

United Nations  
**GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY**

**TWENTY-FIRST SESSION**

*Official Records*

**FIRST COMMITTEE, 1480th  
MEETING**

*Friday, 9 December 1966,  
at 3.25 p.m.*



**NEW YORK**

**CONTENTS**

*Agenda item 96:*

*Status of the implementation of the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty (continued)*

*General debate (continued) . . . . . 331*

*Chairman: Mr. Leopoldo BENITES (Ecuador).*

*In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Fahmy (United Arab Republic), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

**AGENDA ITEM 96**

Status of the implementation of the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty (continued) (A/6397, A/C.1/938-940, A/C.1/L.367, A/C.1/L.388)

**GENERAL DEBATE (continued)**

1. Mr. ORTIZ SANZ (Bolivia) said that General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX), which contained the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, was doubly valuable in that it was one of the most important political documents the United Nations had ever adopted and had proved that apparently opposed points of view could be brought together in a single text. It was very desirable for the Committee to consider from time to time whether the Declaration was being complied with; the Soviet Union should therefore be commended on its initiative in requesting that the item be placed on the agenda. The Latin American countries had again demonstrated a spirit of co-operation in submitting amendments (A/C.1/L.388) to the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.367), which they had wished to make more comprehensive by condemning indirect forms of intervention too.

2. Their desire to condemn intervention in all its forms was strengthened by the fact that resolution 2131 (XX) had scarcely been adopted when the First Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America—known as the Tricontinental Conference—had met at Havana, with the participation of certain States Members of the United Nations. The declared intentions of the Conference, the tone of its decisions and the nature of the bodies to which it had given rise constituted the first international violation of the letter and spirit of resolution 2131 (XX), and an

infringement of the peaceful principles of the United Nations Charter.

3. Bolivia wished to reaffirm its disapproval of acts which encouraged subversion, contrary to the movement of history towards world peace. It could not be denied that peace was ill served by recourse to violent revolutionary action. The voice of truth was always calm. The peoples of the world would one day understand the importance of the Declaration, and it would remain a major document whatever happened. Only in reflection and negotiation could an answer be found to the world's problems.

4. Miss BROOKS (Liberia) said that the question of the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of States and the protection of their independence and sovereignty was of vital importance, given the present state of international relations. One of the basic factors leading to the First World War had been the intervention of European States in the affairs of African countries, and it was their intervention in each others' affairs that had brought about the break-up of the League of Nations and led to the Second World War. The effects of the intervention of foreign Powers at Suez were still being felt in the Middle East, and the "cold war" was the result of the assumption by certain States of the right to run the affairs of others.

5. Intervention took different forms; one of them was the use of information media, which were progressively revolutionizing communications throughout the world, as a means of persuasion. There was nothing wrong with broadening people's minds, but communications media must not be used to disrupt the political growth of any State, nor economic aid as a pretext for interference. States should refrain from training subversive forces to overthrow the Governments of sovereign nations.

6. Some countries still failed to realize that the principle of non-intervention was the keystone of world peace, as her delegation had already stated at the twentieth session (1401st meeting). The principle had been reaffirmed by the Governments of Liberia, Ghana and Guinea in the joint declaration they had issued at Sanniquellie, Liberia, on 19 July 1959, and by President Tubman in his opening address to the Monrovia Conference of Independent African States on 8 May 1961. It had also been included in the charter of the Organization of African Unity, and in the charters of all regional organizations. It was of great importance that the United Nations should not only put an end to all forms of intervention but eliminate its causes, one of which was colonialism and its manifestations, whose disappearance would surely reduce tension in certain areas of the world.

7. Mr. DIARRA (Mali) congratulated the Soviet delegation on its initiative in requesting that the item before the Committee should be placed on the agenda. It must unfortunately be recognized that the objective of the Declaration in resolution 2131 (XX) was far from being attained. The principle of non-intervention had been recognized as essential to international stability, not only in the United Nations Charter but in those of other organizations involving groups of States, and in conferences of heads of State and Government. It was therefore surprising that it had been so often violated, particularly by the Powers which had done most to secure its formal acceptance, but yet had not hesitated to flout it whenever their selfish interests had been at stake. The principle of non-intervention implied the unequivocal condemnation of all intervention, whether military, political or economic. "Counter-intervention" was but a deceitful pretext, since objective analysis of conflicts provoked by foreign interference showed that they had always originated in the imperialist Powers' attempts to maintain their influence in some parts of the world.

8. Attempts were often made to give a semblance of international legitimacy to the use of armed force and economic pressure by presenting them as preventive measures against subversion. That was the case in Viet-Nam, which the United States and its allies were preventing from achieving national unity in accordance with the Geneva Agreements of 1954. In the countries of Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, agents of "official" subversive organizations were sent to stir up trouble, and in the case of failure recourse had been had to blackmail and economic pressure.

