

United Nations
**GENERAL
ASSEMBLY**

TWENTY-FIRST SESSION

Official Records

**FIRST COMMITTEE, 1479th
MEETING**

Friday, 9 December 1966,
at 10.55 a.m.



NEW YORK

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Chairman: Mr. Leopoldo BENITES (Ecuador).

AGENDA ITEM 96

Status of the implementation of the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty (continued) (A/6397, A/C.1/938-940, A/C.1/L.367, A/C.1/L.388)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) wished to discuss the importance of the principle of non-intervention, the significance and purport of the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, the need for strict observance of the Declaration and the meaning of certain documents before the Committee.
2. As he had told the Committee at the twentieth session (1397th meeting), Mexico attached the very greatest importance to the principle of non-intervention. It had supported the principle throughout its history. It regarded non-intervention as the juridical and political safeguard of the existence of any sovereign State and as the corner-stone of peaceful coexistence and friendly co-operation among peoples.
3. Also at the twentieth session, he had stated in the General Assembly (1408th plenary meeting) that his delegation was convinced that the Declaration would take a place of honour in the annals of the United Nations, side by side with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)). The Declaration was a historical document which in itself would be sufficient to make the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations an unforgettable landmark. His delegation had whole-heartedly supported the resolution adopted by the 1966 Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States by which the Special Committee, bearing in mind that the Declaration, "by virtue of the number of States which voted in its favour, the scope and

profundity of its contents and, in particular, the absence of opposition, reflects a universal legal conviction which qualifies it to be regarded as an authentic and definite principle of international law", decided that with regard to the principle of non-intervention it would abide by General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX)^{1/}—a decision which had recently been endorsed by the Sixth Committee.

4. The Declaration would, of course, be valueless unless its provisions were strictly observed. The facts adduced in the course of the current discussion—many of which were obviously accurate and indisputable—showed that the world was still far from attaining that ideal. In the past year, there had been several cases of armed, economic, subversive and terrorist intervention. The General Assembly would, therefore, be taking a constructive step by unanimously adopting a resolution based on a combination of the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.367) and the nineteen-Power amendments (A/C.1/L.388), of which his delegation was a sponsor.

5. In order to secure unanimous adoption of a resolution on non-intervention, the sponsors of the amendments were anxious to produce a text free from any of the accusations and recriminations which had been heard in the Committee. His own delegation would interpret any text which might be put to the vote in accordance with the principles of interpretation established by the Permanent Court of International Justice and later confirmed by the International Court of Justice.^{2/} According to those two bodies, it was a fundamental principle of interpretation that words should be interpreted according to the meaning they would normally bear in their context, unless such an interpretation would lead to nonsensical or absurd results.

6. Reference had been made to a resolution adopted on 28 November 1966 by the Council of the Organization of American States,^{3/} with the abstention of three Latin American Republics, including Mexico. From the statement made in explanation of Mexico's abstention,^{4/} it was clear that in all international forums his country was rejecting intervention of any kind whatsoever and was supporting all the provisions of the Declaration in General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX), including the provisions of paragraph 7. Countries which accepted paragraph 7 of the Declaration could not agree that international organizations

^{1/} See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes*, agenda item 87, document A/6230, para. 341.

^{2/} See *Competence of Assembly regarding admission to the United Nations, Advisory Opinion; I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 8.*

^{3/} See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-first Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1966, document S/7606.*

^{4/} *Ibid.*, document S/7620.

should arrogate to themselves and powers which the peoples of the member countries had not conferred upon them.

7. The value of the resolution to be adopted at the end of the current discussion would not, ultimately, depend on the actual contents of the text. It would depend much more on whether all States Members displayed the necessary goodwill in responding to the General Assembly's appeal and the necessary good faith in observing the principles of the Declaration. Given goodwill and good faith, the resolution would help to reduce international tension. It would also be a major contribution towards attainment of the ideal expressed in the Preamble to the Charter, that the peoples of the United Nations should live together in peace with one another as good neighbours.

