

United Nations
**GENERAL
 ASSEMBLY**

EIGHTEENTH SESSION

Official Records

**FIRST COMMITTEE, 1323rd
 MEETING**

Thursday, 31 October 1963,
 at 3 p.m.



NEW YORK

CONTENTS

	Page
<i>Agenda item 73:</i>	
Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests (<i>concluded</i>)	
Consideration of draft resolution A/C.1/L.326 and Add.1 (<i>concluded</i>).	69
<i>Agenda item 26:</i>	
Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (<i>continued</i>)	
General debate (<i>continued</i>).	72

Chairman: Mr. C. W. A. SCHURMANN
 (Netherlands).

AGENDA ITEM 73

Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests (A/5428 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.326 and Add.1) (*concluded*)*

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTION A/C.1/L.326 AND ADD.1 (*concluded*)

1. Mr. Víctor Andrés BELAUNDE (Peru) expressed the hope that the draft resolution before the Committee (A/C.1/L.326) would be adopted unanimously. While he deplored the fact that it did not provide for certain constructive measures relating to inspection guarantees which had been suggested in the debate and which were mentioned in the documents of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, he realized that the inclusion of such measures, although they were scientifically and legally justified, would have brought political objections from certain Powers.

2. It was important that all States should accede to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed at Moscow on 5 August 1963, for the continuance of nuclear tests by any State, by creating suspicions of a new imbalance of nuclear forces, could bring about the denunciation of the treaty and a return to the dangerous situation which had preceded its conclusion.

3. The cessation of underground nuclear tests had been prevented by the absence of agreement on on-site inspection. If Soviet scientists had, as had been asserted, discovered methods for the detection and identification of underground nuclear tests without on-site inspection, he hoped that such methods would be placed at the disposal of the world scientific community. As the situation now stood, however, there could be no complete control—an essential part of a nuclear test ban treaty—without on-site inspection.

*Resumed from the 1321st meeting.

4. Mr. CHOW (China) said that his Government, as a signatory of the partial nuclear test ban treaty, endorsed the general principles underlying the draft resolution.

5. His Government firmly believed that the use of atomic energy must be confined to peaceful purposes and must have no harmful effects on human life; and it therefore welcomed any international instrument which sought to reduce and eliminate the danger of radio-active fall-out. It was only proper, moreover, that it should show its solidarity with the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations, which had long appealed for the suspension of nuclear tests. Although the partial test ban treaty had obvious imperfections, he believed that if certain nuclear Powers came to realize the damage done to their own normal economic life by the squandering of resources on nuclear weapons, the treaty could serve as a first step toward agreement on the larger problem of general disarmament.

6. The stumbling-block to the conclusion of a total test ban agreement remained the question of verification, which affected the security not only of the nuclear Powers but of all States. If the assertion that underground tests could be verified through national devices was true, it was only logical that the techniques in question should not be kept secret but should be made common knowledge. Only when it had been proved true would it no longer be necessary to insist on on-site inspection. In short, agreement on a total ban depended on the sincerity of the parties. In his delegation's view, however, the proper machinery for exploring the ways and means of obtaining the desired agreement was the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

7. His Government, as the legally constituted Government of China, spoke not only for those Chinese who were free but also for millions of their compatriots living in temporary captivity on the mainland, in signing the partial test ban treaty and supporting the draft resolution.

8. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) said that he was fully satisfied with the wording of that part of the draft resolution which was aimed at promoting the accession of all countries to the test ban treaty; however, he had some reservations concerning those portions which aimed at the achievement of a ban on underground tests.

9. A vital part of the draft resolution was the expression of respect for world public opinion contained in the first preambular paragraph. Historic experience had shown how strong a force that was, and he was therefore confident that the Powers which had not yet acceded to the treaty would give due consideration to the General Assembly's appeal to them to do so.

10. With regard to the goal of achieving agreement on the cessation of underground tests, he felt that

operative paragraph 2, requesting the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to continue its negotiations, did not sufficiently stress the urgency of the matter; he suggested that its wording should be changed to express a sense of urgency consistent with the title of the draft resolution.

11. His delegation fully approved operative paragraph 4, the effect of which would be that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament would take cognizance of the suggestions made in the plenary meetings of the General Assembly and the meetings of the First Committee. One suggestion of particular interest was the establishment of an *ad hoc* scientific committee to study progress in the field of seismic detection and verification techniques. It was unfortunate that no specific reference was made in draft resolution to such a committee, but he hoped that the Eighteen-Nation Committee would consider the suggestion nevertheless.