9. True to the policy of non-alignment, peaceful coexistence and respect for the sovereignty of States, the Government of Mali unequivocally condemned all direct or indirect intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries. In relations between States it was absolutely essential to take account of the fact that all peoples had their own characteristic form of civilization and conceived their national existence in terms of a number of particular factors. No country had the right to determine what best served the interests of another country or to intervene against a peaceful population on the pretext that a given country was the victim of subversive activities. That was why the cause of the Viet-Nameese people in their just struggle for independence concerned all peoples who loved peace and justice. Mali was convinced that all disputes could and should be settled by negotiation. It was the foregoing considerations that would guide his delegation in voting on the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.367) and the nineteen-Power amendments (A/C.1/L.388).

10. Mr. SALIM (United Republic of Tanzania) stressed the importance of the Declaration adopted at the previous session. The Declaration took its place with other instruments which had supplemented the Charter and enriched international law, and whose value was in part due to the dynamism brought to the Organization by the many States, of widely differing cultures, that had become Members in recent years. His delegation believed that the reasons which had prompted the Soviet Union to request the inclusion in

the agenda of the current session of the item under discussion were valid. It had also welcomed the amendments submitted by nineteen Latin American countries to the Soviet draft resolution, which on the face of it were unexceptionable. But some of the sponsors of the amendments had introduced a very untoward polemical atmosphere into the debate. It was clear that the term "intervene" as used in Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter and in General Assembly resolution 2099 (XX) did not refer to mere discussion. While an interpretation limiting intervention to coercive measures would have the result of preventing the application of paragraph 2 of the Declaration, it was obvious that what the Declaration was intended to prohibit was overt intervention. Some of the delegations that had referred to the Tri-continental Conference held at Havana in January 1966 had said that it had had no practical results of any significance; however well intentioned their real objectives, their efforts were in danger of distracting attention from the real issues and sowing confusion and discord among the Member States whose solidarity had made the historic Declaration possible.

11. What were the real issues? The war in Viet-Nam, provocations by Portugal, aggression against the Arab countries, economic and political pressures on small States, and the machinations of the imperialist Powers to overthrow the Governments of independent African and Asian countries that had dared to oppose the interests of the monopolies. The desperate efforts of moribund imperialism constituted the most flagrant violations of the Declaration. The declaration adopted at the First Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade in September 1961, had referred to the risk of world conflict inherent in the transition from an old order based on domination to a new order based on co-operation between nations, founded on freedom and equality. There had certainly been some changes since that 1961 document, particularly in human rights, but development could be retarded if the Member States, in their policies and acts, displayed too great a sensitivity to criticism. International relations had not yet resolved the conflict between the idea of absolute sovereignty and that of co-operation and solidarity. But neither idea could survive unless war, the most important danger to the independence and sovereignty of States, was eliminated. His delegation was saddened most of all by the fact that in the current debate some delegations, greatly preoccupied with the Tri-continental Conference, had not felt it necessary to mention, let alone deplore, the conflict in Viet-Nam. That omission could not be due to indifference; it was no doubt due to a temporary displacement of priorities.

12. For its part, the Tanzanian Government was opposed to any act of direct or indirect interference against the sovereignty and independence of any State and to intervention in the domestic or external affairs of States or peoples. It would support all proposals and measures genuinely intended to further the principles proclaimed by the United Nations.

13. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) recalled that the principle of non-intervention was implicit in the three essential principles of the Charter: sovereign equality,

equality of rights and self-determination of peoples and the prohibition of the use or threat of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any State. It was also implicitly contained in Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. However, non-intervention between States was not, per se, defined in the Charter, and its formulation and progressive development were therefore urgently needed. Unfortunately, the work that had been carried out by the Sixth Committee and the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States under General Assembly resolutions 1815 (XVII) and 1966 (XVIII) had yielded no results, and the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty adopted by the General Assembly at its preceding session had therefore been entirely appropriate. That Declaration was supported by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) on decolonization and had drawn on the juridical wisdom and experience of the Latin American and Afro-Asian countries. It was a document which dealt completely with all aspects of intervention. It was political in origin, but legal in scope and effect.

14. By expressly prohibiting intervention in the internal or external affairs of States "for any reason whatever", the Declaration unequivocally and unreservedly barred any possibility of intervention, including intervention on the pretext of alleged treaty rights, in violation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of another country. Even before the United Nations Charter, any treaty purporting to give one party the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of a State by way of a treaty of guarantee had been regarded as illegal, inadmissible and of no effect. Since the establishment of the United Nations, such treaties of intervention were completely invalidated by the Charter, first because they violated a peremptory norm of international law, namely, the prohibition of the threat or use of force, and, secondly, because they were contrary to the obligations arising from the cardinal principles of the Charter and were therefore void ab initio by virtue of Article 103 of the Charter.