8. Mr. AUGUSTE (Haiti) said that the question of non-intervention was of special interest to the American Republics, and particularly to Haiti, which was the oldest of them all. The peoples of the American continent had fought for their freedom and independence every time they had been threatened by foreign intervention or by ideas which were in conflict with the political credo which they had freely chosen. Since the earliest years of national liberation in the Western hemisphere, Latin American statesmen and jurists had always condemned the repeated interventions and threats of intervention in the domestic affairs of newly independent States. American law on the subject of non-intervention was the richest and most orthodox in the world. Often written under pressure of events, it reflected the struggle waged by earlier generations against colonialism and imperialism to ensure respect for the sovereign rights of newly independent States which had chosen the highest form of government, representative democracy.

9. The foundations of American unity had been laid in the days when the ideas of conquest or reconquest, propagated by the Holy Alliance in Europe, had been applied throughout the American continent. The ambitions of the Holy Alliance had for some time been checked by the Monroe Doctrine. But in later years the Monroe Doctrine had been interpreted in many different ways. It had often been invoked in support of counter-intervention, which was still an extremely controversial concept in international law. It was sometimes difficult to define the very subtle difference between intervention and counter-intervention.

10. The Chilean leader Juan Egaña had been the first to declare in 1810, that the peoples of Latin America should unite to defend themselves against aggression from other continents. In 1815 Simón Bolívar had urged the States of Spanish America to join forces in order to protect their independence and oppose all policies contrary to their own ideals. In 1848 and 1854-1865 at Lima, and in 1856 at Santiago de Chile, the American States had reaffirmed their unity. In 1861 the Argentine Republic had declared that it would be the first to defend any other American State which was attacked by a foreign Power. It was clear that the American States had always been unanimous in their attitude to intervention. In modern days, the establishment of the Organization of American States was but the fulfilment of political ideals inherited from earlier generations.

11. Armed conquest might be a thing of the past. But certain countries, under the spurious banner of international solidarity, were still pursuing expansionist ambitions and preaching subversion against legally established Governments. In the name of freedom the rights of peoples were being abused, the duties of good-neighbourly relations between States were being disregarded and moral aggression was being committed.

12. His country had suffered greatly from that insidious and cowardly form of intervention, intervention by indoctrination. Human thought used for corruption and subversion was just as dangerous as nuclear energy used for mass destruction. It undermined all spiritual values, such as respect for the human person and the right of peoples to choose whatever form of government they wished. Its main purpose was to impose a political and social philosophy which was the very negation of all that was best in modern society. At the twentieth session, the Committee had clearly recognized the dangers of the new and subtler forms of intervention. As the result of proposals by the countries of Latin America and Africa, which had suffered most from subversive activities in the past, the Declaration in resolution 2131 (XX) placed special emphasis on indirect forms of intervention. At the time, the adoption of the Declaration had enhanced the prestige of the United Nations.

13. Unfortunately, soon after the Declaration had been adopted, certain countries which had voted for the Declaration had demonstrated their contempt for the United Nations in an unprecedented manner by endorsing the decisions of the First Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America—known as the Conference—held at Havana in January 1966, which were directly contrary to the principle of non-intervention. His delegation categorically condemned the decisions of that Conference.

14. Intervention in its indirect form gave rise to serious concern in the modern world. Adoption of the Soviet draft resolution as it stood was not likely to dispel that concern. The text of the draft resolution would be considerably improved by the nineteen-Power amendments, of which his delegation was a sponsor.

15. Mr. CHIMIDDORJ (Mongolia) said that the Declaration in resolution 2131 (XX) had been widely hailed because its provisions were directed at an improvement in the international situation, the normalizing of relations between States and the protection of all peoples from imperialist encroachments on their freedom and independence. The Declaration solemnly proclaimed that no State had the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State and that armed intervention was synonymous with aggression. Those provisions were of the utmost importance because it was precisely the gross intervention of the imperialist Powers in the affairs of other nations and States that was a major cause of tension in the world today. Scrupulous observance of the Declaration and of other United Nations resolutions on key problems of contemporary international affairs would definitely help towards achievement of the Organization's fundamental purpose, which was the maintenance of international peace and security.

