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Chairman: Mr. Francisco URRUTIA (Colombia).

AGENDA ITEMS 20 AND 68

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments: report of the Disarmament Commission (A/2685, A/C.1/751, A/C.1/752/Rev.1) (*continued*)

Conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction (A/2742 and Corr.1, A/2742/Add.1, A/C.1/750) (*continued*)

1. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from French*): There are three speakers on my list — the representatives of the Netherlands, Greece and the United Kingdom. The representative of Australia had asked to speak first and the three delegations I have just mentioned have agreed to this. I therefore call on the representative of Australia.

2. Sir Percy SPENDER (Australia): I desire to thank the Chairman and also my colleagues for permitting me to make a brief intervention.

3. The purpose of my intervention is to deal with the observations which I made on 13 October [688th meeting]. I can assure the members that I will not take up much of their time on this occasion. My purpose is simply to clear up any misunderstandings that may exist regarding the proposal I made in the course of my remarks last time. A number of representatives who have spoken since then have mentioned their interest in my suggestion for the establishment of a sub-committee of the First Committee to clarify the position of the parties on the great issues now before us. Besides this, I hope I shall not be out of order if I mention that a number of friends on this Committee have spoken to me outside our meetings about my suggestion and asked me certain questions about it. It is simply to fill out the picture of what I was suggesting on 13 October that I am speaking today, though I am still merely putting forward an idea and not yet making a formal proposal.

4. I might say that I myself have lived long enough to know that no one has any monopoly of ideas, and I

am always ready to welcome comments and suggestions for improving anything that I may put forward.

5. I think I should make it clear, also, that I have never suggested and do not now suggest that we will be able in this general debate to settle the differences between the Powers. I have had sufficient experience, I think, not to hold any such expectation. But I do assert that this Committee must have these issues defined before they go back to the Disarmament Commission or to the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission.

6. I do not think I need rehearse again in full the reasons which prompted me to make my suggestion. What the Australian delegation is seeking in this matter is clarification. The parties in this matter, the Western Powers on the one side and the Soviet Union on the other, have put forward sets of proposals which are as yet no more than working papers, but in which we all have a direct and vital interest. To use a mathematical simile, these proposals appear to us to be in places parallel, in places divergent and in other places intersecting. We believe it to be our duty to find out precisely where and to what extent this may be so.

7. I said on 13 October that this Committee might set up a sub-committee, a body whose exclusive function would be that of obtaining — and I see no reason why it should not be obtained quite quickly — clarification as to precisely how these matters stand between the principal parties. I said that this sub-committee of the First Committee should not, in my view, be charged with the task of attempting to negotiate or to reconcile the differences between the principal parties, because such negotiation and reconciliation would be beyond its competence. I agree with the representative of Canada and with other representatives who have spoken in support of the Canadian draft resolution [A/C.1/752] that such process of negotiation and reconciliation should be attempted — but this should be done later — within the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission which met in London earlier this year.

8. I hasten to add that, as I see it, subject to any direction this Committee may resolve to give to the Disarmament Commission, my suggestion in no way conflicts with the idea expressed in the Canadian draft resolution. This draft resolution, at a later stage, after this Committee and the General Assembly have carried out their duty of ascertaining precisely how things stand, certainly seems to me to recommend action which it would then be appropriate for the United Nations to take.

9. I should now like to repeat, for the purpose of informing the Committee in a little more detail, how I think the machinery I have in mind might work in practice, and what I proposed on 13 October as the task of this sub-committee of the First Committee. As I said then, its functions should be: to report upon the

precise nature of the issues between the parties; to report upon the extent to which there has been any agreement in principle or detail on any of those issues; to report upon the principles and details of differences; and to report upon the nature of such proposals as have been advanced designed to bridge those differences.

10. Under the last heading, it might be appropriate if the sub-committee made a recommendation, if such a step seemed justified by the clarifications obtained, regarding a subsequent method or methods which the First Committee might employ in carrying out its examination of this problem, so that our responsibility in this matter might be fully discharged. Although such a recommendation might be procedural in nature, I do not believe that this Committee or the General Assembly — which, after all, bears the primary responsibility in this field, whatever subsidiary bodies it may set up to represent it — can appropriately return this question to the Disarmament Commission until it has fully examined all aspects of the respective attitudes adopted by the parties. Indeed, I think it essential that any direction to the Disarmament Commission, if such a direction can be worked out or may in fact now be necessary, should be worked out now and the matter not left to be the subject of disputation in the Disarmament Commission itself.

11. In performing these most useful and, to my mind, obligatory functions in terms of our duty in this matter, the assistance of the Secretariat should be requested. The Secretariat could assist in the production of working papers, for example, setting out in the form of objective analyses the comparative positions of the great Powers on the methods and the timing which might eventually lead the United Nations to the conclusion of a world disarmament treaty. This would provide a convenient basis on which the work of the sub-committee which I suggest could proceed. Should a sub-committee be appointed in accordance with my suggestion, the Secretariat might usefully act as its rapporteur.

12. Regarding the functioning of the sub-committee itself, I am not bound to any particular course of action, and I would be most grateful to hear from other members of the Committee who feel that there is some virtue in my idea, how they think things might best be arranged.

13. So far as timing is concerned, I feel that this sub-committee of the First Committee should be established as soon as possible, perhaps even next week, and that, having been given precise terms of reference under which it would seek to clarify the issues, it should be asked to submit a report to the First Committee within quite a short time, say a week or ten days at the most.

14. This I believe may be done under the procedure governing this Committee by dealing with my suggestion as a procedural one, as in truth it is. Alternatively, it would be open to the First Committee at the end of this general debate to consider my proposal in the form of an appropriate draft resolution and to adjourn, for the short time required, further consideration of the substantive motions before it until the sub-committee's report is presented to this Committee.

15. I believe that the full value of the work of such a clarifying sub-committee of the First Committee would really be felt when, at the close of our general debate, the Committee came to consider the draft resolutions

before it, and in particular the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union delegation. I believe it to be particularly important this year that we should see things quite clearly, because when the positions of the great Powers have been narrowed down, as may be the case this year, it is most important to ascertain the precise meaning of any residual divergence between their positions.

16. What I mean by this is that when one has two draft resolutions before a committee on a matter like disarmament, one from the Soviet Union and one from the Western Powers, it is fairly easy to decide between them when one of them contains provisions utterly unacceptable to the other side and from which no retreat is made. This year, it may be that slight divergences apparent in some places will widen, upon careful examination, into chasms revealing once again the familiar obstacles. On the other hand, we may in places be near the closing of the gap.

17. I hope that this second intervention of mine has not proved too long, and that the informal suggestion I have made to the Committee is now perfectly clear. Regarding the composition of such a sub-committee as I have suggested, and indeed regarding all other aspects of the idea I have put forward, I should be most grateful to have the comments of other representatives. On the question of composition, my delegation does have its own ideas, but I do not feel that it would be appropriate to put these forward until we know better how the Committee feels about my suggestion, and whether there will be sufficient support for it from this Committee.

18. Mr. DE KADT (Netherlands): As the representative of a small country, I feel that though this issue is a vital one for my Government and my country, my statement should be very brief. It should be brief because, whatever we think or feel, it is primarily the position of the great Powers which decides whether success or failure is to result from the way in which this vital question is handled. The most we, the smaller countries, can hope for is to exert a moral influence in the direction of a realistic, justified and balanced system of armaments reduction, compatible with the security of us all.

19. It is our firm conviction that every avenue leading to the goal of disarmament should be explored and that this exploration should, first of all, be carried out by a small group consisting of the representatives of the Powers principally concerned, that is, of the nations which can deliver the goods. These representatives should earnestly try to come to positive results. If business has to be done there, it is obvious that it would stand a better chance in confidential and straightforward talks in closed session where undue stress on propaganda accents can more easily be avoided.

20. But before these representatives of the major Powers go to work, they should know what is in the minds of the smaller nations which, together, represent a very considerable part of our world. They should know what is thought and felt by our peoples and by our governments. It is for that reason that the general debate in the Committee is of great importance and that my Government, for one, wants to make a contribution, be it a brief one, to this general exchange of views.

21. It is not to discriminate against any of the statements made so far in this Committee that I state that we were especially impressed by the speech made here by the representative of France [685th meeting], in which, according to the best traditions of French logic and clarity, he tried to arrive at a better understanding of the Soviet draft resolution on disarmament [A/C.1/750]. There is nothing to be gained by vagueness in a matter of life and death, and we should not only know precisely the meaning of every word and every formulation in a certain text, but we should also be quite clear as to how the machinery of disarmament will work, if and when it begins to function, with full regard to the security of us all.

22. My Government wholeheartedly welcomes the proposals of France and the United Kingdom on disarmament [DC/53, annex 9], as it also welcomes the working paper put forward by the United States [DC/53, annex 4]. For us, the proposals and the working paper are inseparable. Together and undivided, they are a plan for the promotion of peace and simultaneously a way to implement peace. I would venture to say that if one were to take only the proposals and combine them with some sort of a machinery of quite another and perhaps defective type, one would not come to peace but to suicide. To be a member of a suicide club has no great attraction for us, even though some may think that by definition we belong to a "decadent bourgeoisie".

23. Therefore, when we have before us a draft resolution said to be based upon the Franco-British proposals, this in itself is no guarantee as to the way this resolution will work out. One could, on the same basis, erect either a United Nations building or a prison, and we really prefer the United Nations building.

24. As we look at the Soviet draft resolution, we have not the slightest inclination to reject it out of hand. But we have not the slightest inclination, either, to proclaim that in accepting it, unaltered and unclarified, we have given real support both to peace and to our own chances of survival. In its present form, and with its present implementation, the Soviet draft resolution, in our view, would only support peace, to use a well-known phrase of Lenin's "as the rope supports the hanged ones"—a phrase, as Mr. Vyshinsky will remember, used by Lenin in his pamphlet on "radicalism", in order to clarify the meaning of the support the Communists should give to the leaders of the labour parties and the trade unions. Whether this kind of support also clarifies the Soviet meaning of "peaceful coexistence" is a subject I will not enter into for the moment, because I really think that as much as we may differ in principle and in intentions, a pattern for living together in the same world can be organized and should be organized.

25. But if that is to be achieved, a great deal depends on the organization, on the machinery, on the scope and the stages of disarmament. We wholeheartedly endorse what was said on this subject by Mr. Lloyd of the United Kingdom [685th meeting], by Mr. Wadsworth of the United States [687th meeting] and by Mr. Martin of Canada [688th meeting]. In this connexion I have no intention whatsoever of dwelling on the past or arguing about the responsibilities for the tensions and dangers by which we are surrounded. These tensions and dangers are with us every day and every night. We can dispel them only by patiently and

stubbornly building a controlled disarmament system and a controlled peace.