15. Interventions in various parts of the world arose sometimes from the antagonism between socio-political systems and ideologies, sometimes from conflicts of interest within a single socio-political system, and sometimes from colonialism or neo-colonialism in their various manifestations. The Declaration in resolution 2131 (XX) had ensured equal protection against all forms of intervention, direct or indirect, by aggression or by subversion. The small countries, which were usually the victims of intervention, of whatever origin, were often threatened simultaneously by direct intervention in their domestic affairs through military, political or economic pressures and by indirect intervention in the form of acts of terrorism and subversion inspired from outside. They must look to the United Nations for the protection of their independence and territorial integrity and must, in return, give the Organization their unqualified support in order to make it a more effective instrument of progress and peace in the world.

16. Cyprus was a classic example of intervention of every kind: denial of the inalienable right of self-determination; the fostering of ethnic divisions on the colonialist principle of "divide and rule"; making the granting of independence subject to the acceptance of illegal treaties; the imposition of an abnormal constitution subjecting the majority to the control of a minority; external aggression and internal subversion. At its twentieth session, the General Assembly had discussed the question of Cyprus at length and had adopted resolution 2077 (XX) reaffirming the full sovereignty and independence of Cyprus and expressly prohibiting any foreign intervention in its affairs. That had not, however, ended the repeated threats of invasion and intervention, and externally directed subversion had not ceased.

17. If it was desired to emphasize the need for observance of the Declaration in resolution 2131 (XX), every intervention must be denounced, irrespective of its magnitude or of the part of the world where it took place. A continued disregard of the United Nations and of its Charter and the persistence of outmoded concepts of force and domination boded ill for the future of mankind, especially in the nuclear age. The trends of peace through war, ideology through force, and national interest through international violence were illogical and must be arrested and reversed. The United Nations had a central role to play in that task, but it could not be effective unless the Member States approached world problems with the objectivity derived from a total allegiance to the cause of mankind as a whole and from the development of a United Nations conscience. The small countries, whose freedom and security depended entirely on the United Nations, had a duty to act together as a central moral force and to contribute effectively to the development and strengthening of the United Nations as an instrument of freedom and peace in the world. All international problems without exception must be brought to the United Nations, but the Organization would also have to be made truly universal.

18. The debate had been very useful in many respects. His delegation was convinced that the First Committee would unanimously adopt a resolution calling for observance of the Declaration. He reserved the right to speak later on the draft resolution and the amendments.

19. Mr. SCHUURMANS (Belgium) said that he was probably not alone in wondering whether it was really advisable, scarcely one year after the adoption of the Declaration in resolution 2131 (XX), to submit to the General Assembly a further draft resolution of apparently similar scope. Admittedly, there was some advantage in reaffirming principles but too frequent reaffirmation might weaken their force.

20. At the previous session, his delegation had observed how easy it was to agree on the wording of the actual principle of non-intervention, whereas there were wide differences in the individual interpretations of that rule and in the way in which it was applied in the day-to-day conduct of international relations. The current debate illustrated the truth of that observation. His delegation felt, therefore, that the prime purpose of the discussion in the First Committee, and

particularly in the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, should be to help formulate clearly, precisely and comprehensively, the doctrine of non-intervention.

21. The principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of States obviously included first of all the prohibition of the threat or use of force to settle conflicts and disputes arising between sovereign States. Also prohibited was the use of any means of duress against another State with the object of forcing it to accept any form of political or economic subjugation. Acceptance of that first principle created no problems.

22. That was not true for another form of interference, less obvious perhaps but more insidious and therefore more dangerous, which must be proscribed just as clearly; that was subversion, the most recent and the most sophisticated method of infringing the sovereignty of States. That new practice consisted in sapping from within the actual foundations of lawful authority until it was overthrown. There were few countries which could boast that they were completely safe from such activities. However, it was the former colonial and newly independent countries which seemed to be the favourite victims of such divisive attempts. Many African, Asian and Latin American representatives had described destructive manoeuvres, encouraged or directed from abroad, against which their Governments were endeavouring to protect themselves by exercising constant vigilance. Particularly worthy of attention among those striking revelations had been the statement made by the representative of Brazil concerning the Tricontinental Conference at Havana. It was outrageous that at that meeting several countries should have openly expressed their concerted and deliberate intention of proclaiming the political dogma of subversion and impudently exposed plans aiming at the violent overthrow of lawful Governments.

23. It was now known how greatly the threat of subversion imperilled the very existence of many sovereign States. The Committee should therefore be grateful to the Latin American delegations for having made good the Soviet draft resolution's unfortunate deficiency in that respect. Any definition of the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of States must take fully into account the right of a lawful Government to call on foreign military assistance whenever necessary. When it decided to do so, in order to meet an external threat or to defend itself against subversion, it was not accountable to any third country for that decision, which was entirely within its own competence and for which it alone was responsible.

24. His brief statement of the principles clearly indicated the attitude which his delegation would adopt when the texts before the Committee were put to the vote. It would vote in favour of the nineteen-Power amendments. If they were adopted, it would support the Soviet draft resolution although it did not consider its wording perfect.