16. His delegation accordingly welcomed the Soviet initiative and believed that the item should be considered not in the abstract or slanted way that some Western delegations preferred, but in the light of specific situations which had developed in the world as a result of violation of the Declaration's provisions.

17. The most glaring example of intervention and the use of force was the ruthless colonial war in Viet-Nam unleashed by the United States imperialists with a view to establishing control over South-East Asia and crushing the national liberation movement of that region's peoples. The United States armed intervention in South Viet-Nam was in flagrant violation of the inalienable rights of States and peoples solemnly proclaimed in the Charter and in resolutions of the United Nations, including the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty. The Mongolian People's Republic fully supported the just struggle of the Viet-Nameese people against United States aggression and held that the United States must stop the aggression and leave Viet-Nam immediately so that the Viet-Nameese people could arrange its affairs in accordance with its own interests, without outside interference.

18. The United States and other Western Powers often used their military installations in foreign territories as a means of coercing sovereign States, forcing them to alter their domestic or external policies, promoting the overthrow of Governments and conducting subversive and provocative activities. The same aggressive ends were served by the military blocs in various regions and the alliances formed with reactionary régimes. Among the many examples that could be cited were the encroachments on the sovereignty and neutrality of Cambodia and Laos, the open United States aggression against Cuba, the provocations organized by the ruling circles of Israel against the Arab countries, the continuing intervention of United Kingdom armed forces against Yemen and the violations of the armistice in Korea. It was that policy of aggression of the Western alliance that was threatening peace and impeding the normalizing of international relations.

19. The United States and certain other countries also resorted to economic, ideological and other forms of direct and indirect intervention in the affairs of other States. They attempted to exert pressure through the granting of so-called economic aid, through outright or indirect economic blockade, through economic sabotage and so on. They tried to force their will on other States, and, if they failed, they fomented economic disruption and discontent. Not satisfied with their powerful propaganda machines, they had instituted special "voluntary" organizations of the Peace Corps type, which were now being set up also in the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and other countries. The aims and activities of those organizations were illustrated by the criminal conduct of United States personnel in Guinea and their recent expulsion.

20. By contrast, the Soviet Union, on whose initiative the Declaration had been adopted and the present item was being discussed, pursued a foreign policy which was devoid of intervention and violation of the sovereignty and independence of States. Relations

between his own country and the Soviet Union offered proof of that.

21. Loyalty to the purposes and ideals of the United Nations and to the cause of peace demanded resolute condemnation of the actions of certain imperialist States which were violating such United Nations decisions as the Declaration in resolution 2131 (XX) and insistence upon their strict compliance with their international legal commitments, in other words, immediate and permanent cessation of illegal actions conducive to a breach of the principles of the United Nations Charter.

22. The Soviet draft resolution met the needs of the entire world community. Amendments to it should pursue no other aim than the universal and unconditional observance of the Declaration. No one-sided interpretation of the terms of the Declaration should be attached to the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of States and peoples, a principle which should apply fully to the struggle for liberation of colonial and dependent peoples, who had an inalienable right to self-determination and independence.

23. The United States and those who supported its aggressive actions were trying to divert the Committee's attention from the real problems of the day and to justify the aggression in Viet-Nam by repeatedly slandering the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, the National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam, and peace-loving socialist States. They sought to hide the aggression behind false declarations of peaceful intentions, even while the war was being dangerously escalated.

24. The representatives of certain Latin American Governments, apparently lacking the courage to admit the struggle their people had to wage against constant interference, armed intervention and pressure by the United States, had mentioned the Tricontinental Conference of Havana. Those representatives, and particularly the Honduran representative, who had referred in that connexion to Mongolia as well, conveniently forgot that the Conference had been a public forum of peoples and that the arrangements for it had been made in 1963, long before the adoption of the Declaration in resolution 2131 (XX). The sole purpose of the Conference had been to root out the causes of intervention by imperialist States and to defend world peace. The participants, morally and legally entitled to express the views of their countries, had discussed problems of deep concern to mankind and had adopted decisions to strengthen the solidarity of the peoples of the three continents in their common fight against imperialism and colonialism and in favour of freedom, sovereignty and independence, in full accord with the principles of the United Nations Charter. His delegation repudiated the attempts thus made in the Committee to hamper the serious discussion of practical issues connected with the protection of man from the threat of another world catastrophe.