26. We are at best beginning the preparation for tackling the subject, and this is no time for rejoicing; neither should we harbour any illusions that our task may be accomplished during this session of the Assembly or in the near future or in an easy manner. But let us prepare for the practical beginning of a realistic task, and let us recommend to the representatives of the nations primarily concerned that they try to see whether they can come to an agreement on the setting up of efficient machinery for the controlled elimination of certain arms and the reduction of armaments and armed forces, as well as for a controlled peace. This is no matter of drafting formulas on peaceful coexistence or other fine-sounding conceptions. The most noble conceptions of peace are embodied in the Charter. Nor is it of vital importance whether the Soviet Union thinks that in a world of peace its way of life will triumph, while we believe that in a peaceful world the proof to the contrary will be furnished. The basic important thing at this stage of the world's development is that there should be real peace.

27. A real, measurable, balanced and controlled reduction of armaments and elimination of weapons of mass destruction, from which enhanced security can result, will be one of the very important factors to that end. My Government is willing to be as helpful in this direction as a government of one of the smaller and peace-loving nations can be.

28. I only want to add two more remarks. First, as for the Canadian draft resolution [A/C.1/752], we agree with it in principle, but we are still open to suggestions that may be made during the general debate. Sir Percy Spender's suggestions, which were clarified today, seemed to us, for instance, to have a great constructive value, and we feel that public opinion in many countries will get the firm impression from them that this Committee and the Secretariat of the United Nations are trying to help the Disarmament Commission's Sub-Committee—which, I repeat, has to do the real job—to obtain a complete survey of the whole issue. There is, as far as we see it, no antagonism between a draft resolution based on Sir Percy Spender's suggestions and the Canadian draft resolution. But does our time-scheme allow us to combine both drafts? Sir Percy Spender, speaking before me, tried to clarify that by saying all this would be possible, and we, for the moment, can only say that we are inclined to support the Australian suggestion, but that we can decide only at a later stage of the discussions.

29. Secondly, it goes without saying that as long as there is no agreement on the general issue of disarmament now before us, our governments will have to take all the measures necessary for their security which they think vital for that purpose. So when I hear that *Pravda* writes that the success of disarmament proposals in this Assembly is dependent upon the rejection of the London agreements, I must come to the conclusion that the Soviet proposals for disarmament are linked with the Soviet campaign to halt the arming of Western Germany. Now my Government has accepted the London agreements, and it is not going to abandon its position as long as there is only a mirage of peace before us. There can be no surrender, whether conditional or unconditional, to these Soviet demands; there can only be endeavours to come to agreements on

disarmament and peace which will not jeopardize our vital security. Being realists, we must repeat: peace and disarmament cannot be proclaimed, they have to be organized.

30. Mr. KYROU (Greece): It may perhaps be recalled that in a short intervention in the Committee's discussions on 13 October [688th meeting], I referred to the disarming spirit and the disarming tactics which should prevail in the consideration of the present item. I did not do that in a jocular way, for I believe that the idea of and the necessity for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments should first take a firm hold on our hearts and minds. The creation of a climate of mutual trust and confidence is the preceding condition to any translation into concrete facts and definite measures of the aspirations which, I am sure, we all share in common. Conciliation and compromise together with willingness to conform to the shifting realities of actual life are the factors conducive to the creation of such a propitious atmosphere.

31. I had the honour to represent my country in the Disarmament Commission when that commission was painfully making its first steps. I still recall — may I say with dismay — the gap which separated the opposing views and the sterile and disappointing spirit in which our labours were conducted. This gap assumed abnormal proportions when propaganda items, like the one on bacteriological warfare, were brought up for discussion. I remember that at that time any proposal formulated by Mr. Moch or by any Western Power was foredoomed to a summary rejection by the Soviet Union. The reverse was perhaps no less true. Mutual distrust and suspicion blocked the way to any meeting of minds.

32. The situation, thank God, has markedly improved since then. We all were gratified to hear Mr. Vyshinsky state, in the General Assembly on 30 September [484th meeting], that his Government was in principle agreeable to the Franco-British memorandum submitted on 11 June 1954 to the Disarmament Sub-Committee in London. This is, of course, a general statement of principle, and we would be grievously mistaken were we to think that what seemed only a few weeks ago an intractable problem could be miraculously solved by a magician's wand. Furthermore, I believe that we would be remiss in our duty as members of the First Committee were we simply to "pass the buck" to the Disarmament Commission with no other directive or assistance than our heartiest wishes for the success of its labours. In my delegation's humble submission, based on the bad experience of the year 1952, the Disarmament Commission could not usefully tackle the many-faceted problems entrusted to it unless we — the First Committee — pointed at least the direction in which is to be found the solution to the all-important question of control.

33. Up to now the two basic notions of disarmament and control seemed desperately to move around a vicious circle. While the suspicion of the East laid stress on the notion of disarmament at the expense of the twin, and in fact inseparable, notion of control, the mistrust of the West took the opposite stand. This mistrust was inevitably fed by the failure of all endeavours to work out a foolproof system of adequate controls. The new approach, which I called the disarmament spirit, could break the present deadlock and turn the *circulus vitiosus* into a *circulus virtuosus*.

34. In this change of international atmosphere — and in this I fully agree with what has just been said by the representative of the Netherlands and with what the representative of Yugoslavia said yesterday [689th meeting] — the small countries have a useful role to play. Their combined efforts could contribute to a further lessening of international tension. The past is rich both in comforting and in disappointing experiences. While leaving the latter to sink into oblivion, we could promote and expand those factors of international life which hold in them the promise of a better future.

35. Only two days ago, the Chairman of the Soviet Union delegation, in a letter to the President of the Security Council [S/3305], referring to the agreement initialled in London on 5 October 1954 concerning the territory of Trieste, stated:

"In view of this circumstance" — namely, that this agreement has been reached as a result of the understanding between Yugoslavia and Italy as the countries immediately interested and is acceptable to those countries — "and also of the fact that the above-mentioned agreement between Yugoslavia and Italy will promote the establishment of normal relations between them and thus contribute towards a relaxation of tension in that part of Europe, the Soviet Government takes cognizance of the above-mentioned agreement."

One now should bear in mind that only a year ago the Soviet Union, on the basis of a strictly legalistic approach, was strenuously opposed to any revision of the provision of the Peace Treaty with Italy regarding the Free Territory of Trieste, if such a revision was not formally undertaken by all the signatory Powers. It is only in the light of the original position of the Soviet Union that the full measure of its present adjustment to the realities of life can be assessed.

36. Let us hope that the lesson will not be lost on those who, in the year of grace 1954, persist in their faith in the spirit of the Holy Alliance and consequently oppose friendly arrangements which would bring up to date situations which are dangerously outstripped by events. It is by a constant renovation brought about by friendly agreements between the parties directly involved that new life can be infused into antiquated institutions or unsatisfactory situations. It is my delegation's hope and prayer that a similar spirit of political and ethical renovation will pervade the members of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee when they set out, once more, but — this time — with much brighter hopes, in search of solutions to the problems of disarmament and control.

37. May I, in absolutely the same spirit, refer for a moment to the eventuality of the Security Council opposing by the veto a decision of the control organ. May I suggest that one of the possible solutions to that crucial problem could be a formal engagement taken by the five permanent members of the Security Council to waive their right of veto in the specific case of disarmament.

38. My delegation is favourably inclined with regard to the proposal submitted by Canada. This proposal has by now been sponsored by three out of the four other members of the Disarmament Sub-Committee of London and we are informed that, under certain conditions, the fourth member is disposed to join this distinguished company. We appreciate very much the

spirit and aspirations embodied in that text. We also share the eagerness of the sponsors to assure world public opinion that no effort will be spared and no avenue will be left unexplored in order to arrive as soon as possible at fruitful results. In this work of enlightenment of public opinion and of the creation of favourable conditions for the accomplishment of the mission entrusted to the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee, the small Powers again bear a larger responsibility than the sum total of their populations and the extent of their territories may imply. The psychological factor is of primary significance in matters of trust and confidence.

39. The representative of Canada was perfectly right in stressing the other day that a useful purpose would be served by having the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee convene early in November so that these bodies may be able to submit their first report to the General Assembly during its current session.

40. For the same, mainly but not exclusively, psychological reasons which have prompted Mr. Martin's suggestion, I would also respectfully suggest to this Committee that it should be made clear that even after the end of the present session it will not be necessary to wait until the tenth session in order to have the forthcoming reports of the Disarmament Commission considered by the General Assembly. I believe, indeed, that it would be proper to give the Secretary-General of the United Nations an *ad hoc* mandate to convene a special session of the General Assembly if, in his opinion, general circumstances and the progress of the Disarmament Commission's efforts warrant such an action.

41. Just a word now on the suggestion Sir Percy Spender clarified this afternoon. Together with the representative of the Netherlands, I would not like to take sides on the suggestion until a later stage or, more particularly, until the end of the general debate, if, at that time, as I hope, it proves unnecessary to set up a sub-committee of this Commission, but rather to make an immediate decision on the Canadian proposal.

42. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom): I apologize to my colleagues for intervening in this debate again, but I want to try to review the position as I see it at present. I propose to disregard certain remarks of a rather controversial nature which have been made in the course of one or two speeches and try to stick strictly to the topic of disarmament.

43. We have had some valuable contributions from representatives of countries which were not members of the Disarmament Sub-Committee. I am not going to make comment today on the procedural aspects, as to what we should or should not do next, but I think that we would all do well to ponder carefully the idea put forward by Sir Percy Spender. The purpose of my intervention, as I have said, is to try to clarify the situation in which we now find ourselves and to try to do it in the spirit of hard-headed realism which certainly animated the speech of the representative of the Netherlands.

44. After the London talks, the differences between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers on disarmament were crystallized. The Soviet Union, on the one hand, was demanding the unconditional prohibition of nuclear weapons and what it called the simultaneous institution of strict international control over the implementation of that prohibition. This meant that

prohibition on the use, possession or manufacture of nuclear weapons was to come into operation before any agreement had been reached upon the powers, rights and functions of the control organ and before the agents of the control organ had been positioned in all the countries concerned. There would be no security, no guarantee for any of the Powers concerned that agreement would eventually be reached on the institution of a control organ.

45. Secondly, the Soviet Union was demanding a one-third cut in the armed forces of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Such a cut, apart from the question of the verification of existing levels, would only leave the relative strength of the Powers concerned the same. The existing disequilibrium would be continued.

46. Thirdly, the Soviet Union was demanding acceptance of an unconditional, unsupervised ban on the use of nuclear weapons as a precondition for the discussion of any disarmament agreement.

47. The Western Powers were unable to accept these three propositions. Their position was that agreement should be reached on a disarmament convention including, among other things, provisions for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, for a major reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments of all nations and the establishment of an effective international control organ. An essential part of such a convention was that the control organ must be created and its officials stationed in all countries concerned ready to supervise the various prohibitions and reductions agreed upon before those reductions and prohibitions began to take effect.

48. The Anglo-French proposals of 11 June, which I have already explained at length in this Committee, were an attempt to set out the kind of programme which we had in mind for giving effect to our principles.

49. That was the position of the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and of the Western Powers on the other hand. That was the position at the end of the Disarmament Sub-Committee's talks. That was also the position at the end of the Disarmament Commission's meetings in New York in July.