25. Mr. VINCI (Italy) said that many interesting ideas had been voiced on the problem before the

Committee. At its previous session, the General Assembly had had a lengthy debate on the item before it had adopted resolution 2131 (XX). In 1964 and 1966, the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States had studied the codification and progressive development of the principle of non-intervention and would continue to do so in 1967 with a view to achieving a legal formulation of that principle.

26. His delegation had voted for General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX) although that resolution had emphasized only certain aspects of the principle of non-intervention. It believed that a principle of such importance should be studied in all its aspects taking into account the right of States to have recourse to all means and procedures generally followed in diplomatic practice and recognized to be in conformity with international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

27. At the twentieth session his delegation had told the Committee (1402nd meeting) that while it was easy to talk of non-intervention, it was much harder, if not impossible, to define exactly in what sort of domestic affairs of States there should be no foreign intervention. The USSR draft resolution then under discussion had contained both too much and too little: too much, because it had listed all the things that should not be done, and too little, because it had not specified what the independence and sovereignty of States entitled them to do. Moreover, the authors had appeared to reserve for themselves the right to judge what constituted intervention; and, by referring to some international conferences and not to others, they had given the right to take a decision on the matter to certain States only. His delegation had added that non-intervention was without doubt a very important principle which figured in the Charter of the United Nations and was fundamental to independence and sovereignty, i.e., the liberty and equality of States. But that principle had to yield precedence to the right of every State, and, for that matter, of the international community to safeguard its own security through the procedures provided in treaties in force and also in the Charter.

28. At the current session the Committee was examining the status of the implementation of the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX). The statements which had already been made had confirmed the extreme complexity of the item and had drawn the Committee's attention to certain imperfections of resolution 2131 (XX). It was therefore quite natural for some delegations to feel the need of a new text which would supplement and improve the previous one.

29. The item under consideration could be examined from two different points of view. First of all, it could be studied as a question of principle. A political body such as the General Assembly was certainly entitled to consider that aspect of the matter, especially in order to suggest general guidelines. To go further, however, would be unwise and even dangerous. The presentation of one-sided views, for instance on the conflict in Viet-Nam, could only confuse the issue and make the Committee's task more difficult. That was why the drafting and approval of a juridically sound

text should be left to more competent bodies such as the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States. Moreover, it seemed appropriate to recall that a procedure of that nature had been indicated in the last paragraph of section II of General Assembly resolution 2160 (XXI) on the strict observance of the prohibition of the threat or use of force in international relations, and of the right of peoples to self-determination. As was known, his delegation would have preferred a more precise wording of that paragraph since it believed that the Special Committee should consider resolutions adopted at the current session of the General Assembly in conjunction with the other sources to be examined in the further study of the principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter, with a view to the early adoption of a declaration containing a legal enunciation of those principles.

30. The Committee could also examine the question of non-intervention from a second point of view, i.e., with reference to precise and well defined practical situations. In that case it would be preferable to include each such situation in the agenda as a separate item. Only by so doing would the General Assembly really be in a position to take the appropriate political decisions.

31. Mr. ODHIAMBO (Kenya) said that he regarded resolution 2131 (XX) as one of the most important resolutions of the United Nations. It was therefore fitting that its implementation should be reviewed from year to year so that all countries, particularly those with imperialistic tendencies, might be in no doubt that intervention was no longer tolerated. After it had succeeded in eliminating colonialism, the United Nations would have to eradicate neo-colonialism if the new nations of the "third world" were to know peace. Neo-colonialism operated through direct or indirect intervention—for example, in the form of technical assistance or loans—which was so thoroughgoing that the client State became a mere appendage of its new master, who even determined its vote in the United Nations. Furthermore, its people continued to be exploited. That was the most serious form of intervention facing the "third world"; and since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX) such interventions had certainly grown no fewer. On the contrary, such little evidence as came to light, for instance on the activities of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, clearly showed that such activities were increasing and that the tools of intervention were being perfected. It was likely that the wielders of those tools had played an important part in the various coups d'etat which had occurred in Africa during the past year. It was therefore necessary for the Assembly to reaffirm the general principles contained in resolution 2131 (XX) and to urge all Member States to abide by them.

32. Much had been said about the Tricontinental Conference held at Havana in January 1966. The people of Kenya had been represented at that Conference because imperialists and neo-colonialists were waging a ruthless struggle to control the "third world" so as to continue to exploit its natural resources and the

labour of its people. However, on achieving independence, the peoples of the "third world" wanted to improve their standard of living and to be able to feed, clothe and educate their children. They wanted to exploit their natural resources for their own benefit and to develop fully their cultural, economic, social and political institutions. Thus there was a real clash of interests between the peoples of those countries and the neo-colonialists. It had therefore been natural for the representatives of those peoples and their friends from other parts of the world to meet and review the extent, the course and the strategy of the struggle in which, through no fault of their own, they had been forced to engage.