25. Mr. KABANDA (Rwanda) said that the state of international relations since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX), and the discussion in the First Committee, had clearly shown that the question of non-intervention in the domestic or

external affairs of States was of crucial importance for international peace and especially for the peace of the developing countries, which had become the battleground for struggles for political influence and economic expansion among countries which wanted to extend their hegemony throughout the world.

26. The terms "interference" and "intervention" should not be confused. Interference occurred when a foreign State meddled in the affairs of another State without being asked to do so by the latter's recognized legal authorities. That was of its very essence deserving of condemnation. On the other hand, one State might intervene in the affairs of another if it had been expressly invited to do so by the legal authorities of the latter in order, for example, to repel a foreign aggression or put down an unpopular domestic uprising. The inadmissibility of interference in the domestic or external affairs of States was a logical consequence of the principles of sovereignty and equality on which the United Nations was based. Unfortunately, the principles were sometimes violated by the very persons who declared themselves champions of the freedom and equality of States and who sometimes provided armed support for unpopular puppet governments and sometimes used disaffected politicians to overthrow legal governments.

27. At the present time, the world was being swept by a wave of upheavals and disturbances fomented by discontented politicians and adventurers in the pay of foreign Powers.

28. On 1 May 1964 the President of Rwanda had expressed his condemnation of any foreign economic, political or ideological interference which might support armed conflict or finance terrorism or subversion in Africa, thus distracting the attention of the African peoples from their efforts at development. That statement had been reaffirmed by the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo in October 1964. Moreover, the Governments represented at the second session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, held at Accra in October 1965, had solemnly undertaken not to tolerate the use of their territories for any subversive activity against other member States, and to oppose every form of subversion by foreign Powers against Africa, the OAU or its member States individually. That statement had recently been reiterated by his country's Minister of International Co-operation in the Assembly's general debate (1428th plenary meeting).

29. Some States felt called upon to preach to others about their political and economic systems and sought to remake those countries in their own image. Such missionary zeal, which was intended to stake out areas ripe for political and economic neo-colonialism, deserved condemnation. Some representatives had drawn attention to such new forms of intervention in the domestic affairs of States as political agitation and corruption. However, there was one other form of interference which was becoming increasingly common in the developing countries: interference through technical assistance. That type of technical neo-colonialism involved the sending by the donor countries of political observers who were often given specific

functions to perform with politicians and social groups in the recipient countries. Often their function was to guide the government departments for which they were responsible in the direction desired by the donor country and, if their efforts failed, to paralyse them. That was a type of interference that might ultimately give rise to a cold war between donor and recipient countries.

30. His Government had always opposed any political or economic exploitation of the developing countries, whatever form it might take. Although bilateral assistance was clearly essential at the present time, the risk of political and economic neo-colonialism was inherent in it. That was why his country hoped that bilateral assistance would evolve towards the establishment of a system of multilateral assistance through the United Nations.

31. His delegation regretted that the Soviet draft resolution did not stigmatize some forms of interference which were all the more dangerous because of their sophistication. The nineteen-Power amendments remedied those omissions and his delegation would therefore vote in favour of the draft resolution, as amended.

Mr. Fahmy (United Arab Republic), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

32. Mr. BANCROFT (United States of America) said that his delegation had refrained from speaking on the question of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of States until it had heard the comments of representatives of the developing countries, which were especially exposed to intervention in its many forms.

33. The problem of intervention—particularly in such indirect forms as subversion and terrorism, which were so dangerously widespread at the present time—was one of the most important issues facing the United Nations and a problem which deserved serious debate, not polemics, and action, not propaganda. His delegation, for its part, would not reply in kind to the invective which a few delegations had used against his country. The Members of the United Nations were already solemnly bound by the clear rules of the Charter forbidding intervention by one State in the affairs of another. The obligations contained in Articles 1, 2 and 33 of the Charter were its very heart. If the injunctions of the Charter and of General Assembly resolutions 290 (IV), 380 (V), and 2131 (XX) were scrupulously obeyed, many of the gravest international problems of the 1960's could be brought to an end.