50. Since then, we have had Mr. Vyshinsky's speeches of 30 September [*484th plenary meeting*] in the General Assembly and in this debate in this Committee [*686th meeting*], and we have had the Soviet Union draft resolution. We all noted with satisfaction that the Soviet Union draft resolution accepted the Anglo-French proposals as a basis for an international convention. What, however, we have to examine carefully is the extent to which the proposals in the Soviet Union draft resolution really do constitute acceptance of the Anglo-French memorandum as a basis.

51. On one point it is clear that the Soviet attitude is now more in accordance with that of the Western Powers. The Soviet Union no longer asks for an unconditional, immediate and unsupervised ban on nuclear weapons as a prior condition to the examination of other proposals. That is a new attitude on its part; that is an advance.

52. With regard to reductions of armed forces and conventional armaments, I am not altogether clear as to what is the present Soviet position. I do not know whether the Soviet Union is still demanding a proportional cut. I think — and I repeat, I think — that the Soviet position is that it has not abandoned its idea of

a proportional cut but it does not, at the moment, insist upon it. The Soviet Union Government apparently prefers the idea of a proportional cut to the proposals put forward by the Western Powers in May 1952 for the fixing of certain levels. At the same time, however, the Soviet Union Government is apparently prepared to examine any method of agreeing on reductions in conventional armaments and agrees that whatever reductions are decided, they should be effected in two stages.

53. I hope that is a fair statement of what, it seems to me, is the Soviet position on this question of a proportional cut in armed forces and conventional armaments.

54. There is, however, one further point with regard to this aspect. In his speech of 11 October [686th meeting], Mr. Vyshinsky asked why it was that in the Anglo-French proposals reference was made to agreed levels and not to ceilings or maximum levels. I think there must be some misunderstanding here. I cannot, myself, see the difference between agreed levels or maximum levels. In my view, the agreed levels would be the maximum level of armaments which each Power would be permitted to maintain. What those levels should be would be a matter for discussion and negotiation, category by category. In my opinion, we have now reached a point, so far as weapons are concerned, at which we should be able to decide what weapons shall be on the prohibited list, and what weapons shall be on the list of those to be reduced. We should now be able to discuss those matters together with profit. In other words, there is no reason why we should not now agree on the scope of a disarmament convention and inaugurate negotiations on the amount of the reductions to be made, category by category.

55. I express no final opinion now as to how this should be tackled. Perhaps a sub-committee of experts from the countries represented on the London Sub-Committee should be set up to survey this field. I do not envy them their task, but it is something which some day will have to be done if we are ever to get a disarmament treaty. I have no desire, in making this suggestion of a sub-committee of experts, to bog the matter down. I want progress, although I recognize as a matter of fact that there is so much work to be done that progress cannot be rapid in these technical matters.

56. So much for the first group of problems in my original classification, and, as I have said, so far as the United Kingdom delegation sees it in that field, it was open for the kind of examination to which I have just referred.

57. What is not so clear in my mind is how much progress will be possible in other directions. I have studied carefully Mr. Vyshinsky's interventions in this debate. I am afraid that there may still be a very wide gap between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers on the question of "phasing". It is true that the Soviet Union agrees that there should be a first phase of conventional disarmament — to the extent of 50 per cent of the agreed reductions — before nuclear weapons are tackled. That is certainly a change from its former position. But we have to look at the second phase in the Soviet Union plan, set out in its draft resolution, and consider exactly what that second phase amounts to, what its plan for the second phase amounts to.

58. This second phase or stage provides for the second half of the reduction in conventional armaments and armed forces, for the whole process of nuclear disarmament — that is to say, a prohibition on use, manufacture and retention of nuclear weapons — and for what is called the simultaneous institution of a standing international control organ. That really is very much what previous Soviet Union plans have amounted to. Up to now it has suggested a percentage reduction in conventional armaments and armed forces, a total elimination of nuclear weapons, and supervision by strict international control; all three processes to be carried out simultaneously. The only change in the new Soviet draft resolution is that it is prepared to permit 50 per cent of the reductions in conventional armaments to take place before the commencement of the second phase. There is that change with regard to the first half of the agreed reductions, although none of our questions has been answered about the nature, functions and authority of the interim control committee. Nothing has been put before us to suggest that that control committee would have effective powers or that it would be set up in time to exercise them effectively.

59. I think, therefore, that the second stage in the new Soviet proposal amounts to something very similar to the old proposals which we have discussed again and again before. May I make it perfectly clear that I am saying this, not to throw cold water or to discourage or to make political points, but simply in order to give this Committee the results of the critical analysis to which we have subjected the Soviet proposals and the Soviet speeches.

60. I say again, there are no short cuts in this matter. There are no easy simple formulas. We have got to be certain that we understand one another and exactly what each of us means. We have got to hammer out between us an agreed solution. I make no complaint, and never have done, of our proposals being subjected to critical analysis, but I think that it is only right to do the same to the Soviet proposals; and may I repeat that, in the absence of an agreement about the constitution, functions and powers of the control organ, it is impossible to have real agreement on disarmament. Unless it is agreed that the officials of the control organ should be stationed in all the countries concerned before any of the agreed programme comes into effect, and stationed there with adequate powers, no country can be expected to implement any programme that may be agreed. Those are the basic principles of the Anglo-French memorandum.

61. It is not satisfactory to blur these questions with the doctrine of simultaneity, even though, as I understand it now, the period of simultaneity has been changed to six or twelve months. I therefore put to Mr. Vyshinsky two perfectly clear questions capable of "yes" or "no" answers, not cross-examining him or subjecting him to bombardment, as he said of Mr. Moch, but two questions which must be answered before the position between us can be understood. I hope Mr. Vyshinsky does not resent my putting these questions. In his speech of 11 October [686th meeting, para. 4] he said that he wanted to be dealt with in this manner and to be asked:

"Yes or no" . . . are you for this or for that? Have you abandoned a certain position or not? Do you accept a certain proposal of ours which we made long

ago, or do you not? Do you still maintain your stand, or have you now given it up?"

62. I am asking him two very simple questions capable of being answered "yes" or "no". First of all, does he accept that there must be agreement as to the nature, function and powers of the control organ before countries begin to carry out the agreed disarmament programme? That question is capable of being answered "yes" or "no". My second question is equally simple, I submit. Does he agree that the officials of the control organ should be in position and ready and able to function in the countries concerned before—and I repeat the word "before"—those countries begin to carry out the disarmament programme, yes or no?

63. If Mr. Vyshinsky answers those questions in the affirmative, then the way to further progress will indeed have been opened, and if he says "no" we shall at least know where he stands on those two matters. I really believe that we have to clear our minds. We have to have the position of each country clearly defined upon those two questions which, as I see it, are fundamental, before any progress can reasonably be expected. Those two questions are questions of timing and, as I say, if they are answered in the affirmative then it may be possible to make further progress. But in any case they leave out of account the constitution, powers and functions of the control organ, and therefore I must try to deal with those now.

64. I listened with care and attention to the thoughtful speech—if I may so describe it—of the representative of Yugoslavia yesterday [689th meeting]. He appeared to me to express doubt about the possibility of strict international control. He seemed to me to suggest that if there was provision for enforcement of the programme of disarmament that would involve such strains and stresses that the world would be torn apart in the process. He suggested, in effect, that a disarmament convention would work only if there was mutual confidence, and that we would have to rely upon the force of public opinion, upon moral forces, to procure obedience. I have not quoted at length from his speech or even used his own words, but I hope I have not misrepresented the thought behind what he said.

65. I agree, with respect, that there is point in what he says. I agree that before it would be possible to inaugurate a disarmament programme, there would have to be an increase in mutual confidence throughout the world. Before countries will permit the agents of a control organ to come upon their territory, there will have to be a further *détente*. To that extent I submit with respect that the argument of the representative of Yugoslavia is valid. I will also go with him to the extent of agreeing that if there is a wilful violation of a disarmament treaty by a great Power, particularly in the nuclear field, then either there will be a world war or the disarmament convention will collapse. I think that in practice it would probably be the latter rather than the former. It would be a tragedy, but it would be the lesser tragedy.

66. But in spite of what he said, I adhere to what is the basic principle in the approach of the United Kingdom to disarmament, namely, that the international control organ must have wide discretion as to its investigations—and I do not think the representative of Yugoslavia would necessarily quarrel with me on that point—and also must have wide authority to take interim action against violations. I shall develop both those points.

67. First of all, with regard to wide discretion as to investigations, the Soviet draft resolution states that the international control organ shall have full powers of supervision, including the power of inspection on a continuing basis—I presume of the factories and so on concerned—to the extent necessary to ensure the implementation of the convention by all States. Under that conception, the control organ would have to have wide powers.

68. It therefore is common ground between us that the control organ would have to have wide powers, and it is a matter to be hammered out in detail between us. What would those powers be? Would the agents of the control organ have freedom of access everywhere throughout the territory of the State in which they were positioned? Would they be able freely to inspect every industrial undertaking, every research organization and every nuclear plant to ensure that armaments were not being clandestinely manufactured?

69. At one time it was suggested that the control agents should have power to inspect only if they had evidence of a breach—if they had evidence upon which suspicion could be founded. To my mind that is quite inadequate. They must have the right of most thorough investigation. Of course, such a right would have to be exercised with moderation and common sense. It would be ridiculous if they were to seek to inspect every factory every day, and there would be many places where occasional—very occasional—inspection would suffice, but they must have the right to go and inspect at any time they think fit. They must also be made familiar with research work being undertaken. It would be necessary to train a body of international scientists, experts in their various fields, who would be capable of evaluating work which was being done and certifying that it was not being done for warlike purposes.

70. In the sphere of conventional armaments, I do not believe that it would be beyond the wit of man to devise a scheme proof against both wilful and involuntary departures from the rules. On the other hand, when we come to the nuclear field, the problems are immeasurably greater. Mr. Vyshinsky himself, again in his speech of 11 October, mentioned, upon quoting Mr. Baruch, that one slight move of the control gauge of a machine producing atomic energy for peaceful purposes would result automatically in the same atomic energy being produced for warlike ends. I assume that that is no exaggeration, and that is the situation we have to face. Intermittent inspection certainly would not guarantee that the control gauge to which Mr. Vyshinsky referred was not moved.

71. The Baruch plan sought to meet this difficulty by international ownership of nuclear energy and nuclear plants. That was not acceptable to the Soviet Union. I do not debate here the merits or the demerits of that decision. The Western Powers have said that they are not tied hand and foot to the Baruch plan or the modified form of it called the "United Nations plan" but will accept any other plan which they believe will be as effective. It is a problem of surpassing perplexity, and the least we can do is to try to work out together the most effective scheme.

72. Obviously the control agents must be permanently stationed in every plant producing, processing and utilizing nuclear fuels. I put forward what I think was a new expression during the London talks when I said

that it seemed to me that those agents would have to exercise something akin to managerial control. By that, as I indicated, I had in mind the existence in each factory, parallel with the management and being taken into all its secrets, being party to all its proceedings, of a group of control agents. That would seem to me the best that we could do.