33. Although Kenya did not accept all the resolutions adopted at Havana, it felt that the Tricontinental Conference had been useful and would look forward to taking part in similar conferences in the future. For obvious reasons, the holding of such conferences was unlikely to be welcome to imperialist countries or to those Governments in the "third world" which had identified their interests with those of the imperialists, or to politicians who had become the agents of neo-colonialism. It should be noted, however, that the Tricontinental Conference alone could not produce a revolution in any country. The French Revolution, the October Revolution, the Chinese Revolution, the Egyptian Revolution and the Zanzibar Revolution, to mention only a few, had not been organized by participants in the Tricontinental Conference. History showed that peoples who were oppressed and exploited would, at the right time, rise and overthrow their oppressors. At a time when people all over the world were becoming aware of their economic and other rights, those in power should really come to grips with the social and economic problems of those in their care if they wished to eliminate the frustration and tensions which so quickly led to uprisings. As the Chilean representative had so rightly pointed out, those social problems should be of far greater concern than any number of Tricontinental Conferences.

34. When discussing the implementation of resolution 2131 (XX), it was impossible not to mention the war in Viet-Nam. That war had become the concern of all humanity and especially of the people of Africa, who realized that similar wars of liberation would have to be fought against minority régimes and their accomplices. The economic interests of the countries which were waxing fat on the fruits of apartheid would probably impel them to intervene, as had happened in Viet-Nam. His delegation had expressed strong feelings on the inhuman war in Viet-Nam and had hoped that it would at least grow less fierce during 1966; but the opposite had happened. He wondered whether it was too much to hope that, when the Assembly came to reaffirm the principles of resolution 2131 (XX), the parties concerned would take heed. In an age of weapons of mass destruction, respect for the principle of non-intervention was vital to the well-being of all the peoples of the world. Once intervention occurred, war could easily follow. He therefore hoped that the United Nations would spare no effort to bring home to Member States the importance of resolution 2131 (XX) and the need for its strict observance. It was in that spirit that his dele-

gation would consider the USSR draft resolution and the amendments to it.

35. Mr. PARIS MONTESINOS (Venezuela) reminded the Committee of his country's position on non-intervention and of the great importance it attached to General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX). He stressed in particular the second sentence of paragraph 2 of that resolution, which should be borne in mind during the discussion of the USSR draft resolution and of the Latin American amendments (A/C.1/L.388). Those texts were in harmony with the wording of the agenda item, to which recent events had unfortunately given point. After the hopes aroused by resolution 2131 (XX), world opinion had been shaken by the resolutions and agreements emanating from the Tricontinental Conference at Havana, which called for intervention, by means of technical, military and economic assistance, in the affairs of other States Members of the United Nations with a view to changing the democratic system freely chosen by their people.

36. He recounted the progress achieved by the democratic Government of Venezuela since 1958 to promote political and economic democracy and remarked that the resultant feeling of national unity had made it possible to frustrate the attempts of foreign aggressors. The Government and people of Venezuela would give no quarter to the bearers of a message of death and destruction; the agents of subversion claimed that such crimes were part of their struggle, but that struggle was becoming increasingly difficult because it was being waged against a people which had confidence in its democratic leaders, whether they were in the Government or in the opposition. What was the key to that success? The answer was simple: an effort had been made to solve the problem of underdevelopment by pursuing a policy of nationalism and of respect for the rights of citizens. That policy made it possible to take resolute action, in a spirit free from ideological overtones, against those who took up arms in order to introduce dogmatic totalitarianism in the country.

37. In supporting the aims of the USSR proposal, Venezuela was entirely logical. In order to preserve its territorial integrity and its sovereignty, Venezuela would exercise the right of legitimate defence in accordance with international agreements and its own legislation, but it expressed the hope that the aggressors would give up a cause which was in contradiction with international law and with United Nations resolutions tending to ensure peaceful coexistence among the peoples of the world. The Latin American countries were determined to defend themselves against aggression and unwarranted intervention, as the Presidents of Colombia, Chile and Venezuela and the personal representatives of the Presidents of Ecuador and Peru had stated in the declaration signed at their Bogotá meeting on 16 August 1966. In that spirit they had studied the report<sup>1/</sup> submitted to the Council of the Organization of American States con-

cerning the agreements, resolutions and conclusions of the Tricontinental Conference. That objective report bore witness both to the threat to the independence and sovereignty of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and to the fact that the Governments which had participated in the Conference had violated the letter and spirit of General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX). His delegation wished that those whose floods of words of peace were given the lie by their daily deeds would be a little more sincere.

38. U SOE TIN (Burma), after recalling the position taken by his delegation at the preceding session with regard to the question of non-intervention and to the statements made by the USSR and United States representatives after the vote on resolution 2131 (XX), welcomed the initiative of the Soviet Union in proposing the inclusion of the question at the current session, thus enabling the Committee to appraise the implementation or violation of the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty by Member States which, one year previously, had reaffirmed the principle of non-intervention and of the inviolability of territorial integrity and political independence.

