggression in the Far East. All that aggressive activity had necessarily increased tension in the region and had created a threat to world peace.

21. The total subordination of the country to the preparations for a new war had produced economic and social disaster in South Korea. Martial law had been in force for more than a year, South Korean patriots fighting for independence and unification had been oppressed and terrorized, and the atrocities and crimes committed by United States troops were increasing. All political parties and social organizations had been dissolved and many publications had been banned; individual liberties no longer existed, and the people were living in misery under a fascist terror. South Korean industry had collapsed: only 10 to 20 per cent of existing plants were in operation. The rural economy had been ruined; more and more farm families were becoming victims of famine. But although South Korea had been transformed into a hell on earth, the South Korean people were still struggling for freedom and independence. The present South Korean Government, like the previous ones, was powerless to solve the political crisis because it was merely an instrument of United States policy. The only way to improve the situation and create the conditions for a rapprochement between North and South Korean authorities would be to remove the foreign troops from South Korea and eliminate all foreign interference in its internal affairs.

22. In contrast with the tragic situation in South Korea the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had successfully rebuilt North Korea and was improving the people's standard of living. Industrial production had been 7.7 times greater in 1960 than in 1944, and the collectivization and mechanization of agriculture had made possible an unprecedented increase in agricultural production, so that North Korea was now able to produce everything it needed. The material and cultural successes achieved by the Democratic People's Re-

public of Korea were evidence of the wisdom of its Government's policies and of the complete popular support they enjoyed. The people and Government of North Korea regarded the resources thus created as the common heritage of the entire Korean people, but the United States occupation of South Korea was preventing the people of that part of Korea from sharing in those benefits and from advancing hand in hand with their North Korean brothers.

23. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea had constantly endeavoured to bring about the unification of Korea, which would not only fulfil the aspirations of the Korean people but also constitute an important factor for peace in the Far East. On 25 October 1962 the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Democratic People's Republic, in a speech to the Supreme People's Assembly, had made the following constructive and realistic proposals: the withdrawal of United States armed forces and the conclusion of an agreement between North and South Korea, each side pledging itself not to resort to armed force against the other and to reduce its armed forces to 100,000 men; the elimination of tension between North and South; the organization of economic and cultural exchanges; the establishment of a confederation; the creation of a Supreme National Committee, including representatives of both Governments, to settle questions of national interest, the two political systems existing in Korea being retained; free and democratic general elections, when the necessary conditions had been ensured, with a view to the establishment of a single central Government and the achievement of the complete unification of the country. Those proposals were notable for their realism, stressing the indispensable prerequisite of the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea and providing for progress in stages as the conditions for complete unification were established.

24. In a letter dated 21 June 1962, distributed under cover of document A/C.1/869, the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic had also made constructive proposals to the South Korean authorities. In addition, on the same day it had addressed an appeal, also contained in document A/C.1/869, to all countries to help bring about the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea and the annulment of all illegal United Nations "resolutions", so that the Korean question could be settled by the Korean people themselves.

25. The United Nations should expose and reject the United States pretext of a Communist threat from North Korea; as the recent example of Cuba showed, the bogey of communism was frequently used by the United States to justify its policy of aggression and world domination. The so-called United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea was an illegal agency which served only as an instrument for justifying United States occupation of South Korea; the General Assembly should dissolve it at once. The United Nations could help to bring about the peaceful and democratic unification of Korea and the strengthening of peace and security in the Far East only by ensuring the withdrawal of all foreign troops from South Korea.

26. Sir Patrick DEAN (United Kingdom) said that the similarity of the debate to those which had taken place on the same subject in previous years might lead some to ask whether any purpose was served by repeating old arguments and proposals. The answer to that question was that the interests of the Korean people were at

stake. For sixteen years their country had been forcibly divided along an arbitrary line; they had lived through a bitter war, and the peace since the end of that war had been a most uneasy one. They had a right to a real and lasting peace based upon the unification and independence of their country. When the United Nations had first taken up the Korean question it had become the custodian of that right. It could not abandon its responsibility merely because no useful results seemed to be being achieved.

27. The issues involved could be understood properly only by considering the whole history of the question. Since other speakers had already dealt with that history, however, he would confine himself to three particular aspects of the problem. First, as to the basic objectives of the United Nations in Korea, it should be noted that both before and after the invasion launched in 1950 by the North Koreans, the United Nations had emphasized its determination to see Korea reunited by means of free elections throughout the country to establish a truly representative Government. To that end it had set up first the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, and later the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK). As stated in its latest report (A/5213), UNCURK had continued to seek an early settlement of the question, although its role had been limited by the persistent refusal of the North Korean authorities to accept the United Nations principles and resolutions as a basis for unification. The North Korean régime remained adamantly opposed to the United Nations objectives in Korea. For example, its belief in democracy could be judged from the fact that in the recent elections in North Korea the candidates in 383 constituencies had been returned unopposed with the support of 100 per cent of the electorate. The United Nations must continue to call upon the North Korean authorities to accept the objectives of the United Nations until such time as they complied.