73. On this aspect of the matter — the powers of investigation, of inspection — I am not putting a series of questions to Mr. Vyshinsky for immediate answer, because I think that many of these matters do not admit of the answer "yes" or "no". But I suggest that in our next series of meetings upon disarmament, whether they are private talks or whatever they are, we have to try to get very much closer together as to the functions and powers of the agents of the control organ. And that will only be possible if we are prepared to examine, paragraph by paragraph, line by line, a working paper on the matter such as the United States paper. That is what we were ready to do in May of this year. So much for the investigation and inspection side of control activities.

74. The second aspect of control is that of enforcement. In the event of the discovery by the agents of the control organ of breaches of the treaty, what is to happen? What power of action are those agents to have? There are two schools of thought. One says that all that those agents should do is to serve notice upon the offending government that a breach has been discovered. When that has been reported to the central control authority, it would no doubt call upon the government concerned to stop breaking the treaty. If the government refused, the matter would then go to the Security Council for a decision as to punitive measures. But the actual agent on the ground, in position, would have the right only to serve a notice to call the attention of the government to the alleged breach.

75. That is one school of thought on this matter. But I do not belong to that school of thought. I believe that that is quite inadequate if there is to be real security. The agent on the spot has to have the power to give certain orders. If he is in Mr. Vyshinsky's factory, where the control gauge can be moved in one minute, he must have the power and the right to say to the manager of that factory: "Move back that gauge." If he is in a factory where warlike materials are being produced and the limit permitted under the agreement is being exceeded, he must have the power to say: "Stop further work; you have gone beyond the agreed limit." Until countries are prepared to surrender enough of their national sovereignty to give, by treaty, that power to officials of the international control organ, I do not believe there is the slightest chance of an effective disarmament scheme.

76. Of course, the factory manager concerned might refuse to obey the order. He might deliberately disregard the terms of a treaty signed by his government, imposing upon him the obligation to obey the orders of the control agency. If he did disobey such an order, and if his government supported him in that refusal, then the matter would, of course, come ultimately to the Security Council. But it would come on a short, simple point, a single clear-cut point: the refusal to obey a lawful order.

77. I agree that there would have to be provision for appeal against the order of the agent. There might have to be provision for compensation if the agent had

made a mistake. But, to my mind, if this plan is to be effective, the agent must have the initial right to stop the work at once. The argument must not be as to whether or not at some time in the future the work should stop. The system must not be such that it might require an endless series of arguments terminating in the Security Council before a breach of the agreement could be proved. That arrangement might be perfectly all right if one were dealing with the building of a battleship, of something which took years to complete. But, when one is dealing with the use of nuclear fuel, a long protracted arrangement such as that is just not good enough.

78. To put the argument in the simplest possible form, the question I am posing is this: do you have the argument before the work has been stopped, or after the work has been stopped? I cannot put it more simply than that. We feel that there can be security only if it is provided that the argument, the wrangle, the litigation, takes place after the work has been stopped. This second aspect of the powers of the control organ must be very carefully considered, and much detailed work will be required to translate into a practical code what I have just been putting to this Committee, if it is accepted.

79. I am afraid that I have never yet had from any representative of the Soviet Union any indication that the Soviet Union is prepared to accept my contentions either as to the discretionary power of investigation of the agency or as to the authority to be given to the individual agent. However, these are matters upon which we shall continue to seek to persuade, matters to which we shall seek to apply the same processes as were applied in London, processes of argument and persuasion which have resulted in a certain change in the Soviet position on certain matters.

80. In dealing with this question of enforcement, I also want to refer to a most important point dealt with by Mr. Vyshinsky on 12 October [687th meeting]. I understand that it is common ground between us — between all of us — that, whether or not injunctive powers are granted to the control organ, provision will have to be made for what is to take place if the orders of the control organ are disobeyed. Whatever powers you agree to give to the control organ, you have to make provision for what is to happen when there is a breach of the disarmament treaty. That is common ground.

81. Now, if the final court of appeal is to be the Security Council, are we to be faced with the position in which one or other of the permanent members of the Security Council will always be able to prevent effective enforcement measures by means of the veto?

82. Mr. Vyshinsky suggested on 12 October that recommendations of the control organ would normally be considered under Chapter VI of the Charter, which would prevent, as he indicated, interested parties from participating in any vote. I do not understand that proposition. Mr. Vyshinsky stated, according to the provisional record of the meeting, that "Chapter VI is devoted to punitive measures". That is not so. Chapter VI of the Charter is concerned with the pacific settlement of disputes. It is Chapter VII of the Charter which deals with punitive measures or, as described in the Charter itself, "Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression". There can be no doubt that recommendations

for enforcement action by the control organ would be considered under this chapter of the Charter and that, under Article 27, the Soviet Union or any other permanent member of the Council would have a perfect right to apply its veto.

83. That is not a position which the United Kingdom Government is prepared to accept with regard to enforcement. Some procedure must be found to ensure that breaches of the disarmament treaty are rapidly and effectively dealt with, although, of course, the ultimate sanction must rest with the Security Council. But saying that the ultimate extreme sanction must rest with the Security Council does not exclude a great deal else, short of that, being ordered by a body where the veto would not operate. I agree that the dividing line would have to be carefully drawn between the powers of the control organ, which would be clearly defined, and the general sanctions which would require the consent of the Security Council exercised under the general terms of the Charter. Those are matters for further public or private discussion between us, and they are matters which arise out of the second group of problems relating to the control organ.

84. I have said what I have in order to try to clarify the position between us, because I think it serves no useful purpose to blur over these matters and to suggest that we are on the verge of a comprehensive agreement.

85. To summarize my argument: the United Kingdom Government is prepared to sit down again, privately or otherwise, however it may be wished, whenever it may be wished, wherever it may be wished, and to seek to reach agreement with the Soviet Union and others principally concerned upon the weapons to be prohibited and the weapons and other things to be limited. We are ready to co-operate in seeking to agree upon the levels to which reductions should take place. We are ready to sit down and discuss with the representatives of the Soviet Union and others principally concerned the constitution, functions and authority of the control organ, and in such discussions we shall put forward again the ideas which I have outlined in this speech.

86. But if these further talks are to have any prospect of even limited success, it is necessary, I feel, that the Soviet Union should answer "yes" to the two questions which I have proposed today.

87. Let me make quite clear what I am saying. I am not refusing further discussion if Mr. Vyshinsky declines to answer, or even if he answers "no". I am saying that if the further talks are to be given the best chance of success—and, in any case, it is quite obvious that it is going to be a long and difficult business—then his answers to my questions should be "yes". Let me repeat them.

88. First, does the Soviet Union Government accept that there must be agreement as to the nature, functions and powers of the control organ before countries begin to carry out the agreed disarmament programme?

89. Secondly, does the Soviet Union Government agree that the officials of the control organ should be in position, ready and able to function in the countries concerned, before those countries begin to carry out the disarmament programme?

90. Only if the answer is "yes" to both those questions can we say that we have been given the green light to go ahead. Only if the answer is "yes" to both those

questions can we say that the Anglo-French proposals have really been accepted by the Soviet Union as a basis for a draft disarmament convention.

91. Mr. MOCH (France) (*translated from French*): I think that today's debate has made a useful contribution to the present discussion. I should like to make a few brief extempore remarks about, first, the statement of Sir Percy Spender, and then about that of Mr. Lloyd.

92. I should like to remind Sir Percy Spender that from the first day of the discussion, the French delegation said that it would support any suggestion which would help to clarify the problem quickly. I then listed the various methods of doing this. I pointed out that it could be done either in the General Assembly, by the usual method, or in a small sub-committee, similar to that set up in Paris in 1951—somewhat on the lines mentioned by Sir Percy—or in a sub-committee of the kind set up in London in 1954, that being the basis of the Canadian draft resolution [A/C.1/752].

93. It goes without saying that the French delegation will have to make a closer study of the Australian proposal, which, at first sight, aims to make what are known as the small and medium Powers—an expression which I dislike, for some small Powers are important on account of their civilization and the influence they exercise—a party to the work of clarifying the various points of view.

94. In reality, I think that my first statement, that of Mr. Wadsworth, that of Mr. Lloyd, and the two principal statements of Mr. Vyshinsky, come close to meeting the point made by Sir Percy Spender—the need for clarification and comparison—and that the results already obtained are not negligible. Obviously, all delegations should take part in this work and some of them have already made a useful contribution; in my opinion, this contribution should be encouraged. Offhand, however, I do not think, unless further study makes me change my views, that Sir Percy's proposal is the best. I think that it is here, in the General Assembly, that all views should be expressed, without any views being eliminated by the setting up of a semi-limited committee, if I may so call it.

95. I should like to take, as an example, the statement made just now by my neighbour—since Greece, in this room, is a neighbour of France, which is glad of that. That statement undoubtedly contained useful suggestions—and I shall revert to one of them in a moment—and they would not have been made if there had been a small committee of which their author was not a member.

96. Hence, at first sight, I think that the Canadian formula, which we incidentally were the first to support, is preferable to the other. I would add that it has been explicitly stated, both by the representative of Canada and by myself, that in our opinion this solution would not require more time than the minimum required for calling a formal meeting of the Disarmament Commission and for reviving its Sub-Committee, but that, subsequently, the Sub-Committee could meet while the First Committee, after completing its general debate and adopting a resolution, went on to other questions. I am certain that, whatever procedural difficulties might be invoked, if the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission were fortunate enough to arrive at a sufficiently substantial agreement while

the Assembly was still in session, we would all agree on a proper method of reopening the debate, either by asking for an additional item to be put on the agenda or by taking another vote, and that all the members of the First Committee would be pleased to hear the report of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission.

97. Thus, at first sight, the French delegation remains faithful to the Canadian proposal, and does not think that the two proposals can be combined by establishing first a semi-limited committee, within the framework of this Assembly, and then setting up the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission.

98. Such are the brief comments I wished to make on the second statement of the Australian representative.

99. I now come to the statement made by our colleague and friend, Mr. Lloyd. It is unnecessary for me to say that I am in agreement with him. It is a habit of fairly long standing to note the similarity of British and French views. I must start by pleading guilty. At the very beginning of this discussion, I put a considerable number of questions to Mr. Vyshinsky who adopted my expression of "inquisitor" and amiably accused me of having shelled him like a whole regiment of heavy artillery. I may have been wrong, though I did obtain replies to a few of my questions, because, in putting this running fire of questions which arose in my mind after a careful reading of the Soviet document, I probably did not sufficiently emphasize some which were much more important than the rest.

100. And, so, Mr. Lloyd coming up as a second wave, that is, with fresh troops, selected from among all the questions already put precisely those which were of vital importance. He divided them into two kinds — the questions to which, he thought, a categorical answer could be given and those which would require considerable technical discussion.

101. May I, in my turn, urge the Soviet Union representative to answer, at least in the way the United Kingdom representative wishes, the questions to which a categorical reply can be given?

102. Should there be agreement on the nature, the duties and the powers of the control organ before the various States begin to carry out the reductions provided for in the treaty? I do not see how this question could be answered in the negative. Let me suppose, for argument's sake, that I am tempted to say "no"; what would this mean? It would mean that each State would begin by carrying out the reductions laid down and that that would be followed by a discussion on whether it was possible to come to an agreement on setting up a control, in other words, that there would be no control. Thus we would come back to these uncontrolled reductions which, as everyone knows very well, are a purely theoretical concept, and no country would ever accept them.