39. Since its admission to the comity of nations, Burma had pursued a policy of non-alignment and peaceful coexistence. It was wedded to the ideals of peace and the strengthening of friendly relations, mutual understanding and co-operation among nations, based on international justice and morality. It recognized the principles of sovereignty, respect for sovereignty, and sovereign equality of States. It respected the sovereign right of every State freely to choose its own political, economic and social system and its way of life, in keeping with its own conditions, needs and potentialities, without any interference or pressure from outside. Burma had accepted and scrupulously complied with the principle of non-interference and peaceful coexistence with all States, regardless of their political, economic or social system. It believed that non-interference was the only feasible and reasonable policy for relations among States. It had never failed to reaffirm that principle, both inside and outside the United Nations. That principle had been one of the most important pillars of Burma's foreign policy in all declarations and joint statements to which Burma was a party. Quite recently, the King of Nepal and the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the Union of Burma had reiterated their respective countries' faith in the principle of non-intervention in the joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit of Burma's Head of State to the Kingdom of Nepal.

40. The cases of intervention in the internal affairs of States cited in the course of the debate had shown the many forms that intervention could take, ranging from armed intervention to subversive activities, which included the maintenance of training camps for saboteurs, infiltrations across frontiers, and adoption of resolutions encouraging the overthrow of established Governments. Regrettably, despite solemn professions of faith by Member States and reaffirmation of the principles of the Charter, intervention was still a common phenomenon. Attempts at intervention were a major cause of world tensions.

<sup>1/</sup> "Report of the Special Committee to study resolutions II.1 and VIII of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on the First Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Conference and its Projections ('Tricontinental Conference of Havana')", Council of the Organization of American States, Pan American Union, Washington, D.C., document OEA/Ser.G/IV, C-1-769-A Rev., vols. I and II, 28 November 1966.

Such actions often produced reactions from opposing external forces. Experience showed that, whatever the reasons for foreign intervention, it led to new conflicts and tensions and therefore did nothing to establish the proper climate for the peaceful settlement of international problems. He was convinced that strict respect for the principle of non-intervention by all, in deeds as well as in words, was the essential prerequisite for the maintenance of peace and security and for the strengthening of international understanding and co-operation.

41. For those reasons, his delegation would support the USSR draft resolution with the nineteen-Power amendments, although it would have preferred the Committee to adopt a much more representative text giving greater weight to such an important principle.

42. Mr. HUOT SAMBATH (Cambodia) said, in connexion with the Honduran representative's statement at the 1474th meeting concerning the Cambodian representative's attendance at the Tricontinental Conference at Havana, that that Conference had not been a governmental conference and that the head of the Cambodian delegation had been appointed spokesman of the "Popular Socialist Community" of Cambodia, which was neither a communist nor a republican organization, Cambodians being primarily nationalists and devoted to the monarchy.

43. As to the question before the Committee, contemporary history showed that intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries had been carried out by the colonialist, neo-colonialist and imperialist Powers, headed by the United States. As could be seen, *inter alia*, from the passages in President Eisenhower's memoirs dealing with United States intervention in Guatemala,<sup>2/</sup> the United States did not agree and never would agree to a country's adopting an independent and neutral policy in its international relations—a strange attitude on the part of a country which claimed to be the leader of the so-called "free" world and a loyal Member of the United Nations, respectful of its Charter. Indeed, the United States sought to destroy any Government which was truly neutral and independent. There again, the events in Guatemala showed clearly that the United States Government intervened in the domestic affairs of any State the moment it adopted an independent policy that was contrary to United States interests. In addition to the case of Guatemala, examples of United States intervention in Latin America were the theft of Mexican territory by the United States and the latter's illegal occupation of Puerto Rico. He recalled the statement by the Chilean representative at the Tricontinental Conference in Havana that the countries of Latin America had suffered various types of mistreatment and had had various régimes imposed on them by the United States. At the same conference, the Panamanian representative had cited his own country as the best illustration of the oppressive nature of United States imperialism, which had kept Panama under its military heel for sixty-two years. There was surely no need to mention the case of Cuba, where the United States, aided by certain other

Latin American States, was committing acts of aggression and provocation. Members of the United Nations would also recall the vigorous condemnation of United States aggression in the Dominican Republic expressed in the Security Council by the Uruguayan representative. That aggression dispelled any remaining doubt about the nature of United States imperialism.

44. The Asian continent had long been exploited and humiliated by the European colonialists and the North American imperialists. The United States had oppressed the Viet-Nameese people by various means; his delegation had already cited, in the General Assembly, irrefutable testimony by United States political figures which proved that the United States was committing aggression in Viet-Nam. His delegation had also denounced the aggression committed against the Chinese people by the United States and the latter's flagrant violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter.

45. Finally, it should be mentioned that in Africa, colonial, racist régimes were continuing to oppress millions of coloured people.