28. Secondly, concerning the question of foreign troops, there were admittedly non-Korean troops in South Korea, but they were there as agents of the United Nations as a whole and not of any one particular Power. As was stated in General Assembly resolution 1740 (XVI), and again in the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.322), most of the United Nations forces had been withdrawn, and the Governments concerned were prepared to withdraw the remaining forces when the conditions for a lasting settlement had been fulfilled. That was the view of the United Nations, and it was a reasonable one. Furthermore, the presence of those troops had been requested by the Government of the Republic of Korea, in exercise of its sovereign right. The reason for that request was the fact that when on a previous occasion United States forces had left Korea, the North Koreans had promptly invaded the South and United Nations intervention had been necessary to drive them out again. If, as the Soviet Union proposed, the United Nations forces were entirely withdrawn, South Korea would have no guarantee against a repetition of those events, particularly since what went on in North Korea was concealed from the rest of the world, and even from UNCURK.

29. Thirdly, the present political situation in the Republic of Korea had given rise to some highly tendentious criticism by the Soviet Union and its supporters. The establishment of a truly democratic system in a new country was not easy, and the South Koreans had encountered their full share of difficulties. But the proper determination was undoubtedly there. In Au-

gust 1962 the Acting President of the Republic of Korea had expressed the will of his people to create a new and workable democracy suited to existing conditions in the country. According to its report, UNCURK had been given assurances by the leaders of the military Government that it continued to support a peaceful and democratic settlement in accordance with the United Nations principles, including that of peaceful reunification.

30. If the discussion of the Korean question had taken on a cold-war aspect, that was the fault of the Soviet Government. In particular, it was unnecessary for the Committee to be deluged with propaganda literature. But the First Committee must continue to do its best to deal with the issues as objectively as possible. His delegation hoped that UNCURK would continue its work until the unification of Korea was achieved, and that it would go on giving what assistance it could to the Republic of Korea in its efforts to build up the country on a sound economic and political basis. As one of the sponsors, the United Kingdom would naturally support draft resolution A/C.1/L.322, the provisions of which derived logically from the views he had put forward. It found the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.323), on the other hand, quite unacceptable, particularly since operative paragraph 2, although seemingly innocent, would have the effect of perpetuating the division of the country.

31. Mr. HAJEK (Czechoslovakia) said that a peaceful solution in Korea was being prevented by continued United Nations adherence to positions imposed by the policies of the United States. That was apparent from the exclusion of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the only real representative of the Korean people, from participation in the First Committee's proceedings, as well as from the report of UNCURK and the statements of its supporters in the Committee. That report appeared to be intended merely to justify the continued existence of UNCURK, which had always been a product and an instrument of the cold war. It failed to make clear the complete absence of representative government in South Korea and the economic failure and bankruptcy of the system which had been installed and was being maintained in South Korea under the protection of United States troops.

32. Not only the socialist countries but even a number of Western observers had recognized the true facts of the Korean situation. Writing in the October 1961 issue of the quarterly review *Foreign Affairs*, the Harvard scholar Edward Wagner had stated that South Korea was ruled by a military junta which had imprisoned thousands. The failure of United States policy in Korea, he had said, had been hidden from the public in the United States. Four thousand million dollars in economic aid had failed to lift the South Korean economy above bare subsistence levels. In contrast, he had gone on to say, the North Korean reconstruction effort had met with remarkable success; and the United States thus faced the possibility that Communism might present the impoverished and police-ridden people of the South with an increasingly attractive alternative.

33. The failure of the United States in Korea should not be endorsed once more by the authority of the United Nations. The fiction of North Korean aggression against South Korea, which had been repeatedly cited by the United States and its supporters to justify the existing situation in Korea, was doubted even by objective Western historians. Its only real basis was the fact

that the South Korean attack against North Korea in 1950 had been promptly beaten back by the North Korean Army; the legend of North Korean aggression had been created simply to secure and retain the cover of the United Nations flag for the illegal actions of the South Korean puppet army and of the United States. Even in countries whose Governments had supported those actions, grave doubts had now arisen with regard to their justifiability and effectiveness.

34. Nevertheless, the Committee now had before it a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.322) calling on the United Nations to endorse the bankrupt United States policy in Korea and the extension of dictatorial misrule from South Korea to the whole of Korea by means of a rigged election. The Committee could not accept such a proposal.

35. The South Korean armed forces had been built up with foreign help, and, contrary to the provisions of the Armistice Agreement of 1953, the occupation of South Korea by foreign troops had been prolonged. According to data available in South Korean statistics, 72 per cent of the foreign assistance received by the South Korean State had gone to military aid and only 28 per cent to the development of the economy and to technical assistance.

36. The United States had also built its own military establishments, including atomic bases, in South Korea, and had infringed the sovereignty of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by violating its air

space and territorial waters. As many representatives had stated during the Committee's debate on general and complete disarmament, foreign military bases in a country did not help to guarantee its independence but instead, by increasing tension, exposed it to greater danger. That view clearly applied very particularly to the United States armed forces in South Korea.

37. The authority and prestige of the United Nations, for which some spokesmen had expressed concern, could only be jeopardized and weakened by the repetition of old legends and lies about the Korean war; such conduct was contrary to the purposes, spirit and letter of the Charter. A peaceful settlement in Korea could be achieved by adopting the proposals made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the economic and cultural rapprochement of the two parts of the country, the creation of a confederation and the holding of free elections in the whole of Korea without foreign interference.

38. If the Members of the United Nations wished to help the Korean people to establish order in their country, unify it and set up a Government serving their national interests, they must put an end to the illegal misuse of the Organization in the Korean situation, dissolve UNCURK and withdraw foreign troops from South Korea. His delegation therefore fully supported the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.323).

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.