103. Secondly do we agree that the officials of the control organ should be on the spot and able to operate in the countries where they have to exercise their control before these countries begin to carry out their reductions? That question almost stems from the preceding one. Indeed, when Mr. Vyshinsky, in his proposal of 30 September [484th meeting], offered the alternative of having the first phase completed in six or in twelve months, I wondered whether that was simply due to hesitation on the part of the Soviet delegation — which is hardly one of its habits, since

it knows where it is going and what it wants — or whether, on the contrary, it did not offer a possibility of reconciling the various points of view. For one solution would be to use both terms of the alternative at the same time and say that each phase should last twelve months — since that is what we are offered — but that the first six months should be employed in introducing the control and installing it ready for operation, the following six months being spent on the actual reductions.

104. At all events, I am convinced that each of our colleagues — and Mr. Vyshinsky the very first among them — is aware of the importance of the two questions extracted by Mr. Lloyd from the previous long list. I am convinced that a great sigh of relief and a great wave of hope would run through this room if the reply to these two first questions were in the affirmative. Then the discussion to which the other two questions, which have many technical and political aspects, must lead, would be facilitated and we should be near our goal.

105. In conclusion, I should like to say that these questions raised by both of us, each according to his temperament, style, and the general tone of these discussions, no doubt show certain divergencies which would not be obvious at first sight, but this is common to all discussions and the important thing, in my view, is that this has already produced some useful clarification. I should like to warn all of us against a pessimistic tendency — we have too long been the victims of pessimists, sceptics, scoffers, and disbelievers — against a tendency which could be expressed somewhat as follows: since definite divergencies, some secondary, some more serious, some really very considerable, still exist between the respective positions, no progress has been made and the misunderstanding has not been lessened. Such an argument is both wrong and harmful to the cause of peace. Some obscurities indeed remain, and some divergencies still have to be reconciled, of that we are all convinced. But it is nevertheless true — I have already said it but I wish to repeat it, because we all need, after wasting so many years, to learn optimism — that real progress has been made with regard to methods and principles, that the principle of unconditional prohibition has been abandoned and that the principles of the interlinking of phases and of disarmament by successive stages have been accepted.

106. It has become increasingly clear, after the most recent statements, that our efforts should be directed towards resolving the divergencies relating to methods of control. On this point, also, the French delegation reserves its right to make suggestions and to make a maximum effort to reconcile the various points of view, for I am convinced that, even in this delicate matter of the respective powers of the control organ and the Security Council, an agreement is possible and feasible. We shall then have to decide when the control is to be installed, another question about which there are divergent opinions.

107. All this is summed up in the two questions put by Mr. Lloyd, and I fervently hope that affirmative replies will be given which will enable us to tackle subsequent difficulties and solve them, and to make considerable progress along the road which it is our duty to follow.

108. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): We have just

heard a fairly detailed statement by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Lloyd, followed by a short statement by Mr. Moch. Before going any further, I must point out that we are being led into adopting an unsound procedure. The Committee began its work by putting twenty-five questions to me, as the representative of the Soviet Union. What strikes me as unusual is the fact that all these questions were largely rhetorical; they were based on pure, abstract logic or reasoning without any attempt being made to relate them to real and concrete facts. This is quite understandable, since until we reach agreement on the principles, it is difficult to discuss the practical form in which the principles will be applied.

109. Twenty-five questions were nevertheless put to me and in a form, which, as I frankly admitted at the time, I found a little embarrassing. I said I would have preferred it if the questions had been less theoretical. In the few answers I then gave I said that unfortunately the questions, or a large number of them at least, not only were not specific, but were not prompted by necessity; it might even be said that they were to some extent artificial, since it seemed to me, and still seems to me, that it will be necessary for us to reach agreement on a number of principles. The groundwork of those principles already appears to have been laid, since the Soviet Union has accepted the French and United Kingdom proposals of 11 June 1954 [DC/53, annex 9] as the basis of the future convention.

110. In my first statement, on 11 October [686th meeting], I attempted to show that what is stated in our draft resolution [A/C.1/750] — namely that we take the Anglo-French proposals as a basis — is in fact the truth, that we take precisely *these* proposals as the basis for our own proposals. In other words, the Anglo-French proposals are the basis of our own.

111. In this task, it seems, I was successful. I described in some detail the points of contact between, on the one hand, the Anglo-French proposals of 11 June 1954, on which we state our own proposals are based, and our own proposals on the other. I listed the points on which there really is agreement. I think I also gave a fairly objective account of the points on which we disagree, on which there is a divergency, a difference of opinion, between us. I refrained from any criticism of the point of view opposed to our own, as I did not wish — to use my expression at the time — to summon up the shades of the past, which I considered would be ill-advised. My aim was to take a positive line; it was not to demonstrate the errors of our opponents, but to indicate the points on which we wished to reach agreement and the basis on which we wished to reach it. That was what I set out to do.

112. During the past two days my words have apparently been taken to heart, since, with a minor exception, we have heard no more of the arguments which found their way into the statements of some representatives at the beginning of the debate. I expected to hear something rather different today, but again questions are being put to me, and with a vengeance! Mr. Lloyd may not have understood me the last time I spoke or rather, since I should like to take the blame for this myself, perhaps I did not express myself clearly. I certainly did not say that I wished to be asked whether my answer was “yes” or “no”. On the contrary, I said that was what I did not want. And I do not want it. I do not want it for

many reasons, and, first and foremost, because I consider that to put questions in such a way, to “negotiate” along such lines, rules out any possibility of negotiation. If I were to tell Mr. Lloyd that my position was such and such and that his position was such and such and to ask him to answer “yes” or “no”, what would he say? In my time as public prosecutor I scarcely ever resorted to such tactics in questioning prisoners standing trial. I always gave them ample opportunity to give their explanations as they themselves wished. Mr. Lloyd, on the other hand, seems to feel he is in the position of a cross-examiner and is trying to put me in the position of a prisoner standing trial. His predecessor, Sir Hartley Shawcross, who was then Attorney General of the United Kingdom, also tried to do the same thing, but later realized that this is not a courtroom, and that the position here is not one in which one party can put questions which the other party is compelled to answer. One party may put them and the other party may answer — this is the basis on which questions should be asked here. The thesis that one party “may” and the other “must” cannot be accepted as a method of discussion. I have too much respect for Mr. Lloyd to feel compelled to decline to answer him on this account. I also attach too much importance to the substance of the question and to the cause we all have at heart to be tempted to take offence at his formulation of his questions. But, if I may express a modest wish, I should have preferred their formulation to be somewhat different. I would rather they had not been put to me — with a vehemence quite alien to the British character — with a categorical request for an answer “yes” or “no”. How does Mr. Lloyd think that I could answer such questions?

113. I think it would be advisable to restate my position, if my previous explanations were inadequate. Again, I take the full blame upon myself. After that, Mr. Lloyd can decide for himself the implications of this request for an answer “yes” or “no”. That will be a matter for him to decide in the light of his convictions, intellect and understanding, for which I have the highest respect. But permit me to decline to accept categorical questions and to give categorical answers. Let us discuss these highly important questions together on a footing of equality.

114. What exactly were Mr. Lloyd's questions? I have asked for the text of his statement in which he put two questions. I listened to the interpretation, but it is not always accurate. What I understood him to say was: “First, does the Soviet Union Government accept that there must be agreement as to the nature, functions and powers of the control organ before countries begin to carry out the agreed disarmament programme?” I am a little surprised at such a formulation of the question, particularly at the present stage. We must, after all, study the documents.

115. Let me take, for example, a document such as the one containing our proposals of 30 September, which cannot easily be forgotten. What was the import of those proposals? What are we proposing? We are proposing the conclusion of an international convention on the reduction of armaments, the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction, setting out the provisions by which these matters are to be regulated. The convention is to deal with the reduction of armaments, the prohibition of atomic weapons and the organization of control.

116. Consequently, it will only be possible to give the direct reply Mr. Lloyd wished to have to his questions when the task of working out a detailed definition of the functions, powers and rights of the control commission has been completed; the reply will be the outcome of that task. But Mr. Lloyd asked me just now to give a straightforward answer on the question of "before" or "earlier". I might just as well ask him what he thinks should be done about armaments reduction, about the prohibition of atomic weapons and what he means by the statement that officials should be "in position". What does being "in position" mean? Does it mean that an inspector would arrive, take a room in a hotel and live there? Is that what being "in position" means? Or, on the other hand, does it mean that the inspector would arrive at a factory, go into the manager's office and tell him that he is the inspector and that full details of what the factory is doing must be served up to him on a silver platter? How does Mr. Lloyd understand the term? What does it mean? He asked me whether there must be agreement before disarmament is begun. But it should be perfectly obvious to him that this point will be dealt with in the international convention which will be concluded before we proceed to disarm. Why then does he ask me whether I "accept that there must be agreement as to the nature, functions and powers of the control organ before countries begin to carry out the agreed disarmament programme"? That is a question which he cannot answer himself.

117. Clearly, we first have to conclude an agreement, the international convention I have mentioned. Is that not obvious? All these matters will be provided for there; the two parties will no doubt propose different provisions and there may be differences of opinion between us, though I hope that this will not be the case. But as for giving an answer now, giving some guarantee or assuming some obligation or taking some sort of oath, I say let us wait awhile, let us meet around the table and begin our work on the convention. Whether there is to be a control organ and when it will begin to function will have to be laid down in the convention.

118. Mr. Lloyd's second question was whether the Soviet Union Government agreed that the officials of the control organ should be in position, ready and able to function in the countries concerned, before those countries began to carry out the disarmament programme. Again I have to give the same answer: this is a matter for the convention. We must work this out in the convention.

119. First it was suggested that there should be one convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons, another convention on the reduction of armaments, and a third convention on control. Then it was decided that it would be better to have a single convention covering all the points. The way the questions are put now, I do not understand their purpose. At any rate, they seem premature.

120. Two draft resolutions have been submitted at this time — one by Canada [A/C.1/752], and the other by the Philippines [A/C.1/751]; a third is being prepared by Australia. Their purpose, as I understand it, is to determine what procedure for our future work will enable us to carry out our tasks successfully. Admittedly, the problems are difficult, but the basis on which we should organize our work is the exchange of views taking place in the general debate here in the First Committee and, quite likely, the draft resolution, which

may perhaps indicate the lines on which the future working group is to proceed. Whether that group is to be a sub-committee of the First Committee, a sub-committee of the Disarmament Commission, or the Disarmament Commission itself — that is something else again.

121. I now come to the questions which Mr. Moch asked me today after saying he always agreed with Mr. Lloyd. I am glad to see such wonderful solidarity, so close that each supports the other blindly, that one has only to say "A" for the other to say "B"; I think that is splendid and I do not object to it at all. The questions Mr. Moch put to me today mean this, in effect: "If you reply 'yes' or 'no', we shall see what is to be done with you." That, in substance, is what he said and he even frightened me. I was terribly scared and am at a loss to know how to reply. If I say "yes", he will say "now I've got you, and you must do what I say". If I say "no", he will answer "I don't want to talk to you anymore".