46. It was in that atmosphere of struggle and oppression that the peoples of the three continents had decided to meet at Havana. It was the colonialist, neo-colonialist and imperialist Powers and their accomplices, led by the United States, that had provoked those peoples by their imperialist, interventionist policy. It was those Powers whose violations of the principles of the United Nations Charter had brought about the historic gathering of the peoples of the three continents and were responsible for the present deterioration of the international situation. As the head of the Cambodian delegation to the Tricontinental Conference had emphasized, the struggle being waged by the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America was not directed against the American nation and people but against a policy which threatened their independence and the peace of the world. The aim of that struggle was to prevail upon the United States Government to respect international law, bring home the troops which it maintained all over the world, abandon its thousands of military bases and agree to place its relations with all peoples on a basis of complete equality.

47. A year had passed since the General Assembly's adoption of resolution 2131 (XX), but world peace was today threatened more than ever by the imperialist policies of the United States, particularly in Viet-Nam. Cambodia, for its part, was being subjected to an increasing number of aggressive, provocative acts by the armed forces of Thailand, the United States and South Viet-Nam. Since they were unable to invade or intimidate Cambodia, the latter's enemies were resorting to subversive methods. Agents recruited in South Viet-Nam among the Cambodian minority and sent to Thailand were creating insecurity along Cambodia's frontiers with the support of elements of the Thai armed forces. A radio station in Thai territory broadcast anti-Cambodian propaganda every day and was—vainly, it should be noted—inciting the population to revolt. Despite those acts of subversion and aggression, Cambodia had proposed to Thailand that the two countries should resume relations after signing a declaration affirming that they respected

<sup>2/</sup> See Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-56* (Garden City, New York, Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1963), pp. 422-425.

their existing frontiers. Cambodia had informed the United States Government that a resumption of relations would be possible if Washington agreed to put an end to all frontier violations and acts of aggression and to recognize and respect Cambodia's present frontiers. However, Thailand and the United States had rejected those proposals.

48. As the Cambodian Head of State had declared in February 1966 to the Chief Minister of Sarawak with regard to the "intransigent" position taken by the Viet-Nameese, it was clearly impossible to agree to negotiations which legitimized aggression by placing the aggressors and their victims on the same footing. In such circumstances, the only possible course was to demand the cessation of the aggression and the departure of the aggressor without prior conditions. To permit the Americans to violate that principle would mean opening the way to oppression and plunder; countries would be obliged to negotiate with the imperialists and neo-colonialists on the "partitioning" of their independence, their territory and their natural resources. Cambodia, for its part, was determined to ensure its survival and could not tolerate a return to the law of the jungle; it would therefore continue to fight for observance of the principles of non-intervention, non-aggression and the self-determination of peoples and for the strict application of international law and international agreements.

49. Mr. KATENGA (Malawi) said that international peace and security depended on strict compliance with the United Nations Charter by all Member States; he cited in that connexion Article 2, paragraphs 1 and 4, of the Charter. It was because of the obligations embodied in that Article that the President of Malawi had deplored one of the resolutions adopted at the Tricontinental Conference, whose sponsors had arrogated to themselves the right to interfere in the internal affairs of African countries whose leaders and Governments they did not like. Malawi felt that it was for the people of each African country to decide what kind of government it wanted and that outside interference was intolerable. That was why it opposed colonialism, which prevented the indigenous population from determining its own future.

50. In conclusion, he wished to recall a statement made by the President of Malawi in April 1964, in which he had defined the policy of his Government as discretionary alignment and neutralism. He had said that when the West was doing what he thought was the right thing—what was good for Malawi—he would align himself and his country with the West. When the East was doing the right thing—what he thought was good for Malawi—he would align himself and his country with the East. But when either one or the other did something wrong—something that was only in its own interest and not in the interest of Malawi—then they would part company.

51. Mr. VAKIL (Iran) reviewed the development of the principle of non-intervention from its origin, which coincided with the emergence of the modern State, to the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX). It was a matter for regret that the basic provisions of that resolution had not been unanimously observed and that, as was clear from the debate, intervention in the external and domestic

affairs of States was a major characteristic of mid-twentieth-century international relations. Consequently, the Soviet Union's initiative in placing the item on the agenda had been useful, as had the debate in the First Committee. It had afforded an opportunity to explore a number of basic issues and to identify existing and impending dangers. By focusing attention on modes of conduct contrary to the principle of non-intervention, the debate might have served to induce second thoughts. It was not enough to speak loudly in defence of a principle when that verbal approbation was followed by deeds which flouted the injunctions of the United Nations Charter.

52. The task before the United Nations was to help bridge the gulf between principle and expediency; that meant that it must approach the problem of non-intervention by introducing legal restraints into the conduct of international policies. The time had come to give the Declaration the status of a normative declaration of law tempering the modes of political behaviour and the ambitions of States. Perhaps the work of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States would contribute to the attainment and exact definition of that aim.

53. The Declaration adopted at the previous session was comprehensive and general in character, condemning intervention not only in its traditional forms but in the guise of indirect interference in domestic affairs also. The anxiety expressed by a number of representatives should have given the Committee a clear idea of the realities of subversive intervention. His delegation was speaking from experience in underlining that danger and emphasizing the necessity of coping with it. The least that the Committee could do at the present time was to recommend to the General Assembly that it should include in any resolution it adopted a specific condemnation of that and other types of indirect intervention. Otherwise it ran the risk of lessening the scope and solemnity of the historic document adopted in 1965.