12. His delegation would support the draft resolution.

13. Mr. NONG KIMNY (Cambodia) said that Cambodia was aware of the danger to present and future generations caused by nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests, and although it had not signed the partial test ban treaty, it hoped that the treaty would be a genuine first step towards a final solution of the problems connected with a comprehensive ban on the testing, manufacture and use of nuclear weapons, and towards general and complete disarmament. He sincerely regretted, however, that the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.326 had felt it necessary to insert a special operative paragraph calling upon all States to become parties to the treaty, since that paragraph would make the unanimous approval of the draft impossible.

14. The reasons why the Royal Cambodian Government was unable to sign the partial test ban treaty had been explained by Cambodia's Head of State. First, as a matter of principle, Cambodia would never sign an international agreement without having participated in the discussions leading to it. Second, it was not logical to require from a country which was neutral in the world power struggle and which neither was nor had any opportunity of becoming a nuclear Power a pledge to hold no nuclear tests. Thirdly, the treaty was defective in that it permitted the continuation of underground nuclear tests. In addition, his Government was disturbed at the fact that under article IV any State could withdraw from the treaty if it considered that its interests were threatened.

15. All of those reasons still held good, and prevented Cambodia from signing the treaty. His delegation would therefore be obliged to abstain from voting on the draft resolution.

16. Mr. Taieb SLIM (Tunisia) said that although his delegation had refrained from speaking during the general debate in order to save the Committee's time, the importance of the problem now under discussion was such that he wished to make certain general comments before turning to the draft resolution. He wished to express his delegation's satisfaction that prudence and wisdom had at last prevailed, so that the Committee had been able to begin its work in an atmosphere of goodwill, and his country's gratitude to the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom for the major contribution that they had made to the cause of disarmament and peace by signing the partial test ban treaty, which, despite its shortcomings, at least represented a first step on the road to general

and complete disarmament. Only a few months ago, despite all efforts and despite the pressure brought to bear by world public opinion, the threat of a nuclear conflict had seemed to be growing every day. Now, at last, there was room for fresh hope.

17. As earlier speakers had stressed, the treaty had various defects: it did not put an end to underground testing, and it contained no provision for the destruction of nuclear weapons stockpiles. It was understandable that the nuclear Powers would have difficulty in overcoming the prejudices and the mutual distrust which had been built up during the years of the cold war; but it was clear that the treaty was only the beginning of a task which would not be completed until underground tests were banned. In reality, the obstacles to agreement on that point were political rather than technical, and he hoped that under the influence of the United Nations the three major nuclear Powers would quickly succeed in surmounting them.

18. The shortcomings of the treaty were due to the fact that a larger number of nations, especially non-aligned nations, had not been associated with it from the outset, and could have been avoided if the Eighteen-Nation Committee had been allowed to have an active hand in drafting it. The Tunisian Foreign Secretary had already expressed his country's interest in the Soviet proposal to hold a summit meeting of the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee; however, it would seem from the statements of their representatives in the First Committee that the three nuclear Powers still preferred restricted talks; and that would be a source of further delay. Nevertheless, his delegation would welcome any new agreement, which might open the way to other agreements and would help to bring home to France and the People's Republic of China the demands of reason and their duty to mankind. But while the United Nations could suggest courses of action, the initiative remained with the nuclear Powers.

19. In passing, his delegation wished to pay a special tribute to countries such as Canada which, although having the scientific and technical capacity to produce nuclear weapons, had deliberately chosen not to do so.

20. The draft resolution before the Committee reinforced the partial test ban treaty by giving it the formal and moral support of the United Nations, and represented a definite contribution to the cause of disarmament. His delegation would consequently vote for it, while hoping that it would open the way to an agreement on the banning of underground testing and to further accords. He trusted that the countries not yet parties to the treaty would respond to the appeal contained in the draft resolution.

21. Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana) said that while it was the great Powers which had been responsible for the partial test ban treaty, they had undoubtedly acted partly in response to the heavy pressure of world public opinion. The eight non-aligned countries in the Eighteen-Nation Committee had done praiseworthy work in that connexion by acting as a catalyst. However, when it came to drawing up a resolution in the First Committee, it was from the members of that Committee itself that the pressure should come, and not from Geneva. Yet it could be seen from the list of sponsors that the opposite had in fact occurred, and while he realized the difficulties with which the sponsors had been faced, he felt that that fact was responsible for a certain weakness in the draft resolution.