122. What are we to do in the circumstances? Mr. Moch says: "I agree with you, everything is all right, kindly answer the two questions now." It seems to me that it is very difficult to carry on a discussion on this basis in the First Committee — we are not in the streets, but in the First Committee. That is why I cannot answer these questions, since it would serve no purpose to do so. If I started to say "yes" or "no", or to ask "is this so, or isn't it", we would get nowhere. I have never been a "yes-man", and I have never been and hope never to be a "no-man". I said that these questions must be covered in the future convention; the convention must be so drafted, and the rights and powers of the important organs, and their relationship with each other, must be so defined as to make it possible to exercise control in such a way that the commission, in the language of our proposal, should be able "to take the necessary steps to supervise the fulfilment by States of the obligations assumed by them in connexion with the reduction of armaments, armed forces..." The commission must work in such a way as to enable States to fulfil their obligations. That is all we can say at this time since the actual nature of these obligations and the precise method of ensuring that States fulfil them are matters for study in greater detail. I am not even sure that these points can be covered in an international convention. What I am sure of, however, is that the international convention will fail to answer a great many practical questions and that more than one instruction will have to be issued in connexion with it. And yet, at this stage, Mr. Lloyd is asking me to give him categorical answers.

123. How can we possibly begin our work if we do not agree here on fundamentals at least? Some other procedure may be followed, but the best way of course will be to agree on fundamentals and to sketch in the broad outlines. We have indicated certain measures. The Soviet Union delegation, including your humble servant, who participated on many occasions in the sessions of the General Assembly, opposed what at the time was called the Baruch Plan, the scheme proposed by the United Kingdom, France and the United States based on the idea that there should be stages and that the question of the prohibition of atomic weapons should be settled only at the end of the final stage, in the remote future.

124. We objected to those stages. We felt that they were impracticable and wrong, and that they would give rise to a situation where all mankind would be under the constant and terrible threat of a future atomic or thermonuclear war. We felt that the peoples of the world wanted a different approach, and we agreed with them in calling for such an approach as would remove that threat forever.

125. The first time we were unsuccessful and our proposals were not adopted. We then proposed another plan, and that, too, was rejected. The question of stages, five stages, was raised on every occasion and attempts were made to reduce their number to the minimum. But the principle of stages was never abandoned. Here it is now, incorporated in our draft resolution, which provides for two stages. But something still seems to be wrong. There were other points of disagreement, too. Instead of removing all these differences and clearing the way, we have taken the French and United Kingdom proposals as a basis.

126. We come now to the question of control. We have been told that we have persistently opposed control. That, of course, is a mistaken conclusion, a misunderstanding; we certainly never said anything to that effect. In our proposal we speak of a temporary control commission. I have already explained why we speak of a temporary control commission, but a few words may well be added at this point. We speak of it because we feel that there must be control over the measures taken by States to reduce their armaments and armed forces so as to ensure that they scrupulously carry out their obligations in that regard. That is why we provide for a temporary control commission. The control commission is designed for one operation only, the reduction of armaments. Again, we find that there are certain obstacles. For example, some say to us: "You have armed forces and you will reduce them, but if we comply with the prohibition on atomic weapons before you do, we shall deprive ourselves of a major weapon against aggression on your part" — which, incidentally, we do not have in mind. This is sheer humbug, but I shall not go into the matter now. At any rate, we are not insisting, as we used to, on the prohibition of atomic weapons as a prior condition, since this is a step forward.

127. I note that there is some acknowledgment of this, although we are not doing it in order to be praised for having taken a step forward, but in order to achieve results. We want to overcome the obstacles which we feel should not, in principle, under other conditions, stand in the way of international agreement. This, too, must be taken into account. There can be no one-sided action in this matter. We are proposing, then, that armaments should be reduced, and by two stages. We will agree to reduce the conventional armaments — which for some reason you fear when they are in our hands — first, by 50 per cent and then by another 50 per cent. Fifty per cent in relation to what? Naturally, in relation to the level which we will agree upon, which is why our proposal speaks of "agreed levels". This will have to be worked out and agreed upon. That is the only way, of course.

128. The next question is about the prohibition of atomic weapons. Our proposal is that when the first stage referred to in paragraph 1 of our draft resolution is completed and we proceed to carry out the remaining 50 per cent reduction, there should be, simultaneously,

a complete prohibition of atomic weapons. We are then asked, what does "simultaneously" mean; is it a matter of hours, days or weeks, as some time limit must be established? This, too, is something we can handle: we can discuss it further and decide how it can best be put into effect. But we accept your principle. We are told that in general people cannot be trusted and that you must therefore have as many safeguards as possible. But what kind of safeguards do you want? Those explicit in the words "you will declare, you will tell us, you will answer". But what kind of safeguards are these? The world has known other occasions in the past when many speeches and declarations were made, when all kinds of agreements were even signed, only to be violated when the necessary forces had been built up: the example of fascist Germany should still be fresh in your memories.

129. You say that there can be no trust and therefore there must be safeguards. Our view is that safeguards of course are necessary but that in this matter as in all else there has to be a modicum of trust. When you are in a shop trying on a suit, you feel the material and try to find out how good the quality is, even though you know very little about quality, and certainly much less than the salesman, who is in all probability standing and watching you and thinking to himself that you know nothing about quality anyway. Nevertheless you still want to feel it and examine it. But if the firm is reliable and has a name for selling good materials, you bear that in mind and decide to trust it. With all the judicial, police and administrative guarantees in the world, you still have to have trust to spend even a single dollar. Some minimum amount of trust at least is necessary. If your attitude is such that you do not trust us and you feel that you are going to be hoodwinked, then there is no point in talking. There must be confidence. There must also be safeguards.

130. The nature of the safeguards depends of course on the obligations concerned. Some will violate these obligations and some will not, but in any event the crux of the matter is of course that there should be an organ which will ensure that the safeguards are not violated. The control commission is such an organ; the Security Council should be such an organ.

131. Issue has been taken with my previous explanations on the ground that I had, as Mr. Wadsworth put it, completely dimmed a ray of hope, or, to use a volleyball term, spiked the ball. I am alleged to have "dimmed" that ray of hope by stating that the control commission could not function outside the framework of the Security Council.

132. Allow me to remind the Committee of General Assembly resolution 41 (I) of 14 December 1946 entitled "Principles governing the general regulation and reduction of armaments" which was adopted unanimously. One of the paragraphs of that resolution reads as follows:

"The General Assembly . . .

"Recommends to the Security Council that it give prompt consideration to the working out of proposals to provide such practical and effective safeguards in connexion with the control of atomic energy and the general regulation and reduction of armaments . . ."

"There shall be established, within the framework of the Security Council, which bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, an international system, as men-

tioned in paragraph 4, operating through special organs, which organs shall derive their powers and status from the convention or conventions under which they are established."

133. I would point out to Mr. Lloyd, Mr. Moch and Mr. Belaúnde — I am referring to his most recent statement [687th meeting] — that it is therefore abundantly clear that under our proposal, which is in accordance with the General Assembly resolution adopted unanimously by them all, the control commission is to act "within the framework of the Security Council". What does this mean? It means that the control commission itself is to be under the control of the Security Council. And why must the Security Council exercise control over the control commission? Because the Security Council is the highest body responsible for safeguarding the peace and preventing any violations of the peace. Or do you disagree with that? I should like you to reply "yes" or "no".

134. At that time, and in conformity with that resolution, we formulated proposals on the establishment of control over atomic energy. It is possible, and I shall not discuss it today, that those proposals were imperfect and need supplementing or amending. The document was quite short and contained only fourteen points relating directly to control; many more may perhaps be necessary and additional provisions, particularly technical provisions dealing with such matters as atomic energy production, may perhaps have to be formulated on the basis of those fourteen points.

135. It was not by accident that I quoted Mr. Baruch. I did so because he put the matter very well when he said that with only a flick of the wrist the atomic energy which was being produced for peaceful purposes could be diverted to the production of weapons which could be used — as he puts it — as a means of blackmail, destruction and so forth.

136. Here again, we can obtain some guidance by referring to previous documents; they can, at any rate, provide a clue which may enable us to understand and possibly solve the problem. I shall quote two or three passages which I believe are directly relevant at this time to the matter we are discussing and to the two questions asked by Mr. Lloyd.

137. In the first place, we stated [*AEC/26*, p. 89] that the international control commission would "Observe the fulfilment of the rules of technical exploitation of the facilities prescribed by the convention on control, and work out and prescribe the rules of technological control of such facilities". What does this provision mean? It means that the control commission will not act on its own initiative, as it sees fit, but will have to act on the basis of certain rules of technical exploitation, which will have been worked out to define how particular facilities are to be exploited, what may and what may not be done, what may be deemed to constitute a violation and what may not.

138. Note the words "work out and prescribe" the rules of technological control. There are perhaps several engineers present who know more about this than I do, but, though I am not an engineer, I must say that "the rules of technological control" mean the rules of control over the whole production process from A to Z, from beginning to end, all details and everything connected with production.

139. Please note, moreover, that at that time, 1946, we used the word "prescribe" in our proposals. What

does this word mean? It means "order". The control commission can say to an enterprise: "Here are your rules of technological control. You are departing from them, abide by them and proceed in this way." Or as Mr. Lloyd said, the control commission could say: "You moved the gauge in that direction, move it back". The way in which the gauge is moved will depend on the rules of technological control. These rules will have to be worked out. Then the control commission will act, not just as it likes and as it sees fit, but in accordance with the rules of control.

140. We proposed that all this should subsequently be included in the convention. I do not know, I am not sure and I cannot honestly say now whether we will again state our position in this way or in some other way, or whether we feel that our formulation is complete. Perhaps it is not complete and perhaps it has to be amended, but surely the general idea is obvious: that the control commission must not be a hollow shell but a powerful organ.

141. I recall that Comrade Stalin, who was the President of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, once stated that the Soviet Union stood for strict control, effective control, the kind of international control that would be equal to the occasion. Repeatedly in our conversations, interviews and statements we have declared that we are in favour of strict control.

142. But without rules of a technological nature there can be no strict control. On the other hand, if the rules of technological control are drawn up and given to the control commission to implement, then we shall have to hope, first, that those rules will really constitute control, and, secondly, that they will be binding on enterprises because it is laid down that the control commission is to "prescribe".

143. And then? What about the governments? What will be the position of a sovereign government? In the first place, it should not be assumed that the principle of the sovereignty of States extends sovereignty to any given enterprise. That is not so. A State is sovereign, but that does not mean that every engineer working in a factory is sovereign. As we see it, such sovereignty would be anarchy. As the proverb has it, whoever takes the stick becomes the corporal. We have in mind enterprises which will be obliged to submit to the rules arising from the instructions and those, in their turn, will be decided by an international agreement signed by governments.

144. Those are the guarantees. Then, what about the State, or the government? How do we envisage the relations between the control authority and governments? I repeat that it may be necessary to widen and amplify the concept, or, on the contrary, to restrict it, but the idea is that the international control authority should make recommendations to governments on questions relating to the production, stockpiling and use of atomic materials and atomic energy.