34. The new draft resolution the Soviet Union had submitted (A/C.1/L.367) had been intended to be the basis for the political attack on his country which the Committee had already heard. Although the draft was deficient, because it avoided the real problems of modern forms of intervention, it was nevertheless a move in the right direction. He would not attempt to judge whether the omission of any mention of subversion, infiltration or other modern forms of indirect intervention resulted from an oversight or from a conscious decision to avoid condemning forms of aggression which the United Nations had long since condemned. Whatever the cause, the nineteen-Power amendments (A/C.1/L.388) went a long way towards

correcting the omission, and his delegation would support them.

35. In the final analysis, there was no need for further addition to the already imposing array of United Nations resolutions; what was needed was that all nations should live by the clear principles laid down in those resolutions and in the Charter. One major step in that direction would be for all Members of the United Nations to act together to enlarge the capacity of the Organization to deal with breaches of the peace. It was regrettable that some Members, whose representatives talked earnestly about peace and non-intervention, were the first to resist any effort to make the United Nations a more effective servant of those principles. However, if resolutions were to be useful, they must be addressed to real problems and real facts. It was in that belief that his delegation would like to see the Soviet draft resolution improved by the restoration of the missing element: a clear condemnation of indirect intervention.

36. The aim of subversion and infiltration, which were the chief modern forms of intervention, was not essentially different from the aim of aggression throughout history: the overthrow of a lawful and established Government in order to set the stage for some form of external authority, overt or otherwise. There was still a resort to violence, but the form that violence usually took had changed considerably. Since the Second World War there had been only a few instances of direct, overt, undisguised military invasion across international frontiers or demarcation lines. What was more frequent at the present time was disguised attacks, in which invaders worked with dissidents, stirring up dissension, distributing weapons, creating false political fronts, and masterminding a strategy of terrorism and guerrilla warfare. That sort of intervention had been clearly condemned by the General Assembly as early as 1949, in its resolution 290 (IV), and also in resolution 2131 (XX). But, as everyone knew, it continued and had even begun to show signs of developing into a full-fledged international doctrine and strategy. In January 1966, the so-called Tricontinental Conference at Havana had been held for the declared purpose of codifying and supporting plans for such intervention and of furthering so-called national liberation movements against the established Governments of non-communist countries. The Conference and its permanent organization had frankly listed the intended victims: in Africa—Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, Senegal, the Upper Volta, Cameroon, the Niger, the Ivory Coast, the Malagasy Republic, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, Rwanda, Botswana and Ghana; in Asia—Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, the Republic of China, Thailand, Laos, South Viet-Nam and Indonesia; and in the Western hemisphere—virtually all twenty-one States except, of course, Cuba.

37. One of the principal decisions of the Tricontinental Conference had been to establish a permanent organization whose function it would be to promote so-called "wars of national liberation" or "people's wars", which, in plain language, meant any civil war, armed struggle, insurrection or subversive movement aimed at the overthrow of the Government of an independent non-communist State by a force

sympathetic to one or other of the communist Powers. It would be hard to imagine a more open or more flagrant defiance of the principle of non-intervention laid down in the Charter.

38. It was particularly remarkable, because the fact imparted an atmosphere of unreality to the proceedings in the First Committee, that the Tricontinental Conference had been attended, and its actions supported, by the representatives of a number of Governments which had taken part in the debate. Most remarkable of all was that the initiator of the debate, the Soviet Union, had been represented by a member of the Supreme Soviet who was also a high official of the Soviet Communist Party. Other communist Governments, including Cuba, the host country, had been similarly represented. Significantly, most of the delegations from non-communist countries, including some of those he had mentioned, had consisted of individuals drawn from subversive movements dedicated to the overthrow of the Governments of their respective countries. Moreover, as might have been expected, there had been a large delegation from Peking.