22. His delegation accordingly supported the suggestion of the representative of Cyprus that the aspect of urgency should be stressed. He formally proposed an amendment ^{1/} to operative paragraph 2 which would add the words "with a sense of urgency" between the words "to continue" and "its negotiations".

23. The text of the draft resolution was in his view weaker than that of General Assembly resolution 1762 (XVII), which had paved the way to the conclusion of the partial test ban treaty. His delegation would have liked to see included in it a reference to interim provisions for the suspension of underground testing, and he urged the sponsors to consider incorporating such a provision in the text, thereby giving the world practical grounds for hope.

24. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) said that his delegation wished to join in sponsoring the amendment submitted by the representative of Ghana.

25. Mr. LECHUGA (Cuba) said that his delegation would abstain in the vote on the draft resolution because in operative paragraph 1 the resolution called upon all States to become parties to the partial test ban treaty. Cuba would not sign the treaty until the United States, which was an original signatory, halted its unlawful activities and aggression against Cuba. The United States was waging an undeclared war against Cuba, smuggling saboteurs into that country, providing economic and military aid to enemies of the revolution, permitting the use of its territory for attacks on Cuba, violating Cuban air space and territorial waters, and maintaining an economic embargo of Cuba in the hope of starving it into submission. None of those activities were in keeping with the spirit of the treaty. Since Cuba was not a nuclear Power and lacked the means of becoming one, the fact that it was not a party to the treaty would have no practical consequences. His delegation's position on the matter was a moral one based on the principles which governed Cuban foreign policy.

26. His delegation agreed with the text of the draft resolution in so far as it sought to promote the achievement of a comprehensive test ban and requested the Eighteen-Nation Committee to continue its negotiations with a view to achieving its objectives.

27. Mr. BUDO (Albania) said that as his delegation had already pointed out in the General Assembly and in the First Committee, Albania was firmly opposed to the Moscow treaty, regarding it as a fraud and as harmful to the cause of international peace and security. It felt that the banning of nuclear tests must be treated as an integral part of the problem of eliminating nuclear weapons, which was itself a part of the problem of general and complete disarmament. It was in the light of those considerations that his delegation would vote against the draft resolution.

28. Mr. HASSAN (United Arab Republic) said that the sponsors of the draft resolution had had the question of urgency very much in mind. It should be recalled, however, that the Eighteen-Nation Committee had agreed to resume its work one week after the Assembly completed its consideration of the question of disarmament. The draft resolution was a well-balanced document which represented the result of almost two weeks of consultation, and he appealed to the Committee to accept it as it stood.

29. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) said that the amendment was not intended to hasten the reconvening of the Eighteen-Nation Committee but rather to promote a sense of urgency in the conduct of the Committee's negotiations. It seemed improper that the resolution should be less emphatic in that regard than the preamble of the partial test ban treaty.

30. Mr. Narendra SINGH (India) appealed to the representative of Ghana not to press his amendment, which would upset the delicate balance that had been achieved in the draft resolution.

31. Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana) said that his delegation would not press its suggestion for the suspension of underground testing. However, the amendment to operative paragraph 2 submitted by Cyprus and Ghana still stood.

32. The CHAIRMAN asked the Secretary of the Committee to comment on the financial implications of the draft resolution.

33. Mr. VELLODI (Secretary of the Committee) said that, in accordance with rule 154 of the rules of procedure, the Secretary-General wished to inform the Committee that the adoption of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.362 would call for an additional appropriation estimated at \$144,000 per month, as well as a further appropriation of \$40,400 to cover non-recurring costs for staff travel. Those estimates, which would cover the general proceedings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, were based on actual expenditure and experience during 1963 and on the assumption that the Committee's meetings would not be held concurrently with those of its Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests.

34. The CHAIRMAN announced that several delegations had joined the list of sponsors of the draft resolution, as indicated in document A/C.1/L.326/Add.1.

35. Mr. NGOKO (Cameroon) said that the amendment would not change the spirit of the draft resolution, since the latter's title and text referred to the urgent need for suspension of nuclear tests, and the Eighteen-Nation Committee was in any case given until the nineteenth session of the Assembly to report.

36. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) said that the amendment, which would in no way alter the sense of the draft resolution, had been submitted in order to bring the latter's text into harmony with its title and with world public opinion.