145. Accordingly, the control authority should not take the action proposed by Mr. Patterson in the United States working paper of 25 May 1954 [*DC/53*, annex 4] — issuing prohibitions, closing factories and so forth — but it should recommend to the government that it should prohibit an activity, and this is already binding on a director, if it is in accordance with technological rules; it should recommend to the government that it force the director to obey, and at the same time it should telegraph. This is very easy; telegrams

travel very fast, if they are not intentionally delayed. A telegram could be sent to the effect that a violation had been committed. To whom should the telegram be sent? To the Security Council.

146. Thus, the matter is not so hopeless after all. But you say: "What if the government disagrees?" And I reply that this remains to be worked out. But the principle should be that the implementation of the rules of technological control must be ensured.

147. It is difficult to say much more at this stage because, if we were to begin now to define the specific and detailed functions of any given organs, their relations, conflicts, possible methods of reaching decisions and so forth, we should hardly be following the wisest course.

148. Furthermore, we suggest that the control authority should make recommendations to the Security Council on measures for the prevention and punishment of violations of the convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons and on control of atomic energy.

149. Why are we proposing that the control authority itself should not solve such problems, but that it should submit its proposals or make recommendations to the Security Council? Because we attach great importance to that very function, that right of the control authority which must also be placed under appropriate control and, in some cases, cannot take independent action without the approval of a more responsible political organ, such as the Security Council.

150. Literally speaking, why should the Security Council not consider such a question and take a decision in twenty-four hours? You will say: "The veto can prevent it." But I have already pointed out that as long ago as 1946 we spoke about the use of the veto. Thus, first, we have already discussed the matter. Secondly, we cannot, while we are discussing this question, take the attitude expressed here, unless I am mistaken, by the Netherlands representative, that the veto should be abolished in this case and that the Charter provisions concerning the Security Council should be revised.

151. You are well aware that, as I pointed out in my last statement, the veto has its part to play and is very important. To abolish the veto on the sole ground that some State may disagree with the control authority as to whether or not to take a particular measure would of course mean casting suspicion on oneself and would be a considerable blow, as the Security Council must act in accordance with the Charter.

152. Moreover, it is undesirable to give the control authority punitive powers. Mr. Lloyd said, on the basis of a misunderstanding, I think, that I had referred for some reason to Chapter VI and that that reference was obviously incorrect. I do not know what he means, but if he was referring to my statement of 12 October, my exact words were as follows:

"May I remind you of Article 39, in Chapter VII, entitled 'Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression' ..."

If any document contains the number VI instead of VII, the title which I gave subsequently, "Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression", makes it clear that the reference is not to Chapter VI. Chapter VI does not provide for punishment, but Chapter VII does. Just as if I had foreseen the possibility of a misunderstanding, I men-

tioned the title of the Chapter — if someone mis-types it as VI, must I take responsibility for that? — "Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression".

153. And then? I quote:

"The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles ..."

Which Article is this? It is Article 39. Where is it to be found? In Chapter VII, not in Chapter VI, but in VII. And I went on: "Here the reference is to Articles 41 and 42. Yesterday I mentioned also Articles 43, 44 and 45". This is all in Chapter VII. None of these Articles belongs to Chapter VI. Thus this is simply a misunderstanding.

154. It is a question of punishment, closing down factories and cutting off supplies of raw materials. Well, if you start doing that sort of thing you can dislocate all industry. What if this should apply to atomic energy, and if atomic energy is one of the State's principal means of industrial production for peaceful purposes, as it will be where water resources and other resources such as coal are insufficient to permit production of electric power to be developed to the maximum. There is a great need in our country for further development of our resources for producing power, especially electric power; atomic energy, especially now that we in our country have discovered all the secrets of the atom, is for us one of those resources. That is why we are the first country in the world to be converting our industry to atomic energy. That is why we put our electric power station into operation six months ago. We did not convert a submarine to atomic energy, but an electric power station.

155. Imagine some zealous military inspector coming and telling us to shut down here and shut down there; he might completely ruin our country's industry. Who would agree to that? That is why I speak of sovereignty and interference in domestic affairs. That is what it means. Some elementary precautions must be taken. We cannot permit the chaos which would ensue if we arranged to carry out one task in such a way as to destroy the very basis for carrying out another task which is no less important.

156. The First Committee has on its agenda an item relating to the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Our position in regard to this question is sufficiently clear-cut, although attempts have been made here to misrepresent it completely. The verbatim record which has been made proves that, as does also the fact that I asked you to consider this question earlier rather than later. Consequently there can be no doubt whatsoever that this is an extraordinarily important question. It is not simply a question of "before" or "after" signing the agreement — of "after this" or "before this"; no, it is not such a simple question. It is a much more important one. I am not mistaken when I say that the question of atomic energy and its use only for peaceful purposes and of the prohibition of its use for purposes of war applies not only to the industry which produces atomic energy, but also to the electric power industry, the steel industry and other types of industry. We have repeatedly made that point, and I do not think that we need revert to it now.

157. Should we therefore permit — as is provided in what is called the “working paper” which Mr. Patterson, the United States representative, defended in 1954 — the control authority actually to close down plants in cases of violation? Well, if there are people bold enough to agree to that, I must confess that we are not to be numbered with them. We consider it impossible to invest the control authority with such functions. Why? First, because that would be a violation of the Charter, which gives only the Security Council that right — I am speaking of sanctions — and, secondly, because it is actually impossible, and this is a formal, legal fact.

158. I think we must really consider this seriously; it is impossible categorically to demand answers to complex questions requiring much prior study and very careful consideration.

159. If we really want to produce a convention which will not be merely a scrap of paper, but a convention actually capable of settling all these problems, we cannot simply answer the questions put to us by a brief “yes” or “no”. Our position is different. We have explained our position, at least in principle, in the 1947 document which I have already quoted; at the London meetings of the Sub-Committee in 1954 we submitted proposals to the same effect. All this requires further consideration.

160. It would be useful, of course, if three Powers which had reached basic agreement on a question, such as the question of control, were to submit concrete proposals. So far we have not seen any concrete proposals for the organization of control, apart from proposals which were at the outset unacceptable — to the Soviet Union at least. I mean proposals to the effect that the control authority should own all atomic energy plants. Ownership of all atomic plants by the international control authority was one of the basic principles of the Baruch Plan. If you look at the document in which the Baruch Plan — that is the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan — is explained, you will see that it covers not only plants which produce atomic energy, but also all related branches of industry, such as the steel, electric power and even the timber and iron industries, and so on.

161. That is why I think questions should not be put in this manner. I am fully prepared to explain our position, but I propose that such questions, once we agree on definite principles, should be discussed again at other levels, that is, under other conditions when there would be reason to expect that this and other questions, which frequently link politics to technical matters, would be dealt with more competently.

162. I shall certainly study the speeches made by my colleagues at today's meeting most thoroughly and carefully, particularly Mr. Lloyd's speech. I shall then ask the Chairman to put my name on the list of speakers, and I shall endeavour to explain the rest; but at this juncture I think I should be careful not to prolong the discussion unduly or cause confusion and digress from the point of the questions asked; I do not think there is any need for me to prolong the debate. On the contrary I want to expedite our work on this problem, and that is why I took the opportunity to explain our position. I reserve the right to explain the rest later.

163. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom): I just want to say a word or two about the observations which Mr. Vyshinsky has just made. Of course, I do not complain of the fact that he proposed to study what I said earlier and possibly to deal with it again on a subsequent occasion. I did not put forward these ques-

tions with the idea of extinguishing or diminishing hope, but simply to try to discover exactly where we are.

164. I quite agree with Mr. Vyshinsky that it is important, as he said towards the end of his speech, to find out whether we are in agreement in principle, and then other people must work out the details. It is precisely to try to discover whether we are agreed in principle that I put these questions. I shall certainly study his observations on control, although I must say I did not think that some of them were very encouraging; but I will certainly examine what he said and perhaps comment upon his remarks again.

165. One point he mentioned was about the question of the veto in the Security Council; he referred to Chapter VII. Perhaps it was a slip of the tongue or a mistake in the interpretation, for I do not quite understand the reference in paragraph 153 of the record of the 687th meeting where he proceeded to read Article 27, paragraph 3. That paragraph specifically states that “in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting”. I think it is clear that Mr. Vyshinsky was referring to Chapter VI; it was a perfectly genuine mistake because, of course, it is under Chapter VII that punitive measures have to be taken; but paragraph 3 of Article 27 does not apply to Chapter VII.

166. At the beginning of his statement, Mr. Vyshinsky — I will not say he was cross with me — criticized me for asking questions. Questions are usually accepted as a legitimate way of trying to clear up difficulties and differences. He asked me one question. As I understand it, he asked me the question: Is the Security Council the main organ for the maintenance of peace and security — yes or no? I will set a good example. I will answer the question immediately by saying “yes”; no one could dispute that fact. Therefore, I make no apology for asking questions. I confess that, at the end of his speech, I am completely unclear as to what his answers are. I was taught that there are three answers to a question: “yes”, “no”, and “I don't know”. I would not dare to suggest that it would be true to say that Mr. Vyshinsky said “I don't know”, but he certainly has not said “yes” and, therefore, at the moment, I do not think that he can be said to have answered my questions clearly.

167. A point which I wish to make to the Committee is that I do not regard this as a battle of wits between two individuals, or as an effort to score debating points off another representative. Those questions were asked in good faith in order to try to determine whether there is agreement in principle between us: because, if the answers to those two questions had been “yes”, then that would have meant that the Anglo-French memorandum had in fact been accepted as a basis. The difficulty that we are in is that the terms of the Soviet Union draft resolution are inconsistent with the Anglo-French proposals. It is quite inaccurate to say that the proposals in the Soviet Union draft resolution are based on the Anglo-French proposals, and I will show why.

168. As I have said, it is perfectly clear that we said in the Anglo-French proposals that agreement had to be reached on the nature of the functions and powers of the control organ before the disarmament programme began. We also made it perfectly clear in our proposals that before the disarmament programme began, the agents of the control organ have to be in position in

the countries concerned, ready and able to do their duty. The Soviet Union draft resolution begins in the first phase, with a 50 per cent reduction in conventional weapons which is, in effect, unsupervised — or it is very vague as to whether it is going to be supervised or not. It does not start with previous agreement on the powers, functions, etc., of the control organ, or on the control organ's agents being in position. That is an important point of difference between the Soviet Union draft resolution and the Anglo-French proposals — a point of principle.

169. Then, the second phase of the Soviet Union proposals prescribes that the following measures be taken simultaneously: (a) in the course of six months States shall reduce by the second half their conventional armaments; (b) the complete prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction shall be carried into effect; (c) States shall institute a standing international organ. These three things would take place simultaneously.

170. Nothing could be more different from the Anglo-French proposals than that; and it was in order to find out where we are, whether we are agreed in principle, that I put those two questions. I put them in good faith because I thought that the answers to them would help to clarify the position. But I certainly feel very strongly that, whatever the answers may be, we must not give up the pursuit of a disarmament agreement, and whatever may be said on this occasion — yes or no — we certainly will continue, so far as the United Kingdom delegation is concerned, to seek to achieve agreement. And we believe that it is still possible to do so.

171. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I have a small point to make on a minor matter. I did not mention Article 71 in a single one of my speeches. Mr. Lloyd should ask the people who gave him the text he is using how the reference to Article 71 got there. I never mentioned that Article. Article 71 deals with an entirely different question.

172. The Article I mentioned was certainly Article 27, which contains a reference to Chapter VI. Paragraph 3 of this article begins with the words: "Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters..." I referred to Article 27, but certainly not in connexion with the enforcement measures dealt with in Chapter VII. That is my first point. But this is a minor detail. I realize that it is getting late and I therefore reserve my right, as I said before, to go into the matter in greater detail later.

173. I was, however, astonished at what I have just heard Mr. Lloyd say, namely, that although we claim to have taken the French and United Kingdom proposals of 11 June as the basis for our own proposals, we have not in fact done so. How can it be suggested that we have not done so? We certainly have, and I can prove it.

174. In the first place, the memorandum of France and the United Kingdom [DC/53, annex 9] begins with the following sentence:

"The States members of the Sub-Committee regard themselves as prohibited in accordance with the terms of the Charter of the United Nations from the use of nuclear weapons except in defence against aggression."

175. Two propositions are clearly involved here; the first is that the States represented on the Sub-Committee regard themselves as prohibited from using nuclear weapons. We have always insisted on that. The fact that the words "regard themselves as prohibited from the use of nuclear weapons" were ultimately agreed on in the French and United Kingdom memorandum marks a substantial advance. The second proposition is expressed in the phrase "except in defence against aggression".

176. What was our reply to Mr. Lloyd's question, which he wished us to answer "yes" or "no"? We answered neither "yes" nor "no". He suggested that we should attempt to clarify the position. But I have already explained in detail — though perhaps not very well — what my position is. Permit me to ask, does the first sentence of paragraph 1 of this French and United Kingdom memorandum correspond to the position of the Soviet Union? It does.

177. The memorandum continues:

"They recommend that the disarmament treaty should include an immediate and explicit acceptance of this prohibition by all signatory States, pending the total prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons as proposed in the subsequent paragraphs of this memorandum".

That is very close to our own phrase... "assume a solemn... obligation not to use atomic weapons..." [DC/53, annex 8]. This idea appears both in the memorandum and in our own proposals. In this matter, therefore, we are as close together as Mr. Lloyd and I are sitting at this moment.

178. The memorandum goes on:

"They further recommend that the obligations assumed by the Members of the United Nations to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State should be accepted by all signatory States not members of the United Nations."

This also is a sound proposition, to which we have not proposed any amendments.

179. Thus, the whole of paragraph 1 of the French and United Kingdom proposals is in complete accordance with our own views, since our basic ideas are the same. How then can it be said that we claim to have based our proposals on the French and United Kingdom proposals, but have not in fact done so? In fact, we have done so.

180. To continue, what does paragraph 2 of the French and United Kingdom memorandum say? It refers to the need for a disarmament treaty, which is the same thing as the convention we too have proposed should be concluded. This treaty would include the following provisions:

"(a) The total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type, together with the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes."

Do we not accept that? Have we in fact taken a different line? No, we are in agreement with this. It is the position we take in our own proposals. I could read out both sets of proposals for you side by side. But you can do this without my assistance, at least when you have had a little time to recover from the meeting.

181. Paragraph 2 continues:

“(b) Major reductions in all armed forces and conventional armaments.”

France and the United Kingdom say “major” and we say “major”. They assert that we have evidently not given up the idea of reduction by one-third. I have already given you an explanation on that point. I said that we adhere to the principle of a progressive reduction, but that does not exclude “major reductions”, and vice versa. Major reductions can be achieved progressively. They can also be achieved by other methods.

182. The question of methods which now divides us — we do differ on this point — does not affect the principle of the need for major reductions. They say they wish to achieve these results by means of substantial balanced or regulated reductions; whereas what we have in mind are progressive, proportional reductions. Their objective is described as substantial and balanced reductions. So much for the methods. But what about the principle? The principle is the reduction of armaments, which both they and we support. The methods can be discussed between us. Mr. Lloyd should therefore avoid confusing method and substance. There is one substantive issue, one problem, but there may be several methods of solving it. Thus, the principles underlying sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 2 are identical with our proposals.

183. Let us now proceed to the next sub-paragraph:

“(c) The establishment of a control organ with rights and powers and functions adequate to guarantee the effective observance of the agreed prohibitions and reductions.”

But this is identical with our proposal that:

“The commission shall take the necessary steps to supervise the fulfilment by States of the obligations assumed by them in connexion with the reduction of armaments, armed forces and appropriations for military requirements” [A/C.1/750, para. 1 (b)].

They are nearly identical, although expressed slightly differently. Thus sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 2 also coincides with our proposals.

184. I could continue this process and list a whole series of important points of agreement. I hoped to be able to do this and am happy to have had this opportunity of demonstrating that our position is identical on important questions of principle relating to the reduction of armaments, the prohibition of atomic weapons, and the acceptance of the obligation not to use atomic weapons. What object are we pursuing? Here is where the divergences begin. What is meant by taking something as a basis? It means to take principles and not details as a basis, even though the details may be very important. I repeat, principles.

185. For that reason I do not intend to argue about the accuracy of Mr. Lloyd's allegation that we have incorrectly claimed our proposals to be based on the French and United Kingdom proposals. If there is any doubt about the matter, we can revert to it later on.

186. Mr. MOCH (France) (*translated from French*): I am rather embarrassed at having to ask Mr. Vyshinsky yet another question.

187. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from French*): Another, by all means. Two, three or four more!

188. Mr. MOCH (France) (*translated from French*): One only, but Mr. Vyshinsky will see that it is not him I am questioning but the interpretation.

189. In the French interpretation of the statement which Mr. Vyshinsky has just made, the word “*progressive*” was, as I heard it, used several times in connexion with the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. But I think that at the same time I heard Mr. Vyshinsky use the word “*proportionnelle*”, and I should like to know whether he used a word in his statement which could be translated in French by the word “*progressive*” rather than by “*proportionnelle*”. I need not emphasize the difference between the two words. It is as great in connexion with military reductions as it is in relation to taxation on capital or income. Quite plainly, the meaning is changed completely if the word in French should be “*progressive*” instead of “*proportionnelle*”.

190. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): The representative of the United Kingdom had asked to speak but perhaps it would be better if Mr. Vyshinsky replied to this point first.

191. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The word I used was “proportional”, but I do not know how it was interpreted. Possibly I used a different word, “progressive”, but if so, it was a slip of the tongue. What I had intended to say was “proportional reduction”.

192. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom): I hope the Committee will forgive me for intervening again, but I think that it is useful to have this exchange of views. Mr. Vyshinsky said, at the end of his last remarks, that I had more or less alleged that the Soviet Union was pretending to adopt the Anglo-French proposals.

193. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): No, no.

194. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom): The word “pretend” was used in the interpretation, but I certainly never alleged anything of the kind. I am simply seeking to ascertain the facts as to whether the proposals are drawn up on the same basis. Mr. Vyshinsky referred to certain parts of the Anglo-French proposals contained in annex 9 of document DC/53; but before I deal with what he said about them, I should like to repeat what we have said several times, namely, that we recognize that there have been certain changes in the Soviet position on certain matters, that we welcome this, and that we want the good work to go on and the process to be continued.

195. With regard to annex 9 it is quite true that the Soviet Union has accepted bits of paragraph 1, the whole of paragraph 2, and I imagine that it does not object to paragraph 3. But when we come to the method whereby the disarmament programme is actually to be carried out, the basic provisions are set forth in paragraph 5, which reads:

“After the constitution and positioning of the control organ, which shall be carried out within a specified time, and as soon as the control organ reports that it is able effectively to enforce them, the following measures shall enter into effect.”

Then we set up, in phases, a process which is bound to end in complete disarmament, but the basic proposition is set out in paragraph 5 when we say, “After the constitution” — which means that there must have been agreement about the nature, functions and powers of the control organ — and after the “positioning of the control organ”, which means that the answer to my second question must be “yes”. That is basic to the Anglo-French proposals, and it was precisely in order

to ascertain the exact Soviet position on that matter that I ventured to put the questions which I put earlier this afternoon.

196. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I did not say that Mr. Lloyd had said that the Soviet Union was pretending. I made no such statement. What I said was that Mr. Lloyd had alleged that our statement or our proposal did not accord with the basic proposals of the French and United Kingdom memorandum of 11 June. That is what Mr. Lloyd said. He went even further and said that they were in fact inconsistent, that is, that the French and United Kingdom proposals were not only not the basis of our proposals, but were quite inconsistent with our proposals.

197. I am glad that Mr. Lloyd has made no attempt to deny what I said because it cannot be denied. He said just now, referring to paragraph 5 of the French and United Kingdom proposals, that we were not agreed on methods. That is true, we are not agreed on methods. But does that prevent us from admitting the points on which we have reached agreement? And is it not of great significance in itself that we have agreed, first, on the figure 50 per cent; secondly, on two stages; and, thirdly, on the date, 31 December 1953. The completion of certain measures will be followed by the cessation of manufacture; this will also take place under our proposals on the completion of measures for a reduction of conventional armaments by 50 per cent. Fifty per cent of what? Of the accepted level, the agreed level. Then comes the second stage of reduction, at which, the first stage having been completed, the prohibition of atomic weapons will take place. Similarly, paragraph 6 (a) of the French and United Kingdom proposals provides for one-half of the agreed reductions of armaments to take effect; when that measure has been completed, the manufacture

of all kinds of nuclear weapons and all other prohibited weapons will cease. Paragraph 7 (b) envisages, on the completion of the second half of the agreed reductions referred to in paragraph 7 (a), the total, absolute prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and the use of nuclear material for peaceful purposes only.

198. Is it not clear that we accept the most important provisions? The first is the reduction of armaments in two stages, each of 50 per cent; and our proposals merely reproduce the proposals contained in the French and United Kingdom memorandum. Can you say that this is an unimportant provision? Or that it does not involve an important point of principle? If you tried to say that, it would be quite incomprehensible. But you cannot. With regard to the second provision, do the French and United Kingdom proposals not provide that, on the completion of this 50 per cent reduction, the production of nuclear weapons will be discontinued? Do we not propose the same procedure after the completion of the second 50 per cent reduction? The French and United Kingdom proposals are therefore completely embodied in our own.

199. In other words, disarmament would be carried out in two stages. After the first, the production of atomic weapons be discontinued; after the second, atomic weapons would be totally prohibited and eliminated, and atomic energy would be used for peaceful purposes only. These are three of the most important provisions in the French and United Kingdom proposals. They form the basis of our own proposals. We regard them as the most important questions which must take precedence over all other questions relating to methods. We regard them as the cornerstone of both our and their whole programme of measures. How then is it possible to allege that our proposals are not based on the French and United Kingdom proposals? In my opinion, there is some misunderstanding here.

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.