39. As far as his delegation was concerned, the First Committee was not engaged in a debate about the relative merits of different social systems or ideologies. The United Nations Charter did not take sides on such matters. But it did take sides on international peace and on its ingredients, the most fundamental of which was that States should refrain from attacking each other. That was the point that was really at issue. There was no point in saying that one form of intervention was a crime but another form was permissible, or that intervention against a State with one kind of political philosophy was a crime but intervention against a State with a different philosophy was permissible. The Charter made no such distinctions; communist, socialist, democratic, republican, monarchist—all political systems were equal before it. The Charter had been written to meet the needs of a diversified world, composed of many kinds of States and systems. It left the choice of each nation's system to be decided exclusively by its own people in the exercise of their right of self-determination. His country strongly believed in such diversity both within nations and among them. It was itself a pluralistic society and considered pluralism a normal, healthy and even essential condition of freedom. In the same spirit, it supported the right of self-determination for all peoples immediately.

40. Guided by such ideas and by its commitments under the Charter, the United States did not and would not intervene by force or subversion against any country. It earnestly hoped, and could see some reason for believing, that monolithic and domineering ideas would fade away and that nations, whatever their cultural or historical backgrounds, would accept the values of tolerance and pluralism in the world community. It looked forward to a time when all peoples would not only "coexist"—a negative and ambiguous concept at best—but would also follow the more positive rule laid down in the Charter: "to practise tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours". In that connexion, he had been glad to note that, in his statement at the 1473rd

meeting, the Soviet representative had said that the non-use of force in international relations was the first of the Charter principles which his Government had sought to strengthen by proposing the item in question and had stated categorically that the Soviet Union opposed the use of force in international relations.

41. In a letter to the President of the United States sent on 8 October 1964, Mr. Khrushchev, then Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, had called for a solemn pledge not to resort to force to alter existing frontiers; for a recognition that the territory of States should not be the object of any invasion, attack, military occupation or other measure of force, direct or indirect; and for an undertaking to settle all territorial disputes exclusively by peaceful means. In that letter, Mr. Khrushchev had touched on the problem of divided States and, in reference to the State of South Viet-Nam, had concluded: "In settling this question, the use of force should be abjured, and the people of these countries should be given the opportunity to solve the problem of unification by peaceful means." That was precisely what the United States sought also and it therefore welcomed such views, whether they were applied to Viet-Nam or to other countries. The discontinuance of the use of force across frontiers or internationally agreed demarcation lines, however provisional they might be, and the use of exclusively peaceful means to pursue political objectives would immeasurably contribute to world order.

42. The United States had long since announced that it considered the Geneva Agreements of 20 July 1954 a satisfactory basis for a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam and had been glad to hear the Soviet Union representative reiterate that view. The Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam had created an international demarcation line with a demilitarized buffer zone on each side of it. It stipulated, in article 6, "No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the provisional military demarcation line unless specifically authorised to do so by the Joint Commission"; and it also required, in article 19, that

the territory of North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam should not be used "for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy". The United States now reiterated its willingness to engage in unconditional discussions based on the principles of the Geneva Agreements. A solution to the Viet-Name conflict would require nothing more of North Viet-Nam than its adherence to the Geneva Agreements and to the normal rules of international conduct. The United States wanted to take nothing from North Viet-Nam that belonged to it; it sought only an opportunity for the South Viet-Name to choose their own future, whatever it might be, free from outside force, intervention or interference.

43. His answer to any nation that encouraged intervention by one State in the affairs of another was that, if that nation really believed in the superiority of its own system, it should allow the system to commend itself through ideas, not guns. Independent States should be free to adopt any system of humane government they considered suited to their own traditions and temperaments. They should be free from any form of outside intervention, whether open or disguised, whether old-style invasion with banners flying, or new-style subversion, infiltration and terrorism.

44. Whatever resolution the Assembly might adopt, the road to peace might well be blocked for some time to come and those who preached and practised intervention against independent States might continue to use the United Nations as a forum to accuse others and to obstruct its use as an effective instrument for peace. But in the long run, the Assembly's resolutions, if they were sound, would have an effect. That was why his delegation hoped that the Assembly would adopt a resolution on the subject in the light of all the facts and in the light of the Charter. It might be a long time before the promises of the resolutions already adopted on the subject were redeemed, but redeemed they would be because that was the only way to reach the common goal: a world at peace.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.