37. Mr. MATSCH (Austria) said that his delegation would vote against the amendment, since its adoption would imply criticism of the Eighteen-Nation Committee for not having acted with sufficient urgency in the past.

38. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the amendment submitted by Cyprus and Ghana (A/C.1/L.327).

The amendment was adopted by 20 votes to 3, with 78 abstentions.

39. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.326 and Add.1), as amended.

The draft resolution, as amended, was adopted by 97 votes to 1, with 3 abstentions.

40. Mr. ALI (Pakistan) said that his delegation had abstained in the vote on the amendment because it had felt that the words "to continue" in operative paragraph 2 already indicated a sense of urgency.

^{1/} Subsequently distributed as document A/C.1/L.327.

41. Mr. PACHACHI (Iraq) said that his delegation had voted for the amendment because it had not believed that the latter would in any way upset the delicate balance of the resolution.

AGENDA ITEM 26

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (A/5408-DC/207, A/5488-DC/208) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

42. Mr. MATSUI (Japan) said that for the first time in the long history of the First Committee's consideration of the vital and intractable problem of disarmament, some positive events had taken place. They were the agreement on a direct communications link between Washington and Moscow, the conclusion of a partial nuclear test ban treaty and the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1884 (XVIII) calling upon all States to refrain from placing weapons of mass destruction in outer space. While those developments were limited in scope and were not genuine disarmament measures, they had at least served somewhat to reduce world tension and to allay mistrust and suspicion among the great Powers, and enabled the Committee to resume discussion of its main task, the question of general and complete disarmament, with renewed hope.

43. The Committee's best approach to the problem in the present circumstances would be to press for consideration of collateral disarmament measures. Such measures could do much to remove some of the obstacles still in the way of general and complete disarmament. They would consolidate confidence among the nations, would bring about a favourable climate for a large-scale disarmament programme, and might even prevent any slowing down or disruption of the disarmament process once it had begun. Various proposals for possible measures of that nature had been put forward. Mention should be made in that connexion of the understanding reached between the Soviet Union and the United States to refrain from stationing weapons of mass destruction in outer space. That understanding had been incorporated in General Assembly resolution 1884 (XVIII), and would help to restrain and confine the arms race. Furthermore, many constructive proposals to eliminate the risk of war through accident, miscalculation or surprise attack had been advanced at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, among them the establishment of observation posts, the advance notification of military movements and manoeuvres and the exchange of military missions. Those proposals deserved the most attentive study.

There were many other proposals that might conceivably further reduce tensions and facilitate general and complete disarmament. In examining all those measures, attention should be concentrated on specific, practical and well defined measures evaluated in terms of their real and intrinsic contribution to the reduction of tension and to disarmament.

44. The question of the establishment of nuclear-free zones was one in which much interest had been shown in recent years, notably by the Latin American States. In general, the establishment of nuclear-free zones should be considered in the light of feasibility, taking into account the conditions prevailing in the region concerned and the possible effect that the measure might have on world security. In any case, certain indispensable conditions would have to be fulfilled. Firstly, a denuclearized zone was conceivable only in areas remote from the nuclear Powers or free from the deployment of nuclear weapons. Secondly, the arrangement must be accepted and respected by all the States concerned—those belonging to the region as well as the nuclear Powers having a direct interest in the security of the region. Thirdly, provision had to be made for adequate safeguards, including inspection and verification. Fourthly, the establishment of such a zone should not upset the world balance of power.

45. His delegation believed that there were certain overriding principles which were applicable equally to general disarmament schemes and to collateral measures. Disarmament, by its very nature, could not be divorced from the maintenance of international peace and security; any measures to be taken must therefore be coldly realistic. That implied that disarmament must be balanced from the standpoint of security and must be placed under effective international control, where necessary, including inspection and verification. In addition, the problem must be approached realistically: disarmament must be begun with limited measures and expanded gradually in scope. Recent developments had illustrated the soundness of those views.

46. The suggestion made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR in the General Assembly (1208th plenary meeting) that the Soviet Union and the United States might retain a limited number of intercontinental, anti-missile and anti-aircraft missiles until the process of disarmament was completed was interesting. That suggestion offered further evidence of the efforts of the great Powers to narrow their differences. The remaining differences would ultimately be adjusted thanks to the efforts of the great Powers and the goodwill of the other nations responsible for negotiating disarmament agreements.

The meeting rose at 5 p.m.