54. Mr. Orhan ERALP (Turkey), exercising the right of reply, said that the Cypriot representative had tried to present the Cyprus question as coming within the scope of the item now before the Committee and as a simple problem of self-determination. He wished to reiterate in that connexion that the Cyprus question was not a case of intervention in a State's domestic affairs. It was a conflict between two communities, one of which was intriguing with a view to union with Greece. Cyprus had in fact exercised its right to self-determination; since the island's independence, however, one of the two communities had constantly striven to end that independence. Moreover, the treaties concerning Cyprus had been freely negotiated by the parties concerned, which had acceded to them of their own free will. They had been signed by the President of the Republic of Cyprus and were therefore valid instruments in international law.

55. He explained that he had spoken not in order to reply to any charges directed against his country, but in order to restate the facts regarding the international treaties to which Turkey was a party.

56. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) replied that it was not a question of intrigues by one of the two communities



with a view to union with Greece. The problem of union with or separation from that country was a matter for the Cypriots themselves. It was for them to decide it by exercising their right of self-determination. The Turkish representative declared that that right had in fact been exercised by the Cypriots. It might be wondered just when it had been exercised, since treaties had been imposed on the Cypriot people and the Constitution of Cyprus had never been ratified by a freely elected legislative body; that Constitution was in fact nothing more than a charter that had been imposed upon the Cypriots. The Turkish representative had stated that the treaties concerning Cyprus were valid as they had been concluded in full freedom. When a country was under foreign domination, how could it freely negotiate treaties? Furthermore, the text of those treaties was itself in conflict with the United Nations Charter; those instruments were not valid under international law and were void *ab initio* under Article 103 of the Charter since they violated the principles of equal rights and self-determination, sovereign equality, non-intervention and the prohibition of the use of force.

57. He wished to emphasize that he had had no intention in his previous statement of criticizing or blaming anyone.

58. Mr. LOPEZ VILLAMIL (Honduras), exercising the right of reply, said that in his statement at the 1474th meeting, to which the Cambodian representative had referred, he had wished to indicate the measures taken by the Organization of American States (OAS) and by members of that organization against the participants in the Tricontinental Conference. One such measure was referred to on pages 65 and 66 of volume I of the report submitted by the Special Committee of OAS,<sup>3/</sup> where it was stated that on 6 May 1966 the Argentine representative had informed the OAS Committee that his Government had withdrawn the *agrément* given the year before to accredit Mr. Huot Sambath as Ambassador of Cambodia to Buenos Aires, because he had participated in the Tricontinental Conference as head of the Cambodian delegation. It was also noted in the report that Mr. Huot Sambath had not yet presented his credentials when the decision was taken.

59. For the rest, he would not reply to the remarks the Cambodian representative had made about the Central American countries, since he felt that the representative of such a distant country was not in a

position to form a sound judgement on their history. He would merely thank the Cambodian representative for expressing the hope that no Power would intervene in the domestic affairs of the Latin American countries, and he expressed the same hope with respect to Cambodia.

60. Mr. PANYARACHUN (Thailand), exercising the right of reply, said that his country sincerely desired to find ways and means of relaxing the international atmosphere and, in particular, its own relations with Cambodia. The Thai Government had always followed that policy and would continue to do so in future. The fact that Thailand had not raised the question of Cambodia did not mean that it had no complaints to make in that regard. However, since the discussions in the Committee could do nothing to restore normal relations between the two countries, it was regrettable that the Thai delegation should be obliged to reply to the Cambodian representative. The latter had referred to the incidents taking place on the frontiers of Cambodia and Thailand. Whatever the problems involved were, they were not the fault of Thailand; the activities against Thailand had been going on for many years and his country was compelled to act in self-defence. As for the allegation that anti-Cambodian propaganda was being broadcast by a Thai radio station, it was only necessary to listen to official Cambodian broadcasts to realize that they were disseminating propaganda against Thailand.

61. The Thai Minister for Foreign Affairs, speaking in Bangkok on 2 June 1966, had stressed that his country had no claims on Cambodian territory and was prepared to comply with the provisions of the treaty signed with France before the independence of Cambodia. The facts showed that Cambodia, for its part, had committed acts of aggression and provocation against Thailand. The Cambodian Head of State had himself confirmed in March 1966 that Cambodia had laid mines on Thai territory. The Thai Government, for its part had repeatedly declared its readiness unconditionally to restore normal relations with Cambodia.

62. With regard to the role of Cambodia and of its representatives at the Tricontinental Conference in Havana, he need only point out that a Cambodian diplomat who had taken part in that Conference had met with a refusal by one Latin American country to accept his credentials and had made it necessary for another Latin American country to close its diplomatic mission in Pnom-Penh.

*The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.*

<sup>3/</sup> See foot-note 1.